1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706

608-262-3581 / www.lafollette.wisc.edu

The La Follette School takes no stand on policy issues; opinions expressed

in this paper reflect the views of individual researchers and authors.

Robert M.

La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison

Working Paper Series

La Follette School Working Paper No. 2012-004

http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers

Statewide Expansion of Treatment Alternatives to

Incarceration in Wisconsin: A Cost Benefit Analysis

Anne Chapman

MPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Colin Christopher

MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Tim Nardine, MD

MPH Candidate, Department of Population Health Sciences

Karen Parkinson

MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Justin Rabbach

MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Nicole Thiher

MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

April 2012

Statewide Expansion of Treatment Alternatives to Incarceration in Wisconsin:

A Cost Benefit Analysis

Prepared by: Anne Chapman, MPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Colin Christopher, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs Tim Nardine, MD, MPH Candidate, Department of Population Health Sciences

Karen Parkinson, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs Justin Rabbach, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs Nicole Thiher, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs

Public Affairs Course 881: Cost-Benefit Analysis

April 2012

Prepared for:

Community Advocates Public Policy Institute

728 N. James Lovell St., 3rd Floor Milwaukee, WI 53233

ii

Table of Contents Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................................................... iv

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. v

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7

Corrections in Wisconsin ...................................................................................................................................................... 8

Treatment Alternatives and Diversion in Wisconsin................................................................................................. 9

Key Features of TAD Programs ........................................................................................................................................ 11

TAD Eligibility ............................................................................................................................................................... 11

TAD Program Components ...................................................................................................................................... 12

TAD Results to Date .................................................................................................................................................... 12

Our Task .................................................................................................................................................................................... 13

The Washington State Institute for Public Policy Model ....................................................................................... 14

Calculating the Benefits and Costs.................................................................................................................................. 15

Analysis ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 18

Determining Levels of Financial Investment ............................................................................................................. 20

Allocation of Program Slots ............................................................................................................................................... 23

Analysis of Selected Portfolios using the WSIPP Model ........................................................................................ 25

Results ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 27

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 31

References ................................................................................................................................................................................ 33

Appendix A: Wisconsin Counties Operating TAD Programs ............................................................................... 38

Appendix B: Wisconsin Drug Courts ............................................................................................................................. 39

Appendix C: Wisconsin Diversion Programs ............................................................................................................. 40

Appendix D: History of the WSIPP Sentencing Tool Model.................................................................................. 41

Appendix E: Program Start-Up Costs ............................................................................................................................ 42

Appendix F: Calculation of Marginal Cost .................................................................................................................... 45

Police........................................................................................................................................................................................... 46

Court and Prosecutor Costs ............................................................................................................................................... 46

Adult Local Jail Costs ............................................................................................................................................................ 47

Adult Local Supervision Costs .......................................................................................................................................... 47

Adult State Prison Costs ...................................................................................................................................................... 47

iii

Adult Post-Prison Supervision Costs ............................................................................................................................. 48

Appendix G: Additional Wisconsin data that would further refine the WSIPP model .............................. 49

Appendix H: WSIPP Comparison Programs Used in Analysis ............................................................................. 51

Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (Proxy for TAD Diversion) ................................................................... 51

Program Comparison between DOSA and TAD Diversion Programs .................................................... 51

Drug Court for Adult Offenders (proxy for TAD Drug Treatment Court) ....................................................... 53

Program Comparison between WSIPP Drug Court and TAD Drug Court Programs........................ 54

Appendix I: Non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010 .......................................................................................... 55

Appendix J: Monte Carlo Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 56

Appendix K: Victim Tangible and Intangible Costs from Various Types of Non-Violent Offenses ...... 58

Appendix L: County Level Results for each Program Portfolio at different funding levels .................... 61

iv

Acknowledgments

This analysis has benefited from the guidance and support of many individuals and organizations dedicated to serving the best interests of the public. Debra Kraft, Nick Sayner, and Marilyn Walczak from Community Advocates Public Policy Institute and Ray Luick from Office of Justice Assistance have been committed toward sound policy analysis of the criminal justice system for years and were invaluable to our group throughout the process. We are also grateful to Steve Aos and his team at the Washington State Institute for Public Policy for directing us and for allowing us the use of their cost-benefit model. We would also like to thank Dane County Deferred Prosecution Program Director Pat Hrubesky and Dane County Circuit Court Judge John Markson for their insight on corrections programming statewide. Kit Van Stelle, Janae Goodrich, and Jason Paltzer from the University of Wisconsin–Madison Population Health Institute provided valuable insight and information regarding Treatment Alternatives and Diversion programs, for which we are grateful. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the interest and support of Professor David L. Weimer. His passion for analysis and dedication to our group provided us with invaluable clarity and direction throughout the project.

v

Executive Summary

Correctional facilities in Wisconsin are overcrowded, housing more than 4,000

inmates above the design capacity of 17,354. Wisconsin Department of Corrections projects

an increase in costs to maintain operations while facing a seven percent cut in funding in

the 2011-2013 state budget cycle. Wisconsin must respond to this challenge with cost-

saving measures. This process often requires a tradeoff between reducing the number of

individuals incarcerated and protecting public safety. One approach to address this

challenge is Wisconsin’s Treatment Alternatives and Diversion (TAD) programs. This

analysis predicts the costs and benefits of expanding TAD programs from seven sites to a

statewide implementation. Using an economic model developed by the Washington State

Institute for Public Policy, we used proxy programs to estimate the return to Wisconsin

taxpayers and crime victims from an investment by the state of Wisconsin to expand TAD

programs statewide. Based on the results of this analysis, we recommend that the state of

Wisconsin invest $20 million annually in TAD programs, allocating 75 percent of that

funding to diversion programs and 25 percent to drug courts. This investment generates a

net present value (NPV) of benefits of $86 million after the first year or $83 million in

benefits after subtracting $3 million in program start-up costs.

Since 2007, Wisconsin has been operating seven TAD sites through a combination of

state and local funding. These TAD sites implement a set of evidence-based corrections

practices, primarily diversion from prosecution and drug treatment court. Although

diversion and drug court serve different populations, both target non-violent offenders

who demonstrate a need for substance abuse treatment. Both approaches offer an array of

drug and alcohol treatment alongside community-based alternatives to incarceration.

vi

Using these practices, Wisconsin’s TAD programs have demonstrated progress leading to a

decrease in the number of individuals incarcerated, thus cutting corrections costs, while at

the same time reducing recidivism and improving public safety.

We used the Washington State Institute for Public Policy model to conduct a cost-

benefit analysis of three TAD program investment portfolios at three funding levels,

calculating the NPV of each. The portfolios of TAD programs included the following:

exclusive implementation of diversion, exclusive implementation of drug court, and a

mixed portfolio of both approaches in which 75 percent of funding is allocated to diversion

and 25 percent is allocated to drug court. We calculated the annual NPV as the following:

benefits to taxpayers from crime reduction and avoided criminal justice costs; plus benefits

to crime victims from crime reduction; minus program implementation and operation

costs. We also include a separate first-year calculation of the NPV for each portfolio that

includes the start-up costs for the program.

Investment in drug courts alone, diversion alone, or a diversion/drug court

combination provides a positive annual NPV at $5 million, $10 million, and $20 million.

Although annually investing $20 million exclusively in diversion gives the largest NPV, we

recommend splitting the investment between diversion and drug court as Wisconsin

already has several well-functioning drug court programs. Because diversion and drug

court programs serve different populations, communities could benefit from having both

programs. Thus, we recommend investing in a portfolio that expands drug court capacity

and recognizes the need to maintain programs that serve an offender population that

requires more intensive treatment and monitoring services than diversion programs

typically offer.

7

Introduction

Current corrections policy in Wisconsin is unsustainable. Whether measured in

terms of growth in prison population, corrections expenditures, or recidivism, Wisconsin

faces a confluence of fiscal and logistical challenges. The state’s prison population grew by

14 percent between 2000 and 2007 and is projected to expand by another 25 percent by

2019. As a result, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections projects $2.5 billion will be

needed to “reduce overcrowding in the prison system and accommodate the projected

growth in the prison population.” Moreover, trends in recidivism point to continued

acceleration in the growth of both prison populations and corrections expenditures.

Indeed, “[f]orty percent of people released from prison in 2005 [in Wisconsin] were re-

incarcerated in state prison within two years.” This represents an 11 percent jump above

the two-year re-incarceration rate in 2000 (Council of State Governments Justice Center

2009, 4).

Community Advocates Public Policy Institute is a Milwaukee-based advocacy

organization addressing these trends. One of the organization’s major advocacy initiatives

is its Community Justice Project whose aim is “to educate the public and other key

stakeholders in Wisconsin about the value and importance of implementing

comprehensive, evidence-based policy change within the statewide criminal justice

system” (Community Advocates Public Policy Institute 2012). To further this aim, the

organization’s Justice 2000 division administers one of seven state-funded pilot programs

called Treatment Alternatives and Diversion (TAD). Statewide, TAD programs offer

community-based alternatives to incarceration, including diversion, deferred prosecution,

and drug treatment court. Preliminary program evaluations of Wisconsin’s current TAD

8

sites suggest that public investments in TAD programs have the potential to reduce

recidivism, incarceration, and overall corrections costs statewide. In an effort to quantify

these outcomes, the organization requested that students at the University of Wisconsin-

Madison La Follette School of Public Affairs conduct a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the

impact of an expansion of TAD programs statewide.

Corrections in Wisconsin

Wisconsin operates 20 adult correctional facilities and 16 correctional centers. The

state also administers educational programming, treatment programs, support groups, and

vocational training. The design capacity of these facilities, defined by industry standards as

the original capacity of the institution plus any expansions or modifications, is 17,354

inmates (Wisconsin Department of Corrections 2011b). The average daily prison

population is approximately 22,000, representing an incarcerated population of more than

4,000 inmates above the design capacity of correctional facilities.

The Wisconsin Department of Corrections fiscal year 2011 budget was $1.3 billion.

Adult correctional services accounted for more than 85 percent, or $1.1 billion, of the 2011

budgeted expenditures. During fiscal year 2011, less than one percent, or $9.9 million, of

the corrections budget was allocated for programs to increase public safety and reduce

recidivism rates for adults. The department projects that maintaining the current level of

operations will constitute a two and a half percent increase in total corrections costs over

the next two years (Wisconsin Department of Corrections 2011a).

By comparison, Minnesota had a 2011 corrections budget of $470 million, with an

incarcerated population of 9,650 adult inmates (Minnesota Department of Corrections

2010). Wisconsin and Minnesota’s geographic proximity and comparable ethnic, racial, and

9

socio-economic demographics allow for initial baseline comparisons. A comparison of 2009

data reveal respective Wisconsin and Minnesota median household incomes of $49,994

and $55,621, rates of individuals below the poverty line of 12.4 percent and 10.9 percent,

and state populations of 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively (U.S. Census 2010a;

2010b). Given the similarities in their demographic and economic characteristics, the

substantial difference in corrections expenditures between Wisconsin and Minnesota

demonstrates a real prospect of significant cost savings for Wisconsin.

Further, legislation enacted in 2011, Wisconsin Act 38, cancels previous legislation

allowing prisoner early release, negating any potential relief for the corrections budget that

would have been realized from early release. Additionally, Wisconsin is considering

sending portions of its current and future overflowing inmate population to neighboring

states. Outsourcing the incarceration of Wisconsin prisoners to out-of-state facilities incurs

higher per-capita expenditures than incarcerating them in state. This further demonstrates

the growing need for alternative corrections policies. Finally, the rising costs of maintaining

facilities and programs and a seven percent reduction for corrections funding in the

governor's 2011-2013 budget require changes to bring corrections costs in line with

funding levels (State of Wisconsin 2011).

Treatment Alternatives and Diversion in Wisconsin

In recognition of increasing corrections costs, legislators enacted 2005 Wisconsin

Act 25 (Wisconsin Court System 2005) and authorized funding for grants to counties to

operate TAD programs (Legislative Fiscal Bureau 2011) to reduce crime and maintain or

enhance public safety, while simultaneously reducing public expenditures, especially on

incarceration (Wisconsin Court System 2005).

10

Wisconsin's TAD programs primarily consist of two types of programs, drug

treatment courts and diversion models. Grant funding by the Office of Justice Assistance

since January 2007 has supported the operation of these programs in seven counties across

Wisconsin. Burnett and Washburn (operating under a shared funding model), Rock, Wood,

and Dane (partial funding) counties operate drug treatment courts. (A map of the counties

implementing TAD programs appears in Appendix A.) Drug courts aim to provide

treatment rather than mandatory incarceration to offenders who need substance abuse

treatment. In general, the treatment and case management services that characterize drug

treatment courts last 12 to 18 months (Van Stelle et al. 2011). (See Appendix B for a

detailed explanation of drug treatment court.)

Dane, Milwaukee, and Washington counties employ diversion models. Diversion

consists of pretrial agreements that divert eligible offenders from the criminal justice

system by offering them the opportunity to participate in treatment in lieu of criminal

charges and incarceration. In contrast to TAD drug courts, which share a common approach

based on standard National Drug Court Institute components, the TAD diversion models

vary in several dimensions such as target population and program length. For example,

Dane County offers a pre-trial bail diversion program for offenders with low to moderate

substance abuse risk. Milwaukee’s program serves a similar population with pre-charge

diversion or deferred prosecution agreement options. However, Washington County serves

a different population in terms of substance abuse treatment needs, offenders charged with

second or third offenses of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and offers them

alternatives to revocation of probation or parole supervision (Van Stelle et al. 2011).

Hence, although these three models share a common goal of diversion of offenders from

11

the criminal justice system, they vary in their approach. (See Appendix C for a detailed

explanation of diversion programs.)

When the TAD initiative was first announced in 2006, Wisconsin TAD programs

collectively received $1.02 million for their first year (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance

2006). For the upcoming 2012 allocations, $968,400 will be available for all current

programs and at least one additional program (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance

2011b).

Key Features of TAD Programs

The following section outlines TAD programs in Wisconsin, including eligibility of

offenders, program components, and the results of TAD programs to date.

TAD Eligibility

Wisconsin’s seven TAD sites follow similar criteria for determining offender

eligibility for enrollment. By Wisconsin state law [2005 Wisconsin Act 25, § 90m. 16.964

(12)], eligible participants cannot be violent offenders (i.e., a person charged with or

convicted of having carried, possessed, or used a dangerous weapon; used force; or been

involved in a crime that caused death or serious bodily harm). This standard allows

offenders to remain TAD-eligible for these offenses: drug crimes, property crimes, and

operating while intoxicated. In addition to eligibility based on crime, TAD participants have

demonstrated a need for substance-abuse treatment, a necessary requirement given that

the TAD programs focus is heavily weighted toward treating substance abuse problems.

Beyond these baseline criteria, TAD sites employ site-specific and district attorney

discretion-based criteria related to a variety of factors such as the severity of treatment

needs, likelihood of pretrial failure or rearrest, or county of residence (Dane County,

12

Milwaukee County, Rock County, Washburn and Burnett counties, Washington County,

Wood County).

TAD Program Components

Although each site’s program design and target population vary slightly, the unifying

hallmark of all TAD projects in Wisconsin is the use of evidence-based practices that

provide alternatives to prosecution, parole revocation, conviction, and incarceration for

non-violent offenders with substance abuse and possible mental health treatment needs.

As described previously, these alternatives take two interconnected approaches to

community-based, rather than incarceration-centered, criminal justice: diversion

(including deferred prosecution and related models) and drug treatment courts.

