ANDREW FIALA

STOIC TOLERANCE

ABSTRACT. This article considers the virtue of tolerance as it is found in Epictetus andMarcus Aurelius. It defines the virtue of tolerance and links it to the Stoic idea of propercontrol of the passions in pursuit of both self-sufficiency and justice. It argues that Stoictolerance is neither complete indifference nor a species of relativism. Finally, it discussesconnections between the moral virtue of Stoic tolerance and the idea of political tolerationfound in modern liberalism.

KEY WORDS: Epictetus, liberalism, Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism, tolerance, virtue

After all, what is it that frets you? The vices of humanity?Remember that all rational beings are created for oneanother; that toleration (anexesthai) is a part of justice;and that men are not intentional evildoers.

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations1

Why should we tolerate others? Most recent discussions of this questionfocus on political concerns about restricting the coercive exercise of statepower.2 These discussions are valuable because they help to clarify the

1 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4.3, trans. Maxwell Staniforth, (Baltimore: Penguin,1969), 63. For the Greek, I have consulted The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aure-lius Anoninus, Emperor of Rome, revised text and translation by C.R. Haines (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 68. I have modified Staniforths translation inlight of Haines where appropriate. Greek terms related to tolerance include words asso-ciated with the verbs phoreo (to carry) and anexo (to hold up). These terms show up inboth Marcus and Epictetus and form the basis of the general idea of enduring, bearing ortolerating adversity. Greek terms derived from these verbs include phortos, which meansbearable or endurable; and anektikos, which means bearable, sufferable, tolerable.

2 For example see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1995); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 2001); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books,1983); Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); HansOberdiek, Toleration: Between Forbearance and Acceptance (Lanham, MD: Rowman andLittlefield, 2001); Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice (Philadelphia:Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Karl-Otto Apel, Plurality of the Good?,Ratio Juris, 10 (1997), 199212, and the debate between Jrgen Habermas and JohnRawls in The Journal of Philosophy (1995), 60931 and 13280 respectively; also see thecollection of essays in a volume edited by David Heyd, Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Prin-

Res Publica 9: 149168, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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limits and obligations of the liberal state in a multicultural society adiscussion that usually traces its lineage to Locke and Mill. In the presentpaper I want to shift this discussion backward in time to a discussion ofStoicism as a historical resource for understanding toleration. Moreover, Iwill also shift this discussion away from the question of political tolerationin order to focus on the moral question of toleration: why should privateindividuals tolerate others with whom they disagree? This discussion willassume that tolerance is a virtue for individuals that can and should bedeveloped as part of a good human life. I examine tolerance as a virtuespecifically as it is discussed by later Roman Stoics such as Epictetus andMarcus Aurelius,3 developing a Stoic idea of tolerance in connection withthe general idea of mastering the emotions in reaction to external events. Iconclude that that Stoic virtue of tolerance is useful politically to the extentthat it allows us to pursue justice in a more rational fashion.

Most generally, the Stoic focus on individual virtue provides a responseto the question of why private individuals should tolerate those with whomthey disagree. Like us, Roman Stoics were aware of the fact of diversity.Cicero, for example, distinguishes the universal reasonable character ofhuman beings from those differences that arise from natural diversity.4 Herecognizes that because individuals are empirically different, the pursuitof virtue will result in diverse human lives. Each person should thus focuson their own duties and character and not wish to try how another manswould suit him.5 And yet this diversity is supposed to be held together by

ceton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and those in a volume edited by Amy Gutmannand Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994).

3 It has been suggested that Marcus is not a true Stoic (see Maxwell Staniforthsintroduction to the Meditations, op. cit., 21). However, Marcus and Epictetus are of interestbecause they so well express a concept of toleration and because they represent twoextremes of human social location, as emperor and slave. I am not, then, claiming tooffer an exhaustive account of Stoicism. Rather, Epictetus and Marcus offer us an easilyaccessible example of the way in which Stoicism might be applied to the question oftoleration. For a detailed study of Marcuss Meditations and the connections between thistext and the writings of Epictetus and other Stoics, see R.B. Rutherford, The Meditations ofMarcus Aurelius: A Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Rutherford argues that Marcusis indeed a Stoic despite the fact that his melancholic, somewhat otherworldly, tone setshim apart from earlier Stoics including Epictetus: 219, 227.

4We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were:

one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reasonand with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and proprietyare derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The othercharacter is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. Cicero, De Officiis, trans.Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), I.xxxxxxi.

5 Cicero, ibid., I.xxx. 113.

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the unifying law of reason. The tension between universality and differ-ence is the space of toleration: we tolerate differences, as long as thosedifferences do not violate the principles of justice. The Stoic idea of justicefocuses on the universality of natural law: individuals are to be respectedinsofar as they are members of the natural community of reason within thecosmopolitan world-soul. From this comes an idea of equality before thelaw that prefigures modern political thought, even though it is notoriouslydifficult to identify something like a natural right that would limit stateintervention in Stoic political thought.6

If the Stoic is supposed to cultivate indifference to external matters including such external indifferents as loss of liberty, loss of property andeven loss of life it is difficult to imagine exactly where the limit of statepower might be. Obviously, the idea of toleration that has been developedin modern liberal theory does a much better job of arguing for the limitsof state power in light of rights to life, liberty and property. Nonetheless,Stoicism is useful for helping us understand why a private individual mightstrive to be tolerant of others. Indeed, Stoics are ambivalent about politicsin general because they realize that a life of quiet contemplation mightbe the only life that allows for freedom.7 Perhaps because of the apolit-ical tendencies of Stoicism, very little attention has been paid to Stoicismin recent discussions of toleration.8 This is ironic because the fathers ofthe liberal tradition Locke, Kant, Jefferson and Mill were themselvesinfluenced by Stoicism.

