SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE Cinderellas or Fairy Godmothers?

A Public Seminar organized by the Institute of International Affairs and Center for

Small States Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Iceland

Tuesday 9 October 2007

Proceedings compiled by Vilborg Ása Guðjónsdóttir MA student in International Relations at the University of Iceland

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© 2008 Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small State Studies, University of Iceland

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Preface After the end of the Cold War a new belt of voluntary groups of neighbouring countries emerged in Europe, stretching from the Barents area in the far north to the Black Sea in the south. The new democracies in the region wanted to explore their newly gained independence and it was still relatively open how they would organize the relations with their neighbours. The “subregional” groups created at that time, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), are often perceived as weak and have received relatively little attention. The objective of this seminar was to compare these organizations with the European Union and NATO and explore the role of such organizations in European security, democracy and integration, by comparing and contrasting the experience of the Nordic/ Baltic region and of South-Eastern Europe to the present day. Introduction On the 9th of October 2007 the Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small State Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Iceland held a seminar on subregional organizations in Europe at the National and University Library in Iceland. Speakers included Ambassador Alyson Bailes, a former Director of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), currently a visiting professor at the University of Iceland, Professor Valur Ingimundarson from the University of Iceland, Ambassador of Romania to Sweden Victoria Popescu and Ambassador of Moldova to Sweden Natalia Gherman. In addition Ambassador Bailes interviewed Ambassador Kornelíus Sigmundsson from the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the closing statement was made by Sweden´s Ambassador to Iceland Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens. Subregional organizations took on a new important role in Europe, and also in some other regions (Africa), after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the so-called multipolar New World Order. Ambassador Bailes gave an introductory lecture on the nature of these organizations and their role in European security, democracy and integration. Professor Ingimundarson gave a realistic appreciation of the organizations Iceland is a member of and their role and effectiveness. Ambassador Popescu discussed the strategic importance of the Black Sea Region, subregional groupings in the region, and Romania´s role; and Ambassador Gherman discussed the experience of Moldova in Central and South-East European arrangements. After a short break Ambassador Bailes interviewed Ambassador Sigmundsson on Iceland´s experience in subregional organizations and last but not least Ambassador Wilkens made a statement on the Swedish CBSS Presidency. Three sessions of question and answer and general debate with the audience were included.

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Formáli Eftir lok kalda stríðsins stofnuðu ríki staðsett frá Barentshafi í norðri til Svartahafs í suðri nýjar svæðisbundnar stofnanir í Evrópu. Nýju lýðræðisríkin á þessu svæði vildu kanna nýfengið sjálfstæði sitt og það var ennþá tiltölulega opið hvernig þau myndu haga samskiptum sínum við nágrannaríki sín. Oft er litið á þá svæðisbundnu hópa sem voru stofnaðir á þeim tíma, eins og CBSS, CEI og BSEC, sem veikbyggðar stofnanir og hafa þær almennt fengið litla athygli. Markmið málstofunnar var að bera þessar stofnanir saman við Evrópusambandið og NATO og skoða hlutverk þeirra á sviði öryggis, lýðræðis og samþættingar í Evrópu, með því að bera saman reynslu Norðurlanda og Eystrasaltslanda annars vegar og ríkja suðaustur Evrópu hins vegar. Inngangur Þann 9. október 2007 héldu Alþjóðamálastofnun og Rannsóknasetur um smáríki við Háskóla Íslands í samstarfi við stjórnmálafræðiskor HÍ opna málstofa um svæðisbundnar alþjóðastofnanir í Evrópu. Málstofan var haldin í fyrirlestrarsal Landsbókasafns Íslands og þeir sem tóku til máls voru Alyson Bailes, fyrrum stjórnandi Friðarrannsóknarstofnunar Stokkhólms (The Stockholm Peace Institute (SIPRI)) sem starfar nú sem gestakennari við stjórnmálafræðiskor Háskóla Íslands, Valur Ingimundarson prófessor við sagnfræðiskor Háskóla Íslands, Victoria Popescu sendiherra Rúmeníu í Svíþjóð og Natalia Gherman sendiherra Moldóvu í Svíþjóð. Því til viðbótar tók Alyson Bailes viðtal við Kornelíus Sigmundsson fyrrum sendiherra Íslands og þá tók Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens, sendiherra Svíþjóðar á Íslandi, einnig til máls. Svæðisbundnar stofnanir fengu nýtt og mikilvægt hlutverk í Evrópu við lok kalda stríðsins og upphaf hins svokallaða margpóla heims. Alyson Bailes kynnti einkenni slíkra stofnana og hlutverk þeirra á sviði öryggis, lýðræðis og samþættingar í Evrópu. Valur Ingimundarson ræddi þá á raunsæjan hátt um þær stofnanir sem Ísland er aðili að, hlutverk þeirra og virkni. Victoria Popescu tók fyrir mikilvægi Svartahafssvæðisins og svæðisbundnar stofnanir á því svæði, sem og hlutverk Rúmeníu í þessu sambandi. Natalia Gherman fjallaði um reynslu Moldóvu af svæðisbundnum stofnunum í Mið- og Suðaustur- Evrópu. Þá tók Alyson Bailes viðtal við Kornelíus Sigmundsson sendiherra um reynslu Íslands af svæðisbundum alþjóðastofnunum og að lokum ræddi sendiherra Svíþjóðar gagnvart Íslandi, Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens, um forsæti Svíþjóðar í CBSS. Á milli fyrirlestra fóru fram umræður.

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Agenda

SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE Cinderellas or Fairy Godmothers?

A Public Seminar organized by the Institute of International Affairs and Center for Small States Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Iceland

0915-1230hrs, Tuesday 9 October 2007 Conference Room, National and University Library (Þjóðarbókhlaða)

Programme 8:30-9:00 Arrival, check-in and coffee 9:00 Introduction: What are subregional organizations? What is their role in European security, democracy, and integration? Alyson J.K. Bailes, Visiting Professor, Dept. of Political Science Respondent: What does this mean for Iceland and for ‘small states’ generally? (tbc) Professor Valur Ingimundarsson, University of Iceland Questions and answers 9:45 Experience from South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region: (i) Black Sea groupings Mme. Victoria Popescu, Ambassador of Romania at Stockholm (ii) The Central European Initiative and South-East European XX Mme. Natalia Gherman, Ambassador of Moldova at Stockholm Questions and answers 10:45-11:00 Coffee Break 11:00 Experience from the Baltic and Nordic Region: An interview with Kornelius Sigmundsson, Ambassador (Regional Cooperation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Statement by Swedish Ambassador on the recent Swedish CBSS Presidency Closing Panel and Audience Discussion Chair: Alyson J.K. Bailes

12:15 Thanks and close of seminar 12:30-13:30 Reception for parcticipants co-hosted by the Embassy of Sweden and University

of Iceland

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Dagskrá

SVÆÐISBUNDNAR ALÞJÓÐASTOFNANIR: Öskubuskur eða góðar álfkonur

Opið málþing á vegum Alþjóðamálastofnunar og Rannsóknaseturs um smáríki og stjórnmálafræðiskors Háskóla Íslands.

9. október, 9:00-12:30, í fyrirlestrasal Þjóðarbókhlöðu

8:30-9:00 Húsið opnar

9:00 Inngangur:

Hvað eru svæðisbundnar stofnanir? Hvert er hlutverk þeirra í öryggi, lýðræði og samrunaþróun Evrópu? Alyson J.K. Bailes, gestakennari, stjórnmálafræðiskor Háskóla Íslands Viðbrögð Valur Ingimundarsson, prófessor, sagnfræðiskor Háskóla Ísland Umræður

9:45 Reynslusögur frá Suð-Austur-Evrópu og Svartahafssvæðinu:

(i) Svartahafið Victoria Popescu, Sendiherra Rúmeníu gagnvart Svíþjóð (ii) "Central European Initiative" og samstarf Suð-Austur-Evrópuríkja Natalia Gherman, Sendiherra Moldavíu gagnvart Svíþjóð Umræður

10:45-11:00 Kaffi

11:00 Reynslusögur frá Eystrasaltsríkjunum og Norðurlöndum:

Spjall við Kornelíus Sigmundsson, sendiherra Ávarp: Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens, sendiherra Svíþjóðar gagnvart Íslandi, on behalf of the recent Swedish CBSS Presidency Umræður og samantekt Stjórnandi: Alyson J.K. Bailes

12:15 Málþingi slitið

12:30-13:30 Móttaka fyrir málþingsgesti í boði sænska sendiráðsins og Alþjóðamálastofnunar

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PART I: Introduction

1. SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, SECURITY AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: What are Subregional Organizations? What is Their Role in European

Security, Democracy, and Integration?

