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International Society for Iranian Studies

The Patrimonial Structure of Iranian Bureaucracy in the Late Nineteenth CenturyAuthor(s): A. Reza SheikholeslamiSource: Iranian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1/4, State and Society in Iran (1978), pp. 199-258Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310302 .

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Iranian Studies, Volume Xl, 1978.

The Patrimonial Structure

of Iranian Bureaucracy in

The Late Nineteenth Century

A. Reza Sheikholeslami

Introduction

A major characteristic of traditional polities is that their policy-implementing and policy-formulating roles are less differentiated than those in more politically developed societies. Consequently, the bureaucracy in a traditional setting plays a crucial role in system-maintenance, not only through its recruitment function and socialization of the new recruits,,but by reinforcing the system's goals and mores. Without the development of an effective bureaucracy as an agent of political integration, the traditional system either remains traditional or breaks apart.1 The possibility that the bureaucracy would be able to perform its herculean task is further reduced by the fact that as a subsystem within the larger traditional political system it mostly symbolizes the general systemic patterns. For example, if the ascriptive norms are prevalent in the society, one may expect to see inheritance of offices and nepotism on the institutional level. Political development, therefore, is a painfully slow process which more often than not may never come about.

A. Reza Sheikholeslami is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington.

199



The Qajar bureaucracy in Iran during the unusually long reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) is a case in point. Under the Western impact and the Shah's attempts to centralize the country, the need for rapid institution building was felt. At the same time, the prerequisites of a modern state, such as separation of interpersonal rela- tions from work, economic and societal differentiation, and, finally, established legal procedures ensuring the efficacy of contracts, were absent.2 The economy was too meager to allow for payment of salaries to office holders, and the working force was not mobile enough to allow for staffing the bureaucracy by any method other than the ascriptive ones.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the beginning administrative centralization should mark the transforma- tion, of first, the Shah's household into major offices of the state, and second, the bureaucratization of some pre- existing traditional structures. The formalization of traditional structures accelerated the process of institution building. But it also imbued the new structures with traditionalism. The Persian political tradition at this time was clearly differentiated into sacred and secular. The secular institutions were mostly absorbed. The sacred were not. It did not deny legitimacy to the government. It did not offer it either. Not assimilated, it was to have grave effects on the stability of the new, albeit traditionalis- tic, institutions.3

The Qajar bureaucracy during Nasir al-Din Shah's reign fulfilled the most important criteria in the We- berian model of a primitive bureaucracy:4 (a) offices were not structurally and functionally differentiated. (b) The organization of official functions was neither continuous nor bound by rules. (c) The official was not always provided with authority to carry out the functions assigned to him, nor were the means of rule enforcement defined, or the conditions for compulsion clearly established. (d) With some exceptions, there was no specialized training or knowledge required from those who held office. (e) Offices were thought of in terms of revenue, thus they could be farmed out. There was no separation between the

IRANIAN STUDIES 200



officer and the ownership of the administrative means, nor was there a separation between the office and the official's residence. (f) To the extent that an officer was obeyed by his subordinates or the community, it was due to his person rather than to his office.

The bureaucratic structure, therefore, was closely related to the general systemic norms. One can observe that a "Weberian" primitive bureaucracy operated in a society where legal norms could not be established either by coercion or by agreement. The only general laws were Quranic. Not only was sovereignty contested between the Shah and the ulama, but the society was fragmented into tribes, isolated villages, and religious and linguistic groupings which surfaced more obviously whenever government authority faded away. Thus, the authority patterns in the Shah's dominion cannot be expressed in a consistent system of abstract rules.

Where the Shah's authority was felt, as it was in the central bureaucracy, one faces a totally different problem. Here the bureaucracy was indeed an extension of the monarch's household. He chose the officers on the basis of his personal trust, and without establishing any consistent limitations on their authority or obligation. Nor was his choice limited by the officer's degree of technical competence. It was a case of patriarchy. "Patri- archalism," as Weber observed, is based "on the official's commitment [not] to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on strictly personal loyal- ty."5 The official's power was an extension of the Shah's power and the manifestation of the Shah's personal trust in the official. Consequently, the areas that the officials had jurisdiction over were not defined, nor was there much relationship between the bewildering and pom- pous official titles and any definite administrative authority. Weber's characterization that "When the ruler's political operations are appended to his purely economic concerns they appear as auxiliary resources which are used merely according to need and opportunity,",6 accurately describes Qajar Iran. Within such a system where the bu-

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reaucrats operate as household servants whose duties and responsibilities change according to their master's de- sires, it is very difficult to reach an objectively defined official function. The relationship between the official and his subordinates followed the same pattern as the one between the official and the Shah: the official made ad hoc decisions and delegated authority to his subordinates on the basis of purely personal considera- tions. Weber identifies a juxtaposition of "inviolable traditional prescription" and "arbitrary decision making (kabinettsjustiz)" as a typical feature of the patrimonial state.7

Weber, in fact, sees some similarity between such personal authority and impersonally oriented bureaucratic domination in the sense that they both enjoy stability and have an "everyday character."8 In the final analysis, he holds that both patterns of domination find their support in the compliance of the subjects. The difference between the two patterns of domination is in the manner in which the norms of domination are established.

The official classes in Iran, however, did not con- stitute a bureaucracy in the modern sense, as the officials basically formed a hierarchy of ascribed positions whose authorities and functions were diffuse. A change can be discerned early in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign when six formally autonomous ministries were formed by the Shah to exercise differentiated aspects of the Shah's authority. The process of institutionalization went so far in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that in the middle of Nasir al-Din's reign it had already become a differentiated institution with functionally specific departments. In some ministries, such as War or Finance, some training and know l- edge were required of the officials. But in each and every case,the official derived his legitimation from the Shah and retained his office at the Shah's pleasure.

At this point, it is possible to give an account of the administrative bodies in Qajar Iran with awareness of the noninstitutional milieu in which they operated. Any formal study of the Qajar bureaucracy in terms of the in-

IRANIAN STUDIES 202



stitutions of which it was comprised,rather than in terms of functions that it actually played and relying on the yearbooks, sal-namahs, which listed the variety of governmental departments, will of necessity miss the informality of the structure of power while drawing up an ideal-typical model of the administration which would bear no resemblance to the actual diffusion and lack of institutionalization. As Aristotle pointed out at the beginning of his treatise on ethics, there is nothing to be gained from trying to achieve a greater precision in an investigation than the subject matter will allow.9

The Persian government was basically organized a- round monopolies. Each officer's sphere of j'urisdiction was defined by the extent of the area that he was authorized by the Shah to exploit fiscally. The ministries, as the highest institutions in the country, were also basically monopolies. Ideally, there were fifteen ministries in Iran headed by the Grand Vizier. They consisted of War, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Treasury, Court, Commerce, Jus- tice, Pensions and Endowments, Post, Press, Science, Tele- graphs, Mines, Public Works, and Customs.10

Some of these ministries were lumped together under one minister. Such groupings of the ministries indicate the prevailing conception of them. The portfolios of Justice and Commerce were often held by the same man, as the criminal litigations were handled by the governors and most civil cases by the ulama. The procedure for commercial cases was most consistent and was handled by the local chambers of commerce. Since the administration of commercial cases was the most organized,and since the Ministry of Justice could have no other consistent area of authority at the time, it was natural that both offices should be held by the same man.

In the same vein, the Ministries of Science, Tele- graph, and Mines were headed by the same minister as were Pensions and Endowments. Interestingly enough, the portfolios of Treasury and Finance were consistently held by two different men. The power of the Minister of War, which could have been significant, was also divided up

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among the Minister and a host of other governors, local notables, army chiefs, and battalion heads.

The Ministry of Pensions and Endowments

The Persian government was not in full control of the charitable endowments, awqaf. The trustees of the estates, mostly in the form of lands, were generally from the ranks of the ulama. Of 4,000,000 tumans, which was reportedly the revenues from endowments, the Ministry con- trolled 500,000 tumans.11 This was distributed among the tullab, theology students, as well as the ulama and many other members of the ruling class. The local governorates distributed funds allocated for pensions, vaza'if, independent of the Ministry of Vaza'if va Awqaf. The administration of Imam Riza's shrine endowments was under the direct control of the Shah and his appointee as the regent, known as na'ib al-tawliyah. Considering that almost all other endowments were administered by individuals, the figure of 500,000 tumans distributed by the Ministry seems too large.

The Ministry of the Post

The organization of the postal system was one of the traditional functions of government which had fallen into utter decay. When Nasir al-Din Shah,during his first Euro- pean trip,employed an Austrian to establish a functioning Ministry of Post, given the prevailing conception of government as a system of monopolies, it was natural that the old but revived function should be granted as a monopoly to a trusted servant. It was the Shah's personal secretary, Mirza cAli Khan Amin al-Dawlah, who assumed the new monopoly. In his memoirs, the supposedly reformist minister writes in a matter-of-fact manner that "By the royal rescript the Ministry of Post which was created at the personal financial cost and labor of Amin al-Mulk [Amin- al-Dawlah] was entrusted to himself forever and the prob- able and expected profits were to go to him."*12 The Shah did not request Mirza CAli Khan to render an account of

IRANIAN STUDIES 204



the revenues under his trust, so long as the latter maintained his monopoly in a state of reasonable efficiency. The old subsidies paid to the chapar-khanahs, postal sta- tions, however, continued to be paid to the newly formed ministry. 13

The Ministry of the Telegraph

An area where the conflict between personal goal- gratification of the officeholder and the general systemic needs were in an obvious contradiction was in the Ministry of Telegraph. The minister regularly blocked the construction of new lines as they reduced his monetary exploita- tions. The minister was expected to pay 19,000 tumans annually into the Shah's treasury to pay for his monopoly. Thanks to the deductions he made for the expenses of the new lines, instruments, and some of the salaries, he paid no money to the government.14

The salaries of nearly all the staff was paid out of the Treasury, since the Ministry was in fact a web of espionage systems in the country, its local offices being headed by military officers reporting directly to the Shah or the Chief Minister.

The Ministries of Commerce and Justice

The Minister theoretically depended on special a- gents in provinces to adjudicate the commercial litigations. The commercial cases were,however,decided by the notable merchants of each locality according to the cus- tomary law, Curf.15 The minister's agent at best could hope to give an official insignia to the decision for some remunerative rewards. The local governors, however, bar- red the special agents from the provinces under their authorities.

The Ministry of Justice, often united with Commerce, was almost a non-existing institution. The adjudication function was carried out by the peripheral bodies.

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The Ministry of Public Works

Justice was not the only nonexisting ministry. The sole employee of the Ministry of Public Works was the Min- ister himself. Amir Nizam, who filled the portfolio for so long that the name of his ministry became actually his name, Vazir-i Fava'id-i cAmmah, was normally away from Teh- ran. Every now and then somebody would remember the ministry and write an elaborate job description for it. Mushir al-Dawlah describes it as a "bureau within the Ministry of Interior, responsible for constructions of public structures such as bridges, roads, karvansarais, ports, docks, and their repairs and unkeep. "17 When the Shah appointed Mirza Qahriman Amin Lashkar to the ministry, not only did he elevate the bureau to a ministry, but he also added a few more functions to the already long list of the Minis- try's responsibilities. The minister was also entrusted with building water reservoirs, drying up the marshlands, and making decisions on the distribution of water of the rivers. 18

An autobiographical source refers to a certain Ja- hangir Khan as the Minister of Industries, although other sources that list other nonexisting ministries do not men- tion this one.19

The Ministry of the Press

There were ministries that actually performed certain specific functions. One was the Ministry of the Press under the authority of Ictimad al-Saltanah. He put together a cadre of scholars who generated a renaissance of literary and scholarly interest. They edited, wrote, and translated a large number of books. They also regularly published newspapers, IttilaC and Iran among them.

