summer aristotle project final
TRANSCRIPT
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‘Endoxa’ in Aristotle’s Philosophical Method By: James Shortly
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Contents I. Introduction 3 II.I G. E. L. Owen’s ‘Endoxic Method’ Interpretation 4 II.II Evidence for Owen’s Interpretation 5
III.I Nussbaum’s Expansion of the ‘Endoxic’ Interpretation 7 III.II Nussbaum’s ‘Preservation of Appearances’ Interpretation of Aristotle’s
Methodology 8
IV. Advantages of an ‘Endoxic’ Interpretation 10
V.I Frede’s Criticism of the “Endoxic Method” Interpretation 11 V.II Another Non ‘Endoxic Method’ Reason for ‘Laying Down Appearances’ 13
V.III A Problem With Rejecting an ‘Endoxic Method’ Interpretation of 7.1 14
VI. The Puzzle 15
VII.I Proposed Solution 15
VII.II Examining the Rhetoric Quote In Depth 18
VII.III Advantages of this Interpretation 17
VIII. Further Evidence for This Interpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophical Method 20
IX. Conclusion 23
Work Cited 24
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I. Introduction In book 7, chapter 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics1, Aristotle seems to establish rules
for his methodology of philosophical analysis, stating that one must first investigate
what is ‘commonly reported’ (endoxa) about the subject under investigation, and
then strive to maintain as many of these common reports as possible in one’s final
logos. Some scholars, like Owen and Nussbaum, have interpreted this section as
revealing a deep philosophical commitment that Aristotle holds towards the role of
philosophy as working within the confines of our common ways of speaking, which
is referred to as the ‘endoxic method’ thesis.
However others, such as Frede, have criticized this interpretation as drawing too
grand a conclusion from one small section of Aristotle’s corpus, as he, in fact, does
not always take into account what is ‘commonly reported’ when engaging in
philosophical analysis. She further argues that when he does, he often does not do
so for the reasons suggested by the kind of ‘endoxic’ interpretation offered by Owen
and Nussbaum.
In my paper, I propose that we can resolve this tension by closely examining
some remarks that Aristotle makes in the Rhetoric, in which he notes that there is a
strong correlation between what is commonly believed, and what is true. My thesis
is that Aristotle did not wish to preserve appearances because of some special
weight that they hold for the epistemic status of the matter being discussed, but that
Aristotle thinks it is methodologically effective to attempt to preserve appearances
1 Nicomachean Ethics 1145b1-‐7
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in your logos due to the fact that there is strong predictive success that beliefs that
are commonly held also turn out to be true upon critical reflection.
I will support my thesis by showing how it allows us to accurately characterize
7.1 and how it relates to the rest of Aristotle’s corpus, while avoiding the criticisms
leveled by Frede against the ‘endoxic method’ thesis. For by interpreting Aristotle as
holding that one ought to preserve endoxa in your logos due to the pragmatic
success that such a strategy has in producing true logos, rather than some
overarching epistemological commitment to preserving endoxa itself, we can better
make sense of why he would establish a methodology in 7.1, yet frequently depart
from it in other parts of his corpus. For on my characterization, we just commit
Aristotle to holding a general guideline about how to affectively engage in
philosophical investigations, and hence in situations where Aristotle has good
reason to oppose what is commonly reported in his final logos, Aristotle would not
contradict his methodology by doing so2.
II.I G. E. L. Owen’s ‘Endoxic Method’ Interpretation The starting point of this discussion about an ‘endoxic method’ comes from some
brief remarks Aristotle makes in book 7, chapter 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics:
“Here, as in other cases we must set down the phainomena and begin by considering
the difficulties, and so go on to vindicate if possible all the endoxa about these states of
mind, or at any rate most of them and the most important” (ENVII 1, 1145b2-‐6).
2 Topics 104b19-‐28
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To understand what is meant by an ‘endoxic method' interpretation of these
remarks, it is important to understand how Owen chooses to translate a few key
terms. While ‘phainomena’, as used by Aristotle in scientific works such as Physics,
often carries the connotation of sensory phenomena, i.e. how the world appears to
our senses, Owen argues that in this passage Aristotle also uses this word to
designate what Owen refers to as ‘linguistic phenomena’, i.e. how the world appears
to us through the way we commonly talk about it. On this interpretation, we would
also translate endoxa, which can mean ‘reputable opinion’ or ‘of high repute’, as
something like ‘generally admitted’, or as he puts it in his paper, ‘common
conceptions’.