Alyson JK Bailes, Visiting Professor, University of Iceland My job is to give a short introduction both to the seminar and the subject. I have actually been working on subregional organizations myself since 1996, when I wrote an arcticle for the NATO Review describing them as the ‘Cinderellas of European security’. I still think that is quite a good image because these are not powerful or glamorous institutions that get involved in the biggest policy issues and crises or that regularly hit the media headlines. Like Cinderella, they work a lot of the time as lower-grade ‘servants’ to the bigger players in Europe, and they do a lot of work that can be regarded as mundane, boring or even dirty – the Northern European subregional groups have certainly spent a lot of their time talking about unpleasant issues of AIDS, prostitution and human trafficking, sewage pouring into the Baltic Sea or oil spill and nuclear leaks into Northern waters! I doubt whether many people could even name all the organizations of this sort in Europe: and to make sure we all have the same understanding of what we’re talking about I should start by running through a few basic facts about them. First, how do we define a ‘subregional’ organization? That is partly a matter of opinion, but in the European context it seems most correct to define the whole of Europe as one ‘region’, and then ‘subregional’ logically applies to groups that exist in smaller sections of Europe or possibly stretch across from one part of Europe into a neighbouring continent. The word also implies that these are groups of geographical neighbours, not states in different parts of Europe that happen to be linked by a common agenda: although there is quite a difference in dynamics and content between a subregional group that forms around a sea area and another where all the parcticipants have some common land borders. Such groupings have been a part of modern European history back to the 1940s, when the ‘Benelux’ grouping of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg was acknowledged and embraced in the original treaties of the European Communities. Also quite an early post-war creation was the Nordic Cooperation group of five Northern states and their special territories. The majority of groupings existing today were, however, created in two main surges: shortly before the end of the Cold War when for instance the Central European Initiative was set up by Italy and Austria with their Eastern neighbours; and in the early to mid 1990s when the new Central European democracies set up some groups just among themselves like Visegrad and CEFTA, and larger groups stretching from East to West across the dividing lines of EU and NATO membership were set up in Northern and South-Eastern Europe including the larger Balkans region. This last phase was also when two of Iceland’s own important neighbourhood groups were created – the Council of

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Baltic Sea States which was basically a Danish idea and the Barents Euro-Atlantic Council designed by Norway. All the groups I’ve mentioned except CEFTA are still in existence today and we have by no means seen the last of initiatives to create new ones, such as the new Black Sea Forum which Ambassador Popescu will be telling you about soon. Two last comments I’d like to make on the resulting pattern are that many of the groups’ territories overlap so that a centrally placed country like Poland or Austria may end up belonging to five or six at once; and that the big powers of Europe’s Atlantic coast – UK, France and Spain – do not have any groups of this sort to belong to, which may be one reason why it has sometimes been hard to get a unified vision of their importance at NATO or EU level. So there seem to be quite a lot of subregional Cinderellas, but do they have the same hidden beauty and nobility as she had beneath her rags and do they have the equivalent of a glass slipper and a prince to look forward to some day? This whole seminar is designed to address that question from different viewpoints, but let me just sketch out a couple of frameworks in which we could try to judge these groups’ importance more accurately. First, all these groups had a conscious security purpose when they were created, and all can be seen as contributing in a modest but very real way to Europe’s security and stability today. None of them deals directly with military matters, but on today’s wider definitions security is about much more than tanks and guns and these groups can be seen as helping to produce it at two levels:

- by the very fact of creating contact, dialogue, understanding and a search for common interests among groups of neighbours who typically include states of very different kinds and sizes and who may have been military enemies before – NB Russia is a member of the CBSS, BEAC and also the Arctic Council;

- and by directly addressing issues that belong to the so-called ‘soft security’ agenda such as natural disasters and environmental problems, accidents and search and rescue arrangements, border cooperation against smuggling and crime and illegal migration, non-military aspects of anti-terrorism policy, health cooperation, and the creation and strengthening of regional infrastructures. Of course these items are on the agendas of more powerful European institutions as well, notably the EU and OSCE; but since geographical neighbours typically have many shared problems or can even be the cause of each others’ problems if they don’t tackle such transnational phenomena effectively, Europe-wide cooperation will work best when it can grounded upon such local clubs which sort out all the problems they can sort out at their level in a proper spirit of ‘subsidiarity’.

Second, the subregional groups have an interesting interplay with the process of enlargement of the two big European institutions – EU and NATO – and thus, with the process of European integration in a broader sense. They have often been described as ‘cushioning the dividing lines of integration’ by allowing member states, countries applying for membership and those who don’t even want membership to go on working together in a friendly fashion. This role clearly has some security value in reducing the inevitable fears and tensions of the enlargement process, making it less likely for instance

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that a new member state will exploit its position to pursue old grievances against its non-member neighbour: but there are practical benefits as well. At the very least, the formal and informal contacts within these groups can be used to spread knowledge and understanding of what is happening within the big institutions. At best, they can improve the quality of EU and NATO policy by feeding back into it a coherent account of each region’s wider special needs, or trying out initiatives at regional level that later prove suitable for taking up by the EU as a whole. Looking at it the other way, the groups can achieve a sort of soft expansion of the achievements of the EU in parcticular, by giving the local non-member states a chance to associate themselves with or imitate institutional policies to whatever extent the legal framework permits. However, in their given historical context the European groups have also turned out very useful for the set of countries that have sought and achieved full integration in the EU and NATO up to this year: partly through the function I’ve just mention of allowing a kind of informal copying of and rehearsal for institutional policies; partly just by offering a training in modern-style multilateralism – what it means to hold a Presidency, for instance – which was parcticularly helpful for new or newly independent states; and partly by avoiding damaging competition among neighbouring groups of applicants or even pushing jointly for their acceptance, as the Visegrad grouping did. While these security and integration functions are the most obvious advantages of subregional groups, let me briefly mention also that they are potentially very relevant to democracy-building and general reform. Aside from giving a general training in correct international behaviour, bureaucratic skills and openness, and promoting cultural and human exchanges which should help to spread reforming influences, they can give a big boost to ‘cross-border’ cooperation among neighbouring provinces which has the added advantages of empowering local actors, encouraging decentralization and improving the balance of living standards between national centres and peripheries. These effects are parcticularly important both for political and human rights and for security when the border areas in question are inhabited by ethnic or other minorities. Several subregional groups have also deliberately created contact networks among the important non-state actors in their parcticipating states, such as parliaments, trade unions, social partners, banks and universities; and the BAEC allows special representation for the Sami as an indigenous population. So Cinderella is doing real good by her humble housework while waiting for her transformation, but will the day ever come when the subregional groups are raised to power and glory or at least to a higher place in the European organizational hierarchy? As I think today’s discussions will show, they do have weaknesses that are hard to overcome and that make it hard for them to even think of competing with the EU or NATO: notably the lack of power to legislate or creating truly binding commitments, the lack of central funding or other material resources, the usually very small central secretariat capacities, and the political reality that frankly they often matter more to the less powerful states in their sub-regions than to the most powerful ones. What is interesting is that these limitations have not led to the groups dying away over the last 10-15 years or even being talked about as going into ‘crisis’, as many people are talking today about the OSCE and some about the Council of Europe. The fact is, at least in my

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understanding, that these organizations’ very weaknesses are also their strengths – or in other words, these Cinderellas will do best to stay in their kitchen and their rags. As modest, voluntary bodies with no parcticular political crusade to fight they do not threaten anyone and can provide a comfortable home for governments and peoples of many different kinds. They can build security precisely by not talking about security too much. For individual governments they cost very little but, as we shall hear this morning, can potentially give a lot. I am not saying exactly that NATO and EU are Ugly Sisters by comparison: but I do think the subregional groups show us that Europe has room, and need, for more than just one kind of multilateral institution today.

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2. SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SMALL STATES: A Criti cal “Northern” Perspective

Professor Valur Ingimundarsson, University of Iceland

As Alyson Bailes has pointed out, the activities of subregional organizations are usually overshadowed by those of larger and more powerful regional structures—such as the European Union and NATO, even if they provide complementary and subsidiary functions in various fields.1 One reason is, of course, that their strength in overcoming or—as some critics argue—shunning geopolitical and cultural divides, is usually also their greatest source of weakness: the lack of a true and enduring identity, shortage of resources, and the absence of accountability or legal or parliamentary enforcement mechanisms. As Chantal Mouffe put it, „[O]ne has to acknowledge that a fully inclusive political community can never be realised. There will always be a ‘constitutive outside,’ an exterior to the community that is the very condition of its existence. Once it is accepted that there cannot be ‘we’ without ‘them’ and that all forms of consensus are by necessity based on acts of exclusion, the issue can no longer be the creation of a fully inclusive community where antagonism, division and conflict will have disappeared.”2

Subregional organizations have a tendency to have a very broad focus or, in some cases, an exceedingly myopic one. More important, they are so consensus-oriented that real differences have to be dealt with in other more politically influential institutions. Yet, as Alyson Bailes has correctly noted, the proliferation of such organizations after the end of the Cold War showed that they were filling a niche following the break-down of the East-West paradigm. Thus, they had a cross-territorial and trans-ideological “soft security” function designed to ameliorate the new divisions created by European integration and EU’s expansion. They were also meant, if less convincingly, to foster democratization through cooperation with state and non-state actors in a non-threatening way—a fact that probably also explains, in part, their continued viability and sustainability. From the perspective of small states, like Iceland, membership in subregional organizations such as the Nordic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Northern Dimension Initiative, and the Arctic Council gives them international profile at very low costs. It also involves them in transnational networks that can have some symbolic political value as well as some economic and cultural rewards through business opportunities, educational cooperation, and exchange programs. Apart from the Nordic Council, Iceland’s membership in these organizations only indirectly affects its immediate regional interests. The CBSS is a forum to facilitate cooperation among the members on the development for democratic institutions, nuclear and radiation safety, and economic cooperation in the Baltic region. For a time, it was meant to serve a similar function as the CEFTA—the Central European

1 See Alyson Bailes, “What are Subregional Organizations? What is Their Role in European Security, Democracy, and Integration?” (Lecture given at the seminar “Subregional Organizations in Europe: Cinderellas or Fairy Godmothers?” University of Iceland, October 9, 2007). 2 Chantal Mouffe: The Return of the Political (London: Verso), p. 85.

