The 1983 Election Campaign in ScotZand 11

a l l t h e arguments. The SNP were i r r e l e v a n t and Labour were mis in formed. The Government had p r o t e c t e d e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s and knew how t o p resent t h e case. about one assumption, t h a t what was s a i d i n Scot land would m a t t e r . Scot land arose n o t t h e s l i g h t e s t i n t e r e s t down South and Scot land was indeed dragged a long i n t h e wake o f England 's march. s i d e r a b l e success o f t h e un-Scot t i sh A l l i a n c e o n l y conf i rmed t h e d r i f t . ' T i l l the l a s t M i n i s t e r o f t h e K i r k i s s t r a n g l e d w i t h t h e l a s t copy o f t h e Sunday P o s t ' , Tom N a i r n once wrote, 'Sco t land w i l l no be f r e e ' , t o which I can o n l y add t h a t u n t i l the SNP r i s e aga in i t w i l l no be v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g e i t h e r .

He was wrong o n l y The campaign i n

The l a s t minute drop i n Labour 's suppor t , t h e con-

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SUBSTANCE AND FORM I N P O L I T I C A L THEORY:

A SCEPTICAL COMMENT UPON BARRY'S ATTACK

ON RAWL'S TREATMENT OF TOLERATION GEOFFREY W SMITH

Barry's Criticism o f RawZs I n c h a p t e r l l o f The L i b e r a l Theory of J u s t i c e B r i a n Bar ry misgu ided ly takes John

Rawls t o t a s k f o r a supposed f a l l a c y i n h i s argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n (Barry , 1975 pp.121-27). B a r r y ' s mis take i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one, n o t s imp ly because i t i m p o r t a n t l y misrepresents Rawls' p o s i t i o n on t o l e r a t i o n , b u t a l s o because i t f l o w s f rom t h e adop- t i o n o f a method o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, though w i d e l y favoured amongst modern Ancjlo- American p o l i t i c a l ph i losophers , can i n f a c t be q u i t e t reacherous.

The essence o f B a r r y ' s o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t Rawls' way o f f o r m u l a t i n g t h e o p t i o n s between which bersons i n t h e ' o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ' a r e t o choose begs t h e ques t ion i n favour o f l i b e r a l i s m and t o l e r a t i o n .

The cho ice t o be made i s a cho ice between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f s o c i e t y , each w i t h advantages and disadvantages, a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y and an or thodox s o c i e t y . . . Rawls m i s - s t a t e s t h e case by say ing t h a t t h e person i n t h e ' o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ' c o u l d n o t r a t i o n a l l y w ish f o r a major i ty - imposed or thodoxy because, a l t h o u g h he would more l i k e l y than n o t be i n t h e m a j o r i t y , he would n o t t a k e t h e r i s k o f be ing i n t h e m i n o r i t y . F o r t o pose t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s way it takes i t f o r g ran ted t h a t t h e person i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n w i l l t u r n o u t t o l i v e i n a p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y , so t h a t t h a t q u e s t i o n i s whether t o i n t r o d u c e or thodoxy. (Barry , 1975 p123)

Th is i s a mis-statement, B a r r y argues, because Rawls ' own p r i n c i p l e s p e r m i t access, even behind t h e ' v e i l o f ignorance ' , t o a body o f psycho log ica l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s con- c e r n i n g t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n . Hence, persons i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a r e a b l e t o conceive o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an a l t e r n a t i v e b o t h t o major i ty - imposed or thodoxy ( w i t h i t s r i s k o f p e r s e c u t i o n f o r anyone who happens t o t u r n out. t o be a member o f a m i n o r i t y persuasion) and t o l i b e r a l p l u r a l i s m ; namely a s o c i e t y ( t h e ' o r t h o d o x ' s o c i e t y ) i n which p e r s e c u t i o n can never occur because d i s s e n t i s imposs ib le . I t i s imposs ib le because t h e k i n d o f vocabulary a v a i l a b l e t o t h e i n h a b i t a n t s i s t o o impover ished t o enable anyone even t o f o r m u l a t e heterodox o p i n i o n s and values. e f f e c t i v e choice, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t as Rawls p resents i t - as between t o l e r a t i o n and t h e r i s k o f p e r s e c u t i o n - b u t r a t h e r between t o l e r a t i o n and t h e m o n o l i t h i c (and hence e n t i r e l y r i s k - f r e e ) or thodoxy o f a r e l e n t l e s s l y i d e o l o g i c a l l y homogeneous s o c i e t y . Bar ry m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no reason t o t h i n k t h a t Rawlsian prudent r i s k - a v o i d e r s must o p t f o r a s o c i e t y o f d i v e r s i t y p l u s t o l e r a t i o n when faced w i t h these a l t e r n a t i v e s . And he concludes t h e chapter on a n o t e which r e c u r s throughout h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f A Theory o f J u s t i c e : Rawls' h a n d l i n g o f t h e argument f o r t o l e r a t i o n rep- resents mere ly one more example o f h i s fundamenta l l y mis taken a t tempt t o squeeze moral