TAD Results to Date

Since the inception of the TAD grants, the University of Wisconsin–Madison

Population Health Institute has conducted ongoing performance evaluations of the TAD

sites. Its statistical findings relate to criminal justice outcomes such as the number of

diversions from prosecution, incidents of recidivism (e.g. new Wisconsin incarcerations,

and new Wisconsin convictions), and avoided days of incarceration. Results from a 2011

institute study suggest that TAD programs, as implemented in the seven current sites, hold

considerable promise as models for reducing incarceration rates while improving public

safety. Collectively, the seven TAD sites can serve an annual capacity of 426 to 545

participants. In the four years since TAD began, the Population Health Institute found that

the programs admitted 2,061 participants with an overall graduation rate of 64 percent.

Drug court participants graduated at a rate of 55 percent, which exceeds the estimated

average national drug court graduation rate of 50 percent. The TAD diversion graduation

13

rate of 66 percent is lower than an estimated national median rate of 85 percent (where

the majority of programs had completion rates above 70 percent). Overall, TAD programs

in Wisconsin resulted in an estimated 135,118 avoided days of incarceration between 2007

and 2010. In addition, offenders who completed TAD programs were significantly less

likely to be convicted of a new criminal offense or sentenced to more incarceration than

those who did not complete the program (Van Stelle et al. 2011).

Our Task

The apparent success that Wisconsin TAD programs have demonstrated in

achieving favorable criminal justice and public safety outcomes suggests that a statewide

expansion could provide substantial social and economic benefits to the state. One way

policymakers could expand the reach of TAD is by diverting public funds for adult

corrections from incarceration to these community-based strategies. A significant obstacle

to this type of reform lies in the perception that alternatives to incarceration such as TAD

programs constitute a “soft-on-crime” approach to public safety. Preliminary evidence,

however, shows that evidence-based programs like TAD reduce recidivism while lowering

criminal justice system costs by avoiding costs associated with policing, arrest processing,

courts, and incarceration. Our task is to consider these results in the context of Wisconsin

corrections to answer the following question: Would a statewide implementation of TAD

programs provide a positive return on investment for Wisconsin residents by reducing

crime and the cost of corrections?

14

The Washington State Institute for Public Policy Model

Ideally, we would have conducted a cost-benefit analysis of expanding TAD

programs throughout Wisconsin by estimating TAD’s specific programmatic outcomes;

predicting the net benefits of TAD programs in the state; and extrapolating such findings

for statewide expansion. In the absence of available data to do this directly, we employed

an economic model developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP)

to project statewide impacts of proxy programs for TAD in Wisconsin. Based on findings

from this model, the Washington legislature changed several crime-related policies. In

2007, it allocated $48 million in the biennial budget for the expanded use of evidence-

based programs (Drake et al. 2009). (See Appendix D for background information

regarding the WSIPP sentencing tool model.) This model has since become nationally

recognized. The Pew Foundation is providing funding to begin tailoring the model to reflect

the specific situations of each state. Our use of the WSIPP model did not include changing

all figures to reflect exact Wisconsin specifications. Before the implementation of programs

in Washington, WSIPP used national averages to approximate the predicted effects within

the state. As Washington continued to fund these programs, and more state specific data

became available, WSIPP has continued to refine the model. We acknowledge that the

proxy programs used from the selection available in the WSIPP model are not perfect

comparisons, but rather our best approximations of Wisconsin’s TAD programs. For drug

court, the model employs a meta‐analysis of more than 50 studies nationwide between

1997 and 2008. For the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA), the model uses a

2006 study from the Washington DOSA program.

15

Figure 1 lays out the basic framework of the WSIPP model. In this study, we did not

change sentencing policies, and therefore did not directly alter the number of people in

prison. Instead, we looked only at the costs and benefits of implementing drug courts or

diversion programs for adults who commit non-violent crimes in Wisconsin. The WSIPP

model calculates the benefits of starting or expanding these evidence-based programs as

the avoided costs to the criminal justice system and the avoided costs of victimization that

result from a reduction in crime and recidivism. As a result, the outcomes reflect the costs

and benefits of reducing crime through drug courts and diversion programs, the impact the

programs have on victimization rates and government spending, and the estimated return

on public investments for various policy options (Aos et al. 2011b). The WSIPP model

monetized values of these impacts, which determine, from a societal efficiency perspective,

whether the total benefits of the programs are greater than their cost of implementation.

Figure 1: WSIPP Model Flow Chart

Source: Authors

Calculating the Benefits and Costs

To estimate the costs of the evidence-based drug court and diversion programs and

their effectiveness in reducing crime, WSIPP conducted detailed meta-analyses of high-

quality evaluations of these types of programs already being administered. The institute

Decide investment

level

Invest in a portfolio of evidence-

based programs

Model calculates the

change in crime rate

Model calculates the

change in taxpayer spending

Model determines

total net benefits of

the portfolio of evidence-

based programs

16

calculated weighted average effects to predict the efficacy of each program in reducing

crime. The costs of these evidence-based programs in the model are based on the marginal

cost of one additional person going through an existing program. Although capital costs

have been included through annualizing, these costs do not include the start-up costs of

beginning a new program (Drake et al. 2009). As a result, these costs and benefits may not

fully reflect the net impact of starting a new program. In our analysis we present the annual

net present value (NPV) of the benefits of each of our portfolios at three funding levels. We

then also include an estimation of first-year benefits that include start-up costs. The

specifics of the calculation of start-up costs appear in Appendix E.

We consider the following two types of benefits in this model: 1) the financial

benefits to the government from avoided criminal justice system costs resulting from

reductions in crime and recidivism; and 2) the social and financial benefits to potential

crime victims of avoided victimizations (Aos et al. 2011b). For example, if an evidence-

based program reduces crime rates in Wisconsin, then the government would save money

due to reduced costs throughout the criminal justice system. Similarly, if fewer crimes are

committed, then fewer victims will suffer both the tangible and intangible costs that result

from crime.

With a more comprehensive data source, we could have considered benefits to the

offenders who participate in these programs. Future versions of the WSIPP model will

incorporate the impact of these benefits (including impacts on education, child welfare,

health, substance abuse, income, and welfare) and will provide policymakers with a more

comprehensive set of benefits to consider (Aos et al. 2011b).

17

The WSIPP model accounts for all of the criminal justice per-unit costs leading up to

and including incarceration, as well as costs incurred by crime victims. Table 1 shows all of

the sources of costs included in the model. Resource costs and victim costs avoided as a

result of a reduction in crime count as program benefits, while all program operations costs

count as program costs.

Table 1: Per-unit cost categories

Resource Costs Marginal Operating

Costs Capital Costs Victim Costs Program Costs Police Police Tangible Drug Court

Courts and Prosecutors Courts and

Prosecutors Intangible

Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative

Adult Jail Adult Jail Adult Local Supervision Adult State Prison

Adult State Prison Adult Post-Prison

Supervision

Source: (Aos and Drake, 2010b)

Marginal operating costs are the added costs to the government for every additional

person going through each part of the criminal justice system. These added costs would

include employee wages, administrative costs, and supplies. Capital costs include the

purchase of buildings, vehicles, equipment, and other large, long-term purchases. Capital

costs do not necessarily increase as more participants enroll in a given program. Changes

in capital cost inputs occur only after a program reaches a given capacity threshold. These

costs accrue directly to the government, funded through tax dollars. Hence, a reduction in

corrections costs counts as taxpayer benefits. The model's calculations of costs also

consider the impact of the marginal excess tax burden, the amount of money lost to society

from raising an additional tax, estimated to be 17 cents for each dollar of taxes raised

(Boardman et al. 2011).

18

In addition to taxpayer-borne costs, victims incur some of the costs of crime. The

model includes both tangible and intangible costs that victims bear. Tangible costs are the

real financial losses that victims incur, including medical and mental health care expenses,

property damage and losses, and the reduction of the victim’s future earnings. Intangible

costs place a dollar value on the pain and suffering experienced by the victims. In this

model, WSIPP estimates intangible victim costs by using jury awards for pain, suffering,

and loss of quality of life (Aos et al. 2011b).

The WSIPP model analyzes policies specific to Washington State. Therefore, we

adapted the data and inputs for Wisconsin. For example, we changed the average daily

prison population data input from 18,400 to 22,212 to mirror the average daily prison

population of Wisconsin in 2009 (Mize 2009). The largest change we made was to adjust

the per-unit cost estimates for each of the seven parts of the criminal justice system listed

in Table 1 for seven different categories of crimes. We used the cost estimates calculated

for Wisconsin in Fredericks et al. (2010), where they calculated the Wisconsin-specific per-

unit cost inputs necessary for this model (see Appendix F). Ideally, we would have also

adjusted the annual costs of participation along with average effectiveness of these

programs to reflect Wisconsin results, but we could not due to data constraints. (See

Appendix G for a listing of additional refinement options for incorporation in future

analysis.)

Analysis

To produce an estimated impact of TAD programs when scaled up to various

statewide capacities, we used WSIPP’s findings from similar programs nationwide as a

proxy. In choosing comparison programs from the WSIPP catalog, we sought to identify the

19

programs that most closely aligned with the two primary TAD intervention models:

diversion and drug court.

Selection of a companion program for TAD’s drug court was relatively

straightforward. Although drug courts differ somewhat in design details and administrative

context (Hrubesky 2011; Markson 2011; Sayner 2011a; Van Stelle et al. 2011), they are

relatively standardized in that they all are based on ten specific program components

developed by the National Drug Court Institute (Van Stelle et al. 2011). Therefore, we

selected WSIPP’s “Drug Court for Adult Offenders” program to provide a proxy for TAD’s

drug treatment court programs in our analysis (Aos et al. 2011a).

Because TAD diversion models vary in approach and context more than TAD drug

courts do, finding a WSIPP program to represent TAD diversion programs is more difficult

than selection of a TAD drug court proxy. In addition, the WSIPP catalog does not contain a

program that perfectly matches TAD diversion programs. However, we selected DOSA, the

program that matches closest, to simulate the estimated impact of diversion programs if

expanded throughout Wisconsin. Both DOSA and TAD diversion programs offer substance

abuse treatment to nonviolent offenders with substance abuse treatment needs. The main

limitation to this comparison is that, whereas diversion projects concern diversion from

courts and jail, DOSA offers reduced prison sentences for offenders sentenced to prison and

residential community-based treatment for offenders not sentenced to prison. As the

WSIPP model does not contain a program that employs diversion from jail, we determined

DOSA to be the best available comparison program, given its similar intent to reduce

incarceration in favor of providing evidence-based substance abuse treatment to those who

20

could benefit most. Appendix H provides more details on the similarities and differences

between TAD programs and WSIPP programs.

After matching TAD programs to the WSIPP programs, we determined the feasible

capacity estimates required to assess the overall monetary impact of a given portfolio of

programs. This process included determining the levels of financial investment in selected

programs, calculating the number of slots funded at the state level, allocating the slots at

the county level while accounting for size constraints and feasibility, running the various

county level portfolios through the WSIPP model, and aggregating these county level

estimates to obtain state-level estimates.

Determining Levels of Financial Investment

To determine appropriate levels of financial investment in our selected programs,

we used program capacity estimates based on 2010 operating levels of TAD programs in

Wisconsin. For 2010, Wisconsin TAD participants across all programs represented

approximately one percent of the annual number of non-violent arrests in counties

operating TAD programs. We determined that statewide implementation of the selected

programs at the level of one percent of annual statewide arrests would require funding

approximately 3,500 program slots. See Appendix I for statewide non-violent arrest figures

for Wisconsin. Looking at the marginal costs of program participants in, the selected WSIPP

DOSA and Drug Court programs, we determined that funding a statewide expansion of

3,500 slots in only diversion programs would cost approximately $5 million dollars, while

funding 3,500 drug court slots would cost approximately $14 million. With both programs

active in Wisconsin, we determined that funding the 3,500 program slots necessary to

attain a capacity equal to one percent of annual non-violent arrests statewide could be

21

attained with $10 million, allowing for some flexibility in division of funding between the

two programs. The $10 million figure represents less than one percent of the Wisconsin

Department of Corrections 2011 fiscal year budget of $1.3 billion (Wisconsin Department

of Corrections 2011a).

Although multiple factors such as participant willingness to volunteer and referral

sources may affect the number of participants in a program, an important factor in

determining the level of participation at a TAD site is the amount of available funding.

Taking this fact into consideration, to demonstrate the possible range of results that could

be achieved from differing funding levels for a portfolio of programs, we analyzed each

portfolio for each county at statewide funding levels of $5 million, $10 million, and $20

million. These figures provide a “cushioned” estimate around the initial $10 million

allocation described above, which allows us to better gauge a range of NPV of benefits for a

given change in the funding of programs.

Using these three expenditure levels, we determined the number of funded slots for

drug courts and diversion programs across the state. The constant marginal cost estimates

of an additional program participant from the WSIPP model for drug court and diversion

were used with a specific funding level to determine the total number of slots that could be

funded with a statewide implementation of only a drug court program or only a diversion

program. For example, the marginal cost estimate of an additional program participant for

drug court in the WSIPP model is $4,095. With $10 million in funding, if all of the funds

went to drug court, 2,442 participant slots would be funded. Using the same formula

produces the number of slots for both drug court and diversion at $5 million, $10 million,

and $20 million levels. We present the results of these calculations in Table 2.

22

In addition to portfolios consisting entirely of drug court or diversion, we analyzed a

portfolio that allocated 75 percent of the funding at a given level to diversion and the

remaining 25 percent to drug court. We chose these percentages because diversion

produces comparable reductions in recidivism rates to drug court, but at a substantially

lower expense (Aos et al. 2011a; Sayner 2011a). We also allocated funds to drug court, as

this program is already in place in several Wisconsin counties and specifically addresses

the more serious, high-risk cases that require intensive supervision and treatment.

Investing in diversion allows the state to avoid expending additional resources by

addressing problems early, increasing the likelihood that offenders never end up in drug

court or prison. This relationship suggests potential benefits to having both programs

operate in the same county. We list the number of program slots funded statewide under

this portfolio in Table 2.

Table 2: Number of program slots funded statewide at a given investment level

Program Marginal

Cost $5 Million $10 Million $20 Million

Diversion $1,509 3,315 6,629 13,253

Drug Court $4,095 1,221 2,442 4,884 75%/25%

Split (Diversion + Drug Court)

See marginal costs above

2,486 + 306 = 2,792

4,969 + 613 = 5,582

9,943 + 1,218 = 11,161

Source: Authors

The number of slots represents an annual investment in a program at a specific

funding level. These figures are annual costs and do not include start-up costs. The start-up

costs we include in our analysis are a one-time investment separate from these annual

investment figures.

23

Allocation of Program Slots

While the aggregate statewide impacts of the program are useful for comparison

and policy decisions, the program effect at the county level is important to consider.

Additionally, WSIPP director Steve Aos suggested to us that analysis of a selected program

was best completed on the margins when using the WSIPP model. His recommendation

stemmed from our use of the model to simulate grant funding rather than funding through

a reduction in the average daily prison population. Trying to run the model for a full

statewide implementation would have caused irregularities in the calculated values. At

such high program slot numbers, the total cost would be much higher than the budget

allotted by the model because we did not allow the model to fund the programs through a

reduction in the average daily prison population. Consequently, our analysis first allocated

program slots to each county for each of the three portfolios at our three given funding

levels. We then ran the model separately for every county for each of the nine portfolio-

funding level combinations.

To determine a county’s allocation of slots at a given funding level, we took the

annual number of non-violent crime arrests in that county and divided by the total number

of non-violent crime arrests in the state. Each county was given an assigned proportion of

the non-violent crime arrests that occurred in the state. Taking these proportions and

multiplying them by the number of available slots statewide gave each county its allocation

of slots for a specific program under a given funding plan.

