NO. 16-CA-708 C/W

16-CA-709

FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST

OF T. D.

ON APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON PARISH JUVENILE COURT

PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO. 16-TP-17, DIVISION "B"

HONORABLE ANDREA PRICE JANZEN, JUDGE PRESIDING

May 31, 2017

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

Panel composed of Susan M. Chehardy,

Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

SJW

SMC

HJL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY

SERVICES

Jessica Coalter

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLANT,

T. D., MOTHER

Jennifer G. Womble

COUNSEL FOR PARENT/APPELLANT,

W. D., III, FATHER

M. Elizabeth Toca

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WINDHORST, J.

The Juvenile Court for the Parish of Jefferson rendered judgment in this case

on the petition filed by the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family

Services (“DCFS”), terminating the parental rights of the mother, T. and the father,

W.D., to the minor child, T.D.1 Both T. and W.D. appeal from that judgment. For

the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

T.D. was born on February 4, 2002, and was 14 at the time of the

termination hearing. T.D.’s aunt, D.M., was his legal guardian and primary

caregiver for most of his life.

On January 30, 2015, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office (D.A.’s

Office) filed a petition against T.D. alleging that he committed simple battery,

simple robbery and criminal damage to property. On February 19, 2015, a petition

was filed charging T.D. with theft of goods valued under $500.00. On March 4,

2015, the matter came for adjudication. The State dismissed the charges of simple

battery and simple criminal damage to property and T.D. entered an admission to

the charge of simple robbery. On March 5, 2015, T.D. entered into an Informal

Adjustment Agreement with the D.A.’s Office and was enrolled in the diversion

program.

On March 17, 2015, the D.A.’s Office filed a petition against T.D. alleging

that he committed theft of goods and criminal trespass. On March 31, 2015, T.D.’s

bond was revoked on the simple robbery charge, and he was remanded to the

Rivarde Detention Center.

Thereafter, the March 17, 2015 petition was amended to charge a Family in

Need of Services (“FINS”): ungovernable. T.D. entered an admission to the FINS

1 Pursuant to Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, the initials of the minor and family

members involved will be used to protect the child's identity. State Dept. of Soc. Services, ex rel. S.S., 07-165 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/25/07), 968 So.2d 199, 200. The minor child has the same initials as the mother and therefore the child will be referred to as T.D. and the mother will be referred to as T.

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charge. At this time, he was placed in the custody of DCFS. On the allegation of

simple robbery, T.D. was sentenced to the Office of Juvenile Justice for one year,

suspended, and placed on two years active probation. The DCFS held several

review hearings in 2015 and 2016, during which time it was noted that, although

there was a visitation schedule set, T.D.’s parents failed to visit him. In May of

2016, T.D. was hospitalized three times for voicing suicidal ideations. Three

hearings were held regarding this issue. There was no indication that the parents

visited T.D. during this time.

On May 16, 2016, DCFS filed a petition for termination of parental rights,

alleging that T.D. had been abandoned by his parents. Also on that date, the

juvenile court ordered appointment of attorneys for W.D. and T. At the July 16,

2016 case review hearing, it was noted that his parents still had not visited T.D.,

and further had not visited him since he had been taken into DCFS custody.

In the petition for termination of parental rights, it alleged that T.D. had been

placed in the State’s custody on April 14, 2015, and had remained in the State’s

custody since that time, for a period of over one year. DCFS further alleged that

both T. and W.D. abandoned T.D. by leaving him under circumstances

demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid responsibility by failing to

provide significant contributions to T.D.’s care and support and/or by failing to

maintain significant contact with T.D. for a period of six consecutive months from

the time T.D. entered into the State’s custody through the date of filing of the

petition, citing La. Ch.C. art. 1015, Sections 5 and/or 6.2

The hearing on the petition filed by DCFS was held on August 15, 2016. At

the hearing, the Juvenile Court judge took judicial notice of the underlying FINS

record. Jovia Alexis, employee of the DCFS and the foster care worker for T.D.,

2 The petition filed by DCFS refers to La. Ch.C. art. 1015, sections 4 and 5. However, La. Ch.C. art. 1015 was

amended and sections 4 and 5 were redesignated as sections 5 and 6 respectively. 2016 La. ACT 608. Facts pleaded in petition clearly indicate that DCFS was proceeding under La. Ch.C. art. 1015, sections 5 and 6. For clarity, the current section number will be used throughout this appeal.

