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THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH 2010 – 2011

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) September 2011, Dhaka, Bangladesh

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Foreword

Bangladesh had witnessed sporadic acts of terrorism in the first half of the last decade. A number of serious attacks were mounted, particularly in 2004 and 2005. The most significant of these was the 21st August 2004 grenade attack on an Awami League public meeting, which specifically targeted the Awami League leadership, including Sheikh Hasina, the then Leader of the Opposition and currently the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. On 17th August 2005, around 500 ‘home-made’ bombs were exploded, in 63 out of 64 districts, and the issue of terrorism in Bangladesh gained worldwide attention. The violent nature of these incidents has convinced stakeholders in the government, civil society and general public that if Bangladesh becomes susceptible to terrorist activities, there will be severe consequences for the stability, security and economic development of the country. With this backdrop in mind, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) has undertaken a three-year project (2010-2012), with the objective of conducting research on the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The project covers the writing of three annual reports and developing a national counter terrorism strategy, aimed at creating a more effective counter terrorism regime in the country. The first annual report, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh 2009-2010”, published with some relevant conclusions and recommendations, has been disseminated to the relevant government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh The second annual report, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh, 2010-2011”, is the outcome of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information and data collected by way of desk research, perception survey and key informant interviews. The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime-related activities have declined. Although people are aware of the activities of militant organizations, they are usually unwilling to talk about the active presence of these groups. Militant groups were found to have networks within the country as well as around the world. Networking was found to be strong, particularly in terms of following common or similar ideologies, receiving training on high-tech equipment and funding. The findings also indicate that Islamist terrorist groups in Bangladesh have changed the pattern of their activities and organizational identity in order to ensure their survival and sustainability. Some militant groups have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir, where activists have access to a modern education system and share a strong network with international terrorist groups. HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been found to be regrouping and following alternative strategies, due to concerted counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the current government. The results of the study also indicates that poverty unemployment, governance problems, decline in the quality of education and lack of political consensus are perceived as contributing factors for the people, especially the youth, to join either Islamist militant groups or support their activities and ideology. This report provides valuable information regarding terrorist activities in 2010-2011, as well as background information of the various terrorist groups in Bangladesh. We hope this information will contribute to the preparation of an effective national strategy to combat terrorism in Bangladesh.

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The commitment of the team of dedicated researchers of the Foreign Policy and Security Section of BEI in preparing the report deserves to be commended. We would also like to express our deep gratitude to the Royal Danish Embassy for its generous financial support for our project and for making this publication possible. We would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to all those who provided us with valuable inputs and suggestions for improving our understanding of the problem of terrorism, and in the writing of this report.

Farooq Sobhan President Bangladesh Enterprise Institute

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword

List of Tables List of Figures EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9-11 1. INTRODUCTION 12-14

Background About the Project Objectives of the Project Objectives of the Report Structure of the Report

2. METHODOLOGY 15-17

Data Collection Methods Sample Selection Procedure Data Processing and Analysis

3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY 18-36 3.1 Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents

Age, Gender and Residence Education and Working Status

3.2 General Perception on Security 3.3 Terrorism and Bangladesh

Public Definition of Terrorism Public Reluctance to Share Information Common Activities of Militants Objectives of Militant Activities Militant Networks Present Trends: Signs of Regrouping by Militants Sources of Finance for Militant Groups Involvement of Women in Militancy Target Population of Militancy Recruitment Motivational Techniques used in Militancy Recruitment Consequences of Militancy/Terrorism Reasons for Getting Involved in Terrorism

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Sources of Information on Militants Respondent’s Views on Combating Terrorism Awareness of Anti-Militancy Programs Steps towards Combating Terrorism

4. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 37-58

Updated Profiles of Terrorist Organizations Regional and International Cooperation Role of the Concerned Groups of Society Social Integration of Former Militants Need for Counter Terrorism (CT) Policy

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 59-60 APPENDIX TABLES 61-69

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Proportion of respondents who provided opinions on crimes that occurred in their localities.

Table 1.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the current situation based on the prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts as compared to the previous year.

Table1.3: Percentage distribution of respondents’ opinions on the most frequent injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts which occur in their localities.

Table 1.4: Measurement of respondents’ fears of facing injustice due to crime/suppression/ torture (%).

Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by people (%). Table 1.6: Peoples’ perception about Militancy/Terrorism (%). Table 1.7: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%) Table 1.8: Common activities of terrorist organizations found by the respondents (%). Table 1.9: Strategies followed by terrorists in their dawat (%). Table 1.10: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%) Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%) Table 1.12: Categories of people involved with militant groups (%) Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by militant activists (% of respondents) Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of

respondents) Table 1.15: Scopes of terrorists/militants threatening national security and democracy (%

of respondents) Table 1.16: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (% of respondents) Table 1.17: Major sources of information about militant groups and their activities (% of

the respondents) Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents) Table 1.19: Respondents’ awareness of anti-terrorism activities (%) Table 1.20: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the

prevention of terrorism (%) Table 1.21: Suggestions for mitigating insecurity and violence caused by extremist

groups (%) Table 1.22: Suggestions about integration of Ex-Militants within mainstream society (%)

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LISTOF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the current situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal acts as compared to the previous year.

Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%) Figure 2.3: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%) Figure 2.4: Recognized women participation in militancy (%) Figure 2.5: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (%) Figure 2.6: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the

prevention of terrorism (%)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The inception of the new millennium was marked by a series of sporadic and often deadly terrorist attacks in Bangladesh. In addition to the mainstream political groups, some extremist religious organizations have come into existence under political patronage. These organizations follow the same doctrine as that of the Taliban. The violent intentions of these groups were made apparent by several fatal terrorist attacks. The 2001 bombing of the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which killed 10 people and left scores injured was a major terror attack by HUJI. The following year JMB exploded bombs in several cinema halls in Mymensingh, killing 15 people and injuring many. Again in 2004, an attempt was made to murder the eminent writer and academic of Dhaka University, Humayun Azad, and the British High Commissioner, Anwar Chowdhury. There was also a deadly attack at a public rally of (the then opposition party) Awami League, which killed 24 people and injured 200. HUJI was accused of carrying out all these deadly attacks. In August 2005, JMB conducted synchronized explosions in 63 of the 64 districts of the country. These incidents galvanized immediate public attention and international concern for the need to counter these terrorist groups. With the extensive support of the current government, law enforcement agencies conducted effective counter-terrorism operations which reduced the level of activities of terror groups. However, it has been stated in several research reports that these groups still exist in the country by assuming different identities and following diverse strategies to continue their actions. Against this backdrop, DANIDA has extended their support to the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute to undertake a three year project on assessing the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The main objective of this project is to develop a National Counter Terrorism Policy (NCTP) in close partnership with the Government of Bangladesh. Under the Phase–I project activities, a report entitled ‘The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh 2009-2010’ was published, which contained relevant conclusions and recommendations and was disseminated to government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh Under the Phase-II activities of the DANIDA project, a survey has been conducted with a view to assessing and monitoring the characteristics, patterns and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism and thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information. With a sample size of 3,200 comprising different segments of literate people between the ages of 18 and 65 years, the survey was undertaken in June 2011 throughout the country. In addition, prominent citizens, religious leaders (the Imams), law enforcement agency personnel and gate-keepers of the community were included as Key Informant Interviewees. Information from newspapers was also included in this survey. The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime related activities have reduced. Also, in comparison with last year, a slight decline has been observed by a significant proportion of (about 40 percent) respondents. Some people (20 percent) still believed that the situation was the same as the year before. While identifying the types of illegal activities, respondents mentioned the following: robbery, highjacking, theft (80

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percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3 percent), and extortion (49.2 percent). Eve teasing was found to be common and an issue of great community concern. There are more issues which are causing insecurity among community people, such as drug addiction (74 percent), torture by police (17 percent), women and child trafficking (15.2 percent) and murder (28 percent). Over 13 percent of the respondents believed that these crimes had high impact on their lives. It is important to note that quite a low proportion, only 6 percent of the respondents, recognized about crimes related to any religion and 2 percent cited about the use of explosive devices. Findings indicate that the relationship between general people and law enforcement agency personnel, especially the police, is not amicable. In regard to approaching the police, general people expressed their fear of being involved in legal matters, as it requires considerable amount of money and other associated consequences. As a result, the majority of criminal cases are resolved among themselves. Regarding militant groups, although the respondents are aware of their activities, very negligible proportion of people is willing to talk about the active presence of these groups: JMB (10 percent), JMJB (4 percent), Allahr Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent), Hizbut Tawhid (0.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8 percent). The major objective and goal of these militant groups are: to threaten people initially and then takeover the country and establish an Islamic regime in the long-run. Some of the respondents believe that this is a strategy to destroy democracy and establish a rigid Islamic system of governance in the country. Militant groups were found to have networks within the country as well as around the world. Networking was found to be strong particularly in terms of following common or similar ideologies, receiving training on the use of high-tech equipment and funding. Funding is provided through NGOs in the name of community development or during religious festivals. Different wealthy Islamic countries are mentioned as sources of funding by over 51 percent of the respondents. About 53 percent of the people surveyed believe that the flow of funding is maintained by activists in different developed countries. Funding activities of local militant groups are mentioned as looting, murdering, high jacking, extortion or other illegal criminal activities. It has been reported in newspapers that many Rohingyas living in some Middle Eastern countries are involved in providing funds to militant groups. Ukhiya in Cox’s Bazar, at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, had been reportedly used for training by many notorious militant activists. In order to save themselves, these militant groups (previously notorious for heinous activities) have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir where activists have access to the modern education system and have strong networks with international terrorist groups. HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been found to be regrouping and following alternative strategies due to strong drive taken by the current government. The reasons behind supporting militant groups have been mentioned by the respondents as poverty, illiteracy, lack of proper practice of democracy and misinterpretation of Islam. The question therefore posed to the respondents was how to fight terrorism in Bangladesh? Generating mass awareness through broadcasting programs in the media and other campaign programs could be one way of combating terrorism and this is supported by 92 percent of the survey respondents. Strengthening legislation and justice

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system has been mentioned by 79.3 percent of the respondents. Appropriate attention should also be given to the cases that have remained unsettled for several years. There are about 50 international terrorists and militants who have been captured in Bangladesh; however, due to lack of adequate evidence against them, legal complications, lack of funds and other difficulties these cases have remained pending. About 92 percent of those surveyed have suggested that Imams have a responsibility to inform people about the peaceful nature of Islam. Appropriate amendment of the madrassa education system, impeding/checking corruption in different government circles, empowerment of people and banning student politics have been mentioned by 75 percent, 59 percent, 54 percent and 30 percent of the survey respondents respectively. In addition, families, societies, Ulema, public representatives and the youth have responsibility to rescue the nation from this process of creeping anarchy. Finally, we can conclude by saying that in order to combat terrorism in Bangladesh, the accomplishment of the following tasks is essential. These are: implementation of a national counter terrorism strategy and policy; establishing strong co-operation with the international community on a global counter terrorism strategy and policy; maintaining continuous efforts for overall sustainable socio-economic development of the country to offset the negative impact of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, misinterpretation of Islam, improper practice of democracy and so on. It was also mentioned that creating a sense of patriotism, and campaign and awareness related programs against militancy is also essential. Employment generation at different levels also should take place, respondents stated.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Background When we look back on the history of terrorism, there are several different linkages to this issue. In South Asia, terrorism has had a profound impact on inter-state relations. Accusations of cross-border terrorism and state terrorism continue to constrain moves towards a constructive engagement. It has also been reported by a segment of the Indian media that some South Asian countries have spawned, encouraged, aided and abetted terrorism in neighboring countries making border areas the familiar scene for terrorists including providing sanctuary, training and financial support.1 Therefore, to understand the trajectory of terrorism in Bangladesh, its history, roots and potential impact on society must be explored. Bangladesh’s history, geographic location, weak infrastructure, socio-economic and demographic factors and Islamic roots have facilitated the spread of extremist agendas.2 Political inaction and tacit approval of certain vested quarters encouraged terrorists to consolidate resources and strike when least expected. One of the first terrorist attacks for which HUJI gained nationwide notoriety was the 2001 attack on the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which killed ten people and left scores injured.3 The following year, JMB carried out near-simultaneous explosions in cinema halls in Mymensingh which killed 15 people and caused grievous injuries. In 2004, heinous attacks were carried out allegedly by HUJI members on eminent writer Humayun Azad and British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury. One of the the deadliest attacks was in August 2004, at the then opposition Awami League’s meeting, which killed 24 and injured 200. It was widely perceived that the target of the attack was the party leader Sheikh Hasina.4 JMB and JMJB grew unnoticed between 1998-2005 until they violently announced their existence in August 2005 with a country-wide bombing campaign of 500 coordinated bomb explosions in 63 districts of Bangladesh5. Although the number of casualties was small, this was the largest terrorist bombing campaign in the country and demonstrated the coordination and tactical capabilities as well as the wide reach of extremists. In November 2005, nine people, including two lawyers and a police constable, were killed and 78 persons injured in two suicide bomb attacks by JMB on the Chittagong and Gazipur court premises. In the same

1 Rahman, R. “Bangladesh’s Fight against Terror: Lessons learnt and future perspectives”. Osmany, M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. “Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P. 18

2 Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective

3 ‘Ramna Batamul Blast Case’ in The Daily Star viewed on the 01/06/11 http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=134379

4 Karlekar H. ‘The Terrorism that stalks Bangladesh’ in Global Asia Spring 2008, Vol 3, No 1, p42-48 Viewed on the 01/06/11 http://globalasia.org/new/l.php?c=e121

5 Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective. Osmany, M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. “Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P.122

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month, a JMB suicide bomber killed two senior assistant judges and wounded three people in the district headquarters of Jhalakathi.6 Later, only due to intense pressure from donor countries, the then government banned HUJI, JMB and JMJB in 2005. Prompted by the pressure of public perception as well as international concern, the extremist elements faced their first pressure under the Caretaker Government (CTG) of Fakhruddin Ahmed. By early 2007, six prominent leaders of JMB and JMJB had been arrested, tried and executed. The Awami League-led Grand Alliance government, upon assuming office in January 2009, continued the momentum started by the CTG and adopted a proactive approach to curbing terrorism. The adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Money Laundering Prevention Act in 2009 and the formation of ‘The National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention’ and ‘The National Committee for Intelligence Coordination’ have built a strong multi- faceted resistance to extremism and portrayed Bangladesh’s concerted efforts against terrorism to national and international observers.7 It is imperative that a comprehensive national strategy be adopted that would act as a holistic intra-governmental blueprint for countering terrorism with the plenary endorsement of civil, community and military constituents. About the Project

The project, ‘Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh’ aims to address the following challenges:

Overcome the existing absence of a comprehensive national CT policy by initiating action to work with the government and other relevant stakeholders in developing a government-owned and consensus-based National Counter Terrorism Policy which would provide the framework and policies to enable the government to address the problems of radicalization, militancy and terrorism in a comprehensive manner;

Lack of detailed action plans on priority areas of counter-terrorism, preventing strategies from taking practical shape;

Lack of systematic information, monitoring and assessment on terrorism trends in Bangladesh. This information is vital for policy-makers and to raise awareness of various stakeholders.