Therefore, in translating these terms thusly, Owen characterizes Aristotle as
establishing an ‘endoxic method’ for how to conduct a philosophical analysis of a
subject, stipulating that we must begin by examining what is commonly said
about that subject under investigation, and then strive to maintain as many of
them as possible in our final logos.
II.II Evidence for Owen’s Interpretation
With respect to his translation of phainomena, Owen argues that it would be
incorrect to translate this as ‘observed facts’. For later on when discussing Socrates’
account of incontinence, Aristotle does not criticize it on the basis that it conflicts
with the ‘observed facts’, as Aristotle also derives a similar conclusion that men act
out of ignorance when incontinent3, but criticizes the kind of ignorance that
3 Nicomachean Ethics 1147b14-‐5
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Socrates ascribes to the incontinent4. Hence, translating phainomena as ‘common
conceptions’ reconciles this issue, and reveals Aristotle’s motivation for criticizing
Socrates’ account; for Aristotle ultimately shares some of Socrates views, but “is
anxious, unlike Socrates, to leave a use for the expression ‘knowing what is right but
doing what is wrong’”5. Thus, because Aristotle makes a distinction with respect to
the kind of knowledge that is related to incontinence in order to synthesize what is
commonly said about the subject of incontinence with Socrates’ arguments and
observations, Owen takes this as evidence for his interpretation of 7.1 as
establishing Aristotle’s ‘endoxic method’ for engaging in philosophical analysis.
With respect to his translation of endoxa, Owen supports this by pointing out that
immediately after the section quoted above, Aristotle does not go on to list the
opinions of the wise or reputable, but those that are commonly held, concluding this
survey by stating that “these are the things said”6. Furthermore, even if ‘endoxa’ is
taken to refer to reputable opinions, it is not necessarily clear that this would be a
problem for an ‘endoxic method’ interpretation. For in the Topics, Aristotle states
“those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or
by the wise”7. Hence, since ‘reputable opinions’ evidently includes the opinions of
the many, and Aristotle, immediately after saying this, lists the common opinions of
the many, this translation is by no means unreasonable.
4 Nicomachean Ethics 1145b28-‐29 5 Owen 241 6 Nicomachean Ethics 1145b20 7 Topics 100b21-‐22
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III.I Nussbaum’s Expansion of the ‘Endoxic’ Interpretation Before explicating how Nussbaum expands on Owen’s ‘endoxic’ account, I shall first explicate the aspects of Owen’s choice of translation that she follows, and how she
provides further support for their validity. First, she follows Owen by translating
phainomena as referring to both perceptual appearances and common conceptions,
and supports this by observing that in the sections of chapter VII of the
Nicomachean Ethics discussed by Owen, Aristotle initially talks about setting down
the phainomena in 7.1, before switching that term with endoxa which, also following
Owen, she defines as “common conceptions or beliefs on the subject”8. Hence, the
argument goes that Aristotle cannot have meant just sense perception, or ‘observed
facts’, by phainomena; for it would not have made sense why he would have
immediately collecting and examining common conceptions when following the
methodological commitments established in section 7.1.
Upon critically examining Owen’s ‘endoxic’ account, Nussbaum makes the
observation that Owen, in arguing that Aristotle takes phainomena to refer to both
‘sense appearances’ and ‘common conceptions’, leaves us with the interpretation
that Aristotle had “two distinct methods” for philosophical investigation, one which
involves collecting and examining sense perception, the other collecting and
examining what is commonly said about subjects. In contrast to this, Nussbaum
argues that Aristotle ultimately has only one methodological commitment to
“preserve appearances” when undertaking philosophical analysis. Hence, whether
Aristotle is trying to preserve sense appearances by rejecting an account of matter 8 Nussbaum 272
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which posits entities that do not appear to our sense perception, such as the claim
that surfaces are composed of triangles9, or, as we saw above, when he rejects an
account of incontinence because it conflicts with “how the world appears to us”, as
revealed in our common practice of talking about incontinent people as “knowing
what is right but doing what is wrong”, they are actually just two different instances
of the same methodological commitment10.