The

12 Geoffpey W Smith

conclusions from (ostensibly) neutral premises. The truth of the matter, Barry contends, is tha t freedom of conscience and l iberal values generally can properly be defended only on the basis of a c o ~ i ~ e ~ t t o a particular and dis t inct ive idea (a 'Faustian vision' Barry ca l l s i t ) of human l i f e (Barry, 1975, p.126).

Ar ument. The fundamenta~ idea is tha t we may expect t o f i n d the key t o the in t e l l i g i - + b i i t y of a poli t ical theory i n i t s author's understanding o f men's powers and poten- ti a1 i t i e s , and of their characteris ti c wants, needs and purposes. version of th i s currently pretty-we1 1 undisputed methodological precept by drawing a now celebrated distinction:

Barry's position here re f lec ts the method he developed i n his earlier Pol i t ical

Barry formul ates his

To make, as I sha l l , a fundamental d i s t inc t ion between what I shall call on one side 'want-regarding principles ' and on the other 'ideal-regarding principles', involves a decision which can be justif ied only by the power of the ist tinct ion to illuminate pol i t ical cont rouer~ies whose f o u ~ ~ a t i o ~ ~ are a t present obscure. (Barry, 1965, p.38)

Thus, there are those thinkers who take men's natures much as they find them and i n a more or less straight~orward Uti l i tar ian manner aim t o maximize want-satjsfaction, and there are thosewho, moved by a vision of what men could, o r should, o r ideally will come t o want, fashion the i r pol i t ical theories in perfectionist terms. B u t , i n e i ther case, identifying and revealing the conception of human naturewhichshapes the theory must illuminate what otherwise may well remain puzzlirtg or enigmatic. The impl ica t i~ns fo r Barry's reading of Rawls are clear. As a society of t o t a l and hence painless orthodoxy i s , from a sheer want-regarding p o i n t o f view, manifestly a possible pre- ference for choosers in theoriginal position whose motive i s avoidance of r i sk , Rawls' claim tha t they will opt f o r a society o f tolerant ~ l u r a l i s m is revealed (and i l ~ u ~ i n a t ~ d ~ as a covert ideal-regarding commitment, misleadingly presented i n the apparently neutral idiom of rational choice. Hence Barry fee ls that he is i n a position to call fo r Rawls ta clear his mind, off as the impjication o f a formal piece of reasoning ' * . . the l iberal must take his stand on tbeproposition that some ways of l i f e , some types of character, are more admirable than others, whatever the majority opinion i n any society. ' (Barry, 1975, p.126)

Instead o f a t t em~t ing t o pass a s u b ~ t a n ~ i ~ e p ~ l ~ t i c a l c ~ ~ i ~ ~ n ~

A Defence of RmZs However, Barry i n f ac t gives us b u t half a s tory, fo r he ignores certain crucial

formal considerations which also apply t o Rawls' position on toleration. I n the course of developing his account of the 'formal constraints o f the concept of r i g h t ' , that is to say, of conditions which serve to constrain persons engaged i n considering the choice o f any ethical principles, Rawls s t ipulates w h a t he ca l l s a 'formal constraint of pub1 i ci ty ' :

'The parties ( i n the original position) assume tha t they a re choosing principles for a public conception of justice. They suppose t h a t everyone will k~ow about these principles a l l tha t he w ~ u ~ d know i f t h e i r acceptance were the resu l t of an agreement. ' (Rawls 1972, p. 133)

Though Rawls does not specif ical ly draw them out, this publicity rule bears two impli- cations which, by themselves, exclude Barry's orthodox society a priori. F i r s t l y , part of what 'everyone will know' about principles of jus t ice must cJearly fnclude the reasons which ju s t i fy , or purport to j u s t i fy them. B u t i f a reason is to functjon as a jus t i f ica tory reason i t must surely presuppose a t least the possibi l i ty of other princi- ples grounded i n other reasons against which i t could be a contender. And this i s precisely what. cannot occur i n Barry's thoroughly one-dimensional society, where dissent is precluded by making alternatives t o the moral status quo s t r i c t l y inconceivable, Moreover, the formal s t i ~ u l a t i o n l a id down by Rawls also specifies t h a t principles o f jus t ice must be such tha t they can be seen as i f they had arisen out of an agreement made i n a hypothetical si tuation of choice. society i s by d e f i n i t j ~ n one i n which there cannot possibly be al ternat ive principles

