ttumfc, 37685 4093

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the itfh of AUGUST, 1946

by• Registered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 14 AUGUST, 1946

The War Office,August, 1946.

DESPATCH ON OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, EAST SYRIA AND IRAN,FROM IOTH APRIL, 1941 TO I2TH JANUARY, 1942.

The following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War, on i&th October,1942, by GENERAL.SIR ARCHIBALD P.WAVELL, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., Com-mander-ifr-Chief, India.

DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO IRAQ.1. Events in Iraq, in early April, 1941, led

to a decision by His Majesty's Government todespatch a force to Iraq as rapidly as possible,and on 8th April a telegram from the Secretaryof State for .India was received enquiring ifthe Government of India could make availablea suitable force to occupy Basra as early aspossible.

2. Detailed plans for the despatch of a forceto Iraq had been under preparation at ArmyHeadquarters, India, for some time but onaccount of commitments elsewhere it had notbeen found possible to provide the necessarytroops before July, 1941.

4 In order to meet the request of His Majesty'sGovernment, and in view of the urgency ofthe situation, it was therefore decided to divertto Iraq a convoy which was at that time inthe process of embarking at Karachi prior tosailing for Malaya. It was hoped at the sametime that the diversion of this convoy wouldconceal the fact that troops were beingdespatched to Iraq.

This proposal was communicated to HisMajesty's Government on gth April andaccepted by them on loth April. The forcein this convoy, which was under the commandof Major^General W. A. K. Eraser, C.B.,C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., Commandeiloth Indian Division, consisted of two seniorStaff Officers, Headquarters loth Indian Divi-sion Artillery, 3rd Field Regiment, 20th IndianInfantry Brigade and certain ancillary troops.

3. Instructions were given to Major-GeneralFraser to the following effect:—

(i) The object of his force was to occupythe Basra-Shaiba area in order to ensure thesafe disembarkation of further reinforcementsand to enable a base to be established inthat area.

(ii) The attitude of the Iraq Army andlocal authorities was still uncertain and itwas .possible that attempts might be madeto oppose the disembarkation of his force.In framing his plan for disembarkation, hewas, therefore, to act in the closest concertwith the officer commanding the NavalForces.

(iii) Should the disembarkation beopposed, he was to overcome the Iraqi forcesby force and occupy suitable defensive posi-tions ashore as quickly as possible.

(iv) The greatest care was to be takennot to infringe the neutrality of Iran.4. The force sailed from Karachi on I2th

April and a period of considerable anxietyensued as to whether the landing would beopposed or not. As the force had originallybeen prepared for despatch to Malaya it hadnot 'been specially embarked with a view toimmediate tactical employment on arrival atdestination, and consequently a risk wasaccepted in diverting it to Iraq where anopposed landing was by no means impossible.In view of the necessity for speed there wasno time to readjust the loading of units, whichwould have caused a delay of some days.

5. In addition to the troops proceeding bysea, 400 personnel of the ist Bn. King's OwnRoyal Regiment were flown from Karachi toShaiba. The arrival of the first air party wastimed to synchronise with the arrival of the

4094 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946

convoy. . Troop-carry ing aircraft used were 7R.A.F. Valentias .and 4 Atala-ntas supple-mented -by 4 D.C. 2's which had recentlyarrived in India.

6. The seaborne force arrived at Basra with-out incident on i8th April and by the eveningof igth April the disembarkation was com-pleted. All evidence indicates that tihe rapiditywith which British forces arrived in Iraq cameas a surprise to Rashid Ali and his supportersand probably accounts for the fact that noorganised resistance was encountered pn arrival.The initial advantage thus gained undoubtedlyhad an important bearing on the subsequentoperations.

7. The naval vessels covering the operationconsisted! erf H.M.S. Emerald, H.M.S. Fal-mouth, H.M.S. Cockchafer, H.M.S. Seabelle..H.M.I.S. Lawrence and H.M.A.S. Yarra. Theconvoy, composed of 8 transports escorted byH.M.A.S. Yarra, was met at sea by H.M.S.Seabelle from Basra on the morning of I5tihApril. Later in the day the escort was re-inforced -by H.M.S. Falmouth who -becameS.O. (Escort). On I7th April the convoy wasjoined by H.M.I.S. Lawrence and proceededtowards the entrance of the Shat-el-Arab. Thefollowing day the convoy moved up the Shat-el-Arab and arrived at Basra at 0930 hrs.H.M.S. Emerald was already in Basra.

The movement in the Shat-el-Arab wasmade in two Sections, each Section being pre-ceded by two warships:—

Section I—Cockchafer and Falmouth.Section II—Yarra and Seabelle.

Lawrence remained to mask the ControlBattery at Fao, while Emerald was at Basrathroughout the operation.

8. On 2ist April the Iraq Government form-ally agreed to the arrival of the British troopsin Iraq under certain conditions: the principalstipulations being that no further troops shouldland before those who had already arrived hadcrossed the frontier out of Iraq, and that atno time should British troops in Iraq exceedone mixed Brigade. However, although theIraq Government was adamant on this ques-tion and the situation remained very tense,further British ancillary troops disembarkedat Basra without incident on 2Qth April.

9. On 7th May, Lieut.-General E. P. Quinan,C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., arrived in Basraby air from India and took over command ofall British land forces in Iraq from Major-General Fraser, who resumed command of theloth Indian Infantry Division. On the samedate a small Force Headquarters also disem-barked, together with the Headquarters of theloth Indian Infantry Division and the aistIndian Infantry Brigade.

10. The directive which was issued to Lieut.-General Quinan on 2nd May instructed him tocommand all British Empire land forces inIraq and stated that it was the intention ofHis Majesty's Government to:—

(a) develop and organise the port of Basrato any extent necessary to enable such forces,our own or Allied, as might be required tooperate in the Middle East including Egypt,Turkey, Iraq and Iran, to be maintained.

