stroschein making or breaking kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applicationsof Dispersed State ControlSherrill Stroschein

In this article, I make a case for a dispersed state control model as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of theWeberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, dispersed state controls are based on a functionalprinciple, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. This examination is informed by recentdebates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorialautonomy in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict. I examine the practical application of a dispersed control model in thecontext of the governance structure proposed for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. I concludewith an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complexdemographic and governing realities in regions such as the Balkans.

K osovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia inFebruary 2008 split the international community.As of this writing, approximately 40 states1 have

recognized or intend to formally recognize Kosovo as anindependent state—a tally codified on a website calledkosovothanksyou.com. Serbia has consistently opposedKosovo’s formal separation from Serbia, and continues toenforce ties to Serbs living in Kosovo—approximately 7percent of Kosovo’s population.2 Given the Serbiangovernment’s stance in opposition to Kosovo’s indepen-dence, it was to be expected that states with close ties toSerbia, such as Russia, might withhold formal recogni-tion of the entity. However, other states with their ownpotential separatist movements have also demonstratedreluctance regarding Kosovo’s recognition. Countries suchas Slovakia and Spain have cited Kosovo’s independenceas setting a dangerous precedent of redrawing borders inthe international system, via unilateral decree.3

This diverse range of opinions on the Kosovo issue posesan inconvenience to the United States and a number ofEU countries that have been articulating plans for theregion’s independence. Long negotiations within the EUhave failed to bring all member states to full agreement insupport of independence. Moreover, the independence issuehas faced an embarrassing division within the UN Secu-rity Council that makes Kosovo’s recognition from thatbody unlikely for some time.

The unilateral nature of Kosovo’s independence hasincluded some rather stark rhetoric by its supporters, inan effort to obscure dissent on the matter. But this rheto-ric also obscures some of the complexities of Kosovo’sintended governance structure, needlessly ratcheting upthe debate. U.S. President George Bush has stated categor-ically that Kosovo’s “borders have been clearly defined.”4

Certainly, Kosovo’s borders can be clearly drawn on a map.However, in de facto terms, the governance structures out-lined for Kosovo will be much more complex than thetypical Weberian state model.

The ideal of a state as outlined by Max Weber is that ofa sovereign administrative apparatus governing the use offorce within a clearly defined territory. But the Ahtisaariplan on which Kosovo’s governance is to be based estab-lishes an asymmetric decentralization model, granting par-ticular powers to Serb-majority municipalities to governtheir own affairs.5 Similar to governance structures in Bel-gium, Northern Ireland/UK, and Bosnia, it devolves sub-stantial powers to substate units and even allows theseunits some powers of cross-border linkages with other statesin the realm of specified issue-areas or functions.

The strong devolution and weak central authority inthese functional governance models defies a traditional

Sherrill Stroschein is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Poli-tics at University College London and Director of theMaster’s Program in Democracy and Democratization([email protected]). She wishes to thank StephenDeets, Matthew Nelson, Stefan Wolff, and three anonymousreviewers for comments on previous drafts; Fotini Christia,Stacie Goddard, Daniel Nexon, Katia Papagianni, andRoger Petersen for conversations related to this piece; and tothe International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)for research support in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in2001 and to the Harvard Academy for International andArea Studies for support in 2003–05.

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view of state control as structured hierarchically around apowerful center. Rather, Kosovo is an example of a grow-ing number of states with complex governance structuresto govern diverse ethnic or religious populations. First,in contrast to the hierarchical model, such states have adispersed control structure, in which the central govern-ment is weak and substate units have substantial powers.Second, in contrast to a territorial premise for gover-nance and control, they operate on the basis of a func-tional premise of control—meaning that substate units neednot be territorial. As an example, Belgium’s linguisticcommunities regulate educational affairs on a functionalprinciple, meaning that both the Francophone and Flem-ish communities govern particular schools within the ter-ritory of Brussels. These communities may also sign treatieson educational policy with other states. Such an abilityfor substate units to conduct foreign policy without direc-tion from the center is a serious departure from the typ-ical model of a territorial state.

While these complex state structures hold promise forthe governance of divided societies, they remain poorlyunderstood in the everyday world of policy discourse. Therhetoric surrounding Kosovo’s independence by all sideshas tended to reflect a zero-sum understanding of the mean-ing of statehood—one that makes Albanians overly joyfuland Serbs overly mournful in relation to the complex insti-tutions that comprise Kosovo’s governance structure. Thisarticle attempts to correct these misunderstandings. In thesections that follow, I first sketch the conditions in Kos-ovo that warrant a complex governing structure. I thenconsider the Weberian state model and the territorial andhierarchical solutions that it implies, noting why they arelikely to be inadequate for this case. I then outline theconceptual bases for functional governance, which pro-vides an alternative to the Weberian model in terms ofboth territory and hierarchy, and analyze the new Kosovostructures along these lines. Finally, I conclude with anoverview of the advantages of creative designs for statesthat move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal withcomplex demographic realities in regions such as theBalkans.

Background: Intractable Positions?During most of the 1990s, Kosovo was a civil disobedi-ence success story. After the removal of the province’s auton-omy by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989, the majority Albanianpopulation adopted a strategy of passive resistance to Bel-grade, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. The Alba-nians maintained a “shadow state” government thatfunctioned at a number of levels, including the collectionof taxes and the development of some infrastructure.6 Thestirrings of violence among Albanian extremists of theKosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 were caused bythe convergence of a number of events. These included

the undeniable repression of the Milosevic regime, theagitation of political rivals to Rugova, and a governmentcollapse in Albania in 1996—which produced chaos onKosovo’s doorstep and facilitated access to armaments. Withthe growth of Albanian extremist activity, repression byMilosevic increased, drawing the attention of the inter-national community.7

Following the NATO intervention in 1999, the UnitedNations held de facto control over Kosovo, granted by UNSecurity Council Resolution 1244. The Resolution denotedKosovo as officially remaining under the control of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, which prevented the prov-ince from officially conducting its own affairs or establish-ing its own defense structures. Kosovo thus remained a dejure part of Serbia, while Serbia held no de facto control inits Albanian-majority areas after the June 1999 settle-ment.8 The real authority was instead the UN Mission inKosovo (UNMIK). It not only provided security, but alsoproposed legislation for parliament, nullified parliamen-tary decisions on security issues (over Albanian protests)and regulated foreign visitors to Kosovo (over protests fromBelgrade).9

The international community’s drive to resolve Koso-vo’s status accelerated in the fall of 2005. Although policybriefs soon after the 1999 intervention were open to avariety of possibilities for Kosovo, independence slowlycame to dominate all other options—partly due to thevehemence of the international actors supporting this posi-tion.10 Most of these policy discussions took the line thatindependence, by establishing clear “ownership” over Kos-ovo, would solve the complex problem of ethnic mixingby simply forcing Serbs to accept Albanian control of Kos-ovo’s territory.11 The Serb position was that Kosovo shouldbe granted extensive autonomy within the boundaries ofSerbia, but this proposal was generally unsuccessful in gar-nering Western support.

In Kosovo’s first parliamentary elections in November2001, the Serb coalition Povratak (Return) was able tomobilize enough of the vote to obtain 22 seats in the120-member parliament, far above their guaranteed 10seats—in spite of initial threats of a Serb boycott.12 How-ever, as Serbs began to perceive UN support for the Alba-nian position on independence, they slowly began towithdraw further from participation in political institu-tions. Less than one percent of eligible Serbs voted in theOctober 2004 parliamentary elections, a boycott endorsedby leaders in Belgrade.13 A Serb boycott of the 2007 par-liamentary elections had a similar effect, as only 3 percentof registered Serb voters went to the polls.14 Serb repre-sentation after both elections thus became limited to theirquota of 10 parliamentary seats. The remaining Serb rep-resentatives have occasionally withdrawn their participa-tion as a form of boycott as well.

Following the February 2008 independence declara-tion, protests were held by Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia.

