STATE OF MINNESOTA

COUNTY OF RAMSEY

Unity Church of St. Paul and White BearUnitarian Universalist Church,

Plaintiffs,and

Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al.,

Intervening Plaintiffs,

and

The City ofMinneapolis, .

Intervening Plaintiff,

and

People Serving People, Inc., et al.,

Intervening Plaintiffs,

vs.

State ofMinnesota,

Defendant.

DISTRICT COURT

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

File No. C9-03-9570

ORDER

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable

John T. Finl.ey on the 3rd day of June, 2004, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion to

amend their complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Marshall H. Tanick,

Esq. Intervening plaintiffs Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et aI., (Religious

Interveners) were represented by David L Lillehaug, Esq. Intervening plaintiff

City of Minneapolis was represented by Burt T. Osborne, Assistant City

Attorney. John B. Gordon, Esq., appeared on behalf of the intervening

:.-

charitable agencies, including People Serving People, et al. Defendant was

represented by Richard L. Varco, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. That the plaintiffs Unity Church of St. Paul and White Bear

Unitarian Universalist Church may amend their complaint in the form that was

attached to their motion as Exhibit #1.

2. The attached memorandum is made a part of this order pursuant to

Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 52.01.

BY THE COURT:

ohn T. FinleyJudge of District Court

Dated this 12th day of July, 2004.

MEMORANDUM

The complaint that the plaintiffs prop'ose to amend conforms to the original

complaint of the intervening plaintiffs, except for some minor linguistic·

differences. The substance of the complaint is the same as the intervening

plaintiffs in that the legal issues are identical to those raised by the interveners.

The original complaint brought by the plaintiffs only alleged that the Conceal and

Carry Law, known as Senate File 842, violated plaintiffs' religious freedom

pursuant to violation of Minnesota State Constitution Article 1, Section 16. The

amended complaint re~alleges that alleged violation, but also alleges that the

same law is an impermissible taking of private property without just

compensation in violation of the Due Processes Clause of both the state and

federal constitutions. There is an additional allegation that the law also violates

the single subject requirement ofArticle 1, Section 17 of the Minnesota State

Constitution. By allowing the amendment, all the issues will be parallel and all

rulings by the Court will affect all parties equally. ,

It is clear that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law of

Minnesota hold that the Court should liberally allow amendment to the pleadings

and amendments should be freely granted, unless it would result in prejudice to

the other party. (See Rules of Civil Procedure and Fabio v. Bellomo, 504

N.W. 2d 758 (1993». There has been no showing of prejudice by any of the

other parties.

----

Therefore, plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint should be granted..-.--!-----_.

\

l/!o/cyJoro 0 r

STATE OF MINNESOTA

.COUNTY OF RAMSEY

Unity Church of St. Paul and White BearUnitarian Universalist Church,

Plaintiffs,and

Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et aI.,

InterveningPlaintiffs,

and

The City of Minneapolis,

InterveningPlaintiff,

and

People Serving People, Inc., et aI.,

InterveningPlaintiffs,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Defendant.

DISTRICT COURT

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

File No. C9-03-9570 .

ORDER

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the Honorable

John T. Finley on the 3rd day of June, 2004, pursuant to plaintiffs' motion to

amend their complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Marshall H. Tanick,

Esq. Intervening plaintiffs Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al. (Religious

Interveners), were represented by David L. Lillehaug, Esq. Intervening plaintiff

City of Minneapolis was represented by Burt T. Osborne, Assistant City

Attorney. John B. Gordon, Esq., appeared on behalfof the intervening

charitable agencies, including People Serving People, et al. Defendant was

represented by Richard L. Varco, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.

Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. That the plaintiffs' (Unity Church of Sf. Paul et al) motion for

summary judgment on the grounds that the Minnesota Citizens Personal

Protection Act 2002, known as Senate File 842, violates Article 4, Section 17 of

the Minnesota Constitution because it embraces more than one sUbject matter is

hereby GRANTED and is therefore declared unconstitutional.

