0

START DEPP Linking Preparedness Resilience & Reponses (LPRR) Typhoon Ketsana Case Study

Metro Manila, the Philippines

Rebecca Murphy, Mark Pelling, Emma Visman & Simone Di Vicenz

1

Contents

Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4

Context…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

Disaster: Ketsana…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..5

Christian Aid and Partner Response…………………………………………………………………………………………….8

Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9

Findings…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9

Community Perception of Resilience……………………………………………………………………………………………10

Recommendations & Lessons Learnt……………………………………………………………………………………………11

Resilience Critical Reflections …………………………..…………………………………………………………………………23

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………30

Next Steps…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..31

References………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…32

2

Executive Summary

This Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) Metro Manilla Philippines case study is one of eight studies of past

humanitarian response interventions being explored by the Linking Preparedness Response and

Resilience in Emergency Contexts project (LPRR). This Ketsana pilot case study focuses on Christian

Aid’s 2009-2012 Ketsana/Ondoy typhoon response in Manila, The Philippines.

The LPRR research team spent two weeks in Metro Manila researching the Ketsana intervention to

explore how humanitarian interventions have been able to help enhance and not undermine the

resilience of households at risk, through disaster response and rehabilitation interventions. Taking a

triangulated approach, this research adopts a number of methods including semi structured

interviews with key informants, household interviews and focus group discussions with community

members. Data has been analysed thematically drawing out core aligning and opposing themes and

perceptions around the five identified resilience variables and additional core factors.

It is important to note that this project recognises the term ‘community’ as a collective group of at

risk, exposed residents. It is clear that community perception of resilience is dependent upon the

specific issues and nuances of the community. For the community of Taytay resilience means secure

land tenure focusing on hard engineering infrastructure and development such as higher flood

dykes, two story concrete houses, drainage systems and paved roads. However a timescale context

of resilience questions whether what builds resilience to cope with the short term risks could

increase vulnerability in the long run. For example whilst the community strongly object against the

idea of eviction and feel safe in Taytay due to the flood wall, they are unsure about whether they

would be safe in the long term. However this is a risk the community are willing to take to live in the

area. Major recommendations from the study suggest that a humanitarian response and

rehabilitation programme should align with tackling the root causes of vulnerability, should take into

consideration timescales of resilience, link into government initiatives and include livelihood and

market analysis capacity building.

Ultimately, programmatically the case study shows a strong recovery and rehabilitation program,

championing Disaster Risk Reduction and resilience building however the immediate response was

slow and challenging. Furthermore it is clear that the Community Organising approach is widely

acknowledged to be an excellent foundation for resilience building and a number of capacity

building techniques are proposed to put this into practice in the immediate response phase of an

intervention. This paper goes onto to map out practical actions and recommendation that could be

done before a disaster hits, during the immediate response and in the recovery and rehabilitation.

3

Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy), Metro Manila, the Philippines

“Life is better now than before Ondoy” (Taytay Community Member).

1. Introduction

This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the

humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the Typhoon

Ketsana humanitarian response and rehabilitation programme from 2009-2012 . This paper does not

provide a comprehensive analysis of the case study’s level of resilience building but aims to outline

participants’ reflections and recommendations. A second paper will be developed critically analysing

the impact this example can have on resilience building. This paper is one of a collection of Linking

Preparedness Resilience and Response in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis

papers.

LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergencies Preparedness Programme (DEPP) DfID funded 3 year,

consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more

resilient communities. The consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern

Worldwide, Help Age International, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World

Vision. The countries of focus include Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic Congo,

Colombia, Indonesia and the Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The project has three strands

focusing on; resilient informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and

learning and capacity building.

This report has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand which focuses on developing a

practical method for improved, resilience informed humanitarian response. In order to do this, eight

case studies of past humanitarian response interventions are being explored. This report focuses on

Christian Aid’s 2009-2012 Ketsana/Ondoy typhoon response in Manila, The Philippines.

Pilot

It is important to note that this Ketsana case study is the pilot case study for the LPRR humanitarian

research. Methods and approaches were adapted and edited throughout the data collection to

increase the quality of research with regards to the research aims and consortia’s requests. A final

edit of the approaches will be done before taking this research forward to the next case study.

4

Purpose of Report

The purpose of this report is to communicate the humanitarian program strategy and the messages,

advice and perceptions coming from the disaster affected communities and the local field staff and

partners involved in the humanitarian response. Please note that this is not a comprehensive

analysis or advisory paper but makes up one of up to 10 case studies developed by the LPRR project.

A second analysis paper will be developed critically reflecting upon all of the case studies and a

practical tool for recommendations will be developed (by December 2017).

Audience

This paper is aimed the in country staff, key stakeholders and partners who supported the data

collection and the LPRR consortia. It acts as a communication tool to share all community and in

country perspectives. Every perception, thought and recommendation made throughout the data

collection is shared here. A process of critical analysis will take place in the next phase of the project.

2. The Context The Philippines

The Philippines is one of the most disaster prone counties in the world and in 2012 had the highest

disaster mortality rate in the world (World Bank, 2011) (CNDR, 2012). The Philippines is exposed to

earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, extreme rainfall, extreme temperatures and tropical storms;

with over 20 typhoons entering the Philippines area of responsibility annually (PAGASA, 2010).

Metro Manila

Metro Manila is one of the largest and most complex megacities in Asia and has been ranked the

second most vulnerable city in the world to climate change risks (Maplecroft, 2011). As an

agglomeration of 17 cities the region of Metro Manila is exposed to earthquakes, landslides,

tsunamis, typhoons, extreme heat, extreme rainfall and frequent and intense flooding, which is

intensified by poor urban planning and a lack of effective drainage systems (EM-DAT, 2010) (Porio,

2011). Furthermore the urban poor in Metro Manila are marginalised, highly discriminated against

and often blamed for many of the city’s problems such as high crime rates, overcrowded conditions

and flooding.