(6) secure control of all means of com-munication, including all aerodromes andlanding grounds in Iraq, and develop these

to the extent requisite to enable the Port ofBasra to function to its fullest capacity.Lt. General Quinan was further instructed

to begin at once to plan a system of defencesto protect the Basra Base against attack byarmoured forces supported by strong air forces,and also to be ready to take special measuresto protect:—

(i) Royal Air Force installations and per-sonnel at Habbaniya and Shaiba.

(ii) The lives of British subjects inBaghdad and elsewhere in Iraq.

(iii) The Kirkuk oilfields and the pipeline to Haifa.He was also to make plans to protect the

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's installations andits British employees in South West Iran ifnecessary.

He was informed that it was the intention toincrease his force up to three infantry divisionsand possibly also an armoured division, as soonas these troops could be despatched from India.

Operations—May, 1941.11. The first hostile move -by the Iraq

forces occurred on 30th April, when twoinfantry brigades of the Iraq Army, supportedby Artillery and some armoured cars, beganconcentrating around Habbaniya and trainingtheir guns on the Camp, thereby constitutinga direct threat to the British Cantonment there.A demand for the withdrawal of these troopswas refused by the Iraqi Commander, whostated that no normal training was to be carriedout from Habbaniya, and that fire would beopened on aircraft or troops leaving the Camp.Hostilities broke out on 2nd May and theRoyal Air Force station was shelled in'ter-mittently until 5th May. The Camp was alsobombed and machine-gunned by the Iraqi AirForce. The Royal Air Force bombed the Iraqipositions ^coring many direct hits on thedrguns, armoured cars and machine gun posts.During this period also the Royal Air Force,despite the fact that the aerodrome was oftenunder heavy fire, successfully evacuated byair to Basra a large number of women andchildren, who had been sent from Baghdad toHabbaniya when the situation at the formerplace became threatening. (The remainder ofthe British population of Baghdad were accom-modated either in the British Embassy or theAmericas Legation throughout the period ofOperations.)

12. The situation at Habbaniya daily becamemore critical as, due to the persistent bombingof the landing 'grounds, we lost a number ofaircraft and, although ist Bn. King's OwnRoyal Regiment were brought up from Shaibaby air as reinforcements, the garrison was con-siderably outnumbered. In the meantime,Iraqi troops had occupied Rutbah, and by 3rdMay all the refineries and oil installations werein their hands. There were at the time in-sufficient forces at our disposal to drive themout. On 6th May Colonel O. L. Robertsassumed command of Habbaniya.

13. A situation had now developed in Iraqwhich was not that which was visualised whenoperational control had been delegated to theCommander-in^Chief, India. The despatch ofadditional troops from India to res-tore thesituation could not be effected in sufficienttime, and His Majesty's Government thereforedecided that operational control should pass

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946

temporarily to Middle East Command fromwhence only immediate assistance could beprovided. The Comrnander-in-Chief, MiddleEast, consequently assumed operational con-trol of Northern Iraq from 5th May andSouthern Iraq from o,th May, and was in-structed 'by His Majesty's Government todespatch such/ immediate .assistance as waspossible. In view of this, arrangements wereput in hand to assemble in Palestine a smallmechanized force of all arms, which at thattime was all that could be spared. This forceconsisted of an incomplete mechanised cavalrybrigade, a field regiment less one troop, threesquadrons Trans-Jordan Frontier Force andist Bn. The Essex Regiment; it arrived atHaifobaniya on i8th May.

14. On 6th May, however, our forces atHabbaniya succeeded in clearing the plateauwhich overlooked the cantonment at shortrange and in doing so captured 26 Iraqi officersand 408 other ranks, together with a consider-able amount of equipment. Our own losseswere slight, but our aircraft inflicted (veryheavy casualties on the remainder of the Iraqi-force as it withdrew in disorder towardsFallujah. It was evident that the moraleof the Iraqi troops had been seriouslyaffected by the attacks which had beenmade on them from the air. In thisoperation ist Bn. King's Own Royal Regimentplayed a prominent part, and the Iraqi levies,who were normally stationed at Habbaniya andconsisted mostly of Assyrians, gave our troopswhole-hearted support.

15. In the Basra area no major operationstook .place. The principal difficulty was that,to start with, there were insufficient troops to

' take over Maqil, Ashar and Basra City con-currently. The airport, dock area and powerstation at Maqil were occupied, but althoughthe Iraqi troops in Basra agreed to withdrawon 2nd May, they failed to do so. When, evenafter the time limit had been extended, theyfailed to comply, action by bomibing andartillery fire was taken against them whereuponthey immediately withdrew northwards, alongthe West bank of the River Tigris .aboveQurmat Ali and towards Qurna. The onlyother action of any importance in the Basraarea occurred on 7th May, when our troopsoccupied Ashar, the business quarter of Basra,after encountering slight opposition from someIraqi police and armed civilians.

16. In the meantime, following the engage-ment with the enemy at Habbaniya on 6th May,there was little land fighting until iQth May,when our troops, in company with the mechan-ised force from Palestine, • occupied Fallujah•after nearly a whole day's fighting. Duringthis operation, an air-iborne detachment waslanded in rear of the enemy position. Mean-while, the Royal Air Force operating fromHabbaniya, had been busily engaged attack-ing Iraqi aerodromes and other military objec-tives, with such success that 'by 8th May theIraqi Air Forces had ibeen practically eliminated.On I2th May, German aircraft were first re-ported in Iraq, and after that date encounterstook place almost daily between our aircraftand German M.E.no's, casualties being sus-tained by both sides. On 2Qth May, Italianaircraft were also in action near Baghdad,

4095

17. In the meanwhile, Rashid Ali and manyof his principal supporters had fled thecountry and the Iraqis asked for an armistice.This was signed at Baghdad at 1500 hrs. on3ist May. It was followed by rioting and loot-ing in Baghdad.