2. Intervening plaintiffs Adath Jeshurun Congregation's (Religious

intervenors) motion for summary. judgment on the grounds that the Minnesota

Citizens Personal Protection Act 2002, known of Senate File 842, violates Article

4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution because it embraces more than one

subject matter is hereby GRANTED and is therefore declared unconstitutional.

3. Intervening plaintiff The City of Minneapolis's motion for summary

judgment on the grounds that the Minnesota Citizens Personal Protection Act

2002, known of Senate File 842, violates Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota

Constitution b~cause it embraces more than one subject matter is hereby

GRANTED and is therefore declared unconstitutional.

4. The intervening plaintiff's, People Serving People, Incorporated, et

aI., (Charitable agencies) motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the

Minnesota Citizens Personal Protection Act 2002, known of Senate File 842,

violates Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution because it embraces

more than one subject matter is hereby GRANTED and is therefore declared

unconstitutionaI.

5. The defendant State of Minnesota's motion for partial summary

judgment is hereby DENIED in all respects.

6. JUdgment is GRANTED plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs against

defendant finding that the part of SF842 (2003) that amends M.S.A. 624.714 was

enacted in violation of Minnesota Constitution Article 45, Section 17 and the

defendants, their employees, and agents are permanently enjoined and

prohibited from taking any action to enforce the unconstitutional provisions of the

Act which is hereby severed from the other part of SF842.

7. That all parties shall pay their own attorney's fees.

8. The attached Memorandum is made a part of this Order pursuant to

Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 52.02.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

BY THE COURT:

ohn T, FinleyJudge of District Court

Dated this J.3... day of JuJ ,2004.

MEMORANDUM

Senate File 842 was introduced as a Department of Natural Resource's

technical bill and amended Minnesota Statute 84.01. This law sets forth the

duties, powers and responsibilities of the Commissioner of the Department of

Natural Resources (DNR) and authorizes the Department to regulate and enforce

its rules. The bill was entitled "A Bill For an Act Relating to Natural Resources". It

had nothing to do with the concealment or the carrying of weapons. This bill

passed the Minnesota State Senate 65-0, with no controversy on March 24,

2003.

When SF842 was sent to the House of Representatives for approval,

House File No. 261 (Boudreau Amendment), which is the Conceal and Carry

Amendment, was attached to the Department of Natural Resource's SF842. The

Boudreau Amendment amended M.S.A. 624.714, which dealt with the carrying of

weapons and not the Department of Natural Resources. On April 23, 2003, the

House of Representatives approved Senate File 842 the "Bill for an Act Relating

to Natural Resources", with the Conceal and Carry /Boudreau Amendment

attached as one piece of legislation without any legislative committee hearings.

The vote was 88 yeas and 46 nays to approve the title and the bill with the

Boudreau amendment.

The matter then returned to the Senate where it was approved on April 28,

2000 by a 37-30 vote without any committee hearings. The title was not changed

and it passed both houses with the title as a "Bill for an Act Relating to Natural

Resources" and became law after it was signed by Governor Pawlenty.

Originally, House File #261's purpose was to regulate the supposed

individual's right to bear arms pursuant to the Second Amendment of the United

States Constitution and the entire bill became the Boudreau amendment

attached to the totally unrelated bill relating to the Department of Natural

Resources.

Following the passage of the law, the reviser of statutes changed the title

from an "Act relating to natural resources" to an "Act relating to state government

regulation". This change in the title did not have any hearings and was not

approved by either body of the legislature.

LAW

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution:

LAWS TO EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT. No law shall embrace more than

one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.

There is a long history of enforcement of the constitutional mandate

requiring the legislature to approve only single sUbject legislation. The controlling

case on the issue of single subject and the Court's right to sever statutes with

more than a single subject is Associated Builders vs. Ventura, 610 N.W. 2d 293

(2000), where Justice Stringer wrote a very historical review and stated:

"Early in Minnesota history the potential for mischief in bundling togetherinto one bill disparate legislative provisions was well known. In theMinnesota Democratic Constitutional Convention in 1857, a proposal thataddressed only the requirement that a title give some indication of thecontents of the bill was amended following the comments of Mr. Meeker.