Damayan Community, Sitio Lumang Bayan, Brgy San Juan, Taytay, Rizal

This project recognises the term ‘community’ as a collective group of at risk, exposed residents.

Christian Aid’s humanitarian response intervention focused on 12 communities throughout Greater

5

Metro Manila and Rizal where-as the rehabilitation project. However in order to provide an in-

depth, nuanced and critical understanding of the community members’ perception of the

intervention this research has focused on one community. The Damayan community in Taytay was

selected by Christian Aid and their partner COM as a case study of best practice.

Beneficiaries are informal settlers with no rights to the land or tenure, limited job opportunities,

continuous threat of eviction, high rates of youth crime and a lack of basic services. Community

members identified relocation as their biggest hazard, followed by flooding and fires.

3. The Disaster

“Sometimes a disaster can be an opportunity. A shock forces you to stop, step back, reflect and see all that needed to be improved” (Field Officer)

On September the 26th 2009 typhoon Ketsana (local name Ondoy) hit the Philippines. Metro Manila

was faced with a rapid onset flood from the typhoon and flooding of the Marikina river. 455 mm of

rainwater fell in 24 hours, killing 747 people and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

When Ketsana hit the Damayan community they were faced with three shocks; first communities

submerged by flood. Secondly the community was unfairly blamed for floods for building homes on

the floodway and third they were prevented from returning home without a clear relocation plan.

4. The Intervention

The first six months of the intervention focused on immediate emergency relief and early recovery:

here Christian Aid and partners provided food, non-food items and shelter and livelihood assistance

to 12,030 families. This was followed by a two and a half year rehabilitation phase which focused on

capacity building and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Specifically urban DRR which looked at unsafe

settlements, evacuation and livelihood centres, secure and safe settlements, livelihoods, risk

assessments, disaster preparedness, legal empowerment and advocacy (development of policy and

legislations, adoption, implementation, enforcement of laws and culture change) and governance.

The over-all objective of the Ketsana Rehabilitation programme was to “enable urban poor

communities seriously affected by Typhoon Ketsana to recover from their loss and strengthen their

capacities to sustain their lives and livelihoods” (Ketsana Narrative Rolling Plan, 2010).

Specifically, the programme was expected to achieve the following outcomes by employing a

package of strategies:

6

0-6 Month: Immediate Response

•“Bouncing back through relief distribution"•Intervention proposal developed by Christian Aid Philippines team, submitted and approved by

DEC •Partners procured: COPE ran emergency response through COM•Relief distribution for 1,500 families in Taytay, Rizal (1000 for the first day and 500 for the

second)•Temporary shelter distributed to informal settlers •Cash for work to restore income while rebuilding communities

6 months – 3 years: Recovery &

Rehabilitation

•Organising safer communities: COM put into practice their community organising approach and training block leaders, a Disaster Risk Reduction committee and developed livelihood cluster groups

•COM lobbied the needed infrastructure repairs •“Towards Increasing Capacity to Absorb Stress and Maintain Functions during

Disasters”Christian Aid invested in Capacity for urban poor partners •Building back better livelihoods: COM diversified and strengthened livelihoods through

training and livelihood funding and Unlad supported COM through training and funding •Thematic partners supported the communities for example:

•SALIGAN provided paralegal training to enhance advocacy and networking skills of community volunteers. Here, Taytay advocated for good local DRR governance

•PHILSA up scaled this to advocate at the Greater Metro Manila scale•Geologists conducted a local geo-hazard analysis and developed early warning systems with the communities

•Manila observatory produced integrated risk analysis to push government to focus on work beyond building infrastructure

•TAO Philippines facilitates the building of small community infrastructure to mitigate disaster impacts such as the model house in Taytay

1. Enhance Disaster Risk Reduction knowledge and skills of partners and target communities through capacity-building interventions.

2. Prepare and/or strengthen community structures for urban DRR. 3. Ensure secure livelihoods of target communities through sustainable individual and

collective enterprise development. 4. Improve disaster resilience and ensure safe settlements of communities through small

infrastructure facilities. 5. Conduct risk assessments in Metro Manila and neighbouring provinces affected by

Ketsana 6. Enhance the overall knowledge base on urban DRR 7. Mainstream urban DRR into local development planning and increase overall awareness

on urban DRR through policy development, advocacy, networking and communication activities.

In the Damayan community in Taytay Christian Aid worked through its local partner Community

Organising Multiversity (COM) and gained additional support and input from a number of local

thematic specialised organisations for support on land and housing, paralegal training, disaster risk

reduction management and livelihoods. A full list of technical support and advocacy partners can be

found in the Resilient Urban Communities document developed by Christian Aid (2012) which is

accessible here.

7

Map 1: Taytay, Rizal, Greater Manila (Project Noah, 2016)

8

5. Research Methodology

The LPRR research team spent two weeks in Metro Manila researching the Ketsana intervention.

This research is underpinned by Bene et al’s (2012) conceptual framework which outlines a resilient

system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with change. A comprehensive and detailed

outline of the methodology can be found in the LPRR learning google drive and project box account.

Links to both can be found in the bibliography.

5.1 Research Aims

Key objective: To show how humanitarian interventions have been able to help enhance and not

undermine the resilience of households at risk, through disaster response and rehabilitation

interventions.

It is important to note here that Christian Aid recognises that humanitarian response and

rehabilitation is part of resilience building. Which is why this case study was selected as a core

example to explore.

5.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling

Taking a triangulated approach this research adopts semi structured interviews with key informants

and household interviews and focus group discussions with community members which included risk

and resilience mapping as the primary data collection methods. The case study site has been

selected by Christian aid as a good example of lessons learnt. This case study is based in Taytay,

Manila the Philippines. Purposive sampling was adopted for participants in order to gain a diverse

range of participants

5.3 Data Analysis

Data has been analysed through thematic analysis, drawing out core aligning and opposing themes

and perceptions around the identified resilience variables and additional core factors.

