state of maine...almost all other contracts will fall under the standard six-year statute of...
TRANSCRIPT
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Updated 2015
STATE OF MAINE COMPENDIUM OF LAW
Prepared by John S. Whitman and Heidi J. Hart
Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger 465 Congress St., 9th Floor
Portland, ME 04101 207-774-7474
www.rwlb.com
http://www.rwlb.com/
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PRE-SUIT AND INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
are quite similar, though not identical.
Organization of the State Court System
A) Mandatory alternative dispute resolution. Pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 16B (2011), all
parties to almost all civil actions in Superior Court with damages likely to exceed
$30,000.00 must participate in mandatory ADR. The parties can agree on the method of
ADR, or if they cannot agree, they must proceed to mediation. ME. R. CIV. P. 16B(d)(1)
(2011). There is no mandatory ADR in federal court in Maine.
Service of Summons
Generally, service is made by mail (by mailing the summons, complaint and a notice of
acknowledgment form) or by sheriff.
A) Person. Pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1) (2011) the service must be
[u]pon an individual other than a minor or an incompetent person, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive
service of process, provided that if the agent is one designated by statute to
receive service, such further notice as the statute requires shall be given.
The court, on motion, upon a showing that service as prescribed above
cannot be made with due diligence, may order service to be made pursuant
to subdivision (g) of this rule.
B) Public corporation. Pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (2011), service upon a public
corporation shall be made “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
any officer, director, or manager thereof and upon any public body, agency or authority by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to any member thereof.”
C) Domestic Private Corporation. Pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(8) (2011), service upon a
domestic private corporation shall be made
(a) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to any officer,
director or general agent; or, if no such officer or agent be found, to any
person in the actual employment of the corporation; or, if no such person be
found, to the Secretary of State, provided that the plaintiff's attorney shall
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also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the corporation by
registered or certified mail, addressed to the corporation's principal office
as reported on its latest annual return; or
(b) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to any agent
or attorney in fact authorized by appointment or by statute to receive or
accept service on behalf of the corporation, provided that any further notice
required by the statute shall also be given.
D) Foreign private corporation. Pursuant to ME. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(9) (2011), service shall be
made [u]pon a corporation established under the laws of any other state or country
(a) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to any officer,
director or agent, or by leaving such copies at an office or place of business
of the corporation within the state; or
(b) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to any agent
or attorney in fact authorized by appointment or by statute to receive or
accept service on behalf of the corporation, provided that any further notice
required by the statute shall also be given.
Statutes of Limitations
The general rule in Maine is that all civil actions must be commenced within six (6) years after the
cause of action arises. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 752 (2011). There are numerous exceptions to this
rule, however.
A) Personal injury. Suits for unintentional torts must be commenced within six (6) years after
the cause of action arises. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 752 (2011). Suits for the intentional
torts of assault and battery, false imprisonment, slander, and libel must be commenced
within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 753 (2011).
B) Wrongful death. Actions for wrongful death must be commenced within two (2) years
from the date of death, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (2011), except that actions for
wrongful death arising from medical malpractice generally must be commenced within
three (3) years after the cause of action accrues. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2011).
C) Survival. In general, no cause of action is lost because of the death of either party. The
cause of action survives for or against the personal representative of the deceased. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 3-817 (2011).
D) Contract. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 751 (2011):
Except as provided in ME. REV. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-725 (2011) (regarding
contracts for the sale of goods), personal actions on contracts or liabilities
under seal, promissory notes signed in the presence of an attesting witness
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or on the bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued by a bank shall be
commenced within twenty (20) years after the cause of action accrues.
Almost all other contracts will fall under the standard six-year statute of limitations.
E) Governmental entities. An action against a governmental entity or its employees (if
permitted by the Maine Tort Claims Act) must be commenced within two (2) years after
the cause of action accrues, or two (2) years after a minor claimant’s 18th birthday. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 8110 (2011).