The Associated Builders' Court continued its historical review as followsat page 299:

The first case to test this constitutional requirement was decided by thiscourt in 1858, only a year after its adoption. In Board of Supervisors ofRamsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330, 339 (GiI.281! 291) (1858), weupheld the constitutionality of a law reorganizing county and townshipgovernments but also requiring the register of deeds to deliver taxdocuments to the county board of supervisors. We concluded that thesingle subject requirement was not offended because there was "noattempt at fraud, or the interpolation of matter foreign to the subjectexpressed in the title." Id. Thirty-three years later we further developedour analysis in Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575. 578. 50 N.W. 923,924 (1891 ), when we held that "[a]n act to establish a Probate Code"providing for procedures in probate courts and for property rights indeceased's estates did not violate either the subject or the title provisionof Section 17. In doing so we clarified the purpose of the Single Subjectand Title Clause-to prevent "log-rolling legislation" or "omnibus bills."

We defined logrolling as the "combination of different measures,dissimilar in character, * * * united together * * * compelling therequisite support to secure the.ir passage." State v. Cassidy, 22Minn. 312, 322 (1875) (subject provision's purpose is to "secureto every distinct measure of legislation a separate considerationand decision, dependent solely upon its individual merits, byprohibiting the fraudulent insertion therein of matters whollyforeign").

That despite these constitutional restrictions, the single subject provisionshould be interpreted liberally and the restriction would be met if the billwere germane to one general subject:

"[W]hile this provision is mandatory, yet it is to be given a liberal, and not astrict, construction. If is not intended, nor should it be so construed as, toembarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in theirscope and operation, or by mUltiplying their number, or by preventing thelegislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected withone general subject. The term 'subject,' as used in *300 the constitution, isto be given a broad and extended meaning * * *. All that is necessary isthat the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this ismeant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some onegeneral idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logicallyor in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one generalsubject."Johnson. 47 Minn. at 577,50 N.W. at 924.

The Court stated, "[W]e explained that the clause is intended to preventfraud or surprise upon the legislature and the public by prohibiting theinclusion of "provisions in a bill whose title gives no intimation of the nature

of the proposed legislation," id" 50 N.W. at 924, but we accord it the sameliberal construction as the single SUbject provision. See State ex reI. Olsenv. Board of Control of State Insts., 85 Minn. 165, 172, 88 N.W. 533. 536(1902). In Olsen we held "[e]very reasonable presumption should be infavor of the title." Id. at 1'75, 88 N.W. at 537. Again in State ex reI. PearsonY. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 552, 287 N.W. 297,301 (1939), wenoted that the generality of the title of an act is not grounds for invalidationas long as the title gives notice of the general subject because "the titlewas never intended to be an index of the law." We held that the title "AnAct relating to persons having a psychopathic personality" and providingfor the commitment of sexual offenders did not violate the title clausebecause it gave notice that the act concerned 'sexually irresponsiblepersons.' See id. at 552- 53, 287 N.W. at 301."

Justice Stringer continued at page 301 :

"In the three most recent cases to come before this court however, whilewe have held that the challenged law did not violate Section 17,.we havetaken quite a different approach. In each instance we took the occasion tosound an alarm that we would not hesitate to strike down oversweepinglegislation that violates the Single Subject and Title Clause, regardless ofthe consequences. In State ex rei. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d777,778,783 (Minn.1986), an act permitting the legislature to transferresponsibilities of the State Treasurer to the Commissioner of Financewas challenged on the ground that the act violated the separation of