In what follows I shall not discuss political toleration or the vexingissue of whether the Stoic sage should take up the task of politics. Rather, Ishall focus on the question of why an individual should cultivate toler-ance. Along the way, I shall distinguish the commitment to tolerancefrom slavish submission and from relativism. The virtue of tolerance doesnot result either from impotence or from the abandonment of the ideaof universal norms for judgment. Tolerance is possible because we areable to use reason to control our emotions and resist our negative judg-ments. It is good to be tolerant because tolerance allows fragile, fallibleand socially interdependent rational beings, such as us, to develop towardself-sufficiency.

6 See Phillip Mitsis, The Stoic Origin of Natural Rights, in ed. Katerira Ierodiakonou,Topics in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15377. Of course,Cicero does claim through Scipio that nothing is sweeter than freedom, even towild beasts Cicero, The Commonwealth, trans. Sabine and Smith (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Co., 1929), I: 35.

7 See Cicero, De Officiis, op. cit., I: xx. 6970.8 One exception is Martha Nussbaums Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1997).

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TOLERANCE IN GENERAL

Toleration is a complex idea that leads to a whole web of related concepts.Our English word is derived from the Latin, tolerantia, which is associatedwith the general idea of enduring, suffering, bearing or putting up with.9When we say in our ordinary language, for example, that someone has ahigh tolerance of pain we mean that he or she is able to endure pain. Thisordinary way of thinking is useful for understanding the idea of toleranceas a virtue: it underscores the fact that tolerance is a disposition that isdirected toward something negative (it would be odd to say, for example,that someone has a high tolerance of pleasure). With this etymology inmind, we can formulate a general definition of tolerance that involves threeinterrelated conditions.10 I shall describe the action of tolerating, assumingthat the virtue of tolerance is a tendency so to act. When I tolerate some-thing, then, (1) I have a negative judgment about this thing; (2) I have thepower to negate this thing; and (3) I deliberately refrain from negating thisthing.

The first condition requires a negative judgment. This can be anythingfrom disapproval to disgust. This negative judgment inclines me towardnegative action regarding the thing in question. I am using judgmenthere and in what follows as a broad concept that can include emotions,dispositions, tastes and reasoned evaluations. This broad conception ofjudgment is a basic Stoic idea, which is important for underscoring thefact that we can, to a certain extent, control the impact of our negativejudgment by opposing it with a different judgment.11 Emotions are judg-ments insofar as they make discriminations among things. Judgments andemotions both have motivational force in the present case, motivating metoward negative action. The thing in question here could be an object or aperson, although with regard to tolerance as a moral disposition, the objectis exclusively a person.

9 See Preston King, Toleration, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 12 or HansOberdiek, op. cit., ch. 6. King makes a distinction between toleration and tolerance. Sucha distinction, as fleshed out by Glen Newey in Virtue, Reason, and Toleration (Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press, 1999), ch. 3, focuses on the difference between tolerance asa virtue and toleration as the description of tolerant acts. I shall stick to this distinction inwhat follows.

10 The three-fold structure I lay out here is related to the three-fold structure of tolera-tion described by Glen Newey, op. cit., 73. Also see Geoffrey Harrison, Relativism andTolerance, in eds Krausz and Meiland, Relativism: Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, IN:Notre Dame University Press, 1982), 22943.

11 On the Stoic conception of emotion as judgment see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapyof Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36686.

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The second condition states that I have the power to express myselfnegatively toward the thing in question. I use negate here in a broadsense that allows for a variety of negative reactions. My negation of thething could be an expression of condemnation toward the thing, it could beavoidance of the thing or it could be a violent attack upon the thing. Thiscontinuum of negations is decidedly vague, although violent destruction ofthe thing is the paradigm.

The third condition states that I deliberately refrain from exercising mypower to negate the thing. It is important here that I do have the power tonegate the thing, as in condition (2). I am not tolerant if I go along withsomething I despise because I am forced to or because I am a coward. Insuch cases, I lack the power to negate the thing. Rather, I am tolerant whenI do not negate the thing I despise even though I could negate it if I wantedto. In this way, tolerance is linked to the idea of endurance or putting upwith and is directed toward those things which we view negatively. Finally,my restraint is deliberate: I refrain from negating the thing because I havea reason not to negate it.

Good reasons for tolerating a thing we could negate are plural andinclude the following: respect for autonomy; a general commitment topacifism; concern for other virtues such as kindness and generosity;pedagogical concerns; a desire for reciprocity; a sense of modesty; andothers.12 Each of these provides us with a reason for thinking that tolera-tion is good. This is pointed out because there may be other non-tolerantreasons for refraining from negation: fear, weakness of will, profit motive,etc. Although there are many reasons why toleration is good, the Stoicapproach focuses primarily on self-control, modesty and the developmentof individual autonomy. Moreover, a sense of human finitude and fallib-ility gives the Stoic a good reason to be tolerant, without leading to moralrelativism or scepticism. Furthermore, the Stoic approach allows us to linktolerance to moral criticism, the development of a moral community andthe pursuit of justice.

STOICISM: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

Toleration is, as Marcus Aurelius indicates above (epigraph), a part ofjustice. It allows us to be more just toward others insofar as it restrains

12 This pluralist approach is similar to Bernard Williams conclusions in Toleration:A Political or Moral Question? in ed. Paul Ricouer, Tolerance Between Intolerance andthe Intolerable (this is an edition of Diogenes, Vol. 44/4, 1996), 47. However, Williamsapplies this pluralistic approach to political toleration and not to moral toleration. For moraltoleration, Williams believes a concern for autonomy is the primary good reason.