The important ministers were those concerned with foreign affairs, the army, and taxes. The latter two aspects of the government require a more detailed study.

IRANIAN STUDIES 206



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs depended very much on his relationship with the Chief Minis- ter. During the absence or weakness of the Chief Minister, the minister in charge of foreign affairs fulfilled his ministry's functions with the authority that was expected of such a high office. Mirza Sacid Khan, although under the thumb of the Shah, was often in a position to make authoritative decisions, as indeed did Mirza Husain Khan.

The Ministry consisted of four departments dealing with the British, Russian, Ottoman, and the nonneighboring powers. There were also five offices: commercial affairs, protocol, records, translation and decipherment, and ac- counting. The Ministry had representatives in the major capitals and towns where Persians congregated to work or trade. To handle its responsibilities in regard to foreign merchants, minorities, and border affairs, the Ministry had offices in the major Persian cities as well.20

The important ambassadorships were sold by the Shah as were the most important consular positions. The possibilities of fiscal exploitation through passport fees, distribution of medals to foreign nationals, and the use of diplomatic mail for trade purposes were so great that the eager candidates were willing to offer large sums of purchase price.

The posts in Istanbul and Tiflis were especially popular on account of the large Persian population residing in Turkey and Caucasia, and the judicial authority of the Persian representative in deciding on conflicts among the Persians as well as supporting their cases to the host government.21

The Ministry of War

The Persian Army was not an autonomous institution, fulfilling technically specific functions, and differentiated from other traditional institutional processes of the

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country. The army was closely tied, in its recruitment, financing, and administration, with the country's diffused social and economic structure.

On the surface, the Ministry of War consisted of nine functionally specific departments. These departments included a blue-ribbon committee which was supposed to de- liberate on military affairs down to the secretariat, which was in charge of clerical matters.22

In a rescript by the Shah to Kamran Mirza, the Shah's son and Minister of War, the Shah distributed the functions of the ministry among seven departments. The new organization was more rational, as overlapping had been avoided. New departments dealing with military instruction and the corps of the army engineers were at least indicative of the Shah's ambitions,though not of the reality of the situation. The Shah foresaw two offices of deputy to the minister. One was of administrative and clerical nature, but the second one, which he called ajudan-bashi, was infused with e- nough power to rival and control the minister. The ajudan- bashi was put in charge of "the instructions, maneuvers, transfer of battalions, appointment of military officers anywhere across the country, and the construction of for- tifications."*23

Colonel Picot's report, however, indicated a gap between the ideal-typical model of the Ministry of War and the actual organization of that office. Picot reported "that the Minister of War unites in his own person several separate and distinct offices, such as those of the Minis- ter of War, Financial Secretary, the Commander-in-Chief, and Paymaster-General."24 In a manner similar to other powerful Qajar officials, Kamran Mirza had monopolized a variety of offices and personalized these offices in his person. Consequently, his authority could not be subject to any institutional checks. "As Minister of War and Fi- nancial Secretary," Picot wrote, "he prepares the Army Estimates, provides the war material, equipment, clothing, tents, etc., meets all pay disbursements, and checks the accounts of expenditure."25 In sum, Picot observes that, "As the Commander-in-Chief he accepts the material and

IRANIAN STUDIES 208



equipment provided by himself as Minister of War."26 On Kamran Mirza, in Picot's words, "devolves the whole responsibility, administrative, financial, and executive."27

Decentralization of the Army

Picot's report on the concentration of the authority of the Ministry of War in the person of Kamran Mirza may give an erroneous impression of the Minister's power. While the Minister was, in fact, the personification of the Min- istry, not all military powers were within the authority of his office. Formally, he was the commander of the whole army. In a rescript, issued in 1882-1883, the Shah cate- gorically wrote, "The three branches of the armed forces of the state, consisting of the gunners, the cavalry and the infantry are under the direct authority of the Minister [of War]."2 Yet in the same year the battalions that were under the authority of the Court Minister, cAla' al-Dawlah, marched in front of the Shah and their officers were given robes of honor and medals by the Shah.29 Seven yearslater Zill al-Sultan's military power reached such magnitude that the Shah sent General Wagner to investi'ate the extent of the threat to his sovereign authority.3

There was a host of other military leaders,who un- like Zill al-Sultan,did not combine administrative and military power but were independent of the minister's supervision. Such an example was Sulaiman Khan Sahib-Ikhti- yar who led the Khurasan army and was responsible to the Shah directly.31

In addition to the military leaders who enjoyed their positions thanks to the Shah's favor,there was a host of local notables who commanded their basically tribal forces and felt their allegiance was due only to the Shah. Some of these local lords,such as Mir cAlam Khan Hishmat al-Mulk,were granted official military ranks and functions in the Ministry,although they hardly came to Tehran and commanded forces which were loyal to them on the basis of their patriarchal allegiance.32

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Size of the Army

The Army was divided into nine tumans, regiments, and each tuman included five to nine afvag, battalions.33 The infantry battalions were supposed to consist of 800 men.34 A contemporary source, however, points out that each battalion included 100 musicians and officers and another 200 were either sick or claimed to be. Thus, the active men of the battalion were not more than 500.35

The army, therefore, officially numbered 64,000 but its fighting force was about 40,000. The sal-namahs consistently give the size of the standing army as well over 100,000,exclusive of the irregulars. Even Mirza Husain Khan, in a letter to the Shah,writes that "the army is over 100,000 men," and the Shah writes his comment on the same letter that,"if 20,000 be stationed in barracks as reserves, then 80,000 soldiers can be mobilized."36

Colonel Baker, an English officer who traveled to Central Asia in the 1870s, reported that the army consisted of 35,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry.37 So objective reports on the Persian Army puts the strength of it between 40,000 and 60,000 men. The difference between the two reports is mainly that the latter does not exclude from the list the number of officers, musicians, and the sick.

To have his commands obeyed, the Shah did not have to depend exclusively on the social fragmentation of his realm. Rather than just being a manipulator he could count on the strength of an army that was about 60,000- men strong--a substantial army given the preindustrial nature of the state and the size of the general population.38

The army was, of course, not large enough to maintain strong presence in the whole country. In Khuzistan, for example, the "Persian army is represented only by a skeleton garrison at Shushtar...and by a qurkhanah-chi or captain of ordinance and a few artillery men... at Mu- hammarah [today's Khurram-Shahr]."39 A report by a Per-

IRANIAN STUDIES 210



sian agent supports the contention that the army's presece in Khuzistan was nominal. The report indicates, however, that there were generally two battalions in Khuzistan. This report also indicates that the battalions were being replaced with fresh ones very rapidly.40 Both reports, however, overlooked the fact that southern Khuzistan was not under direct control of the government, and the Bakhtiari cavalry could be resorted to in order to maintain peace in northern Khuzistan.

The Shah always succeeded in mobilizing enough forces to suppress the several revolts in Iran, the most important of which was that of Shaikh cUbaid Allah. The government defeated the rebels with relative ease even before the arrival of Mirza Husain Khan, who was appointed to command the Army of Azarbayjan and given extraordinary powers in 1880.41 At the same time, Zill al-Sultan dis- patched seven battalions to quell the tribal rebellions of the Hamavand-i Chalabi, Kalhur, and Karandi while he moved at the head of a 12,000-man army to Burujird. This large force was in addition to the local lords, who joined the government forces in sizeable number.42

In fact, although the Shah attempted not to entangle himself in areas over which his jurisdiction was not clear, when it became necessary to extend his sovereign authority he often had enough military power at his disposal to do so forcefully. In the case of Sistan, for example, he wrote to Vakil al-Mulk, governor-general of Kirman, that "at first thoughtlessly they stationed some government forces in Sistan. Now we have no alternative but its com- plete annexation [tasahub]. Muzzaffar al-Dawlah should move to Sistan at the head of three battalions ... .A strong fort shouid be built in Zahidan to house the government forces. "4

The power of the army during the reign of Nasir al- Din Shah has often been underestimated. Yet the account given here should not give the impression of a well-maintained, disciplined engine of violence. Some of the infantry were organized along tribal,"feudalistic" lines, and apparently all the cavalry was raised and maintained

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by the local lords.44 The situation at times was so chaotic that a British officer reported that "no one knows how many privates are in a regiment or what their expenses in pay and rations and other sources allowed by the government for sundry expenses."45

A report read to the Dar al-Shura on the structure of the army throws light on the degree of disorganization, complications, and varieties of the modes in which the army was recruited, and the extent to which the raising and maintaining o f the army was associated with the country's social and economic structure. Because of the information it provides, parts of the report deserve to be quoted at length:

Persian army consists of different types of soldiers. First, there are the volunteers, like the Azarbayjan army. Of course the soldier who joins the army of his own volition will leave the army when he wishes also....Second, there are the taq- simi ones whose induction into the army is part of the taxes paid by localities in lots ... .which are of several types. Places like CAli Abad, which is khalisah [government lands], and Tajrish, which is owned by many persons, have to provide the government with 100 men each as part of their taxes. So every 5 families of the 500 families have to get together and send a soldier....Wherever they find a shepherd or a washer in the public bath who can be persuaded for little money to join the army, they pay him 30 to 50 tumans and the five families present him to the draft officer.... It is obvious that such a soldier is entirely useless. When the whole village is owned by one person the situation is again different. The landowner is either working in the government and is powerful, or he is a petty merchant (kasib), and just a subject (raciyat). No officer, of course, dares to demand any soldiers from the man who works in the government and is powerful... .As far as the kasib and the raciyat are concerned, they do not want to lose good hardworking peasants. If he is wealthy

IRANIAN STUDIES 212



he recruits useless peasants from other villages or pays some hooligans from the city and turns them in. He also passes some money to the draft officer.... If the owner of the village is poor the draft officer does as he pleases.. .takes away whatever and whomever he wants... .Finally, there is a type of draft that is entirely in the hands of the regional officers. They can take whoever they want. Often they collect the money from the landowners for the pay of the soldiers, but they do not recruit the soldiers. This system operates in Kurdistan, Fars, Khurasan, Kirman, and Kirmanshah....None of these systems are consistently applied..,and it is obvious that under such conditions, no effective army can be raised nor can the subject enjoy any peace.... 46

The report also indicates that while the subjects were supposed to contribute 10 tumans toward the pay of the soldiers,they were often forced to pay 100 tumans to pay nonexisting recruits.47

Financing the Army

Not only was the recruitment of the soldiers based on the village system, but so was the manner in which the army was financed. Amir Kabir, in his attempt to establish a standing army to replace the irregulars, tied the military draft to the tax structure, which was basically agricultural tax. Each agricultural unit, bunah, had to send a certain number of soldiers, pay them a maintenance fee, and pay for the upkeep of their families in the village.48 Thus developed a standing army comprised of soldiers drawn from and paid by the villages, which came to be known as sarbaz-i bunichah.