Objectives of the Project Long-Term Objective:

The long-term objective of the project is to strengthen the counter terrorism regime through advocacy for a government-owned and implemented National Counter Terrorism Policy.

6 Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, ‘Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper’ July 2007 revised in March 2011.

7 Ibid, p. 2

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Immediate Objectives:

The immediate objectives of the project are as follows: To reach a broad national consensus and raise consciousness of all stakeholders,

particularly the government, on the need for a comprehensive national level government-owned policy addressing radicalization, militancy and terrorism;

To assess and monitor the characteristics, patterns and trends of radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information for policymakers and other stakeholders to sensitize them about the need for a National Counter-Terrorism Policy;

To develop intellectual dialogue and discourse against terrorism amongst civil society members and youth, making them vigilant against radicalization/militancy and giving them an ownership of the counter terrorism agenda;

To provide technical assistance in developing a comprehensive government-owned policy on the basis of the BEI Strategy Paper on Counter Terrorism and other documents

Objectives of the Report The objectives of the Report are to assess and monitor the scenario as 2nd phase observation between the period of 2010 and 2011 focusing on the characteristics, patterns and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information for the policy makers, development partners, and other relevant stakeholders to sensitize them in order to further develop and provide inputs to countering terrorism in the country. Structure of the Report

The report has been structured into four parts that include the Introduction, Methodology, Major Findings of the Survey and Concluding Remarks. Ancillary tables are presented in the appendix.

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2. METHODOLOGY In accomplishing the aforementioned objectives, the research adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods. Qualitative method included desk research and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with three categories of respondents (Religious Leaders/Imams, Influential People of the Community, Law Enforcement Agency Personnel), in order to gather detailed information related to community insecurity, violence and militancy. In addition, a newspaper survey was done to collect more supportive and case specific information on these issues. A field survey for data collection was conducted in the month of July 2011. 2.1 Data Collection Methods Quantitative

Quantitative data was collected following a semi-structured questionnaire in face to face interviews with adult male and female respondents. Survey participants were selected from those who have at least primary level of education. Qualitative

Qualitative data collection was conducted through the following methods: Desk Research Key Informant Interview (KII) Newspaper Survey Sample Selection Procedure The target age group for the quantitative portion of the survey was between 18 and 65 years. Throughout the country with similar segment of male and female, respondents were selected on random basis. Distribution of Sample Size and Location

The study locations were selected from all seven administrative divisions of the country, with two upazilas from each of the selected districts. These locations were identified as most insecurity-prone places in terms of Islamist radicalization, extremism and religious militancy. Having this in mind, a total of 32000 sample size was selected from 64 thanas/upazilas (Sub-districts) of 32 districts of the seven divisions. Equal distribution was maintained in each thana/upazila having 100 in each.

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The following table depicts detailed distribution of sample for the survey:

Table 1: Distribution of survey locations

Division District (Urban)

Upazila/Thana (Rural)

Lalmonirhat Patgram, Durgapur Thakurgaon Ranisonkhail, Baliadangi Nilphamari Dimla, Domar Kurigram Ulipur, Bhurungamari Rangpur Pirgachha, Badarganj

Rangpur

Gaibandha Sadullahpur, Phulchhari Jaipurhat Khetlal, Akkelpur Naogaon Atrai,Raninagar Chapainawabganj Shibganj, Bholahat Rajshahi Bagmara, Godagari Natore Singra, Gurudaspur Sirajganj Ullapara, Shahzadpur

Rajshahi

Pabna Santhia, Chatmohor Kushtia Mirpur, Bheramara Jhenaidah Shailokupa, Moheshpur Chuadanga Alamdanga, Damurhuda Jessore Jhikorgachha, Sharsha Satkhira Kaliganj, Shyamnagar

Khulna

Khulna Dakope, Paikgachha Barisal Gournadi, Agailjhara Barguna Pathorghata, Amtoli

Barisal

Bhola Char Fashion, Borhanuddin Dhaka Dakshinkhan, Demra Gazipur Kapasia, Tongi Jamalpur Sharishabari Mymensingh Fulbaria, Muktagachha

Dhaka

Sherpur Nokla, Nalitabari Sylhet Jaintapur, Jokiganj Sylhet Habiganj Baniachar, Nabiganj Noakhali Begumganj, Chatkhil Chittagong Hathazari, Raujan

Chittagong

Cox’s Bazar Naikhangchhari, Ukhia KIIs As many as 96 KIIs were taken with 3 different respondents namely, Religious Leaders (Imams), Teachers, Public Representatives (Chairman/Member) and Officials from Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies (Police, RAB, NSI, DGFI).

Desk Research

A review of different newspaper reports, articles, editorials, books and documents was done, reflecting the overall situation of the different communities in Bangladesh and

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exploring the associated problems that have been hindering the development of these people. Media Survey

As source of media reports, BEI has chosen twelve daily newspapers. These newspapers are nationally and internationally well known and acceptable to the public as impartial news reports/sources on Community Security, Radicalization, Terrorism, Drugs and Arms Trafficking in the country. The newspapers are: The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, New Age, Shamokal, The Independent, Sangbad, Daily Naya Diganta, Jugantor, Inqilab, Ittefaq, New Nation and The Daily Janakantha from July 2010 to June 2011. Data Processing and Analysis

The data, acquired from the survey using three different techniques, was processed and analyzed independently and then triangulated. Under the newspaper survey, articles or any kind of news on community security, radicalization, terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking and the use of explosive devices were collected from the 12 selected newspapers between July 2010 to June 2011.

For quantitative data processing, SPSS (Version 17.0) was used for data analysis. Data processing involved the following stages:

Data entry and entry verification Cleaning and processing of data Coding and code transfer Development of analysis plan Analysis of programme development Programme running and report generation

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3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY Under this section, major findings of the surveys are presented in different broad and sub- headings which were derived from three separate methods that include quantitative household survey, Key Informant Interviews (KII) from three distinguished groups of personalities spread in different sections of the communities, information through desk research and the newspaper survey. 3.1 Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents

Age, Gender and Residence This section presents the socio-economic characteristics of the survey respondents in terms of age, sex, education, religion and occupation. Table 2 shows the distribution of male and female respondents throughout the survey areas under seven divisions of the country. The distribution of respondents by division of residence shows that a majority of the respondents live in Rajshahi (22 percent), nearly one-fifth (19 percent) live in Rangpur and another one-fifth (19 percent) lives in Khulna. Over 9 percent live in Barisal and 16 percent of the respondents reside in Dhaka division. The number of respondents living in Chittagong was found to be similar to that in Barisal (over 9 percent). Sylhet division showed the lowest proportion (6.2 percent) of respondents in the survey. Nearly nine in every ten were Muslims, while the rest were mostly Hindus. Table 2: Background Characteristics of the Respondents

Percentage distribution of male and female respondents by age, religion, gender, education and occupation

Background Characteristics

Male Female Total

Age 18 – 30 Yrs 62.4 37.6 68.0 31 - 45 Yrs 64.6 35.4 24.3 46 - 59 Yrs 74.3 25.7 6.3 60+ Yrs 78.6 21.4 1.3 Division Rangpur 51.5 48.5 18.7 Rajshahi 61.6 38.4 21.8 Khulna 59.3 40.7 18.7 Barisal 50.7 49.3 9.3 Dhaka 60.0 40.0 15.6 Sylhet 63.5 36.5 6.2 Chittagong 68.3 31.7 9.3 Religion

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Background Characteristics

Male Female Total

Islam 59.6 40.4 87.5 Hindu 52.6 47.4 9.4 Others 61.8 57.3 1.2 Education Primary 51.8 48.2 4.2 Secondary 61.4 38.6 27.0 Higher Secondary 56.0 44.0 34.5 Graduate 56.7 43.3 23.2 Post-Graduate 68.2 31.8 10.3 Occupation Employed 61.4 38.6 22.2 Student 55.0 45.0 45.4 Politician 68.9 31.1 1.4 Businessman 96.7 3.3 17.0 Unemployed 54.4 45.6 2.8 Other 9.7 90.3 10.9 N 1,880 1,320 3,200

Education and Working Status

About 35 percent of the respondents interviewed completed Higher Secondary level schooling. The second highest respondents (27 percent) completed their education up to secondary level. A good number of respondents interviewed completed their level of education up to graduation. There were also post-graduate level respondents, at over 10 percent. The lowest (4.2 percent) responses were taken from the respondents who had primary level of education. No significant differences were found in education levels between male and female respondents. A variation was observed in the occupation list of the participants. It seems that the majority responses were taken from the students (45.4 percent). The second majority responses (22.2 percent) were found to be employed. About 17 percent of the respondents had small or medium categories of businesses; among them almost 97 percent were male. Although it is very low and insignificant (1.4 percent), there were people who hold politics as occupation. 3.2 General Perception on Security From a security perspective, in order to get a clear view of the situation of the country, respondents were asked about the frequency of crime/injustice/extremism/illegal acts or incidents compared to the previous year. About 40 percent of the respondents opined that such acts had declined, compared to last year. Similarly, from in-depth interviews taken of particular professionals, it was revealed that terrorist activities had decreased comparatively in their respective localities, although the reasons behind this changed situation were not given by them. Over 15 percent of the respondents said that there was little increase in terrorism. More than 20 percent of the respondents believed the situation was the same as before (Appendix Table: 1.1).

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Figure 2.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinion regarding the situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal acts compare to the previous year.

4.0 2.56.57.9 7.4

15.3

6.3 4.9

11.2

25.0

14.5

39.5

4.7 2.77.4

10.9 9.3

20.2

0

10

20

30

40

50

Male Female Total

Too high

Li ttle increase

Huge decline

Smal l decline

Very little

Same as before

Types of illegal activities were gleaned from the survey participants. According to their opinion, crimes related to personal property such as robbery, highjacking and theft (80 percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3 percent), and extortion (49.2 percent) were found to be common in the participants’ respective areas of residence. Another often reported crime is eve teasing. A significant proportion (63 percent) of the respondents had complained about this cause of insecurity. Drug addiction is another crime that causes high level of insecurity among community people as more than 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about it. Among others, police torture (17 percent), trafficking in women and children (15.2 percent), and murder (28 percent) were mentioned by the survey participants. About 65 percent of the respondents believed that all this had some influence on their lives. Although a significant number of responses were noted to have experienced the influence of crime in their lives, the vast majority (83.2 percent) of them denied experiencing any injustice or crime during the past one year (Figure: 2.1). Although respondents mentioned a series of crimes the community people had dealt with, a majority (65 percent) of them believed that this had little influence in their lives. Over 13 percent of the respondents felt that it had high influence in their lives. During the past one year, how much the community people had come across any injustice/crime or suppression was measured. About 17 percent of the respondents said that they had experienced such crimes. Among them, 10 percent were male and 7 percent female (Table 1.5). The majority of the respondents mentioned crimes related to personal property such as theft, robbery, looting, hijacking, etc to be a common type of violence in the community, 33.4 percent claimed that violence was mostly politically motivated, while 21 percent thought about eve teasing to be another cause of rising violence in the community. About 11.3 percent of those surveyed agreed that drug addiction was a reason for community violence. Conflict due to religious reasons was cited by 6 percent of the respondents, and violence using explosive materials was stated by only 2 percent of those surveyed as another reason for community violence. Participants (64 percent) also said that they would report to the police if they were confronted by these types of violent acts again (Table: 1.5).

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Respondents were also asked about why they did not report to the police for the violent incidents faced in the past. In response to this question, a number of reasons were given. The survey results are presented according to the proportion of their response. Over 25 percent of the respondents gave family and personal reason, while 18.4 percent mentioned fear of vengeance or worsening of situation. Some respondents (17 percent) mentioned that they had resolved the problems through mutual understanding. Fear of harassment by the police was another reason as stated by 15 percent of the survey participants, while 14 percent mentioned about not having such kind of experience so far. However, 50 percent of the respondents said that they were a little worried, while 17 percent felt very worried for the members of their families who might be victims of any crime, torture or injustice. According to the KII respondents, money was another factor for not approaching the police. “There is law but no implementation. Moreover, the police charges Tk. 1,500 to Tk. 10,000 for filing a case” was the opinion expressed by many KII respondents of Jhenaidah and Pabna. Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by the people (%).