III.II Nussbaum’s ‘Preservation of Appearances’ Interpretation of Aristotle’s
Methodology
What, then, does this ‘preservation of appearances’ methodology consist in? With
respect to ‘common conceptions’, she argues that this first involves studying both
ordinary beliefs, and those of the wise, such as those who offer scientific or
philosophical examinations11. She further argues that this survey is to be restricted
only to those who share similar “general features of a way of life”, which we can
think of as meaning those who belong to similar cultural groups. Nussbaum argues
that Aristotle holds this commitment by citing that, in Politics I, Aristotle holds a
similar commitment when examining how ethical conceptions arise and apply to
individuals, stating that they only make sense within the context of a shared way of
life, and hence are not applicable to “bestial beings”12.
Furthermore, another reason why it would make sense for Aristotle to hold this
view is that if, as the ‘endoxic’ interpretation contends, Aristotle holds that our 9 On the Heavens 306a5, 293a27 10 Nussbaum 273-‐74 11 Topics 100b21, 104a8-‐12 12 Nussbaum 275
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beliefs often originate in the way we are accustomed to speaking, and the way we
are accustomed to speaking is the result of the particular cultural group we are in, it
only makes sense that, in attempting to locate common beliefs about a subject by
examining ways we are accustomed to speaking, we would restrict it to the cultural
groups which brought about these ways of speaking. For we can only ask a group
about their conception of ‘F’ if they have this conception of ‘F’, and this shared
conception could only come about if they share the similar features of our way of life
that brought about our conception of ‘F’13.
Nussbaum then argues that, after collecting data from ones cultural group, the
next task is to examine whether there are any puzzles with respect to these various
views, i.e. whether they are confused, contradictory with each other, etc.. In
response to any found contradiction, we must strive to offer a consistent account,
while not simply disregarding the conflicting view of some, but finding a way to
harmonize them, or at the very least, “the greatest number and the most basic”14.
The procedure by which we produce an account that harmonizes with some
appearances rather than others varies depending on “the subject matter and the
problem”. First, Aristotle holds that what is universally believed is rarely rejected15,
and while he does not explain in detail why this should be so, it stands to reason that
if a particular belief has universal acceptance, this fact alone strongly guides our
intuitions towards accepting this belief, and hence to reject this would, at least,
require a very strong argument or demonstration to the contrary. Second, she also
13 Nussbaum 275-‐276 14 Nussbaum 276-‐277 15 Nussbaum 278
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argues that Aristotle claims the source of arbitration between various appearances
is revealed through examining our cultural practices; for some of these disputes can
be reconciled by appealing to a judge who renders a verdict16. For example, in
evaluating appearances related to health, Aristotle thinks it reasonable that we
would value the views of a doctor more than those of an ignorant man17, and that
the selection of these judges does not require further justification, as Aristotle
begins from practices that already are in place, rather than trying to develop new
practices or methodologies18.
IV. Advantages of an ‘Endoxic’ Interpretation
In reviewing these two interpretations, I have identified three distinct advantages to
interpreting 7.1 in this fashion. First, it accurately reflects what Aristotle says in 7.1;
for there he seems to be explicitly outlining some kind of methodological
commitment, even if the scope of this commitment is not made fully explicit. Second,
it allows us to make sense of the passage in 7.1 immediately following the section
quoted above; for there Aristotle does review ‘what is commonly said’ about the
subject matter. And third, it makes sense of why Aristotle seems to give epistemic
weight to ‘what is commonly reported’ throughout the rest of his corpus; for it
outlines the methodological framework in which it would make sense to appeal to
‘what is commonly said’ about a subject in trying to establish a good logos of that
subject.
16 Nussbaum 278 17 Metaphysics 1010b3-‐14 18 Metaphysics 1011a3
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V.I Frede’s Criticism of the “Endoxic Method” Interpretation In contrast to these two interpretations, some scholars, such as Dorothea Frede,
have been hesitant to accept this characterization of Aristotle’s methodology. In her
paper “The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not”, she
declares her intent to “deflate” the kind of account offered by Nussbaum and Owen.
What she means by this is that, while she generally agrees with the claim that
Aristotle gives epistemic weight to “what people generally think or say” when
conducting philosophical analysis, she is hesitant to describe his overall
methodology as ‘endoxic’, where that is taken to mean that all investigations must
either begin with consideration of common conceptions, or sense perception. As
such, she argues that the kind of methodology that Aristotle appears to outline in
7.1, and follows within that chapter, is to be treated as an exception to his overall
methodological commitments, rather than an integral part of its foundation19.
