study to examine the links between corruption and organised crime
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Study to examine the links between corruption and organised crime. Tihomir Bezlov and Philip Gounev Center for the Study of Democracy Blagoevgrad , 28 February 2013. Content. Goals and objectives Methodology Organised crime and corruption Institutional perspectives - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Study to examine the links between corruption and organised crime
Tihomir Bezlov and Philip GounevCenter for the Study of Democracy
Blagoevgrad, 28 February 2013
Content
• Goals and objectives• Methodology• Organised crime and corruption
• Institutional perspectives• Market perspectives• Member state perspectives
• Case studies• Recommendations
• Take stock of existing studies on the link • Identify the factors that bring about the use of corruption
by organised crime within the public and private sectors• provide a framework for future assessment of the trends in
the how corruption is used by organised crime• provide a framework for future assessment of the
effectiveness of the various preventive and repressive measures
Objectives
Scope: defining ‘organised crime’
Research methodsD
ata
sour
ces
Institutions:- Police- Judiciary- Customs- Political
156 interviews (law-enforcement, judiciary,
private sector, academics, journalists, anti-corruption
authorities)
Semi-structured interviews
6 country studies(FR, NL, EL, BG, IT, ES)
Literaturereview
Statistical data:105
indicators / indexes
Cluster / neural
networkanalysis
Illegal Markets:- Cigarette
s- THB- Car-theft- Extortion
MS clustersPrivate
sector
Dat
a an
alys
is
Use of corruption by
OC
Institutional effectiveness
Institutional setup
Political historyImmigration
Social stratificationType of illegal marketCulture / informal
social relationsBusiness culture
Economic factors
Grey economy
Defining the link
Corruption and
IR NL AT SE DK UK BE FI DE FR ES IT EL SI CY CZ MT PT SK EE HU LT LV PL RO BG-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
GDP PPP per capita Corr Control Bribes
Corruption and GDP
Statistical evidence: country clusters
Statistical evidence: country clusters
Cluster 1: Denmark, Finland, Sweden
Cluster 2: Austrian, Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Slovenia, Spain, UK
Cluster 3: France
Cluster 4: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Portugal
Cluster 5: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Malta,
Slovakia
Cluster 6: Italy
Cluster 7: Bulgaria, Poland,
Romania
Weak link b/w corruption & OC
Strong link b/w corruption & OC
• Unreliable data (no index on ‘organised crime’)• Data on corruption measures primarily perceptions / petty
corruption• No explanations to describe the nature of the relationship
• (many factors are not / are difficult to measure statistically)• Difficult clustering (unclear boundaries between clusters;
single-country clusters)
Issues with statistical evidence and clusters
• Police• Judiciary• Political corruption • Customs administration and tax administration• Other institutions (depending on OC activity)
• Museums (antiquities market)• Ministries of agriculture / forest services (illegal logging)• Ministries of economy / trade (arms trafficking)
Institutions and corruption
Use of corruption by OC to target institutio
ns
General level of corruption in country
Culture / informal social relations
Regional specifics (pressures)
Anti-corruption unit Anti-corruption measuresInstitutional setup
(powers)Economic factors
(salaries)Size / types of
criminal market
Institutions and corruption
Institutions and corruption
Political
corruption
Judicial corruption
CustomsCorruptionPolice corruption
Use of corruption by OC
Government policies (taxes, illegality)
Culture / informal social relations
Regional specifics (pressures)
Volume of trade /
infrastructure
Type of illegal market
Anti-corruption measuresEffectiveness of law-
enforcementEconomic factors
(salaries)
Grey economy
Illegal market / OC activity and corruption
Use of corruption by OC to target
police
General level of corruption (judicial / political corruption)
Culture / informal social relations
Regional specifics (pressures)
Immigration & OC
Internal affairs unit s
Anti-corruption measuresEconomic factors
(salaries)Policies on illegal
marketsSize / types of
criminal market
Police corruption
Type Grid Group Description MS observed
Donkeys Strong Weak work characterised by both isolations and subordination: individual deviance of lower level officer
All EU
Hawks (rotten apples)
Weak Weak a lot of freedom, distance from organisation, individual deviance (example: higher rank officers or officers working on highly confidential material)
FR, ES, UK, IT, SL, SE, NL, AU, BE, EI, DE
Wolves Strong Strong strong group identity creates a subculture that facilitates organised deviance; group protection against external controls
FR, ES, IT, RO, CZ, BG, PT
Vultures Weak Strong freedom to aggressively seek exploitable situations, using the cover offered by the group
BG, EL, RO, CZ, LT, LA, CY, PO
Police corruption
Trafficking in human beings and corruption
Recruitment
• Law firms – arranged marriages;
• Work/travel agencies
Transport
• Border Police
• Counselor services - visa applications
Exploitation
• Police officers – protection and non-interference
• Local authorities – licensing of premises, prostitutes
Laundering
• Stores, transport companies,
• Financial: change bureaus;
• Car-dealers
Further information
www.csd.bghttp://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/
study_on_links_between_organised_crime_and_corruption_en.pdf
Tihomir [email protected]
Philip [email protected]