Indicators Male Female Total Politically motivated violence 23.4 10.0 33.4 Ethnic conflict 2.8 1.0 3.8 Religious / conflict motivated by religious reasons 2.3 2.2 4.5 Torture using explosive devices/materials 1.3 0.7 2.0 Extortion 10.7 4.2 14.9 Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery, looting, highjacking)

26.8 14.8 41.6

Eve teasing 5.7 14.9 20.6 Rape 3.1 2.8 5.9 Murder 4.0 1.2 5.1 Drug addiction/drinking 7.3 4.0 11.3 Women and children trafficking 1.8 0.4 2.2 Police exploitation / torture 5.4 2.5 7.9 RAB exploitation/torture 1.2 0.9 2.0 In favour of reporting to the police in case of facing any illegal activities

36.0 27.5 63.5

3.3 Terrorism and Bangladesh

Public Definition of Terrorism

The public’s understanding of terrorism was assessed through a survey of a number of people. The survey participants were asked ‘have you ever heard of the word terrorism/militancy?’ Table 1.6 (Appendix) indicates that most of the respondents, except 2 out of 10 people, had not heard about the terms. Some views on militancy are recorded

23

Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%)

5.5

4.1

9.6

2.4

1.3

3.8

1.20.8

2.02.7

1.6

4.2

1.30.4

1.7 1.80.8

2.6

0

2

4

6

8

10

JMB JMJB HUJI AllahrDall

HizbutTawhid

HibutTahrir

Male

Female

Total

here from the respondents’ idea about this issue. As many as 89 percent of the respondents perceived terrorism or militancy as ‘using Islam as a reason to cause instability in the society, and causing fear through anti-social and anti-state acts such as, bombing, vandalism, looting, murder, use of arms, etc.’ More than 81 percent of the participants understand the term/issue of terrorism/militancy as ‘using Islam to steer people in the wrong direction or giving people wrong concepts’. Some people (21.1 percent) took this issue as a fight against non-Islamic state. According to a report published in a journal, the power seeking leaders, who want to use religion as a tool, are the facilitators of extremism in Bangladesh. Beside these, religious and political ideological contradictions, rigid religious beliefs, socio-economic factors like poverty, unequal job opportunities, hunger, backwardness and unemployment also significantly contribute to the rise of extremism in Bangladesh. 8 Public Reluctance to share Information

In this survey, attempts have been made to explore the nexus between religion and militancy. As such, questions were asked about active terrorist groups who motivate people using Jihadi9 ideas in the participants’ respective localities. Compared to the response rate on other issues, a very low proportion of participants spoke about extremist groups. The active presence of JMB was mentioned by only 10 percent of the respondents. Regarding other militant groups, responses were lower than 10 percent. The other groups were JMJB (4 percent), Allahr Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent), Hizbut Tawhid (.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8 percent). From the findings and field observation, it was obvious that people were somehow not willing to provide information about the militant groups (Figure 2.2).

8 Islam, M. A. Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh, BIISS Journal. Vol, 29, No.2, April 2008. P. 161 9 The meaning of jihadi is ‘something of or relating to a jihad’. Jihad is an Arabic for what can be

variously translated as "struggle" or "effort," or "to strive," "to exert," "to fight," depending on the context. In the West, the word is generally understood to mean "holy war," and the terms are given, inaccurately, exclusively militant or violent connotations. Including "jihad" as one of the five pillars of Islam is another common Western misunderstanding. Jihad is not among the five pillars of Islam (the profession of faith, prayer five times a day, fasting during Ramadan, alms for the poor, and performance of the holy Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in each financially solvent Muslim's lifetime).

24

Common Activities of Militants

Although respondents were somewhat reluctant to provide information about the presence of terrorist groups in their localities, survey participants were responsive in expressing their views on the activities of the militants. Few activities are mentioned here as stated by the participants: invite people through Jihadi concepts (46.3 percents), extortion (26 percent), motivating in Jihadi sentiments (23.1 percent), threaten (22 percent), torture in various ways (19 percent), disseminate motivational messages for fundamentalism (17 percent), teach about how to hate other religions and countries (16 percent), murder (14 percent), provide Jihadi training (12.4 percent), provide training on how to use arms (7 percent). (Table: 1.8) Table 1.8: Common activities of the terrorist activists found by the respondents (%)

Common activities of the terrorist activists

Male Female Total

Giving dawat (special invitation) through jihadi concepts

30.4 15.8 46.3

Murder 8.6 5.1 13.7 Extortion 14 11.7 25.7 Causing fear/terror 11.1 10.6 21.7 Torturing in various ways 11.5 7.5 18.9 Increasing/ Disseminating fundamentalism/radicalization

10.4 6.2 16.6

Increasing/disseminating militancy 5.6 1.6 7.3 Giving jihadi training 8.4 4 12.4 Motivating in jihadi sentiments 15.3 7.8 23.1 Training in arms use 4 2.7 6.7 Teaching to hate other country/religion 9.8 5.6 15.5

Arranging invitations to motivate people to join militant groups is a common strategy of these groups, which is commonly known as “Dawati Strategy”. Among their many activities under this strategy, some have been revealed in this survey. Dissemination of messages through distribution of Jihadi books, leaflets and CDs are known to the majority of survey participants; 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about this. The other activities included use of mosques to motivate general people (13 percent) and door to door visit (12.4 percent). Targeting madrasa students and motivating them (39.4 percent) has been claimed by different sources as well (Table: 1.9) Table 1.9: Strategies followed by the terror activists in their dawat (%).

Indicators Male Female Total Jihadi Books, Leaflets, CD, etc. 45.8 27.7 73.6 Door to door visit 7.1 5.3 12.4 Visit madrasas 25.4 14 39.4 In Mosques 7.3 5.3 12.6

25

KII respondents from all seven divisions have mentioned that militant outfits involve themselves in activities such as spreading misinterpretation of Islam, distribution of invitations and manifestos, creating fear among citizens by bombing and killing. Respondents have also said that militants hide in mosques and follow the guerrilla style of warfare. Objectives of Militant Activities

The study also aimed to understand the objectives of militant activities. KII respondents in different regions sketched a few aims of the militants such as: “Their short term objective is to threaten people and long term plan is to capture political power of the country”; “They have only one objective which is to disturb the people and government”; and, “Demolish democracy and establish Saudi system of governance”. These views were mentioned by respondents in Barguna, Jhenaidah, Lalmonirhat, Baniyarchar, Cox’s Bazar, Khulna, Noakhali, and Joypurhaat. A report published in a journal states that JMB tries to instill fear in people and force society to accept a corrupt version of Islamic ideology. They attempt this not realizing that this ideology is deeply flawed and fails to fit in a nation that adopts a unique blend of religio-cultural values to govern their day-to-day life. 10 Another research report has shown that a global Islamist organization, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT, Party of Liberation) aims to impose Shariah (Islamic Law) across the world. With this aim in mind, the organization has built strong global networks11. Militant Networks

All three categories of KII respondents have acknowledged that there is a nexus between militant groups residing in Bangladesh and based abroad in terms of economic, technological and organizational connections. A religious leader from Barguna stated, ‘Terrorist organizations in Bangladesh receive funds from international terrorist groups’. In addition to receipt of funding, terrorist groups in Bangladesh also maintain connections for learning and adopting training techniques and the same ideology, as stated by respondents in Thakurgaon and Rangpur. Terrorist groups are quite proficient in using modern technology, such as the internet, mobile phones, some special signals and other types of very strong networking systems. This information was provided by all KII respondents from law enforcement agencies. In this survey, attempts have been made to figure out the number of militants operating in Bangladesh and those arrested. From the statements given by some KII respondents, it has been estimated that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militant activists are operating in this country and about 200 activists have so far been arrested by law enforcement agencies. However, respondents have not provided information about foreign militants who are suspected to have connection with home-grown terrorist groups.

10 M. Sakhawat Hussain, “Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A Bangladesh Perspective” in Mufleh R. Osmany, and Mohammad Humayun Kabir (ads.), Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P.122

11 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index.htm#assessment1 (Accessed on 26/10/2011)

26

According to newspaper reports, five Bangladeshi people were arrested on suspicion of conducting terrorist attacks near the Sellafield nuclear site in UK. It was also reported by the BBC that all the arrestees were suspected of taking pictures of the nuclear site hours after the killing of Osama Bin Laden.12 In another case, a Bangladeshi citizen named Maulana Mohammad Imran, staying in Habiganj, was found working as a local co-coordinator for the Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT’s Bangladesh co-coordinator Khurram, alias Mohammad Salem, was mentioned as the co-coordinator of India and Bangladesh LeT chapters. 13

Some leading newspapers have reported that militants are still receiving funds from several foreign NGOS to carry out their activities. It has also been alleged that militants have linkages with an islamist political party in Bangladesh.14 Some Islamist extremist groups are alleged to have collaboration with the underground leftist groups.

Present Trend: Signs of Re-grouping by Militants According to newspaper reports, militants are resorting to alternative strategies to ensure their existence under effective counter-terrorism operations taken by the current government.

In order to retain their existence, the Islamist militants are trying to unite under a common platform keeping Hizbut Tahrir in the forefront, as its members are educated in the modern education system. According to intelligence sources, international terrorist groups are also keeping an eye on Hizbut Tahrir.15 Evidence shows that JMB and Hizbut Tahrir are trying to form joint collaborations. They are also trying to establish liaisons with other terrorist and political groups at home and abroad. It has also been revealed in a media report that those who had been arrested during a hartal were HUJI and JMB militants who were being reorganized slowly under the banners of various Islamist groups. 16

Sources of Financing for Militant Groups

International terrorist groups were the top source of funding, according to the majority (65.4 percent) of the people surveyed. Another major source of fund collection for these groups was the subscription from dedicated activists residing in different developed countries. About 53 percent of the selected participants for this survey mentioned about this source of funding. Over 51 percent people were of the view that different wealthy Muslim countries nurtured these militant groups’ activities by providing funds to some NGOs. Local people also unintentionally finance these groups by giving donations in the name of Islam. This was realized by 21.3 percent of the respondents. Money collection

12 The Independent: 5 May 2011 13 Janakantha, Protham Alo, The Daily Star, of 5 October 2010. 14 The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011 15 The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011 16 The Daily Janakantha: 7 April, 2011

27

Figure 2.3: Source of financing to the militant activists/groups (%)

33.1

19.8

52.9

32.6

18.5

51.1

41.8

23.6

65.4

14.69.4

24.0

12.39.0

21.3

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

From theiractivistsliving indifferentwealthy

countries inthe name of

Islam

Donationfrom Muslimcountries for

NGOs

InternationalTerroristgroups

Forciblycollect money

from localpeople

Religiousdonation

from localpeople

Male

Female

Total

by force from local people, such as extortion, murder, looting, highjacking or creating fear was mentioned by 24 percent of the survey participants. (Figure: 2.3) “Expatriates in Saudi Arabia and England, foreign madrasas, Muslim countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and non- Muslim countries such as China, various Islamic NGOs and INGOs” were sources of funding as mentioned by KII respondents from Pabna, Daulatpur of Kushtia, Dhaka, Rajshahi, Sirajganj, Jamalpur, Sherpur and Sylhet. A senior official in law enforcement disclosed a HUJI leader’s confession during interrogation that HUJI had received financial aid from around 3,000-4,000 associates working in different Middle Eastern countries.17 The HUJI leader also stated that an organization named “Rashid Trust” in Pakistan had been providing HUJI with financial aid.18 According to another newspaper, Islamist extremists receive huge financial resources from different local and international NGOs, banks, insurance companies, private clinics, real estate companies and other business organizations.19 Involvement of Women in Militancy

Regarding women activists in militant groups, 32 percent of the survey respondents were aware of it. When asked about the reasons for women joining extremist groups, a few factors were mentioned by the respondents. Over 48 percent noted that women activists were mostly the family members of the militants. Financial problems in the family were another reason given by 32.1 percent of the surveyed people (Figure: 2.4). Being family

17 The Daily Star: 28 April 2011; The Daily Janakantha: 30 April 2011 18 The Daily Janakantha: 29 April 2011 19 The Independent: 19 June 2011

28

Figure 2.4: Recognized women participation in militancy (%)

Recognized women participation in militancy

18.313.4

31.7

0

10

20

30

40

Male Female Total

members of the militant group activists, some women were compelled to act as militants as stated by 30 percent of the respondents. It is easy to force women than men to join these groups, 23 percent respondents stated. Extremist male members forcibly brought the women into their groups, over 17 percent of the respondents claimed. Some women joined these groups with an intention that they would be able to empower themselves and could also prove their worth in the society; 8.4 percent of the respondents stated this factor. Over 8 percent of the respondents believed that women who wanted to change the society by establishing an Islamic state would join militant groups. (Table. 1.11) Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Recognized women participation in militancy 18.3 13.4 31.7

Reasons for being involved with militant groups by the women Being relatives or family members of the militant activists

29.6 18.6 48.2

Being forced by their family to join the militant groups

18 11.5 29.5

It is much easier to force women to join the groups than the men

13.5 9.3 22.8

Extremist male members force the females to join the groups

9.8 7.5 17.2

Joins the groups for receiving financial benefit

18.2 13.9 32.1

To bring change in the society through establishing Islamic state

5.5 2.9 8.3

Because they do not get equal political, economic and social rights in the present state system

2.4 3.1 5.5

To gain equal acceptability/acknowledgement/ freedom of expression as men

2.8 1.8 4.6

To increase women empowerment or to increase their status in the eyes of their elders

5.4 3 8.4

29

Target Population for Militancy Recruitment

One of the fundamental activities of any militant organization relates to recruitment. The underprivileged groups of people are the main target group to get involved in terrorist activities. As gleaned from the survey, the intended people are: poor uneducated males (46.2 percent); madrasa students (44 percent); educated and unemployed youth (41.3 percent); those people who are truly sympathetic to the extremists’ principles (35 percent); poor and uneducated people (32.4 percent); youths who want change in the society (25.1 percent); those people who did not get legal justice from cases including murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, highjacking, loot, etc. (24.2 percent); criminals and those who got involved in criminal activities (18 percent); and educated unemployed young females (14 percent). (Appendix Table 1.12) Motivational Techniques Used in Militancy Recruitment

The survey results revealed that there were various strategies followed by extremists for motivating people to join them. The most popular way of influencing people was to motivate them in the name of Islam; 61 percent of respondents agreed about this technique, among which 35.2 percent were supported by male and 26 percent female. As they target the underprivileged people, especially those who were unable to meet their basic human needs, extremists offer money to them and then involve them in their activities; more than 33 percent of the respondents said about this method. Approximately one third of the respondents mentioned leaflet distribution for encouraging people with their ideology. Organizing meetings and discussions to encourage people to accept the militant group’s ideology was stated by 22.4 percent of respondents. Extremists also engage them in community welfare activities such as providing food, jobs and giving financial support for organizing marriage ceremonies, as observed by 23 percent of survey participants. Extremists not only allure people with their social welfare activities, they also seduce people by promising to provide smart cell phones, computers and other luxury items, as stated by 25 percent of the respondents. Some respondents also said that extremists’ used intimidation (8 percent) and showed their continuous endeavor in undertaking welfare activities to demonstrate that they were more active than the government in this area (9 percent). Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by the militant activists (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Influence and motivate in the name of Islam 35.2 25.5 60.7 Encourage people distributing leaflets 16.7 12 28.7 Encourage people to join their meetings/discussions 12.8 9.6 22.4 Helping people through charity works such as, providing food, employment, giving money for wedding, etc.

