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Social Sciences Task Force (SSTF)1 Final Report
October 1, 2009
Guiding Observations
1. Social Science Excellence Is Critical to Cornell University’s Excellence
It is highly unlikely that Cornell will move up in the rankings unless it has strong social sciences. This insight led previous administrations to focus resources and attention on the social sciences over the past decade with actions such as the launching of the ISS, the creation of the vice provost for social sciences position, and the featuring of the social sciences in the Far Above capital campaign. The connection between the social sciences and university excellence has also been observed by a number of external observers, including the Social Science External Advisory Council (SSEAC), which was chaired by then Northwestern President Henry Bienen. Arguably, the importance of a strong social science portfolio has onlyincreased in recent years, given local, national, and international economic crises; massive political and social upheaval in Iraq and Afghanistan; and President Obama’s emphasis on health care reform and other social issues.
1 Charge appears at the end of the report as Appendix A.
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2. Breadth, Excellence, and Budget Constraints
Cornell has a large number of social science units, including more than 20 departments, and more than 40 centers and institutes, across nine colleges and schools (http://www.cornell.edu/socialsciences/academic.cfm). These units collectively cover an extremely large number of research and teaching areas in the social sciences, from theoretical work in Government and Anthropology, to extension work in Development Sociology and ILR. This tradition of breadth, consistent with “any person, any study”, has been a hallmark of Cornell social science for decades.
In addition to breadth, Cornell social sciences have also been marked by uneven quality. Few units can claim to be top 10 in their area. This is particularly true in anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology; core social science disciplines that are found at nearly all elite colleges and universities.
Cornell has taken steps to promote excellence in the social sciences over the past decade. These have included the founding of the Institute for the Social Sciences, the seeding of the Cornell Population Program, and major hiring efforts in Government, PAM, and select other units. Nevertheless, the current situation is that Cornell is good, but not great, in most social science areas, and many of our units are smaller than their competitors.
In the past, we might have recommended allocating additional resources to the social sciences while maintaining our breadth. In the current economic climate, such recommendations would be not only irresponsible, but also completely unrealistic. Rather, we have concluded that Cornell must choose between breadth and excellence. We cannot use our limited social science resources and faculty lines to advance the goals of nine colleges and dozens of departments and centers, and expect to be competitive.
We strongly encourage the administration to choose excellence over breadth in the social sciences. Cornell must continue to focus on theoretical and applied work, but the number of focal areas must be reduced. If the decision is made to maintain our breadth, while maintaining or reducing resources, then aspirations for excellence in the social sciences must be revised accordingly.
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3. Increased Efficiencies Must Be Combined with Aggressive Hiring if Cornell Is to Excel
Cornell is not alone in facing significant economic challenges. However, perhaps because most social scientists require smaller start-‐up packages and less infrastructural investment than most scientists and engineers, many top universities are hiring in the social sciences. A quick review of online postings reveals anthropology searches at schools such as Wisconsin, NYU, Michigan, Brown, and Harvard; economics searches at such schools as Duke, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Chicago, and Stanford; and sociology searches at such schools as Duke, Wisconsin, and Washington.
According to these same sources, and the Cornell Human Resources website (http://www.ohr.cornell.edu/jobs), Cornell does not have any current tenure-‐track searches in the core social science departments in Arts and Sciences, or the applied social science departments in CALS. There are several active searches in CHE and ILR.
The discrepancy between the number of active social science searches at Cornell and peer universities suggests that our social science rankings will fall unless our efforts to gain efficiencies through reorganization are accompanied by aggressive external hiring. All of the savings generated by increased efficiencies in the social sciences cannot be used to help solve the university’s budget challenges.
4. Current Concerns, Future Excellence
Throughout, our focus is on actions that will position Cornell to excel in the social sciences over the coming decades. This long-‐run perspective differs from a focus on what we can do to enhance social science excellence over the next few years. It is clear that one must think about the short run in pursuing long-‐run excellence, but we believe that an exclusive focus on the short run is inconsistent with the transformational change that is necessary in the social sciences.
Although many will be excited by our focus on long-‐run excellence, we anticipate that some current faculty, administrators, students, staff, and alumni will advocate actions that focus exclusively on short-‐run goals. We encourage the administration to persist in the face of this opposition, being mindful of not only how many people are objecting, but also their levels of expertise and their prominence in key areas. We also encourage the administration to be mindful of the preferences of faculty we have been unable to hire, students we have not been able to recruit, and alums we have not been able to convince to make substantial gifts to the social sciences. The only way to appeal to these aspirational constituencies is to privilege their preferences over those of some members of the current Cornell community. As we
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all know, the status quo has costs that are invisible when attention is focused on those who find the current situation attractive.
Data
In addition to the perspectives of task force members, SSTF discussions have been informed by the following:
• Meetings with Walter Cohen (Arts and Sciences Task Force), Barbara Knuth(CALS Task Force), Kevin Hallock (ILR Task Force), and Alan Mathios (CHETask Force)
• 1996-‐2010 U.S. News rankings for social science disciplines• 1995 National Research Council rankings for social science disciplines• FY2009 funding sources for social science centers and institutes• 2006 and 2007 Social Science External Advisory Council reports• 2007 Economics Ad Hoc Committee report• Annual reports and external reviews for social science departments
The task force did not engage broadly with faculty, students, staff, or alumni as part of its deliberations. After consulting with the Provost, we decided to be discrete about our emerging proposals, especially those proposals that would be seen as controversial and transformative, until we had a clear signal that the senior administration was interested in giving them serious consideration. It will be critical to discuss our ideas more broadly before any decisions are made.
Meetings
The SSTF met on May 20 and 29; June 4, 12, 16, 17, and 24; July 9 and 22; August 27; and September 18, 23, and 29. The meeting on August 27 was an all-‐day retreat. In addition, the SSTF met in three subgroups during August and September.
Responses to SSTF Charge
Below we offer responses to the seven questions posed in our charge (see Appendix A):
1. In which social sciences areas must Cornell offer instruction if it is to continue to bean elite undergraduate institution? Responses should focus on disciplines andareas, not departments.
• It is important to stress that we believe Cornell derives great strengthfrom its position as both a land grant institution and an Ivy League school.