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Free Trade Agreement—or as a normative instrument to pursue EU membership rather than a medium for building common identity and cooperation.

Indeed, it was in this area of democratization that Iceland sought to contribute.3 This was a form of EU democratic subcontracting—with the Nordic countries playing a role in transmitting democratic values, especially to the Baltic states and Poland. To be sure, CBSS has been hampered in its activities due to the diversity of its members and its lack of resources. And for Russia, which does not aspire to EU membership and which has no interest in EU’s democracy lessons, it does clearly not have any normative functions. Thus, one should be mindful about how different member governments view parcticipation in such subregional organizations usually from their own national interests. What is more, organizations such as the CBSS sometimes duplicate the functions of other institutions such as the OSCE, which, as Bailes has suggested, is, indeed, in a state of crisis—with its mission ever more frequently being reduced to providing ritualistic, moralistic, and rather tooth-less verdicts in the fields of election monitoring. As is the case with the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Iceland has a rather limited direct stake in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), whose main geographic range covers Northern Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Northwestern Russia. Nonetheless, it is a forum for discussing economic and environmental problems in an area that Iceland has some fisheries interests. Driven by Norwegian desire to overcome the Cold War divisions and militarization of Europe’s Far North and to address the Barents sub-region’s underdevelopment, the aims of BEAC are very broad—to promote cooperation in areas such as economics, trade and science and technology, tourism, environment, infrastructure and educational and cultural exchange. And its achievements have been rather limited. Perhaps the most symbolic one is that Russia’s initial wariness of the project was replaced by support for it. But what gives it profile is that the big regional powers—the EU and Russia are involved in it.

If the Barents Euro-Arctic Council can be criticized for scratching the surface of too many issues, the Arctic Council can be faulted for having a too narrow focus. Its function has mostly been limited to what has euphemistically been called “sustainable development” and environmental protection. Given the media spectacle surrounding the “Scramble for the Arctic” and the high-priority given to such hot topics as climate change, ice-melting, access to undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic, sovereign claims under the Law of the Sea, and the prospective of new sea lines of communications in the North, it will be very difficult for the Arctic Council to conduct business as usual. The Norwegians, who, of course, with Russia have great stakes in the economic exploitation of the region are keenly aware of these developments. They have been pushing for the broadening of the agenda in line with their own catch-all resource management approach whose aim is to ensure a balance between petroleum development, increasing maritime transport, the utilization of living marine resources, and the need for environmental protection. The Arctic still stands out as a stable and peaceful region. But it is doubtful that the Arctic Council will remain the main forum for it in the foreseeable

3 See, for example, Report on Foreign Affairs [Annual Report by the Icelandic Foreign Minister (Halldór Ásgrímsson)], April 6, 2004, http://www.mfa.is/speeches-and-arcticles/nr/2205

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future because of conflicting sovereign claims and inter-state geopolitical competition. In the end, subregional institutions do not have the material capacity to control access to regions or to enforce (contested) rules in them.

The history of the Northern Dimension Initiative is also instructive when dealing with subregionalism. Having originally been part of EU policy after heavy Finnish lobbying, it has now been redefined, in theory, as a common project, involving the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland. After facing decline, the initiative was, thus, renewed through an attempt to broaden it. For the Russians, this was all-important because it did not want to be subjected to an EU agenda.4 It shows that subregional organizations rarely die, but often take a new leash on life. Geographically, the Northern Dimension still covers the Baltic Sea and Barents Region. The four spaces it encompasses, however, in the fields of economics, internal security and justice, external security, science, education, and culture, express the ‘Northern dimension’ of the EU-Russia relationship, with Norway and, especially Iceland, thrown in—so to speak—to complement it.

This brings me to the problem of defining the processes of regional constructions and reconstructions. Geographical proximity and specificity is often a characterizing trait, but functional factors such as economic, environmental, and cultural ones are also important. As noted, regionalism has been used instrumentally to promote specific political and economic ends such as EU integration. The dynamics of regionalization fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence, institutional ties, political content, and, in some cases, cultural belonging. The concept of “regionness” has been used to describe the situation in which this process has advanced far enough for the region to attain some intrinsic common features.5 For Iceland, the Nordic Council is the only subregional organization that would fit such a description—a description that combines traditional state interests and common identities. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Northern Dimension Initiative, and the Arctic Council are common platforms, to be sure, but far too loose to constitute a community of values.

Another incipient interest-based organization could emerge in the North Atlantic in the near future. In Iceland, increasing attention is now being given to futuristic scenarios in the High North, the vanishing of the Arctic sea-ice and the opening of a circular polar route. In 1916, the Icelandic explorer Vilhjálmur Stefánsson coined the term “Arctic Mediterranean” to describe the sea links between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.6 Stefánsson’s early 20th century vision of all-year commercial sea routes around the Arctic—with ports, naval stations, and weather stations on strategically placed islands—is now being reformulated, reproduced and repacked in the early 21st century. For one thing, it has been pointed out that as a result of climate change, Iceland could become a 4 See Mikhail Nikolaev, “New Northern Dimension,” International Affairs, 53, 3 (2007), 81-89; see also Mette Sicard Filtenborg, Stefan Gänzle, and Elisabeth Johansson, “An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy: ‘Network Governance’ and the Case of the Northern Dimension,” Cooperation and Conflict, 37, 4 (2003), 387-407. 5 See Raimo Värynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review, 5, 1 (2003), 25-51. 6 See, Carina Keskitalo, “International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region,“ Cooperation and Conflict, 42, 2 (2007), 200-201.

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hub for transarctic trade—a commercial center for the reception, distribution and transshipment of goods.

This will not happen any time soon, however. A far more pressing contemporary question for Iceland relates to the rapidly expanding volume of oil and gas shipments from Russia and Norway to the United States through the Icelandic Economic Zone. It might require a coordinated subregional effort to ensure their safety. It will, to a large extent, hinge on the question of whether the problem will be securitized or not. One option would be a “hard security” NATO role or a Northern grouping within it—encompassing those states who have interests in the region—which would give the Alliance more profile in the North Atlantic along the lines of its Mediterranean Dialogue. The NATO-Russia Council could also serve as an extended forum for discussion on energy and maritime security in the area. But a subregional group—based on “soft-security” concerns—might be an alternative, involving Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, and perhaps Canada and the United States. Such a possibility is an example of how regions and sub-regions are often reconfigured in response to political, socio-economic, military, and cultural developments. Thus geographic materiality is not all. Regions arise from the redefinition of norms and identities such as security and environmental concerns. This is what Manuel Castells termed the difference between the “space of places” and the “space of flows.” Places are historically rooted yet reshaped increasingly by the flows of people, information, and goods.7 To sum up, subregional organizations have many diverse, duplicating, and contradictory qualities. They often have normative and overlapping functions. Consistent with the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity, they serve instrumental purposes for larger regional organizations or states. They can be resurrected—like CEFTA—with new members joining them when the first mission has been accomplished (EU membership) and another one is starting; they can languish (despite attempts at rejuvenating them) as a result of false promises like the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which was launched with great fanfare after the Kosovo War8; they can be redefined in an effort to renew them as the Northern Dimension testifies to—or they can remain, for the time being at least, more or less the same, like the Barents Euro-Arctic Council or the Arctic Council. One should be careful, however, not to be seduced by the non-threatening charm of subregional organizations. Despite all the hype about “soft”, permeable, or “fuzzy borders” between the EU and its surroundings, it should not be forgotten that “hard” external borders were simultaneously created through the Schengen border control scheme. Their role in democracy-building should not be exaggerated either. The Baltic Sea Council did not play a key role in Baltic or Polish democratization. And such subregional organizations have not much to show for democratic developments in Russia, which has, typically, responded to such schemes by branding them as foreign interference

7 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Vol. I. The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 8 The economic “reconstruction” effort in Kosovo itself is a good example of the lack of planning and resources characterizing this initiative. The EU’s contradictory accession policies, which, in theory, promote regionalism, but, in practice, are based on bilateralism have also reduced the credibility of the project.