F) Tolling. If a person is a minor, mentally ill, imprisoned, or outside the United States when
a cause of action accrues to him, the limitations period for certain specified causes of action
does not begin to run until the “disability” is removed. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 853 (2011);
Dunelawn Owners’ Assoc. v. Gendreau, 2000 ME 94, 750 A.2d 591. If a person is “absent
from and resides out of” Maine after a cause of action has accrued against him, the
limitations period does not run during his absence, with a possible exception where he was
amenable to long-arm service of process because his out-of-state address was known or
knowable. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 866 (2012); Patten v. Milam, 480 A.2d 774 (Me. 1983).
G) Construction. Actions for malpractice against licensed architects and engineers must be
commenced within four (4) years after the malpractice is discovered; but in no event may
any such action be commenced more than ten (10) years after substantial completion of the
construction contract or substantial completion of the services provided. ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 14, § 752-A (2011).
H) Employment. Under the Maine Human Rights Act actions must be commenced within
two (2) years after the act of unlawful discrimination. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(C)
(2011).
I) Contribution and indemnity. A cause of action for contribution or indemnity does not
accrue (and the statute of limitations does not begin to run) until a defendant has paid a
judgment for more than his fair share of the total damages. Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376
(Me. 1983). In most cases the general six-year statute of limitations will apply to claims
for contribution and indemnity, but a shorter limitations period may apply in certain cases.
See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 676 A.2d 510 (Me. 1996).
J) Professional liability. An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within three
(3) years after the cause of action accrues. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2011). The
statute of limitations is six (6) years for legal malpractice claims, running from the date of
the act or omission giving rise to the injury, except in cases involving negligence in the
rendering of a real estate title opinion or the drafting of a will that has been offered for
probate, in which case the statute of limitations starts to run on the date the negligence is
discovered (but not to exceed 20 years). ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 753-B (2011).
Venue Rules
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With a few exceptions, pursuant to ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 501 (2011), personal and transitory
actions may be brought “in the county where any plaintiff or defendant lives; and when no plaintiff
lives in the State, in the county where any defendant lives; or in the county where the cause of
action arose.”
NEGLIGENCE
Comparative Fault/Contributory Negligence
A) Defining comparative fault. Under ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (2011), the plaintiff’s
action is barred only if his fault (negligence) is equal to or greater than the negligence of
the defendant. On the other hand, if the plaintiff was less negligent than the defendant,
some recovery is allowed but the amount may be reduced by such amount as the jury thinks
just and equitable, considering the degree of the plaintiff’s fault. Id.
B) Negligence per se. In Maine, a violation of a statute does not constitute negligence per se
but rather is only admissible as evidence of negligence. Town of Stonington v. Galilean
Gospel Temple, 1999 ME 2, 722 A.2d 1269.
C) Assumption of the risk. Under the comparative negligence statute, so-called voluntary
assumption of risk has been abolished as a defense except to the extent that it may also
constitute negligence on the plaintiff’s part, reducing his recovery. A plaintiff’s mere
awareness of the danger which causes him injury no longer constitutes an absolute bar to
recovery. Hurd v. Hurd, 423 A.2d 960 (Me. 1981).
D) Contribution. Joinder and contribution are allowed among negligent tortfeasors whose
independent acts contribute to a single result, as well as where the tortfeasors act in concert.
Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292 (1963). Contribution is not allowed, however, among joint
intentional tortfeasors. Cf. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449 (1918); Bedard v. Greene, 409
A.2d 676 (Me. 1979).
E) Employer as a defendant. As a general proposition, an employer is liable to a third party
injured because of the negligence of an employee who is acting in the course of his
employment. See Ottinger v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 635 A.2d 948 (Me. 1993). Maine
has yet to recognize negligent supervision as a cause of action when the employee is outside
the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Penobscot Valley Hosp., 2002 ME 70,
794 A.2d 643.
Exclusive Remedy – Worker’s Compensation Protections
An employee who is covered by workers’ compensation has no right of action against his
employer, at common law or under the Wrongful Death Act, for work-related injury or death. ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, § 408 (2011). The employer’s exemption from civil actions also extends to
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all “employees, supervisors, officers and directors” of the employer. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 39-A, §
104 (2011).
