strategies for managing protected areas

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Strategies for ManagingProtected AreasCalvin E. Ohlson Kiehn a ba Yale University School of Forestry andEnvironmental Studies , USAb Washington State Department of NaturalResources , USAPublished online: 08 Sep 2008.

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Strategies for Managing Protected Areas:Community Management Agreements

in the Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve,Central Ecuador

Calvin E. Ohlson Kiehn

ABSTRACT. Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)has assumed increasing importance in protected area management through-out the developing world. Largely a response to previous state-centeredprotectionist policies, CBNRM seeks to simultaneously promote com-munity development and biodiversity conservation. Where human pop-ulations exist within state-controlled protected areas, successful applicationof CBNRM requires a legal basis for community participation in re-source decision-making. Community management agreements (CMAs)are one contractual mechanism that can provide this foundation. Theirgoals are to: (1) resolve issues of land tenure; (2) devolve authority andguarantee rights of access to communities; and (3) establish conditionsthat promote subsequent management planning and activities. Thischapter examines three case studies involving the use of CMAs withinthe Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve (RECAY), part of the CondorBioreserve of central Ecuador. CMAs were found to be successful inachieving the first two goals mentioned above, but had mixed success inachieving the third. CMAs should: (1) devolve decision-making, imple-mentation, and conflict resolution powers to communities; (2) clearlydefine rights and responsibilities for all parties; and (3) guarantee con-tinual government oversight and support. Although their applicability

Calvin E. Ohlson Kiehn earned a Master of Forestry degree at the Yale UniversitySchool of Forestry and Environmental Studies. He is Forester for the Washington StateDepartment of Natural Resources.

Journal of Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 18(2/3) 2004http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JSF

2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.Digital Object Identifier: 10.1300/J091v18n02_09 197

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may be limited to certain circumstances, criteria should be developed toguide their future implementation in Ecuador and internationally. [Arti-cle copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service:1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <[email protected]> Web-site: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. Allrights reserved.]

KEYWORDS. Community-based natural resource management, com-munity management agreements, protected area management, land ten-ure, international conservation and development projects, ICDP, CondorBioreserve, Cayambe-Coca

INTRODUCTION

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has becomeincreasingly common in international protected area management. CBNRM,along with integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), co-management, joint forest management, and community-managed or indige-nous reserves, is a people-oriented strategy of community-based conservation(Brechin et al. 2002). CBNRM can be described as direct local participation inmanagement decision-making that affects local livelihoods, ecological pro-tection, and sustainable development (Straede and Helles 2000). Usually, it in-volves collaboration with government agencies as well as non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). Examples of CBNRM abound (Poffenburger and Sarin1995, Agrawal and Yadama 1997, Taiepa et al. 1997, Agrawal and Ribot1999, Schroeder 1999, Fischer 2000, Rhee 2000, Straede and Helles 2000,Troya 2000, Twyman 2000, Agrawal and Goyal 2001, Rangan and Lane2001). Though projects vary in many respects, most involve devolution ofsome resource management responsibility from state agencies to communityauthorities (Taiepa et al. 1997). Thus, CBNRM represents a form of politicaldecentralization (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).

This chapter examines three case studies in which community managementagreements have been implemented in RECAY. For each of the three commu-nities, (1) the social and political context, (2) ecological impacts, and (3) re-sulting management agreements are summarized and discussed. Conclusionsare then drawn based on the specific circumstances of the case studies as wellas reviews of published literature. Agreements are evaluated in terms of theireffectiveness in achieving the three goals outlined above. All three CMAshave been successful in resolving land tenure claims. To some extent, theyhave all been effective in devolving authority and guaranteeing rights of ac-cess as well. They have had mixed success in establishing conditions throughwhich subsequent management planning could take place.

198 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY

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Community Management Agreements: Foundations for CBNRM

Community-based management strategies are often a reaction to policiesthat favor state control of environmental protection1 (Agrawal and Gibson1999, Leach et al. 1999, Agrawal and Goyal 2001, Wilshusen et al. 2002).Centralized solutions to protected area management are perceived as havingfailed (Agrawal and Gibson 1999), in part because they have fostered negativefeelings and noncompliance in affected communities. This has often resultedfrom policies that have deprived them of de facto rights (Straede and Helles2000). In addition, state agencies often do not have the resources to cover the“transaction costs” of effectively monitoring and enforcing controls over ac-cess to protected areas (Leach et al. 1999). CBNRM reduces these transactioncosts by dividing responsibilities between communities and regulatory agen-cies (Leach et al. 1999, Rangan and Lane 2001).

Unlike centralized control of resource decision making, an essential ele-ment of CBNRM is recognition of communities’ rights (Leach et al. 1999,Twyman 2000). Granting rights inherently suggests attendant responsibilities(Strum 1994 in Brechin et al. 2002), both of which can be found in principlesof social justice: “(1) the right to participate at all levels of the policy makingprocess as equal partners, (2) the right to self-representation and autonomy,and (3) the right to political, economic, and cultural self-determination (sover-eignty)” (Brechin et al. 2002:45). Proponents argue that when communitiesare given the opportunity to define resource problems, identify solutions, andimplement them, their interest in management and protection increases (Taiepaet al. 1997, Rhee 2000, Twyman 2000). Although CBNRM does not guaranteeindividual rights (Leach et al. 1999, Fischer 2000), under certain circum-stances it can improve a community’s status as it interacts with state agenciesand other entities.

Perhaps the three most fundamental assumptions of CBNRM are that:(1) concerning sustainable resource use, communities have more at stake thando state agencies or private corporations; (2) local populations have a well-de-veloped understanding of ecological systems in their area; and (3) communi-ties can effectively achieve compliance through self-imposed restrictions(Brosius et al. 1998 in Fischer 2000). While the first two assumptions arefairly self-explanatory, the third merits further discussion. Since informal orcustomary forms of social control are reinforced by community norms andcodes of behavior, they often enjoy greater legitimacy than those imposedfrom the outside. “Endogenous enforcement” of behavioral restrictions, whichare supported either by mutual agreement or preexisting relationships of powerand authority (Leach et al. 1999), can be formally recognized by regulatoryagencies. Such recognition creates or strengthens legitimate authority, pro-vided formal agreements do not limit communities’ ability to alter their own

Section II: Management Strategies and Recommendations 199

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institutions in response to changes in social, political, or ecological conditions(Leach et al. 1999).