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testified that the FINS proceeding “turned into” a CINC proceedings, and T.D.

entered foster care in April of 2015, after T. tested positive on a drug screening.

Ms. Alexis stated that a case plan was formulated for T. which included parental

contributions or child support payments and visitation. T. did not make any

contributions or child support payments, and did not provide food, clothing or

other necessities for T.D. In addition, T. did not make any visits. While T. did not

initiate contact with DCFS, she did answer when Ms. Alexis contacted her. Ms.

Alexis stated that T. indicated that she understood her case plan, but she indicated

an unwillingness to participate in that plan. According to Ms. Alexis, T. stated that

“she did not complete or will not participate in her case plan and she would not be

completing as she felt that [T.D.] being in state custody was best for [him].” Ms.

Alexis also testified that initially, DCFS provided bus tokens to enable T. to visit

the child, but stopped when it was learned that T. had an automobile and/or was

not visiting T.D. Ms. Alexis conducted a home visit and determined that T. did not

maintain housing that would be safe and appropriate for T.D. Ms. Alexis stated

that, to the best of her knowledge, T. did not maintain a legal means to support

herself and T.D. and that she did not have a job or provide proof of income. T. did

participate in a psychiatric evaluation, and the recommendations were that she

complete a substance abuse program, and then, after she was clean and sober,

participate in parenting classes. T. did not complete a substance abuse program,

and therefore was not referred for parenting classes. Finally, Ms. Alexis stated that

T. had not made any substantial improvement in addressing the problems that

prevented her unification with T.D., the minor child.

T. testified that she wanted an opportunity to be reunited with T.D., but that

she could not comply with all requirements of her reunification plan because she

was “dealing” with her other children, including a bipolar son.

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Concerning W.D., Ms. Alexis testified that there was also a case plan

formulated for him, which included support and visitation. W.D. did not make any

parental contributions or pay any child support. Furthermore, W.D. failed to visit

T.D. and failed to maintain contact with DCFS. Ms. Alexis stated that she could

not determine whether W.D. had maintained safe and appropriate housing for

himself and T.D. because she was unsuccessful in her attempts to schedule an

appointment with W.D. to visit his home. Furthermore, W.D. had not informed her

that he was employed, and had not provided proof of income to DCFS. Ms. Alexis

stated that the conditions that led to T.D.’s removal from W.D. persisted and that

W.D. had not kept in contact with T.D., nor had he complied with a program of

treatment and rehabilitation services set forth in his case plan. Ms. Alexis testified

that a case plan had been formulated and she made an appointment with W.D. to

review the plan. W.D. did not show up for the appointment and he did not

reschedule.

At the time of the hearing, W.D. was incarcerated, awaiting trial on a

possession of heroin charge. W.D. stated that he was incarcerated in April of

2016. W.D. testified that he was unaware of any case plan made by the DCFS.

W.D. further testified that he had two houses, and family members that were

willing to take care of T.D. while he was incarcerated, but he also admitted that he

did not provide the names of those persons to DCFS. He also stated that he was

willing to take custody of T.D., but did not attempt to do so because “That was

between him and his mother to come in here.” W.D. also stated that he could have

paid bond money and been released pending trial, but refused to do so because he

was facing contempt charges for non-payment of child support.

