Dcfcnce White fjaper l'eam Defence Establishment Fairbairn 1'4-C;-0 15 26-28 ]:airbairn Avenue Canberra AC'S 2600

Dcar Team

Please find attached my submission to the White l'apcr. It is not possible to adequately cover thc issucs in 1000 words but I have been as brief as possiblc.

I am a civilian with a background in governance and policy, and an interest in defence matters. '['hat intcrcst grew aftcr the village whcre 1 stayed in Ambon during the summer of 1996 was razed by Jemiah lslamia with the tacit approval of the Indonesian Contra1 Govcrnmcnl. and as I saw that policy of religio-cthnic cleansing cxtcndcd to other pads of the Indonesian archipelago. East 'T'irnor, and Irian . lap.

1 have followcd the debate on replacement aircrafi for the liAAl: with intcrcst and growing distnay fbr somc years. I hopc that this will alcrt dccisioll makcrs to somc of' thc realilics that Australia must facc if Australia's security is to be assured.

Yours sincerely

Submission to "Key Questions for Defence in the 21'' Century" Defence Policy Discussion Paper.

Erik Peacock

Picture: PAK-FA Russia's 5jth generation stealth air dominance fighter. For sale to South East Asia circa 2020.

Introduction

The Discussion Paper noted public support for the maintenance of highly capable combat aircraft and a capacity for long range strike applications.' This paper addresses those two issues. It discusses emerging trends in the Asia Pacific as against the air power acquisition and capability plan promoted by the Department of Defence. Alternatives are discussed and recommendations are made. Some observations are also made with respect to the proposed purchase of three Air Warfare Destroyers.

The New High Threat Conventional Military Environment

The last decade has seen an increased focus on failed States, terrorism and non-State actors in the security arena. Largely unnoticed outside the analytical community has been the ever creeping rise in conventional top end military capabilities possessed by national States within the Pacific Rim (Pacrim). This trend is rapidly accelerating buoyed by strong economic growth, regional rivalry, the rise of China, and a gobalised arms market. The Asia Pacific is currently undergoing a seismic shift in strategic military power with arguably the most profound changes since the end of the Second World War. The last decade has seen the following critical developments in our region:

the development of strong Russian military exports to the region based on ongoing evolution and development;

the incorporation of "off the shelf' Western and Israeli technology (largely in computing) into both legacy and cutting edge Russian orig~n weapon systems;

the reverse engineering by China and proliferation of sophisticated Russian weapon systems across the full spectrum of military platforms in strategically significant numbers;

the introduction of weapon systems that have no Western equivalents;2

the proliferation of missile technologies across the spectrum that are superior to Western equivalents;

the development of modern force structures;

the integration of modern computer, networking, and surveillance technologies into modern military systems;

the development of 'network centric warfare' as de regur for all middle power nations in the Pacrim within relevant time frames;

the loss of regional air superiority by the RAAF; and

the serious erosion of air superiority by the USAF and USN.~

These developments have been extensively documented in the open source literature, notably by arms manufacturers themselves, and have been subject to extensive comparative technical analysis by independent think tank Air Power Australia.

1 do not know whether the Department of Defence (Defence) is conversant with this literature or whether it has undertaken further analysis, but the public statements I have observed suggest that the Department has not examined the open source literature.

Developments in Air Power

In order to understand the issues around purchasing combat aircraft for the RAAF it is necessary to understand some of the history of air power. Traditionally air power planning focussed around having aircraft that can outfly opposing aircraft. That means aircraft with superior acceleration, endurancekange, weapons payload, cruising speed, rate of climb, and manoeuvrability in close combat, together with better air to air missiles. As an adjunct to these qualities electronic detection (principally by radar) of opposing aircraft came into prominence during the 1960's. As electronic warfare capabilities and guided missile technologies improved a new paradigm of informationlnetwork centric warfare developed. According to this view Western aircraft would use superior radar to detect opposing aircraft first. Opposing aircraft would then be engaged with beyond visual range (BVR) missiles. Opposing aircraft would be shot down before they became aware that they were being engaged. This would be achieved by networking the radars of fighter aircraft with powerful radars mounted on commercial airline style jumbo jets. These are now known as Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C), or Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft. The concept had limited success during the Vietnam War but was proven during the Arab Israeli six day war.

Russian and Western electronic warfare technologies have evolved and leap frogged one another since the 1960's and will continue to do so. Electronic warfare has since expanded to include sophisticated jamming technologies whereby combat aircraft seek to jam opposing radars on other aircraft, missiles, and surface to air missile (SAM) systems. Dedicated electronic warfare aircraft were developed during the Cold War, and an electronic warfare suite is now de regur on all modern combat planes.