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ARTICLES | Making or Breaking Kosovo

656 Perspectives on Politics

Serbia has vehemently declared that it will not recognizeKosovo as a state. Controversy has raged within Serbiaregarding how to treat those states and international bod-ies recognizing Kosovo. A dispute within the Serbianstate government regarding its stance toward theEU—given most EU countries’ support of Kosovo’sindependence—caused the government to collapse a fewweeks later, followed by May elections.15

Kosovo’s independence declaration is a claim for de jurecontrol to be officially allocated to Kosovo, although theinternational community will retain a strong de facto gov-erning role for the next several years. The independenceplan outlines quite complex governance structures, a meansto acknowledge that a simple Albanian domination of theSerbs in government would be problematic. In order toextend powers to the Serbs, the plan outlines a detailedproposal for decentralization, represented by Article 124in the Constitution. It outlines enhanced governance pow-ers that are allocated to local level municipalities, whichalso have the power to collect and allocate their own rev-enues. They also have the ability to engage in cross-bordercooperation with Serbia and to form associations of munici-palities.16 As I outline below, these arrangements reflect adispersed state control model that differs greatly from theWeberian ideal type of a territorial, hierarchical state.

Options for Divided Societies in theWeberian State ModelThe current international system is founded on the normof territorial states, an order that is preserved through thepractice of mutual recognition.17 Max Weber’s influentialwritings on the state describe it as “a human communitythat (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimateuse of physical force within a given territory.”18 Theseterritorial lines may be granted to the state and recognizedby the international community. But it is left to that stateitself, as the sovereign, to assert its own de facto controlwithin them, in the form of “physical force,” throughoutthat territory. According to these norms, the “state is con-sidered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” forthe purpose of control. However, the complex realities ofgoverning diverse populations can produce a divergencefrom this ideal type—and a wide gap between recognizedstate borders and actual control on the ground.19

Given the predominance of the norm of territorial statecontrol in international discourse and legal structures, actualdeviations from this model tend to be treated by the inter-national community as temporary and unstable arrange-ments. Appellations such as “failed states” or “state death”reflect this understanding. Moreover, international policyoften approaches such places with a focus on the creationof institutions to reflect the ideal Weberian state model,or “state-building.”20 One of the difficulties of applyingthis ideal is that the act of drawing and enforcing bound-

aries cannot erase the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and fam-ily networks that may cross recognized state boundaries.The Balkan region contains particularly strong examplesof such networks, though they certainly appear elsewherethroughout the globe.21 Under such circumstances,attempts to draw and enforce such boundaries require asteady commitment of resources to prop up the territorialstate edifice.

Kosovo’s independence declaration reflects some of theseterritorial border norms. Soon after the independence dec-laration, the international community immediately movedto fortify its new state borders—an act that Serbs respondedto by vandalizing border posts.22 After the declaration,Serbs in the North, in cooperation with Serbia, beganstrengthening local institutions in preparation for a poten-tial partition of the Serbian-dominated North from theremainder of Kosovo.23 Even with the establishment ofborder controls, these borders will remain inevitably porous,and surround diverse populations that are connected bynetworks. Such networks often pose control problems fora centralized and hierarchical government structure.24

There is an inherent incongruence between these on-the-ground realities and the attempt to endorse an inter-national system of idealized “nation-states.” A number ofstrategies have been attempted in the pursuit of increasedstate control. One historical solution to potential minor-ity challenges to central authority has been the repressionor removal of minority groups via ethnic cleansing or forcedassimilation.25 Normative shifts in the international sys-tem towards human and minority rights and towardsdemocratization have problematized these approaches aspolicy options. More recently, scholars and policymakersare focusing on attempts to design state institutional struc-tures in a way that can more successfully regulate poten-tial group conflicts.26 In the sections below, I first outlinethree categories of state structure options that remainfounded on the Weberian ideals of territory and hierarchyin state control. I then discuss alternative options—founded on a non-territorial foundation and with dis-persed control structures.

Independence and Partition as Conflict ResolutionConflicts within a state can either be resolved by bruteforce and military victory or by negotiated settlement.Military victory may be more likely to produce a lastingend to conflict, but at a sizeable cost to life and humanrights.27 If a negotiated settlement is to be successful, eachside must believe that the other is adhering to its termsand will not resume hostilities—what scholars refer to as apotential commitment problem.28 Negotiated settle-ments thus often require third-party enforcement to pro-vide enforcement, or credible commitments, that the otherside will be unlikely to cheat on the agreement.29 More-over, negotiated settlements should also redefine conflicts

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in a way that convinces each side that it has a stake in alasting peace.30

Negotiated settlements may be difficult to implementand costly for third parties to maintain, as heavy trooppresence may be required to prevent a recurrence of hos-tilities. Some theorists have argued that conflicts betweenidentity groups are inevitable when individuals of differ-ent groups remain mixed, because the commitment prob-lem implies that each side will have an incentive to attackthe other—an ethnic security dilemma.31 Following thislogic, they propose that the only means to achieve apermanent end to hostilities is through partition andpopulation transfer: partition or independence to draw aboundary, and population transfer to remove the ele-ment of mixing.32 Population transfer tends to be unpop-ular among policymakers, given the obvious human rightsabuses involved in such a policy. However, the logic of“divide and quit”33 inherent in partition does imply thatminorities left within a new state or province would con-tinue to face a serious security dilemma—one potentiallygreater than before partition.34 Indeed, such circum-stances have often led to a military or militia removal ofthese minorities post-partition, as an effort by majoritiesto homogenize the newly-partitioned unit. The Serbs inKosovo have repeatedly expressed fears of such potentialhomogenizing actions, and there has indeed been spo-radic violence against them over the past several years.35

Reflecting a Serb unwillingness to participate in the secu-rity apparatus of a new Kosovar state, soon after theindependence declaration a number of Serb police offi-cers in Kosovo refused to adhere to Kosovar Albaniancommanders—but rather attempted to pledge loyalty toUN forces.36

The recognition of Kosovo’s independence currentlyapplies a double standard regarding the partition issue.Kosovo has been effectively partitioned from Serbia, butSerb proposals for a territorial partition of Kosovo itself,namely to separate the Serb-majority north from Pris-tina, have been officially rejected by the same bodies,ironically on the grounds that it would negate multieth-nicity and facilitate population transfer.37 But indepen-dence is simply partition by another name—both partitionand the creation of new states are based on a territorialprinciple of allocating control. Minority groups who findthemselves within these new territories have understand-able concerns about their status. Such problems are notunique to the Balkans, as a similar dynamic persistsbetween religious communities in Iraq.38 The act ofdrawing borders in partitions and independence declara-tions will inevitably make minorities worry about theirstatus in a new entity. For this reason, territorial auto-nomy and decentralization, outlined below, tend tobe viewed as more palatable options—as minoritiesremain within the protection of a larger state. However,these options are also based in Weberian state principles,

and are thus limited as a means to alleviate minorityconcerns.

Territorial Autonomy, Federalism, andDecentralizationSocialism left a legacy of very centralized governments.For the past two decades, most Central and Eastern Euro-pean states have embarked on decentralizing reforms—the territorial devolution of governmental powers fromthe central to a more local level. Devolution efforts arefounded on the normative principle of subsidiarity: “thenotion that responsibilities should be assigned to the low-est level government that can adequately perform them,”as noted by Ronald Watts.39 Naturally, the act of choosingwhat unit this lowest level should be is often fraught withcontroversy. Contention over types of decentralization wasindeed one of the primary initial causes of the initial unrav-elling of Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991.40 This devolutionprocess continues, but is now being implemented at farmore local levels.