Yet, again, Barry's t o t a l ly orthodox

Substance and Form i n P o l i t i c a l Theory: A Sceptical Comment upon B a r q ' s Attack on Rmls' Treatment of Toleration

13

between which such a choice could ever conceivably have been t h o u g h t t o be made. b.y r e s t r i c t i n s the range of a l te rna t ives between which choice i s Permissible. the Publi-

T h u s ,

c7ty constraint alone i s su f f i c i en t t o ru l e o u t Barry's tertium q b i d between-the th rea t of m a j o r i m p o s e d orthodoxy and l ibera l pluralism.

'

To suqqest, therefore, tha t Raw1 s ' signal e r ro r consi s ts in i 11 i c i t l y be; nding the preferences -of his rational choosers by a covert imputation of ideal-regarding motives i n order t o def lec t them from what i s manifestly a prudent option i s t o miss the f a c t t ha t a society of to ta l orthodoxy i s precluded as a possible object f o r choice antecedently t o any choices made in the original posit ion. Hence, Rawls has his r e s u l t even before his choosers s i t down t o consider the options and , consequently, independently of any par t icu lar conception of t h e i r motives or values.

To this i t m i g h t be replied tha t , even i f the publicity condition can carry Rawls t o his conclusion for to le ra t ion , t h i s i s only because i t i s the constraint i t s e l f which bears the substantive l ibera l commitment. I s n ' t i t the case then, tha t Barry i s s t i l l basically correct i n h i s ana lys i s , even though he might be somewhat of f - ta rge t in locating the precise position of the bias? s h r i f t . t ractual idiom in which Rawls presents i t . Admittedly the idea of a social contract between hypothetically abstracted individuals i s typ ica l ly l i b e r a l . B u t the actual components of the ru le merely specify two general formal conditions f o r moral reasoning which a re eas i ly detachable from the notion of a contract .1 One spec i f ies the public ava i l ab i l i t y of pr inciples of j u s t i c e and the reasons f o r them; the other requires moral reasoning t o take place with reference t o possible a l t e rna t ive principles and reasons. Of course, there may well be a sense in which these elements presuppose a substantive position in tha t they exclude the narrowly gemeinschaft-minded conservatism which objects t o the idea of c r i t i c a l moral reasoning as such. oughly one-dimensional morality of the kind Barry requires could properly be called a 'morali ty ' a t a l l . And even i f we are prepared t o admit t ha t i t might, i t surely s t re tches the term ' l i b e r a l ' to the point of vacuity t o argue t h a t a l l other moral positions than t h i s must be l i b e r a l .

B u t t h i s again gives Rawls too short a We need t o dist inguish between the publ ic i ty s t ipu la t ion i t s e l f and the con-

B u t i t i s f a r from c lear tha t a thor-

Rawlsian Toleration Reconsidered The e f f ec t then, of Barry's interpretat ion i s n o t r ea l ly ' i l luminat ing ' a t a l l .

I t simply makes Rawls' defence of to le ra t ion appear t o be f a r more exposed than in f ac t i t i s . For, whatever Rawls' theory of human natureLmightbe, whether i t i s the Faustian view ascribed to him by Barry or n o t , the formal publicity constraint which he imposes upon any acceptable s e t of principles of j u s t i c e i s su f f i c i en t t o get him his conclusion.

This i s n o t t o say, of course, t ha t Rawls ac tua l ly pursues t h i s l i n e of argument. I t i s implici t ra ther than e x p l i c i t in his posit ion. On the contrary, he does indeed, as Barry charges, take i t forgranted tha t persons i n the or iginal position will turn out t o l i ve in a p l u r a l i s t i c society, and he i l l i c i t l y presents to le ra t ion a s the outcome of a s t ra tegy of risk-avoidance (Rawls, 1972, pp.206-7). B u t , c lear ly , pluralism cannot f igure both as an antecedent and a s an outcome of choice in the original posit ion; and in running both Rawls commits himself t o a major s t ructural inconsistency in his theory. upon which Barry concentrates his a t tack , i s log ica l ly redundant, and must be abandoned. Barry misses t h i s , however, because his preoccupation with finding the hidden theory of human nature behind Rawls' apparently formal reasoning leads him t o focus upon the way in which Rawls smuggles an ideal-regarding conception of human in t e re s t s into an argument the position and s t a tus of which in the overall theory i s l e f t unquestioned.