By the end of the Cold War circa 1990 Western electronics were generally superior to Russian ones in most instances. Since the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia has financed its new technology development programs through foreign sales giving anyone access to top tier Russian technology at competitive prices. This has led to dramatic improvements in design and capability. In addition Russian designers have incorporated 'off the shelf' Western digital and avionics technology into their designs. China has done likewise and reverse engineered Russian systems. The electronic advantage enjoyed by Wesfern air forces has now largely evaporated and will be increasinglychallenged in coming decades.

Since Soviet forces could not guarantee air superiority they invested considerable research into SAM systems. These are now the best in the world and are being marketed in the Asia Pacific. The most advanced of these systems; the S-3001400, Tor and Pantsyr have no Western equivalent.'

US planners have attempted to regain the high ground by incorporating features in some aircraft designs intended to make the aircraft difficult to detect. This is done by reducing radar and infrared signatures, notably by applying surface coatings designed to absorb radar waves and shaping the aircraft in ways designed to scatter radar waves. Aircraft that incorporate these features are known as low observation aircraft or 'stealth aircraft'. None of these aircraft are invisible to opposing sensors but some are difficult to detect at tactically useful ranges in a range of scenarios. Of these 'stealth' aircraft the F-117 Night Hawke has been retired, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is under development, and only the F-22 Raptor is in active service. (The USAF also operate a small and very costly bomber force of 8-2 stealth planes but they are not relevant to our discussion).

Key Assumptions in Air Power Planning

Confidence in electroniclnetwork centric warfare has reached the level in Russell Offices where the basic flight capabilities of combat aircraft are seen as largely irrelevant. Rather, it is believed that low observation features and superior electronics will guarantee that opposjng aircraft can be engaged and shot down before they have any chance of detecting and engaging friendly aircraft. To this end Defence imagine that Wedgetail early warning aircraft networked with JORN over the horizon radar and the low observation JSF will give the RAAF an unbeatable asymmetric advantage through 2040.

This is significant for Australia because both of the intended replacement aircraft for the RAAF, the Boeing Super Hornet and the Lockhead Martin Joint Strike Fighter, are markedly inferior in basic kinematic performance to the evolved Russian Sukhio aircraft being fielded by India, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. That is, they are inferior in their rate of climb, acceleration, thrust, cruising speed, range, and manoeuvrability to late model Sukhois. Further, the JSF is too small to allow for capab~litygrowth in anything other than software. This gap will widen as next generation Sukhois already nearing production will be equipped with supercruise in addition to thrust vectoring. Indeed, the Russian design philosophy is to build space into their airframes for ongoing incremental upgrades in engines and avionics.

' It should be noted that the Israeli Air Force recently overflew Syrian Pantsyr batteries, leading many commentators to claim that the Israeli's had jammed their radar, bringing into question the utility of this SAM system. There are two important observations here. The Syrians obtained base line 1980's technology that was vulnerable to jamming whereas models for sale to our region feature modern EASA radars basically the same as those mounted on late model MlGs and Sukhois. It is also probable that the Syrians chose not to engage the Israeli's who had massed a force of around 100 combat aircraft off the Syrian coast. It is also notable that the Israeli's chose not to engage the Pantsyr batteries and so a true contest was not entered into.

The JSF is marketed as a stealth aircraft. Given its inferior kinematic performance it will rely entirely on stealth for its survival in combat against regional ~ u k h o i s . ~The Super Hornet has no meaningful stealth characteristics and is already over matched in the region.5

The Department of Defence plan is therefore based on the key assumption that the basic flight performance of combat aircraft are largely irrelevant because electronic detection and networking technologies will ensure an asymmetric advantage in any combat scenario. That view represents perhaps the most radical parad/gm shift in the history of air combat.

This key assumption is in turn based on the following assumptions:

I potentially hostile nations will not field networking technologies or AEW&C aircraft or modern BVR missiles through 2040;

2. potentially hostile nations will not develop counter measures to Western electronic warfare technologies through 2040;

3. Russian and Chinese designers will not incorporate Western digital technology or develop equivalents through 2040;

4. Russian and Chinese designers will not field radar technology that is capable of detecting Western low observation aircraft in the 2040 time frame; and

5. neither Russia nor China will develop low observation technologies before 2040.

Unfortunately Defence appears to have attempted to commit Government to their acquisition/capability plan for the RAAF in the context of an intellectual vacuum in which no meaningful analysis of opposing technologies or air power platforms has been undertaken. It is therefore essential to examine the above assumptions.