Advance to Baghdad18. Shortly before this it had become ap.par-

ent that it was essential to get troops forwardfrom Basra to gain control of the situation atBaghdad and also to open up communicationsbetween Basra and Habbaniya. To effect this,2nd Battalion 4th Ghurkha Rifles -were movedfrom Basra to Habbaniya iby air and a columnwas despatched from Shaiba towards Baghdadby the Euphrates route. This column, whichconsisted of 2Oth Indian Infantry BrigadeGroup, advanced from Shailba on 27thMay along the line of the railway, brushingaside slight opposition encountered near Ur.The advance from Fallujah was slow owing toextensive inundations, and the Brigade wasunable to reach Samawa until loth June andBaghdad on I2th June. The Iraqis had doneconsiderable damage to the railway track, re-moving hundreds of sleepers and destroyingessential installations at the stations. Recon-struction was carried out rapidly, and the linewas re-opened to traffic on gth June.

19. Although the progress of the 2oth IndianInfantry Brigade Group^was slow, preparationswere well in hand for another force to advanceiby the Tigris. This force, under BrigadierWeld,' Commander 2ist Indian InfantryBrigade, was to proceed 'by river to Kut andthence by motor transport to Baghdad. • Allavailable barges and steamers were collected,;many 'from up-river, and the barges decked soas to take motor transport, guns and armouredcars. These plans were made in conjunctionwith the Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf(Commodore C. M. Graham, R.N.), and theconvoy sailed on I2th June under commandof a Naval Officer and with naval escort. Themilitary force consisted of 2ist Indian InfantryBrigade (less two battalions), two troops ofI3th Lancers (armoured cars), one troop 157Field Regt. and ancillary units. It reachedKut on I7th June and Baghdad on igth-Jmie.This move up the Tigris had a most salutaryeffect on the tribes along the route, who,according to reports, were likely to. be verytroublesome and actively hostile.

Occupation of Mosul20. No time had been lost in despatching

troops to Mosul, where pro-Axis influence 'wasmuch in evidence. A small mobile column,consisting of one Squadron Household Cavalrywith two 3-7-in. howitzers and six Royal AirForce armoured cars, was formed and this leftfor Mosul by road, arriving on 3rd June. Twocompanies 2nd Battalion 4th Ghurkha Rifles,together with a Royal Air Force detachment,went iby air from Hafobaniya to Mosul on 3rdJune; the remainder of the Battalion reachedMosul by air next day. In addition, ist Bat-talion King's Own Royal Regiment from •Hab-baniya left Baghdad on 2nd June and arrivedon 3rd June. The 2oth Indian InfantryBrigade arrived in Baghdad via the RiverEuphrates route from Basra on i2th June anddetachments were sent without delay to Kirkuk,Haditha, Rutbah, Fallujah and (Mosul in order

4096 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946

to release troops who had come from Palestineand Transjordan.

21. On i8th June Lt.-General Quinanassumed command of all land forces in Iraqwhich were still under General Headquarters,Middle East.

Advance into Syria22. It was decided that assistance in the

Syrian Campaign should take precedence overall other tasks in Iraq, and that this assistanceshould consist of: —

(i) Protection of the railway from Iraq toTurkey where it ran through Syrian Terri-tory.

(ii) The advance into Syria from Iraq oftwo Indian Infantry Brigade Groups.Arrangements were put in hand for Haditha

to be stocked with 15 days supplies and petrolfor two infantry brigade groups (lorry-borne),one armoured car regiment, and one squadronRoyal Air Force.

Orders -were issued for the 2ist Indian Infan-try Brigade Group at Baghdad, the 25thIndian Infantry Brigade Group and the I3thLancers at Basra to advance up the EuphratesValley and the 2ist Brigade (Brigadier C. J.Weld) to protect the Line of CommunicationsHaditha-Deir-ez-Zor.

The operation forward of Haditha was to becontrolled by the General Officer CommandingPalestine and Transjordan, and to facilitate thisthe loth Indian Division was ordered to providean Advanced Headquarters.

The governing factor was the provision ofmotor transport for troop-carrying and formaintenance. Only one and a half GeneralPurpose Transport Companies were availableand these were employed together with the2nd Line Transport of all infantry brigadesexcept the 24th Indian Infantry Brigade atBasra.

Three more General Purpose Transport Com-panies were due to sail from India on 25thJune. Neither Headquarters Palestine andTransjordan nor the Royal Air Force in Iraqcould assist with motor transport, strenuouseffort was therefore made to hire the necessarycivilian transport to make up the seriousdeficiency until the arrival of the three com-panies from India. It was now necessary toget troops into Deir-ez-Zor as soon as practic-able, and orders to this effect were given toLt.-General Quinan.

23. The situation at the time was that tihe2ist Indian Infantry Brigade, less twobattalions, had arrived in Baghdad via theTigris^ route on igth June. Of the other twobattalions of that Brigade one was in Mosul:and the other en route Basra-Baghdad. Ordershad been issued on 20th June for the moveby road of 25th Indian Infantry Brigade to-gether with tihe I3th Lancers from Basra toBaghdad, using all available motor transport.

Every effort was therefore made to acceleratethe concentration of one brigade group of theloth Indian Division at Haditha. A battalionof the 20th Brigade was sent forward to Mosul4>y road and rail to relieve the other battalionof 2ist Brigade, which was to proceed toHaditha.