A) Intentional Acts. Under some circumstances an employer may be liable for the intentional
tort of its employee. McLain v. Training & Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494 (Me. 1990). But see
Mahar v. Stonewood Transp., 2003 ME 63, 823 A.2d 540.
Joint and Several Liability
Where two defendants are each more at fault than the plaintiff, they are jointly and severally liable
to him. If their separate acts cause a single injury that is incapable of apportionment, each is liable
for the entire amount of the damages. Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235 (Me. 1992). If
apportionment is possible, then contribution must be determined with reference to each
defendant’s degree of fault. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971).
Strict Liability
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 221 (2011) provides that
[o]ne who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier
might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or to
his property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it
is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without significant change in
the condition in which it is sold. This section applies although the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
Willful and Wanton Conduct:
In Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985), the Court limited the recovery of punitive
damages to those situations where the defendant acted with “malice”: either deliberate ill will
toward the plaintiff, or conduct so outrageous that such ill will could be implied. Gross, wanton,
or reckless conduct does not support punitive damages.
DISCOVERY
Electronic Discovery Rules: The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure have not been amended to
shadow the new federal rules concerning electronic discovery.
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Expert Witnesses
A) Forms of disclosure. The court’s scheduling order, issued at the outset of litigation, sets a
deadline for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant to designate their experts. The information
that must be contained in those designations is governed by ME. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (2011).
B) Discovery of Expert Work Product. There is some conflicting authority on this issue, but
as a general matter, expert work product is discoverable. See ME. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)
(2011).
Non-Party Discovery
A) Subpoenas. Subpoenas may be served on any non-party including the attorney of a party.
ME. R. CIV. P. 45(b) (2011). The form and service requirements are all contained in ME.
R. CIV. P. 45.
B) Respondents. “A person commanded to produce and permit inspection and copying of
designated books, papers, documents, or tangible things, or inspection of premises, need
not appear in person at the place of production or inspection unless commanded to appear
for deposition, hearing, or trial.” ME. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(2)(A) (2011).
A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall produce
them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and
label them to correspond with the categories in the demand. When
information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it is privileged
or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim shall be
made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to
enable the demanding party to contest the claim.
ME. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)-(2) (2011).
C) Time frames for responses. A party has 14 days to respond to a request to produce. ME.
R. CIV. P. 45(b) (2011). A party has seven days to object to a discovery or pretrial subpoena.
ME. R. CIV. P. 45(b).
Privileges
A) Attorney-client privilege. This privilege is governed by ME. R. EVID. 502:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1)
between the client or the client's representative and the client's lawyer or the
lawyer's representative, or (2) between the lawyer and the lawyer's
representative, or (3) by the client or the client's representative or the lawyer
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or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer
representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of
common interest therein, or (4) between representatives of the client or
between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers
and their representatives representing the same client. The privilege may be
claimed by the client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal
representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar
representative of a corporation, association or other organization, whether
or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer's
representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
ME. R. EVID. 502(b)-(c) (2011).
B) Work product. A party is not entitled to materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative unless he can
show that he has a
substantial need for the materials in the preparation of his case and that he
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
ME. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (2011).
EVIDENCE, PROOFS & TRIAL ISSUES
Appeals
In civil cases, the time within which an appeal must be taken is twenty-one (21) days after the
entry of judgment or order appealed from. ME. R. APP. P. 2(b)(3) (2011).
Biomechanical Testimony
Biomechanical expert testimony is treated the same way as any other expert testimony in Maine.