The bunichah system remained in force,although the expansion of the army necessitated the search for new sources of money. Thus,by the 1870s,it was only one of the three sources for the payment of the army's expenses. The Shah makes this clear in his answer to a letter from

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the then Minister of War, Mirza Husain Khan, in which the latter, in the name of cordiality between himself and Mirza Yusuf, the Minister of Finance and Mirza Husein's rival, had requested that the sources of the money allotted to the army be identified and thus be under his own control. The Shah wrote to Mirza Husain Khan that

the army's budget depends on different sources. First, there is the six-month maintenance costs of the soldiers, payable by the provinces. You can use your own judgment to ensure its efficient collection and receipt. Second, there is the money for the upkeep of the army [throughout the year]. That comes from the Customs. They should collect that every month and deliver it. Third, there are the other costs. The money for them comes from the Treasury.49

In 1886, the bunichah, or the six-month maintenance allow- ance, amounted to b519,214,"8.50

The other two sources also seem to have contributed heavily toward paying the army, as some battalions remained in service all year long and had to be paid not only for six months of service, but for the whole year. The Shah had to pay for clothing, foreign officers, and ammunition out of the Treasury. There was also a large class of ci- vilians in the Ministry of War doing scribal duties, lashkar nivis, who were not paid by the bunichah taxes.51

The financing of the army was as irregular as its recruitment. Soldiers did not receive the same salaries, nor did the central government know what they received. In fact, the Grand Vizier, Mirza Yusuf, asked Asif al-Dawlah, the governor-general of Khurasan, as to the manner in which the Khurasani soldiers were paid. Asif al-Dawlah's answer indicates that some soldiers were completely on the government's payroll. The pay of other soldiers depended on whether they were drawn from privately owned villages, or whether they came from the government lands. Some soldiers received their bunichah salaries in kind and others in cash. As far as the two battalions of Qa'in were concerned, even

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the governor-general was not informed, as the amir of Qa'- in, Hishmat al-Mulk, commanded them independently and de- ducted the costs from the taxes he owed to the governmentS2

Given the erratic nature of the payments to the army, it is not surprising that the battalions repeatedly rioted as their salaries were in arrears. Even the battalion charged with the protection of the capital was so ill paid and so tardy that in 1890 they took bast in the royal stable, an act which for the army, amounted to insurrection. 3

Troop riots in other parts of the country because of delayed payments were common, as they were farther from the capital. They had more grievances and more freedom to ex- press those grievances.5 In Bushihr,the soldiers became so desperate that they turned to looting in order to feed themselves. The situation became so dangerous that the government had to move troops against them. The riotous troops faced with a superior force took bast under the flag- staff of a foreign power at the Ottoman consulate.55

During emergencies,the government took extra care to deliver the troops' pay on time. When Shaikh cUbaid Allah rebelled,the government tried to meet the soldiers' pay. In a letter to the Shah, Mirza Husain wrote:

I have written to CAzad al-Dawlah to use any means to ensure that the tribal cavalries which are called up receive their pay for the period between now and the end of the year. They are supposed to receive this in installments. I know, however, that they are shameless and undisciplined. They can find this [tardy payments] an excuse and not respond to the call-up. 56

Attempts at Reforming the Army

Some of the officials whose interests lay with the chaotic system prevailing in Iran, blatantly lied to the Shah on the needs for reform. Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Daw- lah,who ran the Ministry of War in Kamran Mirza's name in

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1870-71,wrote to the Shah, "I swear upon the 'revengeful salt'57 of the Shahanshah, may we all be sacrificed to him, that there is no better army anywhere in the world than yours."*58 The Shah, however, had experienced a quick de- feat at the hands of a small Anglo-Indian army in 1856-57 and even a more ignominious one at the hands of bands of Turkomans in 1861. There were also officials,who either altruistically or because they opposed the clique in power, informed the Shah about the prevalent conditions in the country. One such official wrote to the Shah:

the army is so hopelessly weak that it cannot with- stand the onslaught of an enemy for an hour, if that much. I do not think we have two combat-ready battalions. The causes of this are, of course, obvious, particularly after the Marvand Astar-Abad episode [the Turkoman fiasco] when the commander of the troops sold the provisions and left his soldiers hungry. What can one expect of the troops [so bad- ly treated]. That is why so many battalions in this last year became so rebellious.5

The efforts to reform the army had already begun under Amir Kabir. The financial system that he set up still funded the army and patterned its recruitment practices. The college that Amir Kabir founded, Dar al-Funun, was a military college and remained so. Its curriculum was closely tied to the needs of the army and its teachers as well as students had army ranks.60

In 1867, the Shah formed the Military Council rMaj- lis-i Tahqiq Divan-i Nizam]. It was expected to see that the military code, that had just been prepared,was executed.1 In a rescript, the Shah discussed the Council's authority in more detail. He still held on to a traditional view in insisting that the Western progress was inspired by Islam, and thus Europeanization was not a change for Iran, but signified a return to the old Islamic ways. In the usual vague and general style of thinking, he gave the Council authority to oversee all affairs of the army but in effect granted it little if any authority. The document, however, still indicated relatively significant intentions for re-

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form. The Shah wrote:

the worldly affairs, particularly the matters regarding the state and kingship and more specifical- ly those that concern the army cannot be attended to properly in the absence of consultation and the solicitation of the ideas of the wise. In fact, at the time of the Prophet... in most affairs the wise were consulted. This was particularly so in military matters. This was an Islamic practice until the end of caliphate. This custom gradually died out in the Islamic lands while the Europeans pick- ed it up and adhered to it firmly... the authority of this Council extends to all the military matters. They should present their opinions on all these areas. All military farmans after Jinab-i Aqa's [Mustawfi al-Mamalik] and Sardar-i Kull's [cAziz Khan-i Mukri, the Minister of War] should be pre- sented to the Council. Only if the Council accepts [the proposals] do they become the law of the land, [hukm-i qanuni]. We will execute the decisions.... However, if we object to some of their decisions and prove to them that they have made a mistake, they should confess to their mistake and give a new opinion.62

The council, in effect, had no authority. It was the formalization of the Shah's will in a more bureaucratic manner. It was still a step forward for a government that had few routinized established ways of conducting its affairs. A further step toward rationalization of the army administration was taken when the Shah specified the time, the days, and the place where the council had to meet.63 This was an important measure toward conceptualization of office in abstract terms, separating it from the individual who held the office and conducted his administrative functions at home and in erratic style.

There are other indications that a certain degree of regularization had set in before the advent of the West- ernizing reformers. Inspectors were sent to the battalions to take account of the ammunition, soldiers, and the gen-

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eral conditions of the battalion. Many such reports can be located in the manuscript collection of Majlis Library.64

The Shah's first two trips to Europe, in 1873 and 1878, impressed upon him the need for the reform of the army along Western lines. The emptiness of the treasury cou- pled with the Shah's irresolution did not allow any mean- ingful modernization of the armed forces. Certain paraphernalia of Western technology and appearances were grafted upon the traditional structure of the Persian Army. Amin al-Dawlah sums up the result of the first trip as simply "the purchase of several thousand rifles bought in Ger- many. Some bullets for these guns were bought from Austria and two Austrian advisors were hired for the Post Office and the Mint House."65 During his second trip,the Shah seems to have showed more interest in the reinforcement of his army. He purchased large amounts of ammunition from Austria. He also hired a number of Austrian officers to reorganize and instruct the Persian Army.66 The Austrians were particularly chosen as Austria could play the role of the third interested power to balance the pressures of Rus- sia and Britain on Iran. According to Amin al-Dawlah,the Shah had resolved to reconstruct his army completely on European models.67 He could not afford, however, to ali- enate the Russians. He also employed a Russian officer to organize a cavalry on the Cossack model. In 1879,the officer formed a Cossack brigade which became an effective tool of oppression, and an aid for the execution of Russian policies .68

Even before the Shah's second European trip, one may observe some indications of rationalization of the military system. Many officers who drew salaries but performed no functions were invited to retire without pay and not to make claims for back payments.69 The Persian soldiers, in contrast with their Ottoman counterparts, did not resent the new Austrian uniforms. In fact, they seemed to show a degree of eagerness for the new weaponry and organization70

At best, the reforms remained half-hearted. There was neither money nor resolution behind the reforms. The Ministry of War changed little under Mirza Husain Khan.

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Structurally, it was differentiated. Specialized departments existed which theoretically were to perform specific functions. The army, however, was staffed by the s am e old faces. The very few who came to hold important positions for the first time, such as Vajih Mirza, owed their success not to their ability but to their close relationship with Mirza Husain Khan.71 It is, therefore, not surprising that upon Mirza Husain's departure from the Minis- try of War no profound changes of the staff took place either, as Mirza Husain had not brought new officers or structural change which could have threatened the interests of the traditional elite.

Ironically, it was in the interests of Persia that the reformers failed to modernize the army. Their success would have meant a burdensome structure over a traditional society which would have had its finances sapped to pay for a modern army. The army in turn would have become an agent of oppression. The early and uneven modernization of the armed forces would have turned Iran into a praetorian state, robbing it of its traditional stability without bringing advantages of the modern world. Invariably, the reformers assumed that the problem of modernizing the armed fo r c es was merely financial. Malkam wrote that "The army will never become modernized unless taxes are increased."72 Mirza Husain in a letter to the Shah saw "All of the progress of the European armies...[as]...the result of regular delivery of the soldiers' pays and purchase of ammunition."73 The reformers showed no awareness of the relationship between the traditional social structure of Iran and the modern superstructure they hoped to impose upon it. Nor did they realize that the strength of the European armed forces had more to do with the structure of the European societies than the purchase of the arms. The new reformers were much more short-sighted than the earlier personalities, like Amir Kabir, who saw the need for an educational institution to train a cadre to lead the army.74

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Finance

Nowhere was the burden of traditionalism felt as much as in the financial offices of Nasir al-Din Shah's state. Early in his reign, during Amir Kabir's sidarat [chief ministry], the financial sphere was brought under control. Large numbers of pensions were either cut off or reduced, and the taxes came to be more effectively collected.75 What Amir Kabir succeeded in doing, however, was mainly to make the old system work. Reforms were par- tial and structural changes nonexistent. Mirza Husain, during his sidarat, failed to bring any measure of change into the financial departments.76

The difficulty of financial reform was rooted in a multiplicity of problems. First, the Shah viewed the economic sphere as a main extension of his authority. In a variety of ways he exercised this power. He imposed taxes and tariffs, granted monopolies and concessions, and even sold land when the city walls of Tehran expanded to encom- pass a larger area.77 Thus any reform, of necessity,would have touched upon the Shah's interests, as the Shah con- sidered the wealth of his realm as his personal prerogative.

Second, the economic structure was amorphous. The currency used in various parts of Iran differed. For example, coins minted in Tehran were not worth the same amount in Khuzistan. Siyah-pul, a copper coin, was worth 1/54th of a qiran in Shushtar, 1/56th in Dizful, and 1/64th in Ahvaz. There were also Persian coins used in some parts of Persia and not in others. Copper money was generally worth less than its nominal value, whereas silver and gold were generally worth twice theirs. To complicate the matter further, various kinds of European, Indian, and Otto- man currencies were freely used in transactions.78 The tax structure was no less confusing. Different localities paid different taxes. Most taxes were collected by indig- enous local hierarchies. To change the system would have required the creation of an effective organization to collect the taxes on a systematized and universal basis. Not only was the creation of such a body difficult, but had it been established it would have had to face the opposition

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of the local notables. The political system was not strong enough to face such opposition.

Third, the Department of Finance, Vizarat-i Maliyah, had turned into the bailiwick of a closely tied group from the city of Ashtian. The department's officials, known as mustawfis, in the manner of other Qajar officials, conducted their affairs in an informal manner. Few records were kept and only the initiated could find out about the nature of the taxation system. To change the system,the coopera- tion of mustawfis was needed, and as occurred during Mirza Husain Khan's sidarat, the mustawfis were too jealous of their monopoly to allow for any change.

The problem was further compounded by the absence of credit. The Shah, therefore, viewed a full treasury as a necessary ingredient of his royal power. Increasingly, he came to view the problem in the short run, as the over- haul of the system could have momentarily cost him finan- cially. The Shah was often in need of quick cash. In 1870, when the great famine had already started to have an impact, he instructed the deputy of the youthful prince- governor of Fars, Zill al-Sultan, to send him 70,000 tumans immediately to pay for his trip to Iraq. The crop situation was so bad that the local notables no longer wanted the position of tax collector. The local notables were finally persuaded to provide the money th em selv es on condition that their positions be guaranteed for three years and that the central government give them more autonomy.79

Moreover, there were no functioning tribunals in existence to deal properly with the problem of recovering sums due individuals or the government. Consequently, there was an ever-present sense of uncertainty in financial affairs.

