statcon cases digests_01

Statutory Construction_ Case Digests_Chapters I-II

Case: US vs. PonsCase No. 1

Facts:1. Gabino Belise, Juan Pons and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with illegal importation of opium in the country.2. Beliso and Pons were tried separately. Pons questioned the validity of Act. 2381 to which he will be punished if found guilty. He claimed that the act was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on the 1st day of March and therefore , the act is null and void.

Issue:1. W/N the court can look to legislative journals as proof of when the adjournment happened.2. W/N the court can go behind the legislative journals to determine the date of adjournment

Rulings:1. Yes. Official documents may be proved through the proceedings of the Phil. Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for the Philippines or of congress by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof.2. The court does not need to go behind the legislative journals when such journals are already clear and explicit. The journals say that the Legislative adjourned at 12 midnight on Feb. 28, 1914.

MANABAG VS LOPEZ VITOCase No. 2*

Facts:Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities; and members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to take their seat except in the election of a house speaker. They argued that some senators and house representatives were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote from each house to enact a Resolution (proposing amendments to the constitution). The Resolution was passed and was already considered an enrolled bill. But if petitioners were counted, the vote would have been short of the required ¾ vote.

Petitioners filed a case to prohibit the implementation of a congressional resolution, claiming that it was not duly enacted.

The respondents contend that the matter is beyond the court’s jurisdiction because according to the enrolled bill doctrine, the court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled resolution.

Issue/s:(1)WON the court can take cognizance of the issue at bar(2)WON the resolution was duly enacted

Held:(1) YES. The Court may render judgement based on looking into the journals and would not violate the enrolled bill doctrine because due enactment of law may be proved in two ways as per Sec 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by

copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed in their order; and (2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

(2) YES. The Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself from considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. The Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the question whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary ¾ vote were members of the Congress within the meaning of the Constitution. Petition was dismissed. Astorga v. Villegas

Case No. 3G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974)Chapter I, 1, Footnote No.37

FACTS:House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE:W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

HELD:Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such.

“Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.”

People of the Philippines v. PurisimaCase No. 4G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16


FACTS:Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.ISSUE:W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.HELD:The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measureis to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

Lidasan v. Commission on ElectionsCase No. 5G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967)Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51

FACTS:Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections.

ISSUE:W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.

HELD:Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato

that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio CarlosCase No. 6G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947)Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

FACTS:The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance;(2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.

HELD:No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.

Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co v. City of CDOCase No. 7*

FACTS:The City Council of CDO passed an ordinance imposing a tax on the lease of electric and/or telecommunication poles or towers.

CEPALCO assailed the validity of the ordinance before the RTC on the ground that the tax imposed by the ordinance is in reality, an income tax which the City Council of CDO may not impose because it violates the Local Government Code. And assuming that the City Council may enact the ordinance, CEPALCO is exempted by virtue of RA 9284 providing for its franchise.

ISSUE/S:(1) WON the CDO ordinance is valid(2) WON CEPALCO should be exempted from tax


(3) WON CEPALCO’s action in barred for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and for prescription

HELD:(1) Court held that the tax imposed by the ordinance is not upon income but upon the privilege to engage in business, and the city council is authorized by the Local Government Code to impose such tax.(2) CEPALCO shall not be exempted from the tax since there is no provision in RA 9284 that provides for its exemption.(3) CEPALCO’s action is barred as if failed to raise an appeal within the 30 day period provided in the Sec187 of Local Government Code

Mirasol v Court of AppealsCase No. 8*

FACTS:The Mirasols are sugar land owners. PNB financed their sugar production from 1973-1975.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in 1974, authorizing PHILEX to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX’s purchases. The decree directed that the profit of PHILEX was to be remitted to the government.

Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay for their obligations, the petitioners asked PNB for accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail other loans and make unfunded withdrawals until they failed to settle their obligations and PNB foreclosed their mortgaged properties.

PNB asked PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB argued that there was nothing to account since under, all earnings from the export sales of sugar are to be remitter to the government.

Mirasols filed a suit against PNB for accounting and damanges.