Finally, CBNRM projects often operate based on assumptions that commu-nities are small in numbers, geographically defined, and socially homogenous,and that they hold shared norms. These characteristics presumably contributeto effective decision-making and collective action (Agrawal and Gibson1999). While simplified representations of community dynamics have beenidentified as a major shortcoming of some CBNRM projects (Brosius et al.1998 in Fischer 2000, Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Leach et al. 1999, Rhee2000, Twyman 2000), these views nonetheless have considerable strategicvalue in justifying support for these methods over state control or privatizationof resource management (Li 1996).

Prior to implementation of community-based natural resource manage-ment, a legal foundation must exist that grants communities rights to thelands they occupy and use (Fischer 2000). In general, land tenure is consid-ered a prerequisite for sustainable management; otherwise there is little in-centive for investments in anything other than short-term resource use(Tucker 1999). While some have argued that private ownership creates thegreatest incentives for sustainable natural resource use (Hardin 1968), com-munal ownership can also achieve this goal, provided that access to re-sources can be controlled and community members perceive that benefitsoutweigh costs (Tucker 1999). In cases where human settlements are locatedwithin protected areas or other state-controlled lands, validation of thesecommunities’ right to exist is absolutely essential for community participa-tion in management to occur. In light of protectionist beliefs about the in-compatibility of human settlements and biodiversity conservation, stateshave been loathe to guarantee communities significant access to resources orland under these circumstances.

One way this obstacle can be overcome is through the application of com-munity management agreements (CMAs). Although a review of publishedliterature found little mention of CMAs as such, there are numerous exam-ples of agreements between state agencies and communities that allow forshared control of protected area resources (see Poffenburger and Sarin 1995,Agrawal and Yadama 1997, Taiepa et al. 1997, Agrawal and Ribot 1999,Leach et al. 1999, Schroeder 1999, Fischer 2000, Straede and Helles 2000,Troya 2000, Twyman 2000, Agrawal and Goyal 2001, Rangan and Lane2001). These agreements have met with widely varying degrees of successfor reasons that will be discussed later. For the purposes of this analysis,CMAs are defined as contractual mechanisms between communities andnatural resource management agencies that serve to: (1) resolve issues ofland tenure; (2) devolve authority and guarantee rights of access to commu-


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nities; and (3) establish conditions through which subsequent managementplanning can take place.

The Study Site and Case Studies

The Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve (RECAY) is the largest and oldestof four protected areas that comprise the Condor Bioreserve of central Ecua-dor. Established in 1970, it covers roughly four hundred thousand hectares,nine life zones, and six different ecosystems (Fundación Antisana 1998).Among the goals of the reserve are protecting rare and unique ecosystems,preserving biodiversity, and providing water resources for the public good(Fundación Antisana 1998). Although RECAY is recognized by neither theWorld Conservation Union (IUCN)2 nor the United Nations Education, Scien-tific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), descriptions of the reserve mostclosely resemble those of UNESCO’s Biosphere Reserve classification (Jervis2002).

According to Ecuadorian law, it is illegal for any individual or group tomaintain possession of lands within protected areas such as Cayambe-Coca(Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001, Comuna de Oyacachi 2001). Nonetheless,there are several communities that have permanent settlements within theboundaries of the reserve. This has created a challenging dilemma for the Min-istry of the Environment,3 which is responsible for its management. Given theMinistry’s limited budget and strict legal mandate, how can it ensure that thesecommunities’ activities are compatible with the goals of the reserve withoutcompromising their socioeconomic well being?

METHODS

Research for this analysis was conducted as part of the spring 2001 gradu-ate course Rapid Assessments in Forest Conservation for Diversity and Pro-ductivity at Yale University. The goal of the course was to evaluate the successof the Condor Bioreserve project in achieving its stated goals of watershedmanagement, ecosystem protection, and economic development of resource-dependant communities. The author and fourteen other graduate students fromthe School of Forestry and Environmental Studies conducted research prior toand following an eleven-day trip to the Condor Bioreserve. Information col-lected included both published literature and internal documents of organiza-tions operating in the Bioreserve. During the field trip, meetings were conductedwith informants from the Ministry of the Environment, NGOs (FundaciónAntisana-FUNAN, The Nature Conservancy-TNC, and Fundación Rumicocha-FER), consultants from the “Local Participation in Protected Area Manage-ment” (PALOMAP) study, and local communities.


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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Communities within the Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve

There are only two established communities completely within RECAY,and both have received considerable attention. The community of Oyacachi isthe larger, with 550 people (105 families) and 44,500 ha (11.0 percent of thereserve) under its control. The indigenous Quichua of Oyacachi have occu-pied the area since the mid-16th century. Their territory is located in the south-western portion of the reserve (Figure 1), between elevations of 1,800 and4,000 meters. The area is primarily páramo and pastureland (27,911 ha, or 63percent), with relatively smaller areas of forest and agricultural land (Comunade Oyacachi 2001). According to Ministry of the Environment officials,Oyacachi is a highly organized community (Colcha 2001, Martínez 2001).


Cayambe-Coca

Sinangoé

Antisana

Cotopaxi

Pululahua

Sumaco-NapoGaleras

Quito

Cotacachi-Cayapas

Baeza

CONDOR BIORESERVE

Oyacachi

FIGURE 1. Location of Oyacachi and Sinangoé community territories withinthe Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve, one of four protected areas in theCondor Bioreserve initiative.4

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Only one internal conflict is acknowledged in the community’s managementplan: the past division between Evangelicals (50 percent of the population)and Catholics (30 percent), which has apparently been resolved (Comuna deOyacachi 2001). Though some immigration and colonization occurred in the1980s and 1990s, historically Oyacachi has been relatively isolated. This hasbegun to change as more roads have been put into the area (Centro de Datospara la Conservación 1997).

The second established community is Sinangoé, which occupies approxi-mately 15,000 ha in the northeastern corner of the reserve (Figure 1). The in-digenous Cofanes have lived in the area since the 16th century, althoughSinangoé itself may have been established in the late 19th century. The terri-tory is at a lower elevation than Oyacachi (between 650 and 800 meters abovesea level), and has a large component of alluvial and submontane rainforest.Of the roughly 100 people (16 families) that live in this community, all are in-digenous Cofanes, except for three families headed by Cofán-mestizo couples(Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001). In comparison with Oyacachi, Sinangoéhas experienced more frequent conflicts, both within and outside the commu-nity. Historically, there have been disputes between Catholics and Cofanes,between mestizos and indigenous people, and between the indigenous Cofanesand Quichuas. More recently, Sinangoé has been exploited by individualsfrom other communities, who enter the territory to hunt, fish, and extract gold.With the construction of the Lumbaqui-La Bonita highway near its border, ex-posure to pressures from the outside has increased considerably (Centro deDatos para la Conservación 1997).