Assumption 1 China has invested in strategically significant numbers of AEW&C aircraft of Russ~anor igh6 Similar platforms will likely to sought as force multipliers across the region. Air Power Australia has conducted a systematic analysis and comparison of Western and Russian BVR missiles based largely on Russian open source literature. Significantly, Sukhoi aircraft equipped with Russian air-to-air missiles enjoy a range advantage in the order of 30 percent, and an advantage in the diversity of homing technologies including infra red and passive radar, and in the number of missiles ~ a r r i e d . ~Late model Sukhais allow up to 11 missiles to be carried, similar to the Super Hornet and significantly more than the JSF that carries only 4 internal and two external missiles. The greater number, variety and range of BVR missiles carried by Sukhoi variants coupled with greater speed and range of the aircraft confer significant advantages to air forces fielding this plane. Despite good front end stealth, the JSF as it turns will be detectable to both radar and infra-red sensors at tactically useful ranges from rear and beam angles. The superior range and speed of the Sukhoi means that opposing pilots can engage and

disengage at will. They can take more shots from further away against the JSF than the JSF can against them. Should the JSF attempt to return to base to re-fuel or re-load, Sukhois can run it down and shoot it down.

Significantly, Russian missiles can home-in on the frontal radars of Western aircraft. Thismakes a non-sense of fhe claim that the Super Hornet is superior to the Sukhoi not withstanding the Super Hornet's inferior performance in every cardinal parameter, because its radar canjam the Sukhoi radar.8 In the very unlikely event that the claim that the Super Hornet can jam opposing radars is true and continues to be true for some decades, Sukhoi pilots simply need to launch a passive homing missile to shoot down the Super Hornet or force it to turn off its radar. If the Sukhoi then closes to within visual range it out manoeuvres the Super Hornet every time.

Assumption 2 The Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft are a key part of the Defence vision for a 'network of networks' that would give the RAAF an asymmetric advantage in air-to-air combat. To counter the advantage conferred by this sort of Western aircraft the Soviets developed long range passive seeking air launched anti AEW&C missiles that home in on the AEW&C radar from 'stand-off' ranges of up to 400km. These are now aggressively marketed in the region as a 'force leveller' for smaller nations that field Sukhois but cannot afford AEW&C platforms. It can be assumed that as a minimum China, Malaysia and Indonesia will invest in this capability. This will enable them to shut down Australia's Wedgetail n e t ~ o r k . ~

China and Russia are actively pursuing research into electro magnetic pulse weapons that can be fitted to cruise missiles and air to air missiles to effectively 'knock out' aircraft in the sky or in their hangers. With Indonesia planning to develop a fleet of cruise missile equipped submarines this becomes a serious issue requiring the hardening of airfields and adoption of counter measures.1°

Late model Sukhoi aircraft come replete with modern phased array radar including in some models the powerful lrbis E radar that is roughly equivalent to the most power radars mounted on the Super Hornet and the Raptor. It is likely that this radar and later upgrades will be able to detect the JSF at tactically useful ranges.'' The Sukhoi also comes equipped with in built jammers to degrade the radar performance of opposing aircraft and opposing BVR radar guided missiles. It is not known to what extent this will limit the operational performance of Western long range air to air missiles.

Assumption 3 Both Russian, Chinese, and Indian aircraft now incorporate Western and Israeli avion~cs.'Off the Shelf' Western digital technology has been incorporated into a range of modern and legacy missiles and SAM systems. The little noticed retro fitting of legacy Soviet era systems with modern computing and guidance systems has in many instances brought those systems up to date to the point where they now pose a real threat to teen series Western aircraft such as the Super Hornet.

Assumption 4 Russ~andesigners gained access to US stealth technology following the downing of an F-1l? Night Hawke stealth bomber by ~ e r b i a nforces. Since then Russia has invested considerable research into counter stealth technologies. This has included the retro fitting of legacy SAM systems with modern digital computing technologies and investment in long wave radars in the VHF band to overcome absorption and scattering technologies. Incorporating these elements into SAM systems now allows for the detection of mid sized aircraft including low observation aircraft such as the JSF. The claim that the JSF will be invisible to opposing SAM systems still holds true for SAM systems operating the narrower radar bands that are not networked to a suitable VHF antenna, and that are not using passive infra red detection to lock onto the rear aspect of the aircraft. However it will become increasingly unsupportable as VHF radar detection technologies and top tier SAM systems such as Tor and Pantsyr proliferate. The Russian literature bluntly states that theatre level SAMs capable of engaging ballistic missites and aircraft at ranges of up to 300-400km are now able to detect Western low observation aircraft. This is almost certainly true for the S-400 system being deployed in ~ u s s i a . ' ~Various versions of this system are operated in significant numbers by China and will almost certainly appear in Malaysia and Indonesia. Iran is actively seeking to purchase the system. As noted above, export Sukhoi variants carry an electronic warfare package as standard. As more powerful radars such as the irbis E are developed, the West is likely to see an erosion of the stealth advantage enjoyed by the JSF. It is notable that middle powers have learned the lessons of air power conflicts in Iraq and Serbia and are emulating Wester force structures but with the added element of Russian SAM systems. 1 draw the Committee's attention to the work of Colonel Medved on defeating the JSF. Unfortunately his mathematics is better than his English and his analysis is credible.13

