Support to HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, Spring 2002

Presentation to 19 ISMORJohn Sharpe

Head OA HQ Land Command

Support to HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, Spring 2002

Presentation to 19 ISMORJohn Sharpe

Head OA HQ Land Command

Timeline

Campaign v Taliban & AQ

ISAF Planning

ISAF Deployment

Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul

Analyst 1

Analyst 2

Analyst 3

Analyst 4Handover

to Turkey

Bonn

•Dealing with extreme climatic conditions•Basic wash facilities•Worse food than mess food•Bottled water•Keeping fit•Motivation•Having fun!

Living Conditions 1.

Living Conditions 2

Working Conditions

Reachback

Historical Analysis Team QinetiQ

OA CellIn-Theatre

Initial Response & Coordination of Reachback Tasks

HQ LandBase Team

Dstl

Frontline “PCS (was HLS)Air Systems

- Farnborough- Portsdown- Farnborough- Farnborough

Mortar School Army

RAF Waddington AWC

Summary of Work

Pre-Deployment

Deployed Team 1 (Feb-Apr)

Deployed Team 2(Apr-Jun)

• Measures of Success • Target Audience Analysis (TAA)» Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Model• J2 Database• APOD Threat Analysis• Medical Statistics and Blood Data

» Measures of Success» Target Audience Analysis (TAA)• Fuel Utilisation Calculator (FUC)• Blood Donor Analysis• APOD Threat Analysis• ISAF News• Statistical Advice and Explanation• Data Collection and Canvassing of Cells

• Historical Analysis Review• Troops to Task» Strategic Lift• Sustainment

Strategic Lift

Strategic Lift Few a/c equipped

Few Aircrew trained

Air routes under threat

Nighttime flying

Evasive routing

Sanitise approach & transit routes

Teeth

Runways constrained

Little offload space

EngineersAirfields damaged & Contaminated

EODClear

Repair

Move material Transport

Roads under threat

Movement Constrained

Teeth & Transport

Escorted Convoys

HQ areas Contaminated

Little living & storage space

Clear

Construct Engineers

EOD

Political Imperative

TeethVisible Presence

Patrol

EOD and Lift Model

Engineering Capacity

Aircraft HandlingCapacity

Aircraft Arrival

Rate

Storage Capacity

Transport Capacity

Onward Movement

Rate

Materiel at Airhead

Materiel at Destination

Storage Capacity

Sustainability Lift Model

Sustainment Requirement

Aircraft Arrival

Rate

Forces in Theatre

Force Arrival

Rate

DEPLOYMENT TIMES

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Days Base Case

Generic a/c per day

Resupply Flights (Generic a/c)

Measurement of Success

Schematic Overview of Campaign PlanSchematic Overview of Campaign PlanPHASE II - FOC

Security Assistance

ISAF Coherence

Infrastructure/

Humanitarian Sp

DP4

DP5

DP9

DP11

DP16

DP8

DP1 DP15

DP10 DP21

DP19

Strategic CofG

Coherence of IA

OPEndstate

StrategicEndstate

PHASE III - Further Assistance

DP1 Reassurance Patrolling/Deter DP1 Reassurance Patrolling/Deter ViolenceViolenceDP2 Force Protection/SustainmentDP2 Force Protection/SustainmentDP3 ContractorisationDP3 ContractorisationDP4 International Sp for ISAF/DP4 International Sp for ISAF/JCB for IA/ISAF CohesionJCB for IA/ISAF CohesionDP5 De-Militarised KabulDP5 De-Militarised KabulDP6 Factional and Tribal ToleranceDP6 Factional and Tribal Tolerance

DP7 ISAF acceptance(IA/Pop)DP7 ISAF acceptance(IA/Pop)DP8 Open KIADP8 Open KIADP9 Power/Water/Sanitation/MedDP9 Power/Water/Sanitation/MedDP10 DPs relocatedDP10 DPs relocatedDP11 Sp Neutralisation of anti-IADP11 Sp Neutralisation of anti-IAFaction ThreatFaction ThreatDP12 Functioning Judiciary DP12 Functioning Judiciary DP13 New Afghan Security StructuresDP13 New Afghan Security Structures

