study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time period(2003-2008) by various banned/terrorist...

8/9/2019 study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time period(2003-2008) by various banned/terrorist outfits

1/23

IFIMBUSINESSSCHOOL

2009

PROJECT

ON

STATISTICSTo study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time

period(2003-2008) by various banned/terrorist outfits

P G D M 0 9 - 1 1 , I F I M B - S C H O O L


2/23

PROJECT ON STATISTICS

P G D M 0 9 - 1 1 , I F I M B - S C H O O L Page 2

STATISTICS PROJECT REPORTSTATISTICS PROJECT REPORTSTATISTICS PROJECT REPORTSTATISTICS PROJECT REPORT

ON

A STUDY

PRESENTED BY

TAPAS RANJAN OJHA, SOBHANSON DAS, SNEHASHISH

GOSWAMI, RASHMI NARAYAN SAMANTASINGHAR


3/23



CONTENTS

Acknowledgements...................................................................3

Objectives & Scopes..................................................................4

Introduction...............................................................................5

Statistics in studying the trend in terrorism...............................10

Appendices...............................................................................19

-Abbreviations...........................................................................19

-Definitions................................................................................20

-References...............................................................................21


4/23



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The most important acknowledgement, by far, is to the officers of the paramilitary

forces who helped us with invaluable data to bring this project into the current

shape. We thank Mr.Parminder Singh, from Intelligence Bureau, who put his

considerable experience and wisdom at our disposal in the early stages of theproject. We are highly indebted to all the personnel working with ADUGODI and

ANANDNAGAR police division to have helped us with vital data at various stages of

our project, directly or indirectly. We also extend our heartfelt thanks to the

Dy.Commandant ,CISF of ISRO division for having provided us with his priceless

time out of his highly busy schedule which formed a strong base for the foundation of

the project. Search engine GOOGLE and BING deserves a space for thanks for

without their miraculous tool the project would not have seen the light of the day.

Words will not be enough to express our gratitude to Mr.R.Ballasubramanian,

Mr.C.K.Sandhu, Mr.J.C.Gehlot whose work on understanding the trend of terrorism

was of immense help. We are again thankful to all the officers for allowing us to get

access to highly prohibited area to materialise the project.

Our heartfelt thanks are due to all the people who indirectly directed us to proper

authorities and the places where they can be approached for the most difficult part

of the project-data collection. We thank all the people who were directly or

indirectly associated with the project, as the space is not sufficient to name all of

them. It would be a huge injustice not to mention all the classmates who boosted our

morale high whenever we thought of scrapping the sensitive project and starting a

fresh one.

Last but not the least, we are highly thankful to our professor Mr.Shivakumar who,

not only provided us with the vision to undertake the project, But also put in

herculean endeavours to introduce significant statistical tools to us which helped us

all throughout the project.


5/23



OBJECTIVES & SCOPES

1. To study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time period (2003-2008) by

various banned/terrorist outfits.

SCOPE: In strategising counter terrorism policies making use of the past data and its

analysis.

2. To study the degree of association between

a) The strength(in numbers) of INFORMERS cum DIRECT FIELD OPERATION

PERSONNEL of IB & RAW

and

b) Number of major terrorist attacks in 2008.

SCOPE: In making optimum use of the strength and formulating deployment policies

learning from the mistakes committed.

3. To find out the chances of property being damaged when casualties are already

reported and casualties when properties have got damaged already, in course of a

militant attack.

SCOPE: In analysing the chances of both loss of life and public property in attacks to

come and how to equip ourselves to counter that situation


6/23



INTRODUCTION

What is Terrorism?What is Terrorism?What is Terrorism?What is Terrorism?

Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of

recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described

variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to

oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose

point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for

the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive

power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to

the secretive nature and small size of terrorist

organizations, they often offer opponents no clear

organization to defend against or to deter.

That is why pre-emption is being considered to be so

important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to

carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the

nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal

activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has

become increasingly common among those pursuing

extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its

popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous concept. Even

within the Indian Government, agencies responsible for

different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.

