North Carolina A&T State University

Greensboro

Striking for Independence: The Solidarity Movement’s fight against Communism in the

1980s

By

Jonathan Jackson

Course: HIST 599- Senior Seminar

Section: 01

Instructor: Dr. James Wood

Semester: Fall 2015

I. Introduction

The Solidarity movement came into existence in Poland in 1980 as a result of price increases

and the resulting protests of the 1970s. Solidarity was the first labor union to be formed that was

not associated with the Communist party. It was the product of different labor unions coming

together for better working conditions in Poland that blossomed into a movement with much

higher political aspirations. The Solidarity movement used the general strike and the threat of the

discontinuation of work as a tactic to bring the Communist regime in Poland to the negotiating

table. The Solidarity movement challenged the proposition that Marxist-Leninist Communism

protected the rights of the workers. Initially, the Communist party of Poland attempted to quiet

down the unrest that was growing in the community. The employed strike breaking tactics to

push the strikers to revolt or use violence giving them the legality to use force against the

protestors. Yet, the organization and dedication of Solidarity held true to their philosophy and

ideals of non-violence. The leadership of Solidarity, combined with the unifying factor of the

Polish Pope, John Paul II, was essential to the success of the nonviolent tactics that Solidarity

employed to have their voices heard all around the world. More important, its voice was heard all

the way into the Soviet Union. This paper will argue that the Gdansk worker strikes in the

1980sthat were led by Solidarity began a pathway towards Polish independence from the Soviet

Union’s repressive tactics during the Cold War was effective because of the general strike.

II. Historical Background

The History of Poland is a long process of partition and unification of over four times where

it was invaded by Napoleon, the Russian Empire, Hitler, and the Communists occupied and

subjugated to larger and more stronger neighboring countries. Poland’s partitions had

demonstrated how countries in the neighboring area fought over the occupation of Poland and its

strategic importance. At one point, Poland had disappeared of the map. The Polish sense of

nationalism was born from the desire to unify Poland after decades of being jostled from the

grips of occupying countries. The Soviet occupation of Poland after the defeat of Nazi Germany

was reinforced as a means of creating a buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe because

of Russia historically being invaded by armies of the West through Poland. The fight for Polish

independence towards the end of the 1960s following Poland’s economic downturn that would

lead to the development of an organization that would evolve in a number of ways to change the

way the course of history. After the student revolt of 1968 and the Baltic strikes late in 1970,

Edward Gierek replaced Wladislaw Gomulka as leader of the Polish United Party on December

20th, 1970. December 1970 was the first occasion in Eastern or Western Europe since the Second

World War when spontaneous action by workers had dislodged an incumbent ruler.1 The

spontaneous action by workers and the concessions that the Gierek regime made to them proved

that workers of Poland could act on their own independent of the intelligentsia. The workers in

Poland had shown that they had the political muscle to influence the Communist regime in

Poland, and could use that political muscle to strike back at the regime should they have to use it.

When Gierek was placed in charge, he showed that he had a different style of leading that

was more open and relaxed. In January 1970 Gierek went to the Baltic ports to negotiate directly

with strikers, placating them with promises of greater involvement in future decision-making.

Gierek hoped that by floating hard-currency loans from the West, Poland would be able to create

the infrastructure necessary to get its economy moving. The loans that Poland received from

Western banks were mishandled and the Gierek regime simply gave the loans to workers as a

means of raising the standard of living. Wages increased while the prices of goods and other

necessities remained artificially low. In June 1976, Gierek attempted to fix the situation by 1 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.360

raising food prices. Workers in Radom and other places in Poland protested, forcing Gierek to

pull back on food price raises, but he also harshly repressed the strikers. Gierek’s economic

strategy to rely on the western markets and western credit was a huge miscalculation as the oil

hikes of 1973 created a recession at spread across the world. During the second half of the 1970s

Poland’s economy went from bad to worse to apparently irredeemable.2

The economic conditions in Poland from 1970-1980 laid the foundation for the Solidarity

movement to develop. Poland was facing severe economic dislocation and to offset the pressure,

the Polish government increased food prices upon the Polish citizens. The food price increases to

the country being outraged because the price increases came just before Christmas festivities,