It is admissible if it satisfies the requirements of Daubert and Kumho. Reali v. Mazda Motors of
Am., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2000) (Defendant sought to exclude the expert testimony of a
biomechanical engineer, claiming the testimony was based on computer simulations that were
unreliable and irrelevant. The court concluded that the biomechanical engineer could testify on
human tolerance levels, but he could not testify about his simulations because the court rejected
his Delta V figure as unreliable).
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Collateral Source Rule
Medical expense damages may be recovered for charges paid by a collateral source or charges
actually incurred but later written off or otherwise not collected. Mention to the jury of collateral
source payments or write-offs should be avoided. See Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978)
(“The fact [that] necessary medical and nursing services are rendered gratuitously to one who is
injured as a result of the negligence of another should not preclude the injured party from
recovering the reasonable value of those services as part of … compensatory damages in an action
against the tortfeasor.”).
Convictions
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. ME. R. EVID. 404(b) (2011). For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
specific crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment for
one year or more, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. ME.
R. EVID. 609(a) (2011).
Day in the Life Videos
In the only Maine case addressing day in the life videos, the court denied the injured individual's
motion to admit the day in the life videotape into evidence and excluded it under Rule 403.
Bolstridge v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 621 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Me. 1985).
Dead Man’s Statute
The Maine Dead Man’s Statute was repealed in 1977.
Offers of Judgment
Offers of judgment are governed by ME. R. CIV. P. 68 (2011) which states,
[a]t any time more than 10 days before the trial begins or within such shorter
time as the court may approve, a party defending against a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the
defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the
offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer
or within such shorter time as the court may order the adverse party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
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accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one
party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but
the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment,
which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served
within a reasonable time not less than 10 days, or such shorter time as the
court may approve, prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the
amount or extent of liability.
Offers of Proof
In order to preserve an issue for appeal,
ME. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) (2011) requires the proponent of the evidence to
make its substance known to the court by an offer of proof, unless the
substance was apparent from the context of the question. An offer of proof
should contain not only the facts that are sought to be elicited, but also
reference to the facts, circumstances, or legal grounds on which the
testimony is admissible. Similarly, when a party eschews an explicit offer
of proof and relies on the context of a question to preserve the issue for
appeal, both the substance and the legal grounds on which the testimony is
admissible must be apparent from that context.
State v. Snow, 2007 ME 26, 916 A.2d 957.
Prior Accidents
Prior accidents are not admissible to determine liability. See, e.g., Fortier v. Lovejoy, 520 A.2d
1303 (Me. 1987).
Relationship to the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Maine Rules of Evidence are modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence and are quite
similar, though not identical.
Seat Belt and Helmet Use Admissibility
In automobile accident cases, the non-use of a seat belt by the driver or any passenger, or a
mandatory child safety seat, is not admissible in evidence. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2081 (2011);
Morton v. Brockman, 184 F.R.D. 211 (D. Me. 1999) (applying rule in federal court).
Subsequent Remedial Measures
Evidence of subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect
in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. ME. REV. STAT.
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tit. 14, § 1403 (2011); ME. R. EVID. 407(a) (2011); FED. R. EVID. 407 (2012); Freeman v.
Funtown/Splashtown, USA, 2003 ME 101, 828 A.2d 752.
Use of Photographs
To prove the content of a photograph, the original is generally required unless the original is lost,
destroyed, unobtainable, in control of the opponent or goes to a collateral issue. ME. R. EVID. 1002,
1004 (2011).
DAMAGES
Caps on Damages
The Maine Liquor Liability Act sets a cap of $350,000.00 (exclusive of medical expenses), per
defendant, for any and all claims arising out of a single incident. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 2509
(2011). The Maine Tort Claims Act sets a $400,000.00 limit on any damages award against a
governmental entity and/or its employees arising out of a single occurrence. ME. REV. STAT. tit.
14, § 8105(1) (2011). Under most circumstances, the $400,000 cap will be waived to the extent of
liability insurance. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8116. Claims for wrongful death are statutory and caps are
included in the statute: $500,000 for loss of care, comfort, security and distress of the beneficiaries,
and $250,000 for punitive. There is no cap on medicals, burial expenses, pecuniary loss, or
conscious pain and suffering.