5.4 Limitations

Whilst the participants explored if the resilience variables were present in the intervention, it is felt

that the research is limited by the fact that it failed to ask whether participants think these variables

are important factors of resilience building and why this it. Furthermore in reflection of the findings

9

it is clear that the research could be described as gender blind. Whilst participant sample selection

was purposively designed to include a mixture of female and male participants, there was a lack of

questions focusing on the differences or similarities in perceptions between male and female

participants. Future case studies will aim to address these limitations.

6. Findings

The Ketsana case study findings have been divided into seven sections including the community’s

perception of resilience, general recommendation and analysis of the five core resilient variables

outlined in the methodology. It is important to note that the aim of this research is to capture the

perceptions of those at risk. It aims to document the thoughts and recommendations of community

members, field staff and other key actors. These findings, lessons and recommendations are based

specifically on the Ketsana response in Taytay and will be used to develop more general, globally

applicable guidance.

6.1 Taytay Residents Perceptions and Recommendations

Context Specific

A communities’ perception of resilience is dependent on the nuances of the context. For the

residents of Taytay resilience means secure land tenure and site development. More specifically the

community illustrates resilience to predominantly focus on hard engineering, infrastructure and

development such as higher flood dykes, two story concrete houses, drainage systems and paved

roads.

The community feel that if the government and INGO’s invest in building the community up, then it

would make it harder for the government to demolish their houses and relocate the community. A

number of community members explain how they are reluctant to invest time and money in making

their housing and community development more resilient for the fear of being relocated.

Lesson Learnt

It is important to understand the context and issues in the community that existed prior to the

disaster. In responding to a disaster, this case study advocates for the need for humanitarian

intervention and rehabilitation programmes to align with tackling the root causes of vulnerability

and not undermine existing work. Whilst immediate needs must be met, programmes should tie into

and advocate for tackling these issues from the early recovery phase. Christian Aid and COM’s

response included advocacy training to strengthen the barangay’s access to information,

10

connections to the government and confidence to advocate for their needs and land rights. However

it is important to note that this may not always be an appropriate approach especially when

responding to a conflict related crises.

Timescale of Resilience

What builds resilience to cope with the short term risks could increase vulnerability in the long run.

For example, whilst the community strongly object to eviction and resettlement and feel safe due to

the flood wall, they are unsure about whether the community will stay safe in the long term and

recognise that staying living on the floodplain could increase vulnerability. However the community

feel that at this moment in time this is a risk that they are willing to take.

Lesson Learnt

It is important to recognise and understand the different timescales of resilience building. Whilst

resilience to current risk needs to be built, it is important to reflect upon a longer, uncertain risk

timescales and identify how long term resilience can be built.

6.2 General Recommendations

It is important to note that this section aims to outline all of the recommendations and perceptions

shared by all of the community members, field staff and other key actors who partook in the data

collection. This is not a list of advisory recommendations for the LPRR project but aims to act as a

communication tool to share all of the thoughts and perceptions. A second paper will be developed

by the LPRR team to set out the analyzed and advisory recommendation and practical actions.

Therefore please take this paper as a communication platform for the community members and field

staff to share all of their thoughts. This paper does not argue that all of these recommendations are

valid and support resilience building.

Community Members

1. Speed of response

First, the humanitarian response is thought to be far too slow. “It was months before we got relief

aid from COM” (Community member). The community reflected that this was because COM had no

humanitarian response experience and strictly adhered to the development approach which was too

slow in response to crises. The community recommend that whilst including the local partner, the

Christian Aid London team should organise and implement the immediate response directly. The

local partner could shadow Christian Aid, learning and advising but the decision making process

11

should be led by Christian Aid. The local partner could then lead the early recovery, rehabilitation

and longer term development phases.

2. Government interventions

Secondly the community highlight that the intervention

could have linked up to the governments’ existing

bottom up programme which funds local enterprises.

The fishing community has now linked up with this and is

supported through this scheme; however there was a

gap between the Christian Aid intervention and

government support to keep the livelihood’s

intervention going. It is important to note that this

bottom up scheme was launched by the successor Aquino administration and was not available at

the time of the intervention. The implementation of this scheme is thought to be a positive outcome

of the crises.

3. House to house distribution

Third the community recommend that the distribution should have been organised by house. COM

should have been called upon to map out the community and identify houses that existed before the

typhoon. This would ensure everyone in the community receives relief.

4. Cash for work & loan schemes

In addition the community explain that the intervention could have been strengthened by focusing

more heavily on the cash for work and loan program for the rehabilitation. The community explain

that initial cash for work enables empowerment for beneficiaries to get back on their feet and the

loan scheme creates a sense of pride and motivates a plan for the future so they can pay the loan

back which can be used to support other families in the community. It is important to note that this

opportunity was recognised by Christian Aid and COM however prohibited by the donor and was not

allowed to act as a loan even though the community was requesting it to be.

5. Livelihood diversification, market access and local economy strengthening

Additionally the community highlighted the success of the livelihoods program and supported COM

and Christian Aid’s focus on greater diversity of livelihood choices so as to ensure it is as inclusive as

possible and outlined the need to support market access and understanding of the local economy.

Access to the market and a weak local economy were highlighted as significant challenges both in

regards to post disaster and longer term development. Before developing new and diversified

12

livelihoods develop and implement a strategy to ensure in-depth understanding of the local

economy, local market, market access and a strengthened local economy; a specific focus on the

urban context is also required.

Government

1. Speed of response

Echoing the community’s reflections and recommendations around timing the government think

that the response should only have taken two weeks. Two weeks after the crises the beneficiaries

should have all of their immediate needs met. After 2 weeks efforts should start on building the

community back better. This is something the government was unable to do and why INGO’s

stepped in.