To substantiate this concern, she begins by claiming that no other section in
Aristotle’s corpus follows an ‘endoxic’ methodology as closely as 7.1; for Aristotle
very rarely “lays down the appearances” when engaging in philosophical analysis20.
Conversely, Frede argues that a lot of the time, he just begins with his own
argumentation21. Additionally, if he does appear to lay down appearances
beforehand, often times there are significant discrepancies between what he says in
7.1, and how he actually ‘lays down appearances’ in other sections, that would hence
19 Frede 186-‐7 20 Frede 190 21 Frede 201-‐202, 212
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make it problematic to cite these passages as examples where Aristotle follows the
methodology established in 7.1.
For example, while 7.11-‐14 of the Nicomachean Ethics, which deal with pleasure,
appears to follow the ‘endoxic method’, as there Aristotle begins by offering
different views of pleasure and concludes with the phrase “these, then, are the
things said”22, upon closer inspection a few relevant features emerge that show his
approach to this topic diverges from what the tenets of an ‘endoxic method’ would
demand. First, not all ‘endoxa’ of pleasure are surveyed, but rather, his survey is
limited only to those related to “the Platonist contention that pleasure is a genesis in
the sense of filling of a lack or the restoration of an equilibrium, which is by no
means a common view”23. Furthermore, having “set down the appearances”,
Aristotle does not go on to attempt to preserve all or most of them, but to refute
them all, and then introduce his own concept of pleasure, that of ‘unimpeded
activity’. It should also be noted that this view is neither derived from these views,
nor is any effort made to harmonize it with them24. To offer another example, while
in the Metaphysics Aristotle does consider the views that his predecessors had with
respect to first causes25, this is not to be taken as following an ‘endoxic method’; for
he does this not in order to later go on to preserve them in his final account, but in
order to demonstrate the “necessity and the superiority of his own canon of four
causes”26.
22 Nicomachean Ethics 1152b23 23 Frede 191 24 Frede 191 25 Metaphysics 983a33-‐b4 26 Frede 192-‐193
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Thus, Frede concludes that when Aristotle does “lay down the appearances”, this
can often be interpreted as more of a compositional technique that allows him to
more smoothly transition into his own arguments. She concludes on the basis of this
that it is more accurate to interpret Aristotle as holding that his own argumentation
is really what does the work of supporting his account of a particular subject matter,
rather than whether the account conforms to what is commonly said27.
V.II Another Non ‘Endoxic Method’ Reason for ‘Laying Down Appearances’
The second stage of her deflation is to argue that when Aristotle does “lay down the
appearances”, often they function more as a tool in dialectical exercises, which are
not necessarily undertaken for the purpose of uncovering truth, rather than as an
integral part of some ‘truth finding’ methodology. To substantiate this claim, she
first observes that Aristotle rarely uses the word ‘endoxa’ outside of the context of
Topics, and that, in that work, Aristotle argues that endoxic premises occupy a
middle position as the starting point of a dialectical exercise28; neither obviously
false (like eristic premises), nor obviously true (like demonstrative premises used in
scientific syllogisms), but (on the surface) have the potential to be either29.
Hence, using what is commonly accepted as the starting point of dialectical
analysis is useful; for in order for one to have a fruitful dialectic, what is being
discussed must seem plausible to both participants 30. Thus, Frede argues that
Aristotle’s interest in ‘what is commonly said’ for dialectics is not necessarily 27 Frede 192 28 Topics 100b23-‐31 29 Frede 194 30 Frede 194-‐195
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motivated by any special weight that it holds for the epistemic status of the matter
being discussed, which is the kind of conclusion an ‘endoxic method’ interpretation
of these sections might conclude, but has preference for them because of their
usefulness in playing an “intellectual game”, which does not necessarily aim at the
acquisition of some wider truth about the subject matter being discussed31.