Assumption 5 The Sukhoi design bureau has commenced work on the PAK-FA stealth air dominance fighter This aircraft is intended for the Russian air force with operational testing to begin in 2015. It will likely make an appearance in the Pacrim around 2020. It is intended to counter the US Raptor and is designed for air dominance.14That is significant because the JSF in not designed for air dominance but for ground support, and will thus be outclassed.

Russia continues to research cloaking technologies that can be retro-fitted to otherwise non-stealth aircraft. The status of this technology is unknown but Russian planners clearly consider that it has potential.

Discussion

The key assumptions underpinning the Defence plan for replacement of combat aircraft for the RAAF are now shown to be obsolete having been overtaken by regional developments. IfAustralia is to maintain air dominance it cannot assume that 'network centric warfare' or 'stealth' will compensate for

inferior performance in basic flight parameters, or that Australia will have exclusive access to any of these technologies compared to other countries the region. These technologies will become increasingly challenged in the emerging high threat environment for air power in the Pacific Rim.

Australia's investment in Wedgetail is therefore a necessary component of a balanced force structure. However, if air dominance is to be achieved, Australia must also invest in sufficient numbers of aircraft that demonstrate a clear margin of superiority in both flight kinematics, stealth, and radar performance as against ongoing evolutions of the Sukhoi. The only aircraff that can demonstrate this is the F-22 Raptor. This is achieved through all aspect stealth, super cruise, thrust vectoring, and advanced kinematics none of which are possessed by the JSF. Further, the Raptor is a large enough airframe to enable block upgrades and evolution through 2040 as competing technologies continue to evolve.15 The JSF is too small to allow for significant upgrades.

So far we have discussed air superiority. Long range strike is not a capability that can be provided by either the Super Hornet or the JSF. To suggest otherwise is to dissemble. The only available Western aircraft that can provide that capability is the F-I I I due to its range, fuel load and weapons load. This is an issue of hard physics. The only other potentially available aircraft that has a similar mission and flight profile is the Russian Su-34 Fullback. Low rate production of that aircraft has commenced for the Russian air force, but its export status is unknown.

I have read much of the discussion around retiring the F-111 including the report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade lnquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority to which I made a submission. No rational or scientific argument has been advanced for retiring the F-I 11. The F-I 11 has not failed a correctly administered wing test. The F-I 1I has an ample supply of spare parts and aircraft based on early retired USAF machines preserved in the Nevada desert. Australia has the defence industrial base to maintain, evolve and improve the aircraft including the capability to reverse engineer some components should this become necessary. The F-I I I has an incredible safety record. According to the Commonwealth Audit Office the existing fleet can be safely flown for another 10,000 hours. The F-1I I includes a dedicated electronic warfare variant (Raven) that could provide a capability that the RAAF currently lacks. In effectively campaigning against the F-I I I on the basis that 'we don't know what we don't know' about future maintenance risks, Defence has made an emotional rather than a rational decision.

What is so remarkable about this plane is that it has never been more uniquely suited to Australia's strategic environment than at this time. The regional arms race has largely been driven by exporting the military technology and strategy that the F-I I I was designed to defeat at the height of the Cold War. The F-I 1I was intended to penetrate heavily defended airspace in order to deliver large amounts of ordinance over considerable

distances against high value targets including air fields and surface vessels. This ability is particularly relevant given Australia's geographic position.

Since Defence has not proposed a credible replacement aircraft, retiring the F-I I7 would amount to a policy of unilateral disarmament in the context of a regional arms race.