Using this method, however, yielded such small allocations to some counties that

taking on the start-up and ongoing administrative costs of the program would not be

advisable. For example, some counties have such a relatively low proportion of non-violent

24

crime arrests that they would only receive enough funding for one program slot. Setting up

a county-level program with only one annual participant would not be practical. In terms of

a statewide implementation strategy, we suggest several options.

One option, a dual-county administration of programs, would allow neighboring

counties to share operations and costs and thus bring the number of allocated program

slots up to some minimum number. This coordination could lead to the availability of

programs to residents of all counties throughout the state. We refrained from defining

specific dual-county administrative partnerships in this report as they would change

depending on the level of statewide funding and require collaboration and logistical

decisions on the part of local county governments. We believe that arbitrary partner

assignments in this report would fail to properly assess all details needed for consideration

before the forming of a partnership. Proof of the viability of this option does exist, however,

as a set of TAD programs are implemented under the dual administration of Washburn and

Burnett counties.

For this analysis, we selected a second option, focusing on the implementation of

programs in counties with a relatively higher number of non-violent arrests. Under this

option, programs are not offered in all counties. Holding the funding level constant, the

slots that would have been assigned to counties below a designated minimum we

reallocated proportionally to those counties above the minimum. This process is explained

below.

We determined eight annual participants for drug court or diversion as the

minimum needed to justify the start-up and continued administration of that program in a

specific county. This minimum threshold was chosen as a reflection of the current

25

operation of TAD programs in Wisconsin. The lowest annual program participation rate

was eight participants in each type of program for either drug court or diversion. This

means that no program in operation served fewer than eight participants in a given year.

Using eight annual participants as the cutoff for both programs, we proportionally

reassigned program slots from counties that did not reach the required minimum to the

remaining counties. For the portfolios consisting exclusively of drug court or diversion, any

county that was below the minimum eight slots was excluded from having that program in

that county (i.e. if only drug court or diversion were to be implemented, and a county was

below eight slots, it would not be allocated any funding and likely would not implement a

program). Under the split portfolio of 75 percent diversion funding and 25 percent drug

court, we excluded counties fully from having a program only if both drug court and

diversion slot allocations were each less than eight at the given funding level. This means

that in order for a county to host neither program, they would have needed to have

allocations of fewer than eight participants in both programs. Diversion is less costly to

administer, and several counties met the minimum requirement for diversion but not for

drug court. In these cases, the counties still received the allocated diversion program slots

and would implement the diversion program. The drug court slots, which were below the

minimum number of eight participants in this case, were reassigned to counties that had

allocated drug court slots of more than eight participants. This method of reallocation

resulted in a set of counties in the split portfolio that would only host diversion programs.

Analysis of Selected Portfolios using the WSIPP Model

For each county-level slot allocation we ran in the WSIPP model, we recorded the

corresponding results for changes in taxpayer costs, changes in victimizations, and the

26

likelihood in percentage terms that a given level of investment in a selected program would

reduce victimizations.

All analyzed portfolios produced results demonstrating a reduction in taxpayer

costs. This cost reduction is a benefit accruing to taxpayers, and thus we present these

figures as positive numbers titled “benefits to taxpayers.”

All analyzed portfolios also reduced victimizations. These reductions are listed in

our results tables as negative numbers, reflecting the number of fewer crimes predicted

form the status quo. Each reduction estimate is the mean result of a Monte Carlo analysis

within the WSIPP model. This analysis generates a percentage figure representing the

portion of trials in which victimizations were reduced. This percentage allows for an

assessment of the risk that a given investment in a portfolio of programs would actually

result in an increase in victimizations. For example, we may list the reductions in

victimizations from a given portfolio to be -15 with a likelihood of reductions to be 99

percent. This means that portfolio was run through the WSIPP model 10,000 times, and on

average the predicted number of reduced crimes was 15. The 99 percent means that in 99

percent of the trials the predicted change in crime was negative. For further explanation of

the Monte Carlo analysis used in the WSIPP model, see Appendix J.

In addition to results extracted directly from the WSIPP model, we provide a

monetized valuation of the benefits that accrue to victims as a result of the reduction in

victimizations. Using existing research, we calculated an average cost associated with a

single victimization of a type of crime. We then created weighted monetized values of a

single reduced victimization as a result of participation in diversion or drug court. Our

calculations produced a value of $4,495 for a victimization reduced from diversion and

27

$10,216 from drug court. (Appendix K provides an explanation of this calculation.) The

numbers differ between programs due to differences in the populations they serve. These

values allow for a calculation of victim benefits by multiplying them by the change in

victimizations from a given program (obtained from the model). We define these figures as

“benefits to crime victims” and list them as positive dollar values in our result tables

(Tables 3, 4, and 5).

The results described above for each county under each program portfolio at each

funding level appear in Appendix L.

Results

We found the statewide effects of a specific program portfolio at a given funding

level by aggregating the individual county level effects in that category. The statewide

results of investments in each portfolio appear in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The first NPV figure,

NPV (Benefits – Program Costs) Statewide, represents the annual benefits predicted from

the specified annual investment in each program. Additionally, we provide a value

representing necessary start-up costs that represent a one-time investment separate from

the annual investment in the program. Thus, the second figure represents the NPV in the

first year of operation. All dollar figures have been rounded to the nearest million.

Table 3 shows positive annual statewide NPV of benefits of drug court at all

investment levels before including start-up costs incurred in the first year, but only at a $20

million investment after including start-up costs. This difference demonstrates an issue of

scale. An investment in drug court only makes sense if expenditures amount to a particular

level of program participants that justifies the training of staff members to administer the

program. (Please note that we estimated start-costs at a $5 million investment in drug

28

court to be $427,500 and we thus rounded to $0. In addition, the NPV figures that rounded

to $0 resulted in actual values of the following: $5 million with start-up costs equaled

$131,333; and $10 million with start-up costs equaled $389,531.) In terms of crime

reduction, we see that an exclusive funding of drug court programs at all levels leads to

confident estimates of victimization reductions.

Table 3: Statewide results from exclusive funding of drug court programs

Investment Level

$5 Million $10 Million $20 Million

Program Slots Funded 1,221 2,443 4,885

Change in Victimizations -244 -495 -987

Trials where Victimizations are Reduced

100% 100% 100%

Benefits to Taxpayers $3 million $6 million $12 million

Benefits to Crime Victims $2 million $4 million $8 million

NPV (Benefits - Program Costs) Statewide

$1 million $1 million $2 million

First-year Start-Up Costs $0 $1 million $1 million

NPV (Benefits -Program Costs – First-year Start-up Costs)

Statewide $0 $0 $1 million

Source: Authors

29

Table 4 presents the results based on exclusive funding of diversion programs at the

three funding levels. In this case we find clearly positive NPV of all investments and these

investments provide large returns while reducing crime. A $20 million investment

exclusively in diversion leads to a calculated NPV of benefits of $106 million annually after

the first year, incurring $4 million of first-year start-up costs. This investment also predicts

a crime reduction of more than 8,000 victimizations.

Table 4: Statewide results from exclusive funding of diversion programs

Investment Level

$5 Million $10 Million $20 Million

Program Slots Funded 3,311 6,626 13,248

Change in Victimizations -2,192 -4,415 -8,682

Trials where Victimizations are Reduced

99% 99% 99%

Benefits to Taxpayers $22 million $44 million $87 million

Benefits to Crime Victims $17 million $35 million $68 million

NPV (Benefits - Program Costs) Statewide

$27 million $54 million $106 million

First-year Start-up Costs $1 million $2 million $4 million

NPV (Benefits - Program Costs – First-year Start-up Costs)

Statewide $26 million $52 million $102 million

Source: Authors

30

Table 5 presents results of split investments of 75 percent in diversion and 25

percent in drug court. In this case, all three funding levels result in positive calculations of

the NPV of benefits and reductions in crime. Thus, these portfolios reduce crime and costs.

The inclusion of relatively more expensive drug court programs in these portfolios leads to

fewer overall program slots being funded at each level here, as compared to the same

funding level with only diversion. The highest calculated NPV of benefits comes with the

highest level of investment, where a $20 million investment leads to a calculated NPV of

benefits of $86 million annually, following the first year in which $3 million of start-up

costs incurs. This investment predicts a reduction in crime of nearly 7,000 victimizations.

Table 5: Statewide results from a 75% diversion and 25% drug court investment

Investment Level

$5 Million $10 Million $20 Million

Program Slots Funded 2,485 DOSA +

306 Drug Court = 2,791

4968 DOSA + 609 Drug Court =

5,577

9,945 DOSA + 1,218 Drug Court

= 11,163

Change in Victimizations -1,703 -3,419 -6,751

Trials where Victimizations are Reduced

99% 99% 99%

Benefits to Taxpayers $17 million $35 million $66 million

Benefits to Crime Victims $13 million $26 million $53 million

NPV (Benefits - Program Costs) Statewide

$22 million $45 million $86 million

First-year Start-up Costs $1 million $2 million $3 million

NPV (Benefits -Program Costs – First-year Start-up Costs)

Statewide $21 million $43 million $83 million

Source: Authors

31

Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates that positive monetary and social benefits can result

through an investment to expand TAD programs statewide. Excluding start-up costs

incurred only in the first year, investing $5 million, $10 million, or $20 million in drug

courts alone, diversion alone, or a 75/25-percent split between diversion and drug court

leads to a relatively large positive NPV of benefits for the residents of the state of

Wisconsin.

While the largest NPV of benefits at each funding level are realized from

investments made exclusively into diversion programs, we recognize that other factors

beyond monetary efficiency play a role in the decision to invest in these programs. We

account for considerations such as public perception of being “tough on crime,” the

difference in the populations that diversion and drug court serve, and that both programs

are already implemented in Wisconsin. From this, we recommend an annual investment of

$20 million into a mixed program, with 75 percent going to diversion and 25 percent going

to drug courts. We make this recommendation assuming that the taxpayer investment

would be shared among a broad array of stakeholders throughout the state’s criminal

justice system.

We believe this recommendation to be feasible, as it represents a level of investment

equivalent to approximately 1.5 percent of the $1.3 billion Department of Corrections

budget, and this agency is only one piece of the overall criminal justice system that may

contribute to TAD expansion. This investment returns a NPV of $86 million annually, an

increase of four times the initial expenditure. Funding both programs allows for inclusion

32

of a wider range of participants and provides leeway to counties with both programs.

These counties would be able to assign offenders to the program that better treats their

specific needs and increases their likelihood of being treated successfully. This portfolio

also requires $1 million less in initial start-up costs than the $20 million implementation of

a diversion only portfolio.

In view of the high rates of return on investment in our selected portfolio, we

encourage further analyses to determine if even higher levels of investment would produce

similar returns. If similar rates of return are present, the larger investment would allow for

implementation in a greater number of counties and an expansion of existing programs,

resulting in increased savings and greater crime reduction. Additionally, further work

could monetize the value of benefits that accrue to program participants, as these benefits

are not explicitly accounted for in this analysis. Inclusion of these benefits may lead to a

positive NPV of benefits, even after accounting for start-up costs and increased NPV of

benefits for all portfolios as well.

Overall, TAD programs can reduce both costs and crime at the same time. We hope

this analysis provides further evidence for consideration as Wisconsin policymakers

contemplate funding a statewide expansion of TAD programs. This analysis demonstrates

that investing in these alternative programs appears to be a very effective use of funds. It is

an investment that works to address crime itself rather than simply continuing growth in

spending on incarceration-based sentencing options.

33

References

2005 Wisconsin Act 25 § 90m. 16.964 (12). July 25, 2005. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2005/related/acts/25.pdf Aos, Steve, Polly Phipps, and Robert Barnoski. 2005a. Washington’s Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative: An Evaluation of Benefits and Costs. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 05-01-1901. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-01-1901.pdf Aos, Steve, Polly Phipps, and Robert Barnoski. 2005b. Washington’s Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative: An Update on Recidivism Findings. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 06-12-1901. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-12-1901.pdf Aos, Steve, and Elizabeth Drake. 2010a. Fight Crime and Save Money: Development of an Investment Tool for States to Study Sentencing and Corrections Public Policy Options. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 10-04-1201. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/10-04-1201.pdf Aos, Steve, and Elizabeth Drake. 2010b. WSIPP's Benefit-Cost Tool for States: Examining Policy Options in Sentencing and Corrections. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 10-08-1201. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/10-08-1201.pdf Aos, Steve, Stephanie Lee, Elizabeth Drake, Annie Pennucci, Tali Klima, Marna Miller, Laurie Anderson, Jim Mayfield, and Mason Burley. 2011a. Return on Investment: Evidence-Based Options to Improve Statewide Outcomes. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 11-07-1201. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/11-07-1201.pdf Aos, Steve, Stephanie Lee, Elizabeth Drake, Annie Pennucci, Tali Klima, Marna Miller, Laurie Anderson, Jim Mayfield, and Mason Burley. 2011b. Return on Investment: Evidence-Based Options to Improve Statewide Outcomes. Technical Appendix I: Detailed Tables. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 11-07-1201A. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/11-07-1201A.pdf Barnoski, Robert, and Steve Aos. 2003. Washington State’s Drug Courts For Adult Defendants: Outcome Evaluation and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 03-03-1201. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/drugcourtMar2003.pdf

34

Boardman, Anthony E., David H. Greenberg, Aidan R. Vining, and David L. Weimer. 2011. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 4th. NJ: Pearson Education Inc. Community Advocates Public Policy Institute: Community Justice Project. 2012. Website. Accessed April 4, 2012. http://www.ca-ppi.org/solutions/community-justice.php Community Advocates. 2009. Annual Report. Milwaukee, WI. Accessed December 1, 2011. http://communityadvocates.net/documents/2009_CA_annual_report.pdf Council of State Governments Justice Center. 2009. Justice Reinvestment in Wisconsin: Analyses & Policy Options to Reduce Spending on Corrections and Increase Public Safety. NY. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Wisconsin%20Analyses%20and%20Policy%20Options.pdf Dane County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application. Drake, Elizabeth, Steve Aos, and Marna Miller. 2009. Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington State. Victims and Offenders. 4: 170-196. Accessed March 20, 2012. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-00-1201.pdf Fredericks, Sylvia, Sara Kock, Emily Ley, Olivia Little, Natalie Olson, and Paul Waldhart. 2010. Efficiently Reducing Corrections Costs in Wisconsin: Applying the Washington State Model. Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs. Working Paper No. 2011-001. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/cba2011-001.pdf Hrubesky, Pat, Director, Deferred Prosecution Unit, Office of the Dane County District Attorney. 2011, October 28. Personal Communication to Colin Christopher. Kennedy, Spurgeon, James Brown, Barbara Darbey, Anne Gatti, Tara Klute, Mary Pat Maher, and Daniel Peterca. 2010. Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion. Rochester, NY: National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies. Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/PromisingPracticeFinal.pdf Legislative Fiscal Bureau. 2011, May 12. Treatment, Alternatives and Diversions Program. Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/budget/2011-13-Budget/documents/Budget%20Papers/127.pdf Markson, John, Judge, Dane County Circuit Court. 2011, October 27. Personal Communication to Colin Christopher.