To compound the problem further, each item of expenditure was related to some particular revenue. Thus, the expendituresand revenues were related not only in their total sums but in parts of them. Malayir and Tuysirkan were entrusted to Ictizad al-Saltanah, the Minister of

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Science, so that he would spend the revenues of these two provinces on the polytechnic o f Tehran, Dar al-Funun.80 The same was true for other expenditures. The taxes from the town of Abhar and two of its villages were allocated to the stable of the gunnery.81 Certain parts of the taxes of Gilan were allocated to the military budget.82 Each time a certain General Nasir Allah Khan was promoted, his salary increase was to be paid through a new opening, that is, the death of another officer, or he had to await such an outcome.83

Consequently, the whole financial structure was fragmented. Reforms, when contemplated, were conceived piece- meal. Even then,each expenditure had a strong vocal supporter.

Financial Departments

The functions of assessing the taxes, of collecting them, and of maintaining the treasury were distinctly separate. The Ministry of Finance, Vizarat-i Maliyab:, assess- ed the taxes. The local notables such as tribal chiefs, town zabits, and heads of corporations collected the taxes. And the Treasury, vizarat-i Khazanah, received the taxes.

The division of financial responsibility among three autonomous structures may exaggerate the powerlessness of the Minister of Finance. Haji Sayyah, for example, consistently pessimistic, describes the minister as "someone who has paid some money and has purchased a title. [The position] is only an honor and carries no function, except that he may get a chance and look at the tax registers of Tehran environs. The taxes are collected by the governors who sell the positions of mustawfis, and put them in charge of the collection of taxes."84 Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah who, owing to his Western education and high government position, could assess the situation better, lists the functions of the ministry as "preparing the budget and overseeing the financial sections of all government bureaus."85 A rescript by the Shah places even more authority in the ministry. The minister was distinctly

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placed over all ministries as he had to approve all their expenditures, not just oversee them. He was also put in charge of all government concessions, monopolies, and banks. Once a year he was expected to submit a written report on the budget to Shura-i Dawlati, Government Consultative As- sembly.86 Some less important ministries were completely under the authority of Mirza Yusuf,who held the portfolio of the Minister of Finance before Nasir al-Din Shah's as- cension to the throne and retained it through most of Nasir al-Din Shah's reign, until the Ministry that he had inherited from his father,and had passed on to his six-year-old son,became totally identified with his person. As the Min- ister of Finance, Mirza Yusuf had direct authority over the Ministers of Pensions and Endowments, Customs, Tele- graph, and Post. Many branches of the royal household also fell under his authority.87 The title of minister was, therefore, far from an empty one. He was in a position to distribute patronage, and his close association with the royal household enabled him to retain his authority for an inordinately long period.

The minister, assisted by his mustawfis drew up a dastur al-amal, local budget, for each province. In general, he decided how much each province had to send to the

reasury after allowing for local expenditures. By increasing the amount that had to be sent to Tehran or by not ac- cepting some local expenditures as appropriate, the minister could punish any governor he chose. Similarly, he could reward them. The mustawfis decided where those who received salaries and pensions from the government could draw them from. They could assign one's salary to a source that was not recoverable or to one that was reliable.88 The ministry had control over anybody who had anything to do with the government. The minister had agents in the provinces who oversaw the general tax structure; they were independent of the governors but dependent on the minister's support.89

The position of the mustawfi was one of the few positions in Iran which required some technical training. In a traditional society where public education was limited to a military college, the positions that entailed expertise

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naturally went from father to son as the sons could privately receive the education needed to become public servants. As Picot pointed out, "These Mustawfis are recruited from Irak [Arak], where certain families have provided Accountants [mustawfis] for generations. "90 Even though the special training required for the office of a mustawfi gave to certain families a form of monopoly, it brought a certain degree of predictability and order to the Ministry of Finance not common in other government departments. For instance, when Anis al-Dawlah, the Shah's favorite wife, requested Mirza Yusuf to appoint a certain person as a mustawfi, Mirza Yusuf wrote to the Shah in a self-assured tone, unparalleled by other officials, that "Her Exalted Highness Anis al-Dawlah has recommended Mirza Husain's son be appointed as a mustawfi. He is an able young man. He should, however, not become a mustawfi at this point."'91

The Ministry of Finance consisted basically of one important department concerned with the major function of the ministry, the Idarah-i Istlifa. It was in charge of drawing up tax registers for each province. In addition to the central office in Tehran, the Idarah-i Istifa had agents, mubashirs, in all of the provinces who theoretically oversaw the collection of the taxes. He sent a report on the anticipated local income and expenditure at the beginning of each fiscal year which was ratified after being signed by the director of the Istiffa, the Minister of Fi- nance, the Grand Vizier, and the Shah.92 Normally, however, the financial report was made by the financial agent of the local governor and then signed by the aforementioned officials. In fact, the sources indicate that each governor had his own personal representative in Tehran, known as vakil, who was supposed to present the list of the expenditures and income for the previous year to the central government for ratification.93

In major provinces such as Fars, Isphahan, Khurasan, Kirman, and Kirmanshahan, the ministry had special agents, ma 'murin-i vilayat. Many of these agents were people with local roots such as Mushir al-Mulk in Fars. There were individual mustawfis in Tehran, however, with specific assignments for specific provinces.

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The accounts had to be ratified by yet another office, known as the Baqaya. The officer in charge of the Baqaya department was in charge of all accounts including the buyutat, the royal properties. At the end of each fiscal year he would investigate the documents regarding the actual expenditure and income and collect the difference. Thus Vazir-i Baqaya, the officer in charge of the collecting function of the Ministry of Finance could summon any erring governor or his agent to Tehran. It is notable that this officer was always a court functionary.

The Treasury was associated even more closely with the royal court. It was in fact only a department within the Court Ministry.95 It was authorized to receive "all the taxes and what was due to the government and the payment for government expenditures."96

The Collection of Revenues

Nowhere was the symbiotic relationship between the center and the periphery more pronounced than in the collection of taxes. In the absence of an efficient bureaucracy, the central government depended on local notables in its most basic and important relationship with its subjects--its fiscal relationships. The local notables also enjoyed the legitimacy that recognition by the government brought them. This insured their rights against other possible local rivals. In a socially fragmented society where even the small social units such as the tribes and towns were factionalized into hostile sections and quarters, the recognition by the central government of a local family's political authority meant more than formal recognition of an authority that was already there. The local magnates eagerly sought the recognition of their authority by the government. Often they paid large sums to sanctify their positions in the central administration.97 Haji Ahmad Khan Minabi, a local magnate in Bandar-i cAbbas, strengthened and institutionalized his position by succeeding in getting a farman from the Shah confirming his function of tax collection and putting him under the authority of the gover- nor of Fars . 8 Others, not yet fully established, mobi-

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lized the support of the notables in their respective areas to prove they could effectively and with the least degree of conflict collect the taxes.99

At times the government's authorized agent was forcefully ejected by a powerful local leader who hoped to usurp power. In 1880, for example, the governor of Ram-Hurmuz, appointed by the Persian government, was forced to escape from the city because of a popular rebellion led by a local shaikh. The rebellious shaikh agreed to pay the governor of Khuzistan, Nizam al-Saltanah, even more than he did his predecessor, in order to be confirmed in his position. 100

The performance of official functions by notables came about mainly because of their local roots rather than by assignment from the central government. This duality of authority structure created an axis of conflict between the center and the periphery. The center demanded more money as the costs of the government soared,and the periphery tried to retain as much of the taxes as possible. At the same time,the center expanded its direct rule, particularly over the customhouses. In spite of the sometimes tense relationship between the two poles of power, the existence of a dual administration, local and central, brought about an element of stability. Law and order, in its traditional sense, were maintained, cases were adjudicated, and, above all, taxes were collected. Such important governmental functions were carried out in the context of a government with few institutions worthy of the name and with an almost annual change of governors sent by the central government.

In Rasht, where the governorship was a revolving door, a local notable by the name of Haji Nasir ran the government of the city to the extent that he became nick- named Haji Hakim, Haji the Governor.101 The family of Amin Divan ran the affairs of Lahigan for more than 150 years.102 And CAbd al-Husain Khan and his family did the same for Fuman.103 In Bihbihan, by the time of the revolt of Mirza Qavam al-Din in 1851 against the central government,104 his family, which had achieved the chieftancy of the city through military force, had ruled the city and collected

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its taxes for over 200 years.105 During this period, the central government often had its governors in Bihbihan, but the government functions were carried out by the local structure of power.

It is important to note that as far as the collection of taxes was concerned,the areas of jurisdiction were based on personal rather than territorial law. Therefore, as Weber pointed out, "The individual carried his profes- sio juris with him wherever he went. Law was not a lex terrae...but rather the privilege of the person as a mem- ber of a particular group...the result was the coexistence of numerous 'law communities' the autonomous jurisdiction of which overlapped."*106

When the government extended its authority to Hindi- jan in Khuzistan, empowering a Mirza CAbd Allah Khan to collect the taxes, he turned to the two traditional leaders of Hindijan who had traditionally divided up the city between themselves to collect its taxes. Mirza CAbd Allah, however, farmed out his taxation authority to the two leaders, locally known as qa'ids, for 12,000 tumans.107 The structure of the tax collection changed only to the extent that Mirza CAbd Allah's appointment marked the beginning of the development of a second bureaucracy, namely that of the central government. The ambitions of the central government were not paralleled by the existence of an able administration. The duality of the structure of power, therefore, is the most common characteristic of Nasir al- Din Shah's Iran.

The local structures of power had preserved and allowed for the continuation of organized life during the period of chaos between the fall of the Safavids in 1722 and the advent of the Qajars in 1798. They formed an un- derpinning of social life that at the time of Nasir al- Din Shah's reign had more history behind it than did the Qajar rule. Locally it was more legitimized than the Qajar government. Even a court historian accedes in a revealing passage that "None of these tribes [of Mamasani] follow anybody's commands other than those of their own kalantars [subtribal leaders]. Nor will they ever accept the author-

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ity of any outsider." This source emphasizes that the position of the kalantar has remained in certain families, passed from father to son, since time immemorial.108

By granting authority to the local chiefs to collect taxes,the government helped to tighten the control of many local chiefs over the local inhabitants. The process, though useful as far as it bridged the gap between the ethnically Turkish central government and the non-Turkish subjects, thus easing the tax-collection process, proved dysfunctional in the long run as it intensified the traditional, localistic, and primordial structures of power. As the taxes were paid by whole tribes, guilds, and city quarters, the local leaders in charge of tax collection retained p o w e r over the localities and this power was now supported by the central government which above all was interested in the prompt receipt of revenues.

The tribal chiefs paid their taxes as they moved from their summer pastures to their winter quarters.l09 Collec- tion of the taxes from the tribes often resembled prepara- tions for a military campaign. If the tribe managed to surprise the government and arrived at their winter quarters before the government agents could stop them and collect the taxes due, the government had a difficult task finding them to exact the taxes. The Luristan tribes, for example, went to Khuzistan in winter and the governor of Khuzistan had little authority and interest in collecting taxes from the tribes.110 At that point, having migrated in small groups, the tribes were scattered all over Khuzi- stan.