While devolution is a broad term that implies the trans-fer of power, terms such as decentralization and federal-ism usually denote a symmetric dispersion of powers amongunits. The United States is an example of a symmetricallocation of powers among the 50 states of the union.Autonomy, on the other hand, consists of an asymmetricdevolution of powers to a specific minority within a state.41

It codifies the recognition that a particular minority groupor historical territory might have unique governance con-cerns beyond those of other groups—as in the case ofNative American reservations in the United States, Que-bec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain, Crimea in Ukraine, orSouth Tyrol in Italy. Autonomous units tend to have pow-ers beyond those of other units.42 In addition, autono-mous units may take territorial or non-territorial forms;territorial forms are addressed here, while non-territorialforms are addressed in the following sections on func-tional governance principles.43

Autonomy may be assigned to a unit as part of a usefulpost-conflict strategy. In essence, it gives concessions toeach side—it can satisfy a minority enclave’s demand for adegree of self-government without conceding state sover-eignty. Autonomous structures thus allow for the possibil-ity that groups on different sides may both perceivegoverning institutions as advantageous; in academic terms,they are “multivocal,” allowing for different interpreta-tions.44 The ambiguity of autonomy is a source of itsstrength, as it allows each side to claim some victory in abattle for control over a specific territory. Up until theFebruary independence declaration, Belgrade had beenproposing autonomy for Kosovo, in a form that wouldhave allowed significant governing authority to the Alba-nians within the territory of Kosovo, while at the sametime keeping Serbia’s state borders around Kosovo intact.45

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But many international policymakers viewed the proposalwith suspicion, preferring instead a “clear” solution inKosovo.

A disadvantage of territorial autonomy is that once ter-ritorial units are created, they can also provide a basis forsecession from the state. The propensity of territorial auton-omy to encourage secession has occupied the attention ofseveral analysts in comparative politics and internationalrelations.46 Autonomous units established on a territorialprinciple tend to legitimize and institutionalize local con-trol within particular borders, and thus can be perceivedor used by local leaders as a stepping-stone to statehood.The alternative of functional autonomy, discussed furtherbelow, can mitigate these effects by only giving groupspower over certain competencies or functions, rather thanover a territory. In this way, it does not create “mini-states”potentially ready for secession.

The most commonly-used forms of devolution in theinternational system take territorial forms that are verymuch in line with the Weberian state model. In addition,these systems preserve hierarchical structures, provided thatthe central government retains powers to restrict or negatepowers exercised at the substate unit level—also the casein most devolved systems.47 These territorial models tendto reserve powers over foreign policy and security for thecentral government. But systems of functional competen-cies may allocate these powers to substate units (as inBelgium and Bosnia), moving away from the typical Webe-rian centralized hierarchy. Current plans for Kosovo’s gov-ernance structures include a mixture of all of these elements,discussed in more detail towards the end of the article.One more territorial menu option first remains to be dis-cussed: innovations in elections, representation, and theallocation of governing powers.

Elections, Representation, and ConsociationalismThe above sections illustrate how, under the premise ofterritorial governance, minorities will tend to perceive thatthey are at a power disadvantage in relation to majori-ties.48 Because democracy codifies the principle of major-ity rule, translating demographics into political power, itsimplementation can augment these minority fears. Theseeffects are compounded where ethnic or religious groupsare mobilized as ethnic or religious political parties, a strongfeature of the Balkans.49 The majoritarian electoral sys-tems of the United States and Great Britain discouragethe formation of small parties, such as ethnic parties. Major-itarian systems thus tend to hide ethnic or religious polit-ical divisions. In doing so they may prevent politicalfragmentation, but also fail to give voice to minorities inthe political process.

Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, usedin both Kosovo and Serbia, grant minorities this voice—because in PR systems seats in parliament more closely

reflect group proportions.50 PR systems can also encour-age ethnic parties. Serbia contains ethnic minority partiesfor Albanians (Presevo Valley), Muslims (Sandzak), Hun-garians (Vojvodina), and Roma while Kosovo contains eth-nic minority parties for Serbs and Roma. Quotas are alsoapplied to guarantee representation and voice for minor-ities. Of the 120 seats in Kosovo’s parliament, 10 arereserved for Serbs and 10 for other minorities. Given con-tinued Serb boycotts of Kosovo’s elections, their quota hasserved as a useful avenue for continued representation.

Minorities may view electoral representation as a smallallowance, because even quotas in parliament cannotchange the fact of minority status in the decision-makingprocess. For this reason, consociational structures in manydivided societies provide a more direct means to integrateminorities in policy discussions. In consociational struc-tures, each group is given veto powers. In Belgium, Bos-nia, and Northern Ireland, for example, decisions onimportant matters cannot be made by one group withoutthe potential for veto by other groups.51 Kosovo’s newgoverning structure includes some consociational fea-tures, but they do not involve a strict minority veto—partly due to the demographic imbalance in favor of theAlbanian majority. Rather, the decentralized structure pro-vides the mechanism to alleviate minority concerns.

One disadvantage of consociationalism is that itincludes groups in representation at the cost of govern-ment efficiency.52 Groups often disagree, producing fre-quent stalemates. Belgium thus maintains a modified formof consociational government. In Belgium, decisions onparticular functional matters are relegated to each groupseparately, in a process discussed below. This functionalinnovation provides a means out of obvious stalemates inadvance—and in this way steps away from the territorialand hierarchical limitations of the Weberian state model.

An Alternative: Functional RatherThan Territorial GovernanceA territorial principle for control assumes sovereignty onthe basis of territory. A functional principle is instead con-cerned with control over particular issues. Rather thanallocating sovereignty over a particular territory, func-tional governance specifies sovereignty over specified com-petencies: Sovereignty over what? Sovereignty to do what?Functional units of government that are designated thesecontrols can coexist and cooperate with territorial units.The Belgian federation, for example, consists of three ter-ritorial and three non-territorial units. The non-territoriallinguistic councils adjudicate matters of language, educa-tion, and health care, while the territorial regions adjudi-cate matters that are more closely linked to territory, suchas environment and economy. In a system of “exclusivecompetencies,” policy decisions on language and educa-tion thus come under the jurisdiction of the three

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non-territorial linguistic communities. This innovationremoves divisive issues from the realm of general statedebate and adjudicates them separately—a means to avoidunnecessary conflicts between groups.53

The central government in Belgium does maintaindecision-making powers over budgetary allocations to theseunits, which can be and has been a source of a stalemate atthe center. But because so many functions of the Belgiangovernment are devolved to these substate units, a poten-tial crisis is not perceived as such. In fact, during a longgovernmental stalemate in 2007 and early 2008, inter-viewees in Brussels quipped that the business of gover-nance simply continued on without an effective center,due to the fact that devolution to the federation units is sostrong.54

How can it do this? As noted above, the Belgian gov-ernment is consociational, such that each group may vetoproposals by the other—a source of recent crises. Conso-ciationalism requires that elites cooperate in order to cre-ate policy. However, Belgium’s consociationalism issupplemented with the complex federal structure out-lined above. In this structure, territorial and non-territorialunits with specific functional competencies take specificpolicy matters outside of the realm of general debate. Bel-gium thus takes two steps away from consociationalism asit is usually applied. First, the division of competenciesamong the different units means that elite cooperation isnot necessary for several decisions to be made. Second,the non-territorial units of the federation invoke aspects ofcollective rights for communities in governance, regard-less of the actions of elites at the central level.55 Some ofthese innovations appear in the new governmental struc-ture for Kosovo.56 After a sketch of the conceptual foun-dations of functional governance, I will outline the Kosovostructures in more detail.