The immediate policy direction required to ensure Australia has the "highly capable combat aircraft and a capacity for long range strike applications" identified in the discussion paper are evident even for the non technical observer. Australia needs to:

re-invigorate the maintenance and upgrade program on the F- I11 including the option of acquiring more F-I 11 aircraft;

formally request export of the F-22 Raptor from the US;

investigate the availability and interoperability of Russian aircraft; and

begin immediately to undertake a technical analysis and comparison of all available combat aircraft against the Sukhoi 35 as the latest benchmark in Russian air superiority, and against known likely developments in the future Sukhoi variants including the PAK-FA.

I draw the Defence White Paper Team's attention to the force structure proposed by Air Power Australia of 50 Raptors, the existing F-IIIfleet and an additional 28 F-I IIaircraft including Raven electronic warfare aircraft.16 I also draw the Committee's attention to the Air Power Australia costing of Aus$22 billion for this force structure as against Aus$39 billion for the Hornet HUG upgrade/JSF/Super Hornet force structure proposed by Defence. That is a saving of approximately Aus$I7billion in 2008 dollars.

I also draw the Defence White Paper Team's attention to the fact that in 200'1 US authorities commenced assessment of the Raptor for export to Australia. This assessment stopped only when the Department of Defence made it clear that it would not consider the Raptor. Seven years later the Raptor has emerged as the clear contender based on capability and cost. In this context fhe claim by some in Defence that US law prohibits expod of the Rapfor and so the plane is not available to Australia is dissembling to say the least.

What is not obvious is why defence has:

not taken account of regional developments;

~nsistedon retiring the F-11I ;

failed to undertake a technical comparison of late model regional Sukhois as against available potential replacements for the RAAF;

claimed that the Super Hornet is superior to the Sukhoi when this is evidently untrue;

having claimed that the Super Hornet is superior to the Sukhoi continued as a partner in the JSF program;

not publicly acknowledged developments in the cost and capabilities of the Raptor as against the JSF; and

not explored options for export of the Raptor with US authorities.

Put bluntly there has been a systematic failure of policy compounded by a failure to acknowledge that failure since the last White Paper and since the Air 6000 process was cancelled. It appears that Defence is unwilling and perhaps unable to undertake systematic capability planning at this time. Given this, there is a need for the Minister to drive aggressive policy changes, and aggressive organisational changes within Defence.

What is most obviously lacking is independently verifiable and robust analysis. If mistakes of the past are to be corrected and not repeated the Minister must ensure that independent experts are included in the policy development and planning process. These should be people with adequate technical qualifications and experience who are not associated with relevant companies or the Department of Defence. The Minister should:

actively seek advice from the analytical community;

read the expert submissions to both the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade Inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority, and the Ministerial Review of the Adequacy of Extant Plans for the Development of Australia's Air Combat Capabilify to 2045; and

appoint an expert independent advisory board to critique Departmental advice and provide alternative analysis.

There has already been one major public review of options for aircraft acquisition for the RAAF that attracted considerable in-put from the expert community and from Defence. The review failed to draw any conclusions but did highlight the fact that the views of the analytical community and Defence were often diametrically opposed. It is not clear how the Minister's review will dovetail with the White Paper. Neither exercise is likely to be fruitful if the Minister continues to uncritically accept the advice of his Department and fails to test that advice against other available expertise.

Risks to Australia

A number of strategic risks arise from the force structure pursued by Defence. The first has already been discussed, and that is that an air force whose combat aircraft comprise a mix of JSF and Super Hornets will be overmatched in the region with the capability gap widening rather than narrowing over time.

The second risk is that price increases in the JSF will force Australia to purchase fewer aircraft. Fewer aircraft directly translates into reduced capability and limited mission profile thus exacerbating the first risk. The JSF was initiatly billed at Aus$35 million per plane. It is now billed at Aus$75 million per plane, but this only refers to the 'Unit Recurring Flyaway Cost' not the full cost of operating the plane. The true cost for an operational plane

including parts, training, weapons, simulators etc, will be closer to Aus$l40 million. This is more than the cost of the Raptor which was considered too expensive for Australia.

However the cost may increase above that if other project partners and the US congress reduce their buy. A reduced buy by Congress is likely given the enormous expense of this project, the parlous state of US Government finance, and the massive budget over runs from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the JSF project so far. A smaller production run will necessarily translate into greater unit cost. Defence has not publicly indicated what the maximum price is they are prepared to pay for 100 JSF. If the price becomes untenable the Australian Government will be under strong pressure to reduce the JSF buy. Defence has not stated how many JSF they believe are necessary to enable the RAAF to defend Australia. Notably absent from the Defence air capability plan is adequate tanker support to keep JSF aircraft patrolling against long ranging Sukhois. This may become a critical issue if the JSF buy is reduced because fewer JSF will have to stay in the air longer to patrol the same amount of sky.