14.0 8.7 22.7

Giving financial support 18.9 14.3 33.2 Alluring people by offering better life, mobile phone, computer, etc.

14.0 11.0 25.0

Criticizing the government and the political system 12.7 8.3 21.0 Constantly trying to prove that they more devoted to people’s welfare

4.2 3.5 7.7

Terrorizing people or forcing them 10.7 5.5 16.2

30

Consequences of Militancy/Terrorism

Respondents were asked about how terrorist activities could affect one’s life, the society and the country as a whole. A highly significant proportion of respondents mentioned about different security threats. These are mentioned below in chronological order by the proportion of findings (Appendix Table 1.14):

Threat to national security was mentioned by 95 percent of the respondents

89.4 percent believed that terrorism was a threat to life and property of the people

85 percent of the respondents thought terrorism damage national image of the country

74 percent of the respondents mentioned that it was a threat to the process of democracy

The most viable issue, ‘the economy of the country’, terrorism brings threat to this (75 percent)

Social security, social cohesion and social stability could be paralyzed as mentioned by 88 percent, 71 percent and 81.3 percent of the respondents respectively

Eight out of ten people believed that incidents related to anti-social and anti-state activities such as, bombing explosion, looting, vandalism, destruction of lives and property damage, attacking the state structure, etc. were a menace to national security and democracy of the country

Terrorism causes enmity among different ethnic and linguistic groups as believed by 32 and 55.4 percent of the respondents respectively.

More than one-fourth of the respondents believe that it involves innocent members of the public in the anti-state and anti-government activities.

Similar to the above mentioned findings, another report has viewed terrorism as a threat to a wide range of national security goals. This threat perception is concurrent with terrorists’ methods of operation, saliency of enemy and counter terrorism efforts. So it is important to understand threat, threat sources, and determinants of terrorism. Although threat differs from place to place and time to time, the perception of threat includes analysis of the indicators and vulnerabilities.20 Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Can easily define/identify the terrorists 6.4 4.5 10.9 Terrorist activities have increased a lot 4.9 6 10.9 A little increase 7.9 7.4 15.2 Same as before 18.1 16.3 34.3 Terrorism is a threat to national life 56.2 38.4 94.6

Threatened areas of our life due to terrorism Threat to national security 55.3 39.8 95.1 Threat to life and property of people 51.9 37.5 89.4

20 Islam, M. Aynul, “Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh,” BIISS Journal. Vol, 29, No.2, April 2008. P.156

31

Figure 2.5: Reasons to be involved in terrorism (%)

42.1

31.2

73.4

25.4

14.9

40.3 38.5

24.3

62.8

16.912.1

29.0

11.58.3

19.923.9

17.8

41.7

27.520.7

48.2

0

20

40

60

80

A B C D E F G

Male

Female

Total

Indicators Male Female Total Threat to national image 52.4 32.3 84.7 Threat to democracy 44.9 28.5 73.5 Threat to the economy of the country 45.8 28.9 74.7 Threat to social security 50.4 37.7 88 Threat to social cohesion 42.5 28.3 70.8 Threat to social stability 49.8 31.5 81.3

Table 1.15: Scope of creating threat at the level of national security and democracy (% of

respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Terrorism can threaten national security and democracy through anti-social and anti-state activities (such as, bombing, looting, destruction, loss of life and property, attacking state structure, etc.)

47.2 32.1 79.3

Terrorism hampers state sovereignty, security, social and economic prosperity, degrades the national image at international level and undermines human rights.

41.4 23.3 64.7

Causes enmity among different ethnic and linguistic groups

20.5 11 31.5

Destroys the image of Islam as a religion 32.3 23.1 55.4 Involves general and innocent people in anti-state and anti-government activities

16.1 11.9 28

Reasons for Getting Involved in Terrorism

‘Why some people in Bangladesh get involved in terrorism?’ It is natural for this question to grow in the minds of the people of Bangladesh as they have faced challenges due to terrorists’ deadly attacks several times. Through this survey, the reasons for peoples’ involvement with terrorist activities have been explored. Poverty has been mentioned as one of the prime causes for getting involved in terrorism by three fourths of the people in the survey. According to them, people join militant groups because they cannot meet their basic needs. Wrong interpretation of Islam to Muslim devotees is another reason, as mentioned by 63 percent of the people surveyed. Four out of ten people believe it is a political matter in which Islam is being manipulated. Illiteracy is another important reason stated by 42 percent of the survey people. Lack of democracy in the country was stated by 20

32

percent of the respondents and 29 percent believe terrorism in Bangladesh is influenced by regional and international militancy. (Figure: 2.5). Similar to the responses derived from the quantitative survey, KII participants also mentioned about poverty, illiteracy, lack of democracy and misinterpretation of religion. “Militants want to capture state power”, “This is a conspiracy of external sources”, “This is to create chaos in the society” were mentioned by public representatives of Mymensingh, Lalmonirhat, Sylhet and Rangpur. Some respondents viewed that some people engaged in terrorist activities do not even realize the consequences of their activities. According to an article published in a journal, there are linkages between terrorism and Islam. The analysis shows that Deobandi Islam denounces the worship of saints, music and dancing, and refuses any idea of progress and envisions a return to a puritanical view of Islam. Such a misguided view of Islam is able to spread due to five specific reasons: bad state of Islamic scholarship in the Muslim world; the misperceptions of what “secularism” means; the strong influence of Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies due to the rise of petrodollars; the post-national diaspora in the Middle East, those involved being attracted to a puritan version of Islam; and the weaponization of society.21 Sources of Information on Militants

Most people surveyed mentioned television as the major source of information regarding the militants and their activities (92 percent). Newspapers came as the second available source for this kind of information (approximately 75 percent). Hearing from other people as a source has been mentioned by 33.2 percent of the respondents. Only 27.2 percent people mentioned radio as a source of information. Some respondents mentioned the internet, their own experiences and talking to witnesses as sources of information, which are 13 percent, 6 percent and 2.2 percent respectively. Table 1.17: Major sources of information about the militant groups and their activities (% of

the respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total TV 53.8 38.2 92 Radio 16.6 10.5 27.2 Newspaper 45.7 27.8 73.5 Internet 7.4 5.1 12.5 Heard from other people 17.8 15.5 33.2 Own experience 3.3 2.3 5.7 Have witnessed 1.4 .8 2.2

21 Shuman, A. Counter-Terrorism in Bangladesh: The Imperative for Community-Based Approach. BIISS Journal, Vol. 28, No.3, July 2007, p. 238

33

Respondents’ Views on Combating Terrorism

While initiating to take opinion from the target audience on how to counter terrorism, it was essential to know their awareness on this issue. Over 68 percent of them were aware of this. Among them, 41 percent were male and 28 percent were female respondents. Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Peoples’ awareness on terrorism 40.6 27.5 68.1

Few measures to tackle terrorism By giving proper interpretation of Islam through the Imams

53.7 38.1 91.8

By amendment of Madrasa education 44.8 30.2 74.9 Strengthening legislation and the judiciary 45 34.3 79.3 Banning of student politics 15.8 14.2 30.0 Stopping corruption in different government circles 33.9 25.4 59.3 Empowerment of people 31.2 22.5 53.7 Increasing public awareness through the mass media and public awareness programmes

54.4 37.7 92.1

Don’t know/ Can’t say 44.4 52.8 97.2

In response to the question on how terrorism could be prevented, there are as many as 7 different ideas/thoughts stated by the respondents. Slightly over 92 percent suggested for generating mass awareness, broadcasting programmes through the media and implementation of other campaigns as one way of preventing terrorism in the society. Eight out of ten people (79.3 percent) suggested strengthening legislation and the justice system of the country. In order to promote the true meaning and image of Islam, Imams (Muslim religious leaders) could take the responsibility of explaining religion properly (suggested by majority participants - 92 percent). Three fourths of people surveyed (75 percent) think that appropriate reforms of Madrasa education could be one of the measures against terrorism. Slightly over 59 percent and 54 percent of the respondents recommended stopping corruption in different government circles and empowerment of people respectively. Only 30 percent of people mentioned of the banning of student politics as a mean of preventing terrorism in Bangladesh.

The most common recommendation from all KII respondents of seven divisions is seeking assistance from general people, as terrorists reside within the community. It is often difficult to deal with them unless community people cooperate in providing information to law enforcement agencies.

“Terrorists live among general people. So, they can help by providing information secretly. We can ensure security in this case”- is the gist of the statements from all seven divisions.

Respondents have been asked about how to improve the situation related to the present legal framework or any other weaknesses in countering terrorism. Some respondents were unwilling to opine as they were not aware of this issue. However, a majority of those who were aware of it appreciated the actions taken by the current government and according to them, it made the situation comfortable for the citizens. Some of the respondents, mostly people’s representatives, recommended death penalty for acts of terrorism.

34

Awareness of Anti Militancy Programmes

According to 30 percent of the respondents, there are some anti-terrorism measure in their respective areas. Four out of ten people (40 percent) have stated that they were aware of some public awareness campaigns undertaken by the government and other sources. Table 1.19: Respondent’s awareness on anti-terrorism activities (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Area wise anti-terrorism activities 19.5 10.4 29.8 Public awareness programmes undertaken by the government or by the general public

26.2 13.8 40

Among those who observed the awareness programmes The law enforcement agencies have been more strengthened

60.6 31.8 92.3

Forming a secured society by organizing people through various awareness programs

47.4 23.5 70.9

Expressing dislike for extremist groups and bringing them under the legal framework

29 17.1 46.1

Modernization of Madrasa education 26.1 16.6 42.7 Providing employment opportunities 18.4 13.1 31.6 Establishing various recreational organizations such as clubs, groups, etc.

12.3 6.8 19.1

Employing community police 26.7 15.3 42 Establishing equal rights for both men and women through reformation of shalish

10.6 8.2 18.8

Improving the law or judicial system 37.7 16 53.7 Nothing has been done 21.7 8.5 30.3 Anti militancy sermons in mosques 20.8 9.5 30.4

Those who mentioned these measures were asked to describe those. Ten different measures had been identified by the people surveyed such as the initiative taken to strengthen the law enforcement agencies (92.3 percent) and encourage local people to organize different awareness programmes aiming to have a peaceful society (71 percent). More than half (54 percent) of the surveyed people had talked about improvement in the judicial system and 46 percent had appreciated the initiatives taken to prosecute the extremist groups under the legal framework. Initiatives taken for madrasa reform had been appreciated by 43 percent of the survey participants. As unemployment has been cited as a reason for joining terrorist groups, many people (32 percent) suggested for measures to create employment opportunities. As many as 19 percent of respondents mentioned about setting up various recreational facilities, such as clubs, groups, societies, etc and reforming ‘Shalish’ to establish equal rights for both genders. About 30.4 percent respondents have acknowledged the importance of messages passed through the sermons in mosques. However, 30.3 percent of the people surveyed reported that there were not many social awareness campaigns against terrorism (Table. 1.19).

35

Figure 2.6: Level of success of the law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in prevention of terrorism (%)

24.8

18.4

43.2

9.96.9

16.8

0.8 0.6 1.40

10

20

30

40

50

A little Quite successful Completelysuccessful

Male

Female

Total

In the survey, people were asked about the role of law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism. Certain positive changes have been recognized by 43.2 percent of the respondents, while 17 percent believe that the programmes/ initiatives taken by law enforcement agencies have been quite successful. Respondents of the survey also mentioned that terrorist cases were handled under the Criminal Procedure Act while some others mentioned the Anti Terrorism Act 2009 and the Small Arms Act. “This Act helped in arresting and punishing terrorists” was the view of people of five survey areas. Indeed, those who were aware of these Acts appreciated this initiative. According to the KII respondents, due to successful implementation of these laws, the number of terrorists has decreased. Newspapers reported about programmes arranged by a civil society organization named Shamprodaikota-Jangibad Birodhi Mancho based in Chittagong. Some observers are of the view that communalism and militancy were crucial challenges facing the country. Others were of the view that the country would suffer a lot if the government and people of the country compromised on the matter and did not stop the activities of the militants and communalists immediately.22 Mobilization of community people in countering ideological radicalism has also been emphasized in the International Conference on Community Engagement (ICCE), held in September 2011. In this conference, community engagement has been focused on three-dimensional approaches. First, engagement programmes to reach out to the Muslim community in order to empower them with knowledge that will immunize them from extremists’ ideologies. The second approach targets the non-violent extremists who are exposed to violence and the violent ones who exist but remain unknown. The third approach would engage non-Muslims in community programmes to ensure that they do not have a wrong understanding and perception of Islam.23 Steps towards Combating Terrorism

Almost all the respondents (98 percent) supported the integrated collective approach between local/general people and the intelligence/law enforcement agencies as an effective force to counter terrorism. Similarly, 97 percent of the respondents felt it necessary to have a comprehensive national strategy to prevent terrorism in Bangladesh.

22 The Independent: 19 June 2011 23 CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, International Centre for Political Violence and

Terrorism Research – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; Volume 3, Special Issue 1, October 2011.

36

Table 1.21: Suggestions for the solution of the insecurity and violence caused by the extremist groups (%)

Indicators Male Female Total

The law enforcement agencies must come forward 48.7 32.2 80.8 The capacity of the law enforcement agencies should be enhanced so that they can handle any violent situation more easily.