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The challenge is to find ways to blend the theoretical and the applied in efficient and impactful ways. We believe that it would be a fundamental error for Cornell to abandon its land grant mission or Ivy League tradition in pursuit of only one of these missions.
• To be an elite undergraduate institution, Cornell must offer instruction ineconomics, psychology, sociology, political science, and anthropology. TheSSTF members maintain that important as they are, more specializedsocial science units depend on, and draw from, a strong core.
2. What are Cornell’s highest-‐ranked social sciences research areas? Which areasare making significant progress? Which areas are at risk of significant declines?
• Note: Task force members developed great rapport and trust with oneanother, but it was nevertheless difficult to reach consensus on which areasare at risk of serious decline, or have already declined. The lack of attentionto this question in the report reflects group process issues, not an inabilityfor individuals to identify weak or declining programs. The SSTFrecommends that the Provost’s Office and colleges work together to identifyweaker programs and then decide what actions will best position Cornellfor long-run excellence. Candidates for closure include those units that aredeemed by the Provost and deans to be weak now, to show little promise forsignificant improvement in the long run, and to not be essential to theuniversity’s mission. Closures will have the greatest impact on the socialsciences if there is the flexibility to redistribute lines across colleges.
• The social sciences at Cornell are good but not great. The core socialsciences are all ranked in the mid-‐teens, and none stand out as being insignificantly better shape than the others.
• We clearly have pockets of excellence in the social sciences where top-‐tencaliber sub-‐fields exist (e.g., labor economics, comparative politics,international development), even if they are located in larger units ordisciplines that are not ranked as well. This is where the small size of ourcore units really hurts us; we have pockets of excellence but also largegaps that pull down overall rankings. For those disciplines that aredistributed across the university, such as economics, psychology, andsociology, restructuring and mergers offer the promise of making betteruse of social science resources that are currently spread across thecampus.
• All of the Cornell social science departments in Arts and Sciences, andmany in other colleges, are too small to be ranked highly (e.g., in the topten); size affects their visibility nationally and internationally. Theproblems of size are compounded by college and department tastes forspecialization in some cases, and by fragmentation across the university –especially in economics, psychology, and sociology.
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• Economics is poised to make significant strides thanks torecommendations in the recent ad hoc committee report, the founding ofthe IAEC, and other efforts to create linkages among economists acrossdepartments and colleges. Unfortunately, the economics initiative hasstalled because the Economics Department has not voted on the slate ofjoint appointments proposed by a cross-‐campus committee, and theadministration has not been able to identify resources to support the sixproposed endowed professorships. We risk a dangerous further erosionof faculty morale across economics units.
• Sociology has already implemented structural changes similar to thoseproposed in the economics initiative (e.g., extensive joint appointments,extra-‐departmental representation on senior searches), but thesechanges have failed to offset the loss of Arts and Sciences lines and therapid expansion of competitors’ core sociology departments. It isimportant to follow through on these efforts with adequate resources.
• We have devoted significant time to discussing AEM. This unit is acombination of applied economics-‐-‐with an established graduateprogram, and an undergraduate business program, and so is beingdiscussed by the Management Sciences Task Force and the SSTF. We areconcerned that given the heterogeneity of AEM, and the needs of theundergraduate business program, important areas such as developmenteconomics, agricultural economics, and environmental economics mightnot receive sufficient attention.
3. In which social sciences areas should Cornell focus new investments andminimize budget reductions?
• The core social sciences must be protected and ideally strengthened. Thedispersed nature of the social sciences at Cornell has carried somebenefits, but a major disadvantage is that the core disciplines havereceived insufficient attention. The core departments are all significantlysmaller than their respective departments at peer universities, and theyare even smaller yet when compared to top-‐ten departments in theirrespective fields. Cornell’s strengths in the applied social sciences willlikely benefit from having more strength in the core disciplines.
• In addition to the core social sciences, it will also be important to invest inareas of policy relevance (e.g. environment, energy, health care, socialsecurity, unemployment/underemployment, education, poverty), and tofoster interdisciplinary collaborations.
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4. What changes in the Graduate School, the graduate field system, and the list ofcurrent graduate fields would benefit the social sciences?
• Opinions about the field system vary significantly across SSTF members.Support for the field system is greatest among SSTF members from fieldsthat are concentrated in a small number of departments (e.g.,Government, Anthropology). In fields that cross a large number ofdepartments, faculty tend to find that the field system does notcompensate for having a large number of social science units withoverlapping missions. We recommend addressing the underlyingstructural problems in the social sciences, which are problems that thefield system is not intended to, and cannot, solve.
• At the same time, many of our recommendations will require that theadministration revisit the allocation of graduate student funding acrosssocial science units. For example, if faculty lines are moved from onedepartment to another, some number of graduate student fundingpackages should also move in order to maintain Cornell’s competivenessin recruiting and retaining top faculty.
5. How critical are cross-‐college infrastructure units (e.g., ISS, CISER, SurveyResearch Center, BLCC) to social sciences research? Are there criticalinfrastructure needs, such as space or scholarly resources?
• Contemporary social scientists employ a wide range of methodologicalapproaches. At one extreme are social scientists that work alone, and thatneed little more than paper, pencils, and basic computers to conduct theirresearch. At the other extreme are social scientists that require externalfunding and expensive data collection and data analysis tools to conducttheir work. This latter group tends to work collaboratively in teamsconsisting of faculty, postdoctoral fellows, and undergraduate andgraduate students. If Cornell is to support excellence in the socialsciences, it will be critical to provide access to a diverse range of excellentand affordable infrastructure support services.
• Social science infrastructure units were examined in depth by a SSTFsubgroup (see Appendix B). There is strong support for merging ISS,CISER, SRI, and BLCC organizationally, and locating them in shared space.There is also interest in developing close ties between this newconsolidated social science infrastructure unit and the Cornell StatisticalConsulting Unit (CSCU). These organizational and physical moves willenhance Cornell’s support of the social sciences, and produce modest costsavings.
• The SSTF encourages the administration to examine the large number ofcenters that exist within colleges, and to consolidate centers and supportservices where possible.
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6. Are there social sciences units that should be merged? Are there social sciencescenters, programs, fields, or departments that should be closed? What would thecosts and benefits of these changes be? What roles should faculty,administrators, students, and alumni play in identifying and implementingmergers and closings?