2. Integrate with the government’s programmes

Additionally the local government explain that they would have liked Christian Aid and COM to have

linked up with them from the very beginning of the intervention so that they could support and

complement each other’s work. However this was made complex and challenging at the type due to

the run up to the elections and various political agendas.

Field Staff: Local Partner and National Staff

Furthermore interviews with the interventions staff (Christian Aid field staff and local partner staff)

outline a number of reflections and recommendations to build resilience for each specific phase of

the intervention.

1. Before the Crises

Update data

First, ensure you have an updated household list in the community you already work. Ideally; map

out who is in the community, who is pregnant, who have small children, who is less able and more

vulnerable. Also map out the capacities; who is more able to respond to a disaster and support the

more vulnerable in the community?

Train and Build Capacity

Next, train longstanding partners in humanitarian response and know who else is working in the

area and bridge communication links. Equally, build the communities capacity to prepare and

13

respond to a community. Strengthen family preparedness plans and help them put together family

preparedness kits.

Promote Savings

Lastly, build the communities’ ability to save a little extra such as food, water and a community pool

of rice and supplies

2. Immediate Response

Train & Build Capacity

During the immediate response it is recommended that interventions could strengthen long term

resilience through utilising the people themselves as a source of resilience. This is a core success of

the Ketsana response and rehabilitation program. The community members were mobilised

effectively by COM. It is felt by participants to be important to build capacity to prepare and respond

themselves. As you are facilitating the response take on both local community organisation field

staff and community leaders and train them, allow them to shadow field staff to understand the

emergency response, needs assessment, relief distribution and early recovery process. Train the

community in DRR and to be the first responders for the next crises. Whilst this was done effectively

in the rehabilitation phase; a number of community members suggested training community leaders

‘on the job’ from the offset as the response is being implemented. Build surge capacity of staff and

local partners and ensure humanitarian response can work through those who already know those

effected and when designing the intervention ensure greater linkages between humanitarian,

disaster risk reductions, climate change adaptation.

Adopt the Community Organising Approach

Furthermore the success of the community organising approach highlighted the benefits of

replicating this as it serves as an excellent platform for resilience strengthening. This involves

focusing on strong community participation, decision making responsibility and empowerment from

the offset.

However a core challenge has been highlighted that this is a very time-consuming process whereby

COM implements a very well planned and deliberate strategy outlined below:

1. Entry to community 2. Integration and immersion 3. Issue identification and analysis 4. Tentative plans and strategizing 5. Core group building 6. Ground working house to house visits 7. Community meetings

14

8. Mobilizations, negotiations and dialogues with other stakeholders/interest groups 9. Evaluation 10. Reflection 11. Formulation of community structures to enhance participation 12. Process repeats

Advocate for underlying issues

In addition the field staff argued for the need to advocate from the offset to tackle the underlying

problems; in the case of Taytay this was for land rights and work with the local government, advise

them, gather their advice, draw on their capacity and longer term funding.

Collaborate

It was also recommended that interventions coordinate and collaborate with other organisations

and stakeholders working in the community. Find out how long they have been working there, how

long they expect to be working there and what they have been and are currently doing. Map out

how your interventions can complement each other. Employ one coordinating organisation or work

together in cluster meetings to divide needs and support.

Timelines

Lastly, the importance of setting out and communicating a clear timeline for the response and

rehabilitation phase with the community so they know what to expect and when. This is a core

humanitarian program management and implementation action that needs to be ensured to

prevent causing tension and stress throughout the community and undermining or negatively

impacting upon social cohesion and community togetherness. Community togetherness is a core

aspect thought to be required for building resilience.

3. Early Recovery and Rehabilitation

Finally, the field staff reflected on how the early recovery and rehabilitation phase is a slightly easier

phase to develop initial resilience building attempts. Once basic needs have been met, more time

can be dedicated to forward thinking. Again the community organising and future thinking approach

was highlighted as a good foundation for resilience strengthening. A number of specific actions have

been outlined.

First, ensure active and inclusive participation and allow the community to determine how

livelihoods will be strengthened and diversified. Next continue to align with other government

programmes in the community.

Additionally begin actively tackling root causes of vulnerability in the community. Finally as

demonstrated in the Ketsana intervention employ a variety of national and local thematic experts to

15

support the community, this enables a long term technical support system to be developed even

when the Christian Aid intervention has finished.

6. 3 Resilience Principles Findings

In addition to the general recommendations mapped out by participants, a number of resilience

variables were explored throughout the interviews and focus group discussions. This section maps

out there reflections on these five core resilience variables.

Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values and

appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects

“We are always in unity when there is a calamity” (Taytay Community Member).

“Conflict was set aside in the immediate response; many helped each other, shared food and stayed in each other’s houses. Those with misgivings forgot the misgivings and helped each other” (Taytay, community member).

Lessons Learnt

The Taytay Ketsana case study illustrates how the typhoon and response programme strengthened

community cohesion and collective action. In particular the household interviews highlight that

everyone helped one another after Ketsana. One community member explained how she stayed on

the road but some neighbours took her children in and looked after them for her. In one house there

were seven families staying. They shared food and made sure everyone was okay and evacuated.

The community explain that Taytay has changed positively since Ketsana; not only do the community

members assist and check up on each other but also work together to improve the community from

advocating for land rights to clearing up rubbish together. It was felt that the community was more

united, organised and so resilient after Ketsana

Recommendations

The following recommendations have been captured from community members, field staff and key

informants from partner organisations and the government. It is important to note again that these

are all of the recommendations and thoughts presented in the Typhoon Ketsana data collection

period and a second round of analysis will produce the LPRR recommendations and practical toolkit.

16

Inclusive Participation for Strong Resilient Informed Interventions

Firstly, be as inclusive as possible. Achieving strong participation from a range of community actors

has the potential to significantly strengthen your programme and strengthen long term community

resilience. Utilise participation to understand social values and tap into local knowledge to

strengthen response, early recovery and rehabilitation. Ideally tap into this local knowledge before a

disaster strikes. Map out households and where the most vulnerable people are. Gather an

understanding of social values such as strong community organisation, livelihoods, local economy

and capacities in the community to draw upon in the event of a crisis.