V.III A Problem With Rejecting an ‘Endoxic Method’ Interpretation of 7.1
While Frede makes a strong case for her criticism of the endoxic method thesis, her
characterization of 7.1 as an exception to Aristotle’s overall methodology might not
strike one as being very satisfying, as it does not really make sense of why Aristotle
would clearly introduce a methodological constraint only to disregard it in all his
other works. To attempt to resolve this tension, she offers another possible
interpretation of how this section relates to the rest of Aristotle’s corpus. She argues
that we can regard 7.1 as just being a remnant of the Eudemian Ethics that no longer
serves a function within the Nicomachean Ethics, and hence, does not have a place
within his overall methodology due to it simply being an earlier view he later
abandoned. Frede supports this interpretation by referencing Cooper, who argues
that, in contrast to the Nicomahean Ethics’ “smooth and puzzle free exposition”, the
Eudemian Ethics’ preference for “aporetic treatment of problems” is more consistent
with what is said in section 7.132.
31 Frede 195 32 Frede 207-‐208
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VI. The Puzzle
In reviewing the advantages of either accepting or rejecting the ‘endoxic method’
thesis, outlined in sections IV and VI, we are faced with a puzzle. While the ‘endoxic
method’ thesis allows us to make sense of what Aristotle explicitly says in 7.1, it has
the unfortunate consequence of ascribing to him a methodology he evidently does
not always (or often) follow. However, while rejecting the ‘endoxic method’ thesis
seems on the surface to be more promising, as it allows us to characterize Aristotle
in a way that more accurately reflects how he goes about engaging in philosophical
analysis throughout the rest of his corpus, we are still left with the lingering issue of
how to make sense of 7.1, and how to situate its significance within Aristotle’s
corpus. While Frede does suggest we can resolve this tension by regarding it as just
a vestigial left over from the Eudemian Ethics, this argument is very speculative, and
as such a more robust explanation -‐ one supported by textual references that go
beyond observations about a purported lack of continuity with respect to style – is
to be preferred.
VII.I Proposed Solution
As a response to this puzzle, I offer a third interpretation of 7.1 and how it relates to
the rest of Aristotle’s corpus, which forms as its nucleus a quote from the Rhetoric.
For there, Aristotle observes that humans have “a sufficient natural instinct for what
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is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at
truth is likely to make a good guess at what is reputable"33.
In the following sections, I will show that we have good reasons to believe that
Aristotle’s belief in a strong correlation between what is commonly believed and
what is true offers both a fruitful interpretation of 7.1, and its relationship to the
rest of Aristotle’s corpus, while avoiding the problems that Frede convincingly
demonstrated exist with the ‘endoxic method’ interpretation of 7.1. I will
accomplish this by showing that interpreting 7.1 in light of this belief does not force
us to commit Aristotle to the view that a necessary condition of a logos being ‘good’
is that it must take into account, and harmonize with, either common conceptions or
sense perception, like in Nussbaum and Owen’s formulation of the ‘endoxic method’
thesis. Rather, because Aristotle held that there is a strong correlation between the
common beliefs of people, and true beliefs, his frequent appeals to ‘endoxa’ are just
the result of Aristotle’s recognition that it follows from this strong correlation that
those who wish to get at the truth would be wise to be guided by the beliefs of the
many; for the predictive success afforded by this correlation justifies our use of
‘endoxa’ as a guide towards producing true logos. Hence, on my account 7.1 is to be
interpreted as expressing a pragmatic guideline towards pursuing the truth, rather
than some wider, epistemological commitment about the nature of truth as
inherently requiring the preservation of ‘endoxa’.
33 Topics 1355a17
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VII.II Examining the Rhetoric Quote In Depth
“Man has a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the
truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess
at what is reputable” -‐ Topics 1355a17
Let us now examine more precisely the meaning of this statement, how it makes
sense of 7.1, and how it accurately situates its importance within Aristotle’s wider
corpus while avoiding Frede’s criticisms of the ‘endoxic method’ thesis. To offer
context, Aristotle is here speculating about why it is that groups of people come to
uncritically believe the same thing about the world, and why it is that, even though
they lack the critical investigative tools of the philosopher or scientist to understand
that what they believe is true and why it is true, they still often happen to stumble
upon the truth in their beliefs about the world. How can people, on mass, acquire
true beliefs so frequently when they lack the critical tools to do so?