.powers doctrine as well as the single SUbject and title constitutionalrestrictions. We held the act unconstitutional as a violation of theseparation of powers doctrine and therefore we did not reach the singlesubject issue, but in a concurring opinion by JUstice Yetka, joined byJustice Simonett, the disparate provisions of the act were cited promptingJustice Yetka to declare that "now all bounds of reason and restraint seemto have been abandoned." Id. at 784 (Yetka, J., concurring specially). Hereferenced, for example, provisions relating to agricultural land, a council'of Asian-Pacific Minnesotans and the establishment of a recyclingprogram. See id. Justice Yetka questioned whether this court has beentoo lax in perniitting such legislation and observed "[t]he worm that wasmerely vexatious in the 19th century has become a monster eating theconstitution in the 20th." Id. He concluded with an alert to the legislatureas to what was to come if an act violated the single subject and titleprovisions in the future:

[W]e should send a clear signal to the legislature that this type ofact will not be condoned in the future. Garbage or Christmas treebills appear to be a direct, cynical violation of our constitution * * *.It is clear to me that the more deference shown by the courts to thelegislature and the more timid the courts are in acting against

constitutional infringements, the bolder become those who wouldviolate them.

* * * [W]e should publicly warn the legislature that it if doeshereafter enact legislation similar to Chapter 13, which clearlyviolates *302 Minn. Const. art IV. § 17, we will not hesitate to strikeit down regardless of the consequences to the legislature, thepublic, or the courts generally.Id. at 785.

We took the occasion to sound an alarm that we would not hesitate tostrike down oversweeping legislation that violates the Single Subject andTitle Clause, regardless of the consequences.

The Court's analysis continued at page 303:

"Appellants next argue that there was no evidence of impermissiblelogrolling and therefore the mischief the constitutional restriction wasintended to address Is not present. Appellants' contention is misdirected.The Single Subject and Title Clause, as Minnesota's first lIsunshine law,"requires that the legislature not fold into larger, more popular bills, whollyunrelated and potentially unpopular provisions that may not pass as a

. stand~alone bill. The purpose of preventing logrolling is to precludeunrelated subjects from appearing In a popular bill, not to eliminateunpopular provisions in a bill that genuinely encompasses one generalsubject. We fully recognize that it is the legislature's prerogative toestablish our state's pUblic policy in the area of prevailing wages and thatthe legislative process is not bound by rigid textbook rules. Nonetheless,lawmaking must occur within the framework of the constitution. So whilewe do not conclude that there was suspicious conduct on the part of thelegislature nor impugn its motive In Including the prevailing wageamendment in a bill that was predominately tax reform and relief, we areconcerned about the lack of a single subject and the characteristics oflogrolling. First, prevailing wages have been historically discussed in thelabor committees, not tax committees. [FN25] Amendments to Minn.Stat.§ 1238.71, subd. 2, where the prevailing wage amendment now appears,have historically come about through education bills. [FN26] That mostdiscussions on *304 prevailing wages took place in the tax committeesuggests, if not logrolling, an unexplained deviation from the history oflabor committee discussions on the prevailing wage act.

"Second, the issue of prevailing wages had no companion bill inthe senate, received little consideration in the house committee hearingsand was inserted into a much broader and popular bill with an entirelydifferent legislative theme.

"Third, while we acknowledge that the legislative process iscomplicated and the rationale for pursuing one particular process oranother is not always clear, obviously a more direct route to adopting theamendment would have been to redefine "project" in Minn.Stat. § 177.42,which includes the original definition of "project" for prevailing wagepurposes. These factors raise concerns about the legislative process, andwith the lack of germaneness to the general subject of taxes and taxreform, we conclude that the prevailing wage amendment violates thesingle subject provision of our constitution.

"Finally, appellants argue that chapter 231 does not violate the titleprovision of Section 17 because its title gave sufficient notice of theamendment to the prevailing wage law. The single sUbject and titleprovisions of Section 17 are often discussed together, but the titleprovision serves a different purpose and requires a somewhat different .analysis. The purpose of the title provision is to prevent fraud or surpriseon the legislature and the public-in essence to provide notice of the natureof the bill's contents. See Johnson. 47 Minn. at 577,50 N.W. at 924.".