Draw on participation in immediate response to map out beneficiaries and to keep the distribution

organised and secure. Utilise social values and local knowledge to strengthen early recovery and

rehabilitation. For example the Filipino social value of strong cohesive community, strengthened

community organisation and local knowledge around fishing techniques and the local fishing market

supported the livelihoods programme.

Additionally, the Taytay case study highlights how local knowledge and social values are imperative

to designing an effective and suitable early warning system. Community members have valuable

local knowledge around monitoring risks such as river levels, knowing where the most vulnerable

people are, who needs to be helped and how to raise the alarm. It was outlined by Christian Aid field

staff that this is a core strength enabled by its partnership model.

When, where and how to include participation?

Before the crises

Participation can be utilised for social profiling; understand who is in the community and where the

most vulnerable are. It can also support the development of early warning systems which can be

designed and run by the community. Again, participation is crucial to train community to prepare

and be the first responders and ensure training itself is inclusive.

During Response

Utilise participation to conduct a thorough needs assessment; to identify who the most vulnerable

are and to support fair, secure and organised distribution of relief goods.

Early Recovery and Rehabilitation

Participation should be the focus of this entire phase. The community should design and implement

this phase with the support of the local partner.

17

Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and

recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective

“The local government were very involved and the project was strengthened through the longstanding relationship COM had with them however more could be done to strengthen the quality and sustainability of government support.” (Field Officer)

“Community cohesion, organisation and leadership were strengthened by Ondoy and the response. The local government learnt from the COM and the community on how to develop early warning systems and rehabilitation. It strengthened the project and local governance” (Field Officer).

Lessons Learnt

Government & Governance

The Ketsana intervention illustrates that the government can both be both a strength and a

challenge for humanitarian interventions. For typhoon Ketsana the government provided relief

goods first. The government provided soup through the housing association the day after the

typhoon and dropped relief aid from helicopters the following week.

However the government also blamed the community for the floods, took back the community’s

land rights and threatened them with relocation. Furthermore programmes, especially relief

distribution can be used by politicians for leveraging public support. COM staff explained that they

had to actively ensure distributions were not done near politicians homes or offices.

Integrating programs into local government plans and funds was felt to strengthen the sustainability

and longevity of programs. The community tied the fishing corporation into the government’s

bottom up scheme to keep it going once Christian Aid’s programme had finished.

The government were keen to be active and involved with INGO and NGO interventions, to support

and collaborate in any way possible and it was felt that the government began to appreciate the fact

that we need a longer term solutions to address risk and increased investment in information,

forecasting, communications, Early Warning Systems and preparedness. However it is important to

note that whilst the government is exploring the idea of relocation they of course are reluctant to

invest in long term solutions, development or preparedness for the community.

It was felt that the DRRM law made a big impact; it is very effective and was pushed through

because of Ketsana; now at least 5% of all local government funds must be spent of Disaster Risk

Reduction and Preparedness. It is felt that this clearly demonstrates how a disaster can create

political space and act as a catalyst for transformative change.

18

Community cohesion & governance

Community cohesion is thought to have been strong and the project is thought to have

strengthened it even more so. The community got to know each other better, worked together,

shared experiences and formed a sense of belonging. Community governance was therefore

strengthened. This was a huge benefit for the project; it made it easier to work there and supported

the community organisation. The residents of Taytay became even more involved, confident, active,

and aware of risks, laws and rights. The fact the community is organised means it is easier to be

engaged with the government.

However, personalities, power relations and internal community conflict can affect governance. The

local barangay officer did not appear so engaged with the Homeowners Association’s Leader

working directly with the mayors’ office. This had a negative impact of the project especially with

regards to sustainability. It is important to note that field officers explained that this would require

in-depth understanding of the local governance system; barangay formation and local governance.

Again it is felt by field staff that the ability of this is something achieved through the partnership

model.

Recommendations

In reflection of these lessons, participants made a number of recommendations.

Firstly, include the local government from the offset both advising and advocating for their support

and response and drawing upon their capacity. Secondly, use the response to strengthen community

cohesion through the community organising model for early recovery and rehabilitation.

Furthermore understand the context, the relationships prior to the disaster, the power dynamics,

tensions and struggles and mitigate these to align efforts.

How, when and where

Before the crises build a relationship and develop trust, respect and advice on action and response.

Draw upon capacities and work together to coordinate during the response phase. Finally, during the

early recovery and rehabilitation phase; first, draw on the government to advocate for and tackle

root causes of vulnerability and risk. Next, tie the project into local funding and lastly, train local

government on good disaster preparedness. Of course the field staff outline that this is context

specific and needs to be carefully implemented so as not to offend politicians or government

officials.

19

Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with

preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards

“We are always ready, ready to help, ready with our boats. We are prepared and no longer scared of the typhoons” (Taytay Community Member).

“Everyone knows the risk they see it changing. Everyone sees the change with the rains that come which are not in the rainy season” (Field Officer).

Lessons Learnt

Risk awareness, acceptance of uncertainty and effective preparedness is imperative to a resilient

community. They Taytay barangay feel that they are much more aware, prepared and resilient

because of Ketsana (Ondoy) and the humanitarian response programme. The community feels safe

and prepared however are still concerned that the wind will destroy the wooden houses. The

community unanimously feel that their biggest risk is the threat of the community being demolished

and people being relocated. The community, whilst keen to build resilience, feel reluctant to invest

time or funds in resilience building for the fear of being relocated. One recommendation from field

staff is to develop housing that can both be resilient and movable so can be taken with the

community if they are relocated.

“I feel safe as the community has been developed, we are aware, we’ve been trained, we can swim, we know first aid, we don’t know what will happen but we know how to prepare and where to go and we have the dyke to protect us” (Taytay Community Member).

