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Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service and Suffolk County Council

Integrated Risk Management Plan 2015-18 Consultation Findings

Opinion Research Services

Opinion Research Services Integrated Risk Management Plan 2015-2018 Consultation (April 2016)

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As with all our studies, findings from this research are subject to Opinion Research

Services’ Standard Terms and Conditions of Contract.

Any press release or publication of the findings of this research requires the advance

approval of ORS. Such approval will only be refused on the grounds of inaccuracy or

misrepresentation.

© Copyright April 2016

Opinion Research Services (ORS) The Strand, Swansea, SA1 1AF

01792 535300 www.ors.org.uk

Spin-out company of Swansea University

ght March 2016

http://www.ors.org.uk/


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Contents Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................................... 6

The Commission ........................................................................................................................................ 6

Extensive Consultation ............................................................................................................................. 7

Summary of Consultation Strands ............................................................................................................ 8

Consultation Proportionate and Fair ..................................................................................................... 10

Consultation Findings ............................................................................................................................. 11

General Issues .................................................................................................................................... 11

Bury St Edmunds Proposal ................................................................................................................. 14

Ipswich Proposals ............................................................................................................................... 17

Lowestoft Proposal ............................................................................................................................ 22

Sudbury Proposal ............................................................................................................................... 25

Wrentham Proposal ........................................................................................................................... 29

Submissions from Representative Bodies .............................................................................................. 33

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................. 35


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Acknowledgements Opinion Research Services (ORS) is pleased to have worked with Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service

(SFRS) and Suffolk County Council (SCC) on the consultation programme reported here.

We are grateful to all of those who completed the questionnaire or submitted a written

submission, petition or online comment - and to those who took part in the focus groups and

public and other meetings. The latter were especially patient in listening to background

information before entering positively into the spirit of open discussions about challenging topics,

with some controversial aspects in some cases. They engaged with the Service, with the issues

under consideration and with each other in discussing their ideas readily.

We thank SFRS and SCC for commissioning the project and we particularly thank the officers with

whom we have worked with for their collaboration - and for attending the focus groups and

meetings to answer people’s many questions. Such meetings benefit considerably from such

readiness to answer participants’ questions fully and frankly, as in this case.

At all stages of the project, ORS’s status as an independent organisation facilitating the

consultation as fairly as possible was recognised and respected; this is an independent report and

has not been influenced or shaped by SFRS, SCC or any other party. We are grateful for the trust,

and we hope this report will contribute usefully to thinking about SFRS’s development in difficult

times.


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The ORS Project Team

Project Design and Management

Dale Hall

Kelly Lock

Ciara Small

Fieldwork Management

Robyn Griffiths

Focus Group Facilitators

Dale Hall

Kelly Lock

Report Authors

Kelly Lock

Ciara Small

Vicki James

Dale Hall


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Executive Summary and Conclusions

The Commission

1. Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) and Suffolk County Council (SCC) are considering

options for the future of fire and rescue services across the county in the context of steadily

reducing risk (when measured in terms of the number of incidents) and financial

constraints. As such, on the basis of our experience of the fire and rescue service and many

statutory consultations, ORS was commissioned to undertake a programme of key

consultation activities, and provide an interpretative report of findings.

2. The proposals consulted on were to:

Remove one (on-call) fire engine from

Bury St Edmunds Fire Station

Remove one wholetime and two on-call

fire engines from Ipswich

Redevelop Princes Street Fire Station or

move to a new building in the centre of

the town - and develop a blue light hub

with the Police and Ambulance Services


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Extensive Consultation

3. The consultation period ran for 14 weeks until 22nd February 2016, and included elements

conducted by ORS as an independent organisation - for example, advising on the nature and

scope of the consultation; designing informative and interactive presentation material

suitable for use at the public focus groups; designing, implementing and analysing responses

to an on-line and paper version of an open consultation questionnaire (including 4,090

additional copies received separately in relation to Sudbury alone); recruiting, facilitating

and reporting five deliberative focus groups with randomly selected members of the public;

analysing and summarising written submissions and petitions received by SFRS during the

consultation period; and producing an interim and final overall report of all consultation

findings and guidance on the interpretation of the material.

4. In addition, SFRS and SCC’s own activities included: providing details of the IRMP proposals

on the SCC website (which received 3,105 unique page views - 2,240 external and 865

internal); printing and distributing approximately 850 consultation documents and

questionnaires; undertaking two pre-consultation workshops prior to the commencement

Remove one (on-call) fire engine from

Lowestoft South Fire Station

Replace the second fire engine at Sudbury

with a rapid response firefighting vehicle

Close Wrentham Fire Station


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of the formal consultation process (which were attended by key stakeholders and facilitated

by the Consultation Institute); undertaking and collating notes from five public meetings;

undertaking approximately 50 internal staff meetings; undertaking 14 consultation meetings

with town and parish councils, area committees and other local organisations; and

publicising the consultation in the local media (broadcast and print) and via press releases,

social media, Twitter and Facebook.

Summary of Consultation Strands

Open Questionnaire

5. The open consultation questionnaire (with an accompanying Consultation Document) was

available online and as a hard copy between 16th November and 22nd February 2016. 1,654

questionnaires were completed: 1,603 were submitted online and 51 by post. A further

4,090 ‘unofficial’ questionnaires were also received that only asked the questions relating to

changing the second fire engine at Sudbury to a Rapid Response-type vehicle.

6. It should be noted that while open questionnaires are important consultation routes that

are accessible to almost everyone, they are not ‘surveys’ of the public. Whereas surveys

require proper sampling of a given population, open questionnaires are distributed

unsystematically or adventitiously and are more likely to be completed by motivated people

while also being also subject to influence by local campaigns. As such, because the

respondent profile (as outlined in the full report) is an imperfect reflection of the Suffolk

population, its results must be interpreted carefully. Crucially though, this does not mean

that the open questionnaire findings should be discounted: they are analysed in detail in

this report and must be taken into account as a demonstration of the strength of feeling of

residents who were motivated to put forward their views (and in many cases concerns)

about the proposed changes.

Focus Groups with Members of the Public

7. SFRS and SCC commissioned a programme of five focus groups with members of the public

in the affected areas to allow local residents an opportunity to offer their views on the IRMP

proposals. These focus groups involved a total of 47 people - and participants were

recruited by ORS through random digit telephone dialling, with quota controls to ensure the

relatively proportional representation of different demographic and socio-economic groups.

Care was taken to ensure that no groups were disadvantaged in the recruitment process

and participants were recompensed for their time and expenses in attending.

8. SFRS and SCC commissioned the focus group programme in order fairly to ‘test’ the

acceptability or otherwise of their proposals in thoughtful, considered and deliberative or

‘jury-style’ meetings. The meetings began with detailed presentations by ORS outlining the

principles of the IRMP proposals and the implications of the changes in the relevant areas.


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There were lengthy question and answer periods, followed by the residents’ detailed and

deliberative discussions of the issues.

Public and Other Meetings

9. As part of its extensive consultation programme, SFRS held five open access public meetings

in the areas affected by the proposals. These were attended by over 500 people, including

members of the general public, serving and ex-firefighters and their families and local

councillors. Each session began with a detailed presentation by SFRS, but the great majority

of the time was devoted to questions (and answers) and comments from attendees on all

aspects of the proposals - the most typical of which are summarised in this chapter.

10. Also included within this summary are the main issues raised in the approximately 50

internal staff meetings and other meetings attended by SFRS officers.