In order to facilitate stocking at Haditha andto achieve surprise it was essential to keepback the 2ist Indian Infantry Brigade Groupin the Baglhdad-Habbaniya area.

24. On 22nd June, one Infantry Battalion,less one company, and one Squadron I3thLancers moved to Haditha with orders to cap-ture Abu Kemal, known to be occupied bysome French troops and rebel Iraqis. Thetransport situation made a -move forward fromAbu Kemal before 2gth June impossible.

2ist Indian Infantry Brigade was concen-trated at Abu Kemal by 30th June, including2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles from Mosuland the I3th Lancers. The advance from AbuKemal began on ist July with 2ist BrigadeGroup leading.

Advanced Headquarters loth Indian Divi-sion arrived at Abu Kemal on the evening of3Oth June and operational command of thecolumn passed to the General Officer Com-manding Palestine and Transjordan at 2400 hrs.30th June.

25. Meanwhile a small force had been pre-pared at Mosul for operations in the Bee duCanard to clear the area Qamichliye—Hassetche—Ras el Ain of Vichy troops and secure theuse of the railway as far as the Turkish frontiernear Nisibin. The operations were designedto attack the northern flank of the Frenchtroops in the Jezireh and to establish a threattowards Aleppo.

Another column, consisting of one infantrybattalion and detachments of other arms,moving from Mosul arrived at Souar on theRiver Khabur, 30 miles North-East of Deir-ez-Zor, as loth Indian Division approachedthe latter town.

The 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, less twobattalions (2nd Battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles inthe Kirkuk area and 2nd Battalion 8th GurkhaRifles with detachments at Baghdad, Rutbaihand on the pipe line) was already in Mosul'with the ist Battalion King's Own RoyalRegiment under command. As it was essentialfor security reasons to leave at least onebattalion in the Mosul area and to protect thepipe line and oil installations, the iyth IndianInfantry Brigade ('Brigadier D. D. Gracey)—less one battalion—was moved to Mosul fromBasra, leaving the equivalent of one infantrybrigade in the Basra area. The move beganon 25th June and concentration at Mosul wascompleted by 6th July.

A column consisting of two companies istBattalion i2tih Frontier Force Regiment andone section 3rd Field Regiment and three RoyalAir Force Armoured cars, under command ofMajor P. T. Clarke, ist Battalion I2th FrontierForce Regiment, moved forward from Mosulon the night 2nd/3rd July with orders tooccupy Tell Kotcheck, seize the railway androlling stock up to that station and preventsabotage of the railway line. Complete sur-prise was achieved and the French Garrisonof Tell Kotcheck decamped.

On 4th July, the remainder of ist Battalioni2th Frontier Force Regiment reached TellKotcheck and on the night 4th/5th July theadvance began. Tell Aalo together with itsgarrison was captured without loss on 5th July.

On 6th July the 32nd Field Regiment andone company 5th Battalion, I3th Frontier ForceRifles arrived at Tell Aalo and on 7th Julyat 0500 hrs. the advance on Qamichliye wascontinued. A column consisting of one com-pany infantry, one troop artillery and threeRoyal Air Force armoured cars deployed infront of Qamichliye at about 1000 hrs. and

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946 4097

shortly afterwards our troops took possessionof the town. The railway and all railway in-.stallations up to the Turkish frontier had -beencaptured intact as well as several bridges whichhad .been prepared for demolition.

On 8th July, a column was sent to captureHassetche, the seat of the local Government,in the Bee du Canard. Here the French de-cided not to fight and the town and fort wereoccupied without opposition.

On gth July Ras el Ain was found to beclear of French troops. Lack of motor trans-port made furtiher advance impossible. 5thBattalion I3th Frontier Force Rifles thereforeremained in occupation of the Bee du Canardcovering the railway and the remainder of thecolumn returned to Mosul on I4th July.

26. On return, of the Headquarters of I7thIndian Infantry Brigade to Mosul, the Head-quarters of the aoth Indian Infantry Brigademoved to Baghdad, being better placed thereto control its detachments dispersed in theoilfields and on the Kirkuk-Haifa pipe line.

The loth Indian Division (less 20th IndianInfantry Brigade) remained in Syria until re-leased for operations in Iran, it reverted tocommand of the General Officer CommandingTroops in Iraq on loth August. It was main-tained throughout from Iraq and this strainedto the utmost the very limited resources inmotor transport.

Reversion of Command to India and issue ofRevised Directive.

27. Meanwhile, in view of the collapse ofthe Rashid Ali regime and the improved situa-tion in Iraq, His Majesty's Government con-sidered that control of the operations' shouldrevert to India as soon as possible as she hada greater interest and stake in them. It wastherefore decided that the Commander-in-Chief, India, should take over control of allland forces in Iraq as soon as he was able tomeet the administrative commitment.

At 0300 hrs. on i8th June the control ofoperations in Iraq passed back to the Com-mander-in-Chief, India, and Lieut.-GeneralQuinan took over command of all the landforces in that area.

On 5th July, General Sir Claude Auchinleck,who until then had been Commander-in-Chief,India, became Commander-in-Chief, MiddleEast Forces, in succession to General SirArchibald Wavell, who took up the appoint-ment of Commahder-in-Chief, India, on nthJuly.

28. The outbreak of war between Germanyand Russia and the conclusion of operationsin Syria resulted in a changed situation inIraq. A revised directive was therefore issuedto Lt. General Quinan on 2Qth July. The in-structions contained in this directive were tothe following effect:—

(i) Lt. General Quinan was instructed thathis object in general was to hold NorthernIraq against any' enemy attack developingthrough Turkey and/or Iran, and to developfacilities for the maintenance and employ-ment in Iraq of- a force which might in cer-tain circumstances amount to ten divisions(some armoured) and thirty squadronsRoyal Air Force.