The community understand risks are changing and explained that they were fearful for another crisis

like Ketsana (Ondoy). They anticipate floods and typhoon, they continuously monitor what is going

on and prepare accordingly. The community get information from the local government, from the TV

and news and information on typhoons or disasters is taken very serious by the community.

“I would say 70% of the community would prepare before a typhoon. They prepare floods and medicines and wrap clothes. Some do not because it is not in their nature. All we can do is keep advocating for preparedness” (Field Officer).

20

Recommendations

Participants made a number of recommendations for further strengthening the understanding of

uncertain risk and appropriate preparedness.

Perceptions of Resilience over Timescales

It is important to link this principle back to the community’s perception of resilience and highlight

the core issue around the idea that building resilience to immediate risk may not build resilience to

longer term future risks and could serve to increase vulnerabilities and exposure in the future. Here,

the issue of trade-offs, risk perception and the at risk people are willing to live with are all

highlighted. The community feel that living on the flood plain is a risk they would chose over

resettling, even though resettlement programmes could increase the community’s resilience in the

long run.

Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning

“They are hungry for training all the time” (Field Officer).

It was strongly recognised that ongoing learning is crucial for resilience building. A continuous

culture of stopping, reflecting and re-assessing conditions and risks is imperative. The Taytay case

study demonstrated a strong culture of learning. Furthermore an organisational and community

openness to change is also crucial here as through learning interventions should be able to adapt,

change and develop through its continued learning.

Lessons Learnt

Participants explained that community members regularly reassessed risks and updated contingency

plans. However this is not the case in all communities and is something that is felt needs to be

advocated for. There were lots of spaces for learning during the project implementation.

Participants feel that learning was a key, intentional aspect of the project both for the organisations

and for the community/ barangay throughout all stages of the intervention. There was felt to be a

real eagerness and pride to learn; in both the communities and the organisations. This is felt to

significantly strengthen the programme as it created an open, alert and a more flexible culture. Field

staff explained how their beneficiaries are always looking at how to develop and how to develop

their communities.

21

Furthermore once the intervention had trained community members on DRRM, preparedness and

resilient livelihood’s, the government asked the community members to go to neighbouring

communities and share what they learnt.

“How can you teach if you do not learn?”(Field officer)

Recommendations

Participants explained that it was more challenging to dedicate timing to learn and build capacity

during the immediate response however recommended that interventions create a culture and

physical space and place to learn and train throughout the project right from the offset. Tie learning

and capacity building in and through the entire programme.

Field staff explain that it is important to train the community to be the first responders, local

community organisations should support the community and the government to take responsibility

for ensuring citizen safety, security and wellbeing. Therefore training, capacity building and advocacy

around what the government should be doing is imperative for resilience strengthening.

Principle 5: A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support ‘bouncing forward and better’. Inequality

The community explain that there is inequality in the barangay; everyone is poor but some are more

vulnerable than others. Ultimately it is felt that through addressing inequality and tackling

vulnerability; resilience can be built.

The household interviews highlight that the community understand that there are differences in

inequality and vulnerability. For example those who are more wealthy and able to afford concrete

houses with second and third floors are thought to be more resilient, as well as those with savings

and families living elsewhere who can send money to them.

One community member explains that she does not earn enough to save any money. She felt if she

did have savings then she would feel a little more resilient and able to cope in the next crises.

Another community member explains that his family felt resilient as they could draw upon their

wealth and assets in a crisis. “My daughters still get scared when it rains heavily, they go up to the

third floor but they know if it gets bad then we can just move to our other house which is on the

other side of the community on higher ground and away from the lake” (Taytay Community

Member).

22

The community explain that Taytay had changed significantly and

positively since before Ondoy. The community feel life is better there

now; they feel safer and more resilient. Specifically the community feel

that they are more organised, cohesive, confident and aware. There

has been investment to build a higher flood dyke, a drainage system

and stronger concrete houses. Livelihoods have been diversified and

strengthened. The community feel that they have a greater access to

and understanding of information, an early warning system and close

links to the government. However, ultimately the people of Taytay feel

that in order to become resilient, they first need their land rights back.

Tackling underlying issues

Field officers explained that the response programme was underpinned by the focus of tackling

underlying inequality and support the community to bounce back better. The intervention did this

through ensuring the recovery and rehabilitation program took a community organising approach

and focused on tackling the root causes of vulnerability, inequality and poverty. Through livelihood

strengthening, cash for work, loans and supporting the community in their advocacy for land rights.

It is important to note that field staff explained that this understanding and perception of inequality

and power dynamics needs to come from the community members’ perspective; not the (I)NGO or

even local partner.

Recommendations

In reflection of this the participants made a number of recommendations for tackling the root causes

and supporting the idea of bouncing back better.

First, design the program to acknowledge, address, advocate for and tackle root causes of poverty

and vulnerability. Secondly, prioritise the most vulnerable, draw upon participation, local

organisations and local government to help identify who is the most vulnerable in a community.

Additionally, in the early recovery stages ask the community how they would like to bounce back

better. What they would like to do to improve their own community. Lastly, draw upon community

organising as a model to put this into action effectively.

23

6.4 Challenges

Finally the participants outline a number of core challenges that they felt limited and blocked the

Ketsana response from effectively building resilience.

Land Rights & Technical Advice

The dominant challenge highlighted by all participants is the community’s lack of land rights which is

needed to be able to build long term resilience. Secondly, field staff highlighted their limited access

to technical advice on resilient engineering; it was explained that the team did not know who to ask

or where to find resilience focused engineering exerpts and would recommend having a support

system of technical advisors ready to bring technical capacity in.

Experience and training

Third, field staff explained that they had no experience or training in how to do resilient informed

humanitarian response. The local partner COM had no experience of emergency response and

initially the program was supposed to focus specifically on rehabilitation but rehabilitation cannot be

done without responding to the disaster first. Furthermore, the local partner organisation explained

that they were unsure how to engage with the government during the emergency response phase

without getting caught up in the politics.