The local notables, the kalantars , khans, zabits, and the shaikhs not only gained prestige and political power through their fiscal functions, but they accumulated a great deal of wealth, as well. The two shaikhs of Bani Taraf, heading the two sections of the tribe, collected b e - tween 25 and 30 percent of the produce of the peasants. This amounted to 60,000 tumans of which they turned over only 18,000 tumans to the government.111

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The local structures of power and wealth were often supported by the central government. It was through the pyramidal structure of power that the government could reach its subjects. When Prince Rukn al-Dawlah, the governor-general of Khurasan, decided to move to Bujnurd at the head of an army,to discipline the hereditary governor of Bujnurd, Siham al-Mulk, who had become rebellious and would not pay the taxes he had collected, the Grand Vizier,Amin al-Sultan, sent strict telegrams to Rukn al-Dawlah, instructing him to "treat him [Siham al-Mulk] and his dependents with maximum respect and do all within your power to cooperate with him and help him so that he will return to Bujnurd willingly. Then again you should strengthen him, treat him kindly, cooperate with him and his dependents, lest he become unhappy and disappointed. 112

The government treated these local structures, entrusted with the collection of taxes, very cautiously. When Sultan Muhammad Khan, the kalantar of Bihbihan, al- legedly, "gathered a large entourage of rebels around himself, spent the government taxes on them, paid no attention to the decrees of the royal government, and treated the agents of the government with disdain and unjustly... "113 only then was he carefully summoned to Shiraz, the provin- cial capital. His exile was very carefully arranged and gently applied, however, "so that the taxes of Bihbihan could remain recoverable."t114

The taxes in Fars were contracted to several important local notables. The governor of Fars, Prince Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah, complained to the Shah that he had no power to demand the taxes from the local magnates.115 In a letter to the Shah, another prince-governor of Fars complained "The problem of Fars is that there are no peasants [directly under the government authority]. All authority rests in the hands of the landowners. The landowners are the ones who are supposed to pay the taxes. And they are all notables, ulama, and sayyids. All respectable people. And their custom has always been to misbehave and not pay their dues.",116 A much more powerful governor, Zill al-Sultan, found it necessary when he became the governor of Fars for the third time to humble himself before Mushir, a notable

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who was the chief tax collector of Fars.117 Presumably he had learned his lesson during his first two assignments to Fars.

In Khuzistan the local structure of tax collection was even more independent of Tehran. The Shah's envoy reported that "no one knows how much taxes the local governor of Huwaizah collects.",118 In Dizful,the collection of the taxes was entirely in the hands of the local notables and "the governor is stationed in the city simply to maintain law and order but does not interfere in the taxes at all"111 Some of the shaikhs were so powerful that "even if they plunder all of the subjects' possessions, the subjects will not dare to protest. So far there is no record that any subject [raciyat] has ever shown that he is aware of the existence of the governor-general or protested to any government agency." 0

The taxes were collected in Kirman under a similar situation. The local notable, as zabit, collected all that was due the government with no interference from the central government.121

The system was therefore far from being integrated. Local officers exercised fiscal responsibilities owing to their local roots. Functionally, they were part of the Ministry of Finance, institutionally they were independent. Without them the fiscal system could not have worked at all. With them it worked through conflict and compromise.

Varieties of Taxation Systems

It has been pointed out that dependence on the local structures of power to collect taxes was necessitated because of lack of administrative organization and the complexity of the mosaic of different customs and taxes. The former has already been discussed. It remains to discuss the extent that the taxes varied from one locality to the next.

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Edward Stack,who visited Iran in 1880 and traveled extensively throughout the country points out that the tax base changed from village to village. From year to year within each village it changed for each peasant, depending on whether he depended on irrigation or rain to produce his crop. Yet within these small units, the villages, obliga- tions were well defined and customs so well rooted that there was little room for disagreement. In the absence of records of who was responsible for what amount of taxes, the centralization of tax structure would not have been feasible.122

Basically, the taxes were collected in cash and in kind. To this category should be added military taxes such as providing the government with soldiers and providing them with provisions and some pay. Taxes in kind depended on the locality and what it produced. Taxes for Tehran and its environs amounted to 141,633 tumans annually in cash. The area also had to provide the government with 250 khar- vars123 of wheat, 7,523 kharvars of corn, 67.5 kharvars of barley, 2,727 kharvars of rice, and 18,727 kharvars of hay.124 Azarbayjan was responsible for paying the central government 786,142 tumans in cash, 54,873 kharvars of grain, 7,020 kharvars of rice, and 4,958 kharvars of hay.125 Kir- man, on the other hand, paid only 221,534 tumans and 2,075 dinars in cash.126

Not all these taxes due the central government reached Tehran, a s the local expenditures authorized by the government, such as payments to the army or pensions of the ulama were subtracted from the total amount. In Khuzistan, where the government extracted L47,428.13.3 which was equal to 142,285 tumans and 993 dinars in cash, L4,555.13.8 was spent on pensions and salaries and L4,783.17.10 on the army locally. The central government's receipts from Khuzis- tan came to L38,089.1.7.A17

What was taxed in each province changed from place to place. The Persian Gulf district is representative of the whole mosaic of the tax structure. Dashti, ruled by a hereditary khan, paid three different kinds of taxes. First, there was an agrarian tax of 50 qirans per gav128

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of cultivation. The date palms were taxed anywhere between half a qiran to 2 qirans according to the trees' productivity. Finally there was a poll tax which was between 5 and 20 qirans. The khan actually sent agents to Bushihr to collect it from the native Dashtis who worked and lived in Bushihr. They paid 8 qirans each.129 In Langah,- a port not far from Dashti, the taxation system was different. The date trees paid a quarter of a qiran and a tenth of their produce. Sea captains paid 12 rupees and sailors paid 4 rupees. The shops were also taxed between 4 and 8 rupees each. In Langah,the taxes were theoretically collected by the governor as the chief agent of the central government, but he regularly farmed it to the local kalantar, who in turn collected the taxes through the hereditary kad-khudas of city districts and villages.130 In Hayat Davud, a district ruled by local khans, the only tax was land tax. It was between 50 and 70 qirans on each gav of cultivation. There were no other taxes.131 Liravi, also ruled by hereditary khans, paid only a land tax which amounted to from 20 to 60 qirans per gav of cultivation.132 It seems that areas which were ruled by the local notables and were subject only to formal control by the central government paid less tax than areas over which the government exerted more authority. Where the government could send its own official, the official relied on the local structure to collect the taxes. As a result, the subjects had to support not only the local notable but the Tehran official as well. Hindijan, for example, was ruled by local notables known as qa'id . Then the government included Hindi- jan in Mirza CAbd Allah's governorate. He delegated his authority to collect taxes to the local qa'id for 12,000 tumans annually.133

The rate of taxation, however, was universally high. In Khuzistan,where "only the peasantry pay taxes and other classes of subjects, no matter how rich, do not pay a pen- ny in taxes,"'134 the peasantry paid a third of its produce to the government. The tax agents,known as musaddiqs, as- sessed the produce upon cultivation and often overestimated the produce.135

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In addition to the burdensome regular taxes there was also in operation a series of irregular and equally burdensome taxes. In Azarbayjan, at least, a special tax known as iCanahyah-i sultaniyah was collected. Tabriz alone paid 10,000 tumans annually.136 The total amount of it for Azarbayjan must have been enormous, as Vazir Nizam boasted to Azarbayjani notables that he had persuaded the Shah to reduce it by 50,000 tumans.137 In Tehran there was even a tax on the nightingales.138 And it was only just before his assassination that the Shah abolished the special tax on bread and meat.139

The Ministry of the Customs

To collect tariffs on exports and imports the government faced the same problem: the tariffs were not uniform. Their complexity would have thwarted even an efficient bureaucracy, and no such bureaucracy existed in Iran. So until late in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign the customhouses were farmed to local or other magnates. Tariff was uniform only for foreigners. In the manner of other tax farmers, the farmers of customhouses received a great fortune, little of which found its way into the coffers of the government.140 The central government was acutely aware of its own limitations. Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, for example, wrote that "If the Persian government would de- cide to abolish the farming of the customhouses and admin- ister them through central government agents [nawkar-i divani], then it would need a number of honest and compe- tent administrators who are not presently available.",141

The expansion of foreign trade made the customs even more profitable during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah than they were before. The revenues from Azarbayjan, for example, increased at such a rate that the government became interested in putting the Azarbayjan customhouse under the central government's control. Ictimad al-Saltanah, writing in 1877, records that "Sixty to seventy years ago the customs of Tabriz was worth only 12,000 tumans. Now because of the expansion of trade its revenues exceed 300,000 tumans.",142

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Azarbayjan's customs was the first of a series of customs to come under direct government control. Before the Shah went to Europe for the first time in 1872, he became interested in establishing a ministry of customs and he appointed Suhrab Khan Gurgi as the Vazir-i Gumrukat, the Minister of Customs.143 He was a courtier,as the state was conceived as the Shah's property and thus the exploitation of its wealth fell under the household functions. The elder Amin al-Sultan, the Shah's trusted official in charge of the financial functions of the household, was the seventh Minister of Customs.144 Appointed in 1879,he managed to bring most of the customhouses under direct royal authority. When the elder Amin al-Sultan died in 1882, the revenues reaching the central government from customs had reached 300,000 tumans.145 The office of the Ministry of Customs was inherited by his son,who in 1892 agreed to pay 900,000 tumans annually to the Shah alone.146 Others were willing to pay as much as 1,200,000 tumans.147 This tremendous increase in the revenues of the Ministry of Customs indicated its rapidly increasing importance,as trade--and the authority of the central government--expanded. In ten years the Shah's income from customs had tri- pled. During the first decade of the ministry's existence it was at least equally successful in expanding its authority.

The duality of the bureaucracy, however, continued to exist. Amin al-Sultan, the Grand Vizier, farmed out the customhouses, including the customs on internal trade,rah- dari, to the local notables and reportedly after gayments to the Shah secured 200,000 tumans for himself.14 The customs on goods exported and imported from Persia remained f i x e d at 5 percent in accordance with the Treaty of Turk- amanchay between Iran and Russia signed in 1828. This was true for foreign traders, while a Persian trader's tariff depended on the power and cupidity of the farmer of the customhouse. The structure of the Ministry of Customs, like other Qajar institutions, was marked by informality and unpredictability. The impact of the West had expanded another avenue to fleece the population,and again the personal goals of the officers and the systemic needs were at variance.

IRANIAN STUDIES 234



The Structure of Governorships

The authority of a governor, like that of other officials, depended on his person rather than on his office. The tenure of office for a governor was much shorter than for a minister, as the former, away from Tehran, had more possibilities of establishing himself as a center of power. The duties of a governor, as the Nasiri documents indicate, were limited to prompt dispatch of the taxes and mainte- nanceof order. The routinized formula, commending the governors who had performed well, shows that the central government did not expect the governors to go beyond their two traditional tasks.149 Nor did they conceive their duties to the Shah in any other way.l50

Most governors did not perform these two tasks well, either. Their reports to Tehran indicate not only absence of authority but personal mediocrity. Kiyumarth Mirza, the prince-governor of Kirman, reported proudly to Mirza Khuam- mad Khan Sipah-Salar, the chief minister, that he had suc- cessfully managed to have two petty thieves arrested.151 Nor were the reports of other governors much different. Where there were no outstanding religious leaders, the governor disposed of legal cases before him capriciously and without reference to any code of justice other than his own pecuniary needs.152 The capriciousness of the governor often caused his escape from the city upon dismissal, but before the arrival of the new governor, as the rival factions attaching themselves to the new governor saw to it that the dismissed governor paid for his erratic be- havior. When Sipahdar, for example, was replaced by Fakhr al-Mulk as the governor of Qum,he sought refuge in the shrine of Qum as his house was plundered by groups who had joined forces with the new governor.153

The main insignia of the governor's authority was financial. In what came to be known officially as tafavut-i camal,the governor collected more money from the tax farmers than he paid the government. Hamzah Mirza Hishmat al-Dawlah, the governor of Khuzistan in 1869 and 1870, for example, collected 137 000 tumans in taxes and kept a fourth of it for himself.i54 That amount seems rea-

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sonable considering that a petty governor, that of Bagh-i Tun, collected four times more from the tax farmers than he paid the central government.155