The Court then addressed the issue of severability and stated at page

304:

"We consider next whether the entirety of chapter 231 must be heldunconstitutional because it contains more than a single subject and its titledoes not give reasonable notice of its contents, or whether there can be aseverance of the offending amendment permitting to stand the otherstatutory provisions of chapter 231. For several reasons we conclude thatthe constitutional construal of Article IV, Section *305 17, does not requirethe entire law to be declared unconstitutional."

At page 306, the Court stressed its authority to sever legislation without

specific legislative authority and referenced to "Petition for Integration of Bar of

Minnesota. 216 Minn. 195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515. 518 (1943):

("The supreme court is thereby made the final authority and last resort in[interpreting] * * * the constitution."). Since the legislature cannot authorize thecourt to do what the constitution prohibits, we reiterate that our authority tosever the offending provision comes not from the legislature, *307 but from theconstitution itselfand precedent interpreting Section 17."

ANALYSIS

The issues before the Court includes several matters that must be

specifically analyzed by this Court, including whether a bill that amends M.S.A.

84.01 technical provisions of the Department of Natural Resources' regulatory

provisions is constitutionally consistent with a 22~page amendment that

amended M.S.A. 624.714, the substance of which is the right to conceal and

carry a weapon. M.S.A. 624.714 regulates the carrying and concealment of

weapons and the process, to be used by local authorities for granting permits

to all person to carry and conceal in some places but not in other places within

the state of Minnesota.

HF261 , which became the Boudreau Amendment to SF842, provides as

follows:

624.714 Carrying of weapons without permit; penalties.

Subd.1 (b) A citation issued for violating paragraph (a) must bedismissed if the person demonstrates, in court or in the office of thearresting officer, that the person was authorized to carry the pistol at thetime of the alleged violation..

Subd. 2 (b) Unless a sheriff denies a permit under the exceptionset forth in subdivision 6, paragraph (a), clause (3), a sheriffmust issue a permit to an applicant if the person:

(1) has training in the safe use of a pistol;

(2) is at least 21 years old and a citizen or a permanentresident of the United States;

(3) completes an application for a permit;

(4) is not prohibited from possessing a firearm under thefollowing sections:

(I) 5188.01, subdivision 14;

(ii) 609.224, subdivision 3;

(iii) 609.2242, subdivision 3;

(iv) 609.749, subdivision 8;

(v) 624.713;

(vi) 624.719;

(vii) 629.715, subdivision 2; or

(viii) 629.72, subdivision 2; and

(5) is not listed in the criminal gang investigative datasystem under section 299C.091.

Subd.6. Granting and denial of permits. (a) Thesheriff must, within 30 days after the date of receipt of theapplication packet described in subdivision 3:

(1) issue the permit to carry;

(2) deny the application for a permit to carry solely onthe grounds that the applicant failed to qualify under thecriteria described in subdivision 2, paragraph (b); or

(3) deny the application on the grounds that there exists asubstantial likelihood that the applicant is a danger to self orthe public if authorized to carry a pistol under a permit.

(b) Failure of the sheriff to notify the applicant of thedenial of the application within 30 days after the date ofreceipt of the application packet constitutes issuance of thepermit to carry and the sheriff must promptly fulfill therequirements under paragraph (c); To deny the application, thesheriff must provide the applicant with written notification andthe specific factual basis justifying the denial under paragraph(a), clause (2) or (3), including the source of the factualbasis. The sheriff must inform the applicant of the applicant'sright to submit, within 20 business days, any additionaldocumentation relating to the propriety of the denial. Uponreceiving any additional documentation, the sheriff must

.reconsider the denial and inform the applicant within 15business days of the result of the reconsideration. Any denialafter reconsideration must be in the same form and substance asthe original denial and must specifically address any continueddeficiencies in light of the additional documentation submittedby the applicant. The applicant must be informed of the rightto seek de novo review of the denial as provided in subdivision12.

Subd. 11. No limit on number of pistols. A personshall not be restricted as to the number of pistols the personmay carry.