To account for this phenomenon, Aristotle posits that humans have a natural
instinct towards apprehending the truth, which he thinks guides how we think
about the world towards truthful conceptualizations of it. Thus, it is clear from this
why Aristotle would stress the need to examine common beliefs when attempting to
produce true logos in 7.1. For while he does not think that something is true because
it is reputable, as he makes clear in the Posterior Analytics34, and hence does not
hold that true logos are true because they preserves endoxa, nonetheless since he
observes that there is a strong correlation between endoxa and true logos, assuming
34 Posterior Analytics 81b20
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this is true Aristotle has good reason to regard endoxa as instrumentally useful in
acquiring true logos. For if it just so happens that the common beliefs often happen
to be true, even if it they are not always true since “the man who makes a good guess
at truth is likely to make a good guess at what is reputable” due to the predictive
success that adhering to endoxa has towards acquiring the truth, being aware of the
endoxa and attempting to avoid transgressing them in your logos serves as a useful
guideline for how to carry out philosophical investigations in a way that is
conductive to producing true logos.
To summarize what has been established so far, my interpretation departs from
the ‘endoxic method’ thesis in that it neither interprets 7.1, nor Aristotle’s use of
endoxa in producing logos throughout his corpus, as revealing an epistemological
commitment that correct reasoning intrinsically involves adhering to endoxa – that
true logos are true because they preserve endoxa. Rather, I wish to suggest that his
preference is motivated by his belief that there is a strong correlation between what
is generally believed and what is true, which affords those who do not contradict
endoxa in their logos greater predictive success in producing true logos than those
that contradict endoxa.
VII.III Advantages of this Interpretation
The advantages of this interpretation are clear; for it is able to render an account of
Aristotle’s philosophical method that explains what Aristotle says in 7.1 and why he
frequently uses endoxa in producing logos throughout his corpus, while
simultaneously avoiding the criticisms that Frede brings up against committing
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Aristotle to an ‘endoxic method’. For having accepted Frede’s contention that
Aristotle does not always preserve appearances in his final account, my
interpretation does not force us to have to characterize Aristotle as contradicting
himself, as it interprets 7.1 as merely establishing a general guideline for engaging
in philosophical analysis. Hence, Aristotle does not need to preserve endoxa in all his
logos for it to still stands as an accurate characterization of his philosophical
method.
Additionally, this characterization improves on Frede’s attempt to explain how
7.1 relates to Aristotle’s philosophical method; for it does not force us to disregard
what is said in 7.1 as just an exception to his wider practices, nor does it offer a
speculative reason for this exception. Rather, it situates this section within
Aristotle’s wider corpus as one guideline he offers for how to reason effectively, and
does so by drawing upon what he explicitly says in another section of his corpus.
Furthermore, this view also provides a reason for why we might reasonably think
that logos that contradict what is commonly spoken of ought to be met with
skepticism, and require more persuasive argumentation to be accepted as true35.
This is greatly advantageous, as it allows us to better make sense of Aristotle’s
criticisms of views that depart from how the world is ordinarily experienced or
spoken about, such as his criticisms of atomism36; for my interpretation allows us to
understand this justification on pragmatic grounds. Otherwise, it is not prime facia
clear why Aristotle would be opposed to this form of characterization, and have an
35 Topics 104b19-‐28 36 303a21-‐22
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intrinsic preference for preserving endoxa in a way that does not simply beg the
question.
VIII. Further Evidence for This Interpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophical Method
One might argue in opposition to my thesis that I have made too sweeping a
characterization of Aristotle’s corpus based on one short quote taken from one his
works, and hence may have fallen into a similar trap that Frede accused Nussbaum
and other proponents of the ‘endoxic method’ thesis of having fallen into. Thus, to
avoid these kinds of accusations, in this section of my paper I shall examine a few
instances within Aristotle’s corpus in which he carries out his philosophical
investigation in a way that is consistent with, and show signs of, an adherence to a
philosophical method grounded in an underlying belief in a strong correlation
between common beliefs and true beliefs.
One instance in which it is very clear that he is drawing upon this underlying
belief can be found in Parts of Animals37; for he observes that people intuitively (and
correctly) divided different classes of birds and fish without knowing the specific
differentia upon which they made their divisions.