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in its own domestic affairs. To be used as subcontractors for Ugly Sisters is perhaps not a fitting role for Cinderellas. And there has always been some artificiality in their claims of involving indigenous people, whose subjectivity is despite the rhetoric absent in subregional projects. But like the cat, subregional organizations have nine lives—and even if they would probably not exist without core regional organizations, or be relegated to irrelevance without links to them, their ability to reinvent themselves should be seen as a sign that they can, in some cases, serve a useful soft security function. If their existence leads to the desecuritization of problems, they definitely have a role to play; if it does not, there is no need to let them live to create a false sense of stability, security, or economic possibilities.

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3. DISCUSSIONS AFTER PART I One member of the audience wanted to know in which way powerful institutions like the EU and NATO were trying to influence the development of subregional groups. Ambassador Bailes wanted first of all to point out that the development of subregional organizations is not just happening in Europe. She referred to Africa as one good example, where subregional groups have taken on a very active security function in conflict mediation and peacekeeping, and are strengthening their legitimacy by increasingly working within African Union or UN mandates and guidelines. In her view the development of subregional organizations can derive both from the influence of larger and more powerful institutions but also as a reaction against them, when groups of local actors that are against globalization and institutionalization react against the top-down pressure of multilateral frameworks. In Bailes´ view subregional groups that are created because of the influence of more powerful organizations can have a positive role in helping those organizations carry out important rules and regulations: even large organizations need smaller groups to carry through the detailed work that they don´t have time for in Brussels, as well as to help reconcile their dictates with local national identity and local needs. In Ingimundarson´s view subregional groups are sometimes a product of local and national initiatives dealing with local problems which more powerful organizations are simply not interested in. As an example he mentioned how the United States are not very interested in the Arctic Council at the moment, but that they probably will be when it gains more strategic value. Professor Ingimundarson added that subcontracting is also a large part of this endeavour, as mentioned in his lecture: for example the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and also the OSCE in many ways. According to the Professor the relationship between subregional groups and more powerful international organizations is very full of contradictions. Regarding the possible affects subregional organizations can have on democratization Ambassador Bailes admitted that when one country in the group is much bigger than the others, it is hard for smaller countries to push for democracy in that country if it doesn´t want it. When countries are of a similar size, however, as in Central Europe, the flow of influences is much more complex and we have seen some democratizing effects of subregional ties in that region, for example when provinces are given more power and allowed to play international roles. Bailes mentioned that this had been particularly clear in the region of Transcarpathia around Kosiče and Uzhgorod where five state boundaries meet, the only problem being that when some of these countries join the European Union the effects of Schengen lead to the non-member countries getting cut off all over again. She did however acknowledge that there are a lot of contradictions and drawbacks in this field, especially when larger organizations exploit smaller local institutions whilst cutting across them with new divisions and tensions when it suits them. The interesting thing would be to see how this interplay is differentiated from region to region, leading us to the next part of the seminar: Experience from South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region.

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PART II: Experience from South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region

4. BLACK SEA GROUPINGS. Victoria Popescu, Ambassador of Romania to Sweden

4.1 Strategic Importance of the Black Sea Region (BSR) The Black Sea (known to the Greeks as Pontus Euxinus - the “Hospitable Sea”) is an area of crucial importance for Europe taking into account its geographical location, at the cross - roads between East and West, between Europe, Central Asia and the wider Middle East. It has links with Central Europe, through the Danube River, and access to the Mediterranean Sea (through its straits).

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For much of mankind’s history the Black Sea has been a stage for the geopolitical struggle between the Great Powers, in the attempt to gain control over its waters and straits. Since 1989, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Region has witnessed great political, economic and social changes that have decisively altered the political map of the area. Yet in the early nineties’, the BS Region was primarily regarded as a former Cold War buffer zone rather than a relevant geopolitical entity. It is only today, after years of sustained efforts by the countries of the region, and the advancement of EU and NATO enlargement, that we witness an increased awareness about the strategic importance of this area for the stability and security of Europe at large. The concept of the Black Sea Region encompasses a variety of countries, heterogeneous in terms of size, population, linguistic and cultural features, strategic status (Russia as a reasserting superpower; regional powers such as Turkey and Ukraine; EU members – Greece, Romania, Bulgaria; newly independent states – Moldova, Georgia etc.). It covers not only littoral (riparian) countries on the Black Sea (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey), but adjacent neighboring countries as well (Greece, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan). Therefore, the concept of a broader Black Sea Region is also being used.

At present, the area faces a wide range of opportunities and challenges. It is an expanding market and an important hub for energy. It is rich in natural resources, and represents the most important oil and gas supplier of Europe. But it is also confronted with unresolved conflicts (so-called frozen conflicts), economic and environmental difficulties and other security problems relating to trans-border organized crime, illegal trafficking in persons, weapons and drugs. 4.1.1 Romania in the Black Sea Region Romania is in South-Eastern Europe, North of the Balkan Peninsula, inside Danube River basin and opening on the Black Sea in the South-East. Its neighbors are Moldova to the East, Ukraine to the North-East, Bulgaria to the South, Serbia and Montenegro to the South-West and Hungary to the West. Romania is the 11th biggest country in Europe, a total of 238,400 sq. km, and has 21.7 million inhabitants (2002 census). The Language spoken in Romania is Romanian which is of Latin-origin and is in the same family as French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese. Being located in the Black Sea Region, Romania is deeply concerned with the stability and democratic development of this area. It understands the problems and aspirations of the countries of the region, having shared with them a common troubled history and common concerns of stability and welfare. Romania became a NATO member in 2004. In January 2007 it joined the European Union, together with Bulgaria, finally cementing its position as a modern democratic European society. At the same time, Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU has set the stage for a deeper and wider transformation of the Black Sea Region and for EU’s increased involvement. Thus, the Eastern frontier of the European Union reached for the first time the shores of the Black Sea. Romania

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strongly supports the continuation of EU enlargement towards areas in our Eastern and South Eastern neighborhood (Western Balkans, R. of Moldova, Ukraine etc). We believe that the Black Sea needs to and can become a place where the democratic values (pluralist democracy, market economy, rule of law, respect for human rights) are shared and further spread Eastwards. 4.2 Regional and Subregional Cooperation: Black Sea Groupings In the early 1990’s, owing to the past hegemonic background of the region and their lower degree of development, most of the countries in this region directed their efforts towards national recovery. Most of them turned their face to the Western countries and European and Euro-Atlantic organizations (Council of Europe, NATO, European Union) in search of security guarantees and support for their socio-economic reforms. With the most significant exception of Russia, the others have pursued the official policy of joining the EU and in most of cases NATO, too, and have reached different stages in this integration process. It is only later, in the mid and late 1990’s, that subregional cooperation became a real priority for the Black Sea region. At present, the Black Sea region benefits of multiple inter-governmental initiatives, ranging from structured, formalized ones, to more informal frameworks for dialogue.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is the best - known and most representative for the region. It was established in 1992 and became a full-fledged regional organization in 1999. It accounts for 12 member states (littoral countries - Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine; neighbors - Greece, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Serbia) and a number of observers – countries (e.g. USA, Poland, Germany) and organizations, including the European Commission. It has a Permanent International Secretariat, in Istanbul, and a number of related bodies and affiliated centers (Parliamentarian Assembly, Business Council, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, International Center for International Studies, Coordination Center for Statistical Data). Despite BSEC’s important role in the region, parcticularly in the areas of confidence - building, research and economic cooperation, it has not yet managed to achieve relevant regional-scale projects. It lacks efficiency and visibility owing to the scarcity of financial resources, persistence of divergent views and interests and absence of a coherent long-term strategy. Two main tasks stand now before the BSEC: 1) to continue its internal restructuring (unleashed in 2006, under the Romanian chairmanship-in-office) and become more project-oriented and 2) to deepen its interaction with the EU (parcticularly through the Black Sea Synergy). Other Black Sea Groupings and initiatives have a more limited number of member or parcticipating states and a more focused profile (relating for instance to environmental protection and maritime security): - Black Sea Commission (BSC) - on the protection against pollution, 6 members – all littoral countries - Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine; - GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - regional organization of four CIS states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova;