Finally, Ms. Alexis testified that T.D. was currently in the custody of DCFS,

residing at BoysTown in New Orleans, and that he was adjusting well with a few

minor setbacks. According to Ms. Alexis, T.D. had related to her that he wished to

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be adopted. Furthermore, DCFS was of the opinion that it is in the best interest of

T.D. that he be freed for adoption and that, if freed for adoption, adoptive

resources would be recruited.

Malik Regard testified that it was the recommendation of T.D.’s Court

Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”), that he remain in his current placement

and continue the services that were being provided.

ANALYSIS

The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that:

In any case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are two

private interests involved: those of the parents and those of the child.

The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the

continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their

children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the

law and due process requires that a fundamentally fair procedure be

followed when the state seeks to terminate the parent-child legal

relationship. However, the child has a profound interest, often at odds

with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent

adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and

continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care.

In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have consistently

found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent.

The State's parens patriae power allows intervention in the parent-

child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as where the

State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in an

involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of

involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible

protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide

adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and

adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the

termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve

permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary

termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived

of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for

all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. As such, the

primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best

interest for the child, including termination of parental rights if

justifiable grounds exist and are proven. Nonetheless, courts must

proceed with care and caution as the permanent termination of the

legal relationship existing between natural parents and the child is one

of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. The

potential loss to the parent is grievous, perhaps more so than the loss

of personal freedom caused by incarceration. (Citations omitted).

In re J.A., 99-2905 (La. 01/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 810-811.

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La. Ch.C. art. 1015 provides the statutory grounds by which a court may

involuntarily terminate the rights and privileges of parents. Petitioner in an

involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding need establish only one

ground for termination of parental rights. State ex rel. ML, 95-0045 (La.

09/05/95), 660 So.2d 830; State ex rel. A.T.C., 06-562 (La .App. 5 Cir. 11/28/06),

947 So.2d 71. The Juvenile Court judge must also find that the termination is in

the best interest of the child. La. Ch.C. art. 1039; State in Interest of ML & PL,

95-0045 (La. 09/05/95), 660 So. 2d 830, 832. Additionally, the State must prove

the elements of one of the enumerated grounds in Ch.C. art. 1015 by clear and

convincing evidence. State ex rel. ML, supra. The appellate court reviews a trial

court's findings as to whether parental rights should be terminated according to the

manifest error standard. In re D.L.R., 2008-1541 (La. 12/12/08), 998 So. 2d 681,

687: State ex rel. K.G., 02-2886 (La. 03/18/03), 841 So.2d 759, 762.

In this case, DCFS sought termination of T.’s parental rights and W.D.’s

parental rights under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) and/or (6), which provides:

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

* * *

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody

of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under

circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid

parental responsibility by any of the following:

(a) For a period of at least four months as of the time of the

hearing, despite a diligent search, the whereabouts of the child’s

parent continue to be unknown.

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to

provide significant contributions to the child’s care and support for

any period of six consecutive months.

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to

maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or

communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

(6) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed

since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a

court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a

case plan for services which has been previously filed by the

department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return

of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable

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expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or

conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for

a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The Juvenile Court judge in this matter gave extensive reasons in rendering

judgment. Concerning termination of the parental rights of T.D.’s mother, T., the

court found that:

At the adjudication hearing on April 14, 2016, T.D.’s mother

consented to T.D. being placed in the custody of DCFS. Thereafter,

T.D. was placed in BoysTown. Since that date, seventeen months

ago, T. has never been to BoysTown to visit her son. ... On multiple

occasions, T. has expressed that she would not and/or could not care

for her son. ... For the seventeen months that T.D. has been in the

custody of DCFS, T. admittedly failed to contribute any monetary

child support, clothes, food or other necessities for her son. At every

hearing and in every DCFS report to the court, it was noted that T.

never once contributed to the cost of caring for her son. T. has failed

to provide any financial support for her son and has failed to maintain

significant contact with her son over a seventeen month period.