33.3 21.1 54.3

Perpetrators of violence must be brought under legal framework

22.1 16.5 38.6

Modernization of educational system and making it more suitable for employment

18.2 12.6 30.8

Amendment of Madrasa education 26.3 18.3 44.6 Increase employment opportunities 27.2 20 47.3 Making young generation aware of their duties and responsibilities

22.1 15.7 37.8

Civil society must come forward and work with security and judicial agencies

20.8 14.8 35.6

Move people away from violent paths through introducing art and cultural programmes

11.4 6.6 18

Stopping student politics 12.5 9.4 21.9 Establishing Islamic governance system through sharia/laws

11.7 6 17.7

Stopping religion based politics 21 15.9 36.9 Arresting and punishing those involved with extremist groups

20.9 15.2 36.1

Don’t know 1.3 1.5 2.8 Opinions have been taken from the respondents on several issues to create a safeguard in Bangladesh against terrorism. According to them, the roles of law enforcement agencies have been given high priority in tackling this issue (81 percent respondents). As such, they have suggested for enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies so that they can handle any kind of violent situation (54.3 percent). Almost half (47.3 percent) of the respondents have advocated for the creation of job opportunities that would prevent people from joining extremist groups. A little less then half (45 percent) of the people surveyed have opined about madrasa reform. Madrasa reform has been a priority task of the government. About 39 percent of the respondents stated that perpetrators of violence must be prosecuted under the legal framework, while 36 percent stated that an integrated approach by the civil society and security and judicial agencies was essential. Banning religion-based politics and student politics was favoured by 37 and 22 percent of the respondents respectively. Many respondents (36.1 percent) wanted not only the perpetrators of terrorist violence prosecuted but also those linked with extremists to be arrested and punished. The role of the youth is crucial in mitigating extremism. They should be aware of their responsibilities to society and also accountable for their actions, as claimed by 38 percent of the surveyed people. Moving people away from a violent path by encouraging them to be involved in art and cultural programmes was suggested by some people (18 percent). About 18 percent of the respondents agreed about establishing Islamic governance through Islamic laws in the country.

37

Beside mainstream survey respondents, in-depth responses have been collected through open-ended discussion with a few groups of professionals known to have high levels of understanding on the issues of terrorism and security. They suggested certain initiatives that could be taken to fight against terrorism. These are the following: “Preaching the correct meaning of Islam; more mass awareness programmes; modernizing both mainstream and madrasa education system; practicing democracy properly in order to minimize social inequalities; transparent and proper judiciary; economic reform; creating employment opportunities for the youth; more effective law and justice system; corruption and foreign cultural aggression should be effectively fought; strengthening investigation mechanism; organization like CID needs to be more active; modernizing law enforcement agencies”, etc.

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4. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM The government of Bangladesh has taken several steps to fight terrorism. These include a terrorist monitoring cell, the proper interpretation of Islam, education and finance and social development related programmes that encourage people to fight poverty. All these initiatives have been taken to accelerate the government’s goal of uprooting terrorism from the country.

However, according to a leading newspaper report, the activities of the terrorist monitoring cell have somewhat slowed down. This monitoring cell was formed to ensure the uninterrupted process of the war crimes trial. The issue of allocating about Tk. 10 crore to contain militant activities has not yet been resolved. The surveillance on the enlisted Qawmi madrasas, militant groups and political groups also waned.24

The government has taken a long-term plan to deter the funding of terrorism and militancy. Accordingly, a decision has been taken to amend the money-laundering act. Bangladesh has applied for membership of the EGMONT group, an international network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) with 117 member countries. Besides, steps have been taken to improve the financial intelligence unit of the Bangladesh Bank. Software and hardware equipment is being used for computerized analysis of data and information. To improve the skills of the employees working in the FIU, they are being sent for training inside and outside the country. The Bangladesh Bank has also issued notices to all banks in the country to implement the regulations of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 and the Anti Terrorism Act 2009.25

There are about 50 international terrorists and militants who have been captured in Bangladesh at different times since 2009. However, they cannot be charge-sheeted due to lack of adequate evidence against them. Request was made to Interpol to help in investigating their backgrounds. But there was no proper response from Interpol in this regard. Bangladeshi agencies were also unable to carry out a proper investigation due to legal complications and lack of adequate funds. As a result, these cases have remained unresolved for some time now.26

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reiterated the importance of the initiatives in poverty alleviation for eradicating terrorist and militant activities from Bangladesh and the region. She said that poverty had the potential for continued terrorism and militancy. She remarked that poverty and peace could not live together. The Prime Minister also stated that it was important to establish democracy and human rights.27

24 The Daily Janakantha: 3 April, 2011 25 Jugantor: 9 May 2011 26 Sangbad: 10 May 2011 27 The Daily Star: 5 June 2011; Daily Naya Diganta: 5 June 2011; Jugantor: 5 June 2011; Prothom Alo: 3

June 2011

39

Rigorous programmes have been introduced in schools and mosques to deliver speeches against militancy and drug abuse before assemblies and in Khutbas (sermons before Friday prayers). A committee has been formed to report on the progress/monitoring of these initiatives, as stated by the Education Minister.28 In order to provide functional evidences of terrorist acts and counter terrorism initiatives taken by the Bangladesh government, the following table has been developed based on newspaper reports during the period of July 2010 to June 2011:

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

3rd Aug, Prothom Alo, 2010

JMB member named Kalim Uddin alias Kalim was arrested in Bagmara

JMB

4th Aug, Prothom Alo, 2010

3 suspected members of Hizb-ut Tawhid were arrested in Nilphamari

Hizb-ut Tawhid

7th August, Janakantha, 2010

A task force comprised of all intelligence agencies of the country, interrogated Bhagne Shahid, the organizational chief of JMB. Under interrogation, he stated that a suicide squad of 50 members had been making plans for terror attacks in different parts of the country to stop the war crimes trial. They have targeted seven sensitive places and important persons. He further informed that a former M.P. of Jamaat, Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher, is functioning as the coordinator of JMB, HuJi, Hizbut Tahrir and Jamaat Shibir.

JMB

New Age, 9 Aug 2010

A Gopalganj court granted the Criminal Investigation Department seven days to interrogate Harkatul Jihad-al-Islami chief Mufti Abdul Hannan in a case related to the explosion at the Baniarchang Catholic Church. The case details stated that ten young Christians were killed and over fifty others were injured in a bomb attack at the Church in Maksudpur upazila on June 3, 2001 when the weekly prayers were underway

Harkatul Jihad-al-Islami

10th Aug, Prothom Alo, 2010

There was a report that 3 members of JMB, including wife of JMB’s leader Siddikul Islam alias Bangla bhai, were

JMB

28 The Independent: 8 may 2011; Prothom Alo: 9 May 2011

40

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment under the ‘Explosive Materials Act

Prothom Alo, 11 Aug 2010; Jugantor, 10 Aug 2010; The Independent, 10 Aug 2010; The Daily Star, 11 Aug 2010

Five JMB militants were sentenced to life imprisonment in Bogra by the CMM court in relation to the 17th August 2005 bomb blasts

JMB

12th Aug, Prothom Alo, 2010

3 activists of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested in Chittagong

Hiz-but Tahrir

12th Aug, New Age; 13th Aug, Samakal, 2010

Top JMB leader Yanus Ali was arrested from Atrai

JMB

13th Aug, Prothom Alo; 14th AugNaya Diganta, Samakal, The Independent, 2010

2 student members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested from Chittagong University of Engineering and Technology

Hiz-but Tahrir

14th Aug, Jugantor; 15th Aug, The Daily Star, 2010

2 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested from Sylhet.

Hiz-but Tahrir

16th Aug, Prothom Alo; 17th Aug, Samakal, 2010

2 members of Allahr Dal were arrested from Gaibandha, Sadullahpur

Allahr Dal

19th Aug, Prothom Alo, Jugantor; 20th Aug, Naya Diganta, Janakantha, 2010

Regional Commander of JMB, Hemayet Hossain Himu was arrested from Atrai, Naogaon

JMB

21st Aug, Prothom Alo, 2010

A JMB militant was arrested in Mymensingh

JMB

21st Aug, The Independent, 2010

An absconding member of JMB was arrested in Sholakia

JMB

22nd Aug, Samakal, 2010

A member from HIz-but Tahrir was arrested from Brahmanbaria

Hiz-but Tahrir

Jugantor, 24 Aug, 2010

Police arrested the Jamayat-e Islami Amir, Mawlana Matiur Rahman Nijami, and sent him to prison on a case filed under the anti-terrorism law. He was arrested on the basis of evidence gathered from the confessions of JMB leader Mawlana Saidur Rahman

JMB

31st Aug, Prothom Alo; 1st September, Ittefaq, The Daily Star, 2010

9 suspected youths including district commander, Saiful Islam of Allahr Dal were arrested in Shariatpur

Allahr Dal

41

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Prothom Alo, 31 Aug 2010; New Nation, 1 Sept 2010; The Daily star, 1 Sept 2010

A Nilphamari Court, in two separate cases, sentenced nine militants of Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) for twenty years rigorous imprisonment under Arms and Explosive Act

JMB

The Independent, 3 Sept 2010

Dhaka CMM Court formed charges against four persons, including Hiz-but Tahrir chief coordinator Professor Mohiuddin Ahmed, in a case filed under Anti-Terrorism Act

Hiz-but Tahrir

Jugantor, 4 Sept 2010; The Independent, 6 Sept 2010

Police found a sophisticated 7.6 mm pistol, 2 magazines and 1 round of bullets from a JMB member, Mr. Moktar Hossain, arrested from Daulatdia ferry terminal

JMB

6th Sept, The Independent, 2010

Mr. Ali Ahmed (28), a former member of Islami Chhatra Shibir, student outfit of Jamaat-e-Islami, now an active member of Hiz-but Tahrir, revealed in interrogation that many activists of Hiz-but Tahrir (HT) had gone underground following the banning of the organization. Police also found several copies of the draft constitution of HT in his possession which pleaded for setting up an Islamic state in Bangladesh

Hiz-but Tahrir

14th September, Samakal, The Independent, Janakantha; 15th September, New Age, The Daily Star, 2010

6 members of Hizbul Mahdi were arrested in Barkal Upazilla, Rangamati, Chittagong Hill Districts

Hizbul Mahdi

18th Sept, Ittefaq; 19th Sept, Samakal, New Age, 2010

A member of Allahr Dal was arrested in Jaipurhat

Allahr Dal

22nd Sept, Samakal, The Independent, 2010

An activist of JMB was arrested in Rupganj, Narayanganj

JMB

23rd Sept, The Independent, 2010

There was a report that CID arrested HUJI leader Mufti Mainuddin alias

HUJI

42

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Abu Jandal and took him on remand for 5 days. In interrogation, he repeatedly revealed the name of Abdus Salam Pintu who was the mastermind behind the grenade attack on Awami League’s (AL) rally on Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka on August 21, 2004. Pintu was a deputy minister of the four-party alliance government at that time.

24th Sept, Prothom Alo; 25th Sept, The Independent, Janakantha, 2010

2 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested from Gazipur, Dhaka

Hiz-but Tahrir

26th Sept, Prothom Alo; 27th Sept, Samakal, Jugantor, The Independent, New Age, The Daily Star, 2010

7 activists including 4 women of Hiz-but Tawhid were arrested in Rajshahi

Hiz-but Tawhid

27th Sept, Jugantor, New Age; 28th Sept, Prothom Alo, Naya Diganta, Samakal, The Independent, 2010

4 suspected members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested from Dhaka city

Hiz-but Tahrir

28th Sept, Jugantor, 2010

It was reported that Hiz-but Tahrir, after being banned by the Government of Bangladesh, started functioning under the banner of Hiz-but Tauhid using the organizational infrastructure of that militant outfit. It was also reported that they were recently recruiting female members in their propaganda activities to encourage general people to join their group.

Hiz-but Tahrir

Prothom Alo, 29th The local operational commander of JMB

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Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Sept 2010 JMB, Mr Mezbaul Haque alias Hockey Bipul, and his father were incarcerated from Bagmara in Rajshahi.

Prothom Alo, 30 Sept 2010; Samakal, 30 Sept 2010; The Independent, 30 Sept 2010

Mr. Jahid Hosain alias Babu was arrested in connection with carrying out bomb attacks at Barisal on 17th August 2005. In addition to this case, twelve other cases were filed against him due to various allegations relating to terrorism. He, therefore, was also sentenced to 90 years of imprisonment.

1st Oct, Samakal, 2010

Mawlana Sohel Mahfuz, one of the founding Shura members of JMB was, appointed as the new Amir of JMB after Mawlana Saidur Rahman had been arrested. He had been hiding out in India for a long time before he took his position as the Amir. Intelligence sources said that, staying in Sylhet, he had been trying to operate JMB’s strategies. He already marked Dhaka as their base and appointed a branch Amir for Dhaka.

JMB

2nd Oct, The Independent, The Daily Star, 2010

2 activists of Hiz-but Tawhid were arrested in Rajshahi

Hiz-but Tawhid

2nd Oct, Samakal; 20th Sept, Samakal, 22nd Sept, Jugantor, 2010

The second in command of Mufti Hannan and Huji leader, Mufti Mainuddin alias Abu Jandal, confessed in interrogation by CID, that Ivy Rahman was killed by the grenade thrown by him. He stated that he collected these grenades from Mawlana Tazuddin who is the younger brother of Abdus Salam Pintu. He also said that he led a 12 member team on that day for the attacks. He further confessed that an influential faction of the then coalition government and several prominent intelligent officers facilitated this horrific attack behind the scene.

Samakal, 3 Oct 2010; The Indeendent, 2 Oct 2010; New Age, 3 Oct 2010; New

Three members of JMB, including the Divisional Chief of Dhaka, Mr. Shariful Islam

JMB

44

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Nation, 3 Oct 2010; The Daily Star, 3 Oct 2010; Prothom Alo, 4 Oct 2010

Likhan alais Rana, were arrested along with a huge quantity of explosives from Savar on the outskirts of the capital. The other two arrestees were Ehsar (fulltime) member Mr. Sahinul Islam alias Belal, and Gayebi Ehsar (part-time) member Mr. Shahinur Rahman Babul. The Rapid Action Battalion also seized eight petrol bombs, a huge quantity of explosive substances, including boric power, a revolver, batteries, wires and books on jihad from their possession. The Battalion officials claimed that the terrorists were planning attacks at various places including Dhaka with the purpose of reviving the group by publicizing their activities and existence. Upon primary interrogation, it was revealed that Shariful Islam was the warrant second in command of JMB and a convicted criminal of the 17 August

45

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

2005 bomb blasts. A Dhaka Court approved eight days remand in two separate cases under Anti-Terrorism Act and Arms and Explosive Substances Act 1908.