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- BLACKSEAFOR - set up in 2001 is a Black Sea naval cooperation task group aiming at enhancing maritime security (e.g. rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, environmental protection) in the region. It gathers the 6 littoral countries. Now it is strengthening its capacity to better cope with asymmetric risks and other illegal activities at sea. - Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea (adopted in 2002) - assumed as a legally binding document on maritime cooperation by the six Black Sea coastal countries. - Operation Black Sea Harmony - initiated by Turkey in 2004, still has a national character being directed to the protection of Turkish Black Sea straits but a multilateral potential since the other Black Sea coastal countries have been invited to join in. Remarks: In our view the Black Sea region needs vision and concrete regional projects. To this effect we have to be creative, and also to gain from the experience of other regions (e.g. the Baltic Sea region, South East Europe). It is necessary to facilitate some degree of diversity of initiatives likely to induce healthy competition in the region (of course, provided that better coordination is ensured and unnecessary proliferation of formats is avoided). 4.3 Romanian initiatives in the Black Sea Region: Hence, Romania came up with the initiative of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership – as an example of how we would like to move forward regional cooperation. The Forum was successfully launched through a Summit in June 2006, with a large support and parcticipation (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, R. Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine). Black Sea Forum provides a platform for open dialogue and interaction, likely to generate ideas, encourage networks and involve all stakeholders from the region (governments, business, civil society, academics). It has no ambition of institutionalization and complements other groupings. The Forum is meant to contribute to revitalizing Black Sea regional cooperation, by establishing communication channels between various Black Sea initiatives and covering those niches that are have not been fully used (such as cultural diversity, bottom up approach facilitating direct contacts between local authorities, civil society actors etc., developing public – private partnerships). It encourages and helps the Black Sea region to strengthen and prioritize its agenda, in keeping with the principle of regional ownership. Based on the region’s main concerns it has identified among its priorities for action: energy, economic development, democratization, environmental protection, infrastructure, civil security, so mostly priorities relating to soft security. Some of these topics have already been tackled during various seminars at expert level organized within the framework of the Forum and many projects have started to be formulated. For example, in the near future, three specific projects are planned with respect to civil security, inter-cultural dialogue, and environment.

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The initiative to establish a Black Sea Euro region, under the auspices of the Congress of Local and Regional Powers of the Council of Europe, was launched in 2006, during the Romanian Chairmanship-in-office of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It is aimed at boosting trans-border cooperation at the level of local authorities. An important Black Sea regional instrument, called the Black Sea Trust Fund for Regional Cooperation, is based in Romania. It is the German Marshall Fund grant-making initiative for supporting regional cooperation at civil society level. This instrument has also been mentioned in the Black Sea Synergy. 4.4 EU Involvement in the Black Sea Region Romania has constantly advocated for the strengthening of EU’s involvement in the region being aware that the EU has the potential to make a difference there. Such a momentum was provided by Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, in January 2007, when the Black Sea region has become EU’s neighbor, and thus of direct policy-interest to the Union. The European Commission’s communication on the Black Sea synergy, published this year, represents an important message of encouragement that EU’s policies and instruments for the Black Sea region will receive more attention. It is viewed as part of the enhanced European Neighbourhood Policy (the so-called ENP +) which was decided upon at the EU Summit in June 2007. The Synergy will facilitate the use of existing bilateral strategies under ENP also for developing regional cooperation. Moreover the Synergy is mostly focused on the cooperation with BSEC and other Black Sea initiatives (the Black Sea Forum was mentioned in this respect). The Synergy pursues an integrated and pragmatic approach of the Black Sea region, focused on projects directed to some priority areas such as energy, transport, environment, internal security and democratic institutions. Even if the Synergy is not a whole new and separate policy it has the potential to boost regional cooperation, to bring more EU funding for regional projects and help democratic reform. 4.5 Inter-Regional Cooperation It is of great relevance for the Black Sea region to gain from the good practices and lessons learned of other regions that have faced similar challenges. From among the possible models of regional cooperation to follow in this respect I would mention two examples: - First, the Stability Pact for South –East Europe which has been successful in coordinating international actors and donors in the Western Balkans; and - Second, the Baltic Sea area in parcticular with reference to the Northern dimension. The problems the Black Sea region faces at present are to some extent comparable to those encountered in the early 1990’s by the Baltic region, including the lack of vision and the lack of networks among various stakeholders. The EU’s Northern dimension (which also represented a source of inspiration for EU’s Black Sea Synergy) complemented and revitalized the already functioning regional groupings. The two regions also have in common Russia and the concern to involve it in regional cooperation.

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4.6 Concluding remarks - Based on Black Sea region experience, we believe in the comparative advantages of subregional cooperation as an important tool for strengthening the stability and welfare of our region. - Likewise, we recognise the positive aspects deriving from stronger inter-governmental cooperation in the Black Sea region. However, it is clear that the framework of cooperation should be enlarged with non-governmental actors, too. They have the power to fuel profound changes in their countries and in the region. - An enhanced involvement of the European Union is fundamental for the region for the continuation and deepening of the democratic reforms. - Subregional organizations are useful Cinderellas and should not compete with the Pan-European organizations to become fairy godmothers. They have to preserve and develop their comparative advantages and focus more on developing networks among all the stakeholders in the region and boosting trans-border cooperation.

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4. CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EAST EUROPEAN ARRANGEMENTS: The Experience of the Republic of Moldova

Natalia Gherman, Ambassador of Moldova at Stockholm

Republic of Moldova

• Capital: Chisinau• Area:total: 33 846 square kmland: 33 009 square kmwater: 837 square km• Population:total 4,144,647

Regional cooperation for the Republic of Moldova represents an efficient instrument used to fulfill the most important objective of its internal and external policy – European integration. The geographical positioning of Moldova at the crossroads of several European sub-regions, proved it possible to adhere to almost all arrangements in Central, South-East European and the Black Sea Regions. One would need some time just to name them, so I would first mention those that are pertinent to the topic of my presentation: the Central European Initiative (CEI)9, modernized Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)10, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE), South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Regional Arms Control Verification Centre (RACVIAC)11, South-East European Energy Treaty. In addition to these, Moldova is a full-fledged member of the Organization of the Economic Cooperation of the Black Sea region (BSEC), all structures of the Danubian Cooperation Process12 and the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, better known as GUAM (Georgia, Ucraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). Obviously, Moldova is a member of pan-European organizations like the Council of Europe, the OSCE and others. 9 See Appendix 10 ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 ibid.

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Adherence to many regional arrangements was not exactly automatic for Moldova. As a country that regained its independence in 1991, we found ourselves in an environment that has already established its identity and regional ownership since the end of the Cold War and dramatic transformation processes that followed. Being aware of the necessity to start interacting with its neighbours in the first place in order to make its voice heard on a broader European scale, Moldova applied and had to prove that it deserved the role of a member in several organizations, starting with an observer status and gradually being perceived by its neighbours as a reliable partner. To illustrate: Moldova joined the Central European Initiative in 1996, becoming the 16th member state. Moldova obtained the status of observer to the SEECP only in 2005 and in May 2006 at the SEECP Summit at the level of Heads of State of the parcticipant countries, Moldova was accepted into the organization as a full-fledged member. Throughout the years, the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe have organized themselves remarkably well promoting the whole range of regional interests, many of them achieving almost all goals set at the beginning of the process. Such examples proved to be quite convincing for Moldova, moreover, at the moment of our application all organizations already had EU member-states as parcticipants (e.g. Austria and Italy in the CEI). Long before the EU-Moldova integration Action Plan and the European Neighbourhood Policy in general were designed, regional partnership was the only available tool for Moldova to transform itself and to obtain precious experience of interaction with the European institutions from within a multilateral structure that offered more opportunities in comparison to scarce and often artificially restricted bilateral dialogue with the EU. Besides, it represented a chance to broaden the spectrum of bilateral relations with the neighbouring states and to create our first political alliances with the EU member-states by using available venues for enhanced political dialogue that inevitably led to increased confidence among parcticipants. Like all our partners in the region, we saw the parcticipation in the mentioned structures as the best preparatory way to joining the EU as a member state, by ensuring total adherence to the European norms and standards in the fields of democracy, human rights, economic, educational, security and justice areas and many others. Of no less importance were the efforts to bring in functional order the mechanisms of combating corruption and organized crime, improve energy security, civil emergency response, etc. These are of course obvious elements of a programme of close association with the Union of any candidate that aspires to join. Reforming ourselves along these ways in the framework of regional organizations and becoming fully compatible with our partners that are either members or candidates to join the EU - provides us with an opportunity to eventually ask for the same status. An enlargement-reluctant EU could be convinced only by the real achievements on the ground. Therefore, all means should be used to facilitate the process, including the new instruments of the recently developed European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). We regard new ENP instruments as complementary to the existing tools of regional cooperation that have already proved to be efficient. Moldova’s commitment to regional cooperation has been acknowledged by its regional partners by granting it the right to hold Presidency not in one, but in four organizations