Loss of Earning Opportunity
To recover, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the earning opportunity
was real and available and that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the inability to seize
the opportunity. Speculative opportunities or earnings will not suffice. Snow v. Villacci, 2000 ME
127, 754 A.2d 360.
Mitigation
In Maine, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages after suffering an injury or loss. Walter v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 2000 ME 63, 748 A.2d 961.
Punitive Damages
In Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985), the Law Court limited the recovery of punitive
damages to those situations where the defendant acted with “malice”: either deliberate ill will
toward the plaintiff, or “conduct so outrageous that such ill will could be implied.” Gross, wanton,
or reckless conduct does not support punitive damages; malice must be alleged and proved. Id. In
addition, proof of malice must be made by “clear and convincing evidence,” a higher standard than
mere preponderance of the evidence. Id.
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Recovery of Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest
A) Prejudgment interest. In all civil actions, aside from small claims, prejudgment interest
(if it began to accrue on or after July 1, 2003) is allowed at the one-year U.S. Treasury bill
rate plus 3%. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1602-B (2011). Prejudgment interest accrues from
the date when the complaint was filed in court, or from the date when a “notice of claim”
(if any) was served on the defendant. Id. The availability of statutory prejudgment interest
does not preclude a plaintiff from enforcing a contract or note containing a specific interest
provision, or otherwise showing damages beyond the statutory rate. See Nickerson v. Rowe,
647 A.2d 1191 (Me. 1994).
B) Post-judgment interest. In all civil actions, post-judgment interest is allowed at the one
year-U.S. Treasury bill rate plus 6%. If the action involves a contract or note that contains
a higher interest rate, however, the higher rate is applied. Post-judgment interest accrues
on the amount of the judgment alone, not augmented by prejudgment interest. Post-
judgment interest accrues from the date of entry of judgment, including the period of any
appeal. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 1602-B, -C (2011).
Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees
Ordinarily, the party who prevails at trial is not entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees from the
losing party. There are isolated statutory exceptions to this rule. The prevailing party is entitled,
however, to recover certain “costs” from the losing party. In state court, the prevailing party may
always recover filing fees, fees for service of process, statutory witness travel fees, and reasonable
travel expenses of the party or his attorney. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1502-B (2011). The court
may also allow recovery of deposition costs, medical report costs, and expert witness fees and
expenses. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1502-C (2011).
Settlement Involving Minors
The settlement of any claim brought on behalf of a minor is invalid unless approved by order of
court or affirmed by entry of judgment. If no action has been commenced, a minor by guardian,
guardian ad litem, or “next friend” may apply to any court in which such an action might have
been commenced for an order approving a proposed settlement. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1605
(2011). The court must determine that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and in the best interest
of the minor.” Corey v. Corey, 2002 ME 132, 803 A.2d 1014. The procedure for obtaining
settlement approval is set forth in ME. R. CIV. P. 17A (2011). The court generally requires that the
net settlement proceeds be deposited in a bank account or invested in an investment account until
the minor is an adult, and withdrawals require court approval. Id.
This Compendium outline contains a brief overview of certain laws concerning various
litigation and legal topics. The compendium provides a simple synopsis of current law and
is not intended to offer lengthy analysis of legal issues. This compendium is provided for
general information and educational purposes only. It does not solicit, establish, or continue
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an attorney-client relationship with any attorney or law firm identified as an author, editor
or contributor. The contents should not be construed as legal advice or opinion. While every
effort has been made to be accurate, the contents should not be relied upon in any specific
factual situation. These materials are not intended to provide legal advice or to cover all
laws or regulations that may be applicable to a specific factual situation. If you have matters
or questions to be resolved for which legal advice may be indicated, you are encouraged to
contact a lawyer authorized to practice law in the state for which you are investigating and/or
seeking legal advice.