state of transport security in the e-mail ecosystem at large

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State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large Aaron Zauner IETF Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - //

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Page 1: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Aaron Zauner

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015

Page 2: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Overview

Results

Conclusion

Page 3: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Context

§ Joined SBA-Research in Janurary to help with an ongoing Internet-wide scanning project§ We’ve conducted scans on e-mail related ports over the last couple of months§ Currently digging through collected data and writing papers

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 1/12

Page 4: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Targets and Methods

§ SMTP(S), POP3(S), IMAP(S) and Legacy Ports§ masscan and sslyze with a queueing framework built around it§ Delay between handshakes in sslyze added

§ some POP/IMAP daemons are easily DoSed§ Runs spanning months (roughly from April to June)§ About 9.2 billon TLS handshakes with sslyze§ Multiple masscan runs for banners/certs§ triggered dovecot bug (CVE-2015-3420) :)

§ initially discovered and investigated/reported upstream by Hanno Boeck

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 2/12

Page 5: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Protocol Support

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 3/12

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RC4

Accepting RC4 Not accepting RC4SMTPS 82,27 17,73SMTP 86,27 13,73IMAPS 83,36 16,64IMAP 85,71 14,29POP3S 83,74 16,26POP3 86,51 13,49

Table : RC4 Cipher Support Percentage

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 4/12

Page 7: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

AUTH PLAIN offered by hosts

SMTP (25)§ 917,536 - AUTH PLAIN, no STARTTLS support§ 1,722,387 - AUTH PLAIN & STARTTLS

IMAP (143)§ 211,962 - AUTH PLAIN, no STARTTLS support§ 3,243,632 - AUTH PLAIN & STARTTLS

POP3 (110)§ 225,341 - AUTH PLAIN, no STARTTLS support§ 3,391,525 AUTH PLAIN & STARTTLS

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 5/12

Page 8: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Certificates

ssc: signed certificate, ok: CA signed, local: unable to get local issuer certificate, ssc chain: selfsigned certificate in certificate chain (Mozilla Truststore)IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 6/12

Page 9: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Certificates (cont.)

SMTP and SMTPS§ Almost all leafs >= 1024 bit RSA (most 2048)§ Same for intermediates (fewer than 200 with less than 1024 bit RSA)

POP3(S) and IMAP(S)§ Very similar results, a few more low-bit leaf and intermediates.

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 7/12

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Weak ciphers and Anon-DH

SMTP (STARTTLS)§ RC2-CBC-MD5 - 40.9% accept (26.5% prefer!)§ IDEA-CBC-MD5 - 14.4% accept

SMTPS§ Anon-DH suites: about 12% acceptance

POP(S)/IMAP(S)§ Nothing too exciting, ask me about details if you’re interested

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 8/12

Page 11: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Key-exchange

DH(E)§ Large number of 512bit DH primes in SMTP§ Sigificant amount of DH group size =< 1024 in all studied protocols

ECDH(E)§ Group size: most use 256, some 384, very few 521 throughout studied protocols

Common Primes§ Apache prime (Adrian et al ‘Weak-DH’ paper) not used§ mod_ssl prime: some users, very few

more on this topic TBD

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 9/12

Page 12: State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at Large

Weak Keys

Analyzed 40,268,806 collected certificates. Rather unspecacular:Fast-GCD (Heninger et al. “Mining P’s & Q’s”, algo. by djb)

§ 30,757,242 RSA moduli§ 2,354,090 uniques§ 456 GCDs found

Debian Weak-Keys (CVE-2008-0166)§ Compared to openssl-blacklist package§ A single (1) match

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 10/12

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Conclusion

§ First to conduct such a detailed study for E-Mail§ A lot of issues with transport security in the e-mail ecosystem§ Results are pretty much what we’ve expected beforehand§ We’ll publish all collected datasets (soon-ish)

§ More studies, analysis and papers forthcoming§ We have tons of additional data, if you have specific questions write us!

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 11/12

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Thanks for your patience. Are there any questions?

Point of contact: [email protected]

IETF93 Prague, Security Area Open Meeting - 23/07/2015 State of Transport Security in the E-Mail Ecosystem at LargeAaron Zauner 12/12