4th Oct, Prothom Alo; 5th Oct Samakal, Independent, 2010

3 Pakistanis were arrested as suspected members of Lashkar-i- Taiba in Dhaka

Lashkar-i- Taiba

5th Oct, Prothom Alo; 6th Oct, Naya Diganta, Samakal, New Age, 2010

An activist of Lashkar-i- Taiba was arrested in Dhaka

Lashkar-i- Taiba

Naya Diganta, 6 Oct 2010

Government has decided to provide training for Sixty Four (32 males and 32 females) members of Ansar and VDP on countering terrorism through the Islamic Foundation. The training would be provided in light of two objectives. After having trained, it is expected that they would help in training other members of their forces. Later, they will also build awareness among the general people with an aim to obtain information on militant activities from the grassroots level.

5th Oct, Prothom Alo; 6th Oct, Naya Diganta, Samakal, New Age, 2010

A Pakistani member of Hizbul Mujahidin was arrested in Dhaka

Hizbul Mujahidin

Samakal, 6 Nov 2010; Janakantha, 6 Nov 2010

Four figuitives of JMB’s Gayebe Ehsar members were arrested from a residential hotel at Tongi by the members of law enforcement agencies and recovered nine bombs, two daggers and thirteen jihadi books from their possession.

JMB

46

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Prothom Alo, 7 Oct 2010

Eight members of Hiz-but Tauhid, arrested in Rajshahi, were taken on remand for 3 days.

Hiz-but Tauhid

9th Oct, Prothom Alo; 10th Oct, Samakal, Janakantha, 2010

RAB officials arrested two Lashkar-i-Taiba members from Abdullahpur, Tongi, and Dhaka. The arrestees were - Wajed Khan alias Zafar alias Salman, a Pakistani citizen and bomb specialist of LeT, and Mr. Abu Bakar Siddik. RAB officials said that they arrested these terrorists upon getting information from another Lashkar member, Maulana Imran, arrested earlier.

Lashkar-i-Taiba

14th Oct, The Independent; 6th Nov, Samakal, 2010

It was reported that the Hiz-but Tauhid had been carrying out campaigning programmes in southern regions of the country including Jhalakathi, Pirojpur and several other areas. They selected remote areas for their campaigning programmes, including door to door campaigns at the grass roots levels to motivate the local people to join their cause of establishing Islamic law in Bangladesh. The activists of Hizbut Tauhid are offering many opportunities to poor villagers as well as using religious notions and quotations for attracting them in their parties.

Prothom Alo, 14 Oct 2010

Two Members of Huji, Abdul Malek alias Golam Mohammad and Shafi

HUJI

47

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

alias Samiullah alias Moshtak were sent to prison after completing two days remand. RAB filed a case against them under Article 11 of Anti-terrorism Act-2009

Samakal, 17 Oct 2010

It was reported that five militants, using fake identities, were taking driving lessons from the Bangladesh Technical School under UCEP (Under Privileged Children Educational Programme) at Mirpur in Dhaka. After six months of training, they suddenly stopped attending classes. When the school authority tried to reach their contacts to find out the reason of their absence, it was eventually found that they had given false identities. Later, Detective Branch of Dhaka Metropolitan Police found that they were, indeed, dangerous terrorists who built a terrorist base at a house in North Bishil of Shah Ali thana in Dhaka where they gathereda huge number of jihadi books, a SMG, live grenades, shells for making grenades, a

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Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

loaded pistol, gun powder, formula for making bombs and huge amounts of explosives

Prothom Alo, 14 Dec 2010; Prothom Alo, 16 Dec 2010

RAB officials captured twelve HUJI members from Hathajari and Rangamati and recovered a lot of books on training and ideology of the militants, maps for carrying out terrorist attacks, cocktails, bomb making materials and electronic circuits. In this connection, RAB officials also arrested the Chairman of a faction of Islami Oikyjote, Mufti Mohammad Izaharul Islam Choudhury, from Chittagong on allegations of having connections with HUJI

HUJI

The Daily Star, 14 Dec 2010

The Rapid Action Battalion raided a hilltop training camp of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Huji) in Chittagong and held five leaders of the banned militant outfit with some training materials and explosives. The detained Huji operatives admitted to RAB that they had been running training camps in the hilly areas for the last few months. With the help of around 100 locals who gathered there hearing the gunshots, the Rab members held four Huji men, while around 20 others managed to flee the scene, said a RAB officer who led the operation. Intelligence sources

HUJI

49

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

confirmed that Huji set up training camps in the remote hilly forest areas in the early 1990s and ran those till the crackdown after the August 17 blasts in 2005.

22nd Oct, Prothom Alo, 23rd Oct, New Age, The Daily Star, Independent, Janakantha; 26th Oct, Samakal, 2010

3 members of Hiz-but Tawhid including its district Amir were arrested in Chapainawabganj, Rajshahi

Hiz-but Tawhid

23rd Oct, Prothom Alo, Independent, 2010

3 suspected members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested in Sylhet

Hiz-but Tahrir

28th December, Prothom Alo, 2010

JMB’s Ehsar member Shamim Hosain, who was arrested from Hathajari, Chittagong, by the members of the law enforcement agencies, confessed to the police that some militants, including him, rented a house at Hathajari for conducting organizational activities of JMB. They stayed at this house pretending to be rickshaw pullers, masons and day laborers. He also confessed that he was one of the bomb specialists of JMB and a case was filed against him in 2008 under Anti-terrorism Act. He had been a fugitive since then

JMB

4th Nov, Samakal, 2010

2 members of Hiz-but Tawhid was arrested in Uzirpur, Barisil

Hiz-but Tawhid

13th Nov, New Age, Janakantha, 2010

3 JMB members were arrested in Satkhira

JMB

16th Nov, Prothom Alo; 20th Nov, Samakal, 2010

4 Hiz-but Tahrir activists were caught in Chittagong

Hiz-but Tahrir

22nd Nov, New Age, 2010

16 suspected JMB activists were arrested in Gopalganj

JMB

24th Nov, The Daily Star, 2010

1 Gayree Ehsar member and JMB Leader, Abul Kashem were arrested in Kurigram, Rangpur

JMB

2nd Dec, Ittefaq, 2010

9 members, including 2 women activists and the district chairman were arrested in Natore. They are the members of Kalema Jamayet militant group

Kalema Jamayet

3rd Dec, Prothom Alo, New Age, 2010

JMB activist Maulana Obaidur Rahman Ibne Abdullah, brother of Sheikh Abdur R ahman, was arrested in Gopalganj

JMB

50

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

5th Dec, Prothom Alo; 6th Dec, New Age, 2010

There was a report that Hiz-butTahrir, a banned militant outfit, had started operating under different names at various educational institutions in Bangladesh. Earlier, this organization used to operate only in the Madrasas and orphanages across the country but has now expanded its operational areas particularly in private universities and English medium schools.

Hiz-but Tahrir

23rd Dec, Protham Alo, Ittefaq, 2010

6 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were arrested in Dhaka

Hiz-but Tahrir

25th Dec, Prothom Alo, 2010

4 female activists of Hiz-but Tawhid were arrested in Barisal

Hiz-but Tawhid

Prothom Alo, 26 Dec 2010

Police found many Jihadi books and four bombs from the house where the JMB militant was arrested

Police captured a member of JMB named Mr. Shamim Hasan from Hathajari, Chittagong, when he tried to flee after throwing a bomb at the policemen. At least six other JMB members fled from the scene.

JMB

1st Jan, New Age, 2011

Leaflets, CD, Books on Jihad

Police arrested 3 terrorists in Chittagong.

Hiz-but Tawhid

3rd Jan, New Age, 2011

5 computers, 3 laptops, Jihadi books, Training guides and BDT. 65,000.

In Kalabagan, Dhaka, RAB arrested 4 JMB activists.

JMB

6th Jan, Ittefaq, 2011 Leaflets, CDs, Books on Jihad

RAB-5 CT Cell Unit, Railway Colony Camp Members arrested 6 terrorists in Rajshahi.

Hiz-but Tawhid

6th Jan, Ittefaq, 2011 Leaflets, CD, Books on Jihad

RAB arrested 11 activists from Chuadanga

Hiz-but Tawhid

4th Jan, The Daily Star, 2011

7 books, 6 CDs, 70 leaflets

Police arrested 4 activists from Atwary, Thakurgaon

Hiz-but Tawhid

20th Jan, The Daily Star, 2011

Huge quantity of publications and posters of Hizb-ut Tahrir and 2 computers.

Police arrested 9 activists from Dakkhinkhan, Hazaribagh, Ashkona, Uttara of Dhaka.

Hiz-but Tahrir

51

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

23rd Jan, The Daily Star, 2011

7 books on Jihad, 2CDs and leaflets

With the help of local people police arrested 3 male activists from Bhagnagarkandi in Singra of Natore.

Hiz-but Tawhid

26th Jan, The Daily Star, 2011.

Jihadi Books, CDs, posters, leaflets, calendars, microphones, loudspeakers

With the help of local people police arrested 11 men and 6 women activists from Uzirpur, Barisal

Hiz-but Tawhid

26th Jan, New Age, 2011

20 books, 19 CDs RAB arrested 4 activists from Charghat, Rajshahi

Hiz-but Tahrir

1st Feb, The Daily Star, 2011

Leaflets, books on Jihad, CDs and Calendars

Police arrested 2 activists from Chandpur

Hiz-but Tawhid

4th Feb, The Daily Star, 2011

A JMB activist was arrested on charge of abduction and extortion in Bagmara, Rajshahi.

JMB

9th Feb, New Age, 2011

Bomb making materials and bombs

Police arrested 3 women activists from Mirbagh, Dhaka

JMB

11th Feb, Jugantar, 2011

Explosives, books on Jihad

RAB arrested 25 activists from Shirajganj

JMB

12th Feb, The Daily Star, 2011

Jihadi books, papers, CDs, leaflets, and fake BD currencies worth 25,000 taka

RAB arrested 2 activists from Alokdia, Sirajganj

JMB

18th Feb, New Age, 2011

Religious books, CDs, leaflets

Police arrested 2 activists from Jhikargachha, Benapole.

Hiz-but Tawhid

18th Feb, The Independent, 2011

Jihadi books, CDs, posters, leaflets, calendar, microphone, loudspeaker

RAB arrested 4 activists from Uzirpur and Gournadi upazila, of Barisal

Hiz-but Tawhid

22nd 23rd of Feb, The Independent, 2011

Police arrested 8 activists from Shiddeshwari, Dhaka

Hiz-but Tahrir

25th of Feb, The Independent, 2011

Books, CDs, 4000 leaflets

14 activists were arrested by the Police from Jamalpur

Hiz-but Tawhid

1st of March, New Age, 2011

Police arrested the JMB leader from Naldanga, Natore, who was fugitive and was a close ally of Bangla Bhai

JMB

1st of March, The Independent, 2011

Police arrested a terrorist from Adabar, Dhaka.

Hizb-ut Tahrir

4th March, The Daily Star, 2011

8 member of a terrorist group was arrested in Joypurhat and Dinajpur

Hiz-but Tawhid

5th March, The Daily Star, 2011

2 activists were arrested by the RAB in Elephant Road, Dhaka.

Hiz-but Tahrir

11th March, The RAB-12 arrested a JMB activist from JMB

52

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

Daily Star, 2011 Bahadurpur, Bheramara of Kushtia. 11th March, The Daily Star, 2011

China made 7.62mm pistol, 15 gram ganja, 4 small packet of heroin and 14 bottles of phensidyle

DB police arrested 6 activists in Kotalipara, Gopalgonj

30th March, The Daily Star, 2011

A huge amount of explosives, a number of Jihadi and militant books

Police and BGB arrested 2 activists and discovered a training camp as Safe Haven in Thanchi, Bandarban.

JMB

30th March, The Daily Star, 2011

Police arrested an activist from Sadar Upazila, Pabna.

JMB

2nd April, Independent, Janakantha, Samakal, 1st April, Prothom Alo, 2011

Jihadi books, Leaflets and CDs

RAB arrested 8 male and 2 female activists from Baje Kajla, Rajshahi city while holding their organizational meeting. The arrestees are Mozaffar Hossain Lala, Mizanur Rahman Mithu, Razon Ali, Sharif Hossain, Moniruzzaman Milon, Manik Hossain, Nabizul Islam, Ashraf Ali, Moriam Khatun, and Mina Begum. RAB officials stated that all the arrestees confessed their involvement with the outfit and denied that their outfit was banned.

Hiz-but Tawhid

2nd April, The Daily Star, 1st April, Prothom Alo and The New Age, 2011

Chittagong Metropolitan Police (CMP) arrested 3 student activists from Sholokbahar, Chittagong

Hiz-but Tahrir

5th April, The Daily Samakal

According to the local people, arrestees used to conduct Islami dawat in different places.

Police arrested 4 suspect JMB members from Betagi, Barguna

JMB

16th April, The Daily Star, 2011

The activists were pasting posters on walls protesting the government's move to ban fatwa (religious edict), and demanding cancellation of the proposed Education Policy and National Women Development Policy, local people said.

Police arrested 5 activists from Nazrul Avenue in Kandirpar, Comilla. They were held on charge of anti-state activities.

Jagrata Muslim Towhidi Janata (JMTJ)

53

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

26th April, The Daily Star, The Naya Diganta, 2011

According to RAB, the arrestees rented a house near Pachgona Government Primary School in Ati Bazar area a month ago by disguising themselves as garment workers. The law enforcers also recovered some CDs, a bomb-making manual and organizational books of the outfit.

RAB arrested 2 activists including acting chief Abdul Hannan Sabbir from Pachgona Government Primary High School in Ati Bazar area, Keraniganj

HUJI

28th April, The Daily Star, The Independent, 2011; 27th April, The Daily Samakal, The Daily Naya Diganta, 2011

RAB arrested the HUJI Chief Sheikh Farid Ahmed alias Farid alias Rashid from Tongi railway station area in Gazipur.

HUJI

19th May, The Daily Star, 2011

A cache of fire arms, explosives and bomb making materials, shutter guns, a 9mm pistol loaded with one bullet, a revolver and a pipe gun, two live bombs, half kg of gunpowder, two magazines, cartridge making equipment, batteries of mobile phones and eight books on Jihad.

RAB arrested a suspected operative Abdul Alim from East Khajurapara in Jhenaidah. Alim was taken to the Rab-6 headquarters for interrogation.