Written Submissions

11. In total, 74 written submissions were received, many of which were both lengthy and

deliberated - so these considered documents are worthy of careful consideration for the

issues and counter-proposals they contain. To make them readily accessible, the written

submissions are reviewed in the relevant chapter, though the main themes have been

included in this summary.

Standardised Submissions

12. In addition to the individual written submissions reported above, SFRS and ORS received

1,699 postcards whereby people registered: concerns about the ‘inadequate detail’ in the

IRMP consultation document; and their opposition to reductions in emergency response

resources until provided with further information relating to changes affecting their areas.

The postcard also requests that changes to council tax contributions be fully explored and

consulted upon with a view to maintaining current fire cover levels across Suffolk.

Submissions via Social Media

13. 74 questions and comments were raised via social media (Facebook and Twitter), most of

which were general objections to the IRMP proposals - and more specifically to those for

Ipswich, Sudbury and Wrentham.

Petitions

14. Petitions are an important form of democratic expression and deserve to be noted carefully.

In assessing what weight to give them in the overall interpretation, SFRS and SCC could

consider whether:

The points of view expressed reflect general public opinion?

Those signing were reasonably well-informed about the issues?


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The petition statements were fair and factual or emotive and exaggerated?

The signatures were spontaneous and self-motivated or the result of active and

persuasive campaigns?

15. None of these criteria should be used to disqualify a petition from consideration; but they

indicate how relative weight might be assigned to petitions as against other forms of

consultation. In this case, there were two petitions:

6,184 people signed a petition (organised by the Bury St Edmunds on-call

firefighters) entitled ‘Petition against Cuts to Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service’;

and

5,255 people signed a petition opposing the IRMP proposals and calling for the

full SCC to vote on them, as opposed to Cabinet only. This was organised by the

Ipswich Labour Party in conjunction with the Fire Brigades Union.

Consultation Proportionate and Fair

16. The key legal and good practice requirements for proper consultation are based on the so-

called Gunning Principles, which state that consultation should: be conducted at a formative

stage, before decisions are taken; allow sufficient time for people to participate and

respond; provide the public and stakeholders with sufficient background information to

allow them to consider the issues and any proposals intelligently and critically; and be

properly taken into consideration before decisions are finally taken.

17. In this case, SFRS and SCC undertook two pre-consultation workshops prior to the

commencement of the formal consultation process. These were attended by key

stakeholders and facilitated by the Consultation Institute.

18. The 14-week formal consultation period gave people sufficient time to participate - and

through its consultation documents, website information and detailed presentations and

meetings, SFRS and SCC sought to provide sufficient information for staff, stakeholders and

residents to understand the proposals and to make informed judgements about them and

the supporting evidence.

19. The final Gunning principle listed above is that consultation outcomes should be properly

taken into consideration before authorities take their decisions. In this case, the production

of an interim report at the midway point allowed the progressive reporting of people’s

opinions - and the final report from SFRS will be presented to SCC Cabinet on May 17th.

20. Properly understood, accountability means that public authorities should give an account of

their plans and take into account public and stakeholder views: they should conduct fair and

accessible consultation while reporting the outcomes openly and considering them fully.

Consultations are not referenda, and the popularity or unpopularity of draft proposals


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should not displace professional and political judgement about what are the right or best

decisions in the circumstances. The levels of, and reasons for, public support or opposition

are important, but as considerations to be taken into account, not as decisive factors that

necessarily determine authorities’ decisions.

21. The key question is not, Does the proposal have majority support? but, Are the reasons for

the popularity or unpopularity of the proposals cogent? Consultation is to inform authorities

of issues and/or arguments and/or implications they might have overlooked; or to

contribute to the re-evaluation of matters already known; or to reassess priorities and

principles critically. However popular proposals might be, that does not itself mean they are

feasible, safe, sustainable, reasonable and value-for-money; and unpopularity does not

mean the reverse.

Consultation Findings

General Issues

Open Questionnaire (Foreseeing and Managing Risks)

22. Only around a fifth of respondents (18%) agreed that Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)

has adequately taken account of foreseeable risks in planning the future of the service.

Almost three quarters (73%) disagreed, with more than half of respondents (53%) saying

they strongly disagreed.

23. Almost a quarter of respondents (22%) agreed that SFRS has established the correct balance

of managing risks through a combination of Prevention, Protection and Emergency

Response services. However around two thirds of respondents (67%) disagreed, with around

two fifths (40%) strongly disagreeing.

24. Respondents were asked to comment on how SFRS works to reduce risks in the community.

The main themes that emerged are outlined below.

Comment Total responses

% of

respondents

(Base: 1,649)

Disagree with reductions and closures/must maintain current provision 170 10

Cuts to the fire service will risk lives/endanger public and firefighter safety 158 10

Need to maintain and/or improve fire prevention and education/firefighters

should be seen more within the community 124 7

Disagree with proposals due to increased population/housing stock/

numbers of cars on the roads 57 3

Proposals will result in longer response times 51 3

Comments relating to Wrentham (need to maintain current provision/

disagree with proposal/proximity to A12/covers large, rural and isolated

area/other concerns over proposed closure)

48 3

Firefighters work hard to protect communities/firefighters ‘do a good job’ 45 3


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% of

respondents

(Base: 1,649)

Comments relating to Sudbury (disagree with proposal/other concerns over

reductions at Sudbury) 44 3

Proposals are financially motivated/money is being put before people’s

lives/people’s safety is more important than value for money/minimal savings 43 3

Proposals will create additional pressure on SFRS and will result in a more

‘stretched’ service with less coverage/less resilience for large-scale or multiple

incidents

31 2

Alternative suggested 28 2

Incidents can happen at any time/risk is unpredictable 27 2

Comments relating to Lowestoft (need to maintain current provision/disagree

with proposal/other concerns over reductions at Lowestoft) 23 1

Proposals will have a negative effect on rural/remote areas 22 1

SCC needs to do more research on risk/more risk assessments 18 1

Need more information/data to make an informed decision 18 1

Consultation does not take into account ‘other’ FRS emergencies such as

flooding, terrorist attacks, chemical spills, animal rescues etc. 18 1

Save money but cutting high salaries/managers/administration staff 15 1

Need to increase fire cover 15 1

Other 196 12

Public Meetings, Other Meetings and Written Submissions

25. Many general concerns and issues were raised across the five public meetings, the

approximately 50 internal staff meetings, the other meetings attended by SFRS officers and

in the written submissions. These were mainly around:

Public and firefighter safety and the impact of the IRMP proposals on SFRS’s

overall resilience for large-scale and simultaneous incidents;

The need to maintain public safety and not make service reductions purely on

financial grounds (many people said that SFRS already offers excellent value for

money and is too ‘lean’ to reduce safely);

The possibility of further reductions in future;

The potential for longer response times across Suffolk, where standards are

currently not being met;

The ‘fragility’ of the on-call system in terms of the frequency with which

appliances are ‘off-the-run’ - and the need to improve on-call recruitment,

retention and availability prior to making reductions to the wholetime service;

The potential for employers to refuse to release on-call staff for an increased

number of fire calls;


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How future-proof SFRS’s proposals are in the context of future population and

housing stock increases - as well as possible terrorist attacks;

The need to protect the many high-risk and/or historical properties across

Suffolk;

Possible reductions in the amount of prevention and protection work

undertaken (in the context of fewer wholetime firefighters being available to

undertake it);

The unsustainability of falling incident numbers (and that some incident types,

casualties and fatalities are rising);

The effects of reductions in neighbouring fire and rescue services;

The need to review the proposals on a regular basis; and

The need to consider council tax rises or using SCC reserves as an alternative to

operational reductions.