35

Marlowe, Douglas B. 2010. Research Update on Adult Drug Courts. Washington, DC: National Association of Drug Court Professionals. Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Research%20Update%20on%20Adult%20Drug%20Courts%20-%20NADCP_1.pdf McCollister, Kathryn, Michael French, and Hai Fang. 2010. The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 108: 98-109. Milwaukee County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application. Minnesota Department of Corrections. 2010. Notable Statistics. St. Paul, MN. Accessed on October 15, 2011. http://www.doc.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/stats/documents/notablestatistics.pdf Mize, Kate. 2009. Stopping the Revolving Door: Reform of Community Corrections in Wisconsin. Hartland: Wisconsin Policy Research Institute. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume22/Vol22No5/Vol22No5.pdf National Association of Drug Court Professionals. 2011. History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision. Accessed December 15, 2011. http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history Rock County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application. Sayner, Nick, Director, Justice 2000. 2011a, October 4. Personal Communication to Anne Chapman. Sayner, Nick, Director, Justice 2000. 2011b, November 8. Personal Communication to Anne Chapman. State of Wisconsin. 2011. Statewide Budget and Position Summaries. Madison, WI: Division of Executive Budget and Finance, Department of Administration. http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/statewidetotals1113.pdf U.S. Census Bureau. 2010a. State and County Quick Facts – Minnesota. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/27000.html

36

U.S. Census Bureau. 2010b. State and County Quick Facts - Wisconsin. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html Van Stelle, Kit, Janae Goodrich, and Jason Paltzer. 2011. Treatment Alternatives and Diversion (TAD) Program: Advancing Effective Diversion in Wisconsin, 2007-2010 Evaluation Report. University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute. Madison, WI. http://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/tad-2011-evaluation-report-full-report.pdf Wade, Kate, Shelby McCulley, David Harkins, Allison La Tarte, Mary Regan, and Robert Sommerfeld. 2008. 17-Year-old Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/08-3full.pdf Walczak, Marilyn. Community Justice Project Manager, Community Advocates Public Policy Institute. 2011b, November 8. Personal Communication to Anne Chapman. Washburn/Burnett Counties. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application. Washington County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application. Washington State Courts. 2011. Directory of Drug Courts and Other Problems Solving Courts in Washington State, Introduction section on Adult Drug Courts. Accessed November 1, 2011. http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_dir/?fa=court_dir.psc&tab=1 Wisconsin Court System. 2005. Wisconsin – ‘Roessler Bill’ Provision of the 2005 Budget Act. Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/2005wisact25.pdf Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 2011a. Agency Budget Request, 2011-2013 Biennium. Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/DOC%202011-13%20BIENNIAL%20BUDGET%20REQUEST.pdf Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 2011b. Institution Populations. Week of November 4, 2011. Accessed on November 20, 2011. http://www.wi-doc.com/doc-pdf/fri_11_04_2011.pdf Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2006. Governor Doyle Announces $616,000 for Alcohol and Drug Treatment and Diversion. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://oja.wi.gov/journal_media_detail.asp?prid=2328&locid=97

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Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2011a. Arrests in Wisconsin 2010. Accessed November 15, 2011. http://oja.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=21986&locid=97 Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2011b. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Announcement. Accessed October 1, 2011. http://oja.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=21960&locid=97 Wood County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Application.

38

Appendix A: Wisconsin Counties Operating TAD Programs

This map shows the locations of TAD programs currently funded in Wisconsin. Figure A-1: Map of Wisconsin counties operating TAD programs

Figure: Authors Source: U.S. Census 2010b

Note: For the purposes of TAD, Dane County is a diversion project. The Dane County drug court is only partially funded by TAD grants.

39

Appendix B: Wisconsin Drug Courts

Compared to diversion programs, drug courts aim to provide treatment rather than

incarceration to higher risk non-violent offenders with more intensive substance abuse

treatment needs. These programs are built on key program components, as defined by the

National Drug Court Institute. Unlike diversion, which is primarily a pretrial approach, drug

courts can be offered to offenders at several stages in the criminal justice process, from

pre-plea to post-plea to post-conviction, or as an alternative to revocation of community

supervision. Drug courts are longer-term and more intensive than diversion programs,

ranging from 12 to 18 months. Drug courts offer a comprehensive array of substance abuse

treatment, case management, and monitoring. Drug courts funded through the TAD

program in Wisconsin operate in Rock, Wood, Dane (partially funded) Burnett, and

Washburn counties. Burnett and Washburn (in collaboration with the St. Croix tribe) run

separate drug courts but are funded under a joint application (Van Stelle et al. 2011).

As of December 2010, more than 2,600 drug courts operated in the United States,

according to the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (2011). Since the

establishment of the first drug court in 1989, drug courts have been subject to extensive

evaluations that show positive results. Multiple meta-analyses of drug court research have

been performed, showing on average reduction in recidivism of between ten and 15

percent for participants. Drug court participants have been found to exhibit less drug and

alcohol usage than non-participants (as confirmed by drug testing) as well as self-reported

improved interpersonal relationships, employment rates, and income (Marlowe, 2010).

40

Appendix C: Wisconsin Diversion Programs

Diversion programs consist of pretrial agreements that redirect eligible offenders

from the criminal justice system and offer them treatment alternatives in lieu of criminal

charges and incarceration. These models include evidence-based customized treatment

and procedure plans such as: bail monitoring, deferred prosecution agreements, diversion

from prosecution, and alternatives to revocation of probation or parole. In contrast to drug

courts, county diversion programs do not follow a uniform program design. In general, they

emphasize early intervention and target offenders with a low risk of rearrest and high

probability of completing their customized treatment program. As a result, although

diversion programs vary in length, they can be completed in as little as six months or less

(Sayner 2011a). Diversion models with TAD support in Wisconsin operate in Dane,

Milwaukee, and Washington counties (Van Stelle et al. 2011).

Diversion programs have been operating in the United States since the 1960s, with

funding from the federal government and presidential encouragement. Today, almost 300

pretrial diversion programs operate nationally. These programs operate at the county,

state, and federal levels serving a wide variety of participants. Evaluations of diversion

programs show the following estimates of recidivism rates for new crimes: five percent for

felonies, 15 percent for misdemeanors, and one percent for traffic offenses (Kennedy et al.

2010). However, since there is a wide variety of types of diversion programs, meta-

analyses of these programs are not as widely available as they are for drug courts.

41

Appendix D: History of the WSIPP Sentencing Tool Model

To conduct the analysis presented in this study, we employed a model developed by

the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). The Washington legislature

established this institute in 1983 to conduct non-partisan research on important state

issues. Since 1997, WSIPP has been developing and refining an analytical model, known as

the WSIPP sentencing tool, to identify the costs and benefits of different mixes of

incarceration and evidence-based alternative programs that could potentially reduce crime

and government costs (Aos and Drake 2010a). At its inception the WSIPP model was

limited to using meta-analysis data as approximations of how these programs could be

implemented within the state. Over time, as program-specific data have become available,

WSIPP has refined the model to better reflect actual programs rather than national

averages.

In 2010, the Pew Charitable Trusts contracted WSIPP to develop a policy tool that

focuses on criminal justice sentencing policies and programs from an investment point of

view. They are now working together to make this sentencing tool available and adaptable

to other states. The WSIPP sentencing tool is user-friendly software, and the Pew

Foundation works directly with states to help with adoption, modification, and

implementation of the model. “The purpose of the WSIPP sentencing tool is to allow users

to enter state-specific input factors endorsed by each state, and then test bottom-line

results on crime levels and taxpayer savings for different combinations of public policy

choices” (Aos and Drake 2010b, 4).

42

Appendix E: Program Start-Up Costs

To estimate program start-up costs, we consulted Nick Sayner, director of Justice

2000, the program that administers the Milwaukee County diversion program, and Marilyn

Walczak, community justice project manager at Community Advocates Public Policy

Institute. They stated that start-up costs for drug court and diversion programs are

typically staff-driven, because these programs generally operate within existing program

infrastructure throughout the criminal justice system, such as the courts, prosecutors’

offices, mental health facilities, and so on. This arrangement limits the need for substantial

fixed or capital costs to implement new programs. In addition, start-up costs are not

generally itemized separately in grant applications. According to Sayner and Walczak,

programs typically build start-up costs into the grant request for the first year of funding.

As the program builds up its infrastructure in the initial stages, the program serves a

relatively low client population. After about three to six months, the program typically

becomes fully operational. The primary costs incurred when starting a new program

involve the staff training, supplies, and equipment necessary for staff members to carry out

their duties (Sayner 2011b, Walczak 2011). Consequently, we assumed program start-up

costs can be estimated on a per-employee basis.

Based on his experience and knowledge of drug court and diversion program

operations, Sayner estimates per-employee start-up costs to be roughly $5,000 to $10,000.

Costs could vary considerably depending on the type of program, setting, participant

population, and other variable factors, especially in diversion programs. Sayner’s aggregate

per-employee estimate breaks down as follows: $1,500 for a desk and chair, $1,000 for a

computer, $500 for a printer (which may not be needed for each staff member), $500 for

43

monthly telephone charges, $100 for business cards, $500 for office supplies, and $150 for

technical support (to set up the computer, email, printer, etc.). These estimates total $4,350

(Sayner 2011b). Apart from equipment and supplies, several other factors affect start-up

costs, most notably staff training. Some counties may also need to invest in database

development, administration, and integration within an existing criminal justice tracking

system.

The relationship between staff-driven start-up costs and the size of the program is

not linear. One staff member can serve some capacity range before needing another staff

member, at which point a program could again grow by some number of participants

before needing another staff member.

Second, although real costs are associated with training and equipping staff

members to start a program, the extent to which a new program could avoid direct

budgetary outlays by utilizing excess equipment, supplies, office rental, and other forms of

underutilized capacity from other programs and agencies within the criminal justice

system is variable. In Milwaukee, for example, the diversion program all but eliminated

budgetary outlays for its start-up costs. Although the use of excess capacity from other

program cost centers does represent an opportunity cost, such a cost is likely to be lower

than an outright purchase of needed equipment and supplies. Valuing these opportunity

costs is difficult because each county has a different administrative setting with varying

arrangements of program resources.

Taking all of these assumptions into account with the intention of making

conservative estimates to account for considerable uncertainty and variability in costs, we

44

use the median between Sayner’s estimates of $5,000 to $10,000 (Sayner 2011b) per-

employee, to arrive at a start-up cost of $7,500 per staff member.

From there, we estimated how much staffing would be needed for a given county to

start a program at a given participant capacity. We constructed estimates of the staffing-to-

participants ratio based on personnel data we gathered from the 2012 TAD grant

applications for each current TAD site. Where we found the necessary data in the grants,

we performed separate calculations for the ratio for diversion and drug court. For both

programs, we calculated the average staffing-to-participant ratio to be approximately one

staff person to 30 participants.

Using this estimate, we assumed that one full-time staff member can serve

approximately 30 participants in each of our programs (i.e., one staff member for up to 30

participants, two staff members for 30 to 60 participants, etc). Combining these staff

member allocations per county with an estimated $7,500 cost per staff member, we

estimated a total start-up cost for each county. We include start-up cost calculations for

each county in Appendix L.

45

Appendix F: Calculation of Marginal Cost

Instead of using the Washington-based cost data embedded in the model, we

replaced it with Wisconsin-specific per-unit cost estimates from a 2010 La Follette School

cost-benefit analysis by Fredericks et al. Although Fredericks et al. did not find significant

differences between Washington and Wisconsin costs in their analysis, we believe using

Wisconsin cost data better approximates net benefits for Wisconsin taxpayers of

implementing these programs. Based on Washington State Institute for Public Policy’s

(WSIPP) methods, the following outline explains the calculations of their cost estimates,

and the results of these calculations are shown in Table F-1. Please see Fredericks et al.

(2010) for further explanation.

Table F-1: Marginal costs

Marginal Operating Costs Capital Costs Per-Unit Murder

Rape and Sex

Offense Robbery Agg.

Assault Property Drug Mis-

demeanor

Costs Paid by Government

Police $439 $439 $439 $439 $439 $439 $439 $189

Courts and Prosecutors $126,634 $15,599 $8,199 $4,053 $167 $167 $167 $21

Adult Jail $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $55,000

Adult Local Supervision $1,100 $1,100 $1,100 $1,100 $1,100 $1,100 $1,100 -

Adult State Prison $13,939 $13,939 $13,939 $13,939 $13,939 $13,939 $13,939 $85,673

Adult Post-Prison

Supervision $1,030 $1,030 $1,030 $1,030 $1,030 $1,030 $1,030 - Source: Fredericks et al. (2010)

46

Police

Wisconsin’s aggregate data on total direct current expenditures for police from

2004 to 2007 from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics was used to estimate police

operating costs of $439 in 2010 dollars. Fredericks et al. used arrest rates from the

Wisconsin Office of Justice Statistics from 2004 to 2007 to calculate an average cost per

arrest. They found a line of best fit for these four years and used it to approximate the

average cost per arrest for 2010 and the average annual escalation rate. They then applied

a ratio of the difference between Washington’s average costs per arrest and their marginal

operating costs to Wisconsin’s average costs per arrest to obtain an estimate of the

marginal operating costs of police in Wisconsin. They used the same process to calculate

Wisconsin’s police capital costs.

Court and Prosecutor Costs

Using data on court expenditures from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and the

number of felony convictions in Wisconsin, which the authors estimated as 24 percent of

adults arrested for felonies, they calculated an average operating cost per conviction from

2004 to 2007. They then calculated a weight for each type of crime from Washington’s

average and marginal costs per conviction and applied it to Wisconsin’s average costs per

conviction to find Wisconsin’s marginal cost per conviction. The costs vary from $126,634

for a murder to $167 for a misdemeanor.

Fredericks et al. obtained data on the capital expenditures for Wisconsin’s court

systems from the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2006 and divided it by the

number of federal convictions in a year in Wisconsin to estimate the average capital costs

47

per conviction for courts. They converted this number into an annualized capital payment

by converting this cost into a 20-year financing term with a specific bond-financing rate.

Adult Local Jail Costs

The average cost per prisoner of $14,000 in local Wisconsin jails was found in Wade

et al. (2008) for 2006. Fredericks et al. found a ratio of Washington’s average costs to

Washington’s marginal costs and applied this ratio to Wisconsin’s average costs to find

Wisconsin’s marginal operating costs in local jails. Fredericks et al. followed WSIPP’s

method of calculating capital based on the cost for new jail beds. After a review of the costs

for a variety of new jails from across the country, WSIPP estimated that it costs $150,000

per county jail bed.

Adult Local Supervision Costs

The average cost per prisoner under local supervision ($1,100) comes from Wade et

al. (2008). Fredericks et al. calculated a ratio of Washington’s average costs to

Washington’s marginal costs and applied this ratio to Wisconsin’s average costs to find

Wisconsin’s marginal operating costs of local supervision.

Adult State Prison Costs

Wisconsin’s ADP data and average annual operating costs of adult state prisons was

obtained from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for 2006 to 2010. An average

annual state prison cost per average daily prison population was then calculated and used

to fit a linear regression to predict prison operating costs and escalation rate. Using a ratio

of Washington’s average costs to marginal costs, this number was converted into an

estimate of Wisconsin’s marginal state prison operating costs of $13,939 per inmate.

48

Fredericks et al. estimated capital costs of a new state prison bed based on cost

information from the Redgranite Correctional Institution that was completed in 1999 in

Waushara County. They estimated per-bed costs and used a 25-year financing term at a

specified bond rate to convert the per bed costs estimate into an annualized capital

payment.

Adult Post-Prison Supervision Costs

Fredericks et al. obtained Wisconsin’s average daily prison population data and

average annual operating costs of adult post-prison supervision from the Wisconsin

Department of Corrections for 2006 to 2010. A line of best fit was found between these four

costs per ADP estimated to project the average operating costs per year and to estimate the

average annual rate of escalation. Using a ratio of Washington’s average costs to marginal

costs, this number was converted into an estimate of $1,030 for Wisconsin’s per-unit

marginal operating costs for adult post-prison supervision.