DP14 Local Sp for ISAFDP14 Local Sp for ISAFDP15 DDR ProgrammeDP15 DDR ProgrammeDP16 Structural Development DP16 Structural Development DP17 Manage ExpectationsDP17 Manage ExpectationsDP18 Force Transition to FOFDP18 Force Transition to FOFDP19 Reformed Armed ForcesDP19 Reformed Armed ForcesDP20 Functional Police ForceDP20 Functional Police ForceDP21 Inter Theatre Land LOC SpDP21 Inter Theatre Land LOC SpDP22 Loya JirgaDP22 Loya Jirga

DP3

Political /Legal

Security

of Kabul

DP7

DP6

DP14 DP18

DP20

DP2

DP12 DP13 DP17 DP22

Financial

Data Types & SourcesPatrolling - Numbers - Patrol Reports

- Duration

Policing - Number of patrols - HQ KMNB

Crime - Numbers - RMP- Types - IA Police- Rest of World - Reachback

Military - Sightings- Vehicle Movements - HQ KMNB- Barracks in use- EOD data

Medical - DNBI - HQ ISAF- Types - Clinic data

CIMIC - Projects Completed - HQ KMNB

Use of KIA - Flights - Airfield Staff

Commerce - Vehicle Movements - HQ KMNB

Crime by Time (as at end of APR 02)

Reported Crime Statistics for Kabul

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

23-Jan 30-Jan 6-Feb 13-Feb 20-Feb 27-Feb 6-Mar 13-Mar 20-Mar 27-Mar 3-Apr 10-Apr 17-Apr 24-Apr

No

. O

f R

ep

ort

ed

Off

en

ce

s

Murders

Armed Robberies

Serious Crimes

Felonies

Perceived fall in reported crime since the implementation of ISAF/IA Police Joint Patrols

Lack of reporting

Week Beginning (2002)

Fall in murder and robbery

Unexplained increase

Headline Murder Rate

62 3

27

51

5

18 18

27

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Kabul(CurrentEstimate)

London Berlin Chicago WashingtonDC

Ankara Karachi Moscow Pretoria

Afghanistan Europe United States Asia & Africa

Average Annual Reported Murder Rate per 100,000 Population

Data from UK Home Office 97-99 and UN HABITAT Global Urban Indicators98

Extrapolated from IA Central Police Records

Target Audience Analysis

Info OpsInfo OpsMedia products to convey ISAF’s message to the people of Kabul :

• ISAF Newspaper• ISAF Radio• ISAF TV• ISAF Loudspeakers• ISAF Leaflets

They wished to measure to measure Kabuli’s attitudes and the penetration of these ISAF media products.

Dropboxes For & AgainstDropboxes For & AgainstFor:

• can use to distribute other material - leaflets & newspapers• questionnaires available to all• no pressure or time limits for completion• cheap & easy to make collections• facilitates comparison of police districts• potentially large samples

Against:• security & safety issues• multiple entries by individuals• collusion• problems with illiterate people• possible access problems (location vital)

1st ISAF Info Box, Spin Kalay, Police District 9

Summary of Conclusions:

• Presence of ISAF soldiers & ISAF media products well received by the majority of Kabulis.

• Most Kabulis believe the security situation has improved.

• There is a good understanding of the ISAF mission.

• Gaps in knowledge have been identified.

• TAA is enabling targeting of Info Ops products.

Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Model

Initial Reception

• Wow! Great! Brilliant!

• Must show this to the COS

• “Mentioned in dispatches”

• You guys don’t have anything better to do?

• Is this another game?

Concluding Remarks

Lessons• Simple is good, speed of response is paramount• The earlier OA is involved the better the payoff:

• Need to get the MOS-type studies underway early in order to shape them and establish data collection

• Expect the utility of OA to continue throughout the operation - providing analysts are on-hand

• Reach back is great but still need deployed OA

• OA team often of value to HQ as source of semi-expert IT:• Continues to be the case even with increased “IT literacy” in HQ

• Many tasks IT-based rather than true OA

• OA standalone PC kit often in demand

• Expertise with MS Office applications underlies much of our utility

• Standalone nature demands IT ability within the team

Use of OA Outputs

• GOC/COS• Interim

Administration

• Foreign Ministers

• Visiting Senior Military

• Media Ops• Info Ops / Psy Ops• UK – longer term

campaign monitoring• Pte Bloggs!