December 12th, 1970. Two days later on December 14th workers in the Lenin shipyard of Gdansk

went on strike and begun marching towards the center of the city. The disgruntled workers

moved on the Communist party headquarters and a clash between the strikers and police resulted

in seventy-five strikers were killed and many others were wounded in the aftermath of the strike.3

The Polish intelligentsia joined the cause of the worker discontent in the late 1970s. The prime

reason for this was the Committee for Workers’ Defense, or KOR, which was originally formed

to collect funds for and to give legal assistance to the workers who had been arrested after the

strikes and demonstrations of 1976.4

The opportunity of having a civil organization posing as a defender of the rights of workers’

was a major advantage against the Communists, who was founded on the principle of the rights

of the workers.5 In 1977 KOR transformed into the Committee for Social Self-Defense, or

KSS/KOR. This transition focused less on the individual and more on the working class as a

2 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.3613 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.3594 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.3645 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.360

whole. At the same time the formation of KSS/KOR also marked a shift from passive to active

defense of working class rights, from defensive to an aggressive posture.6 While Polish workers

had one focus on the organizing abilities of KOR and KSS/KOR, they also had a focus on

reaching others through the strength and power of the Roman Catholic Church. Karol Wojtyla, a

professor at the Catholic University of Lublin and later archbishop of Cracow, was elected Pope

on October 16, 1978. Karol Wojtyla, now Pope John Paul II, was seen as a new national leader

that the Poles saw as someone who was not beholden to the influences of a foreign occupier.

Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland in June of 1979 drew huge crowds of people eager to hear the

central figure of the Catholic religion speak to his masses without ideological-laden dialogue in

the native Polish dialect. The visit of Pope John Paul II in June of 1979 demonstrated the power

and influence that the Roman Catholic Church that would later prove to be a major ally for the

Solidarity movement.

III. The Formation of Solidarity

Price increases during the 1970s was a major cause of popular upheaval in communist

Poland. The failures of Gierek’s regime to tackle the deterioration of Poland’s economy added

with the belief that other solutions to those problems were present, created the conditions for an

epic confrontation between the strikers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk and the government

after a series of strikes during the summer of 1980. The main characteristic of the workers’

movement in the earlier cycles of struggle was the workers repeatedly placed their confidence in

specific political party leaders, who in the end had been unable to fulfill their aspirations.7 The

negotiations between the government and the strikers was the climax of the years of frustrations

6 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.3647 Amrita Chhachhi, Ravi Arvind Palat, and Paul Kurian. 1982. “Movement Towards Workers' Democracy: Solidarity in Poland”. Economic and Political Weekly 17 (26). Economic and Political Weekly: p.1073. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/4371073.

that the Polish people had with the Communist Party of Poland and the tension was at its highest.

Ultimately, the government capitulated to the demands of the workers that may have seemed

manageable and focused solely on the job-related benefits, but the repercussions of giving into

the demands of the workers would have irrevocable political blowback for not only the

Communist Party of Poland, but on the communist ideology and the Soviet Union. The Gdansk

strikers were different from previous strikers in the past. They were more disciplined,

uncompromising, politically savvy, and advised by members of the intelligentsia.8 They were not

going to be bought off by the government until their twenty-one demands were satisfied. The

Gdansk strikers were joined by the Inter-Factory Strike Committees (the IFSCs), which were

founded to coordinate action and maintain disciple and order. The IFSC influenced the Gdansk

workers to want to create free trade unions that were not beholden to the Communist Party or

ideology. Discipline and order was key for the strike and IFSC to get what they wanted because

the regime searched for any sign of weakness within the groups. Cohesion between the two

groups was paramount to get the necessary concessions from the Gierek regime. Divide and rule

no longer worked; the workers refused to be divided.9 R.J. Crampton wrote that, “In September

of 1980, a meeting of IFSC representatives from all over Poland convened in Gdansk and set up

a national coordinating committee. This was the ruling party of the new force which dominated

Poland: Solidarity.”10 The Solidarity movement, an expression of nationalist, democratic, and

economic aspirations, spread rapidly to all parts of the nation and enlisted more than 9 million

people, including approximately one-third of the members of the Polish Communist Party (called

the Polish United Workers’ Party).11

8 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.3679 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.36810 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.36811 DeFronzo, James. “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements.” 2nd ed. (United States: Westview press), (2006): p.54.