Extra-exaction of taxes was so much a part of the system that Fakhr al-Mulk, the new governor of Qum, was advised that the taxes of the first two months of the year belong to the former governor, Sipahdar, as part of his tafavut-i Camal.l56 Zill al-Sultan gives a descriptive account of the tafavut-i Camal. "Iranian governors," he wrote, "collect two kinds of taxes. The first is asl, the tax which is sent to the central government. The other kind of tax is tafavut-i Camal. The amount of the latter depends on the size and prosperity of each area.",157 Then Zill al-Sultan points out that part of this additional tax finds its way to Tehran in the form of presents to the bear- ers of-the robes of honor (the government agents residing in the province) and payments to the mustawfis of the army and to the civilian bureaucracy to settle the accounts of the governor. Taxes from some areas were not recoverable. So the tafavut-i Camal was to cover such deficits as well.158

In a system where governors received no salary, it is not surprising that they supported themselves through extra taxes. The basic flaw in the system was its unpredictability. FarC or tafavut-i Camal in some areas was three times the amount of asl according to Picot who had carefully studied this matter.159 While Mirza Yahya Khan Mushir al-Dawlah could not even collect the asl of the taxes of Fars, Farhad Mirza collected the asl plus a huge farC for his own expenditures.160 One contemporary source pointed out that the origin of the tafavut-i Camals went back to fines exacted from certain individuals some time in the past. The money was recorded as part of the revenue of that particular area where the victim of the fine resided. So year after year it was added to the normal taxes of that area.161

Some governors, by saving the salaries and pensions of the dead and the absent, added to their farC.16 Sul- tan Hamid Riza Farman-Farma, for example, increased his farC by reducing the amount of money the pensioners were

IRANIAN STUDIES 236



to receive.163

On the surface, however, the governor seemed to have little flexibility. Tehran issued a kitabchah-i dastur al- Camal, or local budget, for each governorate. The revenues and the expenditures were clearly specified.164 The central government, however, paying no salary to its governors, expected them to live on the farC they managed to collect.

Important governors had major figures in Tehran as their special channel of communication with the Shah. Dur- ing his lifetime,Mirza Yusuf was Zill al-Sultan's channel to the Shah as well as his main supporter in Tehran. Zill al-Sultan's deputy governor, during the former's minority, bitterly complained of the flow of telegrams from court to Fars, Zill al-Sultan's governorate, as Mirza Yusuf was em- powered as the special representation to handle all of his affairs with Tehran.165 Those representations often became formalized. In addition to his ministries,the list of Mir- za Yusuf's offices included the direction of the affairs of Fars, Khuzistan, Isphahan, and other governorates ruled by Zill al-Sultan.166

While the governor needed a powerful supporter to protect him against intrigues in Tehran, he also needed an agent to present his tax accounts to the central government and settle any problems of discrepancies. Zill al- Sultan was fortunate to have Saraj al-Mulk as his financial agent, pish-kar in Tehran. 167 The later decline of Zill al-Sultan's authority is partly related to his wor- sening relationship with his pish-kar.

Some governors had no authority. All power was exercised by their deputies. This was particularly so in case of the younger princes, who as members of the Shah's household were expected to govern the Shah's realm but were either too young or too incompetent. A letter from Kiyumarth Mirza, the governor-general of Kirman to Mirza Muhammed Khan Sipah-Salar, illustrates this point:

My total surrender and obedience to... [Muhammad Ismacil Khan Vakil al-Mulk, the deputy-governor],

237 Vo.Z. XI, 1978



is much more than you can possibly imagine. I have done whatever he has ordered. I have followed whatever h e has said. I ha v e not participated in any affair of the governorship.... I have tried to please him to the extent that when upon arrival he asked me to give him my stamp so that he would not have to disturb me by asking for my approvals, I gave it to him immediately. I stay away from the public. I do not let anybody come to see me, so that I do not be tempted to interfere in the administration. 168

Kiyumarth Mirza was not the only prince-governor with no authority. The crown prince was also just a nominal governor in Azarbayjan. In June 1879,when the prince returned to Azarbayjan and it seemed that he was officially given permission to rule, his deputy-governor issued a manifesto making it quite clear that he did consider himself independent of the crown prince. He declared in his manifesto that "I therefore accepted the present appointment from His Highness [Mirza Husain Khan] the Sepeh Salar and by his advice."'169

Even Zill al-Sultan who was more shrewd than other prince-governors had his power severely cut by Mirza Hu- sain, who distrusted him. Mirza Husain appointed Zahir al- Dawlah as Zill al-Sultan's deputy, entrusting full authority on the former and being well aware of the mutual ani- mosity between the prince and Zahir al-Dawlah.170

The Decline of the Governor's Authority

Ironically, the powerful governors sowed their own seeds of decline. Farhad Mirza was successful in ruthlessly putting down the centers of rebellion in the western part of Iran, bringing the tribes under closer governmental supervision. Between 1869 and 1872 he extended the authority of the government where before there was nothing but local autonomy.171 He further encouraged the Shah to dispossess the previous governor's family, CImad al-Dawlah, who had bought most of Kirmanshah's vil-

IRANIAN STUDIES 238



lages through dubious means and thus had established a claim to exercise of authority in Kirmanshah.172 It was finally decided that no governor was allowed to purchase lands within his governorate.173

The military authority was carefully separated from the governor's authority. The Shah sent chiefs of military councils, Ra'is Divan-Khanah-i Nizami, to major provinces. These officers were independent of the governors.174 It was this dichotomy of authority that made it possible to order four hundred Khurasani soldiers to storm Hisam al- Saltanah's residence and easily arrest the governor of Khurasan, the celebrated conqueror of Harat and the Shah's uncle, and send him to Tehran.175

The extension of telegraphic lines capped the authority of the central government over the governors. Most governors became as close to Tehran as the telegraph office. The heads of the local telegraph offices performed espionage work on the governors. 176 The telegraphic lines effectively limited the discretion of governors in regard to financial matters. They had to give adequate and immediate answers. Often they were summoned to the telegraph office for interrogation.177 Even a powerful governor like Zill al-Sultan came to be at the beck and call of the vizier in Tehran.

Concl usion

The reign of Nasir al-Din Shah marks the beginning of the development of the Persian bureaucracy. It developed from two sources: the king's household and the notables' structures of rule application. The notables, starting in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign,began to lose ground to the royal realm. The religious classes, atavistic in outlook, refused to participate in the embryonic bureaucratic institutions and failed to bar their development as well. The bureaucracy was consequently bound to be passive or to enjoy little autonomy. It did not consti- tute an aristocracy. Nor could it become such a social force, considering the absolutist and discretionary poli-

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cies of Nasir al-Din Shah.

Many offices, departments, and ministries existed in name only. Others duplicated each other's tasks, vied for favor from the Shah, and intrigued against each other. Often important functions were distributed among opposing poles as to make its fulfillment improbable and its poten- tial danger to the system minimized. The lower classes participated in Nasir al-Din Shah's bureaucracy as individuals, co-opted into the system through the household structures, representing not the class they came from but the group they had joined. As they gradually replaced the notables, the bureaucratic system became less sensitive to the wishes of the people since the former received their legitimation from the agreement of the people in their locality and the latter were gradually forming a modern bureaucracy, deriving their authority from offices bestowed up on them. In short, Nasir al-Din Shah's bureaucracy, although manifesting traditional patterns, developed to become more independent of the country's social classes. The incongruity between the society and the government made mounting oppression a norm of government.

NOTES

For administration in traditional and transitional societies see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developirq Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964); see also his "Bureau- crats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. by Jo- seph La Palombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-168. For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and political development see Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Devel- opment," in ibid., pp. 62-95. To some,the concept of bureaucracy is necessarily a legal-rational one. In this paper it is utilized as an operational concept. It is the set of positions organized to make legal/ rational, traditional, or charismatic dominations possible.

IRANIAN STUDIES 240



2. For a discussion of the prerequisites of a modern bureaucracy see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucrat- ic and Craft Administration of Production: A Com- parative Study," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV (1959), pp. 168-187; S. N. Eisenstadt, Essays on Comparative Institutions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 177-215; Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organi- zation Theory," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 6 (1959), pp. 791-795.

3. In much of Europe and definitely in England,many of the new bureaucrats were recruited from the ranks of the clergy and thus the term "clerk" for the bureaucrat. Childless, the clergy provided the state with manpower with little interest in appropriation of their offices. Consequently, they were instrumental in establishing a modern centralized state,which at the same time through their participation, the state received legitimacy from the religious sector. See T. F. Tout, The English Civil Service in the Four- teenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1916), Vol. III, pp. 194-195. In Iran, while the monarchy was maintained as a conservative integrative institution during the transitional period giving support and legitimacy to the new institutions, religion remained either outside of politics or hostile to the new organizational arrangements. Depend- ing only on the secular aspect of the tradition, the new institutions had problems of legitimacy and thus of stability. On the question of the importance of conservative, yet adaptable, integrative institutions in the context of political stability see Seymour Mar- tin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Poli- tics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963), pp. 64-86.

4. The ideal-typical model of the primitive "Weberian" bureaucracy has been arrived at here by way of contrast with Weber's definition of an ideal-typical rational bureaucracy. See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. by H. H. Gerth

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and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 196-244; and idem, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by Talcott Par- sons, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1946), pp. 329-340. The construction of the model of a primitive bureaucracy also depends on Parsons' "pattern variables," which again are influenced by Weber. "Pattern variables," Parsons holds, are five dichotomies,"one side of which must be chosen by an actor before the meaning of a situation is determinant for him, and thus before he can act with respect to that situation." Parsons suggests five pattern variables: (1) affectivity-affective neutrality, (2) ascription-achievement, (3) univer- salism-particularism, (4) collectivity-orientation- self-orientation, and (5) specificity-diffuseness. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 77-84.

5. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Inter- pretive Sociology, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wit- tich, trans. by Ephraim Fischoff, et al. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol. III, p. 1006.

6. Ibid., pp. 1029-1030.

7. Ibid., p. 1041.

8. Ibid., p. 1006.

9. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Book I, Chapter 3, trans. by W. D. Ross in Richard MCKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 936.

10. Muhammad Hasan Khan Sanic al-Dawlah (the later Ictimad al-Saltanah) Tarikh-i Muntazam-i Nasiri (3 vols.; Teh- ran: Government Press, 1877-1882), Vol. III (supple- mentary), pp. 5-52 (hereafter referred to as MN).

11. Appendix I in Memorandum by Lt. Col. P ic ot in Memo- randum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia pre-

IRANIAN STUDIES 242



pared for the use of the Foreign Office, December 1895, Confidential (6704), F.O. 60/581, folios 21-22 (hereafter referred to as Picot). There is a Persian study of the government institutions but it presents a highly idealized version of the government organization. See Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz- i Hukumat-i Iran, Persian Foreign Office Archives (PFOA), MS, No. 974.

12. Mirza cAli Khan Amin al-Dawlah, Khatirat-i Siyasi- i Amin al-Dawlah, ed. by Hafez Farman-Farmian (Teh- ran: Persian Book Company, 1962), p. 59.

13. Picot, p. 23.

14. Ibid., p. 24.

15. Edward Stacks, Six Months in Persia, (2 vols.; London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington), 1882, Vol. I, pp. 247-282.

16. cAbbas Mirza Mulk Ara, Sharh-i Hal-i CAbbas Mirza Mulk Ara, ed. by Ahmad Nava'i (Tehran: Shirkat-i Chap, 1946), p. 24.

17. Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukumat-i Iran, no folio no.

18. Nasir al-Din Shah's Rescript to Amin Lashkar, Savad- i Layihah-i Vizarat-i Fava id-i CAmmah, 1299-1300/ 1882-1883, Persian Foreign Office Archives (hereafter referred to as PFOA), M5116, no folio number.