Subd. 12. Hearing upon denial or revocation. (a) Anyperson aggrieved by denial or revocation of a permit to carrymay appeal by petition to the district court having jurisdictionover the county or municipality where the application wassubmitted. The petition must list the sheriff as therespondent. The district court must hold a hearing at theearliest practicable date and in any event no later than 60 daysfollowing the filing of the petition for review. The court maynot grant or deny any relief before the completion of thehearing. The record of the hearing must be sealed. The mattermust be heard de novo without a jury.

(b) The court must issue written findings of fact andconclusions of law regarding the issues submitted by theparties. The court must issue its writ of mandamus directingthat the permit be issued and order other appropriate reliefunless the sheriff establishes by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) that the applicant is disqualified under the criteriadescribed in subdivision 2, paragraph (b); or

(2) that there exists a substantial likelihood that theapplicant is a danger to self or the public if authorized tocarry a pistol under a permit. Incidents of alleged criminalmisconduct that are not investigated and documented, andinciden'ts for which the applicant was charged and acquitted, maynot be considered.

(d) Ifthe court grants a petition brought under paragraph(a), the court must award the applicant or permit holderreasonable costs and expenses including attorney fees.

Subd. 14. Records. (a) A sheriff must not maintainrecords or data collected, made, or held under this sectionconcerning any applicant or permit holder that are not necessaryunder this section to support a permit that is outstanding oreligible for renewal under subdivision 7, paragraph (b).Notwithstanding section 138.163, sheriffs must completely purgeall files and databases by March 1 of each year to delete allinformation collected under this section concerning all personswho are no longer current permit holders or currently eligibleto renew their permit.

Subd. 16. Recognition of permits from other states.(a) The commissioner must annually establish and publish a listof other 'states that have laws governing the issuance of permitsto carry weapons that are not SUbstantially similar to thissection. The list must be available on the Internet. A personholding a carry permit from a state not on the list may use thelicense or permit in this state subject to the rights,privileges, and requirements of this section.

Subd. 17. Posting; trespass. (a) A person carrying afirearm on or about his or her person or clothes under a permitor otherwise who remains at a private establishment knowing thatthe operator of the establishment or its agent has made areasonable request that firearms not be brought into theestablishment may be ordered to leave the premises. A personwho fails to leave when so requested Is guilty of a pettymisdemeanor. The fine for a first offense must not exceed $25.

.Notwithstanding section 609.531, a firearm carried in violationof this subdivision is not subject to forfeiture.

Subd. 18. Employers; public colleges and universities.(a) An employer, whether public or private, may establishpolicies that restrict the carry or possession of firearms byits employees while acting in the course and scope ofemployment. Employment related civil sanctions may be invokedfor a violation.(b) A public postsecondary institution regulated under chapter 136F or 137may establish policies that restrict the carry or possession of firearms byits students while on the institution's property. Academic sanctions maybe invoked for a violation.(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b), an employer ora postsecondary institution may not prohibit the lawful carry or

possession of firearms in a parking facility or parking area (emphasisadded).

Subd.22. Short title; construction; severability.This section may be cited as the Minnesota Citizens' PersonalProtection·Act of 2003. The legislature of the state ofMinnesota recognizes and declares that the second amendment ofthe United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental,individual right to keep and bear arms. The provisions of thissection are declared to be necessary to accomplish compellingstate interests in regulation of those rights. The terms ofthis. section must be construed according to the compelling stateinterest test. The invalidation of any provision of thissection shall not invalidate any other provision (emphasis added).

Subd. 23. Exclusivity. This section sets forth thecomplete and exclusive criteria and procedures for the issuanceof permits to carry and establishes their nature and scope. Nosheriff, police chief, governmental unit. government official,government employee, or other person or body acting under colorof law or governmental authority may change, modify, orsupplement these criteria or procedures, or limit the exerciseof a permit to carry (emphasis added).

This Court is well aware that all Minnesota statutes carry with it the

presumption of constitutionality and that the challenger of constitutional validity of

a statute must meet the burden or proving the unconstitutionality of the statute

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Behl, 264 N.W. 2d 560.