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negative activity and connects with other virtues such as mercy andmagnanimity. The general account of toleration that we find in Stoicismcomes from two directions. First, Marcus and Epictetus both modestlyrecognize the limits of our fallible imaginations. Modest assessment ofones own capacity to judge the other can ground toleration toward theother without becoming moral scepticism: modesty does not ask us notto judge the other, but rather to refrain from following through on all ofthe negative consequences implied in our negative judgment. In this waymodesty and tolerance are part of the philosophical life spent in pursuitof self-knowledge.13 Second, Marcus and Epictetus both recognize thatexternal things perturb us only insofar as our opinion about them allowsthem to. The task of philosophy is to help us properly distinguish betweenthose things which are in our power to control and those things which arenot.

Thus toleration develops from a modest evaluation of our capacityto judge others and from a cultivated indifference toward uncontrollableexternalities. This attitude is important for a life of virtue because it helpsus to attain self-mastery by allowing us to distance ourselves from perni-cious emotions such as anger and resentment. We should focus our energyupon those things that are within our power to control, most importantlyour own opinions and emotions. We must recognize also that the opinions

13 I use modesty here to mean the opposite of hubris (which means pride, irascibilityand the tendency to abuse power). Modesty is linked to other Aristotelian virtues such asself-control or continence (enkratia), moderation or temperance (sophrosune), and fairnessor clemency (epieikeia). Aristotle discusses something like this under the heading mild-ness (praots) in the Nicomachean Ethics (1125b) where it is related to consideratenessor forgivingness (sungnm). But it is not the exact opposite of pride and so is not exactlysimilar to self-abnegation or humiliation. Rather it is a serious appraisal of the limits ofones own powers of judgment that inclines one to proper restraint. Spinoza discussesmodesty (which he conjoins with politeness) in a less praiseworthy vein: [p]oliteness ormodesty (humanitas seu modestia) is the desire of doing such things as please men andomitting such as do not Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Andrew Boyle, Third Part, Definition 43(London: J.M. Dent, Orion Publishing, 1993), 136. The problem with Spinozas definitionis that it turns toleration and modesty into a desire to please, which is not what I have inmind here. Rather, my idea of modesty is something similar to what Norberto Bobbio callsmitezza, which he contrasts with other virtues including modesty, humility, and tolerance:see In Praise of La Mitezza, in ed. Paul Ricouer, op. cit., 14. Bobbio thinks that toleranceis the result of reciprocation in which both parties tolerate each other. This runs counter tomy view, which maintains that modesty can lead us to be tolerant without reciprocation. AGreek term that comes close to what I have in mind is aidos, which can be translated asshame, modesty, sense of honor or propriety. For a detailed discussion of this, seeDouglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honor and Shame in AncientGreek Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). The importance of this term is, asCairns argues, its synthesis of social (other-directed) values and internal conscience.

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and deeds of others are beyond our control. Tolerance is part of a generalsearch for tranquility and self-control in a world of illusions, vanity andunavoidable conflict. Thus in Marcuss writings tolerance is part of a muchlarger idea of bearing and forbearing. This attitude comes from a some-what bleak appraisal of the human condition, although this melancholicpoint of view is itself derived from a modest appraisal of our own mortaland fallible lives:

What is it then, that still keeps you here? The objects of sense are mutable and transient, theorgans of sense dim and misled, the poor soul itself a mere vapour exhaled from the blood,and the worlds praise, in such conditions, a vain thing. What then? Take heart, and waitfor the end, be it extinction or translation. And what think you, is all that is needful untilthat hour is come? Why, what else but to revere and bless them; to do good to men; to bearwith them and forbear (anexesthai auton kai apexesthai); and to remember that whatsoeverlies outside the bounds of this poor flesh and breath is none of yours, nor in your power.14

The way in which Marcus connects tolerance, forbearance and enduranceto the search for tranquility points us to a sense of resignation in light ofthe ubiquity of suffering and the presence of death. We should do our bestto help others while admitting that other people are not going to changeand may even do us evil.

This ideal may seem to go too far, however. It may seem to lead to aform of self-absorbed egoism in which we withdraw from the public sphereand blithely allow our neighbours to do whatever they want to themselvesand to others. This is one of the problems of the ideology of toleration as itis practised in liberal societies: it tends to produce atomized and indifferentindividuals who espouse a pernicious form of relativism. It is significantin this regard that Marcus is emperor, a position that does not allow him towithdraw in this way, despite his philosophical interest in resigned equan-imity. Tranquility demands tolerance. But Marcus is not a relativist and heis not indifferent to the suffering of others; nor can his position allow himto be. Stoicism maintains that there is a human ideal of virtue that includeshuman interaction and social responsibility. Indeed, a concern for justicedemands active intervention in some cases. Nonetheless, the point is thatsocial interaction that is guided by the spirit of tolerance will be both morejust and more tranquil.

Caricatures of Stoicism portray the Stoic as completely self-absorbedand indifferent to others. This caricature results, in part, from confusing

14 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 5.33, 89; Haines, op. cit., 126. I have alteredthe Staniforth translation somewhat in comparison with the Haines translation. Thisconjunction of anexesthai and apexesthai is interesting: apexesthai means something likeholding oneself apart from something while anexesthai means holding up as under aburden.

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Stoicism with Epicureanism and Scepticism.15 Self-control and tolera-tion are important for a Stoic conception of both tranquility and justice.However, while apathy toward those things over which we have no poweris a goal, complete indifference to others would hinder our pursuit of theultimate good for human being, which includes justice, friendship andother social virtues. A Stoic account of toleration must thus link concernfor others with an understanding of the need to control our own judgmentsand emotions under a general idea of impartiality.16 In general, we shouldbe concerned with the good of our fellows because they are brothers andsisters of reason engaged in the common human endeavour of leadinga good life. However, we should also admit that they will disagree withus and may even offend us. We should not be surprised by this and shouldlearn to ignore such differences when we can, so that our anger and disgustdo not inhibit our ability to exercise proper self-control, do not cloud ourcritical acumen, and do not undermine the development of a community ofphilosophical inquiry.