The Indian Department of Defence defines terrorism as the calculated use of

unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce

or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally

political, religious, or ideological. Within this definition, there are three key

elementsviolence, fear, and intimidationand each element produce terror in its

victims. The CBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence

against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian

population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."The RAW defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence


7/23



perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine

agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Outside the Indian Government, there are greater variations in what features of

terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations produced this definition

in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)

clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political

reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are

not the main targets." The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with

the U.N. definition quoted above, and adds two sentences totalling another 77 words

on the end; containing such verbose concepts as "message generators" and

'violence based communication processes." Less specific and considerably less

verbose, the British Government definition of 1974 is"the use of violence for

political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public,

or any section of the public, in fear."

Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim.

The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that .draws the attention of

the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan

their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what

they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the

publics or governments reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich

Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the

immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching

the televised event.

The Black September Organization used the high visibility of the Olympics to

publicize its views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October

1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team

Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241

U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded.

Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress. Their one act of

violence influenced the United States decision to withdraw the Marines from Beirut

and was therefore considered a terrorist success.

There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorists, the victims, and thegeneral publics. The phrase one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter

is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as

evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in,

by whatever means possible. A victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a

criminal with no regard for human life. The general publics view is the most

unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a Robin Hood image in hope of

swaying the general publics point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view

of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and needs to

be countered vigorously


8/23



Terrorist BehavioTerrorist BehavioTerrorist BehavioTerrorist Behaviouuuurrrr

There is clearly a wide choice of definitions for terrorism. Despite this, there are

elements in common among the majority of useful definitions. Common threads of

the various definitions identify terrorismas:

Political

Psychological

Coercive

Dynamic

Deliberate

PoliticalPoliticalPoliticalPolitical

A terrorist act is a political act or is committed with the intention to cause a political

effect. Clausewitz' statement that "war is a continuation of policy by other means" is

taken as a truism by terrorists. They merely eliminate the intermediate step of

armies and warfare, and apply violence directly to the political contest.

PsychologicalPsychologicalPsychologicalPsychological

The intended results of terrorist acts cause a psychological effect ("terror"). They

are aimed at a target audience other than the actual victims of the act. The intended

target audience of the terrorist act may be the population as a whole, some specific

portion of a society (an ethnic minority, for example), or decision-making elites in the

society's political, social, or military populace.

CoerciveCoerciveCoerciveCoercive

Violence and destruction are used in the commission of the act to produce the

desired effect. Even if casualties or destruction are not the result of a terrorist

operation, the threat or potential of violence is what produces the intended effect.

For example, a successful hostage taking operation may result in all hostages being

freed unharmed after negotiations and bargaining. Regardless of the outcome, the

terrorist bargaining chips were nothing less than the raw threat of applying violence

to maim or kill some or all of the hostages. When the threat of violence is not

credible, or the terrorists are unable to implement violence effectively, terrorism

fails.

DynamicDynamicDynamicDynamic

Terrorist groups demand change, revolution, or political movement. The radical

worldview that justifies terrorism mandates drastic action to destroy or alter the

status quo. Even if the goals of a movement are reactionary in nature, they require

action to "turn back the clock" or restore some cherished value system that is

extinct. Nobody commits violent attacks on strangers or innocents to keep things

"just the way they are."


9/23



DeliberateDeliberateDeliberateDeliberate

Terrorism is an activity planned and intended to achieve particular goals. It is a

rationally employed, specifically selected tactic, and is not a random act. Since the

victims of terrorist violence are often of little import, with one being as good for the

terrorists' purposes as another, victim or target selection can appear random or

unprovoked. But the target will contain symbolic value or be capable of eliciting

emotional response according to the terrorists' goals. Remember that the actual

target of terrorism is not the victim of the violence, but the psychological balance

Media ExploitationMedia ExploitationMedia ExploitationMedia Exploitation

Terrorism's effects are not necessarily aimed at the victims of terrorist violence.