Other human presence within RECAY is mostly confined to individualsand communities who are utilizing areas for grazing, agriculture, and some ex-tractive uses. Very few of these people or groups actually live within the re-serve. Due to the fact that this type of resource use occurs throughout theperiphery of RECAY, individual instances are either unnoticed or unreported.The most notable exception to this is Cascabel II.

Cascabel II is a colonist settlement within RECAY, near the eastern bound-ary (Figure 1). It was originally colonized by a group of Quichuas at about thesame time the reserve was established. This group abandoned the settlementfollowing an earthquake in 1987, selling their land to a group of 25 mestizosfrom various communities outside the eastern boundary of RECAY. Thesecolonists have maintained a seasonal presence in the area since the acquisition,organizing themselves into a group called La Asociación Agrícola Cascabel II(Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997). As in Sinangoé, there are multi-ple pressures from outside, including the threat of additional colonization.


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Legal Status and Management Authority

According to Article 71 of Ecuador’s 1981 Law of Forestry and Conserva-tion of Natural Areas and Wildlife, protected areas such as the Cayambe-CocaEcological Reserve are the sole Patrimony of the State, and cannot be appro-priated or sold (Troya 2000, Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001, Comuna deOyacachi 2001). The law also states (in Article 73) that permanent settlementsare prohibited within protected areas (Troya 2000, Centro Cofán de Sinangoé2001, Comuna de Oyacachi 2001).

The Ministry of the Environment (MA), as the responsible authority formanaging the reserve, is required to uphold the mandates of the Forestry Law.If the law were applied as written, managers would have been required to re-move these communities and compensate them for their economic losses.Given their minimal resources, neither INEFAN nor the Ministry of the Envi-ronment has been in a position to do this. In addition, the social and politicalrepercussions of such an action would almost certainly have outweighedwhatever conservation benefits might have been gained (Martínez 2001).

Views regarding the treatment of communities within protected areas havechanged considerably since the enactment of the Forestry Law in Ecuador. Inthe 1978 Study of Management Alternatives for the [RECAY] Reserve, theidea of indemnification and expropriation was still considered viable (Troya2000). Although this idea was abandoned for the most part in the 1980s,ex-INEFAN never changed its official policy to allow communities to existwithin protected areas (Mosquera 2001). This was almost certainly due to con-cerns of precedent. If the government were to publicly allow some settlementsto remain in these areas, incentives might be created for new colonization. Inthe early 1990s, Fundación Antisana proposed the institution of a policy to re-solve this dilemma: only those communities whose presence predated thearea’s establishment, such as indigenous groups or long-standing colonists,should be allowed to remain inside a protected area. As it applies to indige-nous populations, this principle is referred to as ancestral right of possession5

(Bernal et al. 2000, Troya 2000, Mosquera 2001).Although Ministry of Environment managers recognized these established

communities, it is unclear whether there was a cohesive policy for addressingresource conflicts occasioned by this permanent human presence. While oneof the Ministry’s responsibilities is regulating community activities to mini-mize ecological impacts, it does not have the resources to always achieve thisin practice. In addition, based on their working relationships with communitycouncils, MA field staff felt that established communities were in fact very ca-pable resource managers (Martínez 2001). Consequently, managers becameincreasingly willing to delegate authority. This decentralization has been ef-fected in two ways: through strategic accords with organizations working inthese areas, and in some cases, through agreements with communities.


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ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS

In the rapid ecological assessment used to develop the management plan forthe Cayambe-Coca Reserve, natural resource uses and their impacts wereidentified. The primary threats considered were deforestation, burning andovergrazing of the páramo, uncontrolled hunting and fishing, highway con-struction, building of dams, and mineral extraction (Centro de Datos para laConservación 1997). The PALOMAP study echoed these concerns, addinguncontrolled tourism to the list (Poats et al. 2000). While perhaps the greatestimpacts on RECAY are the product of concessions to water, mining and othercorporate interests, this chapter will focus on those trends and impacts whichcan be attributed to human settlements within or around the reserve. The mostsignificant of these are deforestation, degradation of the páramo, and reduc-tions in populations of fish and wildlife (Centro de Datos para la Conservación1997, Fundación Antisana 1998, Poats et al. 2000).

Deforestation

Deforestation is perhaps the most significant problem facing the RECAY.Of the 358,224 hectares in the reserve, an estimated 259,979 ha (73 percent)are forested (Fundación Antisana 1998). While loss of forest cover has oc-curred to some extent in all three of the communities mentioned above, it is ofgreatest concern in Sinangoé and Cascabel II (Centro de Datos para laConservación 1997).

Sinangoé has a long history of timber extraction. Members of the commu-nity have felled small numbers of trees for centuries, primarily for householduses such as fuelwood and construction. This has resulted in very little loss offorest cover. More problematic have been recent trends of illegal colonizationand timber harvesting by people from outside the community (Centro Cofánde Sinangoé 2001). Many of these individuals and companies initially enteredthe area by river to extract some of the more valuable timber species. Thoughtimber harvesting has declined as stocks of valuable species have been ex-hausted around Sinangoé (Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997), theexpansion of highways into the region has considerably increased the threat ofdeforestation. With improved access, it will become more difficult to controlcolonization and encroachment along the new highway (Centro Cofán deSinangoé 2001).

Cascabel II presents greater concern in terms of deforestation. WhereasSinangoé had maintained fairly constant levels of forest cover within its terri-tory for several decades previous to the establishment of RECAY, the areacontrolled by Cascabel II was cleared around the time of the Reserve’s delin-eation. Reports differ as to whether this occurred before or after 1970 (Troya2000). Whatever the case, the perception that the area was illegally deforested


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and colonized within an ecological reserve may have encouraged further en-croachment. Members of the local agricultural association have reported sev-eral new attempts to colonize the area–efforts which, if successful, will lead tofurther deforestation. Another factor that has the potential to increase defores-tation is the stated desire of association members to raise greater numbers ofcattle on their parcels. If grazing is intensified, reduced soil fertility could re-quire expansion into currently forested areas to support the increase (Centrode Datos para la Conservación 1997).