(ii) The operational boundary of BritishAk Force in Iraq was extended to includethe area in Syria East of a line adjoining

A 2

Eamichliye to a point where the road Mosul-Deir-ez-Zor crosses the Iraq-Syria frontier.

(iii) Lt. General Quinan was to submithis plans for holding the Northern Frontierof Iraq against hostile advance throughAnatolia or Iran. The construction of per-manent defences in this area was to be con-fined to denying, where possible, the main

• lines of approach by armoured fightingvehicles into Iraq from Turkey or Iran withthe object of slowing up an advance andforcing it into unsuitable country. Plans indetail were also to be prepared for an ad-vance into Turkish or Iranian territory inorder to seize defiles suitable for delayingaction and to carry out extensive demoli-tions.

(iv) A suitable force was to be held inreadiness to enable the occupation ofAbadan and Naft-i-Shah to be carried out atshort notice.

(v) Basra base was to be developed tomaintain ten divisions and thirty squadronsRoyal Air Force. Um Qasr and Koweit wereto be developed as subsidiary ports.

Situation in Iran.29. The policy to be adopted in view of the

unsatisfactory attitude of the Iranian Govern-ment to the representations made regarding theexpulsion of Axis nationals from Iran had beenunder consideration by His Majesty's Govern-ment and the Soviet Government during theearly weeks of July and on 22nd July Lt.General Quinan was instructed to be preparedto occupy Abadan and Naft-i-Shah and at alater date the oilfields in South West Iran.On 24th July intimation was received that HisMajesty's Government had approved of theproposals for the application of Anglo-Sovietdiplomatic pressure backed toy a show of forceon the Iranian Government in order to securethe expulsion of Axis nationals (from theircountry; should diplomatic pressure fail forcewas to be used.

Instructions were therefore issued (to Lt.General Quinan to make preliminary arrange-ments for:—

(i) The concentration of a striking forceon the Iranian Frontier in the Basra Areaof: —

One Indian Infantry Division.One mechanized cavalry brigade.Two Indian Armoured Regiments.To be supported by one Army Co-opera-

tion squadron R.A.F.The object of this force was to occupy

the oilfields and refinery at Abadan.(ii) The assembly of a naval/irttitary

force at the head of the Persian Gulf con-sisting of three or four sloops and two> com-panies of infantry, to occupy BandarShahpur and seize the port and shipping.Lt. General Quinan was informed that the

above forces were to be ready to move intoIran in the second week in August but thattroops "were not to be concentrated in the Basraarea until further orders were issued. He wasfurther instructed to be prepared to send asmall force to seize the Naft-i-Shah oilfields andto detail one infantry battalion for the occupa-tion of Bushire.

For the purpose of this operation the 4thCavalry Brigade (later'renamed Qth ArmouredBrigade) from Palestine had been placed at

4PQ.S SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946

the disposal of G.O.C. Iraq and Lt. GeneralQuinan was instructed to arrange for its trans-fer in direct communication with G.O.C.Palestine and Transjordan.

On 8th August Lt. General Quinan sub-mitted outline plans for action as follows:—

(a) 8th Indian Division (Major GeneralC. 0. Harvey).

(i) Seizure of Abadan Refinery at firstlight by the 24th Indian Infantry BrigadeGroup (Brigadier R. E. Le Fleming) lessone battalion, moving by the River Shatt-el-Arab and supported by the Royal Navy.

(ii) Seizure of Khurramshahr by onebattalion of -the 24th Indian InfantryBrigade supported by one Squadron Guides

. Cavalry, moving by land from Tanumah(opposite Basra).

(iii) Simultaneous advance by the 25thIndian Infantry Brigade Group (BrigadierR. G. Mountain) and the I3th Lancersfrom Tanumah to Ahwaz, thence to HaftKel oilfields with detachments to Kut

' Abdullah and Dorquain pumping stations.(iv) All moves supported by the Royal

Air Force after first light.(b) 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade

(Brigadier J. A. Aizlewood).Simultaneous seizure of Naft-i-Shah and

Qasr-i-Shirin, the latter mainly by the 14/20- Hussars.

On seizing Naft-i-Shah an advance wasto be made without delay to the Gilan areaand preparations to be made for a moveon to Shahabad preparatory to a generaladvance on Kermanshah. In the event ofthe latter being necessary the gth ArmouredBrigade (Brigadier W. R. Tiarks) was toparticipate. No air support could be made

• available unless stiff opposition wasencountered.

(c) The Bandar Shahpur operation was totake place simultaneously as planned. Twocompanies of the 2nd Battalion loth Baluch

• Regiment embarked on H.M.A.S. Kanimblaafter dark on nth August and sailed thatnight. The o,th Armoured Brigade fromPalestine arrived at Kirkuk and Khaniqinon nth August.

Operations in Iran.30. On 29th July intimation was received

<from .His Majesty's Government that a jointAnglo-Soviet note to Iran was to be presentedon I2th August. Lieut.-General Quinan wasinformed of this and was instructed to com-plete the preliminary concentration of ihis troopsby that date.

• 31. Lt.-General Quinan informed theGeneral Officer Commanding Palestine andTransjordan that he would require the QthArmoured Brigade, which, in order to achievea measure of surprise, he proposed to locateinitially at Kirkuk. He also ordered the follow-ing moves to be put in hand:—ijth Lancersfrom .Syria and one squadron Guides Cavalryto Shaiba to join the 8th Indian Division, 25thIndian Infantry Brigade, less one Battalion,from Syria to Shaiba. The 24th Indian In-fantry Brigade was already in the Shaiba-Basra area and the i8th Indian InfantryBrigade • due to arrive from India on lothAugust. This'completed the concentration ofthe 8th Indian Division.