49

Appendix G: Additional Wisconsin data that would further refine the WSIPP model

The results of the WSIPP model are based on inputs from Washington and national

averages. To narrow the predicted results for Wisconsin programs, parameters within the

model could be further adjusted to better reflect Wisconsin inputs. In this analysis, we

replaced the Washington-based per-unit cost estimates of the corrections system with

Wisconsin-specific per-unit cost estimates from Fredericks et al. (2010) (See Appendix F).

We changed the average daily prison population from 18,400 to 22,212 to mirror the

average daily prison population of Wisconsin in 2009 (Mize 2009). We also adjusted the

number of arrests annually for each type of crime in Wisconsin in 2010 (Wisconsin Office

of Justice Assistance 2011a).

Data availability and time constraints limited further adjustments to the WSIPP

model. Future studies of Wisconsin’s TAD programs using the WSIPP model could

incorporate more adjustments with available data. The most important parameters to

adjust in the model to make it more representative of Wisconsin programs are the actual

costs and participant results of the TAD programs. The specific inputs that can be adjusted

for each program in the WSIPP model are: annual cost per person, the average age of

participants, the number of participants, the category of crime (as specified by the WSIPP

model) that the primary participants fall into, and the effect size and standard error of the

program.

Another possible category of inputs to adjust, if data are available, is annual crimes

in Wisconsin. We only adjusted the number of annual arrests in Wisconsin for each type of

50

crime, but other parameters could be adjusted in the WSIPP model to better reflect crime in

Wisconsin. These parameters include statewide data for each category of crime for the

number of statewide crimes reported to the police, the percentage of crimes reported to

the police, the number of convictions, and the number of counts per conviction.

51

Appendix H: WSIPP Comparison Programs Used in Analysis

To estimate the effect of TAD diversion and drug court programs in Wisconsin using

the WSIPP model, we chose the two WSIPP programs that were as close as possible to TAD

in terms of program features. For Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) (the TAD

diversion proxy program), the model uses one 2006 study from the Washington state

program. For drug court, the WSIPP model employs a meta-analysis of more than 50

studies of drug court programs nationwide between 1997 and 2008 (Aos et al. 2011b).

Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (Proxy for TAD Diversion)

Washington’s DOSA reduces recidivism by offering non-violent adult drug-involved

felony offenders a reduced prison sentence or community-based residential treatment in

exchange for agreeing to complete substance abuse treatment. Until 2005, participants

completed drug treatment while incarcerated, splitting their sentence between prison and

community custody. Should an offender fail to complete substance abuse treatment or be

“administratively terminated from DOSA, the legislation requires that he or she return to

prison to serve the remainder of the community custody term” (Aos et al. 2005b, 2).

Changes to Washington law in 2005 expanded the program to offer community-

based treatment for offenders who had not received prison sentences. Although the

original DOSA design targeted incarcerated offenders, its evolution toward community-

based alternatives for non-incarcerated offenders brings it conceptually closer to the TAD

pretrial diversion approach (Aos et al. 2005b).

Program Comparison between DOSA and TAD Diversion Programs

Eligibility requirements for TAD and DOSA target non-violent offenders with

substance abuse problems. Similar to TAD diversion programs in Wisconsin, Washington’s

52

DOSA program tailors treatments offered to participants using an intensive substance

abuse assessment. Individualized DOSA treatment programs are based on addiction

severity, custody level, risk classification, sentence length, and treatment capacity such that

an offender’s individual needs determine assignment to a customized combination of

evidence-based treatment modes. These modes include up to 12 weeks of intensive

outpatient care, a 30-day intensive inpatient program, six to 12 months of long-term

residential treatment, and continuing outpatient treatment offered at a minimum of three

months after completing one of the previous three modes (Aos et al. 2005a). In comparison,

all seven of Wisconsin’s TAD sites offer distinct combinations of “case management,

substance abuse treatment, drug testing and monitoring, but vary in program

model/approach, length, treatment intensity, and target population” (Van Stelle et al. 2011,

4). Specific similarities between DOSA and TAD diversion components include intensive

outpatient treatment, inpatient/residential treatment, and less intense outpatient care.

Although program similarities make DOSA the most appropriate proxy for TAD

available from the WSIPP catalog, some limitations to a direct comparison exist. For

example, while Wisconsin TAD participants do not receive treatment while incarcerated,

up until 2005, Washington DOSA participants completed drug treatment while

incarcerated, splitting their sentence between prison and community custody. Additionally,

Washington’s DOSA program does not allow participants to access the community-based

components of the program unless they “serve two years on community custody, or half

the midpoint of the standard sentence range, whichever is greater” (Aos et al. 2005b, 2). By

contrast, as mentioned, the treatment length of TAD diversion and deferred prosecution

programs vary. For example, in Milwaukee, the location of most of Wisconsin’s TAD

53

diversion cases, participants complete the program within an average of six months while

demonstrating recidivism and substance abuse outcomes comparable to those achieved by

participants in Milwaukee’s (non-TAD-funded) 12- to 18-month drug court program

(Sayner 2011a). In addition, none of the offenders offered diversion and deferred

prosecution agreements in Wisconsin serve time in prison unless they fail to comply with

their agreements and are sentenced to prison. This process parallels what a community-

based DOSA participant would follow, but differs from a prison-based DOSA participant.

This suggest there could be differences between the two programs in terms of target

populations, available services, service treatment intensity, or other program aspects that

we could not identify given the information available.

In summary, despite their differences, TAD diversion and DOSA programs employ

similar evidence-based program components, target nonviolent offenders with substance

abuse needs, and aim to reduce the amount of incarceration for such offenders. Because the

WSIPP model does not have a jail-diversion program, we determined DOSA to be the best

choice available for using the WSIPP model to estimate the impacts of TAD diversion

programs.

Drug Court for Adult Offenders (proxy for TAD Drug Treatment Court)

Drug courts are specialized forms of criminal court that attempt to assist non-

violent offenders overcome their substance abuse problems. Supervised by a drug court

judge, the rehabilitation process involves a range of professionals from criminal justice

(such as prosecutors and defense attorneys), substance abuse treatment and counseling,

corrections (such as probation and law enforcement), and educational and vocational

training (Barnoski and Aos 2003). According to the National Association of Drug Court

54

Professionals, the general aim of this intensive resource investment, common to drug

courts nationwide, is to “increase the offender’s likelihood of successful rehabilitation

through early, continuous, and intense judicially supervised treatment, mandatory periodic

drug testing, community supervision, and use of appropriate sanctions and other

rehabilitation services” (Washington State Courts 2011).

Drug courts tend to involve higher costs than regular adjudication costs due to

“frequent use of court resources…expenses of drug treatment, urinalysis, and drug court

staff” (Barnoski and Aos 2003, 2). The theory behind this approach is that a substantial

portion of crime stems specifically from offenders’ problems with drug and alcohol

addiction. Drug courts attempt to provide reductions in recidivism among this specific

offender population in several ways. Courts assure their enrollment in effective substance

abuse treatment programs, and increase offender accountability for the success of such

treatment by requiring regular and frequent appearances before the drug court judge

(Barnoski and Aos 2003).

Program Comparison between WSIPP Drug Court and TAD Drug Court Programs

Both Washington’s drug court model and Wisconsin’s TAD drug court model employ

program components developed by the National Drug Court Institute. They operate on the

premise that offering drug court to eligible offenders is an alternative to additional criminal

court processing such as further prosecution, revocation of parole, or conviction. This

alternative provides offenders with a strong incentive to comply with required treatment

conditions (Barnoski and Aos 2003). As Washington and Wisconsin’s drug court models

are similar in structure and follow national guidelines, we consider them programmatically

equivalent and comparable for our analysis.

55

Appendix I: Non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010

To calculate the number of non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010, we used data from the

Office of Justice Assistance as shown in Table I-1. Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance

lists five types of crime in its yearly arrest report: violent crime, property crime, drug

crime, crimes against society, and other crimes. As TAD program requirements state that

those who commit violent crimes are ineligible, we included all other types of crime in our

calculation. We realize that within the nonviolent categories as defined by the Office of

Justice Assistance, some offenders would not be eligible for TAD programs. Our analysis

would be affected if a particular county did not have enough eligible offenders to fill the

allocated slots. Given the small number of slots allocated relative to the number of arrests

made, this scenario is unlikely.

Table I-1: Non-violent arrests 2010

Type of Non-Violent Crime

Composition

Arrest Rate (per

100,000 Adults)

Total Arrests

Property theft, vandalism, fraud, burglary, motor vehicle theft, embezzlement, forgery, stolen property, and arson

968 54,072

Drug possession and sale/manufacturing 501 25,750

Crimes against society

disorderly conduct, operating while intoxicated, liquor law violations, weapon law violations, prostitution, sex offenses, gambling violations, vagrancy, curfew and loitering, and runaways

2,520 140,299

Other negligent manslaughter, other assaults, family offenses, and all other (except traffic)

2,415 127,276

State-wide non-violent arrests

6,404 347,397

Source: Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, 2011a.

56

Appendix J: Monte Carlo Analysis

Monte Carlo analysis is a computational simulation that provides reasonable

estimates of a program’s results by accounting for uncertainties in model parameters and

repeating the analysis numerous times. To do a Monte Carlo analysis, probability

distributions must be assigned to the important variables uncertain in the model. Then, for

each trial run, parameters are randomly selected from the chosen distribution of each

variable and used to calculate the realized net benefits. The WSIPP model runs 10,000

trials. The average of the results of these trials provides us with an estimate of the expected

value of the net benefits of the program. We used the Monte Carlo designed in the WSIPP

model, leaving the parameters as set for the proxy programs. For example, for drug court

the mean victimization avoided per offender going through the program is 0.2 with a

standard error of 0.04. For DOSA, the mean victimization avoided is 0.68 with a standard

error of 0.28. More information on these parameters can be found in the WSIPP Technical

Appendix (Aos et al. 2011b).

The Monte Carlo analysis from the model we used estimates the changes in

victimizations by accounting for a range of effects a program may have on recidivism. Our

primary concern is that victimizations do not increase as a result of these programs. The

results of the Monte Carlo analysis suggest that there is a low risk of crime rates increasing

as a result of a Wisconsin statewide TAD program expansion. For all levels of funding for

drug courts, the Monte Carlo analysis found in 100 percent of trials run that victimizations

would not increase as a result of implementing the program. For all levels of funding for

diversion and the 75 percent diversion / 25 percent drug court split, the Monte Carlo

57

analysis found, in 99 percent of trials run, that victimizations would not increase as a result

of implementing the program.

58

Appendix K: Victim Tangible and Intangible Costs from Various Types of Non-Violent Offenses

The WSIPP model estimates the benefits that accrue to victims for each offender

who goes through a drug court or diversion program. It uses estimates of the cost to

victims of various crimes developed by McCollister et al. (2010) to calculate these victim

benefits. Victim benefits are the costs to victims avoided by reducing crime.

Participation in TAD drug court and diversion programs is limited to only non-

violent offenders. As a result, the victim benefits of these programs seem to be

overestimated in the WSIPP model. To more accurately estimate the benefits to victims of

these programs, we took a weighted average of the total cost of non-violent crime

estimates presented by McCollister et al. (2010). These include the property crimes of

arson, motor vehicle theft, stolen property, household burglary, vandalism and

larceny/theft as well as other non-violent crimes including embezzlement, forgery and

counterfeiting, and fraud. The tangible and intangible costs to victims of each of these types

of crime is included in Table K-1. The average cost per victim of each of these crimes is

included in Table K-2. To make these costs more representative of crime in Wisconsin, we

weighted the average cost of each of these crimes by their proportion of arrests in

Wisconsin in 2010. This resulted in a weighted average of costs to victims of $4,495.

59

Table K-1: Victim costs by Type of Offense

Type of Offense Portion of

Arrests Tangible

Cost Intangible

Cost Total Cost

Weighted Costs

Arson 0.30% $16,429 $5,133 $21,103 $63 Motor Vehicle Theft 2.00% $10,534 $262 $10,772 $215 Stolen Property 3.11% $7,974 N/A $7,974 $248 Household Burglary 8.26% $6,169 $321 $6,462 $534 Embezzlement 0.39% $5,480 N/A $5,480 $21 Forgery and Counterfeiting 2.27% $5,265 N/A $5,265 $120 Fraud 7.85% $5,032 N/A $5,032 $395 Vandalism 16.61% $4,860 N/A $4,860 $807 Larceny/Theft 59.21% $3,523 $10 $3,532 $2,091 Average Victim Costs 100% $7,252 $1,432 $7,831 $4,495

Source: (McCollister et al. 2010; Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance 2011a)

Table K-2: Average Victim Costs by TAD Program

TAD Program Weighted Average

Victim Costs Non-Violent Crimes $4,495

Diversion $4,495

Drug Court $10,216 Drug Court / Diversion Split $5,945

Source: Authors

The benefits to victims of reducing crime from drug court participants should be

greater than the benefits to victims of reducing crime from diversion participants because

drug court participants tend to have committed more serious crimes and to be higher risk.

These benefits reflect the differences in the estimated victim benefits that the WSIPP model

finds for drug court and diversion programs. The WSIPP model estimates that the benefits

to victims are 227 percent higher for drug courts than for diversion programs. By

weighting the cost of crimes by their portion of arrests, of which more than 75 percent

60

were the relatively minor crimes of theft and vandalism, our estimated victim benefits from

a reduction in crime tend to reflect the benefits of reducing less serious, lower risk crimes.

As a result, we used our estimated weighted average cost to victims of $4,495 as our

estimate of the benefits to victims of a reduction in crime through the diversion program.

To reflect the difference in program benefits between diversion and drug court, we scaled

up the estimated costs for diversion by 227 to estimate victim benefits from drug court.

This resulted in an average per victim benefit from drug court programs of $10,216. We

then multiplied our estimate of the average per victim cost of non-violent crimes by the

number of crimes reduced by each program under each funding level to produce an

estimate of the total benefits to victims.