EPICTETUS

He is gentle, generous, tolerant (anektikon), affectionate. Give him to me, I accept him, Imake this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour and a fellow-voyager.17

Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius form an interesting pair. One is borna slave; the other is emperor. Despite their different social standing,they both reach similarly modest conclusions about being human. Froma deterministic, sociological perspective such modesty is understandablecoming from Epictetus, the slave, and is remarkable coming from Marcus,the all-powerful emperor. What unites these two points of view, however,is a commitment to freedom by way of self-mastery. This commitment iswhat leads them both to tolerance. Epictetus does not discuss directly theissue of tolerance to the same extent as Marcus does, although one canpiece together from his writings a tolerant point of view. A question we

15 For a discussion of differences among these see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy ofDesire, op. cit.

16 Julia Annas says, [t]he Stoics are the first ethical theorists clearly to commit them-selves to the thesis that morality requires impartiality to all others from the moral point ofview The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 265. Annascriticizes Stoics as unpolitical (311) and notes the mood of alienation found in Marcusand Epictetus (17576).

17 Epictetus, Against the Contentious and the Brutal, Discourses, 4.5, trans. Oldfather(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 339. I have altered Oldfatherstranslation, substituting tolerant for his patient.

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must keep in mind when looking for tolerance in Epictetus is whether histolerant attitude is the result of a lack of power to negate those things heviews negatively or whether there is some positive reason for him to refrainfrom negating them. As we shall see, in many places Epictetuss approachis something closer to slavish submission to the will of the other than it isto deliberate restraint of the power to negate. When we turn to Marcus, weshall see a more genuine form of tolerance, insofar as Marcus manifestlydoes possess the power to negate.

Epictetuss moral point of view can be focused around two claimsrelated to the issue of freedom: the will can be controlled by reason and theexternal world of appearances is of little consequence. Epictetus repeatedlycounsels us to ignore the vicissitudes of external life and to prepare toendure the ills that inevitably afflict us all. Indeed, the practice of philos-ophy is what prepares us to bear these ills, by teaching us to ignore externalappearances.18 In this sense, Epictetuss approach is, in Isaiah Berlinswords, a retreat to the inner citadel which is antithetical to any robustidea of social life or political freedom.19 Several passages serve to illustrateEpictetuss point of view. He says, [r]emember that what is insulting isnot the person who abuses you or hits you, but the judgment about themthat they are insulting. So when someone irritates you be aware that whatirritates you is your own belief.20 Such an idea is connected to a broadlyconstrued idea of endurance, although it falls short of toleration because itis not clear that such endurance is linked to a deliberate restraint of the urgeto negate. It is not clear in Epictetuss case whether the one who toleratesabuse and irritation actually has the power to negate or whether they submitbecause of some inexorable fate such as illness or lack of social standing.Going further, Epictetus asks us to recognize the point of view of the other:[w]hen someone acts badly toward you or speaks badly of you, rememberthat he does or says it in the belief that it is appropriate for him to do so . . . .Starting from these considerations you will be gentle with the person whoabuses you. For you must say on each occasion, That is how it seemed tohim. 21 Again, it is not clear whether this is slavish submission or whetherit is tolerance, although the idea of being gentle seems to imply that theabused party has some capacity for recourse.

18 For example, Discourses, op. cit., 3.10, How ought we to bear our illnesses?, 71 ff.19 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1969), 11872. Berlin mentions Epictetus in this regard on p. 140.Orlando Paterson makes the same point about Epictetus in his Freedom (New York: BasicBooks, 1991), vol. 1, ch. 15.

20 Epictetus, The Handbook, trans. Nicholas White (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,1983), no. 20, 16.

21 Epictetus, ibid., no. 42, 256.

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Apart from these ambiguous passages, Epictetus does offer us some lessambiguous examples of tolerance. In general, his idea is that we shouldrefrain from judging others. Someone takes a bath quickly; do not saythat he does it badly but that he does it quickly. Someone drinks a greatdeal of wine; do not say that he does it badly but that he does a greatdeal of it. For until you have discerned what his judgment was, how doyou know whether he did it badly?22 This claim supports something likethe argument for toleration based upon modesty. Here Epictetus asks us torestrain our tendency to leap to conclusions about the activities of othersout of a sense of modesty about our capacity to judge. Epictetus discussesmodesty throughout the Discourses under the Greek term, aidos, which inaddition to modesty can mean a sense of shame, self-respect and regardfor other. Modesty shows up in conjunction with other virtues such associality, fidelity, steadfastness, intelligence, gentleness and tolerance.23The basic idea is that one must modestly assess ones own situation andabilities in order to be virtuous.

Epictetuss support of the idea of tolerant restraint toward others comesfrom his recognition of the diversity of human possibilities. He recognizesthe fact that the world is made up of a variety of people each with their owninterests and talents: [d]ifferent people are suited for different things.24Although he is undoubtedly concerned with an idea of a unifying virtue,he recognizes difference in social position, intelligence and virtue. In oneinteresting passage, we find a somewhat submissive or slavish resignationlinked to this relativistic point of view:

To the rational being only the irrational is unendurable (aphoreton) but the rational isendurable (phoreton) . . . . Now it so happens that the rational and the irrational are differentfor different persons . . . . For to one man it is reasonable to hold a chamber pot for another. . . . But some other man feels that it is not merely unendurable (aphoreton) to hold sucha pot himself, but even to tolerate (anaxesthai) anothers doing so.25

From this passage we might conclude that relativism follows from a lack ofcourage and strength to remain committed to a concrete idea of the good.It is as if Epictetus were trying to reconcile himself and others who areat the low end of the social ladder to the inevitability of oppression. Thiswould not be toleration; it would be resignation.