Degradation of the Páramo

Another significant ecological threat to RECAY is degradation of thepáramo. Intentional burning and overgrazing are widespread throughout thehigher elevations of the reserve, and can have serious effects. While burning isintended to rejuvenate páramo grasses, it can eliminate other vegetative spe-cies that provide additional protein to the diets of cattle. In addition, it contrib-utes to loss of species diversity and soil erosion, impoverishing the soil andrequiring more extensive areas to maintain equal numbers of cattle (Centro deDatos para la Conservación 1997).

As páramo comprises the majority of the land area in Oyacachi, grazing isby far the most important economic activity. Thus, practices associated withmanagement of the páramo can have a significant impact on the ecologicalcondition of the areas under their control. In Oyacachi, burning has been re-duced to a large extent in recent years thanks to the efforts of non-governmentalorganizations such as Fundación Antisana (FUNAN) and Fundación EcológicaRumicocha (FER). Nonetheless, the practice continues to some extent in thiscommunity, as well as in other parts of the reserve (Centro de Datos para laConservación 1997, Poats et al. 2000). In terms of grazing levels, there is somerisk that intensification could result in further damage to the páramo ecosys-tem. Residents of Oyacachi have stated their intention to purchase more cattle,and have received loans to do so (Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997).As numbers increase, the inevitable result is either intensification (resulting inovergrazing) within current areas or expansion into new areas such as ungrazedpáramo and forests (Poats et al. 2000).

Reductions in Populations of Fish and Wildlife

Impacts on populations of fish and wildlife exist in all three communitiesdescribed here and throughout the reserve. In all cases, this has been to a largeextent the result of activities by non-residents. Individuals from Sinangoécomplain of outsiders illegally hunting and fishing in their territory. Althoughthese activities are very important to locals as well, they express concern re-garding the techniques employed by some outsiders: hunting with dogs and ri-


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fles, or fishing with dynamite–methods that can lead to much greater populationreductions (Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001). In Cascabel II, members of theagricultural association report that outsiders harvest large amounts of troutand catfish, and have been known to fill 50 kg sacks during single visits(Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997). Oyacachi has experienced con-siderable problems with the construction of the water pipeline for thePapallacta-Quito Water Optimization Project (EMAAP-Q). Whether by con-struction workers or other individuals, the increased human presence has ledto illegal hunting and fishing within the community’s territorial limits. Oyacachihas received money from EMAAP-Q to compensate for various environmen-tal impacts caused by its projects (Colcha 2001).

Though these communities are relatively small in size, it should be notedthat their activities inevitably have some impact on fish and wildlife popula-tions as well. In Oyacachi, Sinangoé, and Cascabel II, fish are an importantsource of protein for most people. Trout and other species’ populations fluctu-ate over time, in part due to periods of intense harvests. Oyacachi communitymembers are currently trying to raise trout numbers following population de-clines in the 1990s (Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997). Wild game isalso an important source of food in both Oyacachi and Sinangoé, where localshave hunted throughout their history. Although there have been incidents ofpoaching by residents, these communities have significantly reduced huntingof threatened and endangered species such as the spectacled bear, tapir, certainspecies of birds, and deer (Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001).

ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

In order to develop general recommendations for community managementagreements, it is necessary to analyze their implementation in each of the threecase studies. Each accord will be described in detail, and significant character-istics highlighted. The analysis will attempt to answer three questions: (1) Wasthe agreement successful in solving problems of land tenure and boundary de-lineation? (2) Did it confer significant rights of access to resources as well asauthority to manage the area? (3) Does it establish a framework for determin-ing rational use of resources (i.e., through management planning)?

It is important to note once again that this chapter is not intended to evaluatemanagement planning per se. As plans for Oyacachi and Sinangoé were onlyrecently completed (in 2001), it would be premature to judge their effective-ness. For the purposes of this analysis, the process is assumed to be inherentlybeneficial, given that it forces people to think explicitly and strategically aboutnatural resource use and conservation. For Oyacachi and Sinangoé, salient


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characteristics from their respective plans will be discussed to illustrate the re-sults of their agreements.

Oyacachi and Sinangoé

Reflecting the similarity of their circumstances, community managementagreements for Oyacachi and Sinangoé are practically identical. The SinangoéCMA was ratified by the Centro Cofán de Sinangoé and ex-INEFAN (hereaf-ter referred to as the Ministry of the Environment) on June 23, 1998. TheOyacachi CMA was signed by the Comuna de Oyacachi and Ministry of theEnvironment exactly one year later on June 23, 1999. Both accords are signedby the highest management authority, the Executive Director in the former,and the Minister in the latter. The Oyacachi agreement borrows heavily fromthe text of the Sinangoé CMA, and contains several improvements as well.

Both CMAs clearly establish their context, justification, and objectives. Ineach agreement, Section I acknowledges the communities’ longstanding pres-ence in RECAY, summarizes the community’s legal status and internal struc-tures of governance, and recognizes the community’s socioeconomic needs.They also present the legal framework for the reserve and the administrativeauthority of the Ministry of the Environment. Finally, Section I outlines theneed for cooperation by both parties (community and state agency) in manag-ing the area. Section II of both agreements outlines general and specific objec-tives, including: (a) promotion of the conservation and sustainable managementof natural resources with community participation; (b) joint design of manage-ment plans, taking into account guidelines established by the RECAY plan;and (c) joint implementation of activities that guarantee sustainable resourceuse and prevent colonization, deforestation, uncontrolled hunting and fishing,soil degradation, and water contamination (INEFAN 1998, Ministerio deMedio Ambiente 1999).

Section III.1 of each agreement describes the communities’ responsibilitiesto their respective agreements. Community obligations include: (a) participa-tion in design and implementation of area management plans, in coordinationwith the Ministry; (b) compliance with rules, programs, and programs estab-lished by both community and RECAY plans; and (d) compliance with theForestry Law, rules for its application, and other judicial norms. Commitment(c) differs between the two agreements. Whereas the Sinangoé CMA stipu-lates that the community must comply with rules for the use of appropriatehunting and fishing technology, as well as assist the Ministry in monitoringthose rules, the Oyacachi accord merely discusses the fact that illegal huntingand fishing activities by members and non-members “will be sanctioned”(Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1999:4, emphasis added) in accordance withthe law. The wording of this statement leaves the reader wondering who has


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the responsibility (or the right) to sanction, although its presence in the subsec-tion on community responsibilities would leave one to believe that this author-ity is being granted to the community. If so, then it represents a significantstrengthening of the accord.