61

Appendix L: County Level Results for each Program Portfolio at different funding levels

Table L-1: County level results for drug court at $5 million investment

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per year

Brown 52 $212,940 $15,000 $130,121 -11 100% $107,268 $9,449 $24,449 Chippewa 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517 Columbia 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,592 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,581 $5,919

Dane 99 $405,405 $30,000 $248,435 -20 100% $205,342 $18,372 $48,372 Dodge 16 $65,520 $7,500 $40,132 -3 100% $32,691 -$197 $7,303

Douglas 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,569 -1 100% $10,216 -$11,570 -$4,070 Dunn 11 $45,045 $7,500 $27,487 -2 100% $22,475 -$2,583 $4,917

Eau Claire 32 $131,040 $15,000 $80,016 -7 100% $66,404 $380 $15,380 Fond du Lac 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981

Grant 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,569 -1 100% $10,216 -$11,570 -$4,070 Jefferson 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981 Kenosha 43 $176,085 $15,000 $107,746 -9 100% $88,879 $5,540 $20,540 LaCrosse 46 $188,370 $15,000 $115,214 -9 100% $95,009 $6,853 $21,853

Manitowoc 22 $90,090 $7,500 $55,111 -5 100% $45,972 $3,493 $10,993 Marathon 29 $118,755 $7,500 $72,704 -6 100% $60,274 $6,723 $14,223

Milwaukee 309 $1,265,355 $82,500 $772,396 -62 100% $637,478 $62,019 $144,519 Monroe 12 $49,140 $7,500 $30,058 -2 100% $24,518 -$2,064 $5,436 Oneida 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,592 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,581 $5,919

Outagamie 48 $196,560 $15,000 $120,598 -10 100% $100,117 $9,155 $24,155 Ozaukee 12 $49,140 $7,500 $30,058 -2 100% $24,518 -$2,064 $5,436 Portage 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517 Racine 48 $196,560 $15,000 $120,598 -10 100% $100,117 $9,155 $24,155 Rock 59 $241,605 $15,000 $148,289 -12 100% $117,484 $9,168 $24,168

Saint Croix 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,592 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,581 $5,919 Sauk 21 $85,995 $7,500 $52,641 -4 100% $43,929 $3,075 $10,575

Shawano 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517

62

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per year

Sheboygan 34 $139,230 $15,000 $85,188 -7 100% $70,490 $1,448 $16,448 Walworth 29 $118,755 $7,500 $72,704 -6 100% $60,274 $6,723 $14,223

Washington 45 $184,275 $15,000 $112,679 -9 100% $92,966 $6,370 $21,370 Waukesha 49 $200,655 $15,000 $122,672 -10 100% $101,138 $8,155 $23,155 Waupaca 11 $45,045 $7,500 $27,487 -2 100% $22,475 -$2,583 $4,917

Winnebago 43 $176,085 $15,000 $107,746 -9 100% $88,879 $5,540 $20,540 Wood 21 $85,995 $7,500 $52,641 -4 100% $43,929 $3,075 $10,575

Source: Authors

63

Table L-2: County level results for diversion at $5 million investment level

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Benefits to Taxpayers

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per

Year

Adams 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112 Ashland 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112 Barron 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $35,952 $90,067 $97,567 Brown 131 $197,679 $37,500 $868,236 -87 99% $390,079 $1,023,136 $1,060,636

Calumet 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812 Chippewa 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956

Clark 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112 Columbia 32 $48,288 $15,000 $212,147 -21 99% $95,273 $244,132 $259,132

Dane 245 $369,705 $67,500 $1,629,003 -163 99% $730,724 $1,922,522 $1,990,022 Dodge 41 $61,869 $15,000 $272,992 -27 99% $122,686 $318,809 $333,809 Door 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812

Douglas 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065 Dunn 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956

Eau Claire 80 $120,720 $22,500 $531,825 -53 99% $238,631 $627,236 $649,736 Fond du Lac 50 $75,450 $15,000 $332,807 -33 99% $149,201 $391,558 $406,558

Forest 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095 Grant 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065 Green 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $38,648 $97,921 $105,421

Green Lake 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095 Jackson 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $35,952 $90,067 $97,567

Jefferson 49 $73,941 $15,000 $324,561 -32 99% $145,606 $381,226 $396,226 Juneau 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812

Kenosha 108 $162,972 $30,000 $720,461 -72 99% $324,017 $851,506 $881,506 Kewaunee 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112 LaCrosse 114 $172,026 $30,000 $761,202 -76 99% $341,544 $900,720 $930,720 Langlade 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095 Lincoln 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $59,770 $154,883 $162,383

Manitowoc 56 $84,504 $15,000 $370,367 -37 99% $164,031 $434,894 $449,894 Marathon 72 $108,648 $22,500 $479,188 -47 99% $213,016 $561,056 $583,556 Marinette 15 $22,635 $7,500 $98,914 -10 99% $44,491 $113,270 $120,770

Milwaukee 769 $1,160,421 $195,000 $5,086,058 -507 99% $2,278,907 $6,009,544 $6,204,544

64

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Benefits to Taxpayers

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per

Year

Monroe 30 $45,270 $7,500 $197,955 -19 99% $86,734 $231,919 $239,419 Oconto 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $38,648 $97,921 $105,421 Oneida 32 48288 $15,000 $212,147 -21 99% $95,273 $244,132 $259,132

Outagamie 119 179571 $30,000 $792,266 -79 99% $355,475 $938,170 $968,170 Ozaukee 29 $43,761 $7,500 $192,214 -19 99% $86,285 $227,238 $234,738

Pierce 17 25653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 99% $48,535 $127,815 $135,315 Polk 9 13581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095

Portage 26 39234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956 Racine 119 179571 $30,000 $792,266 -79 99% $355,475 $938,170 $968,170 Rock 148 223332 $37,500 $983,447 -98 99% $439,513 $1,162,128 $1,199,628

Saint Croix 33 49797 $15,000 $218,573 -22 99% $97,969 $251,745 $266,745 Sauk 51 76959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 99% $152,347 $399,806 $414,806

Sawyer 10 15090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812 Shawano 26 39234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956

Sheboygan 84 126756 $22,500 $558,891 -56 99% $250,765 $660,400 $682,900 Taylor 9 13581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095 Vernon 9 13581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095

Vilas 15 22635 $7,500 $98,914 -10 99% $44,491 $113,270 $120,770 Walworth 72 108648 $22,500 $479,188 -47 99% $213,016 $561,056 $583,556 Washburn 9 13581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095

Washington 113 170517 $30,000 $755,806 -76 99% $339,297 $894,586 $924,586 Waukesha 122 184098 $37,500 $815,643 -82 99% $366,710 $960,755 $998,255 Waupaca 26 39234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956 Waushara 13 19617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $38,648 $97,921 $105,421

Winnebago 107 161463 $30,000 $709,529 -71 99% $318,175 $836,241 $866,241 Wood 52 78468 $15,000 $344,985 -34 99% $154,594 $406,111 $421,111

Source: Authors

65

Table L-3: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $5 million investment

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA

DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations were Reduced

Victim Benefits (from Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801 Ashland N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557 Barron N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801 Brown 18 $73,710 101 $152,409 $30,000 $713,187 -70 99% $417,934 $875,002 $905,002

Chippewa N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682 Clark N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801

Columbia N/A N/A 25 $37,725 $7,500 $165,407 -17 99% $98,093 $218,275 $225,775 Dane 34 139,230 189 $285,201 $60,000 $1,329,657 -131 99% $778,795 $1,624,021 $1,684,021

Dodge N/A N/A 31 $46,779 $15,000 $206,088 -21 99% $122,467 $266,776 $281,776 Door N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557

Douglas N/A N/A 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $71,340 $156,549 $164,049 Dunn N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682

Eau Claire N/A N/A 62 $93,558 $22,500 $411,921 -41 99% $244,340 $540,203 $562,703 Fond du

Lac N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $154,570 $340,832 $355,832

Grant N/A N/A 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $71,340 $156,549 $164,049 Green N/A N/A 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $39,237 $82,889 $90,389

Jackson N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801 Jefferson N/A N/A 38 $57,342 $15,000 $251,609 -25 99% $149,220 $328,487 $343,487 Kenosha 15 61,425 83 $125,247 $30,000 $586,901 -58 99% $343,621 $713,850 $743,850

Kewaunee N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557 LaCrosse 16 65,520 88 $132,792 $30,000 $627,978 -62 99% $368,590 $768,256 $798,256 Lincoln N/A N/A 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $63,017 $137,587 $145,087

Manitowoc N/A N/A 43 $64,887 $15,000 $285,963 -29 99% $170,027 $376,103 $391,103 Marathon N/A N/A 56 $84,504 $15,000 $372,689 -37 99% $221,154 $494,339 $509,339 Marinette N/A N/A 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $47,560 $101,675 $109,175

Milwaukee 108 442,260 593 $894,837 $180,000 $4,158,933 -411 99% $2,440,423 $5,082,259 $5,262,259 Monroe N/A N/A 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $90,959 $201,766 $209,266 Oconto N/A N/A 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $39,237 $82,889 $90,389 Oneida N/A N/A 25 $37,725 $7,500 $165,407 -17 99% $98,093 $218,275 $225,775

Outagamie 17 69,615 92 $138,828 $30,000 $650,495 -64 99% $381,075 $793,127 $823,127

66

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA

DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations were Reduced

Victim Benefits (from Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Ozaukee N/A N/A 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $83,825 $189,140 $196,640 Pierce N/A N/A 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $51,127 $110,400 $117,900

Portage N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682 Racine 17 69,615 92 $138,828 $30,000 $650,495 -64 99% $381,075 $793,127 $823,127 Rock 21 85,995 114 $172,026 $37,500 $809,728 -80 99% $474,411 $988,618 $1,026,118

Saint Croix N/A N/A 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $101,660 $226,269 $233,769 Sauk N/A N/A 40 $60,360 $15,000 $265,653 -27 99% $157,543 $347,836 $362,836

Shawano N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682 Sheboygan 12 49,140 65 $98,085 $22,500 $462,548 -46 99% $271,092 $563,915 $586,415

Vilas N/A N/A 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $47,560 $101,675 $109,175 Walworth N/A N/A 55 $82,995 $15,000 $364,962 -36 99% $216,398 $483,365 $498,365

Washington 16 65,520 87 $131,283 $30,000 $616,996 -61 99% $361,456 $751,649 $781,649 Waukesha 17 69,615 94 $141,846 $30,000 $669,050 -66 99% $392,370 $819,959 $849,959 Waupaca N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682 Waushara N/A N/A 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $39,237 $82,889 $90,389

Winnebago 15 61,425 83 $125,247 $30,000 $586,901 -58 99% $343,621 $713,850 $743,850 Wood N/A N/A 40 $60,360 $15,000 $265,653 -27 99% $157,543 $347,836 $362,836

Source: Authors

67

Table L-4: County level results for drug court at $10 million investment

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644 Ashland 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644 Barron 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,548 -2 100% $18,389 -$3,418 $4,082 Brown 99 $405,405 $30,000 $248,410 -20 100% $200,234 $13,239 $43,239

Chippewa 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981 Clark 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,548 -2 100% $18,389 -$3,418 $4,082

Columbia 24 $98,280 $7,500 $60,087 -5 100% $50,058 $4,365 $11,865 Dane 186 $761,670 $52,500 $465,210 -38 100% $384,122 $35,162 $87,662

Dodge 31 $126,945 $15,000 $77,761 -6 100% $64,361 $177 $15,177 Door 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644

Douglas 17 $69,615 $7,500 $42,607 -3 100% $34,734 $226 $7,726 Dunn 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981

Eau Claire 61 $249,795 $22,500 $152,872 -12 100% $125,657 $6,234 $28,734 Fond du Lac 38 $155,610 $15,000 $95,337 -8 100% $78,663 $3,390 $18,390

Grant 17 $69,615 $7,500 $42,607 -3 100% $34,734 $226 $7,726 Green 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517

Jackson 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,548 -2 100% $18,389 -$3,418 $4,082 Jefferson 37 $151,515 $15,000 $92,649 -8 100% $76,620 $2,754 $17,754 Kenosha 82 $335,790 $22,500 $205,559 -17 100% $169,586 $16,855 $39,355

Kewaunee 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644 LaCrosse 86 $352,170 $22,500 $215,160 -17 100% $177,758 $18,248 $40,748 Lincoln 15 $61,425 $7,500 $37,533 -3 100% $30,648 -$744 $6,756

Manitowoc 42 $171,990 $15,000 $105,199 -9 100% $86,836 $5,045 $20,045 Marathon 55 $225,225 $15,000 $137,970 -11 100% $114,419 $12,164 $27,164 Marinette 11 $45,045 $7,500 $27,487 -2 100% $22,475 -$2,583 $4,917

Milwaukee 583 $2,387,385 $150,000 $1,475,351 -119 100% $1,218,769 $156,735 $306,735 Monroe 23 $94,185 $7,500 $57,448 -5 100% $48,015 $3,778 $11,278 Oconto 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517 Oneida 25 $102,375 $7,500 $62,548 -5 100% $52,102 $4,775 $12,275

Outagamie 90 $368,550 $22,500 $225,137 -18 100% $186,953 $21,040 $43,540 Ozaukee 22 $90,090 $7,500 $54,951 -4 100% $44,950 $2,311 $9,811

68

County Slots

Funded Program

Costs Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Pierce 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,593 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,580 $5,920 Portage 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981 Racine 91 $372,645 $30,000 $228,405 -19 100% $188,996 $14,756 $44,756 Rock 112 $458,640 $30,000 $279,826 -23 100% $231,903 $23,089 $53,089

Saint Croix 25 $102,375 $7,500 $62,548 -5 100% $52,102 $4,775 $12,275 Sauk 39 $159,705 $15,000 $97,690 -8 100% $80,706 $3,691 $18,691

Shawano 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981 Sheboygan 64 $262,080 $22,500 $160,278 -13 100% $131,786 $7,484 $29,984

Vilas 12 $49,140 $7,500 $30,058 -2 100% $24,518 -$2,064 $5,436 Walworth 54 $221,130 $15,000 $134,961 -11 100% $111,354 $10,185 $25,185

Washington 86 $352,170 $22,500 $215,160 -17 100% $177,758 $18,248 $40,748 Waukesha 93 $380,835 $30,000 $232,232 -19 100% $193,082 $14,479 $44,479 Waupaca 20 $81,900 $7,500 $50,017 -4 100% $40,864 $1,481 $8,981 Waushara 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517

Winnebago 81 $331,695 $22,500 $202,855 -16 100% $167,542 $16,202 $38,702 Wood 40 $163,800 $15,000 $100,141 -8 100% $82,750 $4,091 $19,091

Source: Authors

69

Table L-5: County level results for diversion at $10 million investment level

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are

Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimization

s)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $63,365 $168,680 $176,180 Ashland 21 $31,689 $7,500 $138,998 -14 99% $62,467 $162,276 $169,776 Barron 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065 Brown 257 $387,813 $67,500 $1,716,924 -172 99% $770,721 $2,032,332 $2,099,832

Calumet 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $59,770 $154,883 $162,383 Chippewa 51 $76,959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 99% $152,347 $399,806 $414,806

Clark 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $63,365 $168,680 $176,180 Columbia 63 $95,067 $22,500 $419,064 -41 99% $186,052 $487,549 $510,049

Dane 484 $730,356 $127,500 $3,253,942 -325 99% $1,459,651 $3,855,737 $3,983,237 Dodge 80 $120,720 $22,500 $531,825 -53 99% $238,631 $627,236 $649,736 Door 21 $31,689 $7,500 $138,998 -14 99% $62,467 $162,276 $169,776

Douglas 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 99% $134,371 $351,040 $366,040 Dunn 52 $78,468 $15,000 $344,985 -34 99% $154,594 $406,111 $421,111

Eau Claire 159 $239,931 $45,000 $1,057,209 -106 99% $475,016 $1,247,294 $1,292,294 Fond du Lac 98 $147,882 $30,000 $648,745 -65 99% $290,762 $761,625 $791,625

Forest 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $53,928 $139,137 $146,637 Grant 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 99% $134,371 $351,040 $366,040 Green 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956

Green Lake 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $53,928 $139,137 $146,637 Iowa 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $38,648 $97,921 $105,421

Jackson 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065 Jefferson 97 $146,373 $30,000 $645,674 -64 99% $289,414 $758,715 $788,715 Juneau 19 $28,671 $7,500 $125,731 -13 99% $56,175 $145,735 $153,235

Kenosha 213 $321,417 $60,000 $1,418,049 -141 99% $636,350 $1,672,982 $1,732,982 Kewaunee 21 $31,689 $7,500 $138,998 -14 99% $62,467 $162,276 $169,776 LaCrosse 224 $338,016 $60,000 $1,502,814 -150 99% $674,549 $1,779,347 $1,839,347 Lafayette 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $35,952 $90,067 $97,567 Langlade 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $53,928 $139,137 $146,637 Lincoln 40 $60,360 $15,000 $265,653 -27 99% $119,091 $309,384 $324,384

Manitowoc 110 $165,990 $30,000 $734,714 -74 99% $330,309 $869,033 $899,033 Marathon 142 $214,278 $37,500 $943,636 -94 99% $423,784 $1,115,642 $1,153,142

70

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are

Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimization

s)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Marinette 30 $45,270 $7,500 $197,955 -19 99% $86,734 $231,919 $239,419 Marquette 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $23,818 $57,366 $64,866