22 Epictetus, ibid., no. 45, 26.23 Epictetus, Discourses, op. cit., 1.28, 2.22, and 3.311. For discussion of aidos, see

Cairns, Aidos, op. cit.24 Epictetus, The Handbook, op. cit., no. 29, 20.25 Epictetus, Discourses, op. cit., 1.2, 157. Orlando Paterson discusses this passage and

links it to a view of a slavish idea of forbearance that, Paterson says, is a cop-out: op. cit.,281.

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Viewed in a more positive light, Epictetus recognizes diversity as one ofthose external facts that must be accepted as we develop toward freedomand self-control. The point is not that diversity is good; it is, rather, thatdiversity must be accepted if we are to live in this world. Differencesmust be accepted if we are to avoid being frustrated in our dealings withothers. For example, when Epictetus recommends ascetic self-disciplineas a virtue, he encourages us to avoid condemning those who are not sodisciplined or who are not committed to a life of virtue. With regard tosexual purity, he says, do not be angry or censorious toward those who donot engage in it, and do not always be making an exhibition of the fact thatyou do not.26 Thus the development of freedom requires that we concen-trate on those things that are within our power and not get sidetracked by aconcern for things over which we have no control. We do not have controlover other people, so we must refrain from being annoyed, frustrated ordisappointed by their actions. Instead we must learn to develop indiffer-ence toward those things which we cannot control: [w]hat upsets peopleis not things themselves but their judgments about the things.27 In orderto live well, then, we must learn to judge properly and avoid being pulledaround by our immediate emotional response. This is the beginning oftolerance: we must learn modestly to appraise our capacity to judge othersand thus restrain our inclination to negate those behaviours and beliefs withwhich we disagree.

Finally, Epictetus connects this idea of endurance and restraint to philo-sophical practice as embodied in Socrates. In a section of the Discoursesentitled Against the Contentious and the Brutal, he praises Socratestolerant and patient attitude toward the likes of Thrasymachus, Calliclesand even his own wife.28 Socrates tolerance is based upon the following:Socrates bore very firmly in mind that no one is master over anothersgoverning principle.29 The example of Socrates is an interesting one, for itpoints us to the fact that philosophers, who reason with others, who engageothers in dialogue, should nonetheless maintain a tolerant attitude towardtheir interlocutors. Epictetus thus asks us to reason with one another, buthe also asks us modestly to assess the power of reason in order to recognizethat ultimately we have no power over the opinions of others.

26 Epictetus, The Handbook, op. cit., no. 33, 23.27 Epictetus, ibid., no. 5, 13.28 Epictetus, Discourses, op. cit., 4.5. The quotation at the outset of the present section

is taken from this chapter.29 Epictetus, ibid., 4.5, 233.

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MARCUS AURELIUS

Epictetuss discussion of tolerance is haunted by the fact that his argumentfor self-restraint often appears as a rather slavish retreat to the inner citadel.Epictetus does not have the power to negate and so reconciles himself tothe world by learning to endure annoyance, abuse and suffering. Such aproblem does not occur when we turn to Marcus Aureliuss claims abouttoleration. Marcus does have the power to negate and counsels himselfto use it with restraint. Like Epictetus, Marcus recognizes certain limitson our capacity to judge others and also recognizes that freedom requiresthe development of self-control over emotions. He further links tolerancewith the goal of critical dialogue. Marcus assumes that human beings arerational and social: we must do our best, then, to help others toward thegood of becoming rational. The main way to express our concern for thewelfare of our fellows is through philosophical discussion, admonition andpersuasion. Indeed, one should not coerce a rational being against his orher will. However, if it is necessary to intervene in the name of justice,we must do so: [t]ry to move men by persuasion; yet act against theirwill if the principles of justice so direct.30 Tolerance is, of course, only apart of justice. Occasionally intervention is necessary, although we detectin Marcus the hope shared by Socrates that intervention would not benecessary if people were better educated in philosophy and the study ofvirtue.

Marcus does express reluctance about such intervention. His reluctanceto harm others and his desire to help them echoes Senecas advice to Neroin On Clemency: [m]agnanimity becomes every human being, even thelowliest of the low; for what could be grander or sturdier than to beatmisfortune back?31 While Senecas advice to Nero and Marcuss adviceto himself are remarkable given the fact that Nero and Marcus are Romanemperors with absolute power, such advice makes sense within the contextof Stoicisms understanding of world-citizenship.32 From the Stoic pointof view, even the emperor is merely one part of the whole, who sharesthe capacity for virtue with his brothers and sisters of reason. Since theemperor has more power than most, he has an even greater obligation tobe magnanimous and tolerant toward those fallible mortals he governs.Seneca concludes: [w]here vengeance is easy the man who overlooks it

30 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 6.50, 103.31 Seneca, On Clemency in ed. and trans. Moses Hadas, The Stoic Philosophy of

Seneca (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), 143.32 Martha Nussbaum discusses this in Cultivating Humanity, op. cit., chs. 1 and 2 and

in Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, The Journal of Political Philosophy 5:1 (1997),125.