Responsibilities pertaining to the Ministry of Environment are described inSections III.2. Both CMAs stipulate that the Ministry shall: provide technicalassistance for designing management plans; solicit funding for the implemen-tation of said plans; and guarantee permanent support and follow-up. Addi-tionally, the Sinangoé accord specifies that the Ministry must rectify thenorthern limit of the affected area, upon resolution of an ongoing land tenureconflict (overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock-MAG) in asector known as Las Pizarras (Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001). This provi-sion is a pragmatic response to continuing uncertainty in boundary delinea-tion. Rather than hold up ratification of the agreement indefinitely, it allowedthe co-signers to proceed, with the mutual understanding that the boundary is-sue would be addressed eventually. It appears as though it was–though the dis-crepancy goes unexplained, the Sinangoé management plan grants an additional1,300 ha to the community (Centro Cofán de Sinangoé 2001).

The other significant difference in Ministry responsibilities can be found inSections III.2.a. The Sinangoé CMA requires only that the Ministry permitsustainable resource use by the community, provided that the communityguarantees the ecological integrity of the area. The Oyacachi agreement goesmuch further by stipulating that the Ministry recognize the Oyacachi’s ances-tral settlement as well as its right to participate in the use and administration ofrenewable resources (INEFAN 1998, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1999).Administration implies decision-making as well as implementing authority.Although there is no evidence that this distinction in wording has actuallymade a difference in management planning, it clearly provides a strongerguarantee for Oyacachi. This discrepancy indicates either a minor improve-ment in wording (for the later of the two agreements), or greater confidence inthe Oyacachi community’s ability to manage resources. Given the high degreeof organization attributed to this community, the latter seems likely.

Sections IV and V of both agreements clearly delineate boundaries and setforth that territories will be divided into zones of differential use. In establish-ing territorial boundaries, the two accords resolve past and present disputesover control of and access to land. The Oyacachi agreement goes a little fur-ther by defining three different use zones and listing compatible activities foreach. This difference appears to have been insignificant in practice, as bothmanagement plans adopt three roughly equivalent zones of use: urban settle-ment area, community use (grazing, hunting, fishing, or collecting) areas, andprotection area (INEFAN 1998, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1999).


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Legal restrictions for both parties are established in Section VI of the twoCMAs. The rules in Sections VI are identical, and prohibit: expropriation ofany portion of the territory; establishment of rules that are incompatible withmanagement plans for the community or RECAY; promotion of activities thatalter cultural traditions or values; ceding of rights to territorial land or resourceuse to third parties; economic activities not approved in plans; hunting, fish-ing, or collection in prohibited locations or with inappropriate technology; andimpeding access to individuals with Ministry authorization–provided theMinistry has forewarned the community and the individual’s activities do notviolate the spirit of the agreement (INEFAN 1998, Ministerio de MedioAmbiente 1999). Almost all of these restrictions strengthen the legal nature ofboth CMAs, especially those that prevent the transfer of use or ownershiprights to third parties. In effect, these provisions establish communal tenure(as opposed to individual tenure, which can be transferred from one individualto another). Troya (2000) expresses some concern about the prohibition on re-stricting access to Ministry-authorized individuals, pointing out that it wouldbe beneficial for both parties to specify what people would receive such autho-rization, particularly considering issues such as intellectual property rightsand protection of genetic resources. While these concerns are valid, this condi-tion nonetheless provides the Ministry with a legal basis for monitoring. Ifcommunity members retained the right to deny compliance inspections byconsultants or NGO staff members, then Ministry oversight would be muchmore difficult to implement.

Sections VII-X fill out the legal requirements of the agreements. SectionsVII delegate supervisory authority for the community and the Ministry to theCouncil President and the Area Chief, respectively. Sections X make similarprovisions, delegating conflict resolution authority to the Community Counciland the Area Chief, with the option to seek adjudication from the Ministry, andif necessary, the courts. Sections VIII set an indefinite duration of agreements,and Sections IX reaffirm the civil nature of these agreements (INEFAN 1998,Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1999).

Were the Oyacachi and Sinangoé Agreements Successful?

Both agreements were successful in the first goal: delineating communalboundaries and addressing issues of property title. Despite the fact thatSinangoé territory was initially smaller than residents had hoped, they gainedjustification of their exclusive rights to this area. This should prove valuable ifcolonization and encroachment continue to be an issue. In the case of Oyacachi,although the community obtained legal title to its lands in 1906 and was le-gally recognized as a Comuna in 1939, residents were concerned that the exactboundaries of their territory were still unclear (Comuna de Oyacachi 2001).


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This, along with impacts from encroachment from other groups’ livestock andconstruction activities of the EMAAP-Q, provided an incentive to develop anagreement with the RECAY Area Chief (Martínez 2001).

Both CMAs accomplish the second goal, as they confer both significantrights of access and some management authority. As mentioned above, theOyacachi CMA is somewhat more comprehensive in this respect, explicitlyrecognizing the community’s ancestral rights to possess and administer theterritory it occupies. That is not to say that Sinangoé has not received due rec-ognition. Although its language is less sweeping, the Sinangoé agreement alsoguarantees the community continued resource use, participation in deci-sion-making (i.e., management planning), and participation in implementa-tion. While it stops short of granting administrative authority, it nonethelessrepresents a devolution of control from state to community authority.

In achieving the third goal, both agreements seem to have been very effec-tive in establishing conditions for the development and outcome of manage-ment plans. Although co-signers were assigned joint responsibility for designingthe plan (ensuring Ministry oversight), the agreement was an opportunity forthe Ministry to set a base level of protection. For example, numerous provi-sions stipulate plans’ concordance with other legal structures, including theRECAY Management Plan, the Forestry Law, and the Civil Code. The text ofthe agreements also contains substantive provisions regarding actual use ofnatural resources. For example, one is the stipulation that hunting and fishing,when approved, must be conducted with appropriate equipment. Anothermore significant provision was the designation of three zones of differentialuse. This concept, a basic feature of management planning, appears to havebeen new to the formulation of agreements in Ecuadorian protected areas(Troya 2000). Although the Sinangoé CMA does not specify what zones willbe created, it does require that they follow those of the RECAY plan (INEFAN1998).