The I4th/20th Hussars were to be employedin the Naft-i-Shah area.

32. Lt.-General Quinan decided to placeall operations in Southern Iran, including theseizure of Abadan, under Major-General C. O.Harvey, Commander 8th Indian Division.Operations in the Naft-i-Shah area were placedunder Brigadier J. A. Aizlewood, Commander2nd Indian Armoured Brigade, whose forcewas to consist of the 2nd Indian ArmouredBrigade Group (less two regiments), two IndianInfantry Battalions and one medium battery.

In addition, the following air componentwas made available for operations in SouthernIran, and was to be moved to Shaiba by I2thAugust.

One Army Co-operation Squadron(Vincent).

One Fighter Squadron (Hurricanes).One Bomber Squadron (Blenheims).Six Bomber Transport aircraft.

33. The presentation of the Anglo-Sovietnote was postponed more than once and it wasnot until I7th August that it was finally de-livered to the Iranian Government. On 2istAugust information was received from HisMajesty's Government that the reply to thememorandum had been unsatisfactory and thatan advance by joint Anglo-Soviet forces intoIran would probably commence on 22ndAugust. The necessary warning orders wereissued and gth Armoured Brigade was orderedto move to Khaniqin on 22nd August. Dueto representations by the Russian Governmenta further postponement was necessary and thefinal date for the advance was fixed for 25thAugust.

34. As the concentration of troops had beencompleted by I2th August, these many post-ponements decreased any chance of achievingsurprise and it was apparent that the IranianGovernment fully expected an early Britishadvance into Khuzistan and that reinforce-ments, including light and medium tanks, werebeing sent to Ahwaz.

The Iranian forces likely to oppose our ad-vance were estimated to be:—

In the Ahwaz-Abadan-Khurramshahr Area.6th Khuzistan Division.One composite Division, made up of units

from Teheran.16 Light Tanks.10 Armoured cars, 2 sloops, 3 gun boats,

4 aircraft.

In the Senna-Kermanshah Area.5th Kurdistan Division.I2th Kermanshah Division.One composite Division from Teheran.One weak Brigade Group from I3th Divi-

sion en route from Isfahan.35. The advance into Iran commenced on

25th August and the operations went accordingto plan. 24th Indian Infantry Brigade (lessone battalion) embarked in naval craft afterdark on 24th August and landed at Abadanat 0410 hrs. on 25th August. The majorityof the Iranian troops were asleep in theirbarracks arid escaped by lorries, but resistancewas met from some well sited machine-gunposts along the wharves. Street fighting en-sued and it was difficult to dislodge the Iraniantroops without damaging the refinery buildings,which were not completely cleared until 1700

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946 • 4099

hrs. on 25th August. As it was then too lateto clear up Abadan town or Bawarda thatday, a cordon was formed round the refineriesand the troops bivouacked. The following daywas spent in clearing up Abadan island.

36. i8th Indian Infantry Brigade (less onebattalion) -whicih had with it one battalionof the 24th Indian Infantry Brigade, a squad-ron of the Guides Cavalry and a battery ofField Artillery, and 25th Indian InfantryBrigade, with I3th Lancers under command,met with little opposition.

i8th Indian Infantry Brigade advanced fromTanumah on the night 24th/25th August, and,moving across the desert to the North of thevarious water obstacles and defensive positions,came in on Khurramshahr at 0410 hrs.Mopping-up operations were delayed by a con-siderable number of Arabs who joined in thefighting from the palm groves. On 26thAugust a. ferry was established on the riverKarun, and i8th Brigade with a Troop Carry-ing Motor Transport Company completed thecrossing on the afternoon of 27th August ad-vancing beyond Dorquain Pumping Station toa point half way to Ahwaz.

25th Indian Infantry Brigade moved fromTanumah and captured Qasr Shaikh by middayon 25th August, from where it protected theNorthern flank of i8th Indian InfantryBrigade. On 26th and 27th August, 25thBrigade earned out reconnaissances towardsAhwaz, and on 27th August it moved forwardalong the west .bank of the river Karun towithin 25 miles of Ahwaz.

37. The advance on Ahwaz by the i8th and25th Brigade Groups, East and West respec-tively of the Karun river, began in the earlyhours of 28th August. Some resistance wasencountered, but as our troops were approach-ing Ahwaz news of the Shah's " cease fire "order was received from an Iranian envoy.Tftie Iranian General ordered his troops toreturn to barracks in Ahwaz.

38. One Company of Infantry in six Valentiaaircraft landed at 0700 hours on 25th Augustat Haft Kel to protect the oilfields there andto escort the British and.Indian women andchildren from the main fields at Masjid-i-Suleiman to Haft Kel. Two of the. Valentiascrashed on landing but there were no casualties.

39. The Bandar Shahpur operation wascarried out most successfully on 25th August.The naval force* including two companies ofthe 3rd Battalion loth Baluch Regiment (underMajor W. E. Maxwell) on board the ArmedMerchant Cruiser H.M.S. " Kanimbla "(Captain W. L. G. Adams, R.N.) had sailedfrom Basra on the night nth-i2th August. Shecruised in the Persian Gulf- until; 24th Augustand approached Bandar Shahpur harbour inthe early hours of 25th August.

One Company was landed at 0715 hours andhad secured Bandar Shahpur, meeting onlyslight opposition, by 0830 hours by which timethe second company had landed.

40. Meanwhile operations had been proceed-ing in the Naft-i-Shah-Pai Tak Pass area. TheIranian troops in the latter 'area were reportedto have been heavily reinforced. The gthArmoured Brigade arrived at Khaniqin from

* H.M. Ships Enterprise and Hermes and R.'F.A.Pearleaf.