The creation of Solidarity was the culmination of a group of labor committees coming

together and organizing themselves into one cohesive force to be able to strike back against the

Polish government. Lech Walesa became the leader of Solidarity because of his drive to get

recognition for the martyrs in 1970. Lech Walesa had even been part of a Solidarity delegation

that met with the Polish Pope, John Paul II. They even went as far as to create a congress for

themselves with an executive and legislative branches in between September and October 1980,

where they fashioned the labor union fashioned itself into a “self-governing republic.” It was at

the point where Solidarity was beginning its transformation from a trade union to a social and

ultimately, a revolutionary movement.

Solidarity had become something that Eastern Europe had never seen before. It was a mass

trade union movement, because one of the key demands that was for workers to be able to

establish free trade unions. Solidarity was a social movement, the majority of it were the people

mobilizing whole groups of Polish individuals to organize, protest, go on strike, and demand

their rights as workers and citizens of Poland to be recognized and respected. It was also a

political movement because it was to some extent a movement to have the sovereignty of Poland

recognized as the Polish people, who they said had no say in the way that their country was

being run. This dissatisfaction with the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) allowed for the

people to unify behind that dissatisfaction and allowed the embers of nationalism, self-

determination, and democracy to give birth to a new flame of burning passion. Poland could not

be an open democratic society as long as the country was under the control of the Soviet Union.12

IV. The Gdansk Agreement

12 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.368

In August 1980, thousands of striking workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk issued their

list of twenty-one demands to the Communist party-dominated government. In the twenty-one

demands, Solidarity called for getting rid of the appointment of economic administrators on the

basis of party membership and loyalty.13 The elimination of such government corruption, they

believed, would greatly improve the economic institutions in Poland and place qualified people

in positions to create economic policies that would be more efficient and productive for the

Polish people. The first point of the Gdansk agreement states, “The activity of the trade union of

People’s Poland has not lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the workers. We thus consider

that it will be beneficial to create new union organizations, which will run themselves, and which

will be authentic expressions of the working class.”14 The demands for more political democracy

were some of the first demands to be made. Things like the right to form labor unions

independent of the government or the Communist party, legalization of the right to strike, and

the granting of the various forms of freedom of information, expression, and communication

topped the list.15 The demands for more political democracy were issued with some amount of

caution as the Soviet Union believed wholeheartedly in the one-party system and any demand for

an immediate totally democratic, multiparty political system would force the Red Army to

invade Poland to crush the Solidarity movement and put down the ‘rebellion”. The second point

of the Gdansk agreement stated that, “the right to strike will be guaranteed by the new trade

union law. The law will have to define the circumstances in which strikes can be called and

13 DeFronzo, James. “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements.” 2nd ed. (United States: Westview press), (2006): p.60.14 Stokes, Gale, ed. “From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945.” New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1991: p.205 15 DeFronzo, James. “Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements.” 2nd ed. (United States: Westview press), (2006): p.60.

organized, the ways in which conflicts can be resolved, and the penalties for infringements of the

law.”16

The Gdansk agreement was taken to be the launching point for the manifesto of Solidarity,

yet when the Polish government made concessions it in turn legitimized Solidarity as a powerful

political entity that could effect change in Poland. The signing of the Gdansk agreements proved

that the non-violence resistance campaign and mass strike tactics that Solidarity used worked so

long because they were unified and disciplined. Stefan Kawalec wrote that, “For the Authorities,

the signing of these agreements were, above all, ways of stopping the strikes.”17 The reason why

the Polish authorities were so desperate to stop the strikes was because they would adversely

affect the Polish economy and the more economic deterioration that occurred the more

dissatisfied with the government the Poles would become, and so it would enable more and more

people to join the cause of Solidarity.

V. Solidarity’s Non-violent tactics

Solidarity was a means of which to allow the other institutions to develop their own

independent ideas and programs without having to be told from the top what they can say or do

as long as it followed the Marxist-Leninist principles. The chance to develop independent of

state authorities was what attracted various institutions, including those from within the

communist party, to Solidarity. Overthrowing the states monopoly of power over every aspect of

their lives and creating a freer society was fundamental to creating change in Poland during the

1980s. This project for change of the system was realized ‘from below’ through mass strike

16 Stokes, Gale, ed. “From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945.” New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1991: p.20617 Kawalec, Stefan. 1982. “The Political Conditions for Realization of the Agreements”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.174. http://www.jstor.org/stable/423388.

action without any use of violence.18 For Solidarity, the use of nonviolence was a major tactic

that they employed to air their grievances with the Polish government. Non-violence was the

means by which Solidarity felt that they could effect change in Poland, because the Soviet Union

had a history of using force to put down violent uprisings in Postwar Eastern Europe.