In summary, to some extent both agreements achieve all three goals pre-sented above. Both provide communities a legal basis for self-determination,confer management authority while guaranteeing rights of access to natural re-sources, and create a framework for management planning. Both managementplans resemble the agreements that preceded them in their structure, content,and language. In addition, they make reference to specific provisions of theagreements, demonstrating that both accords were used to guide the planningprocess.

Cascabel II

As mentioned before, the case of Cascabel II is distinct from that ofOyacachi and Sinangoé. As a group of colonists who had only been present in


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the reserve since 1987, they had no ancestral claims or otherwise preexistingrights to occupy land or use resources within the reserve. Nonetheless, RECAYmanagers were concerned by increasingly frequent reports of hunting andfishing by outsiders. In addition, there was some threat of additional coloniza-tion (Centro de Datos para la Conservación 1997). The Area Chief also wantedto ensure that the current colonists did not expand their territory any further.These issues provided sufficient incentive to overcome concerns about recog-nizing colonists who entered following the reserve’s establishment (Troya2000). An agreement was signed by field managers of INEFAN and represen-tatives of La Asociación de Trabajadores Agropecuarios Cascabel II (hereaf-ter referred to as Association) on June 5, 1996.

Context and justification for the agreement are explained in Section I. Inaddition to summarizing the legal basis for INEFAN’s management authority,it mentions the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock’s legal recognition forthe Association in 1992 (INEFAN 1996). It also acknowledges the presence ofcolonists in the area since the 1970s, as well as their repeated requests for ten-ure. There is no clear statement of objectives, although in Section II the Asso-ciation formally requests the right to participate in conservation and managementof the reserve.

The agreement establishes general conditions and responsibilities for CascabelII. Section III declares that the Association agrees not to expand its agricul-tural or grazing area, nor begin any new activities, until a management planhas been developed for the area. In Sections IV and VII, the Association isgiven the responsibility of preventing hunting, deforestation, colonization,burning, and any other incompatible activity in and around the settlement. Theaccord also determines that the Association will select Honorary Wildlife In-spectors from their own ranks, and that these Inspectors will be given powersto sanction violators of the aforementioned rules. Section VIII requires Asso-ciation members to participate in all management planning or implementationactivities.

The agreement does not define boundaries, stating in Section V that theywill be determined in management planning to be supported by TNC. SectionVI determines that the accord will remain in effect until the Cascabel II planhas been completed.

Was the Cascabel II Agreement Successful?

According to the three criteria mentioned above, the Cascabel II CMA isnot nearly as successful as the other two agreements. Although it establishesthe right of Association members to remain in their settlement, it fails to deter-mine boundaries, or provide an estimate of the occupied area. Thus, it providesa relatively weak guarantee for both parties. In the event the settlement was ex-


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panded, managers might be unable to prove that the conditions of the agree-ment had been violated. The Association was left at some risk too–shouldex-INEFAN administrators intervene, declaring the area to be smaller thanfield managers’ original agreement, members would have no recourse.

The Cascabel II CMA is more effective in achieving the second goal, devo-lution of authority. Since INEFAN lacked the resources to effectively monitorthe entire reserve, enlisting the support of the Association was a strategic wayto improve its control in an area that was clearly at risk. Though some mem-bers argued that they could improve monitoring if they were all given Honor-ary Wildlife Inspector credentials (Centro de Datos para la Conservación1997), managers may have been uncomfortable giving them that much author-ity.

Compared with the other accords, the Cascabel II CMA establishes aweaker framework for subsequent management planning. There is no mentionof differential zones of use, nor does the text require adherence to the RECAYManagement Plan (which was still being developed at the time). Nonetheless,it does set the stage by formalizing an understanding between the settlementand INEFAN. However, Juan Black (ex-Director of FUNAN), who was in-volved in the negotiations, argued that the text does not accurately reflect thecontext of the verbal agreement that was negotiated between the parties(Troya 2000).

While Troya (2000) agrees that the substance of the Cascabel II CMA mayonly be fully appreciated with an understanding of the negotiations that pro-ceeded it, he points out that the agreement sets a bad precedent because it: (1)lacks an established legal structure; (2) fails to set strict obligations or respon-sibilities; and (3) has an indefinite duration that only terminates upon comple-tion of a management plan. The issue of precedent is significant. Though theagreement is intended to prevent further encroachment, in fact it could havethe opposite effect. With this in mind, representatives of FUNAN, TNC, andother groups have criticized the accord, arguing that recognizing and validat-ing colonists’ presence may encourage new colonization of RECAY (Centrode Datos para la Conservación 1997, Poats et al. 2000, Mosquera 2001). De-spite these concerns, in practice the Cascabel II agreement seems to have beeneffective in at least one respect–five years later, there were no reports of newcolonization (Martínez 2001).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Having discussed the specific characteristics of the three case studies, gen-eral recommendations will now be made for implementation of communitymanagement agreements in the future. These suggestions are largely based on


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studies that have evaluated community-based natural resource management,international conservation and development projects, and co-managementagreements worldwide, though they also reflect lessons learned in the casestudies. Recommendations will cover four aspects of CMAs: (1) the processthrough which they are developed; (2) major characteristics that are essentialto their success; (3) specific provisions that can increase their effectiveness;and (4) their applicability in other circumstances.

Conditions and Processes for Negotiating Agreements

Before community management agreements can be developed, certain con-ditions need to be in place. While none of these is absolutely necessary, theirpresence will improve the likelihood agreements will be ratified and observedin practice. Good working relationships between representatives of all partiesare one important factor. If mutual understanding and trust already exists orcan be developed, compromise is much easier to achieve. This was certainlytrue in the case studies–the RECAY Area Chief was well known for his hon-esty and fairness toward communities. This reputation enhanced his ability tonegotiate certain concessions from community leaders, since they knew hewould live up to his commitments.

Although this type of cooperation takes place at middle levels of organiza-tion, policies at higher levels of organization should also be in place to supportagreements (Taiepa et al. 1997). Otherwise, managers risk loss of personalcredibility or employment if CMAs are not recognized by state agencies. Theyalso risk setting a bad precedent for other communities, who might be under-standably wary if asked to participate in the negotiation of new agreements.