Victims are usually objects to be exploited by the terrorists for their effect on a third

party. In order to produce this effect, information of the attack must reach the target

audience. So any terrorist organization plans for exploitation of available media to

get the message to the right audiences. Victims are simply the first medium that

transmits the psychological impact to the larger target audience. The next step intransmission will depend on what media is available, but it will be planned, and it will

frequently be the responsibility of a specific organization within the terrorist group

to do nothing else but exploitand control the news cycle.Some organizations can rely on friendly or sympathetic news outlets, but this is notnecessary. News media can be manipulated by planning around the demands of the"news cycle", and the advantage that control of the initiative gives the terrorist.Pressures to report quickly, to "scoop" competitors, allow terrorists to presentclaims or make statements that might be refuted or critically commented on if timewere available. Terrorists often provide names and details of individual victims to

control the news media through its desire to humanize or personalize a story. Forthe victims of a terrorist attack, it is a certainty that the impact on the survivors (ifthere are any) is of minimal importance to the terrorists. What is important is theintended psychological impact that the news of their death or suffering will cause ina wider audience.

Operations in Permissive SocietiesOperations in Permissive SocietiesOperations in Permissive SocietiesOperations in Permissive SocietiesTerrorists conduct more operations in societies where individual rights and civillegal protections prevail. While terrorists may base themselves in repressiveregimes that are sympathetic to them, they usually avoid repressive governmentswhen conducting operations wherever possible. An exception to this case is arepressive regime that does not have the means to enforce security measures.

Governments with effective security forces and few guaranteed civil liberties havetypically suffered much less from terrorism than liberal states with excellent security

forces. Al Qaeda has shown, however, that they will conduct operations anywhere.

Illegality of MethodsIllegality of MethodsIllegality of MethodsIllegality of MethodsTerrorism is a criminal act. Whether the terrorist chooses to identify himself withmilitary terminology (as discussed under insurgencies below), or with civilianimagery ("brotherhood", "committee", etc.), he is a criminal in both spheres. Theviolations of civil criminal laws are self-evident in activities such as murder, arson,and kidnapping regardless of the legitimacy of the government enforcing the laws.Victimizing the innocent is criminal injustice under a dictatorship or a democracy. Ifthe terrorist claims that he is justified in using such violence as a military combatant,he is a de facto war criminal under international law and the military justice systemsof most nations.


10/23



Preparation and SupportPreparation and SupportPreparation and SupportPreparation and SupportIt's important to understand that actual terrorist operations are the result ofextensive preparation and support operations. Media reporting and academic studyhave mainly focused on the terrorists' goals and actions, which is precisely what theterrorist intends. This neglects the vital but less exciting topic of preparation andsupport operations. Significant effort and coordination is required to finance groupoperations, procure or manufacture weapons, conduct target surveillance andanalysis, and deliver trained terrorists to the operational area. While the time andeffort expended by the terrorists may be a drop in the bucket compared to theamounts spent to defend against them, terrorist operations can still involve largeamounts of money and groups of people. The need for dedicated support activitiesand resources on simple operations are significant, and get larger the greater thesophistication of the plan and the complexity of the target.

Goals and Motivations of TerroristsGoals and Motivations of TerroristsGoals and Motivations of TerroristsGoals and Motivations of Terrorists

Ideology and motivation will influence the objectives of terrorist operations,

especially regarding the casualty rate. Groups with secular ideologies and non-

religious goals will often attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence to

achieve a specific political aim. This often requires them to keep casualties at the

minimum amount necessary to attain the objective. This is both to avoid a backlash

that might severely damage the organization, and also maintain the appearance of a

rational group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks they reduce

the risk of undermining external political and economic support. Groups that

comprise a "wing" of an insurgency, or are affiliated with aboveground, sometimes

legitimate, political organizations often operate under these constraints. Thetensions caused by balancing these considerations are often a prime factor in the

development of splinter groups and internal factions within these organizations.