Using non-violent resistance, Solidarity created the image that the Soviets and their Polish

puppet government would be seen as the aggressors and oppressors, if they chose to march

paramilitary police forces on peacefully protesting Polish citizens calling for better working

conditions and a larger voice in the decision-making of their country. The use of that tactic was

used to create international sympathy for the Polish people, who were living under the

oppressive fist of the communists. Non-violence for Solidarity, such as sit-in strikes, were direct

actions that relied not on coercion to bring about social, economic, and political change in

Poland. The strikes, in which millions of workers took part, proceeded in total peace and order

without any cases of violence or aggression.19 The Polish authorities, while compromising with

Solidarity, did what they could to maintain some kind of hold on existing power in Poland.

Throughout the five months since the signing of the agreements the Polish authorities were

reluctant to give in to the demands that Solidarity had issued and no matter the intermediate

methods of reaching a middle-ground with the authorities through talks, summons, appeals, or

collective protests fell on deaf ears. The only way that Solidarity was able to bring the authorities

to the table was through striking.20

18 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 107. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383. 19 Kawalec, Stefan. 1982. “The Political Conditions for Realization of the Agreements”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.173. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423388. 20 Kawalec, Stefan. “The Political Conditions for Realization of the Agreements”. 1982: p.174.

Strikes had been Solidarity’s weapon of choice to use against the authorities because they hit

the authorities right where it hurt the most, in the wallet. Solidarity was well aware of the fact

that the Polish government had problems dealing with the economy and multiple strikes all

across Poland during a time of severe economic problems spelled disaster for the Communist-led

government of Poland. The authorities were only forced to come to the table of concessions

when the use of a general strike was used. In addition, The Roman Catholic Church had come

out exercising its own power supporting Solidarity’s reliance on restraint and moderation.

Solidarity, under Lech Walesa, was meant to consolidate all the gains the organization achieved

while keeping violence to a low or non-existence. The shadow of the Soviet Union was cast over

Poland and the worry of the Red Army coming in to take control of the situation was a

possibility that Walesa and Solidarity could do without. At the end of January 1981, Solidarity

had another success where they were able to secure the signing of the Warsaw Agreement, which

allowed Solidarity greater access to the media and provided for three non-working Saturdays per

month.21 Pinkowski, who had signed the Warsaw Agreement was replaced that following month

with Wojciech Jaruzelski.

VI. The General Strike

The crisis of Rural Solidarity began in early February 1981 when a labor union of Polish

farmers, who had come together in support of the rights of farmers, which the Communists

refused to recognize. Rural Solidarity was strongly backed by the Roman Catholic Church and

they had claimed to have had a membership of about half of the 3.2 million smallholders. The

Farmers went on widespread strikes in protest of the government’s reluctance to adhere to their

demands. The issue with rural solidarity was that the courts had ruled that Rural Solidarity could

21 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.371

register as an association group not a labor union which would fall under the right to strike

clause of the Gdansk agreement, and so Rural Solidarity staged a massive sit-in in Bydgoszcz.

When members of Solidarity staged an event in Bydgoszcz on March 19, 1981 to have a debate

about the ideological issues of Rural Solidarity, the police was called in claiming that the debate

was illegal and Jan Rulewski, the regional Solidarity leader, was beaten by police for showing

the constitution to prove that they had the right to debate. On March 31, 1981 a general strike,

with almost twelve million people, was called in response to the Bydgoszcz incident.

The strike that followed the Bydgoszcz incident led to the biggest strike in the history of the

Eastern bloc and forced the government to investigate the beatings that occurred in Bydgoszcz.