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almost simultaneously. Thus, in November this year Moldova will take over the Presidency of the Central European Initiative for 2007-2008; in May 2008 Moldova will begin its yearly Chairmanship of the SEECP, and last week Moldova took over the Presidency of the Multinational Consultative Group that governs the activity of the Regional Arms Control Verification Centre (RACVIAC). In January 2008, Moldova takes over the Chairmanship in the modified CEFTA arrangement on behalf of the countries that have ratified its new version in 2006: Moldova, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, Serbia (and Kosovo). Seems to be too much at first glance, however, we see great opportunities in this coincidence. Apart from an honourable task of holding a Presidency within the organizations that include EU and NATO member states, it implies an immense responsibility and mobilization of all resources internally in order to achieve maximum results for the region. Coordinating the agendas should ensure continuity of the whole process, avoidance of overlapping and duplication of efforts. Any Chairmanship should take into account the interests of all partners and, most notably, not forget about its own one. From that point of view, a country that is responsible to guide many processes at the same time, would probably have an advantage of seeing the whole picture and trying to make the best out of it. The whole exercise is regarded as an invaluable opportunity for a small state to reconfirm itself as a reliable partner, not only consuming but also generating benefits for a bigger regional alliance. At the same time, all mentioned regional arrangements are undergoing the process of profound change and therefore steering internal reform would constitute an important element of a number of consecutive presidencies. To crown it all, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe has been recently transformed into Regional Cooperation Council with headquarters in Sarajevo and a functional international secretariat lead by a secretary general. That new institutional element of SEE regional cooperation would require a correlation between the Chairmanship and the permanent secretariat. It sounds very familiar for a pan-European organization like e.g. the OSCE and even for Central Europe, as CEI has its permanent secretariat in Trieste (Italy), however, it is quite new for South-Eastern Europe. Also from that point of view, countries of the region are getting accustomed to the usual organizational method of work within the EU, preparing them for institutional membership. On the other hand, for the purposes of operational interaction, both EU and NATO support and facilitate a reasonable degree of regional institutionalization. Not surprisingly, while defining the priorities of its presidencies in the mentioned arrangements, Moldova is focusing on the areas that would consolidate the European integration prospect of the countries that are not yet members of the EU. Dialogue with the European Commission and other EU bodies in the field of foreign and security policy, economic development and attracting of investment, energy and regional infrastructure, human and inter-parliamentary contacts – these are priority areas that feature prominently on the list of priorities for the next two years to come. In addition, Moldova will host all meetings at the level of experts in numerous sector working groups that represent the core of activity of both CEI and the SEECP, as well as meetings of national coordinators,

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heads of state or government, parliamentary assemblies. We propose holding meetings of the ministers of European integration, ministers of justice and ministers of energy, heads of the national security councils and heads of migration agencies of the CEI and the SEECP in accordance with our priorities. We hope to bring in the dimension of young people’s parcticipation to the regional initiatives by organizing the Forum of Young People of Central and East European Regions. Comparing and improving region-to-region cooperation is an interesting and valuable exercise (and one of the targets of today’s seminar), that is why for the next two years Moldova in interaction with its partners would endeavour to achieve the best for both Central and South-East European cooperation, perhaps combining objectives and events where possible and desirable. That sounds like an ambitious and challenging plan, however, we know that this is the most efficient way to advance on the path of European integration. That aim of the whole effort is enshrined in the founding documents of the SEECP (Thessaloniki declaration) and by definition it brings the commitment of the EU countries that are full-fledged members of the SEECP, to work together with non-members towards attaining this goal. There is no better expression of that commitment in any other European document as there is no consensus in the EU on the continuation of the enlargement process. That is why regional cooperation in parcticular in South-Eastern Europe is used as a framework for the EU as a whole to encourage democratic and economic transformation of potential members as well as for some individual member states to engage themselves for that purpose. Finally, let me conclude by saying that in our view, yesterday’s candidates – today’s members of the EU not only did not lose enthusiasm for regional cooperation, but as Romanian example eloquently demonstrated – became ready for a more active role in the process. I would not predict the future of the arrangements I spoke about, however, we do not doubt their constructive role in today’s European architecture.

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5. DISCUSSIONS AFTER PART II Firstly Professor Ingimundarson wanted to know if there is some functionality within these subregional organizations in the Black Sea region and if groupings exist within them. Ambassador Popescu responded by saying that the process in Eastern Europe is in many ways comparable to the one in the Nordic area, that democracy is in place but interests also overlap. Ambassador Gherman added that because each organization is so different from the other it gives member states the chance to prioritize certain fields or angles in each of them, according to national interests. For Moldova some priorities would for example be economic reform, energy security and environmental protection. States can shift their priorities depending on their interests at any given time and when a country chairs an organization it has a good chance to make sure at least some of its national interests are better served. Ambassador Bailes added that since smaller states often have a smaller range of priorities they care about, they may have a better chance of achieving something inside the powerful organizations than larger states who feel a need to make a stand on everything. Then Bailes raised the question of whether older member states in large organizations like the European Union are against new Eastern European member states demanding that their neighbouring states be accepted as members as well. Ambassador Popescu responded by saying that although Romania is of course interested in its neighbours, it gave them less attention while it was busy promoting its own acceptance into the EU. After Romania was accepted it has however regained interest in helping neighbouring states by transfering its experience to them, which is also in the interest of Romania itself. According to Ambassador Popescu, the case for possible further enlargement has two dimensions: firstly Romania´s own interest in the welfare of its neighbours and secondly the interest of Europe as a whole, especially regarding energy resources and pipelines in the Black Sea region. The Ambassador then stated that Romania had received good responses to its neighbourhood policy both within the EU and NATO, but that these are still early days. Inside the EU a lot of compromises have to be made, many positions are already occupied and interests are contradictory. According to Ambassador Gherman it makes a big difference for Moldova, in political security and economic terms, that two partners from the region are now members of the EU, Bulgaria and Romania. Moldova is now more eligible for membership of a wide range of organizations and groups and has a better chance of getting its voice heard in a bigger club of states. All the same, the latest enlargement has also had negative affects. The closing of the border to Romania has made border crossing much more difficult for Moldovans, who immediately started to negotiate visa facilitation. It has also had a big impact on trade relations with Romania and Bulgaria, forcing Moldova to go to Brussels to solve the problem by making a special trade agreement with the EU. Although it will take years for Moldova to regain the trade terms it had with these two neighbouring countries before they became EU members, it should eventually benefit from enhanced trade relations with other EU member states. According to Ambassador Gherman these negotiations will take time and be painful, but they are vital since trade is essential for Moldova´s sustainability and independence.

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6. AN INTERVIEW WITH KORNELÍUS SIGMUNDSSON FROM THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ICELAND.

Q1. In the 1990s Iceland decided to become a founder member of all three subregional groups that are open to it through its geographical position: the CBSS, BEAC and Arctic Council. Yet Iceland cannot share the motivations that we’ve heard were so important for democracies in Central and Eastern Europe when they chose to be so active in their own local groups: that is, to consolidate their democratic reforms and their new international identities, and to provide a training-ground and stepping-stone to NATO and EU membership. Iceland has been a Western democracy and in NATO for sixty years already. So what would you say Iceland was looking for, and did it perhaps have a mixture of motives: some things it wanted for itself, and some ways that it saw to help others and pass on its own positive experiences through these frameworks? Ambassador Sigmundsson: The basic motive is political, our government took a conscious decision to join these organizations from the very beginning. We almost had to break into the CBSS. They started their organization in 1992 and our burglary didn’t succeed until 1995, we were admitted after knocking on the doors for three years when people realized that the Baltic concept can be stretched a little bit. So basically our motives were political. In the case of the CBSS we sympathized with the three Baltic States a great deal, we had in in fact never broken off diplomatic relations with those states that were started in the 1920s, we still considered that treaties were in force that were entered into by the Danes on our behalf. Being a relatively newly independent state ourselves we greatly sympathized with the three Baltic States regaining their independence in 1991 and we were the first to recognize their independence and the first to establish diplomatic relations with them. So the basic motives were political and they were greatly political in the case of the CBSS, Barents Euro Arctic Council and Arctic Council. But not only that, very soon after we recognized the Baltic states, our businessmen started recognizing the opportunities in the region. Within a year several of our companies had set up shop, parcticularly in Latvia but also in Lithuania and Estonia. In the 15 years they have been working there their ventures have been hugely successful and this has been a benefit for all, for the Icelandic companies, for the governments to see where the opportunities lie, and also for the people in these countries, since we create employment and trade. So politics and economics were the motives. Q2. Some people who believed that the Baltics, and indeed all other Central Europeans, should be fully integrated in the West as soon as possible were rather afraid of these ‘softer’ subregional groups because they feared that their existence could be used as an excuse to delay full membership, and that the applicants would be sort of stuck in this halfway house for ever. As a country that strongly supported Baltic enlargement did Iceland in fact see such a risk? What turned out to be the best ways to guard against it and to make sure that these groups if anything speeded up enlargement rather than delaying it?