This Court has considered all of the issues that have been brought by

plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs, and defendants, including the allegations that the

bill is unconstitutional under the Freedom of Religion Clause of the state and

federal constitutions; is a violation of the Due Process Clause of both the state

and federal constitutions; that the law is an illegal taking without just

compensation; and lastly, that the law is unconstitutional because it violates the

single issue clause of the Minnesota State Constitution.

It is clear that the amendment to Minnesota Statute 624.714, which

regulates firearms, contains a totally different sUbject matter from the regulatory

provision and from the Department of Natural Resources found in Minnesota

Statute 84.01, et al. This law is unconstitutional because it clearly violates not

only the intent, but also the clear meaning of Article 4, Section 17 of the

Minnesota Constitution.

Our State has prided itself in its openness in all areas of government. We

require notice at the local level for any zoning or regulatory changes so that

people can be heard and exercise their right of free speech and give their input,

whether in support ordissent, of all issues.

We have. an open meeting law, which requires all state age!1cies, local

units of government, and the state legislature itself to have hearings which are

open to the public so there may be public debate for all public issues.

This openness in the legislative and regulatory processes is what

Minnesota citizens are so proud of and are the envy of citizens throughout the

country because of our "clean government".

This basic Minnesota value is totally frustrated when the legislature itself

clearly violates the underpinnings of such a basic conscience-guided law and

constitutional provision. By attaching this very important and divisive amendment

to a totally unrelated, noncontroversial bill without providing notice to the general

public is a direct violation of the state constitution and the holdings of our highest

court.

Attaching this amendment to an unrelated issue, which had already

unanimously passed the Senate, prevented the public from having any input.

There were no legislative hearings in either the House or Senate in which the

attached provision (Boudreau Conceal and Carry amendment) could be debated.

A debate with committee hearings on the single issue of conceal and carry

would have very possibly resulted in a properly drafted bill that would prevent the

inherent problems that have been raised by the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs

in this case.

For an example, all pUblic bodies, including intervening plaintiff The City of

Minneapolis, could have expressed its interest and participated in framing a law

which met the special needs of a public body, such as the local units of

government. How the public conducts its business on its property, as well as

private property, are important issues that should have been discussed in relation

to the conceal and carry legislation if proper legislative hearings had taken place

in a stand-alone piece of legislation as envisioned by the Minnesota Constitution.

How private citizens act on public property and private property could

have been debated if there had been proper notice of a single issue as the

legislative process envisioned by Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota

Constitution. This aspect of notice, which is lacking here, was deemed to be so

important that it was placed within our State Constitution. Resolution of

important issues should not occur when legislative process is circumvented by

placing the amendment onto an unrelated bill that had already passed the

Senate without dissent.

The original Senate File 842 dealt with duties and responsibilities ofth~

Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources amending M.S.A. 84.01,

et aI., and had little substantive changes. The DNR Commissioner Statutes .

provide statewide jurisdiction and usually a local unit can make regulations more

restrictive, but they are prohibited by Subd. 23 in the conceal and carry

ame'ndment from making portions of the law more restrictive than the legislation.

Because the entire provision regarding the Conceal and Carry Law is

unconstitutional, in violation of Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota State

Constitution, this Court does not have to decide on the issues of whether or not it

is in violation of the state and federal constitutions because it infringes upon

religious freedom or that it is a "taking" in violation of the state and federal

constitutions Due Process Clauses. However, this Court will make comment

regarding both issues to provide.guidance to the Appellate Courts.

Article 1, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution states:

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE; NO PREFERENCE TO BE GIVEN TOANY RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT OR MODE OF WORSHIP. Theenumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair othersretained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worshipGod according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never beinfringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support anyplace of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry,against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rightsof conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to anyreligious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of consciencehereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts oflicentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety ofthe state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefitof any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.

The test that has been adopted by the Court in determining whether or not

the party alleging that the law violates its religious freedom are:

1)that the institutions beliefs are sincere;

2) that the act infringes upon those beliefs;

3) that the state has not identified and provided a compelling reason that

the state's interests override the sincere religious beliefs of the institution;

4) and lastly, that the state must show that there are no less restrictive

alternatives that could be imposed.