Members of the Solidarity congress divided on how to approach the interaction with the

government, but Jerzy J. Wiatr wrote that, “Two days before the deadline of a general strike, the

Central Committee meeting once more opted for negotiations and compromise.”22 The promise

of investigations into the beatings at Bydgoszcz and Lech Walesa’s agreement to stem any

further strikes de-escalated the situation and the tension that was developing in Poland. The

compromise resulted in blowback on both sides of the table as Lech Walesa was criticized by the

radicals in his own organization, while Moscow and organizations of the PUWP saw the

government’s accommodations towards Solidarity as a sign of governmental weakness. Rural

Solidarity was not legalized as an organization until May 12, 1981. Solidarity saw the climax of

its power in March of 1981 as the movement fought to be recognized as a major political force

within Poland. The threat of the general strike was a crucial factor in Solidarity flexing it

political might against the government with resorting to violence.

22 Wiatr, Jerzy J. 1981. “Poland's Party Politics: The Extraordinary Congress of 1981”. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 14 (4). Canadian Political Science Association: p.815. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229778.

VII. Martial Law in Poland

Following the Gdansk agreement, the Soviet Union was putting pressure on the Polish

Government to maintain its control over the growing unrest and opposition. It seemed like the

possibility that the Red Army would march into Poland was growing more and more serious.

Stanislaw Kania was seen as too independent and he was effectively replaced in favor of General

Wojciech Jaruzelski as Prime Minister of Poland. On October 8, 1981 Solidarity was been

banned as an organization in Poland. Wojciech Jaruzelski had always been suspicious of

Solidarity and he was known for his hard stance against any sort of political opposition. He

began a harsh crackdown on Solidarity on December 13, 1981. Martial law was declared in

Poland and leading members of Solidarity that had gathered at Gdansk were arrested and sent to

a secret detention facilities. Lech Walesa was effectively held under house arrest, despite

continuing to negotiate with the martial law authorities.

To Jaruzelski, Solidarity were nothing more than a bunch of extremists, creating chaos and

disorder within Poland. It was his job to root them out and reinstitute law and order in Poland.

One of their first actions was to take over Solidarity’s national headquarters in Warsaw.23

Overnight thousands of Solidarity supporters were arrested, censorship was imposed and Polish

military forces and the ZOMO, or the riot police, patrolled the streets. The crackdown also

changed the dynamics of how the government, under Jaruzelski, responded to strikes. The

response that the government gave in the face of organized strikes was now given in the form of

overwhelming force as the ZOMO broke up hundreds of strikes at the plants and several Silesian

coal mines. On December 13, 1981 members of the ZOMO, the riot police, sealed Poland’s

borders, isolated towns and rounded up strikers and leading Solidarity activists that they could

23 “Martial Law in Action”. “Martial Law in Action”. Economic and Political Weekly 16 (52). Economic and Political Weekly (1981): 2111–11. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4370510.

get their hands on.24 On December 28th, 1981 the number strikes in Poland decreased in

proportion to the increase of the Jaruzelski regime’s zero tolerance of civil disobedience. Yet, the

intended effect of fracturing Solidarity as an organization actually had the opposite effect. As

Jaruzelski’s violent crackdown on Solidarity increased, the collapse of government-sponsored

official trade unions and the flocking of Polish workers to the side of Solidarity happened almost

immediately. The harsh crackdown that Jaruzelski imposed only served in pushing the Polish

people towards Solidarity as they were seen as the peaceful non-aggressors fighting for basic

inalienable rights that they were guaranteed to citizens of Poland through their constitution.

VIII. Solidarity Underground

Immediately after Solidarity had been outlawed and its leadership was arrested, underground

networks were formed to carry on the fight for the rights of Polish workers and citizens. Radio

Solidarity was formed in April 12th, 1981. Zbigniew Bujak, Bogdan Lis, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk

and Wladyslaw Hardek created an Interim Coordinating Commission to serve as an underground

leadership for Solidarity. Many other underground structures formed to continue where the

original Solidarity left off. The organizations continued to perform strikes, sit-ins, protests, and

demonstrations despite the government and Polish secret services’ killing demonstrators in one-

sided clashes throughout 1981 and until on November 4 of 1982, when Lech Walesa was

released. Solidarity even created an unofficial stamping system to tell the history of Poland from

the perspective of the Poles and not from the prospective of the communists.25

The international backlash that came as a result of the crackdowns upon Poland and more

importantly Solidarity, won it many allies in the international community. The American 24 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.37525 Evans, Kristi S. “The Argument of Images: Historical Representation in Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981-87”. American Ethnologist 19 (4). Wiley (1992): p.749. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/644917.