(and Rawls' i s weightier than most) i s never simply a set of deductions from some con- ception of human nature o r other. say, a complex of substantive and formal propositions - o f empirical claims, evaluative ccmmitments and s t ipu la t ions of method - the ramifications of which i t s author rarely keeps en t i r e ly i n hand.

In a l l consistency Rawls' exp l i c i t posit ion on to le ra t ion - - v iz theone

Perhaps the moral to be drawn froin a l l this i s t h a t a po l i t i ca l theory o f any weight

I t i s always more or less sympathetic; tha t i s t o

One's in te rpre ta t ive approach must involve an appreciation of t h i s

14 Geoffrey W Smith

ra ther obvious fact . ' Rawls' defence of to le ra t ion i s a good example of what happens when the author somewhat loses his g r i p , and Barry's c r i t i c i sm of t h a t defence i s an equally good example of what can happen whenthecomplexity o f what i s i n f a c t going on is dis tor ted by an unilluminating methodology.

Notes 1 . T h u s Rawls says of the formal constraints of the concept of r i g h t t h a t 'Each of

them i s suitably weak and I assume t h a t they a r e s a t i s f i e d by the t rad i t iona l conceptions of j u s t i c e . ' The formal intra- theoret ical pressures bearing upon and modifying Marx's theory of human in te res t s a re considered i n section 3 of my 'Must Radicals be Marxists? Lukes on Power, Contestabi l i ty , and Alienation' (1981), British Journal of Pol i t ica l Science , Vol . 11 , pp.405-25.

2.

References Barry, B. (1965) , Pol i t ica l Argument (London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul). Barry, B. (1975), The Liberal Theory of J u s t i c e (Oxford: Clarendon Press) . Rawls, J . (1972), A Theory of J u s t i c e (Oxford: University Press).

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THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT I N WEST GERMANY SIMON BULMER

British commentators on the West German general e lec t ion of October 1980 seemed t o agree t h a t there-election of the coa l i t ion government of Social Democrats(SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) under Chancel l o r Helmut Schmidt was a1 1 r a t h e r predictable (Carl-Sime and Hall , 1980). I t I . . . demonstrated once again the profound conservatism o f the West German e lec tora te ' (Irving and Paterson, 1981, p.191). Yet i n March 1983, only some t h i r t y months l a t e r , the German e lec tora te voted i n a Centre-Right coal i t ion con- s i s t i n g of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and of a somewhat re-styled FDP.

about under circumstances of const i tut ional dispute. the Free Democrats I change of coal i t i on a1 1 egi ance of September/October 1982. From the perspective of e lectoral behaviour, the March 1983 elect ion was something of a paradox. On the one hand, i t witnessed the l a r g e s t s h i f t s i n German voting behaviour f o r twenty- f i v e years; on the other hand, there was s t i l l a large measure of pred ic tab i l i ty amidst these shifts.

of German p o l i t i c s : the 1980 e lec t ion ; the internal d i f f i c u l t i e s of the coal i t ion leading t o i t s collapse i n September 1982; and the campaign associated w i t h the March 1983 elect ions . Whilst the 1980 elect ion r e s u l t was considered t o be predictable a t the time, i t now appears t o be a short-term aberration stemming from the media at tent ion given t o the two main chancellor candidates. Policy programmes counted f o r l i t t l e as the credent ia ls of the dramatis personae (Schmidt and Strauss) were p u t under close scrut iny. This merely postponed the policy debate which emerged primarily w i t h i n the coa l i t ion : between the par t ies and inside the SPD. The delayed - yet severe - impact of the international recession upon West Germany required economies i n federal expendi- tu re . The manifest i n a b i l i t y of the Schmidt coa l i t ion t o agree on these savings caused the government's collapse, and not surpr i s ing ly , economic themes were the main focus of the ensuing elect ion campaign. e lect ion represents a milestone i n the development of the German party system.

The March 1983 elect ion - held some eighteen months ahead of schedule - was brought The r e s u l t served t o legit imise

How i s t h i s ra ther contradictory s i tua t ion t o be explained? To account f o r the change of government requires an assessment of three phases

Taken together, the three phases suggest t h a t the 1983