HUJI

24th May, The Daily Star; 23rd May Prothom Alo and Jugantor, 2011

4 books on Jihad RAB arrested suspected operative Md. Obaidullah from Sadar Upazila in Pabna

27th May, The Independent, Sangbad, Jugantor, 2011

The RAB members also recovered 16 hand bombs, 24 cocktails, 41

RAB arrested Maulana Mohammad Abdus Samad, Secretary of Sylhet unit and Ashraful Islam, Secretary of Iswardi Upazila Unit in Pabna from

HUJI

54

Date of Events/ Source

Recoveries/Terror Incidents/Acts

Arrested members during July 2010 – June 2010/Other Legal Measures

Outfit

grenade bodies and other chemicals, including nitric acid, used in making bombs.

Nabi Nagar, Savar, Dhaka

6th June, The New Age and Prothom Alo, 2011; 7th June, The Daily Star and The Independent, 2011

28 Anti state posters, 160 leaflets, 13 magazines and Jihadi books

RAB arrested 27 activists from Barakaw village of Kaliganj Upazila of Gazipur. On primary investigation, they confessed about their involvement with the organization and the intention to establish Khilafat by abolishing the present ruling system. Legal action against them was underway as per the Anti-terrorist Act-2009 for supporting and taking membership of the banned organization, posing threat to the sovereignty and security of the state.

Hiz-but Tahrir

9th June, The Daily Samakal, sangbad, Jugantar, 2011

Jihadi books, 2 diaries

4 young women were arrested by the police from Eden College, Dhaka

16th June, The Daily Star, 2011

Under the police operation 4 terrorist leaders and activists were arrested from Dhaka

Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish (BKM)

30th June, The daily Star and The Independent, 2011

RAB arrested 2 activists from Goalpahar area under Kotwali police station, Chittagong

Hiz-but Tahrir

3rd June, Prothom Alo and 4th June, The Independent, 2011

Police arrested 2 activists from Elephant Road, Dhaka.

Hiz-but Tahrir

24th June, Prothom Alo; 25th June, The Independent and The Daily Samakal, 2011

Police arrested 3 activists from Shahi Eidgah area in Sylhet city

Hiz-but Tahrir

20th April, The Daily Janakantha, 2011

520 rounds of Bullets, Bomb making devices, Jihadi books

BGB arrested 2 activists from Manaipara at Thanchi Upazilla of Bandarban

16th June, Prothom Alo and Jugantor, 2011

Jihadi books and leaflets

Police arrested 8 activists including 2 women and 2 children from Teknaf and Shatkania, Chittagong

55

Regional and International Cooperation

In order to uproot terrorism, Bangladesh has not only become active within the country itself but has also taken up initiatives with some neighbouring countries. Different survey findings have clearly reflected that there have been strong international networks among the militants, which enable them to act boldly and often visibly.

According to a leading newspaper report published in June 2011, the Bangladesh government recommended that a counter-terrorism institute be set up in Bangladesh to bolster anti-terrorism campaigns in its southern and south-eastern regions. Under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an agreement was signed on "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters"; however, a task force by the South Asian countries is yet to be formed. Another "Agreement on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drugs Trafficking" was signed under the BIMSTEC29. This is a regional organization comprising of some South and South-East Asian countries. Under this agreement, there was a plan to set up a counter-terrorism institute.30

SAARC has recently taken more initiatives to enhance regional efforts in the face of increasing terrorism in the region. It has also been mentioned in newspapers that a regional follow-up meeting has been scheduled to be held in Thimpu, Bhutan in the following months among the concerned SAARC members with a view to increasing cooperation in combating terrorism.31 The terrorism issue was taken into consideration under SAARC over two decades ago. In the 1986 Bangalore Summit, all the heads of the states unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplored their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, regional and international peace and cooperation, and recognized the importance of the principles laid down in UN Resolution 2625 (XXV), which among others required that each state should refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts32. Moreover, an additional protocol was mandated in the 11th SAARC Summit held in 2002 to strengthen the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 1987 particularly by criminalizing the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and taking further measures to prevent and suppress financing of such acts. Role of Concerned Groups of the Society

Beside general views of the respondents on combating terrorism, their discrete views on different segments of the community people have been assessed in this survey.

29 BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 30 The Independent: 17 June 2011 31 The Independent: 21 June 2011 32 SAARC Conventions, 1985-2007”. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. p.45

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Role of Families

Families have been identified to have a distinctive role in preventing their household members from being associated with militant groups and other anti-social elements. Since the activists were mostly found to be involved in religious extremism, respondents urged upon the families to provide proper knowledge on this issue. Besides, it has also been accentuated that every individual belongs to a family and, more or less, everyone has weakness for their family members. “Each terrorist is a member of a family. So, the role of the family is immense. The family can play a major role in making their children aware of the dangers of going astray”- religious leaders of Jamalpur, Dhaka, Jessore, Khulna, Lalmonirhat, Sylhet, and Chapainawabganj held such a view. “Families can protect their members by keeping them away from criminal activities like highjacking, taking drugs, etc. Also, families are responsible for providing knowledge about Islam so that children cannot be misled and also about the consequences of terrorism”- respondents from Law Enforcement Agencies of Gournadi, Nilfamari, Jhenaidah, Kurigram, Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Noakhali expressed this view. Role of the Society

A number of issues have been raised by the respondents that could be addressed by society for providing safeguards against the proliferation of terrorism. The proposed ideas were: creating social values among people; involve the youth in awareness programmes; preaching Islam in a proper manner; exchanging information explicitly regarding terrorist activities; assisting law enforcement agencies through providing information about terrorist activities. Forming an anti-militant committee was also recommended by some respondents. “A society in a particular area can play such a role so that no terrorist can enter into that area to affect the people”- mentioned by the Imams of Natore, and Santhia of Pabna. “An anti-militant committee should be formed with the consensus of the local people and the information should be given to the police in case of any militant activities occurring in that location”- Imam, Joypurhat. “If the people are familiar with their particular area, no terrorist can be produced there”- Law Enforcement Agency personnel of Barguna, Nilphamari, Jhenaidah, Kurigram, Gournadi, Kushtia, and Pabna. Role of madrasas

Since madrasas have often been linked with terrorists, strong recommendations have been made for reforming the education system of madrasas. As per the respondents’ suggestions, madrasas can play an important role in countering terrorism by modernizing their education system, providing proper education on Islam to the pupils, preventing militancy training, and having an effective monitoring system. “Make the students aware of misinterpretation of Islam”- opinions of Law Enforcement Agency Personnel, in Nilphamari, Jhenaidah, Kurigram, Sylhet, and Khulna.

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“Madrasa teachers are required to play an important role in giving proper guidelines on Islamic knowledge” – said religious leaders of Demra, Dhaka; Jhenaidah. Role of the Ulema

The Ulema consists of persons who are known to have expert knowledge of Islam. Respondents stated that these intellectual personalities had a big role to prevent Islam from being misinterpreted. The Ulema should take initiatives to remove any stigma attached to Islam, such as it being perceived as a religion that accepts violence. The following suggestions were made by respondents:

Discuss the evils of extremism in madrassas, mosques and with locals; Hold regular monthly discussions with people in the community; Deliver speeches condemning extremism; Deliver lectures explaining the proper meaning of Islam. Role of the People’s Representatives

Public representatives have a multi-purpose role to play, as identified by the KII respondents of the survey. According to the respondents’ views, this group of people in the society not only has the power of influencing the community people but is also in a position to lobby at the policy implementation level. Some statements of the survey respondents are given below: “Public representatives can influence local people by gathering and mobilizing them for anti- militant activities”- Religious Leader, Cox’s Bazaar. “As the people’s representatives have close connection with the ministers, they can exert strong influence on any decision to secure the society”-Public Representative, Jhenaidah. “Representatives can take part in different activities with the general public to create awareness in the society”- Public Representatives of Barguna, Naogaon, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Habiganj, Gaibandha, Baniarchar, Noakhali, Khulna, Chapainawabganj, and Chuadanga. “Door to door visit for creating awareness is needed”- LEA Personnel of Rajshahi, Nabiganj of Dhaka. Role of the Youth The youth, as the new generation of the society, can take immense steps in terms of upholding the society as crime free and progressive, as mentioned by the KII respondents. Respondents also viewed that the youth were the most inspiring segment of the society who could effectively take part in the awareness programmes against terrorism and other anti-social activities. Some statements of the survey respondents are given below: “If the new generation, the youth and the students are actively involved in antiterrorism activities, it is easier to eradicate terrorism or crime from the society”- Public Representatives of Barguna, Jhenaidah, Khulna, and Chapainawabganj.

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Figure 2.7: Suggestions about integration of the Ex-Militants with mainstream society (%)

49.0

31.9

81.0

46.0

29.0

75.0

46.4

32.0

78.3

42.6

29.1

71.7

36.7

25.3

62.0

47.6

32.4

80.0

0

20

40

60

80

100

A B C D E F

Male

Female

Total

“Role of the youth is desirable in any kind of activities in the society. If they step ahead in this case, a terrorism free country could be visualized”- LEA Personnel of Barguna, and Khulna. Social Integration of Former Militant Activists

The survey respondents have not only opined to take action against extremists, they have also provided some suggestions for those militants who have abandoned their violent ideologies in their desire to be re-integrated into mainstream society.

According to the majority of respondents (81 percent), a strategy should be devised to rehabilitate and integrate ex-militants involving the participation of civil society, security and the justice system. Eight out of ten people (80 percent) suggested for training of such militants in vocational or modern education. The third majority of the respondents (78.3 percent) favoured providing profitable employment opportunities. Three-fourths of the respondents (75 percent) supported the notion that local people needed to be made aware of the ex-militants’ rehabilitation. Elderly citizens in the society should have an important role in the assimilation of ex-extremists in the society as suggested by 62 percent of the people. About 23 percent of the people stated that the youths be the mentors in the integration process. [N.B: For Figure 2.7: A - Implementing a proper rehabilitation and unification strategy through the civil society, security and judiciary system, B - Making the local people aware of their rehabilitation, C - Providing profitable employment opportunities, D - Helping them by using the youths as their mentors, E - Using the elders to help them to get involved in the society, F - Educating them in vocational/modern education] Need for Counter Terrorism (CT) Policy

In order to reinforce the country’s situation against militant activities, almost all the KII respondents have opined for developing a comprehensive and coordinated strategy and policy paper. As cited by a respondent,” There is a need for a comprehensive and coordinating strategy and policy paper which can modify the law and help the resistance of criminal activities. The new law would be introduced based on this paper”. Among the other general respondents irrespective of their age, occupation, race and religion, 97 percent have supported the need for a national counter terrorism policy and strategy

59

paper. In terms of gender, 58 percent male and 39.4 percent female respondents agreed that there was a need for such a policy. Some respondents of KII categories have viewed that this paper would help to combat the terrorists and improve the strength of the law enforcement agencies which would ultimately contribute to the improvement of the society/community. It would also help in developing a working relationship between the government and general public. Essential inclusion of stakeholders from the grassroots level within the strategy paper has also been cited by the survey respondents. In addition to the development of CT strategy and policy paper, religious leaders (Imams) have recommended for a law that would prevent the misinterpretation of the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This survey presented the second phase of the project “Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh” for the period 2010 – 2011. Since the occurrence of a series of deadly terrorist attacks in the country, there have been several measures taken at various levels of government to successfully combat terrorism. This survey has however revealed that there are still some insecurities and risk factors associated with the issue of extremism in the country. According to survey findings, insecurity related to extremism has decreased compared to the previous years. However, within certain communities, insecurities still exist in other forms. A significant proportion (63 percent) of the respondents highlighted the issue of eve teasing. Other issues mentioned included the narcotics use (over 74 percent), robbery, hijacking and theft (80 percent), extortion (49.2 percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), and trafficking in women and children (15.2 percent). These findings indicate that community development-related programs have immense influence on the anti-violence efforts. The perpetrators of terrorism take advantage of the unstable situation in communities and the country to easily recruit people into their groups. Other survey findings have also reflected this conclusion. Respondents discussed the key recruitment targets of militant groups, such as poor uneducated males (46.2 percent), madrasa students (44 percent), educated unemployed youth (41.3 percent), people who are truly sympathetic to extremists’ principles (35 percent), poor and uneducated people, youth who want change in the society (25.1 percent), people who did not get legal justice for their unfair sufferings due to criminal activities (24.2 percent) and the uneducated and unemployed young females (14 percent). The government and the non- government sector need to undertake appropriate measures in dealing with these factors in order to successfully combat and defeat extremist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh. The present government’s commendable initiatives to uproot terrorism from Bangladesh have been reflected in many cases. The government has achieved a great deal of success in combating terrorism. However, it is believed that further steps are required nationally and internationally to eradicate the menace of terrorism in Bangladesh. Therefore, action is required against the strong network of militants who obtain funding from the Middle East and several developed countries. The use of modern technology to carry out their activities and maintaining networks have also been revealed here. It is understood that banned militant groups are regrouping under a new leadership and with a newly adopted strategy, which would curtail the government’s strong drive to apprehend them and disrupt their networks. About 50 international terrorists have been arrested and confined due to suspicion of their dubious activities. However, these cases have remained pending for several years due to complications at different levels including inadequate evidence, lack of funding in carrying out investigations and other legal complications. There is therefore an immediate requirement in taking urgent action to solve such cases to ensure proper justice.

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The government of Bangladesh has been taking a series of initiatives to implement the provisions of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 and the Anti Terrorism Act 2009. Regional and international co-operation has also been established with a number of countries to bolster anti-terrorism efforts in the country. Although no task force has been set up yet, an agreement has been signed on "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters" under SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). Under BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), an organization of some South and South-East Asian countries, another agreement has been signed, namely as "Agreement on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drugs Trafficking". Under this agreement a counter terrorism institute has also been planned to be set up in Bangladesh. The government, civil society, madrasas and other educational institutions, religious clerics and scholars of Islam, youth and members of the general public have an important role to play in order to successfully defeat the scourge of extremism and terrorism in Bangladesh. The role of the media was also widely mentioned as the most reliable and accessible source of information. The government of Bangladesh may be said to have used the Presenting Extremism Together (PET) approach, where the government works with local communities and various other stakeholders in combating terrorism.33 Of course, the Government needs to do a lot more on this. Furthermore, through proper implementation of a national counter terrorism strategy and policy, greater socio-economic development in the country may be achieved leading to a vibrant, secular and just society where extremism and terrorism is rejected by all members of society.