26. There were also some specific complaints about the consultation process, mainly with

respect to: a lack of promotion and advertising; the ‘inappropriate’ times at which public

meetings were held; the consultation as a ‘fait accompli’; the lack of a ‘Plan B’; and the need

for the proposals to be voted on by full council rather than by Cabinet only.

Standardised Submissions

27. SFRS and ORS received 1,699 postcards whereby people registered: concerns about the

‘inadequate detail’ in the IRMP consultation document; and their opposition to reductions

in emergency response resources until provided with further information relating to

changes affecting their areas. The postcard also requests that changes to council tax

contributions be fully explored and consulted upon with a view to maintaining current fire

cover levels across Suffolk.


28. 74 questions and comments were raised via social media (Facebook and Twitter) - many of

which were general objections to the IRMP proposals, primarily on the grounds of: public

and firefighter safety; the possibility of increased response times; the need to account for

population increases across Suffolk; and issues around on-call firefighter recruitment and

availability within the county.

29. The consultation process was also mentioned several times in the context of it being a ‘fait

accompli’, its cost, the lack of information provided - and disappointment that decisions will

be made by the SCC Cabinet as opposed to full Council.


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Petitions

6,184 people signed a petition (organised by the Bury St Edmunds on-call firefighters)

entitled ‘Petition against Cuts to Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service’; and 5,255 people

signed a petition opposing the IRMP proposals and calling for the full Suffolk County

Council to hear and vote on them, as opposed to Cabinet only. This one was organised

by the Ipswich Labour Party in conjunction with the Fire Brigades Union.

Main ‘General’ Themes

30. The main general issues raised across all consultation strands can be summarised as follows:

The proposals would negatively impact public and firefighter safety and SFRS’s resilience for large and simultaneous incidents.

Service reductions should not be made purely on financial grounds (SFRS already offers excellent value for money and is too ‘lean’ to reduce safely).

Further reductions could be demanded in future.

Response times across Suffolk (which are already not being met) could lengthen.

The on-call system is ‘fragile’ in terms of the frequency with which appliances are ‘off-the-run’ - and SFRS must improve on-call recruitment, retention and availability prior to making wholetime reductions.

The proposals could mean a reduced amount of prevention and protection work across Suffolk (in the context of fewer wholetime firefighters being available to undertake it).

SFRS must be future-proof in the context of population and housing stock increases - and possible future terror attacks.

There is a need to protect the many high-risk and/or historical properties across Suffolk.

Reductions in neighbouring fire and rescue services could have impact on mutual support arrangements.

SFRS and SCC should consider council tax rises or using Council reserves as an alternative to operational reductions.

The consultation process: is a ‘fait accompli’; has not been adequately advertised or promoted; has not offered adequate information and data to allow informed decision-making; and has not offered a ‘Plan B’.

Decisions on the IRMP proposals should be made by full Council as opposed to the SCC Cabinet only.

Bury St Edmunds Proposal

Open Questionnaire

31. Only just over 1 in 10 respondents (13%) agreed that, within the context of the risks and

financial challenges facing the service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is

reasonable for SFRS to remove the third fire engine from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station.

However, more than three quarters of respondents (77%) disagreed, with just over three

fifths (61%) strongly disagreeing.


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32. Questionnaire respondents were also invited to comment on the proposal for Bury St

Edmunds. The main themes that emerged are outlined below.

Main Theme Total responses

% of

respondents

(Base: 718)

Generally disagree with the proposal 133 38

Removing the third fire engine will risk lives and public/firefighter safety 110 32

Disagree due to large/growing population and increasing infrastructure 87 25

Proposal will create additional pressure on SFRS and will result in a more

‘stretched’ service with less coverage 45 13

Disagree with proposals due to close proximity to busy road networks 45 13

Longer response times from other stations 40 11

The third fire engine is needed to deal with large/multiple incidents 35 10

Proposal will mean insufficient cover for surrounding

rural/remote areas 30 9

High risk facilities in the area (for example, Calor Gas depot/RAF bases) 21 6

Proposals are financially motivated 16 5

Savings should be made elsewhere 12 3

Need more information/data to make informed decision 10 3

Many historical buildings in Bury St Edmunds 10 3

Incidents can happen at any time 10 3

Generally agree with proposal 9 3

Other 93 27


33. In discussing the proposals, participants were initially concerned about a number of issues -

chiefly around: the need for county-wide and local resilience in the context of fire cover

(especially for incidents requiring more than two fire engines); the potential for

simultaneous incidents to stretch FRS resources locally; the perceived increased risk from

new housing and population growth; and the need to protect Bury’s many heritage

buildings.

34. After discussion and clarification though, seven of the nine participants felt reassured that

the third (on-call) fire engine could be removed from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station safely

and without any detrimental effect on public safety given the falling incident numbers and

other resources available locally. Overall, the proposal was considered a sensible and

appropriate means of making the necessary financial reductions.

35. However, while they accepted this particular proposal, participants were worried that it may

represent the ‘thin end of the wedge’ regarding the need for further reductions in future.

Furthermore, although the proposal was typically accepted from a risk management

perspective, there was some recognition of its ‘emotive’ aspects - particularly in terms of

on-call firefighter job losses.


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36. Only one participant fundamentally disagreed with the proposal (on the grounds that for

what you’re saving it’s not worth taking the risk. It’s peanuts for reduced coverage) – and

another felt unable to make a firm judgement one way or the other.


37. In considering the proposal to remove the third (on-call) fire engine from Bury St Edmunds

Fire Station, meeting attendees made the following comments and suggestions:

Public and firefighter safety could be compromised in the context of potentially

longer response times for back-up resources from other stations - which would

be compounded by poor on-call firefighter availability at some of these;

The proposal would affect the station’s ability to respond to large-scale or

simultaneous incidents in the area;

The third fire engine will be required in the light of proposed increases to Bury

St Edmunds’ population and housing stock;

The proposal makes only minimal savings;

The proposal could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from

Bury St Edmunds Fire Station;

The third fire engine offers important stand-by cover for the town; and

There is a need to consider other options such as the closure of Aldeburgh Fire

Station (which is quieter than Bury St Edmunds) or even the removal of some

full-time firefighters from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station.

38. As for the written submissions, only one (from a local resident) was primarily concerned

with the Bury proposal - but it was frequently mentioned in the more ‘generic’ submissions.

Though there was some understanding of and support for the change, most of those who

commented were opposed to it on the same grounds as outlined above - and because of

Bury St Edmunds’ significant and particular risks such as many historical properties, busy A-

roads and ‘site specific risk information’ premises (including two Control of Major Accident

Hazard [COMAH] sites).

Main Themes

39. The main issues raised across all consultation strands specifically in relation to the proposal

to remove the third (on-call) fire engine from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station are summarised

in the table overleaf.


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‘Positive’ Comments

The third fire engine could be removed from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station safely given the falling incident numbers and other resources available locally.

The proposal is a sensible and appropriate means of making necessary financial reductions.

‘Negative’ Comments

Public and firefighter safety could be jeopardised by longer back-up response times from other stations - compounded by poor on-call firefighter availability at some of these.

The proposal would affect the station’s ability to respond to large-scale or simultaneous incidents in the area.

The third fire engine will be required in the light of proposed increases to Bury St Edmunds’ population and housing stock.

The proposal makes only minimal savings.

The proposal could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from Bury St Edmunds the Fire Station.