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Ambassador Sigmundsson: We were never afraid of that nightmare coming true because the cooperation within the CBSS was working very well. We have a collection of countries there big and small, we have Russians, Germans, the Poles and the rest of us, and the cooperation has been proceeding very nicely. I have never heard of a thought that this would be enough for the Baltics, that they could just remain there in the kitchen. In the CBSS we have always had high-level representation, in the CBSS kitchen there is not only Cinderella but also Mr. Putin, Mr. Fradkov and the Prime Ministers of all member countries so there is good company in that kitchen. Q3. Turning to the value that Iceland itself might have got or could still get out of these groups, in what senses or to what extent would you yourself define them as ¨security¨ institutions? Ambassador Sigmundsson: We have an excellent working cooperation within these organizations in just about every field of human activity except military, we have expert groups in this, that and the other and where you have the opportunity to talk there is less danger of anything negative happening. I will perhaps name two areas where we have been doing very well recently: action against trafficking in human beings, parcticularly women and children, and we have very good cooperation in the field of nuclear radiation safety, and I don’t think I need to elaborate on the importance of these two things. I would regard it as one of the highlights of our Presidency of the CBSS that we managed to persuade the Russians to come back to the working group on nuclear radiation safety where they had not been present for a number of years. It is absolutely clear how important it is that they are active in cooperation in this field. Q4. Iceland has historically attached prime importance to NATO for its own security, including the special relationship with the USA. How do you see the relationship between NATO and these very different subregional groups: are they just filling very different niches, as it were, or are they in some way complementary? How do you see the relationship between the subregional groups and the USA – which is a member of the Arctic Council and an observer in the two others? Do you get the impression that the USA takes them seriously? Is there a synergy or rather some kind of competition between the groups and the USA’s own current regional strategy towards the Nordic and Baltic area, known as e-PINE? Ambassador Sigmundsson: I would see it as being complementary, there is obviously no competition. In the CBSS we have a number of observer member states, including the United States and the United Kingdom, so we stretch a little bit beyond our borders. I am convinced that this cooperation that we have created in the CBSS works very well and this has been evident before and after the entry of our member states into the EU and NATO.” Q5. Perhaps I should ask the mirror-image question about Russia: how have the Russians behaved in these groups in your experience? Do they take them seriously and are they prepared to work for some kind of common benefit, or are they just for instance scouting

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for new sources of funds they might profit from? If you do see some positive effects on the Russians taking part, do you think this is feeding back in any meaningful way as an influence on the Russian policy-making machine in general? Ambassador Sigmundsson: Well, to answer briefly the Russians have been behaving very well. It is probably more important with Russia than any other state to have intergovernmental relations. If you need to get anywhere in Russia, in trade or whatever, you have to have an agreement with the Russian Federation that enables you to do business in a sanctioned way. So we in the CBSS have excellent cooperation with the Russians, they turn up at high levels, including Mr. Putin, Mr. Fradkov and Mr. Lavrov. Bureaucrats such as myself and others would be afraid of doing anything without the highest leaders in Russia guaranteeing the process. Q6. It would be interesting to know how Iceland as a non-member of the EU sees the EU’s behaviour within and towards these groups. I believe it has been parcticularly active in taking a share of the work within the CBSS. Do you think it is doing all that it could do, and do you feel that Brussels has really understood the rationale for these groups and how they might synergize with some of its own regional and neighbourhood policies? Ambassador Sigmundsson: I feel that the European Commission is fairly active in the groups you mentioned, perhaps not at a very high level but there is constant parcticipation and they are there more or less all the time. Where the EU is lacking is the level of representation. Like last year we had a CBSS Summit in Iceland and we had nine Prime Ministers and two Foreign Ministers but the European Union representative was low level, only a mere Ambassador. In theory we would like to see the President of the Commission turning up for summit meetings and the Commissioner for External Relations turning up for the Foreign Ministers meetings but we haven´t seen them for quite a while. Q7. In our new course on European security institutions we are also comparing institutions in terms of their machinery and structures and how the input costs compare with the benefits extracted. All these three regional councils are very lightly ‘bureaucratized’ with rather small central staffs and funds, so that a lot depends on the inputs and initiatives of each rotating Presidency. Do you think this is the right organizational solution for the purpose? What are its strengths and weaknesses? Ambassador Sigmundsson: Well in terms of a Member State holding the Presidency I think it’s a great strength. Because let´s face it, the Presidency rotates every year and gives all the different member states an opportunity to call the tune during that year. It is the Presidency that is clearly in the lead, the Secretaritat is there to service the organization and it may not take any initiatives by itself. In the Barents Euro Arctic Council we are now in the process of setting up a Secretariat in the high north, at Kirkenes in Norway. So far the Arctic Council has no Secretariat anywhere, it rotates with the Presidency and we held it for 3 years recently. I think it works very well for these organizatons which are not about to take initiatives and implement them with big

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funding over a number of years. I think these are the right kind of clothes that they are wearing. Q8. A parcticular feature of the North European subregional groups is that they are quite ‘deep’ in structure, with active roles given not just to government officials at several levels but also to the local provincial and municipal authorities, social groupings, businesses, and indigenous peoples such as the Sami and Inuit. Do you see any special benefits in this for promoting stability and effective cooperation? What do you think it was about the Northern European setting that favoured this kind of multi-level structure more than elsewhere? Have you seen any setback to Russian participation at below-government levels since President Putin came to power? Ambassador Sigmundsson: Yes, well let´s face it, a central feature of these organizations is that they are cooperation between governments, first and foremost. That’s particularly true with the CBSS and the Arctic Council. In the case of the Barents Euro Arctic Council there is also a link into something called the Barents Regional Council which has indigenous people from the North and the Northwest, giving it a different flavour. Unfortunately in the case of Russia the Barents Regional Council hasn’t worked very well, for whatever reason, whether its because of the federal authority or whether it’s the lack of organization among the people in these regions. Then side by side with the CBSS we have a number of organizations like the Union of Baltic Cities which brings together about 100 Baltic cities in a common forum. We also have the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation which links regions together and this has been a very successful endeavour and it makes as you say the work deeper than it would otherwise be. Q9. A couple of years ago Iceland held the Presidency of the CBSS and you were the senior official coordinator. What achievements of that period were you especially pleased with? Can you mention anything that was of benefit to Iceland’s general foreign policy and standing? Ambassador Sigmundsson: Well, at the beginning of the Presidency we established eight priorities and I´ll just run through them very quickly. Firstly energy issues for obvious reasons, secondly protection of the environment, and then what we regard as being very important, cooperation on nuclear and radiation safety, (God forbid that a nuclear submarine broke up in our waters, it would not be a very happy situation). And then we want to have good cooperation with regional organizations in Northern Europe and elsewhere. Then children´s issues, here in Iceland we have created something called Barnahús, Childrens House, which is a model for treatment of young offenders or victims of crime who can go there to go through questioning followed by therapy. And then a country with Iceland´s tradition from the year 930 in parliamentary relations, the subject of inter-parliamentary relations was high on the agenda but unfortunately didn’t find favour with all of our colleagues in the club. Let´s not forget where our money comes from, through parliament! Last but not least we put cooperation with Ukraine on the list,

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we have great sympathy with the Ukrainians and the good and bad things they are going through these days. Regarding what would be the benefits for Iceland´s own foreign policy, the key point would be as I said before nuclear radiation safety where we really achieved something. Also we brought the discussion on cooperation with the parliamentarians to the forefront and then the “Euro-faculty” arrangements where we more or less adopt a university in the region and try to improve its teaching methods, books and facilities. These Euro-faculties have been working in for instance Riga, Vilnius and Kaliningrad. This has been very successful and we are now about to set up a new Euro-faculty in Pskov in Russia. Q10. Finally, some questions looking ahead: some analysts used to predict that once that great majority of any subregional group’s members were inside the EU and NATO, the group would either lose its rationale and gradually fade away, or would have to be converted to a sort of regional lobby or ginger group within the larger organizations. The case of the Northern groups is a bit special because the Nordics themselves are not all in both organizations yet and apparently don’t want to be. Do you think this means the Northern subregional groups can carry on as they are for longer? Leaving that linkage with the integration process aside, what would you see as the other factors or alternative scenarios that are likely to determine the groups’ future in say 5-10 years from now? Specifically, do you see perhaps a more prominent and dramatic role emerging for the Arctic Council in view of all the issues raised by climate change in the North including the race that is starting to exploit natural resources? Ambassador Sigmundsson: Well, we have a proven track record in all three organizations. We have good cooperation between large states and small. In the CBSS we have the Russians, the Germans and the Poles and then the rest of us and the European Commission, and it works very well. I would say that in CBSS´s case a particular advantage is the adaptability of the organization. We have taken aboard as we have gone along new issues like trafficking with human beings and organized crime, and these are very important topical issues, we are alive and kicking and intend to continue to exist. We will see what happens with the Arctic Council, my sources tell me it´s not exactly next year or the year after that we will be sailing the North-West passage!