In contrast, religiously oriented and millenarian groups typically attempt to inflict as

many casualties as possible. Because of the apocalyptic frame of reference they

use, loss of life is irrelevant, and more casualties are better. Losses among their co-

religionists are of little account, because such casualties will reap the benefits of the

afterlife. Likewise, non-believers, whether they are the intended target or collateral

damage, deserve death, and killing them may be considered a moral duty. The

Kenyan bombing against the U.S. Embassy in 1998 inflicted casualties on the localinhabitants in proportion to U.S. personnel of over twenty to one killed, and an even

greater disparity in the proportion of wounded (over 5000 Kenyans were wounded

by the blast; 95% of total casualties were non-American ). Fear of backlash rarely

concerns these groups, as it is often one of their goals to provoke overreaction by

their enemies, and hopefully widen the conflict.

The type of target selected will often reflect motivations and ideologies. For groups

professing secular political or social motivations, their targets are highly symbolic of

authority; government offices, banks, national airlines, and multinational

corporations with direct relation to the established order. Likewise, they conduct

attacks on representative individuals whom they associate with economic


11/23



exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While religious groups also use

much of this symbolism, there is a trend to connect it to greater physical

devastation. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals, such as

missionaries, and religious activities, such as worship services, to the targeting

equation.

Another common form of symbolism utilized in terrorist targeting is striking onparticular anniversaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike tocommemorate battles won or lost during a conventional struggle, whereas religiousgroups may strike to mark particularly appropriate observances. Many groups willattempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations, or the executionsor deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. Likewise, strikingon days of particular significance to the enemy can also provide the required impact.Since there are more events than operations, assessment of the likelihood of anattack on a commemorative date is only useful when analyzed against theoperational pattern of a particular group or specific members of a group'sleadership cadre.

The Intent of Terrorist GroupsThe Intent of Terrorist GroupsThe Intent of Terrorist GroupsThe Intent of Terrorist Groups

A terrorist group commits acts of violence to-

Produce widespread fear Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause by attracting

the attention of the media Harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that the the

government overreacts and appears repressive Steal or extort money and equipment, especially weapons and ammunition

vital to the operation of their group Destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create doubt

that the government can provide for and protect its citizens Discourage foreign investments, tourism, or assistance programs that can

affect the target countrys economy and support of the government in power Influence government decisions, legislation, or other critical decisions Free prisoners Satisfy vengeance Turn the tide in a guerrilla war by forcing government security forces to

concentrate their efforts in urban areas. This allows the terrorist group toestablish itself among the local populace in rural areas

STATISTICS IN STUDYING THE TREND IN TERRORISM

Having discussed, what terrorism is about? , The attributes of the terrorists

mindsets which provoke them to actuate merciless ideas and the goals and

motivations that are standardized behind this inhuman act of violence,it is high

time,we introduce certain simple mathematical tools to analyse the trend of

terrorism in the time frame 2003-2008.


12/23



Let us mathematically illustrate the tendencies that this heinous crime against

mankind has witnessed during 2003-2008.

For this analysis,we make use of the data pertaining to various banned/terrorist

outfits and the attacks they have given shape during the time period 2003-2008,as

labelled against them by the ministry of defence, Government of India.The data areas enunciated under :

TERRORIST/BANNED GROUP INCIDENTS(2003-2008)

CPI(M) 67

ULFA 32

AM 15

JeM 36

HuJI 31

SIMI 8

AQ 8

JuD 14

IM 17

HuJeI 8

TeJ 1

HM 34

LeT 69

The above table illustrates the number of attacks carried out by the respective

outfits during 2003-2008.

We calculated the mean for the above distribution which came out to be 26.15

Mean=26.15

Which itself is an indicative of the dreaded situation. The above data infers that on an

average 26 terrorist attacks have taken place which were given shape by the abovementioned groups in 6 years which implies that more than 4 major attacks have


13/23



taken place each year on an average for the last six years which itself is the sleeve

up alert for the defence system of India.