The third fire engine offers important stand-by cover for the town and in neighbouring rural areas.

Bury St Edmunds has significant and particular risks - such as historical properties, busy A-roads, RAF bases and ‘site specific risk information’ premises.

There is a need to consider other options such as the closure of quieter fire stations or the removal of some full-time firefighters from Bury St Edmunds Fire Station.

The proposal may represent the ‘thin end of the wedge’ regarding the need for further reductions in future.

Ipswich Proposals

Open Questionnaire

40. 1 in 10 respondents (10%) agreed that, within the context of the risks and financial

challenges facing the service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is reasonable for SFRS

to reduce the six fire engines (located across two fire stations) in Ipswich to a total of three

fire engines. However the majority of respondents (85%) disagreed with this, with 7 in 10

respondents (70%) strongly disagreeing.

41. Respondents were also invited to comment on the above proposal. The main themes that

emerged are outlined below and overleaf.


% of

respondents

(Base: 1,627)

Generally disagree with proposals/

cutting the number of engines by half is too much 189 12

Reducing the number of fire engines will risk lives and public/firefighter safety 136 8

Ipswich is too large an area to have only three fire engines 90 6

Disagree with proposals due to increased population/housing stock/

number of cars on the road 70 4


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% of

respondents

(Base: 1,627)



Three fire engines is not enough to deal with large/major/industrial fires 51 3

Proposal will result in longer response times 50 3

Three fire engines is not enough to cover the busy road networks in the area 44 3

Disagree with risk assessment/proposals have not been sufficiently thought

through 24 1

Three fire engines is not enough provision for high-rise building fires 23 1

Proposals mean cuts to the busiest fire station/reductions at Princes Street

are too high 22 1

Fewer appliances in Ipswich will mean less stand-by cover for neighbouring

on-call stations 18 1

Need more information/data to make an informed decision 14 1

Other 165 10

42. Similar proportions of respondents agreed (39%), disagreed (33%) and neither agreed nor

disagreed (28%) that, within the context of the risks and financial challenges facing the

service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is reasonable for SFRS to create a (new or

refurbished) ‘blue light’ Hub Fire Station in the centre of Ipswich as a base for the fire and

rescue and blue light partners.

43. Respondents were asked if they had any further comments to make on the proposal to

create a ‘blue light’ Hub Fire Station. The main themes that emerged are outlined below.


% of

respondents

(Base: 385)

Generally agree with proposal/ blue light hub is a good idea 78 20

Proposal will create better and more efficient relationships between

emergency services 56 15

Need more information and data to make an informed decision 53 14

Money would be better spent improving/maintaining existing facilities 51 13

Generally disagree with proposal/blue light hub is not a good idea 49 13

Proposal will save money 32 8

Agree with proposals as long as frontline resources are maintained 29 8

Disagree with proposed site of blue light hub due to traffic/congestion 28 7

Alternative suggestions 24 6

Proposal will have a negative effect on response times 23 6

Disagree with joined-up services due to different skill-sets 23 6

Disagree with joined-up services due to concerns about the Police's role within

a blue light hub 9 2

Other 125 32


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44. In discussing the proposals, participants were initially concerned about a number of issues -

chiefly around: the level of reductions across Ipswich, which is SFRS’s busiest area; the level

of reductions at Princes Street Fire Station, which is SFRS’s busiest station; a possible lack of

fire cover across the town in the event of simultaneous incidents; a lack of wholetime cover

to assist neighbouring on-call fire stations that are ‘off-the-run’; the poor availability of

many neighbouring on-call appliances that provide back-up resources into Ipswich; the

possibility of longer response times; the personal impact of firefighter job losses; and

whether SFRS has taken account of the plans of neighbouring fire and rescue services in

developing its proposals.

45. Ultimately, the Ipswich group was divided in its view of the proposal to remove two fire

engines (one wholetime and one on-call) from Princes Street Fire Station and one on-call fire

engine from Ipswich East Fire Station.

46. Three people (reluctantly) accepted the proposal on the grounds that money must be saved

and that SFRS is making ‘the best of a bad job’. They also felt reassured that the changes

could be implemented safely and trusted the Service to ‘do the right thing’, but were

concerned about the implications of possible additional reductions in future. Another two

participants felt they could support the proposed changes - but only on the proviso that

they are phased in gradually over a number of years and that they are continually kept

under review to monitor any potential emerging risks. Indeed, with regard to a possible

staged or phased approach to the proposals, the group generally agreed that if they are to

be implemented, it should be on this basis.

47. Three people wholly rejected the proposals on the grounds that: the need for fire cover is

unpredictable; it would be unwise to rely on external resources for back-up in the event of a

larger incident; the Service is already too reliant on the on-call service; and that the amount

of prevention and protection work in Ipswich might reduce if there are fewer wholetime

staff available to undertake it.

48. The final five people felt somewhat conflicted insofar as: while a 50% reduction across

Ipswich is difficult to accept in the context of public safety, they also trust SFRS not to

endanger this and can see the logic of the proposal ‘on paper’; they wished to hear ‘the

other side of the story’ from firefighters and their Unions prior to making a firm judgement;

and they questioned the balance of the proposal (that is, the removal of two appliances

from the busiest station at Princes Street and only one from Ipswich East).


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49. Meeting participants made the following comments about the proposals for Ipswich:

The proposed reductions are disproportionate to those being considered

elsewhere and, at 50% across the town, are too swingeing;

The proposed reductions at Princes Street are too high given it is Suffolk’s

busiest fire station;

The town will see increases to its population and housing stock - and already

has many deprived areas, especially around Princes Street;

The proposed reduction could compromise the station’s ability to respond to

large-scale or simultaneous incidents in Ipswich - and, importantly, would result

in longer pre-determined attendance completion for high-rise fires;

Fewer appliances in Ipswich will mean increased workloads for neighbouring

on-call appliances, which will then be spending less time in their own

communities;

Many neighbouring on-call appliances have poor availability to provide back-up

resources into Ipswich - and the second Princes Street wholetime appliance is

the only reliable resource that can prop up the ‘failing’ on-call system locally;

Princes Street’s on-call appliance provides important cover for Ipswich when

the town’s wholetime appliances are at incidents;

Longer response times would be seen not only within Ipswich, but also across

Suffolk insofar as the Ipswich appliances contribute positively to the county-

wide average;

The proposals could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from

Ipswich; and

It would be preferable to phase reductions in gradually if they must be made.

50. 13 submissions (from Capel St Mary Parish Council; Holbrook Parish Council; Ipswich

Borough Council; the Suffolk County Council Labour Group; Tattingstone Parish Council;

Green Watch, Red Watch, White Watch and an individual firefighter from Princes Street Fire

Station; White Watch at Ipswich East Fire Station; the Holbrook on-call firefighters; and

three local residents) were wholly concerned about the proposals for Ipswich – and they

were also frequently mentioned in the more ‘generic’ submissions noted above.

Respondents were overwhelmingly opposed to them on the same grounds as outlined

above – and because: Ipswich has significant and particular risks (such as many high-rise

buildings and houses in multiple occupation; the Docks; the county hospital; several A-roads

and an industrial area); and that wholetime reductions could have an impact on prevention

and protection work in the town.


21


51. Concerns were raised on social media around the Ipswich proposals, particularly in relation

to: the length of time it would take to fulfil the PDA for a high-rise incident after the

proposed removal of three fire engines in the town; longer response times to simultaneous

incidents that occur when the remaining three appliances are already committed; the

town’s demographics; and cover for mid-Suffolk (where the on-call fire engines are

apparently frequently ‘off-the-run’).