• Two subgroups were charged with taking a detailed look at aspects of thisquestion. One subgroup proposed that Cornell transform existing unitsinto a new School of Public Policy (Appendix C). A second subgroupexplored several approaches to merging units (Appendix D).
• The full SSTF supports further consideration of creating a School of PublicPolicy. In order to create this new school, it would likely be necessary totransform one or more current schools or colleges. SSTF members had arange of opinions about which colleges should be transformed to makeroom for a School of Public Policy. The most obvious candidate is CHE,given its existing strength in public policy and the small number ofcolleges of human ecology remaining at top colleges and universities.Senior administrators have the critical information about college plansand constituency relationships that are required to make these decisions.
• Final decisions about creating a policy school must come from theprovost and president, after a period of broad consultation. It will beimportant to focus on the financial viability of the proposed school, itsrelationship to current colleges and departments, and how creating apolicy school will affect the resources available for core social sciencedepartments over the coming years.
• The merger subgroup created an instructive guide that presents thedetails, advantages, and disadvantages of several approaches to mergingunits (see Appendix D).
(1) Coordinating Committee: Individual units retain their currentautonomy, but a Coordinating Committee with representation fromeach unit is charged with overseeing the full disciplinary community.
(2) Super-Department: A large department is “shared” by multiplecolleges. It is funded and administered by multiple colleges and servesmultiple colleges, but operates as a single unit.
(3) Absorption: We focus on one core department, and absorb linesfrom other units into this department.
(4) Extensive Joint Appointments: We create links between componentunits via having many people with joint appointments.
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• Both the merger subgroup and the full SSTF devoted significant effort todeveloping a proposal for specific mergers. We made significant progressin identifying possible mergers (e.g., economics super-‐department,psychology coordinating committee, sociology absorption of selectfaculty), but also in identifying complex constraints (e.g., desire tominimize risks to one’s own unit, difficulty of discussing qualitydifferences across units, need to transform some colleges’ missions withrespect to the social sciences). Our deliberations can inform therecommendations that eventually emerge from the planning process, butit is clear that these recommendations must result from consultation witha broader group of faculty, students, staff, and alumni. It is also clear thatthe eventual decisions must be made by university leadership—a groupthat is charged with advancing the mission of the university, not anyparticular department or college.
• Additional commentso The fact that there are multiple versions of some disciplines at
Cornell may be a luxury (or impediment) that we can no longerafford.
o Given budget constraints, it is unlikely that Cornell will becomestronger in the social sciences unless the number of socialscience departments and colleges declines.
o The current financial problems are a real opportunity to makesignificant changes that should have been made long ago.
o Each unit exists in the context of a college mission. There isoften tension between strategies that maximize college goalsand those that enhance strength across the university. Ifdecisions are left to the deans, and not heavily influenced bythe president and provost, the current fragmentation ofresources will continue.
o There is duplication of course offerings across units. Budgetconstraints require greater coordination.
o If Cornell is to maximize the gains that come from closing adepartment, there must be flexibility as to how the lines of thedefunct department are redistributed. It may be in our bestinterest to redistribute lines across college or disciplinaryboundaries. Any redistribution has to be done with a purposeand with the expectation of significant impact.
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7. What other opportunities exist for budget reductions and revenueenhancements in the social sciences that will not cause undue harm to the coremissions of research, teaching, and outreach?
• Periodic review of post-‐tenure faculty• Consider additional terminal professional masters programs in such
areas as environment, energy, and sustainable development
Recommendations
1. Pursue long-‐run excellence in the social sciences.
2. Reduce the breadth of Cornell social sciences so that resources can befocused on areas of excellence. This will require strategic mergers of existingunits and a reconceptualization of some department and college missions.
3. The Provost’s Office and colleges must work together to identify weakerprograms and to then decide what actions will best position Cornell for long-‐run excellence.
4. Merge social science infrastructure units organizationally, programmatically,and physically to increase efficiencies and effectiveness.
5. Continue to explore options for transforming an existing college or collegesinto a School of Public Policy.
6. Over the past few years, the Social Science External Advisory Council(SSEAC) has provided a critical, informed, external perspective on the socialsciences across Cornell. It will be important to seek their input before andafter any significant changes are made.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix A. Social Sciences Task Force Charge
Cornell University must address a $215 M operating budget deficit on the Ithaca campus. This will require a substantial correction—between 15 and 18 percent of the unrestricted budget, with larger corrections likely among administrative units (see www.cornell.edu/budget for more on the budget challenge and responses).
Solving this budget challenge will require unprecedented coordination across campus constituencies, and a process that imbues budget reduction and revenue enhancement strategies with credibility. Major decisions will need to be made well before the end of the Fall 2009 semester, so that changes can be implemented beginning in fiscal year 2011.
Given the magnitude of the challenge, and the diffusion of the social sciences across the Ithaca campus2, Provost Kent Fuchs is establishing a social sciences planning task force to make recommendations about social sciences priorities, and opportunities for cost savings and revenue enhancements. The recommendations of this task force will be considered alongside recommendations from college-‐based task forces (see attached charge for colleges and schools).
The task force should focus on the following questions:
1. In which social sciences areas must Cornell offer instruction if it is tocontinue to be an elite undergraduate institution? Responses should focus ondisciplines and areas, not departments.
2. What are Cornell’s highest-‐ranked social sciences research areas? Whichareas are making significant progress? Which areas are at risk of significantdeclines?
3. In which social sciences areas should Cornell focus new investments andminimize budget reductions?
4. What changes in the Graduate School, the graduate field system, and the listof current graduate fields would benefit the social sciences?
5. How critical are cross-‐college infrastructure units (e.g., ISS, CISER, SurveyResearch Center, BLCC) to social sciences research? Are there criticalinfrastructure needs, such as space or scholarly resources?
6. Are there social sciences units that should be merged? Are there socialsciences centers, programs, fields, or departments that should be closed?What would the costs and benefits of these changes be? What roles should
2 The social sciences are a substantial component of the following colleges and schools: AAP, Arts & Sciences, CALS, ILR, Human Ecology, JGSM, Hotel, Law.
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faculty, administrators, students, and alumni play in identifying and implementing mergers and closings?