ISSUE/S:(1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the solicitor general(2) WON PD 579 is constitutional for violating due process

HELD:(1) The Constitution vests the power to all RTC’s to consider the constitutionality of statutes.(2) As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law if the controversy can be settled on other grounds. The CA ruled that PNB’s obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined without having to rule on the constitutionality of the PD.

The rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not favored. RA cannot be deemed to have repealed by PD No. 579 because the former did not expressly declared the repeal.

Victorias Milling Co. Inc v Social Security CommissionCase No. 9*

FACTS: The SSC issued Circular No. 22 which provided that the employees’ bonuses and overtime pay shall be included in their remuneration for the computation of monthly deductions.

The petitioner, through a counsel, protested against the circular arguing that it is contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 which expressly excluded overtime pay and bonus in the computation of monthly contributions. Petitioner further questioned the validity of the circular for SSC’s lack of authority to enact such without approval from the president and publication in the Official Gazette.

The SSC objected by saying that Circular No. 22 is not a rule but mere interpretation of the statute, a statement or opinion on a general policy that needed the approval of the president and publication.

Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.

ISSUE/s:Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

HELD:No. The Commission’s Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. The Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

Pelaez v Auditor GeneralCase No. 10*

FACTS:The president issued executive orders to create 30 municipalities pursuant to Sec60 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds were thereby disbursed in the implementation of the said orders.


Pelaez filed a petition to restrain any expenditure of public funds in the implementation of the aforementioned executive orders. Petitioner argued that said orders were null and void on the ground that the president does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

ISSUE:WON the executive orders were null and void.

HELD:Sec10(1) o Article VII of the Constitution gives the president authority to “supervise over all local governments as may be provided by law.” The constitution permits him to no more than check whether the local government or officers are duly performing their duties. The president cannot interfere with local governments so long as the officers act within the scope of their authority. The president may not enact, vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by the municipal council within the scope of its jurisdiction.

The Executive Orders are hereby declared null and void.

Alba v EvangelistaCase No. 11*

FACTS:Alajar was appointed as Vice-Mayor of Roxas City by the president. His appointment was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Alajar remained in his designated office until he received a communication from that Alba was

ISSUE:WON the alleged removal of the Alajar (Respondent) and the designation in his place of Alba (Petitioner) as Vice-May of Roxas City is legal

HELD:Sec 8 of RA603 empowers the President, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, to appoint a person to hold office at his own pleasure.

Term – time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right.Tenure – term during which the incumbent actually hold office.

The court held that since the term of the respondent was fixed implicitly by the President in the exercise of the President’s authority, its expiration is also determined by the President with the same authority. The respondent was not removed but rather, merely lost his right to hold office by the expiration of his term as determined by the President.

Tanada v. TuveraCase No. 12G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986)Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159

FACTS:Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it

was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.ISSUE:W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication.HELD:No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazetteimmediately.

Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. PalomarCase No. 13G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211

FACTS:Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispenseduring a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications, Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief.ISSUE:W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law.HELD:No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind”means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corruptpublic morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of the law is preserved.Macondray & Co VS Eustaquio 64 PHIL 446Definition, Nature and Purpose of Construction Case No. 14*

FACTS: The controversy arose from the contract of sale between MACONDRAY & CO. (Plaintiff) and EUSTAQUIO (defendant) involving a De Soto car, Sedan for the price of PHP 595 promising to pay the car in 12 monthly installments. The contract was coupled with a mortgage


on the car made by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff to guarantee payment. The defendant paid the initial installment of PHP 43.75 and thereafter failed to pay any of the remaining installments. The car was sold at a public auction for PHP 250 prompting plaintiff to collect the remaining balance and other stipulated fees in the amount of PHP 342.20 from defendant.

ISSUE: WON Act 4122 (Installment Sales Law/ Recto Law) is valid?