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secures unqualified praise for gentleness . . . for a king, even a raised voiceand intemperate language are a degradation of majesty.33

Marcuss claims about tolerance, then, contain a crucially politicalimport that should not be forgotten. Unfortunately, however, this tolerantphilosopher-king was himself involved in the intolerant persecution ofChristianity, providing us with an argument for institutional and procedurallimits on state power.34 In making sense of this, we must recognize thatMarcuss philosophical goal the life of the Stoic sage was often at oddswith the demands of his political life. Moreover, we must recall that thebasic idea of monarchy especially a monarchy headed by a philosopher was not at odds with the philosophical tradition that extended back toPlato.35 Of course this does not fully excuse the persecutions sanctionedby Marcus, but it does make us aware of the fact that as emperor (or asa Platonic philosopher-king), his duty was to maintain order within theempire. It is not remarkable that in this context certain dissenters andrebels would be persecuted: it would be anachronistic to apply our ideaof political toleration, with its connection to free speech and dissent, topolitical practice in the empire. Nonetheless, we might explain Marcussmelancholy as in part resulting from the conflicting demands of theseopposed moral and political ideals.

As a moral ideal, tolerance requires both deliberate restraint andrational criticism of those we tolerate. The Stoic follows Socrates inclaiming that evil is a misfortune that results from ignorance.36 We mustuse reason to defeat ignorance, in part by avoiding anger and expressionsof indignation:

How barbarous, to deny men the privilege of pursuing what they imagine to be their properconcerns and interests! Yet in a sense, this is just what you are doing when you allow yourindignation to rise at their wrongdoing; for after all, they are only following their ownapparent concerns and interests. You say they are mistaken? Why then, tell them so andexplain it to them, instead of being indignant.37

33 Seneca, On Clemency, op. cit., 145.34 Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, op. cit., xvii. John Stuart Mill makes

much of this fact in On Liberty and uses it as an example of the problem of unrestrainedpolitical power: On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1998), 31.While it is difficult to reconcile this fact with Marcuss tolerant philosophical point ofview, his personal tolerance perhaps goes too far in the opposite direction, as seen in theway he deliberately ignored his wifes infidelity and his sons licentious behaviour: seeWill Durant, Caesar and Christ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 430.

35 See Rutherford, op. cit., especially the section entitled The Stoics and the Empire,5980.

36 See Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, op. cit., 335 or Annas, The Morality ofHappiness, op. cit., 17879.

37 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 6.27, 97.

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Instead of anger, we owe our brothers and sisters of reason an explana-tion of their wrong-doing so that they may become better. Justice requiresphilosophical pedagogy, not anger or vengeance.

Marcuss discussion of tolerance is based upon four ways of looking atconfrontations with others with whom we disagree. (1) We both may bewrong, in which case I should not condemn the other. (2) I undoubtedlyshare many ideas in common with my opponent, in which case I shouldrespect our common ideas and our common rational nature. (3) I mayhave seen the futility of pursuing incessant arguments with those who willinevitably disagree with me, in which case I should be indifferent. And,(4), it may be the case that the concepts of good and bad simply do notapply in certain instances. These different perspectives make it easier to betolerant, to show compassion and generosity to the other. This all comestogether in a profound and important paragraph:

When anyone offends against you, let your first thought be, Under what conception of goodand ill was this committed? Once you know that, astonishment and anger will give place topity. For either your own ideas of what is good are no more advanced than his, or at leastbear some likeness to them, in which case it is clearly your duty to pardon him; or else, onthe other hand, you have grown beyond supposing such actions to be either good or bad,therefore it will be so much the easier to be tolerant to anothers blindness.38

Our moral judgments are finite and fallible. Beneath our disagreements,human beings share much in common, especially reason and a desire forgood. Social conflicts are unavoidable. Within the larger view of things,our petty squabbles do not really matter. Our views of good and bad aresimply our judgments about things; they are not necessarily in the thingsthemselves. In light of all of this, Marcus states: [a]ll thoughts of blameare out of place. If you can, correct the offender; if not, correct the offence;if that too is impossible, what is the point of recriminations? Nothing isworth doing pointlessly.39 Marcus here tries to straddle the fence betweenthe demands of justice and realism about social conflict. We should do ourbest to enact the good but we should be realistic about our potential tosucceed. Above all we should respect the others rational capacity to makemoral judgments with which we may disagree: [t]each them better, if youcan; if not, remember that kindliness has been given you for moments suchas these.40

It is important to note that although Marcus argues that many of ourmoral judgments are misguided, he does not defend toleration by way ofradical relativism or scepticism. Rather he maintains that human virtue is

38 Marcus Aurelius, ibid., 7.26, 110.39 Marcus Aurelius, ibid., 8.17, 124.40 Marcus Aurelius, ibid., 9.11, 141.

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the use of reason in pursuit of social life. We thus have an obligation tocriticize our fellows while allowing them to disagree with us and whilerecognizing our own limited capacities for persuasion. He is not a moralsceptic, although he does modestly recognize human fallibility: [i]f a manmakes a slip, admonish him gently and show him his mistake. If you failto convince him, blame yourself, or else blame nobody.41 Since my virtueis my own, I must not blame the other for their misdeeds. If I becomeindignant with the other, I must recognize this as a fault in myself andnot in the other: [w]hen you are indignant with anyone for his perfidy oringratitude, turn your thoughts first and foremost upon yourself. For theerror is clearly your own.42 Virtue demands that I do my best to help theother; reason demands that I recognize the others autonomy and my ownfinitude. Toleration is thus the best response in cases where the limits ofjustice are not transgressed; and it is a virtue which contributes to bothjustice and tranquility.