7. What other opportunities exist for budget reductions and revenueenhancements in the social sciences that will not cause undue harm to thecore missions of research, teaching, and outreach?
Throughout, consideration should be given to how planning decisions will be implemented, what difficulties might arise, and what resources and support will be necessary to achieve change.
It will be critical that the task force structure its work in a way that allows for input from, consultation with, or participation by, relevant constituencies. This need for transparency must be balanced against the need to be expeditious, efficient, and capable of making hard decisions. It is inevitable that some recommendations will be unpopular with some constituencies, but if Cornell is to enhance its prominence in the social sciences, this task force cannot allow a desire to avoid conflict deter it from making bold recommendations.
An initial report is due to Provost Fuchs by July 1, 2009. The final report is due by October 1, 2009.
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Appendix B. Sub-Committee on Social Science Infrastructure Units
Our sub-‐committee was charged with the task of assessing the potential integration of core social science research units like the Institute for the Social Sciences (ISS), the Survey Research Institute (SRI), the Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research (CISER), and the Bronfenbrenner Life Course Center (BLCC). As currently configured, these are separate and independent units in their administration, budgeting, and operations.3 Between them, they provide a broad range of infrastructural support services for social science research by both students and faculty, from grant writing and administration to data gathering, computing, statistical analysis, data archiving, training workshops, and the fostering of collaborative ventures.
For the most part, these services are complementary rather than duplicative; that is, the units have worked out a general division of labor based on their different specializations and functional missions. Nevertheless, after studying the activities of these units and meeting with their respective directors, our sub-‐committee believes the current configuration tends to fragment and disperse research activities in ways that are detrimental to the development of the social sciences at Cornell. This fragmentation leads to a number of specific problems:
3SRI, CISER, and ISS all report directly to the Vice-‐Provost for the Social Sciences. The SRI conducts survey research under cost-‐recovery contracts with both Cornell-‐based and external clients. CISER receives financial support from the Provost, colleges, and users, and provides a broad range of services, including assistance with computing, data analysis, data archiving, and training workshops. CISER and SRI are physically located in the same off-‐campus building near the East Hill Plaza, but they remain separate units. The ISS is funded by the Vice-‐ Provost’s office and located in Myron Taylor Hall. It provides financial support for individual faculty research projects, as well as for three-‐year interdisciplinary theme projects. The BLCC, on the other hand, provides support for research on human development and life course issues university-‐wide, but it is part of the College of Human Ecology and reports to the Dean of the college. The BLCC helps fund faculty research, prepare grant proposals, administer grants, and organize data workshops. Included within the BLCC are the Cornell Population Program (CPP), the Cornell Institute for Translational Research on Aging (CITRA), the Program on Applied Demographics (PAD), and the Gerontology Certificate Program.
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Faculty and students are often unfamiliar with the specific academic and training missions as well as the staff and technical research services (e.g., computing) offered by these units
$ Too few well-‐trained staff that can handle social science grants and contracts, both pre-‐ and post-‐award, from NIH and other governmental agencies
$ The separate units do not provide the “critical mass” that is needed to develop advanced technical capabilities (for example, with GIS), to respond quickly to major national funding opportunities, or to augment Cornell’s national visibility and its ability to recruit top faculty and students in the social sciences
$ Large research projects may have to coordinate across multiple units or sites, and opportunities for synergistic collaboration are difficult to exploit
$ Social scientists in different colleges find it difficult to collaborate on multi-‐investigator projects because of different formulae for allocating credit and indirect costs among academic units
$ Some duplication of administrative responsibilities undoubtedly exists, and administrative economies of scale are not being exploited
$ The separate physical locations of these units, and in particular the off-‐campus location of CISER and (perhaps to a lesser extent) SRI, impede collaboration across the units and with users
Given these problems, we believe there is a strong case for integrating these units (and perhaps others on campus) more effectively. Such integration could create a more coherent, efficient, and nationally-‐visible research center in the social sciences– one that could provide a critical mass, develop new technical capabilities, streamline administration, and foster collaboration and coordination among social scientists and professional-‐technical staff.
Within the task force, there is considerable support and enthusiasm for some consolidation of the relevant units, although we take note of several concerns as well. In particular, there are concerns about (1) the existence of distinct organizational sub-‐cultures and how they would work together under a more integrated structure; (2) the implications of integration for the administrative and operational autonomy of the different units; (3) implications for the allocation of IDCs among colleges and departments when research grants are administrated by central administration rather than specific colleges or college-‐based centers (such as BLCC); and (4) the budgetary and cost-‐sharing implications of integrating units
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with quite different internal and external funding sources, academic and training missions, entrepreneurial and disciplinary traditions, and fiscal balances (e.g., “soft-‐money” operations, such as SRI). Additionally, we note that there is opposition within the SRI to a physical relocation of all its operations back to campus, given the institute’s space needs, its staffing requirements, and the parking and logistical challenges encountered in serving their on-‐ and off-‐campus clientele. This might be resolved by giving the SRI office space for client interaction on-‐campus — perhaps within a larger social science research center — while maintaining many of its survey operations in an off-‐campus facility.
These concerns help to crystallize several key decisions that would have to be made in any process of integrating these different units. We believe three such decisions stand out:
$ First, what would a more integrated administrative structure look like? One option is to simply maintain the existing units and then jointly locate them under a more centralized administrative structure (perhaps with the directors of the different units serving on a centralized executive committee). A second option might involve combining two or more of these separate units within a more centralized, overarching structure with a single director. For example, the ISS and BLCC could be merged to form a new administrative hub (e.g., on grants and contracts) for each of the other centers (e.g., this might be renamed the Bronfenbrenner Institute for the Social Sciences or some other appropriate name). A third, and more radical, option would be to dissolve the existing units and relocate their staff, expertise, and service functions within a new and more comprehensive, multi-‐purpose institute that would provide basic infrastructure for social science research across the university. Budgets would be combined while providing greater flexibility to reallocate resources across units as priorities change or in response to new external funding opportunities.