33 The Daily Janakantha: 3 April, 2011

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APPENDIX TABLES Table 1.1: Proportion of respondents provided opinion on crimes that occurred in their localities.

Types of Crimes Male Female Total Politically Motivated

Yes 42.1 27 69.1 No 17.1 14 31

Tortured induced by ethnic conflicts Yes 7.4 4 11.2 No 52 37.1 89

Religious Suppression Yes 5 3 7.5 No 54.1 38.4 92.5

Crime/Torture/Extremism based on small arms Yes 20.8 15.4 36.3 No 37.7 26 63.7

Crime/suppression emanating from self improvised explosives Yes 6.8 4.6 11.4 No 51.9 36.7 88.6

Kidnapping and ransom Yes 10.2 7.3 17.5 No 48.8 33.6 82.5

Extortion Yes 28.9 20.3 49.2 No 29.9 20.9 50.8

Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery. High jacking) Yes 46.2 33.8 79.9 No 12.4 7.7 20.1

Eve Teasing Yes 33.3 29.6 62.9 No 24.6 12.5 37.1

Rape Yes 14.3 9.6 23.9 No 44.7 31.4 76.1

Trafficking of Women and Children Yes 7.6 7.6 15.2 No 51.2 33.6 84.8

Police Torture Yes 10.6 6.1 16.7 No 48.4 35 83.3

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Table 1.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinion regarding the situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts as compared to the previous year.

Indicators Male Female Total Too high 4 2.5 6.5 Little increase 7.9 7.4 15.3 Huge decline 6.3 4.9 11.2 Small decline 25 14.5 39.5 Very little 4.7 2.7 7.4 Same as before 10.9 9.3 20.2

Table 1.3: Proportion distribution of respondents’ opinion on the most frequent injustice /

crime/extremism/illegal that acts occur in their localities.

Indicators Male Female Total Politically motivated 42.1 27 69.1 Tortures induced by ethnic conflicts 7.4 3.8 11.2 Religious suppression 4.9 2.7 7.5 Crime/torture/extremism based on small arms 20.8 15.4 36.3 Crime/suppression emanating from self improvised explosives

6.8 4.6 11.4

Kidnapping and ransom 10.2 7.3 17.5 Extortion 28.9 20.3 49.2 Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery, high jacking)

46.2 33.8 79.9

Eve teasing 33.3 29.6 62.9 Rape 14.3 9.6 23.9 Murder 16.9 10.8 27.7 Drug addiction/drinking 42.1 32.2 74.3 Trafficking in women and children 7.6 7.6 15.2 Police torture 10.6 6.1 16.7 RAB torture 4 2.8 6.7

Table 1.4: Measurement of respondents’ fear of facing injustice due to crime / suppression /

torture in life (%).

Indicators Male Female Total Not influenced at all 7.9 4.8 12.7 Influenced little 39.6 25.3 64.9 Highly influence 7 6.2 13.2 Don’t know/ Can’t tell 4.3 4.9 9.2

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Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by the people (%).

Indicators Male Female Total Politically motivated violence 23.4 10 33.4 Ethnic conflict 2.8 1 3.8 Religious / conflict motivated by religious reasons

2.3 2.2 4.5

Torture using explosive devices/materials

1.3 .7 2

Extortion 10.7 4.2 14.9 Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery, looting, high jacking)

26.8 14.8 41.6

Eve teasing 5.7 14.9 20.6 Rape 3.1 2.8 5.9 Murder 4 1.2 5.1 Drug addiction/drinking 7.3 4 11.3 Women and children trafficking 1.8 .4 2.2 Police exploitation / torture 5.4 2.5 7.9 RAB exploitation/torture 1.2 .9 2 In favor of reporting to the police in case of facing any illegal activities

36 27.5 63.5

Table 1.6: Peoples’ perception about Militancy/Terrorism (%)

Perception of Militancy/Terrorism Male Female Total Heard about Terrorism/ Militancy 57.6 40.2 97.8 Using Islam as a reason to cause instability in the society, and causing fear through anti-social and anti-state acts (such as, bombing, excited behavior, looting, murder, using arms, etc.)

52.9 36.1 89

Using Islam to steer people in the wrong direction/giving people wrong concepts

49.2 32.1 81.3

Fighting against non-Islamic state 11.1 10 21.1 Table 1.7: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%)

Indicators Male Female Total JMB 5.5 4.1 9.6 JMJB 2.4 1.3 3.8 HUJI 1.2 .8 2 Allahr Dall 2.7 1.6 4.2 Hizbut Tawhid 1.3 .4 1.7 Hibut Tahrir 1.8 .8 2.6

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Table 1.8: Common activities of the terrorists observed by the respondents (%).

Common activities of the terrorist activists Male Female Total Giving dawat (special invitation) through jihadi concepts

30.4 15.8 46.3

Murder 8.6 5.1 13.7 Extortion 14 11.7 25.7 Causing fear/terror 11.1 10.6 21.7 Torturing in various ways 11.5 7.5 18.9 Increasing/ Disseminating of fundamentalism/radicalization

10.4 6.2 16.6

Increasing/disseminating of militancy 5.6 1.6 7.3 Giving jihadi training 8.4 4 12.4 Motivating in jihadi sentiments 15.3 7.8 23.1 Training in arms use 4 2.7 6.7 Teaching to hate other country/religion 9.8 5.6 15.5

Table 1.9: Strategies followed by the terror activists in their dawat (%).

Indicators Male Female Total Jihadi Books, Leaflets, CD, etc. 45.8 27.7 73.6 Door to door visit 7.1 5.3 12.4 Visit madrasas 25.4 14 39.4 In Mosques 7.3 5.3 12.6

Table 1.10: Source of financing of the militant activists/groups (%)

Major Funding Sources Male Female Total From their activists living in different wealthy countries in the name of Islam

33.1 19.8 52.9

Donation from Muslim countries for NGOs 32.6 18.5 51.1 International Terrorist groups 41.8 23.6 65.4 Forcibly collect money from local people 14.6 9.4 24 Religious donation from local people 12.3 9 21.3 Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Recognized women participation in militancy 18.3 13.4 31.7

Reasons for being involved with militant groups by the women Being relative or family members of the militant activists

29.6 18.6 48.2

Being forced by their family to join the militant groups

18 11.5 29.5

It is much easier to force the women to join the groups than the men

13.5 9.3 22.8

Extremist male members force the females to join the groups

9.8 7.5 17.2

Join the groups for receiving financial benefit 18.2 13.9 32.1

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Table 1.12: Categories of people involved with militant groups (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Poor illiterate males 26.2 20 46.2 Poor illiterate females 9.1 7.2 16.3 Any poor and uneducated people 19.1 13.3 32.4 Educated but unemployed young men 22.4 18.9 41.3 Educated but unemployed young women 7.8 5.7 13.5 Educated males from wealthy families 5.3 3.4 8.7 Educated females from wealthy families 3.5 2.6 6.1 Those who did not meet justice from cases like murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, high jacking, looting, etc.

14.3 9.9 24.2

Youth groups who are in favor of changing the society

14.1 11 25.1

madrassa students (boys and girls) 25.4 18 43.5 Those who truly believe in the extremist’s principles

19.4 15.2 34.6

Criminals and their followers had involvement in criminal activities

10.7 7.3 18

Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by the militant activists (% of respondents)

Indicators

Male Female Total

To bring change in the society through establishing Islamic state

5.5

2.9

8.3 Because they do not get equal political, economic and social rights in the present state system

2.4 3.1 5.5

To gain acceptability/equal acknowledgement/ freedom of expression in regard to men

2.8 1.8 4.6

To increase women empowerment or to increase their status in the eyes of their elders

5.4 3 8.4

Indicators Male Female Total Influence and motivate in the name of Islam 35.2 25.5 60.7 Encourage people distributing leaflets 16.7 12 28.7 Encourage people to join their meetings/discussions

12.8 9.6 22.4

Helping people through charity works such as, providing food, employment, giving money for wedding, etc.

14 8.7 22.7

Giving financial support 18.9 14.3 33.2 Alluring people by offering better life, mobile phone, computer, etc.

14 11 25

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Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Can easily be defined/identified the terror activists

6.4 4.5 10.9

Terrorist activities have increased a lot 4.9 6 10.9 A little increase 7.9 7.4 15.2 Same as before 18.1 16.3 34.3 Terrorism is threat for national life 56.2 38.4 94.6

Threatened areas of our life due to terrorism Threat to national security 55.3 39.8 95.1 Threat to life and property of people 51.9 37.5 89.4 Threat to national image 52.4 32.3 84.7 Threat to democracy 44.9 28.5 73.5 Threat to the economy of the country 45.8 28.9 74.7 Threat to social security 50.4 37.7 88 Threat to social cohesion 42.5 28.3 70.8 Threat to social stability 49.8 31.5 81.3

Table 1.15: Scope of posing threat at the level of national security and democracy (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Terrorism can threaten national security and democracy through anti-social and anti-state activities (such as, bombing, looting, destruction, loss of life and property, attacking state structure etc.)

47.2 32.1 79.3

Terrorism hampers state sovereignty, security, social and economic prosperity, degrades the national image at international level and in terms of human rights.

41.4 23.3 64.7

Causes enmity among different ethnic and linguistic groups

20.5 11 31.5

Destroys the image of Islam as a religion 32.3 23.1 55.4 Involves general and innocent people in anti-state and anti-government activities

16.1 11.9 28

Criticizing the government and the political system

12.7 8.3 21

Constantly trying to prove that they more devoted to people’s welfare

4.2 3.5 7.7

Terrorizing people or enforcing them 10.7 5.5 16.2

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Table 1.16: Reasons to be involved in terrorism (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Poverty 42.1 31.2 73.4 Using Islam to gain political ends 25.4 14.9 40.3 Wrong interpretation of Islam 38.5 24.3 62.8 Influence of regional and international terrorism

16.9 12.1 29

Lack of democracy 11.5 8.3 19.9 Lack of education 23.9 17.8 41.7 Unemployment 27.5 20.7 48.2

Table 1.17: Major sources of information about the militant groups and their activities (%

of the respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total TV 53.8 38.2 92 Radio 16.6 10.5 27.2 Newspaper 45.7 27.8 73.5 Internet 7.4 5.1 12.5 Heard from other people 17.8 15.5 33.2 Own experience 3.3 2.3 5.7 Have witnessed 1.4 .8 2.2

Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents)

Indicators Male Female Total Peoples’ awareness on terrorism 40.6 27.5 68.1

Few measures to tackle terrorism By giving proper explanation of Islam through the Imams

53.7 38.1 91.8

By amendment of madrassa education 44.8 30.2 74.9 Strengthening of the legislation and the judiciary

45 34.3 79.3

Banning of student politics 15.8 14.2 30 Stopping corruption in different government circles

33.9 25.4 59.3

Empowerment of people 31.2 22.5 53.7 Increasing public awareness. Such as through various mass media and public awareness programs

54.4 37.7 92.1

Don’t know/ Can’t say 44.4 52.8 97.2

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Table 1.19: Respondents awareness on anti-terrorism activities (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Area wise anti terrorism activities 19.5 10.4 29.8 Public awareness program undertaken by the government or by the general public

26.2 13.8 40

Among those who observed the awareness programs The law enforcement agencies have been more strengthened

60.6 31.8 92.3

Forming a secured society by organizing people through various awareness programs

47.4 23.5 70.9

Expressing dislike for extremist groups and bringing them under legal framework

29 17.1 46.1

Modernization of madrassa education 26.1 16.6 42.7 Providing employment opportunities 18.4 13.1 31.6 Establishing various recreational organizations such as clubs, groups etc.

12.3 6.8 19.1

Employing community police 26.7 15.3 42 Establishing equal rights for both men and women through reformation of shalish

10.6 8.2 18.8

Improving the law or judicial system 37.7 16 53.7 Nothing has been done 21.7 8.5 30.3 Anti militancy sermon in mosques 20.8 9.5 30.4

Table 1.20: Level of success of the law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in prevention of

terrorism (%)

Success level of LEAs in preventing terrorism

Male Female Total

A little 24.8 18.4 43.2 Quite successful 9.9 6.9 16.8 Completely successful .8 .6 1.4 Respondents opinion in favor of LEAs effectiveness in relation to sharing information between the local/general people and the intelligence/ law enforcement agencies for prevention of terrorism

57.7 40.1 97.8

70

Table 1.21: Suggestions for the solution of the insecurity and violence caused by the extremist groups (%)

Indicators Male Female Total

The law enforcement agencies must come forward

48.7 32.2 80.8

The capacity of the law enforcement agencies should be enhanced so that they can handle any violent situation

33.3 21.1 54.3

Perpetrators of violence must be brought under legal framework

22.1 16.5 38.6

Modernization of educational system and making it more suitable for employment

18.2 12.6 30.8

Amendment of madrassa education 26.3 18.3 44.6 Increase employment opportunities 27.2 20 47.3 Making young generation aware of their duties and responsibilities

22.1 15.7 37.8

Civil society must come forward and work with security and judicial agencies

20.8 14.8 35.6

Move people away from violent paths through introducing art and cultural programs

11.4 6.6 18

Stopping student politics 12.5 9.4 21.9 Establishing Islamic governance system through Islamic Sharia law

11.7 6 17.7

Stopping religion based politics 21 15.9 36.9 Arresting and punishing those involved with extremist groups

20.9 15.2 36.1

Don’t know 1.3 1.5 2.8 Table 1.22: Suggestions about integration of the Ex-Militants into mainstream society (%)

Indicators Male Female Total Implementing a proper rehabilitation and unification strategy through the civil society, security and judiciary system

49 31.9 81

Making the local people aware of their rehabilitation

46 29 75

Providing profitable employment opportunities

46.4 32 78.3

Helping them by using the youths as their mentor

42.6 29.1 71.7

Using the elders to help them get involved in society

36.7 25.3 62

Educating them in vocational/modern education

47.6 32.4 80