19. Mirza Qahriman Khan Amin Lashkar, Ruz-Namah-i Tavaq- quf-i Tabriz (4 vols.; Tehran: Tehran University), Microfilm No. 2929, Vol. 1, folio 319.

20. For the internal structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see MN, Vol. III, "Supplement," pp. 25-33, and Muhammad Hasan Khan Sanic al-Dawlah, Mir'rat al- Buldan-i Nasiri (4 vols.; Tehran: Government Press, 1877-1882), Vol. II, "Supplement," pp. 20-26 (hereafter referred to as MB).

243 Vol. XI, 1978



21. See ICtimad al-Saltanah's account of MuCin al-Mulk, the Persian ambassador to Istanbul with the Shah in al-MaCi, Kurrasah-i al-MaCi (4 vols.; Tehran: Majlis Library), Ms, No. 1516, Vol. II, folio 732.

22. MB, Vol. II ("Supplement"), pp. 6-7.

23. Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Kamran Mirza, 1882- 1883, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number. Kamran Mirza wrote in a statement on the Shah's rescript that he would comply with the Shah's instructions.

24. Picot, folio 26.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 27.

28. Nasir al-Din Shah's Rescript, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio numbers, 1882-1883.

29. mL, Vol. III, p. 363.

30. "Isphahan," Farhang, Vol. 10, No. 420, January 13, 1887, pp. 277-278.

31. MN, Vol. III, p. 356.

32. MB, Vol. IV ("Supplement"), p. 24.

33. Anonymous, Kitab-Chah-i Tuman-Bandi-i Afvaj (Tehran: The National Library, n.d.), MS, No. 589, no folio number.

34. The list of the battalions which had marched in front of the Shah's portrait in Isphahan are all officially listed as consisting of 800 men. The cavalry, however, was supposed to consist of 100-men groups. See "Akh- bar-i Dakhilah-i Rasmiyah," Farhang, May 6, 1880, Vol. II, No. 45, p. 2.

IRANIAN STUDIES 244



35. Anonymous, Juzvah dar Nazm-i Afvaj (Tehran: The National Library, n.d.), MS, No. 338, folios 3-4.

36. Mirza Husain's letter to the Shah, dated 1875-76 in Ibrahim Safa'i, ed., Barg-ha-i Tarikh (Tehran: Sharq, 1971), p. 35.

37. Al-Maci, Kurrasah-i al-MaCi, Vol. IV, folios 2735- 2837. The article, which is not titled, is a Persian translation of Colonel Baker's report. It is not clear for whom the report was originally written.

38. For the view that regards the Qajar political authority as an outgrowth of social fragmentation and in spite of its weak structure of power, see Ervand Abra- hamian, "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 3-31.

39. J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia (4 vols.; Calcutta: Superinten- dent, Government Printing, 1915), Vol. II, part 1, p. 149.

40. The report bears no title or signature. Its content indicates that it was composed in 1888-1889 (PFOA, MS, No. 6285, folios 33, 37-49).

41. MN, Vol. III, pp. 364-365.

42. Sultan Mascud Mirza Qajar (Zill al-Sultan), Sargu- zasht'i Mascudi, lithograph (no place of publication: no publisher, 1907), pp. 296-297. When Jahan-Shah Khan Afshar rebelled in 1886-1887 the government had no trouble mobilizing a strong enough force to put down the tribal uprising. See Namah-ha-i Nasir al- Din Shah bi Na'ib al-Saltanah (Tehran: National Li- brary, n.d.), No. 1316, folios 110 and 112.

43. "Khulasah-i Baqiyah-i Ahkami ki bi Jinab-i Vakil al- Mulk bi Tarikh-i Mah-i Safar bar Hasb-i Amr Qadar Quirat-i Humayuni Sadir Mishavad," June 15-July 15,

245 Vol. XI, 1978



1863, PFOA, MS, No. 42, folio 96. The Shah has certi- fied the summary of the decrees that are in Dabir al- Mulk' s handwriting.

44. Anonymous, Kitabchah-i Tuman-Bandi Afvaj, no folio number.

45. General Fran[cl?]in's Report on Persian Army, 1877, Enclosure in W. T. Thomson to Derby F.O. 60/379, No. 197, December 17, 1877.

46. "Surat-i Faqarati ki dar Bab-i Macayib-i Giriftan-i Sarbaz-i Haliyah Nivashtah Shudah Bud va dar Dar al- Shura Khandah Shud," PFOA, MS, No. 71, folio 71, 1866- 1867. Some villages did not provide any soldiers. In stead they paid an extra military tax to cover the soldiers that they would have otherwise had to provide. See Zill al-Sultan to Amin al-Sultan, telegram, July 10, 1890, in Majmu Cah-i Tiligraphat (Tehran: Majlis Library, n.d.), MS, No. 3365, folio 40.

47. Ibid.

48. CAbd Allah Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani-i Man, ya Tarikh-i Idari va Ijtimaci-i Iran dar Dawrah-i Qajar- iyah (3 vols.; Tehran: Tehran Musavvar Press, 1943), Vol. I, p. 69.

49. Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah. The letter is in the possession of Farhad Muctamid. Although not dated, the content indicates that it was written when Mirza Husain assumed the Ministry of War in 1874. The Shah's comments are written on Mirza Husain Khan's letter.

50. Returns of Revenue and Expenditure prepared by Arthur Herbert, Encl., in Nicolson to Rosebery, F.O. 60/479, No. 47, April 7, 1886. An account book of a battalion also supports the figure given by Herbert. The six-month maintenance of the Mahallati battalion came to just over 5,300 tumans in 1892-1893. See Daftar- i JamC va Kharj (Tehran: Majlis Library, 1891-92),

IRANIAN STUDIES 246



MS, No. 3210, folio 133. One pound was about three tumans in 1886 (see Herbert's report). This would indicate that the army consisted of 60,000 men as it was proposed before.

51. Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah, probably written 1874-78 (PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio number).

52. Asif al-Dawlah to Mirza Yusuf, September 27, 1884, File No. 13, Khurasan, PFOA, MS, No. 111, no folio number.

53. Amin Laskar, Tavaqquf-i Tabriz, Vol. IV, folio 268.

54. See for example the incident of Gulpaigan Battalion rioting in Shiraz over nonpayment of their salaries. Amin al-Sultan to Muctamid al-Dawlah, telegram, July 14, 1890, Tehran in MajmuCah-i Tiligraphat, folios 141-142. Amin al-Mulk to Muctamid al-Sultan Nasr Allah Khan Sartip (battalion head of the riotous troops), Telegram, July 14, 1890, Tehran, in MajmuCah- i Tiligraphat, folios 143-144.

55. J. G. Lorimer., Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oznan, and Central Arabia (4 vols.; Calcutta: Superinten- ent Government Printing, 1915), Vol. I, part 3, p. 2058.

56. Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah, probably September 1880, Qazvin. The letter is in Farhad Muctamid's collection in Tehran.

57. The word "salt" in the evocation indicates the minister's sense of gratitude for favors already shown to him by the Shah. Lack of gratitude is thought to cause God's anger. Finally, the evocation is interesting in the context of the household in which the members are fed and protected by the master.

58. Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, July 27, 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6139, no folio number.

247 Vol. XI, 1978



59. Anonymous to Nasir al-Din Shah, July 21, 1866, PFOA, MS, No. 1, Section 24, folio 154. The author of the letter,who must have been a high official,suggests to the Shah that to reform the army he should leave more authority in the hands of amir tumans, field marshals, and make them responsible to a War Council, Majlis-i Vizarat-i Jang.

60. MN, Vol. III, p. 381.

61. MB, Vol. III, p. 45.

62. Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript, "Mukhtasar Hukm va Dast-Khatti Ast ki Baray-i Inciqad-i Majlis-i Tah- qiq-i Nizam Nivishtah Mishavad," May 18, 1869, PFOA, MS, No. 173, no folio numbers.

63. Ibid.

64. See, for example, Daftar-i Amar-i Qur-Khanah-i Tabriz (Tehran: Majlis Library, n.d.), MS, No. 3206.

65. Amin al-Dawlah, Khatirat-i Siyasi, pp. 57-58.

66. Ibid., p. 63.

67. Ibid.

68. Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864- 1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1968), pp. 166-168.

69. Zain al-cAbidin, et al., to Nasir al-Din Shah, Novem- ber 21-December 21, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio number; CAbd al-Qadir, et al., to Nasir al-Din Shah, October 21-November 21, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio number.

70. Zill al-Sultan, Sarguzasht, p. 301.

71. MB, Vol. II (Appendix), pp. 6-7.

IRANIAN STUDIES 248



72. Mlirza Malkam Khan, Tanzim-i Lashkar va Majlis-i Ida- rah, ya Intizam-i Lashkar va Majlis-i Tanzimat in MajmuCah-i Athar-i Malkam, ed. by Muhammad Muhit-i Tabatabai (Tehran: Danish Press, 1948), p. 100.

73. The letter is reproduced in Mahmud Farhad MuCtamid, Sipah-Salar-i ACzam (Tehran: Ilmi, 1946), p. 63.

74. MN, Vol. III., p. 381.

75. CAbd Allah Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani, Vol. III, p. 68. See also John H. Lorentz, Modernization and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The Role of Amir Kabir (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1974), pp. 152-172.

76. Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani, Vol. III, p. 118.

77. For the theoretical discussion concerning the patrimonial ruler's financial authoritv see Richard Ben- dix's discussion based on lWeber in Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday and Com- pany, Inc., 1962), p. 335.

78. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. II, part 1, pp. 134-135.

79. Muhammad Quli Asif al-Dawlah, the Vizier of Zill al- Sultan to Mirza Yusuf Mustawfi al-Mamalik}, Shiraz, October-November 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio number.

80. MB, Vol. III, p. 12.

81. Anonymous to Nasir al-Din Shah, Tehran, October 8, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6300, no folio number.

82. MIirza Yahva Khan Muctamid al-Mulk, the later Mushir al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, MajmuCah-i Faramin va Namah-ha-i Nasir al-Din Shah (Tehran: Majlis Library, 1875-1876), M4s, No. 5121.

83. See Nasir al-Din Shah's three farmans promoting Nasir

249 Vol. XI, 1978



Allah Khan in Asnad-i Juda-Juda, dated 1865-1866, 1874-1875, and 1885-1886 (Tehran: Tehran University, The Central Library),. MS, No. 8255, no folio numbers.

84. Hajj Muhammad CAli Sayyah, Khatirat-i Haji Sayyah, ed. by Humayun Sayyah (Tehran: Offset Press, 1967), p. 485.

85. Mlirza JaCfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukamat-i Iran, PFOA, MS, No. 974, folio 17.

86. Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Mirza Yusuf, 1881- 1882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number.

87. MB, Vol. IV (Supplement), p. 12.


89. Majd al-Mulk, Rasalah-i Majdiah (Tehran, Sultani's Private Library), MS, No. 467, folio 24.

90. Picot, "MIemorandum," p. 18.

91. Mirza Yusuf to Nasir al-Din Shah, December 20, 1873- January 20, 1874, PFOA, MS, No. 6320, folio 231.

92. Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Amin Huzur defining the authority of Vizarat-i Baqaya, 1881-1882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number; see also Mushir al- Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukumat, no folio number.

93. Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukumat, no folio number.

94. Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Amin Huzur, 1881- 1882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number.

95. MB, Vol. 2 ("Supplement"), p. 19.

96. Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukumat, no folio number.

97. See the example of a local personage who pays 600 tumans to the governor of Shahrud and receives the

IRANIAN STUDIES 250



authority to collect the taxes of the city. It is interesting to note that the official taxes of the city only amounted to 600 tumans. The actual taxes must have been more than twice the nominal sum. See "Ruz-Namah-i Safar-i Khurasan," pp. 348-349.