Trade offs

In addition field staff explained that whilst recognised as very important, it was a huge challenge to

start mapping out the recovery and rehabilitation in the response phase. It is incredibly challenging

and time consuming and has to be balanced with meeting immediate needs.

Evacuation centres

Finally the community members explained that they have no safe evacuation centre to go to when

early warnings are given.

24

Recommendations for Resilient Informed Humanitarian Response

m

7

Before the Crises Immediate Response Phase Recovery & Rehabilitation

Phase

1. Update data. Update household list in the community you already work. Map out who is in the community, who is pregnant, who is less able and more vulnerable.

2. Train and Build Capacity. Train longstanding partners in humanitarian response and know who else is working in the area and bridge communication links. Build the community’s capacity to prepare and respond to a community. Strengthen family preparedness plans and help them put together family preparedness kits.

3. Promote Savings. Build the communities’ ability to save a little extra such as food, water and a community pool of rice and supplies.

4. Include participation. Participation can be utilised for social profiling; understand who is in the community and where the most vulnerable are. It can also support the development of early warning system which can be designed and run by the community first responders.

5. Build a relationship and develop trust and respect and utilize local government for social profiling to understand who is living in the community

6. Create a culture and physical space and place to learn and train throughout the project right from the offset. Tie learning and capacity building in and throughout the entire programme.

7. Understand the local economy, local market and emergency Country Level Emergency Preparedness Plan

1. Train & Build Capacity. Build the community’s capacity to prepare and respond themselves. As you are facilitating the response take on both local community organisation field staff and community leaders and train them, allow them to shadow the response. Train the community to be the first responders for the next crises.

2. Use cash for work in the response 3. Adopt the Community Organising Approach Replicate the

community organising approach – particularly in distributions – ensure fair and secure household by household distribution

4. Advocate for underlying issues. Advocate from the offset to tackle the underlying problems. Work with the local government, advise them, gather their advice, draw on their capacity and longer term funding.

5. Collaborate. Coordinate and collaborate with other organisations and stakeholders working in the community. Find out how long they have been working there, how long they expect to be working there and what they have been and are currently doing. Map out how your interventions can complement each other.

6. Timelines. Set out and communicate a clear timeline for the response and rehabilitation phase.

7. Utilise participation to conduct needs assessment; to identify who the most vulnerable are and to support fair, secure and organised distribution of relief goods.

8. Root Causes. At this stage at least identify root causes and map out how the next phase may start to tackle them. Prioritise the most vulnerable.

9. Do immediate psycho social trauma debrief with

community

10. Let INGO lead this phase with support from local partner

1. Participation. Participation should be the focus of this entire phase. The community should design and implement this entire phase with the support of the local partner. Allow the community to determine how livelihoods will be strengthened and diversified. Next continue to align with other government programmes in the community.

2. Move beyond advocating for underlying issues and begin actively tackling root causes of vulnerability in the community.

3. Draw on a variety of local or national thematic experts to support the community, this enables a long term technical support system to be developed even when the Christian Aid intervention has finished.

4. Draw on government to advocate for and tackle root causes of vulnerability and risk. Tie project into local funding and lastly, train local government on good disaster preparedness.

5. Continue with cash for work program but also introduce a loan scheme

6. Ensure psycho-social support is a prominent aspect of the project embedded in and aligned to culture

Question: what about the timeframe of resilience building – explore how this may differ to immediate resilience building?

25

7. Resilience Critical Reflections

Taking the initial perceptions and thoughts from participants forward it is important to reflect back

to the LPRR methodology and Bene et al’s (2012) conceptual framework. Bene et al’s (2012)’s

conceptual framework outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope

with change. Community resilience is underpinned by collective action, community cohesion, good

leadership and support (Bene et al, 2012). Here, resilient systems and communities are absorptive,

adaptive and transformative. They are able to withstand shocks, adapt to and transform with

change.

It is important to note that this section aims to open up an initial analytical discussion however a

second paper will be developed analysing the data and mapping out recommendations and practical

actions. This will be developed between November 2016 and April 2017.

Absorb: Immediate Response

It is thought that the community of Taytay and the Ketsana intervention serves as a good example of

Bene’s (2012) stages of resilience in practice. In reflection of the finding previously outlined, Taytay

can be thought to be a community that has demonstrated the capacity to absorb shock and adapt to

risk. This can be seen through the way in which the community rallied together immediately after

the typhoon; making sure everyone was okay, sharing food, building makeshift shelter together and

looking after each other’s’ children. Additionally a wider network of support and social capital

helped ease the shock; the local government, local churches and local NGOs immediately provided

food relief.

Adapt: Recovery & Rehabilitation

It is also thought that the recovery and rehabilitation phase of the intervention provided the

community with the support needed to effectively adapt. Here the Taytay residents changed their

way of life and livelihoods to better prepare for both current and future risks. COM supported the

community to develop a new organisational paradigm whereby a system of block leaders was

developed, along with a disaster risk reduction committee and various thematic livelihood cluster

support groups. Through this the community developed early warning systems, reconstructed their

houses based on a model house which included raising the houses up, developing at least two

stories, implementing proper draining systems and ensuring a ‘through flow’ route in houses for

water to pass through in the event of a future flood.

26

Additionally the community developed an effective early warning system, increased their

knowledge, understanding and access to information on disaster risk and strengthened and

diversified their livelihoods whilst linking local businesses into local government schemes. All of

which are thought to demonstrate strong adaptive capacity.

This was effectively put into practice one year after Ketsana when typhoon Megi (Juan) hit the

community. Here warnings were effectively disseminated, the community prepared through

boarding up houses, gathering their food and water together, ensuring they had their emergency

packs ready and either evacuating their homes or taking refuge on the second and third floors in the

community. As a direct result of this, the community had zero casualties and worked together to

clear up and repair the community after the storm.