Menominee 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812

Milwaukee 1516 $2,287,644 $382,500 $10,231,459 -1021 99% $4,589,722 $12,151,03

7 $12,533,53

7 Monroe 59 $89,031 $15,000 $392,675 -39 99% $176,165 $464,809 $479,809 Oconto 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $76,847 $201,456 $208,956 Oneida 64 $96,576 $22,500 $424,955 -42 99% $190,546 $496,425 $518,925

Outagamie 235 $354,615 $60,000 $1,561,452 -156 99% $700,165 $1,847,002 $1,907,002 Ozaukee 57 $86,013 $15,000 $377,983 -36 99% $163,582 $440,552 $455,552

Pierce 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 99% $101,115 $260,375 $275,375 Polk 19 $28,671 $7,500 $125,731 -13 99% $56,175 $145,735 $153,235

Portage 51 $76,959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 99% $152,347 $399,806 $414,806 Price 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112

Racine 236 $356,124 $60,000 $1,558,892 -156 99% $698,817 $1,841,585 $1,901,585 Richland 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $35,952 $90,067 $97,567

Rock 291 $439,119 $75,000 $1,937,285 -194 99% $870,038 $2,293,204 $2,368,204 Rusk 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $32,806 $81,612 $89,112

Saint Croix 66 $99,594 $22,500 $439,068 -44 99% $196,837 $513,811 $536,311 Sauk 102 $153,918 $30,000 $676,926 -68 99% $303,794 $796,802 $826,802

Sawyer 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $59,770 $154,883 $162,383 Shawano 51 $76,959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 99% $152,347 $399,806 $414,806

Sheboygan 166 $250,494 $45,000 $1,098,745 -110 99% $492,992 $1,296,243 $1,341,243 Taylor 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $53,928 $139,137 $146,637

Trempealeau 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $41,345 $105,188 $112,688 Vernon 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 99% $53,928 $139,137 $146,637

Vilas 30 $45,270 $7,500 $197,955 -19 99% $86,734 $231,919 $239,419 Walworth 141 $212,769 $37,500 $932,552 -93 99% $417,942 $1,100,225 $1,137,725 Washburn 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 99% $48,535 $127,815 $135,315

Washington 223 $336,507 $60,000 $1,487,252 -149 99% $667,359 $1,758,104 $1,818,104 Waukesha 241 $363,669 $67,500 $1,612,936 -161 99% $723,983 $1,905,750 $1,973,250 Waupaca 52 $78,468 $15,000 $344,985 -34 99% $154,594 $406,111 $421,111 Waushara 25 $37,725 $7,500 $165,407 -17 99% $74,151 $194,333 $201,833

71

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are

Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimization

s)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Winnebago 212 $319,908 $60,000 $1,423,205 -142 99% $638,597 $1,681,894 $1,741,894 Wood 103 $155,427 $30,000 $681,893 -68 99% $306,491 $802,957 $832,957

Source: Authors

72

Table L-6: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $10 million investment

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Fond du Lac 11 $45,045 74 $111,666 $22,500 $517,771 -51 99% $304,384 $642,944 $665,444 Jefferson 11 $45,045 73 $110,157 $22,500 $512,236 -51 99% $300,817 $635,351 $657,851

Sauk 12 $49,140 76 $114,684 $22,500 $535,073 -53 99% $314,491 $663,240 $685,740 Wood 12 $49,140 77 $116,193 $22,500 $537,877 -53 99% $315,680 $665,724 $688,224

Manitowoc 13 $53,235 82 $123,738 $30,000 $580,182 -57 99% $341,243 $714,452 $744,452 Walworth 16 $65,520 106 $159,954 $37,500 $745,504 -74 99% $437,552 $920,082 $957,582 Marathon 17 $69,615 107 $161,463 $37,500 $754,991 -75 99% $443,497 $929,910 $967,410 Eau Claire 18 $73,710 119 $179,571 $37,500 $833,330 -82 99% $489,274 $1,031,823 $1,069,323 Sheboygan 19 $77,805 125 $188,625 $37,500 $874,404 -86 99% $513,648 $1,084,122 $1,121,622

Kenosha 25 $102,375 160 $241,440 $52,500 $1,124,137 -111 99% $659,301 $1,387,123 $1,439,623 Winnebago 25 $102,375 159 $239,931 $52,500 $1,109,724 -110 99% $650,978 $1,365,896 $1,418,396

LaCrosse 26 $106,470 168 $253,512 $52,500 $1,177,411 -116 99% $691,998 $1,456,927 $1,509,427 Washington 26 $106,470 167 $252,003 $52,500 $1,164,157 -115 99% $683,675 $1,436,859 $1,489,359 Outagamie 27 $110,565 176 $265,584 $52,500 $1,238,714 -122 99% $727,668 $1,537,733 $1,590,233

Racine 27 $110,565 177 $267,093 $52,500 $1,242,795 -123 99% $730,046 $1,542,683 $1,595,183 Waukesha 28 $114,660 181 $273,129 $52,500 $1,268,446 -125 99% $744,909 $1,573,066 $1,625,566

Brown 30 $122,850 193 $291,237 $60,000 $1,336,349 -132 99% $784,146 $1,646,408 $1,706,408 Rock 34 $139,230 218 $328,962 $67,500 $1,540,923 -152 99% $905,424 $1,910,655 $1,978,155 Dane 56 $229,320 364 $549,276 $105,000 $2,552,592 -252 99% $1,499,924 $3,168,920 $3,273,920

Milwaukee 176 $720,720 1138 $1,717,242 $330,000 $8,096,892 -800 99% $4,753,622 $10,082,552 $10,412,552 Adams N/A N/A 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $63,017 $137,587 $145,087

Ashland N/A N/A 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $63,017 $137,587 $145,087 Barron N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 99% $64,206 $143,486 $150,986

Calumet N/A N/A 15 $22,635 $7,500 $98,914 -10 99% $58,856 $127,635 $135,135 Chippewa N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $154,570 $340,832 $355,832

Clark N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 99% $64,206 $143,486 $150,986 Columbia N/A N/A 47 $70,923 $15,000 $310,116 -31 99% $183,701 $407,894 $422,894

Dodge N/A N/A 60 $90,540 $15,000 $396,344 -40 99% $239,584 $530,388 $545,388 Door N/A N/A 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $63,017 $137,587 $145,087

Douglas N/A N/A 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 99% $133,763 $293,023 $308,023 Dunn N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $154,570 $340,832 $355,832 Forest N/A N/A 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $51,127 $110,400 $117,900

73

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Grant N/A N/A 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 99% $133,763 $293,023 $308,023 Green N/A N/A 19 $28,671 $7,500 $125,731 -13 99% $74,313 $163,873 $171,373

Green Lake N/A N/A 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $51,127 $110,400 $117,900 Iowa N/A N/A 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $39,237 $82,889 $90,389

Jackson N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 99% $64,206 $143,486 $150,986 Juneau N/A N/A 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $54,694 $118,537 $126,037

Kewaunee N/A N/A 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $63,017 $137,587 $145,087 Lafayette N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801 Langlade N/A N/A 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $54,694 $118,537 $126,037 Lincoln N/A N/A 30 $45,270 $7,500 $197,955 -19 99% $114,739 $259,924 $267,424

Marinette N/A N/A 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $83,825 $189,140 $196,640 Menominee N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557

Monroe N/A N/A 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 99% $177,756 $394,425 $409,425 Oconto N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $79,069 $174,182 $181,682 Oneida N/A N/A 48 $72,432 $15,000 $315,797 -32 99% $187,268 $415,633 $430,633

Ozaukee N/A N/A 43 $64,887 $15,000 $285,963 -29 99% $170,027 $376,103 $391,103 Pierce N/A N/A 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 99% $101,660 $226,269 $233,769 Polk N/A N/A 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $54,694 $118,537 $126,037

Portage N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $154,570 $340,832 $355,832 Price N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557

Richland N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $35,670 $74,301 $81,801 Rusk N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 99% $31,509 $65,057 $72,557

Saint Croix N/A N/A 49 $73,941 $15,000 $324,561 -32 99% $192,618 $428,238 $443,238 Sawyer N/A N/A 15 $22,635 $7,500 $98,914 -10 99% $58,856 $127,635 $135,135

Shawano N/A N/A 38 $57,342 $15,000 $251,609 -25 99% $149,220 $328,487 $343,487 Taylor N/A N/A 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $51,127 $110,400 $117,900

Trempealeau N/A N/A 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 99% $43,399 $92,205 $99,705 Vernon N/A N/A 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $54,694 $118,537 $126,037

Vilas N/A N/A 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $83,825 $189,140 $196,640 Washburn N/A N/A 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $51,127 $110,400 $117,900 Waupaca N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $154,570 $340,832 $355,832 Waushara N/A N/A 19 $28,671 $7,500 $125,731 -13 99% $74,313 $163,873 $171,373

Source: Authors

74

Table L-7: County level results for drug court at $20 million investment

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations

)

NPV Benefits with Start-up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams 16 $65,520 $7,500 $40,098 -3 100% $32,691 -$231 $7,269 Ashland 16 $65,520 $7,500 $40,098 -3 100% $32,691 -$231 $7,269 Barron 17 $69,615 $7,500 $42,607 -3 100% $34,734 $226 $7,726 Brown 190 $778,050 $52,500 $477,509 -39 100% $394,338 $41,297 $93,797

Calumet 15 $61,425 $7,500 $37,533 -3 100% $30,648 -$744 $6,756 Chippewa 38 $155,610 $15,000 $95,337 -8 100% $78,663 $3,390 $18,390

Clark 17 $69,615 $7,500 $42,607 -3 100% $34,734 $226 $7,726 Columbia 47 $192,465 $15,000 $117,617 -10 100% $97,052 $7,204 $22,204

Dane 358 $1,466,010 $90,000 $894,821 -72 100% $737,595 $76,406 $166,406 Dodge 59 $241,605 $15,000 $147,812 -12 100% $117,484 $8,691 $23,691 Door 15 $61,425 $7,500 $37,533 -3 100% $30,648 -$744 $6,756

Douglas 34 $139,230 $15,000 $85,254 -7 100% $70,490 $1,514 $16,514 Dunn 39 $159,705 $15,000 $97,690 -8 100% $80,706 $3,691 $18,691

Eau Claire 117 $479,115 $30,000 $292,411 -24 100% $242,119 $25,415 $55,415 Fond du Lac 73 $298,935 $22,500 $181,855 -15 100% $151,197 $11,617 $34,117

Forest 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,593 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,580 $5,920 Grant 33 $135,135 $15,000 $82,505 -7 100% $68,447 $817 $15,817 Green 19 $77,805 $7,500 $47,622 -4 100% $38,821 $1,138 $8,638

Green Lake 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,593 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,580 $5,920 Iowa 10 $40,950 $7,500 $25,035 -2 100% $20,432 -$2,983 $4,517

Jackson 17 $69,615 $7,500 $42,607 -3 100% $34,734 $226 $7,726 Jefferson 72 $294,840 $22,500 $180,418 -15 100% $149,154 $12,232 $34,732

Juneau 14 $57,330 $7,500 $34,974 -3 100% $28,605 -$1,251 $6,249 Kenosha 157 $642,915 $45,000 $396,416 -32 100% $327,934 $36,435 $81,435

Kewaunee 15 $61,425 $7,500 $37,533 -3 100% $30,648 -$744 $6,756 LaCrosse 165 $675,675 $45,000 $415,011 -34 100% $342,236 $36,572 $81,572 Lafayette 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,548 -2 100% $18,389 -$3,418 $4,082 Langlade 14 $57,330 $7,500 $34,974 -3 100% $28,605 -$1,251 $6,249 Lincoln 29 $118,755 $7,500 $72,704 -6 100% $60,274 $6,723 $14,223

Manitowoc 81 $331,695 $22,500 $202,989 -16 100% $167,542 $16,336 $38,836 Marathon 105 $429,975 $30,000 $263,043 -21 100% $217,601 $20,669 $50,669

75

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations

)

NPV Benefits with Start-up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Marinette 22 $90,090 $7,500 $54,951 -4 100% $44,950 $2,311 $9,811

Milwaukee 1120 $4,586,400 $285,00

0 $2,787,990 -225 100% $2,302,686 $219,276 $504,276

Monroe 44 $180,180 $15,000 $110,352 -9 100% $90,922 $6,094 $21,094 Oconto 19 $77,805 $7,500 $47,622 -4 100% $38,821 $1,138 $8,638 Oneida 47 $192,465 $15,000 $117,617 -10 100% $97,052 $7,204 $22,204

Outagamie 173 $708,435 $45,000 $433,244 -35 100% $357,560 $37,369 $82,369 Ozaukee 42 $171,990 $15,000 $105,199 -9 100% $86,836 $5,045 $20,045

Pierce 25 $102,375 $7,500 $62,548 -5 100% $52,102 $4,775 $12,275 Polk 14 $57,330 $7,500 $34,974 -3 100% $28,605 -$1,251 $6,249

Portage 38 $155,610 $15,000 $95,337 -8 100% $78,663 $3,390 $18,390 Price 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644

Racine 174 $712,530 $45,000 $435,725 -35 100% $359,603 $37,798 $82,798 Richland 9 $36,855 $7,500 $22,548 -2 100% $18,389 -$3,418 $4,082

Rock 215 $880,425 $60,000 $539,618 -44 100% $445,418 $44,611 $104,611 Rusk 8 $32,760 $7,500 $20,058 -2 100% $16,346 -$3,856 $3,644

Saint Croix 49 $200,655 $15,000 $121,530 -10 100% $101,138 $7,013 $22,013 Sauk 75 $307,125 $22,500 $187,872 -15 100% $155,283 $13,530 $36,030

Sawyer 15 $61,425 $7,500 $37,533 -3 100% $30,648 -$744 $6,756 Shawano 38 $155,610 $15,000 $95,337 -8 100% $78,663 $3,390 $18,390

Sheboygan 123 $503,685 $37,500 $307,905 -25 100% $254,378 $21,098 $58,598 Taylor 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,593 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,580 $5,920

Trempealeau

11 $45,045 $7,500 $27,487 -2 100% $22,475 -$2,583 $4,917

Vernon 14 $57,330 $7,500 $34,974 -3 100% $28,605 -$1,251 $6,249 Vilas 22 $90,090 $7,500 $54,951 -4 100% $44,950 $2,311 $9,811

Walworth 104 $425,880 $30,000 $262,173 -21 100% $216,579 $22,872 $52,872 Washburn 13 $53,235 $7,500 $32,593 -3 100% $26,562 -$1,580 $5,920

Washington 165 $675,675 $45,000 $415,011 -34 100% $342,236 $36,572 $81,572 Waukesha 178 $728,910 $45,000 $447,599 -36 100% $368,798 $42,487 $87,487 Waupaca 39 $159,705 $15,000 $97,690 -8 100% $80,706 $3,691 $18,691 Waushara 18 $73,710 $7,500 $45,896 -4 100% $37,799 $2,485 $9,985

Winnebago 157 $642,915 $45,000 $396,416 -32 100% $327,934 $36,435 $81,435

76

County Slots

Funded

Program Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizatio

ns

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations

)

NPV Benefits with Start-up

Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Wood 76 $311,220 $22,500 $189,428 -15 100% $157,326 $13,034 $35,534 Source: Authors

77

Table L-8: County level results for diversion at $20 million investment level

County Slots

Funded Program

Cost Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start-up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams 44 $66,396 $15,000 $289,511 -29 99% $129,877 $337,992 $352,992 Ashland 42 $63,378 $15,000 $278,456 -28 99% $124,933 $325,011 $340,011 Barron 46 $69,414 $15,000 $304,137 -30 99% $136,168 $355,891 $370,891