Proceeding further we calculated the median which came out to be 17

Med=17

Since, the data set comprises of extreme values as the lowest number of incidents

registered is 1 whereas the highest being 69,the median is likely to provide a better

measure of central location than the mean. Even with the consideration of median,

the threat to the security is hardly curtailed as the average number of attacks an

year still amounts to more than 2.While the attack on November 26, 2008 at Taj hotel

Mumbai left 380 casualties and over 1300 injured, hence, an estimated occurrence

of more than 2 major incidents a year is a huge setback to the security system and a

threat to life and property alike.

The mode for the above distribution comes out to be 8

Mode=8

From the table above, it can also be inferred that the major challenge to the security

of India is internal than external. With the frequency of attacks by CPI(M) highly

active in central, eastern and south eastern belt of India, this group is proving to be a

major warning to the internal security of the territory and study shows that its area of

operation is rapidly expanding and is now trying to cover the south western India too

under its terror map.

LeT with its notorious blasts in J&K and along the line of border with few ofbombings at McMahan border line is another big threat to the internal security of

India. Their frequencies of blast have augmented in past 3 years along the border of

Pakistan.

ULFA in the North-East have also accentuated their dynamic participation in

violence as the number of incidents reported are 32 which is 4 less than the

incidents given shape by JeM,an external agency.

From the above observation it can be inferred that the distribution is positively

skewed as Mean>Med>Mode

Hence, the concentration of values is more towards the right side of the average of

the distribution

Hence, The above distribution can be represented as under :


14/23



Where, Mean>Med>Mode

Let us now proceed to find the Standard Deviation of the above distribution. The

standard deviation on calculation comes out to be 21.79 which is mathematically a

high figure.

STDEV=21.79

Hence the extent of scatterings of the data in the above data set from the central

value is high. Had there been a consistency in the occurrence of the terroristincidents in the given time frame, the STDEV would have been less, but as the

STDEV for the above data set is high, it can be inferred that the occurrence of these

incidents were inconsistent, and hence, it was difficult to obtain a pattern as to

which time during a year the frequency of attacks were more and hence a proper

counter measure could not be formulated.

Let us formulate the z-scores of each of the observations pertaining to each group

ZCPI(M)=1.8

ZULFA=0.26

ZAM=-0.5

ZJeM=0.45

ZHuJI=0.22

ZSIMI=-0.83

ZAQ=-0.83

ZJuD=-0.56

ZIM=-0.41


15/23



ZHuJeI=-0.83

ZTeJ=-1.15

ZHM=0.36

ZLeT=1.9

Hence, From above values of z-scores it can be inferred that there are no outlayers

as the z-score lies between -1.15 and 1.9.There are no values of z-score which

corresponds to either >3 or >-3.

LeT is 1.9 STDEV away from mean i.e. farthest in positive side(more) and TeJ is -

1.15 STDEV away from mean, i.e. farthest in the negative side(less than)

Now, let us compute the value of (Mean-1STDEV) and (mean+1STDEV)

The range comes out to be 4.09 and 48.67

Now, we might simply notice that the values 1,69 and 67 does not fall into this range.

Rest all the 10 values are within this range which makes 76 percentage of the total

values in the data set.

Empirical rule states that at least 68 percentage of the values will fall in the aforesaid

range which holds good in this scenario.

Now, similarly let us get the value for (Mean +2STDEV) and (Mean-2STDEV).The

range comes out to be -18.2 and 69.73.As the number of incidents can not be

negative let us confine the minimum limit to zero. Hence from the observation wemight see that all the data values fall in this range.

Empirical rule states that at least 95 percentage of the values should lie in the

aforesaid range which holds good again in this scenario.

Hence, the data in the data set are believed to approximate the positively skewed

normal distribution.

Now, let us consider a bivariate distribution. This bivariate distribution analysis will

essentially throw light on the effectiveness of the operation of IB&RAW personnel

during the year 2008.

Let, X representsthe strength (in numbers) of INFORMERS cum DIRECT FIELDOPERATION PERSONNEL of IB & RAW

And, Y represents number of major terrorist attacks in 2008.