Therefore this court finds that the state has met its burden by clear and

convincing evidence in accordance with Article 1035, that T.’s

parental rights may be terminated pursuant to article 1015 (4) [now

(5)].

With regard to termination of the parental rights of T.D.’s father, W.D., the court

found that:

According to DCFS reports and testimony in court, W.D. made his

first contact with DCFS on October 1, 2015, after T.D. called W.D.’s

fiancé to make them aware that he was in state’s custody. W.D. told

the caseworker he was moving to Waggaman and that he would be

preparing a room for T.D. W.D. did not reach out to DCFS again

until February 11, 2016 when he spoke with Ms. Alexis. Ms. Alexis

testified that W.D. requested a meeting so that they could go over his

case plan. He also asked Ms. Alexis if she would bring T.D. to the

meeting so that they could have a visit. Ms. Alexis and W.D. agreed

that W.D. would come to the DCFS office on February 15, 2016 and

that she would bring T.D. for a visit. W.D. failed to show up for the

hearing. He also failed to contact DCFS to set up another

appointment. According to all reports and testimony throughout the

history of this case, W.D. has failed to visit his son and has failed to

contribute to the cost of his care. Pitifully, he did not know his son

was in DCFS care until the child himself called to tell him. Ms.

Alexis did testify that T.D. and his father talk on the phone

occasionally, but only because T.D. initiates the phone calls. It should

be noted that W.D. is currently incarcerated and is therefore unable to

adequately care for T.D.

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It should also be noted that on August 2, 2002, a Motion for Child

Support was filed by the District Attorney in Jefferson Parish Juvenile

Court, against W.D., for the support of T.D. under docket number

2002 NS 899. On August 5, 2002, W.D. entered into a Consent

Judgment in which he agreed to pay T. $188 per month for the care of

T.D. On December 14, 2014, T. waived all arrears due to her. At that

time, W.D. owed $26,578.37 in child support arrears. After that,

W.D. still failed to pay his monthly obligation.

Since the inception of the case in 2002, W.D. has paid a total of

$1031.37 for the support of T.D. ... From April 2014 through March

2016, W.D. paid not one cent of child support. From May of 2006

through March of 2014, he paid a total of $69.63. W.D. has clearly

failed to [financially] support T.D. for the entirety of his life.

Therefore because W.D. has both failed to maintain significant

contact and failed to provide significant contributions to T.D.’s care

and support for periods well beyond six months, this court finds that

the state has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence in

accordance with Article 1035, that W.D.’s parental rights may be

terminated pursuant to article 1015 (4) [now (5)]. (Emphasis in

original.)

Our review of the record reflects that the Juvenile Court was not manifestly

erroneous in its conclusions that the State met its burden of proving, by clear and

convincing evidence, that both T. and W.D. failed to maintain significant contact

with and failed to provide significant contributions for the care and support of their

son, T.D. In fact, T. admitted that she had not seen her son and had not paid any

sums of money for his care. Likewise, W.D. also admitted that he had not seen his

son or made significant contributions toward his care. W.D. testified that he was

incarcerated, awaiting trial, and that he could “bond out,” but that if he did, there

was a detainer in Juvenile Court for failure to pay child support. We find no error

in the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of both T. and

W.D.

In brief to this Court, T.D.’s father, W.D., argues that the Juvenile Court

erred in terminating his parental rights based on abandonment because this matter

started as a Family in Need of Services, and that it was never properly transitioned

to a Child in Need of Care case. Therefore, argues W.D., proper notice procedures

were not followed.

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T.D.’s mother, T., argues that the Juvenile Court erred in allowing DCFS to

pursue termination proceedings based on allegations stemming from the FINS

proceeding, as the laws are not set forth to ensure that the parent’s rights are

afforded protection in such cases. T. further alleges that she was not advised of her

statutorily required warning and rights at the numerous hearings held after the

child entered into the custody of DCFS, and further she was not warned that her

parental rights could be terminated.

La. Ch.C. art. 1001, et seq. provides for the termination of parental rights.