Although our subcommittee is not prepared to recommend one of these options over the others, it is important to identify the full range of restructuring possibilities. Each option provides economies of scale through these types of restructuring that would allow for some cost-‐cutting and administrative streamlining. One question, however, is whether the various colleges or departments would “buy into” a new arrangement if, for example, the BLCC served a campus-‐wide rather than college-‐wide clientele (e.g., would BLCC continue to receive support from CHE if grants are submitted through a reconfigured campus-‐wide social science center)?
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Another question involves the diversified mission and activities of the BLCC. The BLCC provides basic infrastructural research services (especially in grant administration) that could be used by scholars in any number of different areas, much like the ISS, CISER, and SRI. But BLCC’s mission also is focused on substantive concerns, such as human development over the life course, aging, and demographic issues. A decision must be made, then, as to whether a new, larger research institute would provide only infrastructural support services—in which case the substantive, life course work of the BLCC might remain located elsewhere. Or, alternatively, a newly-‐configured social science institute might provide infrastructural services and also promote substantive kinds of work. In this case, all of the BLCC and possibly other existing centers might be incorporated within a larger institute, especially if their faculty are drawn from different departments across campus and if college boundaries constrain collaboration on multi-‐investigator or multidisciplinary projects.
$ Second, what (if any) type of fiscal integration would accompany an administrative restructuring? Would college administrators view a newly-‐centralized social science center as threatening – as cannibalizing their faculty and resources (e.g., IDCs)? Would the different centers pool their resources, retain control over their separate funding streams, and/or cost-‐share on physical and staff resources? This is a sensitive issue, as the SRI currently generates a fiscal surplus and does not receive university funding, whereas the other units all rely on various types of university support. We note, however, that the SRI’s surplus is currently under the control of the Vice Provost’s office, so some sort of centralized pooling and strategic targeting of resources would not represent a dramatic change from the status quo. We believe mechanisms should be found to rationalize the funding of social science research through cost-‐sharing arrangements and the strategic use of surpluses to incubate diverse types of research activities.
$ Third, is it possible – and desirable – to relocate these units to the same physical space? The subcommittee believes that physical proximity among faculty, students, and professional staff is critical for collaboration among some groups of social scientists who work in multi-‐disciplinary collaborative teams (e.g., demographers, health economists). There are clear advantages for faculty and graduate students to have a centralized location that serves as a hub for the different dimensions of the research process that are currently supported separately by the BLCC, SRI, ISS, and CISER. An ISS theme project team, for example, could be physically located in close proximity to professional staff at the BLCC that specialize in grant writing and
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administration, as well as specialists in survey research and data management at SRI and CISER, respectively. This could provide an impetus for various types of coordination in training and conducting research. CISER is anxious to be closer to its users on campus, and it believes some of the more sensitive data that it manages would be more secure at on on-‐campus facility. Even if SRI were to keep some of its survey operations off-‐campus, the institute’s ability to work with faculty and graduate student clients would be enhanced by an on-‐campus presence in close proximity to these other social science units. Overall, we believe the potential gains of locating these various units together on campus are substantial.
In conclusion, our primary recommendation is that the ISS, BLCC, SRI, and CISER be brought together under a more integrated administrative structure, in close physical proximity to one another. We believe several different scenarios for achieving this integration are potentially viable. All would provide cost-‐savings while improving upon the existing fragmentation and dispersion of basic research services at Cornell.
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Appendix C. Public Policy at Cornell University
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cornell should create a School of Public Policy. This new School should immediately embrace the goal of being a top ten public policy program within 10 years. The creation of this School would increase the visibility, quality, and depth of social science faculty at Cornell by providing a vibrant common research environment for the wide variety of social scientists who share public policy research and teaching interests. Simply gathering the existing scholars at Cornell under the auspices of a new School of Public Policy would itself be a bold, highly visible undertaking. It would create a program that would be immediately ranked near the top ten among public policy programs, even without attracting more social scientists to Cornell. Modest growth would make a climb into the top ten a realistic goal.
The School would also increase the quality of public policy teaching programs across Cornell. The School should have the capacity to offer an undergraduate program in public policy, train students at a graduate level with both terminal Masters and PhD programs, and offer mid-‐career degree programs for professionals. The School would help redefine Cornell’s land grant mission by creating an institution dedicated to making contributions to key public-‐policy debates at state, national, and international levels through its scholarship and its training of tomorrow’s leaders.
To accomplish these goals, the committee suggests that the Policy Analysis and Management (PAM) department become the core faculty lines (29) forming the new School, with an addition of 10 new lines (described below) making up a ‘full-‐service’ public policy program. The School should have three basic elements. First, it must have its own independent identity with independent authority and resources to encourage and enhance externally funded research programs in public policy. Second, it must have a sufficient number of dedicated faculty lines to support its core teaching and research programs; a School of less than 35-‐40 lines would not be sufficient to create visibility, maintain the needed core teaching programs, and promote the goals outlined above. Third, the School should be strongly connected to core and applied social science departments across Cornell through joint hires, joint appointments, and affiliated faculty.
These elements can be accomplished by structuring the School with three levels of faculty affiliation: 1) a core group of 35-‐40 faculty fully appointed in the School; 2) a second level of jointly appointed faculty; 3) a third level of affiliated scholars at the University. The structure could be accomplished now with existing faculty at Cornell and a commitment to hire in strategic areas so as to cover those few areas that are essential to a public policy school, and are not now represented at Cornell.
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The creation of a new School of Public Policy through restructuring within Cornell, moderate new investment, and fundraising, would demonstrate an energy and commitment to social sciences at Cornell that would enhance Cornell’s ability to significantly increase the profile of its social science units. This move would be all the more significant because it would come at a time when top universities are contemplating substantial cutbacks in order to balance their budgets.
INTRODUCTION
This report recommends the creation of a new School of Public Policy at Cornell. We address why we are making this recommendation, the goals of this new School, and the elements that would allow the School to achieve its research, teaching, and outreach/extension missions. We are mindful of the exceptional budgetary constraints facing Cornell. We are also mindful of concerns that the social sciences at Cornell suffer from some measure of fragmentation. The core of the recommendation, however, is consolidation of Cornell's existing strength in the social sciences in the area of public policy. Cornell already effectively possesses a core group of faculty working in public policy which, if gathered and constituted as a public policy school, would already constitute a highly ranked program.