The plaintiffsand·intervening plaintiffs are unquestionably sincere in their

beliefs based upon the affidavits submitted. They are well-known religious

institutions and one would be fool hearty to believe that their institutional beliefs

are not sincere. There is no question that the Act infringes upon those beliefs as

it relates to the use of their properties, especially parking lots.

This Court could make no such finding of insincerity nor could it find more

compelling reasons that have been provided by the State as compelling

alternatives. See Garcia Geraci v. Ekankar, 527 N.W. 2d 391, and Thomas v.

Review Board of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), which states:

"This Court does not believe that it should or could speculate as to all thereasons why a religious exemption should be granted as it relates to thereligious institutions becau~e the Court can envision all sorts of otherpossible exemptions, including possibly all public property, pUblic propertyused for private purposes, and private property used for public or religiouspurposes, to name a few. The issues of establishment of a religion orviolation of religious freedom do not have to be determined as theunconstitutionality of the law itself because of its clear violation ofMinnesota Constitution Single Subject. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (1990) and State v. Sports Health Club, 370 N.W. 2d 894 (1985).FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE; NO PREFERENCE TO BE GIVEN TOANY RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT OR MODE OF WORSHIP. Theenumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair othersretained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worshipGod according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never beinfringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any

place of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry,against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rightsof conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to anyreligious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of consciencehereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts oflicentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety ofthe state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefitof any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries."

This Court cannot find any plausible reason why an employer (whether

public or private) may not restrict one from carrying a weapon on their own

parking areas. The State, on the other hand, has not identified a compelling

interest, which necessitates the infringement upon plaintiffs' and intervening

plaintiffs' sincere beliefs. Nor has the State identified that there are no other less

restrictive alternatives than that which the Conceal and Carry Law provides.

The last issue is whether or not there has been an illegal taking in violation

of the Minnesota State and Federal Constitution because they are prohibiting

plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs from excluding persons on property, which

would otherwise be excluded. This right to exclude is well founded and long

established. See Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164 (1979) that states:

"As was recently pointed out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.New York City, 438 U.S. 104,98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), *175this Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set formula' fordetermining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuriescaused by public action be compensated by the government, rather thanremain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id., at 124, 98S.Ct., at 2659. Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engagingin essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors ww

.

such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference withreasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of thegovernmental action-- that have particular significance." IbidIf sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for beforeit takes over the management of the landowner's property. In this case, wehold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamentalelement of *180 the property right, [FN11] falls within this category of

interests that the Government cannot take without compensation. This isnot a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in amanner that will Cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' privateproperty; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this contextwill result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.Compare Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 318, at 326­327,62 L.Ed.2d 210, with the traditional taking offee interests in UnitedStates ex rei. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 63 S.Ct. 1047,87 L.Ed.1390 (1943), and in United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,63 S.Ct. 276, 87L.Ed. 336 (1943). And even if the <,3overnment physically invades only aneasement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. SeeUnited States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 1067,90L.Ed. 1206 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43S.Ct. 135, 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922)."

This Court does not have to determine whether or not the Act violates the

Due Processes Clause of the state and federal constitutions by taking property

without just compensation or any compensation because it has already

determined that it is unconstitutional for other reasons. If the plaintiffs believe

they are entitled to monetary damages by the taking, they also have the right to

bring a separate action for inverse condemnation and prove damages that have

resulted from the State's action,

For all these reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgement is

DENIED and the plaintiffs' and intervening plaintiffs' motions for summary

judgment requesting the Court to declare the Minnesota Protective Act, "Conceal

and Carry Law," is GRANTED and the provision is unconstitutional. It is a

violation of Article IV Section 17 of the Minnesota State Constitution requiring a

single subject matter. The defendants, their agents and employees are

permanently enjoined and prohibited from enforcing provisions of the law, which

wer~ a part of House File 261, which was attached to Senate File 842.