Kirkuk on 22nd August and came under theorders of Brigadier Aizlewood in command ofa column known as Hazel Force, consisting ofthe 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade Group (lesstwo regiments), the gth Armoured Brigade (allin trucks, no armour) and the ist Battalion5th Royal Gurkha Rifles and the 2nd Battalion7th Gurkha Rifles.

41. On 23rd August Major General Slim,loth Indian Division, now available on returnfrom Syria, was placed in command of opera-tions in West Iran. The 2ist Indian InfantryBrigade (less one battalion) and 157 FieldRegiment at Habbaniya were placed at hisdisposal and ordered to move to Khaniqin.

Major General Slim, who arrived at Khaniqinon the evening of 24th August with a detach-ment of 'his Headquarters, decided to makeno change in Brigadier Aizlewood's plan forthe capture of Naft-i-Shah and the advanceon Shahabad via Gilan. He decided to employthe 2ist Indian Infantry Brigade Group againstthe Pai Tak Pass position in co-operation withthe turning movement via Gilan.

42. Naft-i-Shah oilfields were secured againstslight opposition in the early hours of 25thAugust.

Qasr-i-9hirin was cut off from the NorthWest, North and East by 0445 hours on 25thAugust by the i4/20th Hussars after a difficultnight march, and was captured later duringthe morning by a column advancing from theSouth. This column continued the advanceand reached Sari Pul Zuhaib, five milesWest of the Pai Tak Pass, by 1530 hours on25th August.

Meanwhile another column left Khaniqindirect for Gilan meeting with no oppositionuntil it reached the Eastern outskirts of Gilanwhere it was held up until nightfall by rifle,machine-gun and anti-tank fire. Three attemptsto get forward with light tanks before darkon 25th August failed.

The Iranian troops remained in position Eastof Gilan during the night covering an anti-tank obstacle, but were forced to withdraw bymidday on 26th August. The advance fromGilan towards Shahabad continued on 26thAugust, a number of road 'blocks were en-countered but no opposition although the routeprovided a series of good defensive positions.

Shahabad was occupied at 0700 hours on27th August.

43. Meanwhile the Pad Tak Pass position,which was reported to 'be strongly held wasbombed by the R.A.F. on the evening of 26thAugust. The 2ist Indian Infantry Brigade (lessone battalion) reached Sari Pul Zuhab duringthe night 25th-26th August and recon-noitred the approaches to the Pai Tak Passon 26th August. The Iranian troops aban-doned the Pass hurriedly during the night 26th-27th August and the 2ist Brigade advancedwithout opposition on 27th August to Karindwhere they met patrols sent from Shahabadfrom the Qth Armoured Brigade during theafternoon.

44. Reconnaissance from Shahabad on 27thAugust found the Iranian troops holding thehigh ground overlooking the village of Zibirion 'the road Shahabad-Kermanshah. Fromthis position Iranian artillery shelled the roadWest of Zibiri accurately on the morning of28th August. An attack on the position was

4ioo SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946

prepared and was to have <been launched at1000 hours; but just before that hour anIranian Officer arrived with a white flag andthe request for a truce was granted.

Lt. General Quinan arrived at Zi'biri whilstMajor General Slim was still discussing termswith the Iranian envoy and he approved theterms offered. He also instructed MajorGeneral Slim to advance and occupy Kerman-shah in order to secure the oil refinery andtinning factory there.

The refinery area was occupied on 2gthAugust by a detachment and on 3oth Augustthe remainder of the 2nd and gth ArmouredBrigades reached Kermanshah.

45. Our total casualties during the operationsfrom 25th to 28th August in Iran were asfollows:—

Killed. Wounded.British Officers 5 3Viceroy's Commissioned

Officers i iBritish Other Ranks ... i 4Indian Other Ranks ... 15* 34

Total 22 42

46. On 29th. August Major-General Slim atKermanshah was ordered to despatch to Rama-dan a force under Brigadier Aizlewood consist-ing of the i4/2Oth Hussars, one GurkhaBattalion and a troop of artillery, with ancillaryunits, with the object of making friendly contactwith the Russians.

A report was received that Russian forceswere advancing on Kermanshah from thedirection of Senna and on Hamadan fromKazvin. A detachment was despatched there-fore along the Senna road as well as that toKazvin.

The Russian forces were met at Senna at2200 hours 29th August and just South ofKazvin on the afternoon of 3ist August.

47. On 29th August the General Officer Com-manding Iraq was instructed to report his viewsand .plan for dealing with the situation in Iran.He stated that it was proposed to: —

(i) station troops at Hamadan, Kerman-shah, Shahabad and thence along the Lineof Communications to Khaniqin;

(ii) hold Khuzistan with the minimumforces, with Headquarters at Ahwaz. Adetachment could be maintained at Sultana-bad for railway protection;

(iii) withdraw to Iraq all troops notrequired in Iran.Owing to the shortage of motor transport it

was not found possible to maintain any forma-tions beyond Ramadan. The shortage of trans-port had ibeen aggravated (by the arrival of the5th Indian Division (less one brigade group)in Iraq on the 6th September without anymaintenance transport. This division had beensent to Iraq from 'Middle East as an additionalgarrison in accordance with a previous decisionwhen operations in Iran appeared likely.

The Commander-in-Chief, India, arrived atBaghdad on 3ist August, confirmed the aboveplan and instructed Lt.-General Quinan tomaintain close contact with the Russian forcesin Iran.