Basics of Functional Control StructuresTerritory may currently serve as the dominant principle ofgovernance in an international system based on states, butit has not always held this role.57 Various non-territorialand functional control structures conducted the tasks ofgovernance long before states became dominant units inthe international system.58 In the Ottoman Empire, forexample, non-territorial units called millets allowed Ortho-dox and Jewish groups to administer family law on thebasis of their own religious traditions, rather than on thebasis of Islamic law. Membership in millets was based ona personal rather than a territorial principle; thus individ-uals within the same millet might be dispersed through-out a territory.59

Nor does territory hold exclusive reign in the contem-porary era, as the modern international system includeshighly visible exceptions to territorial governing rules.John Ruggie calls these non-territorial or functional con-

trol structures, such as the mutually recognized powersof embassies on foreign territory, a form of “neomedieval-ism” that counters the hegemony of territoriality in worldaffairs.60 In addition, globalization processes are increas-ingly chipping away at the edifice of territorial gover-nance, requiring new assumptions about the assessmentof political control.61 In addition, the establishment ofshared competencies across the states of the EuropeanUnion has produced a hybrid system of territorial andfunctional governance structures.62 Another cross-borderinnovation is Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ire-land is officially part of the United Kingdom, a North-South council with Ireland allows for strong directconsultation with this other state, and citizenship can beshared between the UK and Ireland.63 The territorialmodel of the Weberian state is hardly appropriate here.

International relations scholarship has devoted someattention to functional governance structures, in order tobetter conceptualize these deviations from the system ofterritorial states—as in recent approaches to the study ofempires. Although the study of empires and the studyof states tend to be analyzed within the different fields ofinternational relations and comparative politics, their gov-ernance structures are isomorphic, with similar formsregardless of the level of aggregation at which they areapplied. Dynamics of imperial control and dynamics ofdomestic control can both be understood through an analy-sis of potentially similar control structures.64

These control structures can be approached from soci-ological or neoliberal viewpoints. Viewed through a soci-ological lens, functional control is exerted through networksas ties and relationships form non-territorial conduitsthrough which power may be exercised. Such networks asa basis for control have been examined across a variety ofsettings (from Renaissance Florence to old and newempires) as a strategy used by leaders to consolidate powerover diverse populations.65 Viewed through a neoliberallens, which emphasizes individual choices in politics, func-tional control can take the form of contracting betweenself-interested parties.66 In both versions of analysis, con-trol structures have the capacity to exercise power inde-pendently of territorial sovereignty, and independently ofterritory.

Functional structures of control thus differ from theWeberian state model in terms of their non-territorial exer-cise of power. They also differ from the model in terms ofits emphasis on centralized hierarchy, as the structure ofcontrol may be more dispersed throughout a network orset of contracts. As outlined by Alexander Cooley in hisapplication of firm theory to power structures, power rela-tions in a governance structure or relationship may takeunitary (U) forms or multi-divisional (M) forms. WhileU forms are more hierarchical and centralized, in M formsthe center is weaker and there is more autonomy allottedto the subunits—a dispersed control model.67 The degree

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to which a governance structure reflects hierarchy versusdispersed controls varies according to the strength of theentities and the network’s isomorphic pattern.68

As one example of a hierarchical arrangement, Cooleyexamines Russia’s contracts with Central Asian republicsfor purposes of resource extraction. Both parties may bewilling participants in such transactions, even though theirinteractions often reflect a hierarchical structure of power.69

Another fruitful area for the application of these dynamicslies in the study of imperial management. As outlined byDaniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, a hub-and-spoke net-work pattern with little connection between subunits is amore effective control structure than other forms for anempire, because it forces all communication through thecenter.70 This hub-and-spoke pattern with little subunitcommunication denotes a hierarchical focus on the centerthat is not unlike that of the Weberian state. A strongempire may exercise less direct influence than does a cen-tral government in a Weberian hierarchical state, but thetwo structures reflect the same governance pattern. In con-trast, a more dispersed control structure could allow fordirect links between the units, or for direct links betweenthe units and external actors. In these dispersed forms,controls are allocated to the subunits for potential inter-actions that do not involve the center. These deviationsfrom the territorial and hierarchical aspects of Weberianstate structures show promise for addressing governanceproblems in divided societies.

Non-Territorial Autonomy and FunctionalGovernanceThe primacy of territorial states over other types of rec-ognized political organization inevitably produces con-flicts between groups vying for the same territory. Asnoted by Gidon Gottlieb, the premise that each nationshould have a state of its own is a good idea only in theabstract.71 Given these problems, scholars of national-ism, ethnic conflict, and group accommodation have beenengaged in the project of designing various institutionalsolutions for governing complex societies. First, if terri-tory poses a source of dispute between groups, the natureof territory can be reframed.72 Northern Ireland’s flexiblecitizenship policy and North-South councils take pre-cisely these steps. Second, if a state’s governance hierarchyposes a source of dispute between groups, the state struc-ture can be redesigned away from hierarchical structures.Belgium’s non-territorial federal structure allows Frenchand Flemish speakers to administer their own schoolswithout fear of involvement by the other group in edu-cational matters. The fact that educational matters lieunder the jurisdiction of the non-territorial federal units,the linguistic communities, effectively takes them out ofthe realm of general debate. This is how the system ofdivided competencies can reduce ethnic tensions, by min-

imizing debates on issues that are most likely to causecontroversy between groups. In this way, many potentialdisputes are simply redirected via institutional design beforethey can become truly divisive.73

Normative theorists attempting to address these prob-lems have noted that democratic decisions in particularissue-areas need not require territorial units.74 This line ofthought was initially put forth a century ago by Karl Ren-ner and Otto Bauer, in their attempt to address dilemmasof minority governance brought about by the demise ofthe Austrian Empire. In their view, the non-territorial prem-ises of the Ottoman millet system could be applied toaddress this matter directly.75 While their instrumentalworks on this subject were not put in practice at the time,in the last few decades a literature has emerged on non-territorial autonomy as a means to address governance prob-lems for minorities. Due to a diverse range of scholarshipon this issue, these non-territorial structures are also referredto as “personal” or “cultural” autonomy, as well as national-cultural autonomy (NCA).

These examinations of functional governance have beenpursued separately from the international relations workon functional governance, but the two literatures havemuch in common. In the development of the concept ofnon-territorial autonomy, non-territorial units hold juris-diction over individuals according to a personal principle,and in relation to specific governance functions. Groupsmay thus administer themselves with regard to competen-cies that can be separated from territory.76 Such functionsgenerally include the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or reli-gious matters of a minority group. However, they mightalso include foreign policy, criminal justice, and economicpolicy. These foreign policy powers are evident in Bel-gium, where the linguistic subunits have the capacity tosign treaties with other states on matters relating to edu-cation. Consistent with the logics outlined in the inter-national relations literature, non-territorial autonomyincludes two important components: 1) decision-makingbodies that are not territorial—such as councils electedaccording to linguistic affiliation, and 2) specific func-tional competencies that are assigned to those bodies. Inspecifying particular functions for particular councils, thesestructures reserve matters such as language and educationfor internal group debate, rather than allowing them tobecome a bone of contention between different groups.

Belgium is not the only example of this type of non-territorial governance. In Hungary, non-territorial coun-cils for minority groups were established in 1993, primarilyto administer matters of culture. Similar to the Belgianunits, the Hungarian bodies consist of representatives cho-sen by their ethnic constituents in non-territorial elec-tions.77 The Russian Federation passed a law on NationalCultural Autonomies in 1996, as a means to address theproblem of recognized national minorities living outsideof territorial republics assigned to their ethnic kin. These

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entities officially serve functions of linguistic, cultural, andreligious administration.78 In addition, courts to adjudi-cate matters using Shari’a law (usually with regard to fam-ily law) appear in a number of diverse states, includingNigeria, India, and Greece.79

Closer to Kosovo, Serbia’s 2002 Minorities Law includedprovisions for minority councils funded by the state bud-get and designed to protect language, education, media,and culture for minorities.80 Such pro-minority struc-tures, a vast deviation from past Serbian policies, are com-parable to the non-territorial structures in Hungary, Russiaand Belgium. Moreover, the Minorities Law provides fortowns with high concentrations of a particular minoritygroup to work together, allowing for a loose organizationof Hungarian-strong or Albanian-strong towns and regions.The Hungarian minority in Serbia, which was particu-larly involved in designing this portion of the legislation,has already established some of these structures. The lawwas partially designed with Kosovo in mind. Indeed, asearly as 2003, Serb communities in Kosovo began follow-ing this model in the form of a Union of Serb Municipal-ities, a loose organization headed by a president andexecutive board.81