HELD: YES. This question involves the interpretation of the pertinent portion of the law, reading: "However, if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing by the same, and any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void." This paragraph, as its language shows, refers to the mortgage contract executed by the parties, whereby the purchaser mortgages the chattel sold to him on the installment basis in order to guarantee the payment of its price, and the words "any unpaid balance" should be interpreted as having reference to the deficiency judgment to which the mortgagee may be entitled where, after the mortgaged chattel is sold at public auction, the proceeds obtained therefrom are insufficient to cover the full amount of the secured obligations which, in the case at bar as shown by the note and by the mortgage deed, include interest on the principal, attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and the costs. The fundamental rule which should govern the interpretation of laws is to ascertain the intention and meaning of the Legislature and to give effect thereto. (Sec. 288, Code of Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U. S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil., 134; De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126.) Were it the intention of the Legislature to limit its meaning to the unpaid balance of the principal, it would have so stated. We hold, therefore, that the assignment of error is untenable.

General v BarramedaCase No. 15*

FACTS:The petitioners defaulted their loan obligation with DBP and as a consequence, their mortgaged property was foreclosed for sale and was bought by the defendant.

On September 2, 1963, the registration of the sale and affidavit wherein the Transfer of Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff was cancelled and was issued to DBP. Moreover, General and Gontang purchased land from DBP and their sale was annotated in their Transfer of Certificate of Title.

On August 12, 1964, plaintiff purchased the land and was able to redeem it due to Court of Appeal’s decision since the date when it was purchased was still within a year of redemption

period, which is from the date of the registration of the sale. Now, petitioners (General) contended that there is a great deal of difference in the legislative intent in the use of the words “auction sale” and “sale”. In Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 45, it provides that the right to redeem property sold is within the year from the date of the auction sale and in Sec. 32 of Act 2938 (PNB Charter), it provides that the right to redeem is within one year after the sale of the real estate

The petitioners argued that the more applicable law is the section 31 of Commonwealth Act 45. Hence, the respondent should have not deemed the property since the date when he purchased the land was beyond the time of redemption.

ISSUE: W the rule to apply in determining the start of one year redemption period is the date of the auction sale OR the date of registration of sale in the registry of deeds.

Whether or not the interpretation of Section 31 of Commonwealth Act no. 459 that the period of redemption should start from the date of auction sale and not from the date of the registration of sale should be followed?

HELD:The court stated that a correct solution to the issue must entail not merely trying to determine the meaning of the words “auction sale” and “sale” in different legislative enactments but more importantly a determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task to achieve as it depends more on a determination of the purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a period of redemption of their foreclosed properties. The words “sale” and “auction sale” used interchangeably in different laws referred to the “sale at public auction,” required by law in the disposition of foreclosed properties.

So that whether the legislators in different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no moment, since the presumption is that when they used those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they really referred to only one act — the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the disposition of mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their owners. Wherefore, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against petitioners. Litex Employees Association v. EduvalaCase No. 16G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977)Chapter II, 3, Footnote No.22

FACTS:Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended


that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction.ISSUE:W/N the statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction is validHELD:Art. 226 of the Labor Code states that: "The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the labor shall have and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiation or upon request of either both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and disputes, grievances of probe arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces, whether natural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration" Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Petition denied.

Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. Games and Amusement BoardCase No. 17No. L-12727 (February 29, 1960)Chapter III, Page 114, Footnote No.190

FACTS:The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right.Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec. 4 of RA 309, as amended by RA 983, that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run, the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six.ISSUE:W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.HELD:No. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983, it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. Also, Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO.

In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of the an ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently expresses the

meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements- an internal and external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression.

Manila Lodge No. 176 v. Court of AppealsCase No. 18G.R. No.L-41001 and G.R. No.L-41012 (September 30, 1976)Chapter VI, Page 264, Footnote No. 63

FACTS:The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).ISSUE:W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.HELD:The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.LATIN MAXIM:2a, 6c, 9a, 36b, 37, 43

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong CorporationG.R. No. 170633, 17 October 2007TOPIC: Where Legislative Intent Is AscertainedCase No. 19