The third risk is that the JSF project will fail altogether. This is a real possibility for three reasons. Two are inherent to the project. First the project methodology makes cost an independent engineering variable. This does not reflect material reality. In engineering something either works or it doesn't. Cost is an indicator of the resources committed to making something work. The inevitable result of this methodology is that capability is traded for cost, and so capability is reduced. Secondly the JSF is spruiked as a plane that can do everything for everyone fulfilling every mission profile desired by every project partner. There is no such thing. It is similar to claiming that you can make a car with the economy of a Mini, the turning circle of a Toyota Echo, the off road performance of a land cruiser, the on road performance of a Ferrari, and the internal space of a Ford Fairlane. Planes are designed for a clearly defined flight profile. Something that tries to do everything ends up doing nothing well, and Congress may not want to pay top dollar for a plane that underperforrns. Indeed, there is a real possibility that Congress may scrap the project entirely over cost and capability concerns. That is the real reason why the JSF lobby are working so hard to shut down the assembly line for the Raptor. If the assembly line is closed Congress may feel it has little choice but to purchase the JSF. This also explains why Lockhead Martin are attempting to get the project partners to lock in a buy before operational testing has been completed.

Defence has not indicated whether it has a contingency plan should the JSF project fail. However, given its commitment to the Super Hornet it is likely that the default option would be to buy more Super Hornets. Since Defence has not resiled from their position on scrapping the F- III that means that the RAAF would have to defend Australia with only Super Hornets, a fourth generation teen series plane that is already overmatched in the region. In that event the RAAF would be inferior to the Malaysian Air Force fielding around 40 upgraded MIG 29s and late model Sukhois, and the Indonesian Air Force that intends to f~eldaround 40 late model Sukhois supported by modern SAM

systems. The extended range of the Sukhoi puts Australia within striking range of either nation, while Australia would have considerable difficulty retaliating without the F-111 due to range and fuel load limitations. The RAAF would still enjoy a numerical advantage in either instance, but given the capability gap greater numbers may not translate into much more than parity.

If Indonesia or Malaysia does not invest in AEW&C aircraft, anti AEW&C aircraft missiles, or advance SAM systems such as the S-400, Pantsyr or Tor, or in significant numbers of late model Sukhoi air dominance fighters, then the RAAF may still win the day. However the RAAF could not engage in the kind of coercive diplomacy that ensured our intervention in East Tirnor remained a low intensity conflict rather than open war with Indonesia. If Indonesia or Malaysia does invest in those capabilities, Australia could be overmatched. In that event there would be no military impediment to coercive diplomacy against ~us t ra1 ia . l~

Should Australia get into a shooting war with both countries at the same time, and should both have capitalised on the capabilities provided by the Sukhoi, the RAAF would likely lose. In that eventuality there would be no military impediment to invasion and occupation of ~ustral ia."

Conclusions

There has been a fundamental failure of policy making with respect to acquiring new combat aircraft for the RAAF.

The Department of Defence cannot be relied upon at this time to undertake systematic capability planning, or to provide competent advice to the Minister.

If the will of the Australian people for "highly capable combat aircraft and a capacity for long range strike applications" is to be realised the Minister must drive aggressive policy and organisational changes. These changes include:

retaining the strike capab~lityprovided for in the F-I I I fleet;

scrapping the Super Hornet purchase;

seeking export of the F-22 Raptor;

investigating alternative aircraft;

appointing an expert independent advisory panel to critique Defence advice and to provide independent research and analysis;

actively seeking advice from the analytical community; and

reading expert submissions to recent and current reviews.

Observations on the Air Warfare Destroyers

The stated aim for acquiring three or four air warfare destroyers (AWDs) is to provide a protective umbrella for expeditionary forces against hostile aircraft. It is hoped that this will be achieved through the use of Aegis radar and long range anti aircraft missiles. This would be achievable if the earth were flat. Unfortunately the curvature of the earth means that ship born radar cannot detect low flying objects further away than approximately 20-30 nautical miles depending on the height of the radar mast. That is why AWDs are intended only as force multipliers in USN carrier battle groups where they operate under the cover of carrier based aircraft. No battleship has singly survived sustained air assault since the 1919 and this still holds true today. Any ships purchased by Australia will require robust air cover if they are to survive in the new high threat environment. This brings into sharp relief the lack of planning or budgeting for additional aerial refuelling aircraft for the RAAF.