“We must attempt to recognize the natural groups, following the indications afforded
by the instincts of mankind, which led them for instance to form the class of Birds and
the class of Fishes, each of which groups combines a multitude of differentiae, and is
not defined by a single one as in dichotomy. The method of dichotomy is either
impossible (for it would put a single group under different divisions or contrary groups 37 643b10-‐13
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under the same division), or it only furnishes a single differentia for each species,
which either alone or in combination has to constitute the ultimate species.” – Parts of
Animals 643b10-‐13
Here, Aristotle observes both that a) mankind correctly divided different classes
of animals without critically knowing the differentia by which they made the
divisions but because of some instinct, and b) suggests we should follow these
instinctual divisions in our own, more critical work. Therefore, it is clear that
Aristotle here undertakes his investigation in a way that is consistent with my
characterization of 7.1; for he explicitly states we must preserve appearances, that
the common view is the correct one, and that it is derived from instincts.
In other works he is not as explicit about how we are “following the indications
afforded by the instincts of mankind” when preserving appearances, but
nonetheless we can still see some of beliefs that are expressed in Rhetoric at play in
his investigation. For example, in On the Heavens38 Aristotle explicitly mentions that
believing in the existence of gods is a view that everyone holds, and that we should
think it is true on those grounds, but we can also be independently confirm it is true
on the basis of sense perception.
“Our theory seems to confirm the phenomena and to be confirmed by them. For all
men have some conception of the nature of the gods, and all who believe in the
existence of gods at all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting the highest
38 On The Heavens 270b4-‐14
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place to the deity..the mere evidence of the senses is enough to convince us of (the
existence of gods), at least with human certainty” – On The Heavens 270b4-‐14
Here, Aristotle observes both that a) mankind has universally adopted the view
that gods exist and that they occupy the highest place in nature, and b) that we can
critically verify the truth of this widespread belief through examining sense
perception. Hence, it is likewise reasonable to take this passage as further evidence
for my interpretation of 7.1 given that Aristotle explicitly notes something that is
commonly believed, points to this fact as a reason for thinking it is true, and also
states that we can independently verify the truth of this belief on the basis of critical
examination.
Therefore, these examples stand as strong evidence that the views he expressed
in the Rhetoric were not an exception to his wider practices, but are indicative of a
wider commitment he held about how to effectively engage in philosophical
analysis. There are other instances as well throughout Aristotle’s corpus where he
similarly adheres to, and makes explicit, this methodological guideline39 40, but for
the purposes of avoiding redundancy, an extended examination of them shall be
omitted.
39 On The Heavens 270b4-‐14, 303a21-‐22 40 Generation and Corruption 325a18-‐22
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IX. Conclusion
To summarize, my paper began by examining a puzzle within Aristotelian
scholarship about how to make sense of some statements Aristotle makes in 7.1 of
the Nicomachean Ethics about the need to preserve endoxa when producing a logos.
I first examined the ‘endoxic method’ interpretation offered by scholars like
Nussbaum and Owen, then examined Frede’s critique of these interpretations. In
response to these critiques, I then offered my own thesis, which drew upon a
statement Aristotle makes in the Rhetoric about the correlation between what is
true, and what is commonly believed. My thesis commits Aristotle in 7.1 to offering a
guideline for how to effectively engage in philosophical investigations, which
implores that those who wish to produce true logos ought to examine common
beliefs given that what is commonly believed is also often true.
I then went on to show why this interpretation is advantageous; for it both
accounts for the textual references that the ‘endoxic method’ thesis attempts to
explain, while avoiding the criticisms Frede levels against that thesis by not
committing Aristotle to some sweeping methodological commitment he must follow
in all investigation, but merely a general guideline. I then supported this
characterization by examining sections of Aristotle’s corpus in which he makes
explicit reference to this correlation, and gave evidence that such an interpretation
is in line with how Aristotle actually goes about producing logos in other parts of his
corpus.
24
Work Cited
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Vol 1-‐2. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984. Print.
Frede, Dorothea. “The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are And What They Are
Not. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume 43. Ed. Brad Inwood.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 185-‐215. Print.
Nussbaum, Martha. “Saving Aristotle’s appearances”. Language and Logos: Studies in
Ancient Greek Philosophy. Ed. Malcolm Schofield and Martha Craven
Nussbaum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 267-‐293. Print.
Owen, G. E. L. “Tithenai ta Phainomena”. Logic, Science and Dialectic. Ed. Martha
Nussbaum. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1986. 239-‐251. Print.