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7. A STATEMENT BY SWEDEN´S AMBASSADOR TO ICELAND: The Swedish CBSS Presidency

Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens

I think the CBSS, the Council of the Baltic Sea States is a good example of a Cinderella: one that understands the importance of doing the mundane and boring work in order to promote integration through daily chores. And thereby also to democracy and security. I see no competition with the EU or NATO, instead there is an ever closer collaboration with the EU. European Com one of twelve members. Ten of the eleven Member States of the CBSS (all except the Russian Federation) are part of the same internal market. Eight states through the EU, two (Iceland and Norway, non-litteral states) through the EEA. The EU Commission is now actively considering how to develop a European Strategy for the Baltic Sea region. This was an initiative by the European parliament. Such a Strategy was then requested by the Foreign Ministers in a meeting in June during the Swedish presidency of the CBSS. Thus we can see that within an enlarged EU, with 27 members, there is likely to be more regional cooperation, launched from the special needs of the different regions. The Baltic Strategy is one example. French plans of a Mediterranean Union another. Reinforcing the region´s competitiveness is also a contribution to overall EU competitiveness and to the fulfilment for example of the Lisbon targets. A European strategy for the Baltic Sea region would also need to include a perspective on the further development of cooperation with the region´s only litteral state which is not a member of the EU/EEA, the Russian federation (environment, maritime safety, border crossings, cross-border problems such as communicable diseases, trafficking and organized crime).

During the Swedish presidency of the CBSS it was decided to reform the CBSS. How the reform will be done will be accounted for by the troika of Latvia (that has taken over the chairmanship), Sweden and Denmark, in Riga in June of next year. So the organisation of the CBSS is not static but adapting and changing according to new challenges and needs in the region in order to remain relevant and be prepared for the next phase of development. Be it in promoting trade, investments or social bridges towards more employability and social inclusion, climate change or energy efficiency, or fighting trafficking in human beings, acute ecological challenges as over-fertilisation or oil disasters or the different levels of economic development. Always concentrating on strategic issues for its regional development.

The change in history where the Baltic was a barrier of water to the Soviet Union has now become a Sea of Peace as the Swedish Foreign Minister expressed it. Carl Bildt also explained how the CBSS has changed in character, being more concrete and diversified. The governments are no longer in the driving seat. It is instead much more business, local authorities, universities and independent organisations that cooperate. In an arcticle published jointly by Sweden and the Latvian Foreign Minister when taking over the presidency the title was first “the Baltic region on top”. It was not to show that the 12 members (including the European Commission) are geographically situated in the north of Europe, on that top, but that the Baltic sea has become an important trading route. So the

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title seems to have been changed to: “The Baltic Sea Region-the most dynamic in the World.“ And it is experiencing an economic boom of commercial activities so impressive that Time magazine writes about the “ Sea of Plenty and an Economic Powerhouse of the 21st century”. The investments in the Baltic States by private companies is one example and it is easy to understand what it means to contacts on all levels when there are six flights a day from Stockholm to Tallin -instead of one, as ten years ago. The yearly growth of foreign trade in the Baltic states and Poland amounts to 20%. Also the five Nordic countries and Germany are above the EU average. But the Baltic Sea is also one of the ten most sensitive maritime environments in the world. 25% of its bottom is dead and up to 80% of the rest is dying. The risk of oil spills are doubling.

The commitment to strengthen the Baltic Sea States region is not only in the area of prosperity, economic growth and sustainable development but also in public health and social well-being of the population. When Sweden took over the presidency from Iceland in 2006 it set three priority areas: energy and environment, civil security and trade and investment. To give just one concrete example of what was accomplished in the field of investment I can mention the CBSS “road map on Actions aimed at achieving Competitive, stable, transparent and predictable investment conditions in the CBSS member States”. During the Latvian presidency energy and civil security remain priorities while education has been added as the third main component. - In energy it remains vital to promote the development of competitive energy markets, renewable energy sources, and the infrastructure of energy production and supply. - On civil security the broad aspects of environmental issues like halting the pollution of the Baltic Sea and radiation control are questions that will be continued to be worked o. as well as combatting organized crime and human trafficking. - Education is seen as the main tool for creating a knowledge-based society and developing high value-added production. It is very promising that all governments in the region have a clear vision that no place around the Baltic Sea should be a source of cheap labor. Investment should go into education, science and creative industries in order to enhance productivity.

We are part of a "Europe of Regions" the foreign Ministers of Latvia and Sweden concluded in their joint arcticle: It is our firm conviction that the Baltic Sea region can develop into a model for other parts of Europe by proving that high growth rates and being in the forefront of globalization are compatible with the highest environmental standards and sustainable development. The CBSS can help pave the way for increased regional integration and be instrumental in making the Baltic Sea region one of the most competitive in the world. Thereby it strengthens all of Europe.

Cinderella wants to show that the shoe fits. And that her kingdom is of help to others.

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8. FINAL DISCUSSIONS Ambassador Wilkens wanted to know if Ambassador Popescu and Ambassador Gherman could see the CBSS as a model for their region after hearing about its experience as a subregional organization in Europe. In Ambassador Popescu´s view the CBSS and other similar organizations are very dynamic and the Black Sea region can learn a lot from their experience because there are some comparable factors, for instance dealing with Russia and the expericence of turning from socialism to democratic development. She saw the experience of the Baltic Sea region as a great inspiration. Ambassador Gherman expressed her admiration of the pragmatism in Nordic and Baltic Sea regional cooperation when dealing with ever changing and developing problems. She claimed that Moldova had been observing developments in the region while parcticipating in its own regional arrangements in both Central and Southeastern Europe and that the pragmatic way of dealing with problems was very appealing to Moldova, which is constantly searching for practical solutions to everyday problems. In Professor Ingimundarson´s view these organizations are non-threatening and in that sense positive, but they don´t have much clout and we shouldn´t exaggerate their importance in comparison with the big organizations. Ambassador Sigmundsson added that it is not popular to talk about these organizations, but that within the next year or two we may see an increased emphasis in the Icelandic government on Northern issues, and that we have already seen signs of that. One member of the audience wanted to know how transparent these organizations really are, how much information you can get online and what kind of information is in fact available to the public. Ambassador Sigmundsson replied by saying that the CBSS and the other organizations have their own websites with information on different committees, what they do, why they exist and what they aim for. In addition the CBSS Presidency at any given time also has its own website where it states its priorities and working plan, and any member of the informed general public can extract information from there as they see fit. He noted, however, that the level of media interest in the work of these organizations is not something that they can influence to any great extent. Another member of the audience wanted to know whether the speakers thought that the Barents Euro Arctic Council had a future given that the Russians had remained very inflexible and that is seemed that the Council could only go as far as the Russians were willing to go. Ambassador Sigmundsson replied by saying that that in fact goes for all the organizations since they are consensus based. If any Member State doesn´t want to go any further, that´s as far as the organization will go. He added that the Barents Euro Arctic Council is a very small organization with only six member states, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Russia, and that it has not been very active in taking big initiatives. But cooperation in the high north is likely to increase in the future and the governments of members states are committed to this cooperation. Which form it will take exactly is too early to say. Ambassador Bailes added that these kind of organizations can become important or keep being important when they help solve the latest problems, but also when they don´t help solve them. The Barents Euro Arctic Council and the Arctic Council might get a grip on the energy agenda for instance, or

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they might not which could get people worried. These organizations can be necessary in different ways and the important thing is that these countries are talking around the same tables, despite the fact that they have unsolved conflicts between them. Finally, Ambassador Popescu wanted to know how successful the cooperation between the Nordic countries and Russia had been, and what was the linkage between the Nordic dimension and the new strategy of the European Commission for the Baltic area. Ambassador Wilkens replied that the issues being dealt with under all these headings were of course a lot of the same ones for most countries in the region and since the European Commission´s strategy was only at a starting point it was hard to see how it would all work out. All countries were interested to see in which direction the EU would go in this matter since the chances of getting funding for different region projects depended on it. Ambassador Sigmundsson commented that it is difficult to define what the Nordic dimension is exactly. He saw it as permanent cooperation on issues of interest to the nations in question, and saw every reason to believe it will be successful. Ambassador Bailes added that the way people look at cooperation in this region has changed: the original “Northern dimension” (1999) was seen by many as a purely Finnish initiative to help Finland deal with its neighbours, but the concept now seems to have been reinvented and now has more than just one agenda. In her view this goes to show that multilateralism seems to live longer than bilateralism.

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9. APPENDIX – Membership details of Southeast European groupings

Central European Initiative (CEI)

• Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine

Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)

Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)

• As of 1 May 2007, the parties of the CEFTA agreement are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo.

• Former parties are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

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Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)

Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey andUnited Kingdom

Danube Cooperation Process

Danube Cooperation ProcessBosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,the Czech Republic, Germany,Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro,Serbia Slovakia,Slovenia,Ukraine

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10. Interesting Links Arctic Council http://www.arctic-council.org/ Black Sea Commission (BSC) http://www.blacksea-commission.org/main.htm Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), http://www.bsec-organization.org/ Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group - BLACKSEAFOR http://www.blackseafor.org/ Central European Initiative (CEI) http://www.ceinet.org Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) http://www.cbss.st/ European Union (EU) http://europa.eu/ GUAM - Organization for Democracy and Economic Development http://www.guam.org.ua/211.0.0.1.0.0.phtml North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) http://www.nato.int/ Northern Dimension Initiative http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) http://www.osce.org/ Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) http://www.racviac.org Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) http://www.mvp.gov.ba/Seecp_index_eng.htm