STOIC TOLERANCE

Stoic tolerance is a form of self-control in which we do not allow thefoibles of our fellow human beings to distract us from pursuing thecommon good, which includes our obligation to respect our fellows andto work with them in the pursuit of virtue. Stoic tolerance develops fromproper control of our negative emotional responses to others. SenecasOn Anger is, for example, an attempt to establish the proper relationshipbetween the disruptive emotion of anger and the proper concern and moraloutrage that follow from a concern for justice.43 This Stoic response mightseem to foster an inhuman and un-humane apathetic indifference. But moreproperly understood, Stoicism asks us to develop eupathia or metriopathia:proper emotion or measured emotion.44 Complete lack of passion is clearlynot the conclusion of Stoicism despite caricatures to this effect. As Beckerargues, no Stoic ever held the view that the sages life should be empty ofaffect, emotion, and passion.45 Rather, the goal of Stoicism is properly torestrain passion under the guidance of reason. A Stoic conception of proper

41 Marcus Aurelius, ibid., 10.4, 152.42 Marcus Aurelius, ibid., 9.42, 149.43 See Nussbaums discussion in The Therapy of Desire, op. cit., ch. 11.44 For the problem of Stoic apathy and the difference between apatheia, metriopatheia

and eupatheia see F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (New York: Norton, 1975), 5968 orLawrence C. Becker, A New Stoicism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),12836.

45 Becker, ibid., 128.

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emotion provides a useful approach to tolerance because it allows us tothink of tolerance as a habit of self-control when confronted with differ-ence and disagreement. However, a full conception of toleration requires usto conjoin proper emotion with our duty to criticize others and administerjustice.46

Stoicism maintains a unitary vision of the good life for human beings.This may seem antithetical to contemporary discourse about toleration,which emphasizes toleration as the best way to deal with the fundamentalproblem of liberalism: the diversity of substantive views of the goodlife that are permitted within the liberal ideal of value-neutral proced-ural justice. But Stoicism is not committed to value neutrality. Rather,tolerance is understood as a moral virtue, not as a political idea of impar-tial procedural justice. Despite the Stoic emphasis on the unity of virtue,however, there is plenty of room within Stoicism for a plurality of goods,as Lawrence Becker argues.47 This plurality is possible since there is avariety of goods for human beings that can be subsumed under the naturalfunction of human being. Rational autonomy can lead to a plurality ofsubstantive views of the good. Nonetheless, this diversity does not implythat we should be indifferent about the value of these different goods orthat we should slip into a form of relativism. Rather, justice requires crit-ical engagement with those we tolerate, even while reason requires propercontrol of our emotional reactions when confronted by the incorrigible andintransigent. The Stoic position maintains that we should argue with them,while admitting that it would be unwise to become indignant and unjust tointerfere except where necessary.

Tolerance as a Stoic virtue involves overcoming the passions in orderto engage in fruitful critical moral pedagogy. Situations that require toler-ance are those in which we encounter persons whom we judge negatively.Stoicism attempts to restrain impassioned revulsion in order to allow usto consider some reason for not negating the other. Restraint of negativejudgment makes it possible to see in the other something of value thattranscends our feelings of repugnance. Tolerance is thus a habit of socialdiscourse that allow us to engage the rational part of our companionswithout succumbing to the vicissitudes of our emotional responses, so thatwe can carry out the critical pedagogical task. Indeed, tolerance is basedupon moral concern for the well-being of the other as a rational beingcapable of pursuing virtue in his or her own way. This moral concern is best

46 See Nussbaums discussion of the Stoic ideal of a humane and gentle public life,The Therapy of Desire, op. cit., 423.

47In principle, the diversity of possible Stoic lives and the lives of Stoic sages is

very great Lawrence C. Becker, op. cit., 21.

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expressed by overcoming our emotional response to repugnant practices inorder to engage the other in philosophical dialogue about the good.

The best way to contribute to the development of virtue in rationaladults is to avoid coercion and, instead, appeal to argument; the primaryway in which we avoid manipulation and coercion is by restrainingemotional responses in order to focus upon arguments and reasons. Quitesimply, emotional responses get in the way of rational criticism. Wemust also recognize that coercion will not help us to lead others tomoral autonomy; we each must develop autonomy for ourselves. Likewise,moral or religious conviction cannot be forced because truly to believesomething, one must come to it freely. Nonetheless, tolerance does notmean mere acquiescence in the face of diversity. Rather, if we think thatthe development of moral autonomy is good, tolerance requires that weconfront those with whom we disagree and exhort, admonish, argue and,in general, attempt to persuade them toward the truth.

It is important to note that tolerance is not only good for the other,but that it is also part of my own pursuit of my own good. My search formoral autonomy or good requires that I consider alternative views. I mayultimately disagree with these alternatives; however, I owe it to myselfto consider them. As Epictetus counsels: [i]t is for this reason that thephilosophers advise us to leave even our own countries, because old habitsdistract us and do not allow a beginning to be made of another custom.48If I want my decisions to be as rational as possible, if I want my decisionsto be good, I should make my decisions in the light of as much evidenceas possible. Evidence in moral decision-making must include alternativemoral choices and the kinds of lives to which these lead.

However, a problem may occur if this imperative is taken alone. Itseems to claim that I ought to tolerate immoral behaviour so that I maybetter understand why it is immoral and thus why I ought not to chooseit. Thus my quest for autonomy would come at the expense of someothers who are the victims of immoral behaviour (after all, I learn valuablelessons from their mistakes and their pain). To solve this problem we mustrecognize that the imperative for tolerance cannot be viewed in isolation. Itapplies only to those opinions about which I may be mistaken. Moreover,it applies onlt to questions that do not violate the others search for thegood. Indeed, to become an autonomous moral self is to learn to careabout the autonomy and good of others. In this sense, we must avoid thegive them enough rope to hang themselves problem of indifferent laissez-faire toleration. My moral autonomy depends on the autonomy of othersbecause I rely upon those others to make arguments with me, exhort me,

48 Epictetus, Discourses, op. cit., 3.16.

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admonish me and in general try to persuade me to become autonomous andto pursue the good. My substantive good depends upon the good of theseothers because I am a social animal who finds happiness in the happiness ofothers. To complete my own quest for autonomy and a good life, I shouldthus encourage the other to become autonomous and to discover the good.If the other is recalcitrant I should admit defeat and move on, realizingthat, if they violate justice, I must intervene.