Main Themes


to reduce the six fire engines (located across two fire stations) in Ipswich to a total of three

fire engines can be summarised in the table below and overleaf.

‘POSITIVE’ COMMENTS

SFRS should be trusted to implement the changes safely.

Money must be saved and SFRS is making ‘the best of a bad job’.

‘NEGATIVE’ COMMENTS

The proposed reductions are disproportionate to those being considered elsewhere and, at 50% across SFRS’s busiest area, are too swingeing.

The proposed reductions at Princes Street are too high given it is Suffolk’s busiest fire station - and the ‘balance of the proposal is wrong (that is, the removal of two appliances from the busiest station at Princes Street and only one

from Ipswich East)

The town will see increases to its population and housing stock - and already has many deprived areas, especially around Princes Street.

The proposed reduction could compromise the station’s ability to respond to large-scale or simultaneous incidents in Ipswich - and would result in longer pre-determined attendance completion for high-rise fires.

Fewer appliances in Ipswich will mean increased workloads for neighbouring on-call appliances, which will then be spending less time in their own communities.

Many neighbouring on-call appliances have poor availability to provide back-up resources into Ipswich; and the second Princes Street wholetime appliance is the only reliable resource that can prop up the ‘failing’ on-call system locally.

Princes Street’s on-call appliance provides important cover for Ipswich when the town’s wholetime appliances are at incidents.

Longer response times would be seen within Ipswich and across Suffolk insofar as the Ipswich appliances contribute positively to the county-wide average.

The proposals could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from Ipswich.


22

Further reductions could be demanded across Ipswich in future.

Existing resources will be required in the light of proposed increases to Ipswich’s population and housing stock.

Firefighter job losses are regrettable and undesirable.

Ipswich has significant and particular risks (such as many high-rise buildings and houses in multiple occupation; the Docks; the county hospital; several A-roads and an industrial area).

Wholetime reductions could have an impact on prevention and protection work in the town.

It would be preferable to phase in/stage reductions gradually if they must be made.

53. Discussion around the possible development of a ‘blue light’ Hub Fire Station in the centre

of Ipswich was almost exclusively confined to the open questionnaire. Opinion was split as

to the merits of such a station: those in support felt it would assist in developing closer co-

operation and more efficient, cost-effective working relationships between the emergency

services - whereas those in opposition felt that: it would be a waste of resources; money

would be better spent on improving and maintaining existing facilities; there could be

negative effects on response times; and the varying skill-sets of the different emergency

services would make joint-working very difficult. Many others felt they needed more

information to make an informed decision on the hub proposal.

Lowestoft Proposal

Open Questionnaire

54. Slightly more than 1 in 10 respondents (15%) agreed that, within the context of the risks and

financial challenges facing the service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is

reasonable for SFRS to remove the third fire engine from Lowestoft South fire station.

However around three quarters of respondents (76%) disagreed, with just over three fifths

(61%) strongly disagreeing.

55. Respondents were also invited to comment on the proposal. The main themes that emerged

are outlined below and overleaf


% of

respondents

(Base: 1,593)

Generally disagree with proposal/the fire engine is there for a reason and

should be maintained 154 9

Proposal will risk life and public/firefighter safety 124 8


Disagree with removal of third fire engine from Lowestoft together with

proposed closure of Wrentham/need more coverage not less 44 3


23


% of

respondents

(Base: 1,593)


‘stretched’ service with less coverage/need the third engine for peak demand

times (that is, when the population doubles in summer)

40 2

Two crews will not be sufficient to deal with large/multiple incidents 32 2

Longer response times from other stations 31 2

Generally agree with proposal/appliance is not used regularly and proven not

to be needed/sufficient cover would still be available 31 2


Need more information/data available to make informed decision (for

example, how often has the engine been used in the past five years etc.) 21 1

Proposal will have a negative effect on remote/rural areas 18 1

Alternative suggestion 16 1

Third engine is needed in Lowestoft due to flooding issues 13 1

Savings should be made elsewhere 13 1

Other 148 9


56. Almost all members of the group had come along to the session in the belief that the

reductions would be more radical, and so they expressed a strong sense of relief that they

are, in their view, relatively modest. Nevertheless, when asked about the proposal to

remove the third (on-call) fire engine from Lowestoft South Fire Station on its own merits

(and not as something to be commended because it is ‘not as bad as expected’), participants

were unanimous in considering it safe, feasible and fair insofar as fire cover across

Lowestoft would remain more than adequate.

57. Yet, while they readily accepted this particular proposal, many participants’ worried that it

may represent the ‘thin end of the wedge’ in terms of the need for further reductions in

future. There was, though, a strong degree of trust that SFRS officers would not propose any

future change that could jeopardise public safety.


58. Meeting participants commented on the following issues when discussing the proposal for

Lowestoft:

Public and firefighter safety in the context of potentially longer response times

for back-up resources from other stations (especially during large-scale or

simultaneous incidents) – compounded by poor on-call firefighter availability at

some of these stations;

The pressure the proposed removal of the third Lowestoft South appliance

would place on the other Lowestoft and surrounding fire appliances;


24

The many very deprived (and thus high-risk) areas in Lowestoft;

The need for the third fire engine to cater for proposed increases to Lowestoft’s

population and housing stock; and

The possibility of replacing the third Lowestoft fire engine with a RRV.

59. As for the written submissions, only two (from local residents) were primarily concerned

with the Lowestoft South proposal - but it was frequently mentioned in the more ‘generic’

submissions. Though there was some understanding of and support for the change, most of

those who commented were opposed to it on the same grounds as outlined above - and

because of the good availability of the third fire engine; the potential loss of specialist

equipment and skills from Lowestoft; and the need to consider Lowestoft’s current and

future risks such as: the many high-rise properties; 17 ‘high-risk register’ businesses;

increased heavy industry (and associated construction and maintenance); the third river

crossing (and the added risk of large-scale engineering); and new housing, retail, business

and leisure developments.

60. Some meeting participants and written submissions were also worried about the proposals

for both Lowestoft and Wrentham on the grounds that this would represent a major

resource reduction in the Suffolk Coastal area.

Main Themes


to remove the third (on-call) fire engine from Lowestoft South Fire Station are summarised

in the table below and overleaf.


The third fire engine could be removed from Lowestoft South Fire Station safely given the falling incident numbers and other resources available locally.

The third appliance is not used regularly enough to warrant its retention.

SFRS should be trusted to implement the change safely.




The third fire engine will be required in the light of proposed increases to Lowestoft’s population and housing stock.


25

The removal of the third appliance would place significant pressure on the other Lowestoft and surrounding fire appliances.

The proposal could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from Lowestoft South Fire Station.

The proposals for both Lowestoft and Wrentham represent a major resource reduction in the Suffolk Coastal area.

Lowestoft has significant current/future risks - such as: many deprived areas; many high-rise properties and high-risk businesses; increased heavy industry; the third river crossing; and new retail, business and leisure developments.

There is a need to consider other options such as replacing the third Lowestoft fire engine with a Rapid Response Vehicle.

The proposal may represent the ‘thin end of the wedge’ regarding the need for further reductions in future.

Sudbury Proposal

Open Questionnaire

62. Only 19% of respondents agreed that, within the context of the risks and financial

challenges facing the service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is reasonable for SFRS

to change the second fire engine at Sudbury to a Rapid Response type of vehicle. More than

three fifths (62%) disagreed, with almost half (46%) reporting that they strongly disagreed.

