statement of icc basis on enhancements to icann and iana functions accountability

8/11/2019 Statement of ICC BASIS on Enhancements to ICANN and IANA Functions Accountability

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ICC BASIS Statement

Enhancement to ICANN & IANA Accountability

28 August 2014

three functions in order to ensure a forum of oversight and accountability that is appropriate

for distinct activities: 1) policy-making, 2) dispute resolution and 3) implementation.

a) Policy-Making: ICANNs existing structure of Supporting Organizations (SOs)and Advisory Committees (ACs), which provide technical and policy guidance and whichprovide structure to its bottom-up, consensus multi-stakeholder model, should continue to beresponsible for policy making, though we would not support expansion of their existing policycompetencies. Their membership should be representative of the community of Internetstakeholders and geographic diversity, including developing and developed countries. Theyshould also play a role in selecting nominees for ICANNs CEO and in selecting members ofan independent dispute resolution panel.

b) Implementat ion: ICANNs executive function should be confined to: i)administration of the organization, ii) implementing the policies that pertain to coordination ofInternet unique identifiers, and to iii) recommending policy changes for consideration andultimate decision-making by the SOs and ACs. ICANN should oversee the technical functionsof the DNS and should only outsource technical operations to organizations with a proventrack record. ICANN should remain a non-profit corporation. Policy implementation must occurin close coordination with SOs and ACs who have the ultimate responsibility to ensure thatthe policies they develop are implemented as intended.

c) Dispute Resolut ion: ICANNs Independent Review Panel (IRP) should beexpanded to ensure a balanced structure with multi-stakeholder participation andstrengthened into a new independent dispute resolution panel. This new IRP would beresponsible for resolving disputes between stakeholders and the ICANN board and beendowed with the final authority to impose significant and appropriate discipline and sanctionsand to remove Board and staff members in defined egregious circumstances. This remedyprocess should be transparent, accessible and timely. This is critical to ensure that the ICANNBoard of Directors and ICANNs leadership are accountable to the community of ICANNstakeholders provides a secondary check on decisions reached through the normal ICANNprocesses.

3) Each function should only encompass those explicitly assigned rights,

responsibilities and authorities that have been formulatedthrough the multistakeholderprocess that is the ultimate arbiter of ICANN accountability. This focus by the multistakeholderprocess must be thorough in its remit to identify all significant functions and responsibilities,designate them appropriately and explicitly, and map specific rights, responsibilities andauthorities to the appropriate function. All other rights, responsibilities and authorities nottaken up in these focused efforts should be reserved to the community of ICANNstakeholders.


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4) Protection from Government Capture: Government representatives are core

stakeholders within the multi-stakeholder model, and government involvement is appropriatelyconducted through the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), in coordination with theSO/AC policy development process. In particular, neither the CEO nor the voting members ofthe Board of Directors should be a member of a government or government-controlledorganization. ICANN should prudently engage with government officials, focusing primarily onissues pertaining to the coordination of the Internets unique identifiers, whether directly orindirectly through a third party and such engagements and the topics covered should bemade public in a timely fashion.

5) A significant supermajority of the Board and the appropriate community groupsshould be required for final action on certain policy decisions, to be defined by a cross-

community working group on accountability, to demonstrate broad support by the communityof ICANN stakeholders. In addition, any changes to ICANNs Bylaws, particularly to Article I(Mission and Core), Article II (Power), and Articles III and IV (Transparency, Accountabilityand Review, respectively), should first be proposed to the community for a sufficient publiccomment period, and any changes to these sections should require at least 11 out of 15 votesof the Board.

6) ICANNs budget and the revenue to support it should be limited to meetingICANNs specific responsibilitiesand should not change without SO and AC approval.

7) ICANN must reinforce its transparencythrough its creation of specific performancegoals and submitting to annual audit by an independent accounting firm. The audit should bebroader than a traditional audit of financial records and also include assessment of: ICANNsachievements in meeting its performance goals, its adherence to the Affirmation ofCommitments (AoC) and implementation of recommendations arising from its requiredperiodic reviews, how the Board has treated advice from the GAC and other ACs during thereview period, and ICANNs adherence to its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.Transcripts and detailed minutes of all meetings, including those of ICANNs Board ofDirectors, as well as complete documents and records should also be made readily available.ICANN should also create a formal freedom of information mechanism to ensure communityaccess to documents.

8) All registries and registrars should operate under equitable agreements withICANNthat set nondiscriminatory fees to be paid to ICANN in support of its budget. ICANNmay not set or regulate fees charged by registries or registrars to their customers.

9) These principles and their assured implementation should be adopted and madeeffective prior to the transfer of the IANA contractto ICANN or to any other party thatreplaces the U.S. as contract counterparty. These principles should also be embedded inICANNs Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws so that they are fully enforceable by the new


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independent dispute resolution panel, and they should form the basis for the replacement of

NTIAs current DNS agreements.

10) BASIS concurs in NTIAs requirements and counsel for the transition of the IANAfunctions and strongly supports the view that strong accountability and transparencymechanisms must be in place before the IANA transition occurs. However, the globalmultistakeholder community must guard against the possible appeal that may be found inprocess to be proxy for inaction.

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statement of icc basis on enhancements to icann and iana functions accountability

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