In reality AWDs will be highly vulnerable to quiet conventional submarines proliferating in the region, and to land and air launched cruise missiles. A more rationat purchase for the RAN would be frigates optimised for anti submarine warfare, shore bombardment, and cruise missile defence, with additional expenditure on aerial refuelling tankers and air dominance fighters. The F-1lI again comes into focus here because of its long range patrol capability.

If Government remains committed to the AWD purchase some serious thought needs to be given to role optimisation. A missilelradar suite designed to track fast low flying targets would be a better choice than one designed to track high flying aircraft or ballistic missiles. The technical requirements are different. l9 his is a significant issue given the challenges of weapons system integration, and the fact that the Aegis system is at or near the end of its life/development cycle. So far none of this seems to have been commented on publicly by Defence.

There is a real risk in this program that Australia will purchase a radar and weapons system that cannot defeat sustained attacks from low flying aircraft armed with cruise missiles, and that cannot be affordably upgraded because it is at the end of its development cycle. In this eventually, the A WDs would be expensive duds highly vulnerable to attacks from aircraft and submarines.

' llcpal-trncnt of Defence, Kej, Q O ~ I ~ S ~ I ~ M Sfo r U e f e i ~ c ~tn [he 21" C'onfury,page 4.

' . I here i1l.c numcrous esa~nplcs .a sample crl'which includc:

9 the Shotarn scli'dufotice suitc, and long rang: (5OOOm I - ) missile on tlic '[--YO main battlc tank;

~ h cKornct-1: ~nissilcthat is c lai~ncdto pcnclrate ~ h cfronlal at'mour of the Abt-ams battle tank at 55QO1n.and which was used against Israoli arlnour in l.,cbanon:

~ h cUMP ar~nourcdpersonal car[-icr.that uolnes with a 301nln cannon and no less tllar) cjght Kornct-E missiles. 't'hese vehicles would decimate Australian MI I3 APC and ASI,AVS at stand-off'i-angos and may also challcr~geAhrams main ba~t lelanks;

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Pantsyr, I'or, atid S-300. 5-400 SAM sjstctns l'hc S-300 arld 5-400 havc becn colnparcd lo tlie IJS Patriot system, but thcy are rnorc mobrlc, more sophist~catcdand have longer rangc; and

Yakhont and Moskit anti shipping cruise tiiissilcs which arc markedly supcrior t n ncat'est W c s t c ~ ncquivalcnts i n all paramcters.

See 1JS Air I'orcc Association at: http:!/\vww.afil.~~:~~!MPECj!AirSupretnacv.asp

" For a detailed analysis o f JSI: survivability scc Air I'owcr Auslrnlia at: litlp:~.!~v~~~,~~~.a~1sair~~o~c'er.1ietiAPA-.IS1~-Annlvsis,Iit1~~~

' 1:or a detailcd analysis scc Air l'owcr Australia at: ~ ~ l p ~ ~ ~ y ~ v w . a u s ~ i i r p P o ~ ~ : ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ T ' -

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r:'l;tnh.cr.ljt~jnJIior a chilling Russian analysis scc C:olonol Medvcd hos~cdat: 1 : r \ i - 1 ~ 7I ..htnd,-and his firr~hcranalysis al: _hllp:~ ~ \ ~ \ \ ~ \ t ~ . i l ~ 1 ~ : 1 i 1 ~ , ~ ~ \ v e ~ . 1 ~ ~ t ~ i l 1 ' A - h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ l3J408- 1 .11L11!

"t:or a dctailcd analysis see Air Powcr Australia at: I~ttp:~/w~~~~v.ausai~~po~~er~~~et~~\l--Proqra~~is.IittnI

7 For a dctailcd technical analysis see Air Power Australia at: iittp:i!www.aiisairpower.net~APA-Rus-R V R - A X M W . For an over view see Dejince T o ~ k yarticle hosted at: http:!lwwu.~!usairpower.nct~DTTMissile-Sut\;ev-Mav-05.pdfITor a chilling Russian perspcctivc see Colonial Mcdved's analysis hosted at: h t tp : !~~~w~~~t~s~ i i r~~o~ver I_~1~ t iA l 'A -NO' l 'AM-2OO408I .liiinl

I:or some ll~lssianconitncntary scc: h t t ~ : ? ' ~ r ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ s j ~ i r ~ r ~ ~ v c r - . r ~ e t ~ ~ 4 P ~ l - N O ~ ~ ~ A ~I . l i t~?~l

" Op cit

For a ~cchnicaldiscussion on I1MI' technology scc ~ p : : ~ ~ . a ~ 1 s i l i r p ~ ~ ~ v e r . ! ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~ p I 5 - d rFor a discussion o f air field vulnerability sec AI'A at: l~t~p:~~ww~v.ausairpo~ver.1ict~.4l~A-2008-O~.l~