63. Respondents were also invited to provide further comments on the proposal. The main

themes that emerged are outlined below.


% of

respondents

(Base: 449)

Generally disagree with proposal 157 35

More information required on specification of RRV prior to making an

informed decision 110 24

Second fire engine needed due to recent large fires in Sudbury 78 17

Changing a fire engine to a RRV will risk lives 68 15

RRVs are less capable/not as well equipped as a fire engine 65 14

Disagree with proposal due to increased population/housing stock/

numbers of cars on the roads 45 10

Generally agree with proposal 38 8

Sudbury fire station is too busy for a RRV 35 8


Minimal savings 23 5

Proposal is financially motivated 14 3

RRV being proposed due to recent severe fires 12 3

Many historical/listed buildings in the area 10 2

More cover is needed, not less 7 2

Other 137 31


26

‘Unofficial’ Sudbury Questionnaire

64. A local campaign that invited residents to fill in only the Sudbury element of the

questionnaire yielded a total of 4,090 responses – all of which strongly disagreed with the

replacement of the second Sudbury fire engine with a Rapid Response Vehicle. Respondents

were also invited to provide further comments about the proposal, and the main themes

that emerged are outlined below.


% of

respondents

(Base: 4,090)


Disagree with proposal due to increased population/housing stock 191 5

Changing a fire engine to a RRV will risk lives and public/firefighter safety 189 5

Second fire engine needed to cover large area 152 4

Second fire engine needed due to recent large fires in Sudbury 121 3

More cover is needed, not less 71 2

Financial savings being put before public safety 47 1

Positive personal experience of service from Sudbury Fire Station 32 1

Longer response times 31 1

Job losses unacceptable 30 1

High number of wooden/thatched properties in Sudbury 25 1

RRVs are less capable/not as well equipped as a fire engine 24 1

Many historical/listed buildings in the area 22 1

Alternative suggestions (i.e. RRV for Nayland, in addition to two fire engines) 21 1

Proposals are a ‘fait accompli’ 14 <1

Proposals will have a negative effect on rural/remote areas 14 <1

Minimal savings 12 <1

Proposal is financially motivated 12 <1


‘stretched’ service with less coverage/less resilience for large-scale or

multiple incidents 10 <1

Savings should be made elsewhere 10 <1

More information required on specification of RRV prior to making an

informed decision 9 <1

Save money by cutting non-operational staff/administrative staff/officers/

managers 7 <1

Sudbury fire station is too busy for a RRV 6 <1

Happy to pay more towards retaining the fire service 4 <1

Other 55 1


65. In discussing the proposal to replace the second Sudbury fire engine with a RRV,

participants’ questions and comments illustrated several issues of concern - mainly around:


27

the need for resilient local fire cover (especially for incidents requiring more than one ‘full’

fire engine); the potential for simultaneous incidents that stretch FRS resources locally; the

types of incident a RRV could successfully manage; the need for more information on the

specification of the RRV prior to making an informed judgement on its suitability; the

perceived increased risk from new housing and population growth in Sudbury; and the need

to protect Sudbury’s many heritage and other high-risk buildings.

66. Ultimately (and after discussion and clarification), the Sudbury group felt it could support

the replacement of the second fire engine with a RRV at Sudbury on the grounds that: it

would be a more practical vehicle to negotiate the area’s medieval towns and difficult rural

areas; a rapid initial response would be reassuring (even if it is less comprehensive),

particularly if a full fire engine is ‘off the run’ due to crew unavailability; and there is

sufficient back-up available from neighbouring fire stations.

67. The group, though, sought reassurances that Long Melford and Clare Fire Stations would

retain all of their resources to ensure fast response into Sudbury. Indeed, several

participants only supported the proposal on this proviso - and/or on the condition that the

vehicle includes all necessary and area-appropriate firefighting technology and is able to be

crewed at all times.

68. The ‘relief’ of some participants should also be noted insofar as they came to the group with

the understanding that the second fire engine was to be removed from Sudbury with no

replacement. There was a definite sense that this is a common perception among Sudbury

residents.


69. Meeting attendees raised the following worries and concerns in relation to Sudbury:

It is impossible to make an informed judgement due to a lack of detail on the

specification of the proposed RRV;

There would be a ‘reduced’ service from the proposed RRV initially - as well as

longer response times for back-up at (and thus longer ‘completion’ times for)

larger incidents;

Sudbury is a relatively high-risk area with many ‘difficult’ premises, and has

experienced a number of large fires recently;

A RRV is not suitable for Sudbury, which is busier than some of SFRS’s

wholetime stations;

The proposed change would result in considerable disruption for minimal

savings;

The proposal could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from

Sudbury; and


28

Sudbury ‘should not be used as a guinea pig’ for a RRV, which may be better

suited to another area such as Nayland.

70. 10 written submissions (from Clare Town Council; Great Cornard Parish Council; Newton

Parish Council; Sudbury Town Council; Sudbury and Cornard against Fire Cuts; and five local

residents) were primarily concerned with the Sudbury proposal – and it was frequently

mentioned in the more ‘generic’ submissions. Though there was some understanding of and

support for the change, most of those who commented were opposed to it on the same

grounds as outlined above – and because: a RRV is not required in Sudbury in terms of

topography, access or type of incident; fast response times from Long Melford into Sudbury

may be difficult to maintain in the event of a higher call frequency there; the second fire

engine is required to cater for proposed increases to Sudbury’s population and housing

stock; and that staffing reductions could have an impact on the amount of prevention and

protection work undertaken in the town.


71. The suggested replacement of the second Sudbury fire engine with a RRV was opposed on

social media on the grounds that: Sudbury experiences relatively high activity levels,

particularly in relation to fire; it would not be fit for purpose, especially during simultaneous

incidents; and that people are unable to give an informed opinion without an exact

specification for the proposed vehicle.

Main Themes


to replace the second Sudbury fire engine with a Rapid Response Vehicle are summarised in

the table below and overleaf.


A rapid initial response would be reassuring (even if it is less comprehensive), particularly if a fire engine is ‘off the run’ due to crew unavailability.

There is sufficient back-up available from neighbouring fire stations (most of those who offered support did so on the proviso that Long Melford and Clare would retain all current resources).


There would be a ‘reduced’ service from the proposed RRV initially - as well as longer response times for back-up at (and thus longer ‘completion’ times for) larger incidents.


The second fire engine will be required in the light of proposed increases to Sudbury’s population and housing stock.


29

It is impossible to make an informed judgement due to a lack of detail on the specification of the proposed RRV.

Sudbury is a relatively high-risk area with many ‘difficult’ premises, and has experienced a number of large fires recently.

A RRV is not suitable for Sudbury Fire Station, which covers a large area and is busier than some of SFRS’s wholetime stations.

The proposed change would result in considerable disruption for minimal savings.

A RRV is not required in Sudbury in terms of topography, access or type of incident.

Staffing reductions (which are unacceptable) could have an impact on the amount of prevention and protection work undertaken in the town.

There is a need to protect Sudbury’s many heritage and other high-risk buildings.

The proposal could result in the loss of specialist equipment and skills from Sudbury Fire Station.

Sudbury ‘should not be used as a guinea pig’ for a RRV, which may be better suited to another area such as Nayland.

Wrentham Proposal

Open Questionnaire

73. 15% of respondents agreed that, within the context of the risks and financial challenges

facing the service and reduced levels of 999 call demand, it is reasonable for SFRS to remove

the fire engine and close Wrentham Fire Station. However, almost three quarters of

respondents (72%) disagreed, with around three fifths (59%) strongly disagreeing.