Kosovo’s New StructuresKosovo’s current constitution emerged from the Ahtisaariplan from 2007,82 and includes structures quite similar tothose outlined above to address minority concerns—especially for the Serbs. Minorities in Kosovo are grantedparticular concessions in the areas of representation anddecentralization, discussed here. The constitution, whichtook effect on June 15 2008, utilizes more vague wordingto outline decentralization provisions than the previousconstitutional draft and the Ahtisaari plan. However, theirbasic logic remains, with some of the differences betweenversions noted in the coming discussion.83

With regard to representation, both the previous pro-posals and current constitution codify the 10-seat quotafor Serbs in the Kosovar parliament (Article 64) that hasbeen ongoing practice in recent years. Other minoritiesare also granted seats. In addition, there is a permanentCommittee to represent the interests of minorities inparliament, particularly on issues of “vital interest” tothose communities (Articles 78 and 81). Finally, at themunicipal level, minorities are guaranteed a representa-tive voice where they comprise over 10 percent (Article62).84 At first glance, these representation structures mightappear somewhat consociational. However, the constitu-tion does not give minorities a veto on decisions, thusstopping short of a consociational model.85 Rather, theoperative powers for minorities appear in the highlydevolved state structure.

With regard to decentralization, the initial provisionsfor Kosovo’s devolved structure were quite specific with

regard to references to Serb interests. As stated explicitlyin the Ahtisaari plan’s executive summary (2007):

The Settlement provides a wide-ranging decentralization pro-posal, which is extensive in scope and intended to promotegood governance, transparency and effectiveness in publicservice. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needsand concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which will have ahigh degree of control over its own affairs.86

In the 2008 final constitution, the decentralization lan-guage is more vague, but is represented in the discussionof the “high degree of local self-governance” and “extendedand delegated competencies” outlined for municipalitiesin Article 124.87

The Ahtisaari plan of 2007 is more explicit in outliningspecific competencies for municipalities in areas of highereducation and health care, similar to the Belgian model.The 2007 plan also proposes extensive financial auton-omy for municipalities in the form of block grants, includ-ing the “ability to accept transparent funding from Serbiafor a broad range of municipal activities and purposes.”The final 2008 Constitution omits explicit references toSerbia, likely due to Albanian sensitivities, but retains theseprovisions in the form of municipal powers for “cross-border cooperation,” (Article 124) and in the rights ofethnic and national communities to establish and main-tain their own schools (Article 59).88

In addition, following a pattern established by the 2002Serbian minorities law, Serb-majority municipalities areable to establish partnerships with other municipalities—most likely to be other Serb-majority entities (Article 124).Taken in conjunction with their powers of cross-bordercooperation with other states, Serbian municipalities canthus establish a range of agreements and financial connec-tions with other municipalities and Serbia, on particularmaters of governance that remain of interest to the Ser-bian community.89

These decentralization plans are particularly intrigu-ing in relation to the demographic dispersion of theethnic populations in Kosovo. While the plan officiallyavoids outlining territorial autonomy, a concentration ofSerbian communities in the north, combined with themunicipal structures, gives a wide degree of de facto ter-ritorial autonomy to this area. In the aftermath of inde-pendence, Serbia has been using this fact as the basis foran alternative plan for the potential territorial partitionof Kosovo. However, Serbia’s attempts at partition areproblematized by the existence of several Serb municipal-ities outside of this region, to the east. The Ahtisaari planoutlined extensive autonomy to these Serb-majoritymunicipalities as well, which are points dispersed through-out Albanian-majority areas. In addition, the divided cityof Mitrovica, with a Serb majority in the North and anAlbanian majority in the South, may be governed by twoethnic municipal entities.90

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At first glance, one might say that these municipal enti-ties could be units with territorial autonomy. But thisconfiguration is a combination of territorial and non-territorial controls. Serb-majority municipalities in the Eastcan work closely with the Serb-majority area in the North,and both can form close links to Serbia. Moreover, theAhtisaari plan for Kosovo explicitly outlined the potentialfor Serbian state institutions to contribute funding towardsthe governance of these Serb-majority areas in Kosovo, tosupplement their own revenues, formally recognizing anongoing practice. The linked network structure of Serbcommunities creates a de facto non-territorial network ofgovernance over certain issue areas, particularly language,culture, education, and health care in cooperation withthe Serbian state. While both the 2007 plan and the con-stitution officially omit the establishment of a meso-levelSerb representative body, the system of links implies awhole that is greater than the sum of its parts—a networkstructure not unlike the medieval Hanseatic League withcompetencies over particular areas.91 Even the police force,the representative of state control in the Weberian model,is to be quite decentralized in Kosovo.92

Both groups are aware that this strong decentralizationreduces the potential for territorial and hierarchical con-trol in Kosovo, taking it several steps from the Weberianstate model. Albanians, as the majority, would prefer amore hierarchical model, while the Serb minority prefersa more dispersed control model. Thus, the strong levels ofdecentralization for municipalities were opposed by theAlbanian majority, which can explain the shift to vaguelanguage on these provisions between the initial plans andthe final Constitution. But the Serbian community in Kos-ovo ueses these decentralized structures to their full poten-tial, and will very likely continue to do so. The strongcross-border links that can be established between Serb-majority municipalities and Serbia, including the receiptof Serbian state funding for their activities, contravenesthe norm of a territorial state with the ability to regulateits own affairs. The proposal appears to be at least as pow-erful as Northern Ireland’s North-South councils in thisrespect. The dispersion of strong competencies to thesemunicipalities also represents a quite dispersed controlstructure, rather than a hierarchical model for gover-nance. In addition, the network links that municipalitiescan form with each other and with Serbia add an elementof non-territorial autonomy to the structure, as a de factogoverning network entity is created independent of terri-tory to regulate matters of ethnic Serbian interest.

Kosovo is thus in essence pushing the boundary of whatit means to be a state—unless one is willing to move awayfrom the standard Weberian definition of states.93 Indeed,it may be time to re-think this standard understanding ofhow states should be configured, as democratizationthroughout the globe fosters increased involvement ofminority groups in politics—rather than simply their

repression. Governance dilemmas are unfolding in a vastrange of places, from Europe to Africa and the MiddleEast. As a result, more analysts are turning their attentionto the need to think creatively about the design of insti-tutions to manage them.94

The Precedent Issue and Kosovo’sNeighborsWhat will happen next? Several state governments haveexpressed fears that Kosovo’s independence will encourageother separatist movements throughout the globe—movements that may view it as establishing an inter-national precedent for others to follow.95 But proponentsof Kosovo’s independence argue that it is a unique casethat will not set an example elsewhere.96 How might weconceptualize potential ripple effects in the immediateregion, and how might potential effects be contained?

The impact of Kosovo on separatist movements willlikely depend on the ability for extremist wings of sepa-ratist groups to successfully employ it as evidence or sup-port for their own claims. As outlined by Rogers Brubakerin his triadic nexus model, this potential is contingent onthe set of interactive relationships between minorities, hoststates, and kin states—and the extremist and moderateelements within these entities.97 Romania and Slovakia,for example, contain significant Hungarian minorities. Inthe few years before Kosovo’s independence, articles inboth the ethnic Hungarian and titular press in Romaniaand Slovakia invoked Kosovo as a potential model forethnic Hungarian minorities. The minority Hungarianpress has viewed Kosovo independence in quite positiveterms, while the Romanian and Slovak press have opposedit.98 It should thus come as no surprise that Hungary hasrecognized Kosovo, while Romania and Slovakia have beenreluctant to do so.99

The recognition issue also poses serious problems forstates such as Bosnia and Macedonia, where different eth-nic groups may espouse different views on whether torecognize Kosovo. This section outlines how Kosovo’s inde-pendence might play out in light of the on-the-groundcomplexities of some of its neighbors. As much policyrhetoric on the Balkans appears to overlook some of thecomplexity of this region, the potential implications forthese countries and regions merit some attention.