98. See the reproduction of the farman issued in 1869 in Haji Ahmad Khan Minabi, Sadid al-Saltanah, Bandar-i CAbbas va Khalij-i Fars, ed. by Ahmad Iqtidari (Teh- ran: Ibn-i Sina, 1963), p. 5.

99. See the farman by Zill al-Sultan appointing a certain Muhammad as the tax collector of Jarquyah in the Is- phahan area. The farman is in the Mtinasian Collec- tion, University of California, Los Angeles, no MS number, no date, no folio number.

100. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. I, part 3 , p. 1680.

101. Mtirza Husain Farahani, Safar Namah-i Mirza Husain Farahani, ed. by Hafiz Farman-Farmaian (Tehran: Teh- ran University Press, 1963), p. 42.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., pp. 42-43. For more examples of local notables performing executive functions, see pp. 42-45.

104. Muhammad Hasan Khan Ictimad al-Saltanah, al-Mu 'athir va al-Athar (Tehran: Government Press, 1880-1881), p. 39.

105. Hajj Mlirza Hasan Husaini Fasa'i, Tarikh-i Fars-Namah- i Nasiri (2 vols; lithograph; no place of publication: Sana'i, n.d.), Vol. II, pp. 267-269.

106. Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 143.

107. cAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, Kitabchah-i Ma- Clumat-i Ictimad al-Saltanahl, 1890-1891, PFOA, MS,, No. 6285, folio 163. This is a report to Nasir al-Din

251 Vol. XI, 1978



Shah on Khuzistan affairs and routes.

108. Fasa'i, Fars-Namah, Vol. II, pp. 303-305.

109. "Kirman-Shahan," Farhang, Vol. X, No. 414 (December 23, 1886), pp. 253-255. Luristan taxes were paid by tribal chiefs. See "Burujird," Farhang, Vol. VI, No. 260 (June 19, 1884), p. 1.

110. cAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, Kitabchah, folio 23.

111. Ibid., folio 65.

112. Amin al-Sultan to Rukn al-Dawlah, Telegram, Tehran, PFOA, MS, No. 6256, March 14, 1888, no folio number.

113. Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, 1858-1859, no folio number.

114. Ibid.

115. Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, 1858-1859, no folio number.

116. Zahir al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, 1862- 1863, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio number. In the same letter the Shah wrote that he planned to go to Fars next year to settle the problem. He obviously found it necessary to use his own royal charisma to settle the conflict between the center and the notables.


118. Hajj CAbd al-Ghaffar Najm al-Mulk, Safar-Namah-i Khuzistan, ed. by Mluhammad Dabir Siyaqi (Tehran: CIlmi, 1962), p. 67.

119. CAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, Kitabchah-i MaClumat-i, folio 87. See the similar situation in Bandar-i Mlacshur, folios 164-165.

IRANIAN STUDIES 252



120. Ibid., folios 35-36.

121. Mlurtiza Quli Khan Vakil al-Mulk to Nasir al-Din Shah, Kirman, December 9, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 101, no folio number.

122. Edward Stack, Six Months in Persia, Vol. II, pp. 247- 282. Khamir, for instance, a district in Bandar-i CAbbas province, had its own local tax rates. The inhabitants paid a complicated tax which included taxes on agricultural land, animals, and poll tax. The amount of tax was fixed rather minutely for each kind of animal. The system wvas applied to an area that paid only 200 tumans of taxes a year. This clearly indicates the degree to which the tax structure wvas fragmented. See Muhammad cAli Sadid al-Sal- tanah, Bandar-i CAbbas, pp. 4-5. In Bandar-i cAbbas itself the governor collected the following taxes: (1) taxes on shops, called izafiyyah, fixed at 7 1/2 tumans for each shop; (2) passport dues, tazkarah, 14 1/2 qirans for each passport; (3) tax on commercial transactions, known as dallal, fixed at 2 1/2 percent collected from each buyer and seller; (4) tax on goods about to be loaded on animals, known as sar-rigi; (S) a kind of octroi duty at 1/2 qiran to two qirans on each package according to size, called maidani; (6) iskilliyah or pierage at 2 1/2 qirans to 5 qirans for each package; (7) rah-dari or road tolls. Yet, the customs of Bandar-i CAbbas were not under the governor's authority. See Lori- mer, Gazetteer, Vol. II, part I, pp. 13-14. Where minorities were large, different rates of taxation were applied to non-Mluslims. In Urumiyah,the Mlus- lims paid S qirans equal to 4s.2d. for each house they owned while the Christians paid 8 qirans or 6s.8d. Tax rates on live animals were the same however for Mtuslims and non-Mluslims. The Christians paid poll tax instead of military service,which amounted to 5 qirans; see, for example, the report by William G. Abbott to Her Mlajesty's Principal Sec- retary for Foreign Affairs, Tabriz, November 11, 1880, F.O. 60/431, No. 26, Inclosure 1.

253 Vol. XI, 1978



123. Each kharvar is equal to 300 kilograms.

124. Muhanmad Ibn-i Riza Quli Tarikh-Nivis, Mu'athir-i Mahdiyah (Tehran: National Library), MS, No. 969 , folios 397-398.

125. Ibid., folios 416-417.


127. Arthur Herbert, Returns of Revenue and Expenditure, in Nicolson to Rosebery, Encl. No. 47, F.0. 60/479, April 17, 1886.

128. Gav is a unit of measurement equal to an acre.

129. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. II, part I, p. 371.

130. Ibid., Vol. II, part II, pp. 1089-1090.

131. Ibid.., Vol. II, part I, pp. 698-699.

132. Ibid., Vol. II, part II, p. 1102.

133. CAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, Kitabchah-i Maclumat, folio 163.

134. Ibid., folios 31, 56.

135. Ibid., folios 55-56.

136. CAbd al-cAli Adib al-Mamalik, DafiC al-Ghurur, ed. by Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Khawrazmi), pp. 33-34.

137. Ibid., pp. 154,155.

138. Ruz-Namah, p. 313.

139. See the photocopy of the proclamation in ''Iclan-ha va Iclamiyah-ha-i Dawrah-i Qajar," ed. by Muhammad Ismacil Rizvani, Bar-Rasi-ha-i Tarikhi, No. 26 (June- July 1960), p. 265.

IRANIAN STUDIES 254



140. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. 1, part 3, p. 2595.

141. Mushir al-Dawlah, Tarz-i Hukmat-i Iran, no folio no.

142. MB, Vol. I, p. 348.

143. ICtimad al-Saltanah, Mu'athir va al-Athar, p. 21.

144. Ibid.


146. Ruz-Namah, pp. 991, 995.

147. Ibid., p. 991.


149. See, for example, a letter by Nasir al-Din Shah to Zill al-Sultan published in Farhang. "Surat-i Par- vanah-i Mulatifat Nishanah-i Humayuni," Farhang, Vol. X, No. 414 (December 23, 1886), p. 253.

150. See the many letters of Farhad Mirza MuCtamid al- Dawlah to the Shah and to Mirza Husain Khan indicat- ing that this able and scholarly prince did not think that his functions went beyond the collection of the taxes from the tax farmers and maintaining order. Daftar-i Nivishtigat-i Kurdistan, PFOA, MS, No. 63. The collection of the documents includes letters written between 1871 and 1873. See also Farhad Mir- za's letters to Mirza cAli Divan-Baigi written between 1870 and 1874 in Namah-ha-i Farhad Mirza (Tehran: Sultani's Private Library), MS, No. 422.

151. Kiyumarth Mirza to Mirza Muhammad Khan Sipah-Salar, Kirman, n.d., PFOA, MS, No. 66, no folio number.

152. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. II, part 1, p. 348.

153. Amin al-Sultan to Fakhr al-Mulk, telegram. Tehran, April 30, 1890 (Tehran: Majlis Library), MajmuCah-i

255 Vol. XI, 1978



Tiligraphat, MS, No. 3365, folios 3-4.

154. Lorimer, Gazetteer, Vol. I, part 2, p. 1677.

155. Muhammad Ibrahim Khuda-Bandahlu, "Ruz-Namah-i Safar- i Khurasan va Sistan," ed. by Iraj Afshar, Farhang- i Iran-Zamin, Vol. XII, Nos. 1-4 (1965), pp. 127-128. The governor of Sultaniyah, a traveler recorded, retained one-third of the tax he collected. The rate of extra-taxes for the benefit of the governor varied from place to place; see also CAbd al-CAli Adib al- Mamalik, DafiC al-Ghurur, p. 58.

156. Amin al-Sultan to Fakr al-Mulk, telegram, May 6, 1890, MajmuCah-i Tiligrafat, MS, folios 4-5.


158. Ibid.

159. Picot, pp. 17-18.

160. Zill al-Sultafi, Sarguzasht, p. 87.

161. Majd al-Mulk Sinaki, Rasalah, folios 11-12.


163. Hajj Shaikh Yahya Ahmadi, "Fihrist-i Asami-i Far- mandihan-i Mamlikat-i Kirman," ed. by Muhammad Ibra- him Bastani Parizi, Farhang-i Iran Zamin, Vol. XII, Nos. 1-4 (1964), pp. 64-65.

164. See for example the following local budgets: Asl-i Kitabchah-i Jamrc va Kharj-i Sanah-i Maziyah-i Qui I1, Dar al-CIbad-i Yazd Savad-i Kitabchah-i Du Salah-i Yunit I1 va Qui Il-i Ru-Saqi va Jarnal-Abad va Fasaruq (Tehran: Tehran University, The Central Library), MS, No. 8358.

165. Muhammad Quli Asif al-Dawlah to Mirza Yusuf, Shiraz, March-April 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio number.

IRANIAN STUDIES 256



For another example see Murtiza Quli Khan Vakil al- Mulk to Nasir al-Din Shah, Kirman, March 11, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 101, no folio number.

166. mM, Vol. I ("Supplement"), p. 18.

167. Akhbar-i Dakhilah, Farhang, Vol. IX, No. 360 (May 27, 1886), p. 2.

168. Kiyumarth Mirza to Mirza Muhwamad Khan Sipah-Salar, Kirman, n.d., PFOA, MS, No. 66, no folio number.

169. Translation of Manifesto issued by the Deputy-Gov- ernor of Tabreez. Enclosure in the Consul-General Abbott's Despatch, No. 13, Confidential, July 5, 1879, F.O. 60/425.

170. Benam al-Mulk, "Memorandum," Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Marquis Salisbury, Gulahek, September 3, 1890, Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Library, MS, No. 5991, p. 3.

171. Mirza cAli Vaqayi-Nigar, Hadiqah-i Nasiri (Tehran: The National Library), No. 625, folios 209-215.

172. Farhad Mirza to Nasir al-Din Shah, Kirmanshah, Novem- ber 31, 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6139, no folio number.

173. Mirza Yusuf to Zia al-Dawlah (governor of Simnan), Tehran, Telegram No. 45, January 27, 1884, PFOA, MS, No. 111, no folio number.

174. Anonymous report to Nasir al-Din Shah, November 23, 1863, PFOA, MS, No. 114, no folio number.

175. Anonymous report to Nasir al-Din Shah, March-April 1872, PFOA, MS, No. 6320, folio 6.

176. See for example CAbbas Mirza to Amin al-Sultan, telegram, Qum, October 8, 1890, in MajmuCah-i Tiligra- fat, folios 20-21.

257 Vol. XI, 1978



177. Amin al-Sultan to MuCtamid al-Dawlah, telegram, July 22, 1890, folio 145, and Amin al-Sultan to Zill al-Sultan, telegram, October 20, 1890, folio 46, and Zill al-Sultan to Amin al-Sultan, telegram, October 22, 1890, folio 47, in MajmuCah-i Tiligra- fat.

IRANIAN STUDIES 258



state and society in iran || the patrimonial structure of iranian bureaucracy in the late nineteenth...

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