President, Ronald Regan, who imposed economic sanctions upon Poland because of Jaruzelski’s

harsh tactics against the protestors, and British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as well as

many others pledged support for Solidarity and condemned the Polish government and the Soviet

Union. The CIA as well as the Catholic Church and other western trade union allocated funds,

equipment, and intelligence to Solidarity.

Then on July 22nd, 1983 martial law in Poland was lifted and Solidarity was allowed to once

again operate as an organization in Poland. Amnesty had even been granted to those who had

been arrested. On October 5th Lech Walesa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, yet his wife had

to accept the award on his behalf because the Polish government refused to issue him a

passport... In October 19, 1984 Jerzy Popiełuszko, a popular Polish priest, was pro-Solidarity

who was murdered by members of the Polish police and revered by many members of the

Solidarity and the Poles as a martyr for Solidarity and Polish civil rights.

IX. Solidarity going Political

When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union on March 11th, 1985 the

economic conditions in the Eastern bloc was in a very precarious situation and new economic as

well as political reforms were needed. Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost (openness) and

perestroika (restructuring) were his ideas for reforming the entire Eastern bloc. The new reforms

in the Soviet Union and the decline in Poland’s economy during 1985 reinforced the need for

change to occur in Poland. In 1986 Solidarity had over six underground newspapers and Radio

Solidarity was widely disseminated.26 Solidarity, while still underground as an organization, was

a major driving force behind Political life in Poland, and drove home the point that the Polish

government, as it currently operated, was ineffective and incompetent when it came to running

26 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.380

the economy in Poland. When the Polish government called for a referendum on the new

economic restraints linked to political concessions, Solidarity called for a boycott of the vote

damaging the government’s prospects of getting a popular support for their economic policy.27

Lech Walesa was elected President of Poland in December 1990. The years of protests and

strikes would ultimately culminate in a successful, non-violent transition of power towards

democracy and independence. While the success of the Solidarity movement brought

independence to Poland, the rise of ethnic nationalism and internal conflicts with Solidarity led

to movement losing its popularity and to this day, Solidarity remains one of the largest trade

unions in Poland, fielding presidential and parliamentary candidates in the political elections of

the Polish government. Lech Walesa would serve as President until 1995 and both Solidarity and

Lech Walesa would go on to be acknowledged as important figures in Polish and world history.

X. In-depth section

The use of the general strike was an effective tactic in the repertoire of collective action of

social movements. The general strike tactic enabled the Solidarity movement to air its grievances

with the Communist regime of Poland non-violently. The Bydgoszcz events was an incident that

involved a leading Solidarity activist being the beaten by the authorities in Bydgoszcz on March

16, 1981 and that would lead to Solidarity flexed its muscles on March 24, 1981 by organizing a

four-hour warning strike which brought the country to a standstill, and threatened to follow it

four days late with a general strike of indefinite duration.28 Solidarity’s use of the four hour strike

to bring Poland to a complete stop and then threaten to carry out a much longer strike for an

indefinite amount of time was a perfect example of political maneuvering. Although peaceful

27 Crampton, RJ. “Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century.” London: Routledge, 1994: p.38028 Mastny, Vojtech. 1999. “The Soviet Non-invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War”. Europe-asia Studies 51 (2). Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: p.199. Accessed December 10, 2015 http://www.jstor.org/stable/153609.

strikes had also taken place earlier, this was the first time the conflict not only did not lead to

disturbances and violence, but also resulted in a constructive attempt at reforming the system.29

The object of the strikes were to make use of the economic slump that Poland was going through

during the 1980s. The legality of going on Strike in Poland was a complex issue, and thus

workers had to carry out their protest actions spontaneously without the need of organization or

tactical preparation in lieu of being arrested by the authorities. A strike, or a march, was thus at

the same time a way for the workers to organize and a way of choosing tactics.30

The use of nonviolence as their philosophy was a perfect means of gain the moral high-

ground so that the Communist regime would be perceived as the aggressor against innocent

protestors desiring democracy. Direct non-violent action demand discipline, organization,

preparation, supervision and leadership.31 The strict adherence to non-violence when

demonstrating gained them sympathy and support for the international community and those

countries in turn would place economic and political pressure upon the Soviet Union and the