BosniaThe 1995 Dayton agreement that ended the brutal civilwar between groups established a state divided into twomain parts: the Republika Srpska (RS), inhabited primar-ily by Serbs, and the Croat-Muslim Federation. As Mon-tenegro held a successful referendum on independencefrom Serbia in May of 2006, Bosnian Serbs began to callfor a similar independence referendum for the RS. In spiteof an immediate EU rejection of the referendum request,

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these Serbian demands became louder as the push forKosovo’s independence accelerated. As of this writing, Serbscontinue to threaten to declare independence for theRepublika Srpska from Bosnia.100

MacedoniaUntil the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia (FYROM) was an oft-cited exam-ple of ethnic coexistence. Albanian parties have been arather constant presence in the country’s coalition govern-ment since its first free elections in 1994. Macedonians,who are Slavs, constitute the majority of the population.Official census figures denote the Albanians at 23 percent,though Albanian leaders there have argued that they insteadcomprise close to 40 percent. Other population groups,including Turks, Serbs, and Roma, are estimated at roughly10 percent.101 In 1999, the ethnic balance was changedsomewhat with the arrival of a vast number of Albanianrefugees fleeing Milosevic’s military drive and ethnic cleans-ing in Kosovo.

But in 2001, violence erupted in Macedonia as well.Some violence between Albanians and Serbs within Serbiabrought both extremists and refugees across the borderinto Macedonia. Initial gunfire on the Kosovo-Macedonianborder grew into clashes between Albanian militants andMacedonian police, and arms were regularly transportedfrom Kosovo into Macedonia.102 As the conflict grew, civil-ians inevitably became caught in the fray. By June, morethan 33,000 refugees had left Macedonia for Kosovo, revers-ing the path walked by Kosovar refugees in 1999.103

Intervention from the international community quicklybrought an end to the violence and produced the Ohridagreement between groups. However, scars of fear andsuspicion remain. Recent disruptions in the implementa-tion of the Ohrid agreement demonstrate that in spite ofMacedonia’s successes, peaceful ethnic relations there couldbe easily disrupted. Strong Albanian networks in the regionmake it possible that Albanian extremists, emboldened byKosovo’s independence, could renew an attempt to annextowns in Macedonia to Kosovo, similar to efforts by someAlbanian extremists in Serbia. Moreover, because Macedo-nia borders Kosovo to the south, it would be a likely des-tination for Serbian refugees from Kosovo if they mightbe forced to leave—further disrupting the country’s eth-nic balance. In addition, the issue of Macedonian recog-nition for Kosovo remains internally divisive, and couldbecome a source of political contention between groups.104

Vojvodina in SerbiaVojvodina is located in the north of Serbia. Unlike thesouthern portion, it was part of Hungary before 1920. Fordecades, it has been Kosovo’s sister province, as the tworegions have historically held the same autonomous legalstatus within Serbia. Milosevic revoked the autonomy of

both provinces simultaneously in 1989, but Vojvodina’sterritorial autonomy was reinstated in 2002.105 AlthoughVojvodina has fewer autonomous powers than it did before1989, the 2002 Minorities Law provides for the establish-ment of non-territorial minority councils.106 Many of theprovince’s residents of a variety of ethnicities argue thatany independence for Kosovo implies a parallel consider-ation of Vojvodina’s potential independence. Pro-Vojvodinaparties, the leaders of which are Serbs, are a strong polit-ical presence—and the province’s own blue, yellow, andgreen flag is ubiquitous. Multiethnic support for Vojvod-ina’s increased governing powers is based on the province’swealth in relation to the rest of Serbia, as well as its sepa-rate historical identity.107

Vojvodina contains a population that is 17 percent Hun-garian, along with a mixture of other groups. Ethnic Serbsconstitute approximately 57 percent of the population.108

In addition to the pro-Vojvodina parties, ethnic Hungar-ian and radical Serb parties are the most visible. Amongthe province’s groups, the Hungarians have been the mostactive in establishing the non-territorial councils endorsedby the Minorities Law.109 Increased autonomy for Vojvo-dina has not deterred the actions of local Serb extremists,who categorically oppose any further separation fromBelgrade.

Unfortunately, Vojvodina is rarely mentioned in reportson Kosovo, and the legal relationship between the two isoften dismissed without much consideration of events onthe ground.110 In fact, in July 1999, when U.S. Secretaryof Defense William Cohen visited Hungary’s Prime Min-ister Viktor Orbán to thank him for his assistance onKosovo, he was surprised when Orbán proposed auton-omy for Vojvodina as a proper thank you. Cohen describedthe Hungarian plan as the last thing he wished to discussin the wake of the Kosovo conflict.111 But the notion ofeven further governing powers for the province has notgone away,112 and the pro-Vojvodina parties there remainvocal.

Serbia’s Presevo Valley and the SandzakLarge concentrations of Albanians live in Serbia’s PresevoValley, bordering Kosovo’s east. A sizeable community ofSlavic Muslims inhabits the nearby Sandzak region, whichborders Kosovo’s northwest.113 These regions have not beenimmune to violence—events in Kosovo have had undeni-able spillover effects in these areas of Serbia. In the mostrecent demonstration of how events in Kosovo and Serbiaare entwined, mosques in several cities around Serbia wereset on fire following some violence against Serbs in Kos-ovo in 2004.114

These incidents were not the first time that events inKosovo ignited tensions in Serbia. In February of 2001,clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police tookplace in the Presevo Valley. After the Kosovo conflict in

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1999, NATO had established a 5-kilometer buffer zonebetween Serbia and Kosovo. It was in this army-free bufferzone that Albanian militants, calling themselves the Lib-eration Army of Presevo, Medve –da, and Bujanovac, wereable to gather their forces. These 500–800 militants mod-elled themselves on the KLA and were equipped with weap-ons from Kosovo. With a stated goal of attaching threeAlbanian-majority towns in Serbia to Kosovo, they attackedlocal Serb police and a bus convoy, as well as moderateAlbanian politicians. By May of 2001, NATO began toallow Serb army units into the zone in an effort to rout theAlbanian extremists—though many remain at large.115 Kos-ovo’s independence could breathe more life into this goalof annexing Albanian municipalities to Kosovo.116 More-over, both the Presevo Valley and the Sandzak borderKosovo. In the event of a potential departure of Serbsfrom Kosovo, these already tense areas could be amongtheir primary destinations. An influx of individuals escap-ing violent conditions would be highly likely to disruptregions that already feature a delicate balance betweenethnicities—as shown by the 2001 Macedonia violence.

OverviewAs these examples make clear, the territory of the Balkansis not composed of a set of atomized unit states firmlyseparated by clear lines on a map. Even without the for-mal cross-border institutional provisions inherent in thenew Kosovo, the fates of the various regions within theBalkans are thickly intertwined with networks—ethnic,religious, trade (legal and illegal), and family networks.The presence of these networks might facilitate two mech-anisms that could increase the likelihood of regional insta-bility following Kosovo’s independence: emulation andspillover effects. Such network dynamics are quite com-mon across the borders of diverse states, and can workagainst the logics of state control—Kurds in Turkey andIraq, borders of Palestine/Israel, and Tutsi in Rwanda andBurundi are just a few such examples. The Balkans displaysimilar complexities. Rather than establishing forms ofgovernment that ignore these realities, it is important thatinstitutions embrace them. The Ahtisaari model, used as afoundation for Kosovo’s new government, is a good stepin this direction. However, the international communityactors in Kosovo must implement these provisions as theywere intended, rather than falling back on the rhetoric ofatomized and hierarchical state units.