We believe that the creation of this School, particularly at the moment when our peer institutions are also facing cutbacks, would signal that Cornell remains committed to the goal of excellence in its social sciences. Cornell currently stands nearly alone among our peer institutions in lacking a School of Public Policy. This is a startling fact, especially for New York State’s land-‐grant college, as the core of public policy consists of bringing social science research to bear on problems and issues being dealt with by policy makers and the community. Remedying this omission would bring favorable attention to Cornell during these difficult times.
A. Why a Public Policy School/Program at Cornell?
The subcommittee believes that the creation of a School of Public Policy isnot only long overdue at Cornell University, but at this point in Cornell’s history such a move could significantly enhance the mission and visibility of the Social Sciences, especially during these austere budgetary times and in a political environment in which major public policy challenges will need to be addressed (e.g. health care reform, alternative energy reforms, climate change legislation, Social Security reform). The subcommittee believes that the establishment of a School of Public Policy at Cornell will increase the visibility, quality, and depth of social science faculty, and increase the quality of public policy research and teaching programs at Cornell. These changes will have the greatest impact on applied social science units, but they will also have indirect positive effects on select core social science departments. The key will be accomplishing the following three goals:
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1) Consolidation. The School will provide a common research and teachingenvironment for a wide range of social scientists who share research andteaching interests in public policy, but who are currently appointed in unitsacross the campus.
2) Strengthen the core disciplines. By attracting outstanding policy-‐focusedscholars who maintain high profiles in their core disciplines, the School willenable core departments to recruit and retain faculty who will strengthen theirdepartments, and who would not otherwise be interested in Cornell. The same istrue at the Ph.D. student level, where increasing numbers of excellent studentsare attracted to universities that allow for a joint degree in a discipline andpublic policy.
3) Contribute to Cornell’s land grant mission. A public policy school should be akey element of fulfilling the land grant mission in the twenty-‐first century.Through publications in scholarly journals and books, undergraduate andgraduate training, engagement in the media, and forums and mini-‐courses forpolicy makers, the School of Public Policy will facilitate and contribute to keypublic policy debates. It will serve as the principal conduit between Cornell andthe public on matters of public policy.
Most of our peer institutions have had public policy schools or centers for decades. For example, the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the Ford School at Michigan, the Harris School at Chicago. These schools help position these universities among the world’s most eminent social science institutions. They train enlightened public scholars and leaders and generate cutting edge research-‐based ideas that provide answers to the world’s most challenging public policy problems. The schools provide distinctive educational programs emphasizing the marriage of disciplinary-‐based theory, well-‐honed analytic skills, and deep substantive knowledge of particular areas that are brought to bear in the context of specific policy problems. Faculty in these schools conduct world-‐class research and produce knowledge on which sound public policy can be based and they collaborate directly with specific government agencies
Cornell University has many high-‐caliber, internationally-‐known policy scholars, but they are located in departments and centers dispersed across campus. This dispersion dilutes their visibility and creates isolation and dilution of effort. Under the current Cornell structure, bringing these scholars together for intellectual exchange, research initiatives, dialogue, and teaching initiatives is extremely difficult. There is no integrating institutional structure within which the research and teaching of public policy at Cornell can be encouraged, facilitated, and promoted in order to place us distinctively higher than our peers in the national rankings. Consequently, much of Cornell’s excellent public-‐policy research goes unrecognized in the national and international rankings.
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Many outstanding disciplinary-‐trained social scientists doing applied policy work at Cornell are located in applied departments across campus, and are neither in joint appointments nor affiliated with the core social science departments. For example, nationally recognized policy scholars with training in economics, sociology, and psychology, are located in units such as PAM, AEM, ILR, and Law. Within Cornell’s organizational structure, the true quality of scholars working in public policy is not as visible to the external academic community as they would be if combined into a school of public policy. Dispersion also creates inefficiencies in both research and teaching programs through duplication and dilution of effort. Many of these top-‐quality, disciplinary-‐trained scholars do not contribute to the external reputation of the institution or its core social science disciplines because of lack of critical scholar mass within their applied departments and because their work is not connected as part of an integrated public policy research mission of the university. Some visibility is obtained through policy centers and programs at Cornell, but none of these programs has the external visibility and impact of an integrated School of Public Policy. Part of this problem is also a result of the very large and often ill-‐defined centers and the structure of funding for these centers.
Gathering the already existing public policy expertise and teaching resources at Cornell into a School of Public Policy will place Cornell in a position of leadership in vital emerging areas of both national and international policy, such as environmental policy and renewable energy, health care, education, global labor market problems, aging and Social Security, urban and rural development, and international relations. We already have substantial resources on campus to offer cutting edge research and teaching programs in these areas; what is needed is an institutional structure within which these research and teaching programs are organized, facilitated, and promoted.
The committee believes that this is an ideal time for Cornell University to establish a School of Public Policy, that its establishment will put Cornell’s already vibrant and high quality research and teaching faculty and programs on the national and international map, competing well with our peer institutions, and that the synergies created by joint hires and joint appointments between the School of Public Policy; the core social science departments in Arts and Sciences; and applied social sciences units such as Development Sociology, HD, ILR, and Law will significantly enhance the rankings of social science units across Cornell.
B. What sort of public policy program structure should Cornell establish?
Our peer institutions house a variety of public policy research and teachingprograms, from institutes and centers (Brown and UPenn) to fully integrated schools of public policy (Harvard and Princeton). Each of these structures is a product of history within their institutions. Cornell University, unconstrained by a history of an existing organizational structure, is in a favorable position of being able to choose the optimal organizational structure to promote public policy
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research and the social sciences within this institution as it moves forward. After careful consideration of other programs around the country, the committee believes that the optimal structure for a public policy program at Cornell would contain three key elements:
1) It would be an independent School of Public Policy with its own uniqueidentity. Ideally it would be academically overseen by its own Dean who hasindependent authority and resources to encourage and enhance externallyfunded research programs in public policy and to create a new school culturewith faculty drawn from diverse departments and colleges (endowed/statutory).
2) The School should have a sufficient number of dedicated faculty lines tosupport its core teaching programs. A school of less than 35-‐40 lines would notbe, in our view, sufficient to create visibility and promote the goals we haveoutlined above, and maintain the teaching needs of the core programs needed tobe offered (BS, MPP, MPA, and PhD).