" See rurthcr: I~t~p:~~~~~~~~'~.~~usai~power.~iet~APA-l~la~~kcr-l<adars.ht~~ilFor a Russian comparison 01' radar capability scc: Iittp:::w\viv.a~1s~~ir~~oi1~er~ne~jA1'~2-NOTAM-130408- I .hllnl

12 ];or a dclailed discussion of modcrn and retrofitled liussiati SAM systems see Air Power Australia arliclcs at: I~~~p:~/~v~~~v.i~usairpo\ve~'~~ietilAt'.4-Iiys-I'X ,A-1'11-SAM.htn1l

laor a Russian perspcctivc on counter stealth Icchnology and technical commentary by APA FCC:

tup. ! \ + \ v \ v .au~n i~ .po~~~r .nc t~APA-N~Q~IA h4-230.108-1 hlrnl

''See Colonet Mcdved at: ~ L I ~ ; ~ ! ~ Y ~ V ~ V . ~ I U S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . I ~ ~Significantly Coloncl Mcdvcd states: .'l'he safe way to dcstroy tlie Pigcon [.lSF] is lo use supcrior endurance and aerodynamic porfbrtnance.. ." solnethitig which thc .IS]: lacks and thc Sukhoi has in spadcs.

1-or a dctailcd analysis of JSF survivability and coniparison with Raptor 1;-22 and Sukhoi, sec Air I1owcr Australia a\: ~l~p:~~~i'~'~1~:.aus;rirp~~~cr.r~e1~.4PA-JSII'-~~2~~l~~sis.l~t1~~l

"' Scc Wing Commander Chris Mills ICA/\I: fltd at: ~it~p;~:I~v~w,ausairpo\.vcr.11ct~~~P~l-N07~~420 1 107- 1 . h t~n l. Scc also Wikipedia at Iittp:.':en.wiliipedia.!yo:wiki:'P,\K-FA, and Ibr an inteinationai pcl.spec$ivesee In~tian1 1 ~ ' r o ~ s ~ ~ c eat: h t t p : . 1 / i ~ ~ d i a ~ ~ c r o ~ p a ~ c . ~ ~ ~ r d p r c s s . c o m i O 0 7 017'pak-fa-1lie-t1est-i1~do-russian-5tli-i~ci~eratii~r1-aircraf~~~

15 For comparison of the Raplor as against the JSI; see APA at: l~ttp:!~\~~~~l\~~,a~~saig~o~~~lll~lctihrn

1I

-~O'I 'AMMI502OF:-t.hlml and at htt~~:~~w~vw.a~~sairpo~v~r.neti.APA-Ra~~tar.I~tml

I ? For a de~ailudplan on destroying the ADI: scc Iloloncl Medved at: l~~t~:~~~vw~v,~i~1sair~0~2;e1_.1lct'APA-h'0TAh;1-030707~I . h l l

I'>For solnc historical co~nlnenlarysee: I~ttp:!!~yw~v.ausairpo~\.t.r.r~et;\Yarship-l[j!s.httnl I-or analysis spccific to Australia scc: http:~/~v~~~~~,~1~1~airpi1~~er.net~~11i1I~~i~-SEt2-40OO-AM~,D~htn

Sent: Monday, 15 September 2008 17:00 To: White Paper Subject: WWW Submission: 4. Air Force/Air Power [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

Name: Erik Peacock

Submission: I provided a written submission by post but wish to draw the Committee'sattention to the following by way of addendum. My submission predicted thatGovernment will likely reduce the buy of JSF because they would be too expensive tofit with the Defence budget. The Australian on 11 September predicted that the buywould be halved. See http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24327437-31477,00.html

I also wrote the the JSF will underperform, is a project at risk of failure, andcannot compete with regional Sukhoi aircraft from Russia. That has now been confirmed by the the Sydney Morning Herald at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/151m-planes-a-disaster/2008/09/13/1220857899066.html. It has also been confirmed by the US militaryin computer modelling of combat scenarios. See the Australian at: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,24328813-31477,00.html?from=public_rssApparently the Sukhois "clubbed the JSF like puppy seals".

The SMH article now names the purchase price for each JSF at $151 million. It was supposed to be $35 million when Australia signed onto the program. That makes it moreexpensive than the vastly superior F-22 Raptor. The Defence Department refused toconsider the Raptor because it was too expensive.

Regards

Erik Peacock

I agree to my submission being published on the Defence website

I agree to my submission being quoted in the Community Consultation Report

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