ConclusionThis article has outlined a case for dispersed state controlmodels as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchicalprinciples of the Weberian state. Rather than allocatinggovernance powers in terms of territory, these innovativestructures are based on a functional principle, in whichgovernance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or

function. The examination here is informed by recentdebates in international relations theory on contractualand imperial network models of control, as well as workon non-territorial autonomy in the fields of nationalismand ethnic conflict. Like Northern Ireland’s North-Southcouncils, Kosovo’s new structures allow substate units tocreate formal links, including financial links, with Serbia.With this component, as well as its non-territorial struc-tures, Kosovo moves away from the typical hierarchicalpremises of the Weberian state. Like Belgium’s model ofdivided competencies for territorial and non-territorial unitswithin the federation, the structures planned for Kosovoaim to remove some of the most controversial matters ofgovernance from the realm of public contestation. In doingso, they reduce the potential for group conflict by movingaway from a hierarchical state model to dispersed controls.

The dispersed state control model offers much promisein a world of diversely-populated states. Rather than forc-ing ethnic or religious minorities to conform to the will ofthe majority because they find themselves within a partic-ular territory, dispersed state control models establish non-territorial institutions by which minorities might controlspecific functions of concern to them. The “deciders” ofKosovo’s fate have done well to establish a dispersed statemodel for control within its new structure. It can only behoped that the policy rhetoric of the international com-munity will catch up to these realities. Complex societiesrequire complex governance solutions.

Notes1 The United Nations contains 192 members.2 Kosovo contains an Albanian majority that is ap-

proximately 90 percent of the population, and Serbsare approximately 7 percent, and likely decreasing.Other ethnicities include Roma, Bosniaks, andTurks. Ethnic Albanians have consistently supportedfull independence, while Serbs have categoricallyopposed it.

3 BBC News Online 2008b. Arguments that Kosovo isa unique case (International Crisis Group 2007) seemto be based on wishful thinking rather than an under-standingof ethnicdynamics.Asoneexample, this authorwas contacted by a Kurdish newspaper in Iraq to com-ment on the implications of Kosovo for “Iraqi Kur-distan.”Eachcountryhasmore extremeelements amongethnic minorities who are certainly invoking the Kos-ovo case as support for their own—discourse inHungarian circles in Romania has reflected theseaspects as well; International Herald Tribune 2008.

4 RFE/RL Newsline, February 25 2008.5 Austin 2007. As he argues, “anyone who suggests that

Kosovo is set to become simply another Albanianstate in the Balkans has not read the fine print.”

6 Schmidt 1993, Juviler and Stroschein 1999.

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7 Greenhill 2003.8 United Nations Security Council, 1999. A good

discussion of the differences between de jure and defacto controls appears in Jackson and Rosberg 1982.

9 Alexandris 2004. For an overview of powers, seeUnited Nations Interim Administration Mission inKosovo 2001/2002.

10 International Crisis Group 2002a and 2002b con-tain more subdued language than the 2005a and2006 reports; see also Kupchan 2005.

11 International Crisis Group 2005a and 2006,Kupchan 2005, and Moore 2006a and 2006b.

12 RFE/R Newsline, November 15 and 26, 2001.13 BBC News Online, 2004e, National Democratic

Institute 2004.14 RFE/RL Newsline, November 19 2007.15 RFE/RL Newsline, March 10 2008, Beaumont 2008.16 The initial Ahtisaari plan included provisions for

block grants to municipalities, while the final ver-sion leaves these provisions more vague: UnitedNations Office for the Special Envoy of Kosovo(UNOSEK) 2007a and 2007b; ConstitutionalCommission, Government of Kosovo, 2008a and2008b.

17 Weber 1946, Spruyt 1994, Ansell 2004, Thomas2004.

18 Weber 1946, p. 78.19 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Spruyt 1994.20 Another proposal would make such units official

protectorates of more powerful states, along the linesof “shared sovereigny”; Krasner 2004. This notionbears more resemblance to colonial rule than thenon-territorial governance structures outlined in thisarticle. Not only would ongoing resource commit-ments make Krasner’s shared sovereignty impracticalover time, but a stated commitment to democracyby the world’s leaders makes such relationshipsinherently problematic. A sincere attempt to stabi-lize states from the inside requires some seriousthought regarding institutions of functional, ratherthan just territorial, governance.

21 Examples abound in Africa and the Middle East,but are certainly not confined there.

22 RFE/RL Newsline, February 20, 2008.23 Meanwhile, other states openly opposed indepen-

dence for fear that it might give rise to further sepa-ratist movements elsewhere. While realist views ofinternational relations continue to analyze the statesystem as if it consisted of autonomous units, in factthe international order is better understood as anecosystem of relations, where changes reverberatethroughout network ties and globalized discourse:Bull 1977, Goddard and Nexon 2005.

24 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Herbst 1996/1997.25 Licklider 1995.

26 An excellent, concise overview of these optionsappears in Sisk 1996.

27 Licklider 1995.28 Fearon 1998.29 Walter 2002.30 Goddard 2006.31 Posen 1993.32 Kaufmann, 1996 and 1998, and Downes 2001.33 Kumar 1997; emphases original.34 Kaufmann 1996 and 1998.35 Most notably in 2004, when many Serbs were

forced out of certain areas and their homes wereburned: BBC News Online, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c,2004d, Hayton 2004, Thorpe 2004, Bardos 2005and 2006. There are also ongoing sporadic attacks;International Crisis Group 2007.

36 Associated Press/New York Times 2008, BBC NewsOnline 2008d. In addition, ethnic Serbian railroadofficials facilitated Serbia’s brief takeover of a rail linein northern Kosovo, later regained by the UN;Kristic 2008, BBC News Online 2008e.

37 Sletzinger and Gelazis 2005, Bilefsky 2008a, BBCNews Online 2008a and 2008c.

38 See Diamond 2005, Cordesman 2006, and theRoundtable published in Foreign Affairs by Diamondet al., 2006.

39 Watts 1998.40 For a theoretical treatment, see Cooley 2005;

126–36.41 Watts 1998 and Hale 2004. In practice, however,

these terms are not always used consistently. “Devo-lution” in the UK refers to an asymmetric allocationof powers, and the Belgian “federation” has an asym-metric structure that will be examined later in thisarticle.

42 Hannum 1996; Heintze 1998, 7, and 2002, Thorn-berry 1998. See also Baubock 2001. The term feder-acy might be used to express a loosely-connectedautonomy, as in Puerto Rico’s relationship to theUnited States; see Rezvani 2007a and 2007b, andMcGarry 2007a and 2007b. As defined by Rezvani,a federacy is “a territory within the internationallegal boundaries of a state that has been allocatedsome entrenched [. . .] final decision-making powerswithout being a member unit of a federation”;2007a, 117.

43 A good overview of these principles can be found inAnsell 2004 and in Caporaso and Jupille 2004.

44 Padgett and Ansell 1993, Tilly 2002; Nexon andWright 2007.

45 Judah 2005.46 Roeder 1991, Lapidoth 1997, Bunce 1999, Mozaf-

far and Scarritt 1999, Rothchild and Hartzell 1999,Sambanis 2000, Hale 2000 and 2004, Stewart 2001,Hughes and Sasse 2001, Sasse 2002, Cornell 2002,

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Gorenburg 2003, Laitin 2001, Jenne 2004, Lustick,Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004.

47 This view differs from that of Cooley 2005, 27,who does not view federations as hierarchies. HereI argue that it is the functional content of powersthat determines this question. As military powerand foreign policy tend to be regarded as crucialpowers for a central government to exercise inorder to appear as a state in the Weberian sense,devolving these to a substate unit would removethis element of hierarchial authority. A gooddiscussion of these issues appears in Hayden’s 1999discussion of the Dayton structure establishedfor Bosnia.

48 Unless it is the minorities who hold the means ofcoercion, as was the case in colonial Rwanda and inSouth Africa until 1994.