FACTS•MCC Industrial Sales Corporation the petitioner engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products and of one its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation the respondent.• The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. The respondent would send the pro forma invoice of the


product order to petitioner and after confirmation the petitioner would send it back affixing his signature.• Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract supported by the photocopies of the pro forma invoices against the petitioner• The petitioner claims that under electronic commerce of 2000 the electronic evidence by the respondent is admissible. And the terms electronic document and data message as rules of evidence, and it do not include a facsimile transmission.ISSUE• Whether or not the electronic evidence by the respondent is admissible?HELD• If a statute fails to indicate the legislative intent, the court may look beyond the statute, such as history of the statute in order to ascertain the intent of the legislative.• The court ruled that the international origin of the statute could refer or consistent to model law on electronic commerce adopted by the UNCITRAL to clear out its ambiguity it is not just limited to electronic data interchange. Therefore Data message and electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.• Indeed the court proves that it was within the intention of the framers of the law to consider that original printout or the electronic data store in computer or electronic gadget reduces in a readable form, will be considered as written instrument provided that proper authentication be made and proved, to which the respondent managed to do so. Thus, the high court ruled in favor of the respondent.

U.S. v. Ang Tang HoCase No 20G.R. No. 17122 (February 27, 1922)Chapter XI, Page 435, Footnote No.12

FACTS:Respondent was charged for violating E.O. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law.E.O. 53 follows Act No. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are, Defendant will not be charged.

ISSUE:W/N Act No. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD:The act is unconstitutional. The Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. As known, no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. This power is exclusive to the legislative. In fixing the price, the law is dealing

with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution.LATIN MAXIM:None

People of the Philippines v. MapaCase No. 21G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967)Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89

FACTS:Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.ISSUE:W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.HELD:No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. TheCourt’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.LATIN MAXIM:1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

Guevara v InocentesCase No. 22

FACTS:The petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor and took his oath after such appointment. The defendant questioned the appointment on the ground that the petitioners appointment ceases to be valid after the adjournment of Congress since there was no COAppointments organized during the special session which commenced on Jan17.

At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate adjourned its session. The HOR merely suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without interruption since Jan17.

ISSUE:WON the ad interim appointment of the petitioner is vad

HELD:Art VII, Sec10 of the 1935 Constitution: “the President shall have the power to make appointments [ad interim appointment] during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until (1) disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or (2) the next adjournment of Congress [whether special or regular session].”

The phrase “until the next adjournment of the Congress does not make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. Using the known maxim in statcon stating that “what the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish,” the court


concluded the authors used the word “adjournment” as either regular or special.

The adjournment of one of the Houses of Congress is considered as the adjournment of the Congress as a whole. The petitioner’s ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon the adjournment of the Senate.

The contention that the COAppointments should be first organized before the second mode of termination can be made effective is invalid because they are two separate modes.

United Christian Missionary Society et al vs. Social Security Commission GR. No. L-26712-16 December 27, 1969Case No. 23

Case Doctrine: Where language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute.

FactsThe petitioners filed a petition praying for condonation of assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances. They alleged that they had labored under the impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to the coverage under the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by the SSS officials, they paid. Petitioners claimed that the penalties assessed against them were inequitable because of several past resolutions wherein the commission permitted the condonation of such penalties.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the SSS did not have the power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance. The SSS argued that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, the commission cannot legally do so. The petition was dismissed in favor of the respondent Commission. Thus resulted to this appeal.

IssueWhether or not SSS erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late remittances.

Ruling No error was committed in the commission's action. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The court is therefore bound to uphold the respondent's refusal to claim unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late payment of social security premiums, for otherwise, we would be sanctioning the commission's reading into law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.

Gedeon Quijano & Eujenia T. Quijano, petitioners-appellants Vs.The Development Bank of the Philippines & The ex-officio Sheriff of Misamis Occidental, respondents-appelleesCase No. 24

Facts:• Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the respondent-bank, in the amount of P19, 500.00. The loan was approved on April 30, 1953. The petitioners availed the loan much later and the mortgage contract was executed on March 23, 1954. The petitioner spouses mortgaged real properties with the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the load. The loan was to be received by the petitioners in several releases.• The first release of P4, 200.00 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter. As of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners of the respondent-bank, including interests, was P13,983.59.• On July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897 .• The respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the non-acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or existing on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act No. 897 was approved.