In addition to the previous two conditions, the institutions signing agree-ments should be permanent. Otherwise, decentralization will most likely beunsustainable (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Leach et al. 1999). Though this ap-plies to both government and community institutions, it would seem to bemore problematic with the latter: if an ad hoc community group is formed tofacilitate negotiations, it may not have the established norms of internal con-duct and participation necessary to ensure that compliance with agreements isachieved. Worse, it may completely disintegrate. In Oyacachi and Sinangoé,formal structures for governance as well as informal norms were well established.Internal ordinances were even ratified by responsible agencies (Ministerio deAgricultura y Ganadería 1986, Subsecretario de Bienestar Social 1995). Onthe other hand, the permanency of institutions in Cascabel II is uncertain. Notonly is the community recently formed (1986), but members do not maintainpermanent residence there either. This raises serious concerns about their abil-ity to uphold their obligations as outlined in the Cascabel II managementagreement.


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This is not to say that institutional development should not be attempted tofacilitate the negotiation or implementation of agreements. On the contrary, ifhuman organizational capacity is increased, endogenous enforcement shouldimprove, reducing the number of interventions by state authorities (Brechin etal. 2002). Community institutions can be successfully developed, providedthat focus is placed on decision-making processes rather than outcomes. Whenanalyzing community dynamics, attention should be placed on the various ac-tors and their interests, the way in which these individuals and groups interact,and the institutional arrangements that structure their interactions (Agrawaland Gibson 1999). Institutions can be defined as “regularized patterns of be-havior that emerge from underlying structures or sets of ‘rules in use’ . . .Rather than existing as a fixed framework, ‘rules’ are constantly made and remadethrough people’s practices” (Leach et al. 1999:237). Community institutionsshould be developed during three phases of decision-making: (1) negotiationof rules that govern resource use and management; (2) implementation ofthese rules; and (3) resolution of conflicts that arise as rules are interpreted andapplied (Agrawal and Gibson 1999).

Although this may be more applicable to the management planning pro-cess, it is nonetheless useful to consider models for achieving consensus par-ticipation (Warner 2001), which can be used in negotiating CMAs that representmultiple community interests. This may include some degree of explicit par-tiality–support for under-represented social actors–in attempts to increase rep-resentation of diverse community interests. Specifically, this could entaildirect investments in adult literacy, leadership training, and other skills (Leachet al. 1999). If the assessment and negotiation process does not fully addressall preexisting legal rights and actual uses, including those of marginalized in-dividuals or groups, then CMAs can actually exacerbate preexisting conflicts(Rangan and Lane 2001). If consensus in community decision-making isachieved, it can provide multiple benefits, including: “Improvements in com-munications within and between stakeholders; tackling of contentious issues;facilitation of equitable trade-offs; promotion of projects/policies/decisions/agreements that enjoy the widest possible consensus; accountability and trans-parency in the planning process; greater ownership of decisions and actions;increase in political credibility; increase in local self-reliance and mobiliza-tion; and reduction of the likelihood of conflicts arising in the future” (Warner1997:430).

Major Characteristics of Agreements

There are many characteristics that can be important to the success ofCMAs, but three in particular merit special attention. These are: devolution of


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authority, granting of rights and responsibilities, and maintenance of govern-ment oversight and support.

As mentioned in the introduction, for political decentralization to occur inCBNRM, the state must devolve significant authority to the community(Agrawal and Ribot 1999). It is important to understand the difference be-tween decentralization and de-concentration of power. While the formertransfers powers such as decision and rule making, monitoring, and sanction-ing to non-governmental entities, the latter confers these powers to entities(such as local state offices) which are “upwardly accountable to the centralstate” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:25). If communities are expected to behaveresponsibly, then their influence, prestige, power, authority, and control shouldbe recognized (Taiepa et al. 1997). CMAs are an excellent means of accom-plishing this when they truly grant the powers mentioned above. Ironically,CMAs can actually be used to reinforce state control “when contract terms: (1)stipulate the form of participation each forest community is expected to enact;(2) make access to . . . resources contingent on meeting specific performancegoals; (3) define management criteria so tightly that very little initiative re-mains at the local level; and (4) force communities to assume certain costs ofmanagement while preserving for the state important sources of revenue. Suchexcessive use of conditionality robs efforts to promote community-basedmanagement of their creative and productive potential” (Schroeder 1999:13).

As mentioned in the introduction, rights and responsibilities are an inher-ently linked and essential element of CBNRM efforts (Poffenburger and Sarin1995, Brechin et al. 2002). It is of utmost importance that community manage-ment agreements include explicit provisions for both (Taiepa et al. 1997,Troya 2000, Brechin et al. 2002). For indigenous groups in particular, rights ofequity and self-determination are of great importance (Taiepa et al. 1997). Thethree CMAs studied here all conferred significant rights to the communities inquestion. Accordingly, they were able to establish corresponding responsibili-ties as well.

If one of our goals is to develop community institutions, then CMAs shouldgrant community members responsibility for the three steps of natural re-source management mentioned above. These include the negotiation of rulesthat govern resource use and management, such as that which happens duringmanagement planning. Although agreements may have established a frame-work to guide the process (as in Oyacachi and Sinangoé), opportunities shouldstill remain for additional rule making. Responsibility should also be con-ferred for the implementation of these rules, for example, the monitoring ac-tivities identified in all of the agreements. Finally, communities should also beresponsible for resolution of disputes that arise as rules are interpreted and ap-plied. While the Oyacachi and Sinangoé CMAs make a limited provision forthis, they do not specify how such conflicts will be resolved. The agreements


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could be strengthened by establishing procedures for conflict resolution be-tween the co-signers, rather than merely stating the process for escalation.

The idea of political decentralization, as well as the granting of rights andresponsibilities, does not imply complete loss of control on the part of thestate. The central government should retain some authority, and has an impor-tant role in providing technical assistance, securing financial support, and re-solving conflicts. In the Kumaon Himalaya of India, establishment of communityforest management councils was initiated by the state in 1931. Although coun-cils have recently experienced problems due to lack of administrative assis-tance, their success has been credited, in part, to the state governments:(1) formalization of previously existing community institutions; (2) supportfor creation of new institutions; and (3) early recognition and assistance for therecently established councils at higher levels of government (Agrawal andYadama 1997). In addition, there are numerous examples of state agenciessuccessfully facilitating involvement of multiple stakeholders (Agrawal andYadama 1997, Poffenburger and Sarin 1995, Rangan and Lane 2001, Taiepaet al. 1997). Since communities are dynamic and heterogeneous, natural re-source decision-making often involves managing disagreements between in-dividuals and groups with differing power relations. Under these conditions,both government institutions and NGOs can play an important role in facilitat-ing productive dialogue and arbitrating disputes, through interventions at mul-tiple scales (Leach et al. 1999). In the case studies, the Ministry’s multipleobligations demonstrate its important role in overseeing community manage-ment of resources.