49 See Horowitz 1985 on census voting.50 A broad treatment of these electoral systems appears

in Sartori 1994, Sisk 1996, and Reilly 2001.51 Lijphart 1968 and 1977, Lustick 1979, Andeweg

2000, Wolff 2004. Consociationalism could beunderstood as a form of corporatism because itincludes columns of strong representation—but it isfor ethnic, rather than economic groups. On corpo-ratism, see Schmitter 1974.

52 On this tradeoff, see Diamond 1993.53 Hooghe 1993, Van Parijs 2000, Jacobs 2000, Lau-

vaux 2001, Leton 2001, Jacobs and Swyngedouw2003, Stroschein, 2003 and 2006, Farrell and VanLangenhove 2005, Nimni 2005, and Lidström2007. Some theoretical foundations appear in Rug-gie 1993 and Ansell 2004.

54 Rumors of Belgium’s imminent collapse fail to ad-dress the issue of how the sticky point of Brusselsgovernance might be resolved if the state dissolvesinto two parts.

55 Nimni 2005, especially 8–10.56 See especially Pettifer 2006.57 Weber 1946, Ansell 2004, Thomas 2004.58 These works are numerous. Some more recent ex-

amples include Tilly 1992, Padgett and Ansell 1993,Ruggie 1993, Spruyt 1994, Sassen 2006, and Nexonand Wright 2007, and Nexon forthcoming.

59 Ra-anan 1991, Nimni 2005.60 Ruggie 1993.61 Friedrichs 2001, Ansell 2004, Deets 2008, Agnew

2005, Adamson 2006, Etzioni 2006, Sassen 2006.62 Jacobson 1997, Brenner 1998, Aalberts 2004, Ansell

2004, Di Palma 2004, Caporaso and Jupille 2004,Stone Sweet 2004.

63 O’Leary 2002.64 Tilly 1998, Nexon and Wright 2007, Nexon 2009.65 Some of this work leans toward a constructivist vein

as well. Padgett and Ansell 1993, Ruggie 1993,

Wendt and Friedheim 1995, Jackson andNexon 1999, Tilly 2004, Hobson and Sharman2005, Goddard and Nexon 2005, Nexon andWright 2007, and Nexon 2009.

66 Lake 1996, and Cooley 2000/01 and 2005. See alsoBaumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975.

67 Cooley 2005, esp. pp. 4–6.68 The content of the relations may also affect this

power dynamic, but this issue is beyond the scope ofthe present analysis. See among others Mannheim1955, Foucault 1980, and Shotter 1993.

69 While notions of contracting vs. hierarchy mayappear to be contradictory, this dilemma tends toreflect the nature of principal-agent problems insuch interactions. On this point, see Cooley 2005.

70 Nexon and Wright 2007, Nexon 2009.71 Gottlieb 1994, 101; Heintze 2002; Brooks 2005;

Nootens 2006.72 For an excellent treatment of reframing disputes, see

Goddard 2006.73 Van Parijs 2000.74 Walzer 1992, Gould 2006, Gould and Macleod

2006.75 See Renner in Nimni 1899/2005.76 Coakley 1994, Eide, Greni, and Lundberg 1998,

Bowring 2002, Nimni 2005, introduction andconclusion, Baubock in Nimni 2005.

77 Eide, Greni and Lundberg 1998, Deets 2002, Deetsand Stroschein 2005.

78 Bowring 2002. However, similar to the Hungarianbodies, they sometimes lack appropriate funds tocarry out their dutues.

79 I am grateful to Katerina Mantouvalou, FatimaKazim Olubodun, and Stefan Wolff for these points.It should also be noted that Shari’a law has evenbeen proposed for some Muslim communities in theUnited Kingdom; Burns 2008, Liptak 2008.

80 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2002.

81 RFE/RL Newsline, February 11, 18, and 25, 2003;Naegele 2003.

82 Mustafa 2008, Foniq-Kabashi, 2008, as well asRFE/RL Newsline articles on the Kosovarparliament’s approval of these plans for a constitu-tion in April, 2008.

83 Bilefsky 2008b, Moore 2008b.84 Constitutional Commission, Government of Kos-

ovo, 2008a and 2008b; in 2008a (Draft) especiallyChapter X, article 12, and articles 62 and 64. It isnotable that the European standard for minorityconcessions at the local level is 20 percent. Initialversions of the plan proposed electoral solutions,such as a double majority requirement for pariamen-tary legislation on issues pertaining to minorities, asmentioned in the Ahtisaari plan, United Nations

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Office for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK)2007b, under constitutional provisions.

85 In fact, article 149 explicitly removes the possibilityfor a minority veto (Constitutional Commission,Government of Kosovo, 2008b). Indeed, this arti-cle could cause trouble between communities if itis used by the majority to hinder municipal powersover the affairs outlined here.

86 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy ofKosovo (UNOSEK): Comprehensive Proposal for theKosovo Status Settlement: Section 2, 2007. Emphasisoriginal.

87 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy ofKosovo (UNOSEK) 2007b; Constitutional Com-mission, Government of Kosovo, 2008b.

88 Ibid.89 The Ahtisaari plan, United Nations Office for the

Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK), 2007a and2007b, especially sections on decentralization.

90 International Crisis Group 2007, which includesuseful maps.

91 As of June 2008, Serbs in Mitrovica began to takesome actions toward establishing a meso-level ofgovernment, in the form of a parliament for Serbs(Moore 2008a, Kristic 2008). This developmentcould in fact fit within the provisions of the plan,depending on the approaches of the various actors.

92 United Nations Office for the Special Envoy ofKosovo (UNOSEK): Comprehensive Proposal for theKosovo Status Settlement, and International CrisisGroup 2007. It is notable that health care is alsoadministered non-territorially in Belgium. TheSerb municipalities represent a form of collectiverights for Serbs that crosses borders: Pettifer 2007;see also Austin 2007. On the Hanseatic League, seeSpruyt 1994.

93 See Laughland 2008, who employs phrases such as“polyvalent sovereignty” and “postnational state-hood” to describe Kosovo.

94 Herbst 1996/1997, Ben-Porat 2005, Schwartz andJütersonke 2005. See also Bowring 2002.

95 Petrov 2006, BBC News Online 2008b, Inter-national Herald Tribune 2008.

96 International Crisis Group 2007.97 Brubaker 1996.98 Articles especially in the summer of 2007. On

Kosovo’s independence and its implications for anenthusiastic Hungarian enclave in Romania, seeInternational Herald Tribune 2008.

99 Kosovothanksyou.com, and BBC News Online2008b.

100 Wood 2006, RFE/RL Newsline, August 25 and 28,and September 1, 5, 14, and 15, 2006.

101 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope 1998; Freedom House 1997 and 1999–2000;

International Crisis Group 2005b; Pettifer 2006;and Lobiakas 2008.

102 Associated Press/New York Times 2001a; Radio FreeEurope Daily Report 2001 (later changed name toRFE/RL Newsline); Moore 2001a and 2001b;Glenny 2001.

103 Associated Press/New York Times 2001a and 2001b,Gall 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d.

104 Whitmore 2008.105 RFE/RL Newsline, October 23 and December 18,

2001, and January 24 and 29, 2002, Vecernje No-vosti 2002.

106 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Alliance ofVojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999 and 2002.

107 Puzigaca and Molnar 2001, Social DemocraticLeague of Vojvodina (LSV) 2001, and interviewsconducted by author, Novi Sad, July 2001.

108 Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998.109 The foundations for the Hungarian councils were

established even before the passage of the Law.Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999,Népszabadság 2003, and interviews conducted byauthor, Novi Sad, July 2001.

110 Teleki 2002.111 Népszabadság 1999a and 1999b.112 In interviews with local elites supporting Vojvodi-

na’s independence in the summer of 2001, theycontinually invoked their legal similarity withKosovo.

113 International Crisis Group 2005c is a good sourceon this area.

114 BBC News Online 2004a.115 Anderson 2001, Partos 2001.116 Joseph 2005, Bardos 2005, 35.

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