3) The School should be strongly connected to the core social sciencedepartments in Arts and Sciences and the applied social science departmentsthrough joint hires, joint appointments, and affiliated faculty. These joint hiresand joint appointments would be part of the proposed 35-‐40 lines.
These elements can best be met by creating three layers of faculty involvement. First, the School should have a core set of faculty dedicated to the School. The necessary lines could be obtained by beginning with the Department of Policy and Management (PAM) contributing the core faculty lines for the program, and adding new faculty lines or moving faculty already at Cornell who would be better housed in a School of Public Policy. Further hiring would be necessary to complete the package so as to cover aspects of Public Policy that would not be sufficiently covered with the initial appointments (outlined below). Second, the School should establish joint appointments with scholars at Cornell who conduct public policy research, but who are better served by remaining in their home departments. Finally, the School should establish a set of affiliated scholars at Cornell who will be able to contribute to, and who would benefit from the School's mission.
The PAM Department is home to social scientists whose research is validated by publications in top peer reviewed social science journals as well as very active externally funded grant activity. The research ongoing in PAM contributes to the reputation of two of the core social science fields (economics and sociology) and also to Cornell’s reputation in the more specialized social science fields of public policy analysis and demography. In addition, PAM’s faculty has strength in quantitative methods and conducts research on the effects of government policies on individuals and society. Under the general public policy rubric, PAM’s research strengths are in health policy, family and social welfare policy, and regulatory policy. The first two of these areas are listed as areas of specialty in the U.S. News & World
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Report (USN&WR) rankings of public policy programs (as Health Policy and Management and Social Policy). PAM currently staffs four degree programs (BS in Policy Analysis and Management, an accelerated 5-‐year BS/MS degree in Policy Analysis and Management, the Sloan Masters in Health Administration (MHA), and the Ph.D. in Policy Analysis and Management). The new School would offer broader versions of the PAM undergraduate and masters degrees. A Ph.D. in public policy might also be offered, although we have not reached consensus about whether this degree should be restricted to students who are simultaneously pursuing a Ph.D. in a core discipline.
The committee believes that anything less than a full commitment by the administration to establish an independent School of Public Policy would be a band-‐aid solution. However, the committee recognizes that the path to this new School may involve a transition period.
C. What sort of academic programs should a School of Public Policy atCornell offer?
The School must offer undergraduate and graduate education in publicpolicy. It must also include terminal Master's degree programs. It would include a PhD program, which would be a stand alone program, or part of joint degrees in core social science disciplines.
While the undergraduate and PhD programs are essential to the School, the hallmarks of most top public policy programs and, in fact, the basis for national program rankings (see ranking methods described in the last page of the Appendix), is the Master’s degree program (MPP) (Cordes et al., 2008; Ellwood, 2008). Several top-‐ranked programs have both undergraduate and PhD programs, but they are smaller in size and prominence within the programs. PAM currently has approximately 230 undergraduate majors. The committee believes that the School of Public Policy at Cornell should have as its signature programs both a high quality, research-‐based Master’s degree program (MPP) for training policy analysts for positions in government and other research institutions (and possible further PhD training), and a terminal Master’s degree program for students wishing to go into (or go back into) the political public policy making arena (MPA). These two signature programs would position Cornell well for being ranked in the top 10 programs nationally within the foreseeable future, both in the overarching fields of Public Policy/Public Affairs and in several of the specialty fields identified in those rankings, namely Social Policy, Health Policy and Management, Environmental Policy and Management, Public Policy Analysis, and City Management and Urban Policy (see Appendix 2009 ranking of programs from U.S. News & World Report).
As background, the most recognized rankings of Public Policy Programs are the ones reported by the U.S. News and World Report (USN&WR). While the
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USN&WR rankings are subject to numerous criticisms, they are widely used and recognized in the field of public policy. In the USN&WR rankings, “Public Affairs” is a broad term that covers two very different types of Master’s degree programs: 1) the Public Administration programs that began in the 1920s at such places as Syracuse University; and 2) the Public Policy programs created in the 1960s with the help of Ford Foundation grants (e.g., at Berkeley, Carnegie-‐Mellon, Duke, Harvard, Michigan, Texas, the Stanford Business School, and RAND). The difference between the two programs is that Public Administration programs (e.g., CIPA at Cornell) are grounded in political science and public management and focus on budgeting and human resource issues in government, whereas Public Policy programs are grounded in economics, sociology, and quantitative methods, and focus on research measuring the effects of government policies. The committee believes that Cornell’s strength and competitive advantage lies in the latter type of program, those in Public Policy.
The committee believes that a two-‐year professional Masters of Public Policy (MPP) degree should be the signature program for the new school. It should be a broad based, empirically oriented program that includes course work in economics, political science, political process, policy implementation, methods, and depth in substantive policy areas already offered at Cornell in various departments. The committee believes that, in order to achieve national recognition, the Cornell School of Public Policy must offer programs with the following characteristics.
Research-‐based faculty and teaching programs. Research is the core of top public policy programs, and undergraduate and graduate teaching/extension efforts should flow from that research. Students in the program should be mentored by faculty who are recognized experts in the particular area of research they wish to study, and their training in substantive policy areas should reflect the expertise of the faculty. Ongoing research projects should provide opportunities for students to get hands-‐on training by becoming involved in policy-‐relevant research.
Empirically-‐based research programs. Social science has undergone a quantitative revolution in the last 30 years. The availability of large-‐scale data sets and advances in computer technology and statistical software have changed the way in which many social scientists conduct their work. In addition, public policy is increasingly being driven by “evidence based research.” The need for data to address important and complex social issues has led many public policy researchers to utilize a large-‐scale science model. As applied to policy-‐relevant social science research, this model generally requires peer reviewed external funding to support (1) large-‐scale multi-‐year projects; (2) multi-‐disciplinary teams of faculty, research associates, and graduate students; and (3) data collection efforts or statistical analysis of existing data. This empirically-‐based focus is an important principle in developing high quality public policy programs, and strong training in methods must be the hallmark of such programs.