La. Ch.C. art. 1001 provides:

The purpose of this Title is to protect children whose parents are

unwilling or unable to provide safety and care adequate to meet their

physical, emotional, and mental health needs, by providing a judicial

process for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities

and for the certification of the child for adoption. In all proceedings,

the primary concern is to secure the best interest of the child if a

ground justifying termination of parental rights is proved.

Termination of parental rights is to be considered the first step toward

permanent placement of the child in a safe and suitable home, and if at

all possible, to achieve the child’s adoption. This Title shall be

construed liberally. The proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously

to avoid delays in resolving the status of the parent and in achieving

permanency for children.

According to La. Ch.C. art. 1004,3 in a CINC proceeding, the DCFS, the

District Attorney, counsel appointed for the child in a Child in Need of Care

(CINC) proceeding, or the court itself may file a petition for termination of

parental rights. La. Ch.C. art. 1004 does not restrict all petitioners to a CINC 3La. Ch.C. Art. 1004 provides:

A. At any time, including in any hearing in a child in need of care proceeding, the court on its own motion may order the filing of a petition on any ground authorized by Article 1015. B. Counsel appointed for the child pursuant to Article 607 may petition for the termination of parental rights of the parent of the child if the petition alleges a ground authorized by Article 1015(4), (5), or (6) and, although eighteen months have elapsed since the date of the child’s adjudication as a child in need of care, no petition has been filed by the district attorney or the department. C. The district attorney may petition for the termination of parental rights of the parent of the child on any ground authorized by Article 1015. D. The department may petition for the termination of parental rights of the parent of the child when any of the following apply:(1) The child has been subjected to abuse or neglect after the child is returned to the parent’s care and custody while under department supervision, and termination is authorized by Article 1015(3)(j). (2) The parent’s parental rights to one or more of the child’s siblings have been terminated due to neglect or abuse and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parent have been unsuccessful, and termination is authorized by Article 1015(3)(k). (3) The child has been abandoned and termination is authorized by Article 1015(4). (4) The child has been placed in the custody of the state and termination is authorized by Article 1015(5). (5) The child is in foster care because the parent is incarcerated and termination is authorized by Article 1015(6).

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proceeding. In this case, after the filing of the petition for termination of parental

rights, counsel was appointed for both parents, and both parents were present and

represented at the termination hearing. Furthermore, La. Ch.C. art. 1004 provides

that DCFS may petition for termination of parental rights when the child “has been

abandoned and termination is authorized by Article 1015(4).” The statute does not

require that the DCFS first file to have the child adjudicated in need of care prior to

the filing of the petition for termination. We note that the provisions for filing for

termination of parental rights are not located in that part of the Children’s Code

that provides for either FINS adjudications (Title VII), or for CINC cases, (Title

VI), but are located in totally separate section of the Children’s Code (Title X).

“The Legislature has expressed its intent that courts shall construe the procedural

provisions of Title X of the Children’s Code relative to the involuntary termination

of parental rights liberally.” State ex rel. C.J.K., 00-2375 (La. 11/28/00), 7&4

So.2d 107, 114. There is nothing to support either parent’s claim that this

termination of parental rights petition is somehow ineffective or flawed, because

the child was taken into the custody of DCFS during a FINS case, and not a CINC

case.

In this case, given that the evidence showed clearly and convincingly that

both parents abandoned the child by failing to maintain significant contact after the

child was placed in custody, and by failing to provide significant support at any

time, the DCFS could have independently filed its petition for termination of

parental rights. Attorneys were appointed for each parent at that time, and each

parent was present and testified at the termination hearing. Accordingly, the

procedural safeguards for termination of parental rights were met.

T.D.’s mother, in brief contends that DCFS used the child’s “delinquent and

ungovernable status as a basis to terminate parental rights.” However, her parental

rights were terminated for abandonment, and not the child’s delinquent status.