*Includes four died of wounds,

48. From ist September onwards reportswere received of tribal risings in IranianKurdistan. The situation rapidly deterioratedalthough active patrolling was carried out bythe 9th Armoured Brigade from Senna andKermanshah and also by the 2ist Indian In-fantry Brigade on the line of communicationbetween Kermanshah and Khaniqin. Con-siderable quantities of arms and ammunitionhidden or sold to tribesmen by Iranian Armydeserters were recovered.

49. A small detachment of British troopswith Colonel Popov of the Russian Mission wassent to contact the Russian troops atSaujibulagh on 7th September.

50. 'On 9th September orders were issued forthe 9th Armoured Brigade (less one Regiment)with one Indian Infantry Battalion undercommand, to be ready to move to Teheran atshort notice.

51. The I3th Lancers which had been with-drawn from Khuzistan, arrived at Kermanshahon I2th September and moved on to Ramadannext day, less one squadron which was retainedfor employment in the Kermanshah-Sennaarea.

52. There were indications that the Persiansdid not intend to satisfy our demands for thesurrender of Axis nationals and on I4th Sep-tember the War Office intimated that a jointAnglo-iRussian advance to Teheran wouldbegin as soon as mutual arrangements with theRussian Commander had been completed. TheRussians agreed to a simultaneous entry intoTeheran at 1500 hours on I7th September bythe British from the South and the Russiansfrom the East and West. This was carriedout according to plan, relations between ourtroops and the Russians were most cordial.

Meanwhile Khuzistan remained quiet and ah1

except one Infantry Brigade and a battery ofField Artillery were withdrawn to Iraq.

But in Kurdistan fighting still continued be-tween gangs of Kurds and Iranian troopsgarrisoned in various forts. Active patrollingwas continued to 'give moral support to theIranian Commander at Kermanshah.

The Headquarters of the 6th Indian Division(Major-General J. N. Thomson) arrived atBasra on i2th September with, the 27th IndianInfantry Brigade, and was ordered to relievethe 8th and loth Indian Divisions in Khuzistanand West Iran respectively.

Other local moves were carried out, and on26th September and 3rd October respectivelythe 9th Armoured Brigade from Teheran andthe 5th Indian Division (less one BrigadeGroup) from Kirkuk began to return to MiddleEast 'Command.

53. On loth October information was re-ceived from His Majesty's Government to theeffect that a proposal had ibeen made to theRussian Government for the withdrawal of bothRussian and British troops from Teheran andits neighbourhood and that plans should imme-diately be made with the Russian Commanderfor joint withdrawal to take place as soon aspossible. The withdrawal was carried out oni8th October after a combined British-iRussianparade on I7th October. The Russians with-drew to Kazvin and Pahlevi and our troops toSultanabad and Ramadan.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 14 AUGUST, 1946 4101

54. The situation in Iranian Kurdistan hadnot improved and on loth. October it becamenecessary to maintain a strong mobile detach-ment at Senna for the purpose of stabilising thesituation by frequent patrolling.

55. Work continued on the construction offortress areas in North Iraq and in Persiathroughout the winter, •all available labour,engineer resources and troops being employed.The 6th Indian Division (less one Brigade)remained in Iran and the whole of the 8thIndian Division and two Brigades of the lothIndian Division worked on defences in Iraq.One Brigade each of the 6th and loth IndianDivisions were employed on protective dutiesin the Basra-Shaiba base area, on the lines ofcommunication Basra-Baghdad and Baghdad-HaJbbaniya-Rurbah, and in Kirkuk and on theoil pipe line. The 2nd Indian ArmouredBrigade Group trained in North Iraq after con-centrating there in -November.

In spite of exceptionally severe winter condi-tions very good progress was made on defensiveworks.

At the same time work continued steadilyon:—

(i) development of the main base area atBasra-Shaiba and advanced bases nearBaghdad, and at Kirkuk and Ahwaz (Iran);

(ii) construction of aerodromes andsatellites in North Iraq and in Iran;

(iii) improvement of road, rail and rivercommunications in Iraq and Iran;

(iv) developments of Urn Qasr and BandarShahpur (Persian Gulf) Ports;

(v) construction of telegraph communica-tions systems in Iraq and Iran.56. At the end of October plans were put in

hand to receive in Iraq two British Divisionsand up to eight Squadrons of aircraft, forlater despatch to the Caucasus. Though nodefinite decision had been reached regardingthe despatch of these forces, soth Division was

ordered to move from the Middle East to Iraqas soon as possible. This Division (less oneBrigade Group which had been retained byMiddle East Command) began to arrive in Iraqon I4th November, and was concentrated inthe Kirkuk area by 8th December.

57. On ijth November, 1941, a new direc-tive cancelling that issued on 2Qth July wasissued to Lt.-General Quinan. It gave de-tails of the reinforcements ihe might expect toreceive up to June, 1942, and instructed himthat his primary task was the defence of Iraqand Iran against the enemy advance fromAnatolia or from the Caucasus. In the de-fence of Iraq he was to act throughout inthe closest co-operation with the CommanderNinth Army (Palestine and Transjordan).

He was to be prepared also for the followingpossible operations:—

(i) Operations in Anatolia in co-operationwitih troops of Middle East Command andpossibly the Turkish Army.

(ii) Co-operation with the Russian Armyin the defence of the Caucasus or NorthIran.He was to prepare to maintain ten Divisions

and thirty Squadrons Royal Air Force in Iraqand up to six Divisions in Iran. In additionto developing road, rail and river communica-tions as necessary to ensure maintenance ofitihese forces, he was to ensure the maximumpossible delivery of supplies to Russia.

58. In view of changes in the general situa-tion, orders were received on 3rd January,1942, for the 5oth Division to return, to theMiddle East Command and the move com-menced from Kirkuk on I2th January, 1942.

59. With effect from I2th January, 1942,operational control of Iraq and Iran passedfrom the India Command to the Middle EastCommand.

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