Specific Provisions for Agreements

Though there is no single prescription for community management agree-ments, there are numerous measures that can strengthen the text of an agree-ment. Clearly defining objectives, rights and responsibilities, and restrictionsis one example. While in some cases the goals and commitments of variousparties may have been discussed informally, setting them down in the formalagreement increases accountability. In addition, the text of the agreement canprovide justification for those who might otherwise be critical (Troya 2000).

In his analysis of agreements formed between the Ministry of the Environ-ment, communities, and other entities, Troya identifies factors6 that canstrengthen accords: (1) clear statement of justification; (2) clearly defined ob-jectives; (3) division of authority among all parties; (4) explicit zoning and de-scription of area impacted by agreement; (5) description of responsibilities forall parties; (6) establishment of effective monitoring and evaluation; (7) provi-sions for enforcement if terms of agreement are not met; (8) compliance withapplicable laws and agency mandates; (9) recognition of legal principle of


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“previous informed consent”; (10) specified time period during which agree-ment will be in effect; (11) guarantee of permanent follow-up (Troya 2000).With the exception of provisions for enforcement, all of these measures can befound in the Oyacachi and Sinangoé CMAs.

Considering Their Application Elsewhere

Agreements should be based on the specific circumstances of each situation(Taiepa et al. 1997). Although CMAs have been very effective in RECAY,this may have been in part due to factors that are unlikely to be encountered orextremely difficult to artificially replicate elsewhere. One is the presence of acharismatic leader in a position of authority, who can mobilize communityparticipation and guarantee state support of innovative resource managementsolutions. Another is the existence of indigenous groups that actually embody,to a large extent, some of the underlying assumptions about communities:small and geographically isolated, socially homogenous, and holding sharednorms (Agrawal and Gibson 1999).

Community dynamics create an important set of variables in natural re-source management that may limit the applicability of CMAs. For example, intesting the proposition that group size is inversely correlated with successfulcollective action, Agrawal and Goyal (2001) found that “medium size” com-munity forest councils in India were more likely to invest in third-party moni-toring than small or large size councils. This was attributed to “lumpiness” (aminimum viable scale) and “nonexcludability” (inability to protect a resource,which increases with group size). These two characteristics dictated minimumand maximum sizes for investment into monitoring of common-property re-sources (Agrawal and Goyal 2001). Other, less tangible factors in communi-ties could also inhibit the implementation of CMAs.

Other potential obstacles to collaborative efforts include: (1) institutionalculture of management authorities, particularly if they have inflexible rulesand procedures; (2) adversarial relational factors between organizations orgroups that preclude consensus; and (3) considerable power inequalities, espe-cially in situations where certain individuals or groups are not perceived ashaving legitimate claims (Selin and Chavez 1995).

Despite these concerns, the Ministry should develop general guidelines forimplementation of these strategies in the future. The Ministry has signed nu-merous cooperative management agreements in the last decade; one employeeestimated that there are roughly 120 in existence (Troya 2000). Though manyof these are agreements with non-governmental organizations, private compa-nies, and other governmental entities, they are, nevertheless, numerous examplesof community agreements. Unfortunately, there has been minimal monitoringor evaluation of their implementation, and no apparent strategy for their appli-


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cation so far (Troya 2000). Fortunately, however, this may be changing. Inthe draft of its National Policy and Strategy for Biodiversity in Ecuador:2001-2010, the Ministry identifies the importance of making agreements withmultiple entities, including “nationalities and indigenous peoples, and localcommunities, about the exercise of individual and collective rights, access tonatural resources, access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowl-edge, participation in the benefits of conservation and the sustainable use ofbiodiversity, and the implementation of the system of previous consultationand citizen participation” (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 2001:125).

CONCLUSIONS

Community management agreements are valuable tools for improving pro-tected area management. CMAs devolve resource management authority tolocal communities, reducing the need for state presence in these areas and ad-dressing inherent issues of social justice. They can reinforce productive work-ing relationships and provide the framework for the management planningprocess, setting the stage for future cooperative efforts. The case studies fromRECAY demonstrate that community-based natural resource management is alegitimate alternative to state control or privatization of protected area man-agement.

Although there is no universal formula for their application, CMAs shouldincorporate three major elements to be effective. (1) They should devolve sig-nificant management authority to communities, including decision-making,implementation, and conflict resolution powers. (2) Rights and responsibili-ties should be clearly defined and fairly distributed among all parties to agree-ments. Finally, (3) government institutions should provide continual oversight,technical assistance, financial support, and conflict resolution. To encouragethe successful application of community management agreements elsewherein Ecuador, the Ministry of the Environment should articulate a policy fortheir implementation, incorporating these recommendations and others tomaximize benefits for protected areas and the communities who depend onthem.

NOTES

1. Although state-centered policies of protected area management have fallen intowidespread disfavor among many international organizations, government agencies,NGOs, and academics, frustration with the limitations of community-based manage-ment of protected areas has led to the resurgence of a “protection paradigm” that advo-cates strict protection of biodiversity. See Wilshusen et al. (2002) for a critique of


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literature supporting the protection paradigm. In addition to the literature critiqued byWilshusen et al., see Bowles et al. (1998a, 1998b), Soulé (2000, 2001), and Rice et al.(2001) for arguments advocating greater protection measures.

2. See Ravenel and Redford (in review) for a review of IUCN protected area cate-gories.

3. The authority originally responsible for managing protected areas in Ecuadorwas known as INEFAN (Ecuadorian Forestry, Natural Areas and Wildlife Institute). InNovember of 1998, INEFAN was incorporated into the Ministry of the Environment,and is now referred to as “ex-INEFAN” in its current capacity within the Ministry.

4. Reprinted and adapted with permission from Comuna de Oyacachi (2001).5. Article 84, Number 3 of the Political Constitution of the Republic, which was rat-

ified by the National Assembly in 1998, upholds indigenous communities’ rights topossession of ancestrally-held communal land (Bernal et al. 2000).

6. These factors and others were originally described at length. They have been se-lected and put into list form by the author.

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RECEIVED: 06/01/02REVISED: 10/01/02

ACCEPTED: 04/06/03


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strategies for managing protected areas

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