MONTH X Y

JAN 625 1


16/23



FEB 559 0

MARCH 521 3

APRIL 530 1

MAY 510 1

JUNE 536 0

JULY 532 2

AUG 517 1

SEP 517 4

OCT 523 4

NOV 579 1

DEC 583 1

As we see from the above table, we can generalize the performance of the IB and

RAW in the year 2008.From February to march there was decline in the strength

which gave way for 3 major attacks in march, one blast in the army camp at

Kupwada, another at Dras and an attack in CRPF camp at Beladila. On April, there

was sudden rise in strength owing to the attacks in preceding months hence the

attack dropped down to 1,maoist attack on RPF camp at Jhajha.But there after there

had been a aberrant trend that was seen

The strength kept on decreasing and hence, the attacks augmented, the IB and RAW

could come into action only on December by the time major attacks like the one in

November at Nariman point, Victoria terminal and Taj, one of the major, already took

place.

Let us find out the degree of association among these 2 variables

Using Karl-pearsons correlation,

SDx=35.05

SDy=1.38

COV(X,Y)=-17.61

Therefore, r =-17.61/(35.05X1.38)=-0.36

From the value of r, it can be inferred that the two variables are moderately

negatively co-related.Hence,i t would not be wrong to put in question the

effectiveness of the personnels performance of RAW & IB to optimum the optimum

level.

Now with the data observed in 2008,


17/23



Let N be the no. Of incidents took place in 2008.

A be the event of people being killed when an attack takes place.

B be the event of property being damaged when an attack takes place.

Now, in total of the 19 cases there were 17 cases where there had been casualties.

And in 18 cases, property has been damaged.

Hence P(A)=f/N=17/19=0.89

P(B)=f/N=18/19=0.94

Where,

f is the frequency favouring the event and N is the total number of occurence

These two events are not mutually exclusive

Hence, the chances of casualties occurring in next terrorist attacks are at a very

higher side slated to be around 89 %

And the chances that the next attack would bring in damage to the property is about

94 percent

The number of events wherein both, there have been casualties as well as damage

to property are essentially 17.

Hence, P(A intersection B)=17/19=0.89

Now,probability that in an attack there have been casualties while damage to

property has already taken place = P(A|B)=P(A intersection B)/P(B)=0.89/0.94=0.95

And the chances of vice versa is=P(B|A)=P(A intersection B)/P(A)=0.89/0.89=1

THIS IS ALMOST SURE!

Hence, statistically there is a lot that can be predicted about the future. Let us see

what it would look like based on our evaluation and input by Terrorism expert, IB,Mr.Gehlot

Future Trends in TerrorismFuture Trends in TerrorismFuture Trends in TerrorismFuture Trends in Terrorism

As a conflict method that has survived and evolved through several millennia to

flourish in the modern information age, terrorism continues to adapt to meet the

challenges of emerging forms of conflict, and exploit developments in technology

and society. Terrorism has demonstrated increasing abilities to adapt to counter-terrorism measures and political failure. Terrorists are developing new capabilities


18/23



of attack and improving the efficiency of existing methods. Additionally, terrorist

groups have shown significant progress in escaping from a subordinate role in

nation-state conflicts, and becoming prominent as international influences in their

own right. They are becoming more integrated with other sub-state entities, such as

criminal organizations and legitimately chartered corporations, and are gradually

assuming a measure of control and identity with national governments

Adaptive Capabilities of Terror GroupsAdaptive Capabilities of Terror GroupsAdaptive Capabilities of Terror GroupsAdaptive Capabilities of Terror Groups

Terrorists have shown the ability to adapt to the techniques and methods of counter-

terror agencies and intelligence organizations over the long term. The

decentralization of the network form of organization is an example of this. Adopted

to reduce the disruption caused by the loss of key links in a chain of command, a

network organization also complicates the tasks of security forces, and reduces

predictability of operations.

Terrorists have also been quick to use new technologies, and adapt existing ones to

their uses. The debate over privacy of computer data was largely spurred by the

specter of terrorists planning and communicating with encrypted data beyond law

enforcement's ability to intercept or decode this data. To exchange information,

terrorists have exploited disposable cellular phones, over the counter long-distance

calling cards, Internet cafes, and other means of anonymous communications.