Issue:• Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was existing at the time of the approval of RA 897.

Ruling:• NO. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable to take advantage of their back pay certificates. On the other hand, however, the Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Appellants availed of their approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the corresponding releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the mortgage contract on March 23, 1954. Undoubtedly, notwithstanding the approval by the appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants' loan application on April 30, 1953, appellants did not thereby incur any obligation to pay the same; only after the corresponding amounts were released to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach; and it cannot, therefore, be said that the said loan was an


obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953.

Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of CustomsCase No: 25G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971)Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39FACTS:This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage”

ISSUE:W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines.HELD:No. It is quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines.LATIN MAXIM:6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

National Federation of Labor v. Hon. EismaCase No. 26G.R. No. L-61236 (January 31, 1984)

FACTS:Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. Thereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide.ISSUE:W/N courts may be labor arbiters (mediators) that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC?HELD:Yes, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.In the Labor Code, Sec. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction.

However, P.D. 1367 amended Sec. 217, vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. But again P.D. 1691 amended Sec. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. Additionally, BP 130 amended the same section, but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. Thus

the law is clear, respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case.

Republic v Lacap 517 SCRA 255, March 2, 2007Austria- Martinez, J. Verba Legis Rule or Plain Meaning RuleCase No. 27

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This rule derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

FACTS: The controversy started when the Philippine Government through the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit disapproved the final release of the funds to be used for reimbursement to the respondent, LACAP on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract even if the obligations (concreting of Sitio 5, Bahay Pare) on the part of respondent have been fully completed.LACAP filed a complaint for Specific Performance. OSG for petitioner invoked the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies based on the premise that respondent’s claim is premature since he failed to appeal to COA who has the administrative jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects?

HELD: The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void the contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Nota Bene:Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)


Canet v DecenaCase No. 28

FACTS:Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Julieta Decena was the mayor therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof.” This ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but she denied it because the said ordinance does not contain rules and regulations as well as a separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance indefinitely.

Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayor’s permit for the operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canet’s application on the ground that under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which generally provide for the issuance of a mayor’s permit for the operation of businesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so.

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor’s permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on Decena’s administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution).

It was Ordinance No. 001, S. 1999 which provided for the collection of application filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor’s permit fees, filing fees for the institution of complaints, entrance fees and special derby assessments for the operation of cockpits.12 This Ordinance, however, was withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, since there is no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit, Resolution No. 049, S. 1998, authorizing petitioner to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur cannot be implemented.

It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius.14 Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.15 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat.16 Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.17 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.18

Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law.19 Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe.20

LOZANO vs NOGRALES 16 June 2009Case No. 29

FACTSPetitioners prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-Fourths Vote of All the Members of the Congress”. Petitioners seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definite interpretation by this Court of Sec. 1, Art. XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioner’s supplications.ISSUEW/NOT the Court may have a judicial review upon the present case.HELDNONE. This Court’s power of review is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the Constitution. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this Court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions”, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action

Biraogo v NogralesCase No. 30

FACTS:The petitioners prayed to the nullification of house Resolution No. 1109 on the ground that it contradicts the procedure provided on the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as separate voting of the members of each House is deleted and substituted with ¾ vote on all the members of the Congress.


ISSUE:WON the court has the power to review the case of constitutional validity of the HR No. 1109.

HELD:No. The SC cannot review the case because its power is limited only to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims.

The court is canned from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” unless it has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

A party will be allowed to petition only if they can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the illegal conduct of the government (2) the injury is fairy traceable to the challenged action (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.

Locus Standi requires personal stake on the outcome of the controversy. The possible consequence of the resolution is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi.

FRANCISCO vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES10 November 2003 Case No. 31

FACTS: In 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

In 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House.Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;"

Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent/s claim is tenable

HELD: To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court turned to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction, to wit, first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat- the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision is to be separated from the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the constitution and one section is not allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

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