So what should we do about our emotional responses to those withwhom we disagree? The question is whether one should be entirely dispas-sionate or whether we should care about those others who disgust anddisturb us. The idea of eupathia is not one of complete apathy. Rather,eupathia results from the use of reason to see the real causes of our disgustand anger. As Epictetus and Marcus both indicate, the cause of an insultor offence is usually not deliberate injustice (which must be punished)on the part of the other but, rather, ignorance in both ourselves and inthe other. Emotional responses to those we find repugnant disrupts reasonand prevent us from properly understanding them. We must confront ouremotions rationally in order to arrive at a tolerant critical perspective. Insome cases, this will help us move beyond an injury: [p]ut from you thebelief that I have been wronged, and with it will go the feeling. Rejectyour sense of injury, and the injury itself disappears.49 In other cases, itwill help us administer justice impartially and mercifully.

The emotions that properly accompany tolerance are thus modesty,compassion and pity.50 We must restrain ourselves by recognizing the factthat others will disagree with us. If we realize this, then our astonishmentand anger will give place to pity.51 This is not only a form of altruism, butalso a matter of self-interest: we need the friendship of other good peopleto further our own quest for goodness. Anger and disgust usually serveonly to undermine reason, alienate us from others, and prevent us fromfulfilling our social duties.

Pursuit of the good requires that we rationally criticize our fellows,that we listen to their criticisms of us, and that we tolerate their failingswhen justice does not require active intervention. This involves distancingoneself from ones passions long enough to listen to reason and to examinethe arguments made about ones passions. The difficulty for a Stoic social

49 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 4.7, 65.50 Nussbaum indicates that, for Seneca, compassion is to be avoided because it is a

weakness: The Therapy of Desire, op. cit., 428. In this sense, Marcus is perhaps developingbeyond Stoicism toward something like the Christian idea of mercy. In either case, the pointis that mercy and toleration are parts of justice.

51 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 7.26, 109.

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philosophy is thus the same difficulty as that found in liberal discussionsof the paradox of toleration: how do we critically engage each other whilenot becoming intolerant and while not sacrificing the demands of justice?In Stoicism the answer is found in proper control of the passions, such thatjustice is not obscured by immoderate emotional responses.

CONCLUSION

Stoicism entered modern political philosophy by way of Spinoza. He takesup the idea of controlling emotions in his claim that the more an emotionbecomes known to us, the more it is within our power and the less the mindis passive in regard to it.52 For Spinoza, virtues of mind such at temper-ance, sobriety and chastity give us power over our passions.53 AlthoughSpinoza does not focus on the virtue of tolerance in any detail, it is one ofthese virtues of mind.54 It helps us both to attain self-mastery and properlyto exercise our judgment toward others. Spinoza is significant becausehe provides a link between a Stoic theory of the emotions and an ideaof political toleration as developed in his Theological-Political Treatise.Spinozas idea of political toleration is similar to Lockes defence of toler-ation in his Letter Concerning Toleration and may even have influencedLockes account.55 Both Spinoza and Locke focus on the impossibility ofusing political power to force people to think in an orthodox fashion. Thisidea, the root of many contemporary liberal notions of toleration, is thusindirectly linked back to the Stoic idea that reasonable dialogue guided bytolerance is the best way to make our brothers and sisters of reason morevirtuous. In the history of liberalism these ideas were further developedby Kant and Mill, and thus handed on to contemporary liberals such asRawls.56

Citizens of tolerant liberal societies would do well to remember thattolerance is not only a political idea but that it is also a virtue for individuals

52 Spinoza, Ethics, op. cit., Fifth Part, Proposition 3, Corollary, 198.53 Spinoza, ibid., Third Part, Prop. 41, Note, 122.54 For a discussion of tolerance in Spinoza see Michael A. Rosenthal, Tolerance as a

Virtue in Spinozas Ethics, Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001), 53557.55 For a discussion see John Christian Laursen, Spinoza on Toleration, in eds

Nederman and Laursen, Difference and Dissent: Theories of Tolerance in Medieval andEarly Modern Europe (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 185204.

56 On the connections and differences between Kant, Spinoza, and the Stoics, see MarthaNussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, op. cit. For a different approach, whichtraces the virtues of liberalism, including tolerance, to Christian sources, see James T.Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 1.

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who are confronted with the radical diversity that is made possible bypolitical toleration. Even the Stoics recognized that there will be inevitableconflicts among approaches to the good life.57 Justice includes tolerancebecause we should be merciful and compassionate toward rational beingswith whom we disagree. Tolerance is also, however, a virtue of self-sufficiency: I will control myself better if I focus upon those things whichI am able to control, i.e., my own opinions and emotions. Stoic tolerancethus results from the fundamental insight that we cannot control the opin-ions and actions of other. Despite this, we must not become completelyindifferent to those others who are essential to the joint project of livinga good social life. As Marcus concludes: [i]n one way humanity touchesme very nearly, inasmuch as I am bound to do good to my fellow-creaturesand bear with them. On the other hand, to the extent that individual menhamper my proper activities, humanity becomes a thing as indifferent tome as the sun, the wind, or the creatures of the wild.58 Wisdom and toler-ance result when we are able to link our obligations to others with thisrealistic indifference toward those things over which we ultimately haveno control.

Department of Philosophy and Humanistic StudiesUniversity of Wisconsin Green Bay2420 Nicolet DriveGreen Bay, WI 54311USAE-mail: fialaa@uwgb.edu

57 As Becker concludes, these conflicts appear to be endemic to human social life,and Stoic ethics has no a priori commitment to achieving a complete integration ofinterpersonal norms, either in theory or practice Becker, op. cit., 52.

58 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, op. cit., 5.20, 85.