Bayfield 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 99% $26,964 $65,595 $73,095 Brown 513 $774,117 $135,000 $3,419,438 -342 99% $1,534,701 $4,045,022 $4,180,022 Buffalo 14 $21,126 $7,500 $92,469 -9 99% $41,345 $105,188 $112,688 Burnett 13 $19,617 $7,500 $86,390 -9 99% $38,648 $97,921 $105,421 Calumet 40 $60,360 $15,000 $265,653 -27 99% $119,091 $309,384 $324,384

Chippewa 102 $153,918 $30,000 $676,926 -68 99% $303,794 $796,802 $826,802 Clark 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 99% $134,371 $351,040 $366,040

Columbia 126 $190,134 $37,500 $840,055 -84 99% $377,047 $989,468 $1,026,968 Crawford

(2009) 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 99% $35,952 $90,067 $97,567

Dane 964 $1,454,676 $247,500 $6,309,742 -630 99% $2,828,973 $7,436,539 $7,684,039 Dodge 160 $241,440 $45,000 $1,057,604 -106 99% $474,117 $1,245,281 $1,290,281 Door 41 $61,869 $15,000 $272,992 -27 99% $122,686 $318,809 $333,809

Douglas 90 $135,810 $22,500 $597,639 -60 99% $267,842 $707,171 $729,671 Dunn 104 $156,936 $30,000 $687,489 -69 99% $308,288 $808,841 $838,841

Eau Claire 316 $476,844 $82,500 $2,130,636 -213 99% $956,323 $2,527,615 $2,610,115 Fond du Lac 196 $295,764 $52,500 $1,309,875 -131 99% $587,815 $1,549,426 $1,601,926

Forest 36 $54,324 $15,000 $237,535 -24 99% $106,508 $274,719 $289,719 Grant 90 $135,810 $22,500 $597,639 -60 99% $267,842 $707,171 $729,671 Green 51 $76,959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 99% $152,347 $399,806 $414,806

Green Lake 35 $52,815 $15,000 $231,497 -23 99% $103,811 $267,493 $282,493 Iowa 27 $40,743 $7,500 $178,733 -18 99% $79,993 $210,483 $217,983 Iron 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 99% $29,660 $73,312 $80,812

Jackson 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 99% $134,371 $351,040 $366,040 Jefferson 193 $291,237 $52,500 $1,284,718 -128 99% $576,580 $1,517,561 $1,570,061 Juneau 38 $57,342 $15,000 $251,609 -25 99% $112,799 $292,066 $307,066

Kenosha 424 $639,816 $112,500 $2,826,124 -282 99% $1,267,308 $3,341,116 $3,453,616 Kewaunee 41 $61,869 $15,000 $272,992 -27 99% $122,686 $318,809 $333,809 LaCrosse 446 $673,014 $112,500 $2,950,132 -294 99% $1,323,034 $3,487,652 $3,600,152

78

County Slots

Funded Program

Cost Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start-up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Lafayette 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065 Langlade 37 $55,833 $15,000 $245,831 -24 99% $108,305 $283,303 $298,303 Lincoln 79 $119,211 $22,500 $522,220 -52 99% $234,137 $614,646 $637,146

Manitowoc 218 $328,962 $60,000 $1,446,185 -144 99% $648,484 $1,705,707 $1,765,707 Marathon 283 $427,047 $75,000 $1,880,389 -188 99% $843,524 $2,221,866 $2,296,866 Marinette 59 $89,031 $15,000 $392,675 -39 99% $176,165 $464,809 $479,809 Marquette 16 $24,144 $7,500 $106,214 -11 99% $47,636 $122,206 $129,706

Menominee 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 99% $59,770 $154,883 $162,383 Milwaukee 3018 $4,554,162 $757,500 $19,029,605 -1900 99% $8,536,802 $22,254,745 $23,012,245

Monroe 118 $178,062 $30,000 $784,271 -78 99% $351,880 $928,089 $958,089 Oconto 52 $78,468 $15,000 $344,985 -34 99% $154,594 $406,111 $421,111 Oneida 127 $191,643 $37,500 $849,133 -85 99% $381,091 $1,001,081 $1,038,581

Outagamie 467 $704,703 $120,000 $3,087,621 -308 99% $1,384,601 $3,647,519 $3,767,519 Ozaukee 113 $170,517 $30,000 $755,806 -76 99% $339,297 $894,586 $924,586

Pierce 68 $102,612 $22,500 $452,634 -45 99% $203,129 $530,651 $553,151 Polk 37 $55,833 $15,000 $245,831 -24 99% $108,305 $283,303 $298,303

Portage 102 $153,918 $30,000 $676,926 -68 99% $303,794 $796,802 $826,802 Price 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $63,365 $168,680 $176,180

Racine 469 $707,721 $120,000 $3,086,626 -308 99% $1,384,152 $3,643,057 $3,763,057 Richland 23 $34,707 $7,500 $153,014 -15 99% $68,758 $179,565 $187,065

Rock 579 $873,711 $150,000 $3,820,856 -382 99% $1,714,461 $4,511,606 $4,661,606 Rusk 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 99% $63,365 $168,680 $176,180

Saint Croix 131 $197,679 $37,500 $874,782 -87 99% $392,776 $1,032,379 $1,069,879 Sauk 202 $304,818 $52,500 $1,351,164 -135 99% $606,241 $1,600,087 $1,652,587

Sawyer 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 99% $116,844 $303,106 $318,106 Shawano 102 $153,918 $30,000 $676,926 -68 99% $303,794 $796,802 $826,802

Sheboygan 331 $499,479 $90,000 $2,221,708 -222 99% $996,769 $2,628,998 $2,718,998 Taylor 35 $52,815 $15,000 $231,497 -23 99% $103,811 $267,493 $282,493

Trempealeau 29 $43,761 $7,500 $192,214 -19 99% $86,285 $227,238 $234,738 Vernon 37 $55,833 $15,000 $245,831 -24 99% $108,305 $283,303 $298,303

Vilas 60 $90,540 $15,000 $396,344 -40 99% $181,108 $471,912 $486,912 Walworth 281 $424,029 $75,000 $1,885,001 -188 99% $845,771 $2,231,743 $2,306,743 Washburn 34 51306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 99% $101,115 $260,375 $275,375

Washington 443 668487 $112,500 $2,950,244 -294 99% $1,323,034 $3,492,291 $3,604,791

79

County Slots

Funded Program

Cost Start-up

Costs Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

NPV Benefits

with Start-up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Waukesha 479 722811 $120,000 $3,193,324 -319 99% $1,433,137 $3,783,650 $3,903,650 Waupaca 104 156936 $30,000 $687,489 -69 99% $308,288 $808,841 $838,841 Waushara 49 73941 $15,000 $324,561 -32 99% $145,606 $381,226 $396,226

Winnebago 422 636798 $112,500 $2,851,565 -285 99% $1,279,891 $3,382,158 $3,494,658 Wood 205 309345 $52,500 $1,366,366 -137 99% $613,431 $1,617,952 $1,670,452

Source: Authors

80

Table L-9: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $20 million investment

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Adams N/A N/A 33 $49,797 $15,000 $218,573 -22 $129,601 99% $283,377 $298,377 Ashland N/A N/A 32 $48,288 $15,000 $212,147 -21 $126,034 99% $274,893 $289,893 Barron N/A N/A 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 $133,763 99% $293,023 $308,023 Brown 52 $212,940 385 $580,965 $112,500 $2,666,086 -264 $1,567,102 99% $3,326,783 $3,439,283 Buffalo N/A N/A 11 $16,599 $7,500 $72,905 -7 $43,399 99% $92,205 $99,705 Burnett N/A N/A 10 $15,090 $7,500 $66,242 -7 $39,237 99% $82,889 $90,389 Calumet N/A N/A 30 $45,270 $7,500 $197,955 -19 $114,739 99% $259,924 $267,424

Chippewa 10 $40,950 77 $116,193 $22,500 $473,073 -47 $276,443 99% $569,873 $592,373 Clark N/A N/A 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 $133,763 99% $293,023 $308,023

Columbia 13 $53,235 94 $141,846 $30,000 $650,623 -65 $383,453 99% $808,995 $838,995 Crawford

(2009) N/A N/A 9 $13,581 $7,500 $59,712 -6 $35,670 99% $74,301 $81,801

Dane 99 $405,405 724 $1,092,516 $210,000 $5,101,961 -504 $2,996,875 99% $6,390,915 $6,600,915 Dodge 16 $65,520 120 $181,080 $37,500 $837,619 -83 $494,030 99% $1,047,549 $1,085,049 Door N/A N/A 31 $46,779 $15,000 $206,088 -21 $122,467 99% $266,776 $281,776

Douglas 9 $36,855 68 $102,612 $22,500 $467,939 -46 $273,470 99% $579,442 $601,942 Dunn 11 $45,045 78 $117,702 $22,500 $537,243 -53 $316,274 99% $668,270 $690,770

Eau Claire 32 $131,040 237 $357,633 $67,500 $1,667,472 -165 $980,925 99% $2,092,224 $2,159,724 Fond du Lac 20 $81,900 147 $221,823 $45,000 -$1,021,860 -101 $601,634 99% -$768,949 -$723,949

Forest N/A N/A 27 $40,743 $7,500 $178,733 -18 $105,821 99% $236,311 $243,811 Grant 9 $36,855 67 $101,103 $22,500 $465,285 -46 $274,065 99% $578,892 $601,392 Green N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 $154,570 99% $340,832 $355,832

Green Lake N/A N/A 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 $101,660 99% $226,269 $233,769 Iowa N/A N/A 20 $30,180 $7,500 $132,793 -13 $79,069 99% $174,182 $181,682 Iron N/A N/A 8 $12,072 $7,500 $53,120 -5 $31,509 99% $65,057 $72,557

Jackson N/A N/A 34 $51,306 $15,000 $225,566 -23 $133,763 99% $293,023 $308,023 Jefferson 20 $81,900 145 $218,805 $45,000 $1,011,327 -100 $592,122 99% $1,257,744 $1,302,744 Juneau N/A N/A 28 $42,252 $7,500 $186,505 -19 $110,577 99% $247,330 $254,830

Kenosha 43 $176,085 318 $479,862 $97,500 $2,235,128 -221 $1,314,440 99% $2,796,121 $2,893,621 Kewaunee N/A N/A 31 $46,779 $15,000 $206,088 -21 $122,467 99% $266,776 $281,776 LaCrosse 46 $188,370 335 $505,515 $97,500 $2,325,452 -230 $1,367,350 99% $2,901,417 $2,998,917 Lafayette N/A N/A 18 $27,162 $7,500 $119,871 -12 $71,340 99% $156,549 $164,049

81

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Langlade N/A N/A 28 $42,252 $7,500 $186,505 -19 $110,577 99% $247,330 $254,830 Lincoln N/A N/A 59 $89,031 $15,000 $392,675 -39 $233,044 99% $521,688 $536,688

Manitowoc 22 $90,090 164 $247,476 $52,500 $1,139,308 -113 $670,002 99% $1,419,244 $1,471,744 Marathon 29 $118,755 213 $321,417 $67,500 $1,479,180 -146 $870,348 99% $1,841,856 $1,909,356 Marinette N/A N/A 44 $66,396 $15,000 $290,768 -29 $172,405 99% $381,777 $396,777 Marquette N/A N/A 12 $18,108 $7,500 $79,723 -8 $47,560 99% $101,675 $109,175

Menominee N/A N/A 15 $22,635 $7,500 $98,914 -10 $58,856 99% $127,635 $135,135 Milwaukee 309 $1,265,355 2,265 $3,417,885 $645,000 $15,308,356 -1512 $8,991,218 99% $18,971,334 $19,616,334

Monroe 12 $49,140 89 $134,301 $30,000 $618,479 -61 $364,429 99% $769,467 $799,467 Oconto N/A N/A 39 $58,851 $15,000 $260,113 -26 $154,570 99% $340,832 $355,832 Oneida 13 $53,235 95 $143,355 $30,000 $659,856 -65 $388,803 99% $822,069 $852,069

Outagamie 48 $196,560 351 $529,659 $105,000 $2,458,119 -243 $1,444,635 99% $3,071,535 $3,176,535 Ozaukee 12 $49,140 85 $128,265 $30,000 $583,373 -57 $341,243 99% $717,211 $747,211

Pierce N/A N/A 51 $76,959 $15,000 $339,418 -34 $201,536 99% $448,995 $463,995 Polk N/A N/A 28 $42,252 $7,500 $186,505 -19 $110,577 99% $247,330 $254,830

Portage 10 $40,950 77 $116,193 $22,500 $473,073 -47 $276,443 99% $569,873 $592,373 Price N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 $64,206 99% $143,486 $150,986

Racine 48 $196,560 352 $531,168 $105,000 $2,465,175 -244 $1,448,797 99% $3,081,244 $3,186,244 Richland N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 $64,206 99% $143,486 $150,986

Rock 59 $241,605 435 $656,415 $127,500 $2,962,386 -293 $1,740,102 99% $3,676,968 $3,804,468 Rusk N/A N/A 17 $25,653 $7,500 $112,433 -11 $64,206 99% $143,486 $150,986

Saint Croix 13 $53,235 98 $147,882 $30,000 $681,076 -67 $399,504 99% $849,463 $879,463 Sauk 21 $85,995 152 $229,368 $45,000 $1,053,655 -104 $619,469 99% $1,312,761 $1,357,761

Sawyer N/A N/A 29 $43,761 $7,500 $192,214 -19 $114,144 99% $255,097 $262,597 Shawano 10 $40,950 77 $116,193 $22,500 $473,073 -47 $276,443 99% $569,873 $592,373

Sheboygan 34 $139,230 249 $375,741 $75,000 $1,725,716 -171 $1,013,623 99% $2,149,368 $2,224,368 Taylor N/A N/A 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 $101,660 99% $226,269 $233,769

Trempealeau N/A N/A 22 $33,198 $7,500 $146,013 -14 $83,825 99% $189,140 $196,640 Vernon N/A N/A 28 $42,252 $7,500 $186,505 -19 $110,577 99% $247,330 $254,830

Vilas N/A N/A 45 $67,905 $15,000 $299,574 -30 $177,756 99% $394,425 $409,425 Walworth 29 $118,755 211 $318,399 $60,000 $1,469,581 -145 $863,214 99% $1,835,641 $1,895,641 Washburn N/A N/A 26 $39,234 $7,500 $171,343 -17 $101,660 99% $226,269 $233,769

Washington 45 $184,275 333 $502,497 $97,500 $2,326,411 -230 $1,368,539 99% $2,910,678 $3,008,178 Waukesha 49 $200,655 360 $543,240 $105,000 $2,498,647 -247 $1,469,604 99% $3,119,356 $3,224,356

82

County

Slots Funded:

Drug Court

Drug Court Cost

Slots Funded:

DOSA DOSA Cost

Start-up Costs

Taxpayer Benefits

Change in Victimizations

Benefits to Victims (from

Reduced Victimizations)

% of Trials where

Victimizations are Reduced

NPV Benefits

with Start- up Costs

NPV Benefits per Year

Waupaca 11 $45,045 78 $117,702 $22,500 $537,243 -53 $316,274 99% $668,270 $690,770 Waushara N/A N/A 37 $55,833 $15,000 $245,831 -24 $143,275 99% $318,273 $333,273

Winnebago 43 $176,085 317 $478,353 $90,000 $2,198,611 -218 $1,293,632 99% $2,747,805 $2,837,805 Wood 21 $85,995 154 $232,386 $45,000 $1,076,098 -107 $633,143 99% $1,345,860 $1,390,860

Source: Authors