Embedding information in digital pictures and graphics is another innovation

employed to enable the clandestine global communication that modern terrorists

require.

Terrorists have also demonstrated significant resiliency after disruption by counter-

terrorist action. Some groups have redefined themselves after being defeated or

being forced into dormancy. The Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminosa) lost its

leadership cadre and founding leader to counter-terrorism efforts by the Peruvian

government in 1993. The immediate result was severe degradation in the operational

capabilities of the group. However, the Shining Path has returned to rural operations

and organization in order to reconstitute itself. Although not the threat that it was,

the group remains in being, and could exploit further unrest or governmental

weakness in Peru to continue its renewal.

In Italy, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rossi) gradually lapsed into inactivity due to

governmental action and a changing political situation. However, a decade after thesupposed demise of the Red Brigades, a new group called the Anti-Capitalist Nuclei

emerged exhibiting a continuity of symbols, styles of communiqus, and potentially

some personnel from the original Red Brigade organization. This ability to

perpetuate ideology and symbology during a significant period of dormancy, and re-

emerge under favorable conditions demonstrates the durability of terrorism as a

threat to modern societies.

IncreasingIncreasingIncreasingIncreasing Capabilities of TerroristsCapabilities of TerroristsCapabilities of TerroristsCapabilities of TerroristsTerrorists are improving their sophistication and abilities in virtually all aspects oftheir operations and support. The aggressive use of modern technology for

information management, communication and intelligence has increased theefficiency of these activities. Weapons technology has become more increasingly


19/23



available, and the purchasing power of terrorist organizations is on the rise. Theready availability of both technology and trained personnel to operate it for anyclient with sufficient cash allows the well-funded terrorist to equal or exceed thesophistication of governmental counter-measures.

Likewise, due to the increase in information outlets, and competition with increasingnumbers of other messages, terrorism now requires a greatly increased amount ofviolence or novelty to attract the attention it requires. The tendency of major mediato compete for ratings and the subsequent revenue realized from increases in theiraudience size and share produces pressures on terrorists to increase the impactand violence of their actions to take advantage of this sensationalism.

Today, most experts believe that certain parts of the Middle East, Pakistan andAfghanistan are turning out to be the main power centers for terrorism. Decades oflawlessness and corruption have seen Islamic terrorist groups fill the power vaccumin this region and continue to turn out an alarming number of religiously motivatedterrorists.

THANK YOU


20/23



APPENDICES

1. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE PROJECT

IB Intelligence bureau

RAW Research & Analysis Wing

CPI(M) Communist Party of

India(Maoist)

ULFA United Liberation Front of

Assam

AM Al Mansurian

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed

HuJI Harkat-ul-jihad-Islami

SIMI Students Islamic Movement of

India

AQ Al-Qaeda

JuD Jamat-ud-Dawa

IM Indian Mujahideen

HuJeI Harkat-ul-Jihad_e-islami

TeJ Tehrik-e-Jaffiria


21/23


22/23



c)Standard deviation:

Where : xi-u represents the gap from the mean

And n is the number of observation. N=n-1

d)covariance: The covariance between two real-valued random variables Xand Y, withexpected values and is defined as

e)Correlation:

Degree of relationship between the variables under study

f) Probability:

It is a numerical measure of the possible outcomes of a non-deterministic

experiment.

3.REFERENCES

a)Crime journal

b)Gazette of India

c)The Hindu

d) Web Portals

-Naxalwatch.blogshot.com

-Democratic.undergronud.com

-world-check.com

-worldpress.com

-dawn.com

-indiamart.news.com

-news.outlookindia.com

-Bing.com


23/23


-Google.com

-terrorwatch.com

-cdi.org

-fas.org/irp/world/india/ib

e) Terrorism and homeland security : An introduction-Jonathan R.White

f) Inside Terrorism- Bruce Hoffman

g)Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse-Bard O'Neillh)Oxford English Lexicon

i)26/11 commission report

study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time period(2003-2008) by various banned/terrorist...

Documents