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In addition, both T. and W.D. also argue that the Juvenile Court erred in

finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child

because T.D. was not positioned for adoption at the time of the hearing. However,

a review of La. Ch.C. art 1001, supra, reflects that there is no requirement that

mandates that the plan for adoption be set prior to the termination of parental

rights.

In its original enactment, La. Ch.C. art. 1001 had provided that “The purpose

of this Title is to provide a judicial process for the termination of all parental rights

and responsibilities under circumstances described herein. Such termination of

parental rights is to be considered the first step toward permanent placement of the

child in a suitable home through the process of adoption.” La. Ch.C. art. 1001 was

amended in 1997.4 According to the Official Revision Comments in the 1997

amendment, La. Ch.C. art. 1001 was amended, first “to emphasize that the best

interest of the child must be the foremost concern of the court when demonstrated

justification exists to sever the parents’ rights,” and that:

Three additions have been made to this Article by the 1997

amendments. The first is to emphasize that the best interest of the

child must be the foremost concern of the court when demonstrated

justification exists to sever the parents’ rights. If termination of

parental rights is not warranted, under Article 1039, the court has

other options that may better serve the child’s best interest. The

second addition is to recognize that although adoption is the goal

when termination of parental rights is ordered, adoptive placement

may prove to be impossible to secure for some children. In those

cases, a permanent placement of the child, as defined by Art. 1003(8)

can become an acceptable alternative. The third addition is to

emphasize that time is of the essence in processing a termination of

parental rights case, limited only by assuring that the fundamental due

process rights of the parents are safeguarded. An expeditious

4 After the 1997 amendment, La. Ch.C. art. 1001 provided that:

The purpose of this Title is to protect children whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide care adequate to

meet their physical, emotional, and mental health needs, by providing a judicial process for the termination of all

parental rights and responsibilities and for the certification of the child for adoption. In all proceedings, the

primary concern is to secure the best interest of the child if a ground justifying termination of parental rights is

proved. Termination of parental rights is to be considered the first step toward permanent placement of the child

in a suitable home, and if at all possible, to achieve the child's adoption. The procedural provisions of this Title

shall be construed liberally. The proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously to avoid delays in resolving the

status of the parent and in achieving permanency for children.

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resolution of the child's status is imperative if stability for the child is

to be achieved. (Citations omitted).

See 1997 La. ACT 256.5

These Comments recognize that there are some situations in which the best

interest of the child still is served by termination of parental rights, even if

adoption might not be possible.

In this case, having found that the Juvenile Court did not commit manifest

error in finding that the best interests of the child were served by terminating

parental rights, we find no merit to the arguments of T. and W.D. that the Juvenile

Court erred in terminating their parental rights in this proceeding that began as a

FINS case, or because the child was not positioned for adoption at the time of the

termination hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the above discussed reasons, the ruling of the Juvenile Court terminating

the parental rights of the mother, T., and the Father, W.D., is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

5 La. Ch.C. art 1001 was again amended by in 1999 to add the terms “safety and” in the first sentence and “safe

and” in the third sentence. 1999 La. ACT 449.

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY

CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

ROBERT A. CHAISSON

ROBERT M. MURPHY

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

HANS J. LILJEBERG

JUDGES

CHERYL Q. LANDRIEU

CLERK OF COURT

MARY E. LEGNON

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

SUSAN BUCHHOLZ

FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

16-CA-708 C/W 16-CA-709

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN

ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY MAY 31,

2017 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

E-NOTIFIEDJUVENILE COURT (CLERK)

HON. ANDREA PRICE JANZEN (DISTRICT JUDGE)

JESSICA COALTER (APPELLEE) JENNIFER G. WOMBLE (APPELLANT)

MAILED

M. ELIZABETH TOCA (APPELLANT)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

POST OFFICE BOX 1900

HARVEY, LA 70059

JESSE S. GEORGE (APPELLEE)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

615 BARONNE STREET

SUITE 203

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70113