74. Respondents were also invited to make further comments about the proposal to close

Wrentham Fire station. The comments are summarised in the table below and overleaf.


% of

respondents

(Base: 418)


Proposal will risk life and public/firefighter safety 118 28

Longer response times to Wrentham from other stations 83 20

Proposal will lead to insufficient cover for the area 76 18

Wrentham Fire Station covers the busy A12 67 16

Wrentham Fire Station covers rural/remote areas 64 15

Agree with proposal (general agreement, proximity of Reydon and Lowestoft

South, Wrentham does not attend many calls) 53 13

Disagree with proposal together with removal of third fire engine from

Lowestoft South 37 9

Wrentham provides vital back up for surrounding areas 27 6

Minimal savings 25 6

Difficult access into Wrentham from Reydon/Southwold/Lowestoft 20 5




30


% of

respondents

(Base: 418)

More information required 19 5



Should improve on-call availability rather than closure 8 2


Savings could be made elsewhere 8 2

Proposal could impact on prevention and protection in Wrentham 7 2

Lack of cover for large-scale/simultaneous incidents 6 1

Would prefer to pay more council tax to offset proposal 6 1

Already pay council tax for these services 6 1

Other 99 24


75. In discussing the proposals, focus group participants were concerned about a number of

issues - for example that: new housing and population growth in the county must be

increasing risks substantially; simultaneous incidents stretch the resources of the FRS,

making it very difficult to reduce resources; and that general response times are probably

increasing due to congestion on the roads. Participants also appreciated the difficulties

arising from variable RDS availability and thought the matter should be addressed with

some urgency wherever possible.

76. In discussing the Wrentham proposal, the group members were curious to know the size of

the fire station area and to what extent it receives back-up or primary cover from other fire

stations. Above all, though, they were concerned about the potential impact of the proposal

on response times and the weight of attack available for the more serious incidents.

77. Some were especially concerned about what they interpreted as the cumulative effect of

the changes insofar as: ‘is it feasible for all the proposals to go ahead? We’d be losing two

fire engines in this corner of the county’ - and the group was also concerned about the

effects on the Wrentham RDS crew, asking how they would be treated and what could be

done to lessen the impact on them.

78. Overall though, the issues summarised above were not seen as insuperable obstacles by

some members of the group, though there were issues on which they sought reassurance

from the SFRS managers. Indeed, two people thought the Wrentham proposal was

definitely ‘safe and feasible’ in its own right; but one of them was concerned about the

change happening alongside others to the Lowestoft South on-call service. They also

stressed the financial challenges and thought the proposal for Wrentham was reasonable in

this context.


31

79. Two others thought the proposal for Wrentham was unsafe and undesirable, with one of

them believing strongly that ‘the emergency services should not have to face cuts’ and ‘the

population is growing’. However, even while disagreeing with the proposal, the same

person said, ‘but I trust the fire and rescue service in saying that the proposal is safe’. The

remaining person said they could not make a firm judgement one way or the other

80. Overall, everyone said that the proposal might well be OK, but not in the context of the

Lowestoft South on-call changes.


81. With specific regard to Wrentham, meeting participants objected to the proposal on the

following grounds:

Public and firefighter safety could be compromised - particularly in the context

of potentially longer response times for back-up resources from other stations;

Reydon and Southwold Fire Station has poor on-call firefighter availability;

Wrentham Fire Station serves a large and diverse area and is strategically

located on the A12;

Access from Reydon and Southwold into Wrentham can be difficult;

The proposed change will result in considerable disruption for minimal savings;

and

The station will be required to cater for proposed increases to Wrentham’s

population and housing stock.

82. As for the written submissions, 13 (from the Group Parish Council of Frostenden, Uggeshall

and South Cove; the Sotterley Estate (2 submissions); Wrentham Parish Council; Dr Therese

Coffey MP; and eight local residents) related to the Wrentham proposal - and it was

frequently mentioned in the more ‘generic’ submissions. Though there was some

understanding of and support for the change given the proximity of Reydon and Lowestoft

South stations and the small number of incidents attended by the Wrentham crew, in the

main respondents objected to the proposal on the same grounds as outlined above, and

because: the Wrentham crews are often deployed outside its formal response area (mainly

to back-up Reydon and Southwold) and their availability is better than stated; staffing

reductions could have an impact on prevention and protection work in the area; and more

effort should be made to improve on-call availability as opposed to closing the fire station.

83. Some meeting participants and written submissions were also worried about the proposals

for both Lowestoft and Wrentham on the grounds that this would represent a major

resource reduction in the Suffolk Coastal area.


32

Submissions Via Social Media

84. Finally, the proposed closure of Wrentham Fire Station was discussed on social media in the

context of longer response times, the proximity of the A12 and the excellent attendance at

the Wrentham public meeting.

Main Themes


to close Wrentham Fire Station are summarised in the table below.


The fire station could be safely closed given the proximity of Reydon and Lowestoft South stations and the small number of incidents attended by the Wrentham crew.

The proposed change is reasonable in the context of SFRS’s financial challenges.

SFRS should be trusted to implement the change safely.




The fire engine will be required in the light of proposed increases to the area’s population and housing stock.

Wrentham Fire Station serves a large, diverse and rural area and is strategically located on the A12.

Access from Reydon and Southwold into Wrentham can be difficult.

Wrentham crews are often deployed outside their formal response area (mainly to back-up Reydon and Southwold) and their availability is better than stated.

The proposed change would result in considerable disruption for minimal savings.

The closure of the station could have an impact on the amount of prevention and protection work undertaken in the area.

The proposals for both Lowestoft and Wrentham represent a major resource reduction in the Suffolk Coastal area.

On-call firefighter job losses are regrettable.

Council tax increases should be considered to maintain the fire station.

More effort should be made to improve on-call availability as opposed to closing the fire station.


33

Submissions from Representative Bodies

86. Three comprehensive submissions were received from the FRS Representative Bodies: the

Fire Brigades Union (FBU), the Fire Officers’ Association (FOA), and the Retained Firefighters

Union (RFU). These have been fully summarised in the main report and readers are

encouraged to consult these precis for a full account of the organisations’ views,

assumptions and reasoning - but the main points raised (as well as some alternative

suggestions) were as below.

FBU

The FBU states that SFRS has become the most cost-effective (or cheapest) FRS in the

Country; meaning it is a very lean service with very little resource to cut. And while it is

appreciated that SCC has previously shown some financial protection, the FBU suggests this

recognises that SFRS can ill-afford to have its budget reduced. The FBU strongly believes

that the proposed IRMP reductions will not improve fire cover and will increase risk to the

public and firefighters - and that to follow through with them will be detrimental to the

provision of a fire and rescue service for Suffolk.

The affected individual branches of the Union submitted their own responses to the IRMP

proposals, which were wholly rejected in all cases. The many and varied reasons given for

this opposition have been included within the area-based summaries above (and are

included in full within the relevant chapter of the full report).

FOA

While understanding that funding reductions must be accounted for, the FOA feels that

SFRS is already the leanest Service in the UK and that its resilience will be ‘massively

undermined’ by the reduction of the wholetime establishment (which, in a predominantly

on-call service, is the only guaranteed resource to support Service delivery).

The FOA also has concerns about reductions in personnel with the adequate skills to

operate specialist equipment - and the ‘detrimental impact’ this would have on the Service’s

ability to deal with certain incidents and support national resilience. This, it is said, will need

to be addressed to ensure sufficiently trained personnel and adequate training time.