Polish government. Workers’ protests in the form of direct actions, and in particular strikes,

constitute a common phenomenon in industrialized societies.32 For industrialized societies, one

of the more effective means of fighting for the rights of workers would be to go on strike because

it creates work stoppage that affects the revenue of a business or the economy of an entire nation

when enacted on a national scale. The first of the patterns of protest included the discontinuation

29 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.107. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.30 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.108. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.31 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.108. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.32 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.109. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.

of work (strike), mass meetings at the places of work, and an announcement of demands.33 The

second included scuffles with militia units, especially those trying to disperse a march or a mass

meeting, as well as attacks on government buildings, including arson.34 The government’s refusal

to negotiate brought about acts of violence because it refused to hear the plights of the workers

resulting in them acting out in a way that would force a reaction of the government officials. The

general strike was something that incorporated a mass following of workers to rally with

Solidarity to make the Communist regime come to the table in hopes of hearing their demands.

On June 25, 1976, a strike was initiated by workers of the General Walter Metal Works in

Radom, and later, around 10 a.m., several thousand people gathered in front of the building of

the KZ PZPR.35 Since the masses did not obtain any reply to their demands (the withdrawal of

the price rise) by the deadline they set, they entered the building, which appears to have been

evacuated by the Party functionaries.36 The building was destroyed and set on fire, then shortly

after that a small group of people looted stores requiring a special motorized militia united being

called to respond. The waves of protests in the 1980 developed peacefully and nowhere did they

turn into riots.37 The strike movement culminated in great sit-in strikes at the coast, in which the

most important demand was for the formation of free trade unions and for stopping repression

against independent activists and the independent publishing movement.

33 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.109. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.34 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.109. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.35 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.113. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.36 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.113. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.37 Modzelewski, Wojciech. 1982. “Non-violence and the Strike Movements in Poland”. Journal of Peace Research 19 (2). Sage Publications, Ltd.: p.114. Accessed November 24, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ncat.idm.oclc.org/stable/423383.

XI. Conclusion

This paper will argue that the Gdansk worker strikes in the 1980sthat were led by Solidarity

began a pathway towards Polish independence from the Soviet Union’s repressive tactics during

the Cold War was effective because of the general strike. The general strike did play an

important role in Poland achieving its independence from the Soviet Union and establish free

trade unions, democracy and the ability for workers to go on strike. The Solidarity movement

proved to be successful in gaining rights for Polish people that they were entitled to by their

constitution. The general strike allowed for Solidarity to become the voice of the Polish people

and strive to have a say in the running of their nation’s economy. The desire to become

independent and express pride in their own country’s history was a major factor that pushed

them to persevere and endure the retaliation of the Communist regime. Solidarity remains the

largest trade union in Poland and they continue to participate in politic elections. Like other

social movements, Solidarity faced internal conflicts within itself that led to it losing popularity

and but Lech Walesa would eventually only serve one term as president of the Poland.

The legacy of Solidarity was that they helped contributed to the downfall of Communism

and the Soviet Union. The started a domino effect of Eastern bloc nations protesting for

regaining control of their countries back and the growing desires for ethnic nationalism,

independence, and the right to vote in free election for their choice of government. Solidarity

came at a time when the economic dislocation of Poland created the necessary conditions for

Solidarity’s general strike tactic to work and have such a devastating effect on the ruling power.

The general strike serves as an example for the repertoire of collective action that was explained

by Charles Tilly. The creation of their radio broadcast, the newspaper, the sit-in strikes, the threat

of strikes—all were tools that Solidarity used in their own repertoire of collective action against

the Communist regime.

They were all effective tools to achieve their goals and many social movement could

learn to utilize their methods as well as the organizational structure to be effective as

organization. Solidarity held to a much disciplined command structure that enforced strict

discipline in its members to adhere to the non-violent philosophy. The exemplary leadership of

Lech Walesa and the brilliant tactical planning enabled Solidarity to be successful as an

organization. Solidarity, from its founding, underwent a transformation from a free trade

organization to a social movement to a revolutionary movement and ultimately, a political

movement. The success of Solidarity created a ripple effect around the world and brought a

change to the Cold War era. For a social movement, like Solidarity, to make such an impactful

mark upon human history is remarkable and the ability of a social movement to have such

talented people goes to show the strength of the people’s ability to organize themselves to fight

for rights that others cannot take away from them. The Solidarity movement was a social

movement that impacted the world and changed the way that the political landscape of the world.

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