Furthermore the fishing community effectively advocated for the government to fund the

replenishment of their catfish stock provided to the fisherman by the Christian Aid Ketsana response

which was washed away by typhoon Megi. The fisherman also learnt how to construct fishing nets to

protect their stock from future storms, thus showing clear examples of adaptation.

Transform: Wider Scale & Tackling Root Causes

It could also be argued that Taytay and the wider Metro Manila context also show potential for

progressive transformational change to the community’s way of life and livelihoods for strengthened

resilience. This can be seen on a large scale through developing and passing new laws and

legislations around disaster risk reduction and at the community level both the impact of new laws

and through exploring the idea of relocation and resettlement.

For example the 2010 DRRM national law is thought to have been passed as a direct result of the

impact of Ketsana. This is thought to demonstrate the beginning of a more transformational change.

It is thought that this serves as a good example of how disasters can create political space and could

be an example of the beginning of a transformation shift to a more resilient nation.

However it is clear that in order for the community to effectively transform with risks and truly

strengthen long term resilience, the root causes of vulnerability and inequality need to be

addressed. For the residents of Taytay this predominantly means secure land tenure. Box 1 outlines

the practical examples of these scales of resilience building.

27

Absorb Adapt Transform • Community cohesion – rallying

together to cope • Sharing food, shelter, look after each

other’s children, checking everyone was safe, starting house repairs together.

• Wider support network – government, local NGO’s.

• Changed how houses were re-built based on the model house

• Changed livelihoods • Learnt how to prepare, how to

communicate with government and how to advocate for rights effectively

• Success story – next typhoon effectively prepared

• Community level – talk of relocation – longer term resilience vs. short term resilience – a drastic change in way of life

• National level – DRRM law passed – a change in governance

Resilience across time: trade-offs and decision making

In addition, it is important to reflect upon what resilience means, to whom and how it changes over

time. As previously mentioned it was clear that the community and field staff recognise that there is

a difference between what could build immediate short term resilience to risk and what might be

needed to build longer term resilience. Most of this debate is centred on secure land tenure and

relocation.

Ultimately it is questioned whether what may bring immediate short term resilience required to gain

land rights and therefore be allowed to develop the community properly with roads, drainage

systems, housing, schools, a medical centre and market (as mapped out in the community’s people’s

plan for future development) could increase vulnerability in the long run by encouraging

development in high risk, exposed areas.

It is questioned whether relocation could be a better option for a safer resilient community and if so

whose decision is that to make; is it the INGO’s place to advocate for this, NGO’s, the government or

the local community? Furthermore with the community being so against the idea of relocation, how

should this sensitive topic even be approached let alone tackled?

8. Conclusions In conclusion the Christian Aid and COM typhoon Ketsana response has proved to be an excellent

pilot case study for the LPRR humanitarian research strand. It is clear that the intervention is a good

case study of best practice for resilient informed recovery and rehabilitation. However, the

immediate response was too slow and failed to meet immediate needs.

It can be thought that the case study provides an example of Bene et al’s (2012) AAT resilience

framework with the people of Taytay explaining how they coped and worked together to absorb the

shock and adapt to be more resilient for the next typhoon. Furthermore on a wider scale the

governments’ response to typhoon Ketsana and the way in which the 2010 DRRM national law was

28

passed shows signs of more transformational change and resilience building. However, ultimately it

has been found that resilience cannot be affectively built or strengthened unless the underlying

issues and root causes of vulnerability are identified and tackled.

The Ketsana intervention also demonstrates how resilience can mean different things for different

communities depending on the context, issues and specific nuances. For Taytay this means secure

land tenure, without which the community felt that they could not proactively strengthen their

resilience.

A core question highlighted by the Ketsana intervention is the issue of resilience over different

timescales. The fact that resilience changes across timescale and what may increase resilience in the

short term has brought up the question of trade-offs and whose decision is it to make to decide

whether a community’s short term or long term resilience should be prioritised.

Furthermore the community members, humanitarian staff and key stakeholders that participated in

the research highlighted a number of practical actions for improving humanitarian interventions to

be more resilience focused. In summary the Ketsana intervention supported the importance

community participation, inclusion, trust building and collaboration with other organisations and

interaction with the government.

The case study also highlighted the importance of:

• Tackling root causes,

• Regularly updating community data,

• The strengths of the community organising approach for resilience building,

• The benefits of drawing upon local technical expertise.

• Cash for work and household load schemes, and

• Called for INGO’s to lead the immediate response with support from local organisations and

then hand the recovery and response back over to local partners.

Next steps

Lastly, next steps include a final review of the research methods, feedback gathered on this report

from the Christian aid Philippines team and partners, a presentation of findings to the LPRR

consortia and a reflection on whether it is in line with whether it effectively meets the research aims

and objectives. Next a further 7 case studies will be captured from the Philippines Haiyan response,

Kenya, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, DRC and Colombia. Finally a global approach for resilient

informed humanitarian response will be developed, piloted and rolled out. For any questions please

29

contact Becky Murphy the LPRR Resilience Learning and Capacity Building officer

at rmurphy@christian-aid.org.

Images

All images are of the Taytay community and were taken by Becky Murphy at Christian aid throughout the November 2015 research trip

References

Bene, C., Wood, R., Newsham, A., Davies, M., (2012) Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny?

Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability

Reduction Programmes, IDS, 405

Christian Aid (2010) Ketsana Narrative Rolling Plan

Christian Aid (2012) Resilient Urban Communities

EM-DAT (2010) Philippines Country Profile, Online Resource Available

at: http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile

MapleCroft (2011) Climate Change Risk Atlas, Online Resource Available

at: http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html

Porio E (2011) Vulnerability, Adaptation, and Resilience to Floods and Climate Change-Related Risks

among Marginal, Riverine Communities in Metro Manila, Asian Journal of Social Science, 39, 425-445