Regarding the proposals themselves, the FOA understands the rationale underpinning those

for Bury St Edmunds, Lowestoft, Sudbury and Wrentham - but feels strongly that on-call

availability at affected and surrounding stations must be improved to ensure timely

response and back-up. The Association does not, however, support a 50% reduction in fire

cover across Ipswich (the reasons for which have been included in the area-based summary

above), though it does understand the proposed removal of the third appliance from

Ipswich East (while suggesting that consideration must be given to the number of on-call

posts there given the wide range of specialist appliances and equipment at the station).


34

RFU

While the RFU fully understands the challenging economic environment SFRS finds itself in,

it is concerned that the Service is proposing to remove six fire engines - five of which are on-

call. This, the Union believes, will impact on the Service’s ability to respond to large-scale

incidents such as flooding and spate dry conditions.

The consultation document acknowledges a problem with the availability of on-call

firefighters, and the RFU is keen to see this improved via an ongoing three-way relationship

between the Service, on-call employees and their primary employers.

As for the proposals:

The RFU suggests an alternative proposal for Bury St Edmunds Fire Station

(please see overleaf);

The RFU supports the proposed removal of the third wholetime crew from

Ipswich on the grounds that there is currently a ‘costly overprovision of

wholetime resources’ in the area. However, it is concerned about an overall

50% reduction to fire cover across Ipswich for reasons outlined in the area-

based summary above;

The RFU is concerned that SFRS is proposing to introduce a RRV at Sudbury

without providing details on how it will save money, improve the service or be

operationally viable. The Union feels it cannot support this proposal in its

current form because there are too many unknowns; and

While acknowledging that low availability means Wrentham Fire Station does

not respond to many calls, the RFU requests more information on whether a

fully crewed station would provide valuable cover for the Service. Also, if the

changes in Wrentham and Lowestoft South go ahead, the RFU is concerned

about a major reduction in fire cover in the South Lowestoft/Kessingland area.

Alternatives

87. Some alternatives were also proposed. For example, the RFU agrees with Sir Ken Knight’s

report (Facing the Future) that it is in the public’s interest to better utilise on-call staff, and

thus considers it disappointing that the service wishes to reduce rather than increase their

number across the county. As such, the Union suggests the following to realise alternative

savings greater than those that would be yielded by some of the current proposals:

Reviewing the 2-2-4 full-time shift system at Bury St Edmunds given the station

only responded to 195 calls last year in its station area (excluding false alarms);

Reviewing the 2-2-4 full-time shift system at Ipswich East given the station only

responded to 317 calls (including false alarms) last year at a cost of £8,276 per

call; and


35

Reviewing crewing arrangements at Haverhill and New Market Fire Stations

(which attended 178 [86 false alarms] and 187 [91 false alarms] last year

respectively): the RFU feels that these stations’ call levels are low enough to

warrant a stand-alone, one pump on-call station - and that both are

surrounded by neighbouring resources in Cambridgeshire and Essex.

88. Furthermore, both the RFU and FBU did not consider a RRV to be right for Sudbury (for

many of the reasons outlined in the area-based summary above), but would ‘welcome the

opportunity to work with SFRS on a trial at a better location’ (RFU) or would be open to

helping develop a working group to look at the use of such vehicles (FBU).

Conclusions

Introduction

89. The SCC Cabinet will draw its own conclusions from the consultation elements reported

here and from the other evidence available for its consideration. So the following remarks

are not intended to advise the Cabinet on its final decision, but only to identify where there

was general agreement in the consultation process, while also indicating the relative weight

that might be attached to the different methods that in many cases produced radically

different outcomes.

Range of Opinions

90. The summary above has demonstrated a stark contrast between the questionnaire, various

meetings, petitions, and many submissions that were generally very strongly opposed to

most of the IRMP Proposals (on the one hand) - and (on the other hand) the public focus

groups and some submissions that accepted them or could see the case for some change. In

this context, the Cabinet has to consider whether any consultation methods and/or opinions

carry more weight than others, while also taking into account all the other evidence for or

against the proposals.

Meaning of Consultation

91. When interpreting the findings reported here, a key principle is that consultation is not a

referendum: it is not a ‘numbers game’ and the loudest or majority opinions should not

automatically prevail. The key issue is not whether most people agree or disagree with the

proposals, but, Are the reasons for their popularity or unpopularity cogent? However

popular or unpopular proposals might be, the Cabinet will want to consider if they are

evidence-based, feasible, safe, sustainable, reasonable and value-for-money.


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Interpreting the Consultation Methods

Criteria

92. The consultation methods yielded different results, as we have seen - so what weight should

the SCC Cabinet attach to each of them? While not pretending to be exhaustive, ORS

suggests that in making its assessments the Cabinet should have regard to: whether views

expressed reflected general public opinion; whether respondents were relatively well or

poorly informed about the evidence; whether opinions were ‘thoughtful’ (based on personal

deliberation) or the result of organised campaigns marshalling collective sentiments;

whether the views expressed were cogent and evidence-based; and how many people were

supportive or opposed (though we suggest that normally this will be the least important

consideration).

Overall Conclusions

93. The table below shows the relative support for and opposition to the overall case for change

and the area-specific proposals by consultation strand. Of course, there were opposing

views within each engagement method, but in this case the majority view is stated.

QUESTIONNAIRE MEETINGS (PUBLIC/STAFF/

OTHER)

PUBLIC FOCUS

GROUPS

SUBMISSIONS PETITIONS

OVERALL CASE FOR CHANGE

OPPOSED OPPOSED SUPPORTED OPPOSED OPPOSED

BURY ST EDMUNDS PROPOSAL


IPSWICH PROPOSALS

OPPOSED (more support for ‘Blue Light

Hub’)

OPPOSED DIVIDED OPPOSED OPPOSED

LOWESTOFT PROPOSAL


SUDBURY PROPOSAL


WRENTHAM PROPOSAL

OPPOSED OPPOSED DIVIDED OPPOSED OPPOSED

ORS and SCC Cabinet Roles

94. Interpreting the overall ‘meaning’ of the consultation outcomes is neither straightforward

nor just ‘numerical’ – for the different methods, groups and outcomes have to be not only

respected, but also ‘evaluated’ in terms of the relative weight to be attached to each. They

cannot be simply ‘summated’ into an unambiguous consensus.

95. It is also worth reiterating that consultation is not a ‘numbers game’ - and that the key issue

is not whether most people agree or disagree with the proposals but whether the reasons


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for their popularity or unpopularity are rational and convincing. People’s reasoning has been

well documented throughout this report, and it is this that the SCC Cabinet will primarily

wish to consider when making its judgements.

96. In this context, it is not the role of ORS to make policy recommendations or to go beyond

the fact-based interpretation above. In the light of our general guidance, the SCC Cabinet

will consider all the consultation outcomes, alongside all the other evidence, in order to

make its decisions. Ultimately, an overall interpretation of the consultation will depend

upon the Cabinet itself: its members will consider all elements and determine which seem

the most telling, by considering the relative merits of the various opinions as the basis for

public policy.

97. The challenge for the Cabinet is to maintain public and professional confidence in the safety

and resilience of SFRS services while also demonstrating that it can successfully deliver

appropriate changes to balance its budget. We trust that this report will make at least some

contribution to that endeavour.

suffolk fire and rescue service and suffolk county council · 2016. 4. 6. · opinion research...

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