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Broad-‐based APPAM-‐type teaching programs. The Association of Public Policy and Management (APPAM) is the primary professional organization of public policy programs. The basic elements that are included in most broad-‐based policy programs that are affiliated with APPAM include: (a) economics; (b) political science and the political process; (c) methods; (d) process and policy implementation; (e) ethics; and (f) substantive policy areas.
Domestic and international focus: The committee believes that the new school of public policy should encompass both domestic and international policy and train the next generation of scholars and professionals who will carry forward a commitment to international knowledge, teaching, and service.
SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF PUBLIC POLICY EXPERTISE ALREADY EXISTING AT CORNELL
Economics, Sociology, and Applied Departments
Cornell already has a large number of faculty with expertise in empirically-‐ based, policy-‐relevant research. Substantive policy areas in which Cornell is already outstanding include: international development (ECON, AEM); labor market policy (ILR); environmental and energy policy (CALS); food systems and obesity (PAM, AEM); education policy (ILR, PAM, CALS); city and urban policy (CRP); rural economic development (Development Sociology); poverty and inequality (Soc); criminal justice (Law School, PAM); and American politics, international relations, and comparative politics (Government). Development of these concentration areas by faculty across the campus working in these policy areas through joint appointments and other types of affiliations will be essential to the success of the initiative. We are confident that the establishment of a School of Public Policy at Cornell will include participation of a wide variety of academics in units across campus who conduct high-‐quality, empirically-‐based, policy-‐relevant research. Cooperation with these like-‐minded scholars would also allow us to offer concentration courses in a wide variety of additional subfields. The School of Public Policy also would have natural connections to other core disciplines in addition to Economics and Sociology.
Anthropology
Sustaining and enhancing an anthropological perspective in the School of Public Policy would be critical, particularly as ethnographic perspectives are increasingly sought to explain both individual and collective socio-‐cultural behaviors — primarily through socio-‐cultural anthropology, urban anthropology, economic, political, and legal anthropology. Recognizing the unique perspectives provided by qualitative and ethnographic work, especially when grassroots perspectives are greatly needed, is a growing emphasis in many leading schools of
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public policy around the nation. The School of Public Policy at Cornell could be instrumental in leading the integration of more broadly defined social scientific perspectives in public policy through forums and public symposia that could attract prominent policy makers and academicians to dialogue on the contributions of qualitative and quantitative social scientists to important public policy issues.
An example of how critical anthropologists could be to areas of strength within the Cornell School of Public Policy, the Department of Anthropology was recently involved in a target hire of a prominent medical anthropologist in 2008-‐2009 whose background and expertise fit perfectly to serve links between health scholars in Policy Analysis and Management, Weill-‐Cornell Medical College, and potentially even the Law School (e.g., organ transplant industry). An emergent priority with the Department of Anthropology that would fit well with a School of Public Policy at Cornell has been their efforts to build in the area of global health, public health, and biomedical anthropology.
Government
The Government Department will be a central collaboration contributing to the success of a School of Public Policy at Cornell, especially their strength in American Politics, comparative politics, political theory, and their recent strength building in quantitative studies of public opinion and political behavior. It is hard to imagine the new School of Public Policy at Cornell without the Government Department as a central contributor to such an effort.
School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR)
Some of the most interesting contributions to the study of central public policy issues have come from disciplines such as sociology, political science, labor economics, and organizational behavior, all strengths in the ILR School at Cornell. They foster cross-‐disciplinary work and dialogue in the form of conferences, public lectures, and symposia all focused on issues of American labor and employment policies, labor standards and labor law, critical issues in public policy and political economy. The school is increasingly moving in the direction of building expertise and building a teaching portfolio surrounding global labor issues and the changing global workforce.
City and Regional Planning (CRP)
The department of City and Regional Planning (CRP) has substantial scholarly expertise and a teaching portfolio in areas that will be critical to the School of Public Policy at Cornell, especially in the areas of urban planning, administration, and development. Faculty from CRP have expertise in areas such as urban politics/development and public administration, environmental planning and regulation, planning for sustainable transportation, resource management and environmental law, economic and community development, land use and real estate
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regulation and planning, public administration, urban public finance, and real estate law and planning. Together with faculty from the Real Estate Program in the Hotel School and faculty members from the Law School, the School of Public Policy at Cornell could take the lead amongst its peers in urban public policy and local public administrative issues.
WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM INVESTMENTS NEEDED TO POSITION A NEW PUBLIC POLICY SCHOOL
AT CORNELL IN THE TOP 10?
While Cornell has a large number of faculty working in the concentrations mentioned above, the committee identified the minimum investments needed to position a new School of Public Policy in the top 10. Specifically, the committee identified the area of Public Finance, including aspects of taxation and fiscal federalism as a priority area for investment. Another important area, central to top public policy schools, is political science. The committee sees these two areas as central to the core of public policy training and we describe this in detail, below.
Political Science/Political Economy. As a discipline, political science lives on the fault line between two cultures in the academy, the sciences and the humanities. Political science is a social science concerned with the theory and practice of politics and the description and analysis of political systems and political behavior. It is often described as the study of politics defined as "who gets what, when and how." Social scientists in this field examine how the political organization of federal, state, and local government influence fiscal policy and economic performance; the role of political parties in coordinating policy across layers of government; the allocation and transfer of power in decision-‐making; the roles and systems of governance including governments and international organizations, public policies, public administration, and the non-‐profit sector. For example, at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University their political scientists are integrally involved in their Center for Democratic Government and Innovation, the Carr Center for Human Rights, the Center for Public Leadership, and the Center for State and Local Government. Types of courses that political scientists teach within schools of public policy include, among others, courses on political economy, democratic political institutions, federalism, politics of the law and courts, ethics and public policy, political theory and philosophy, and American politics and government.
Public Finance and Tax Policy. Cornell has a small number of high quality faculty doing research and teaching in the area of public finance, but further investments in this area would be needed in a School of Public Policy at Cornell to provide a comprehensive research/teaching portfolio in public finance. Social scientists would be needed who work in the area of public finance, laws and taxation, government spending, operations, and income distribution. The type of social scientists needed are those concerned with issues surrounding paying for collective or governmental activities, and with the administration and design of those activities, addressing questions such as the role of government in a free
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market economy, what the government or collective organizations should do, or are doing, and questions of how to pay for those activities.
CURRENTLY EXISTING CENTERS, INSTITUTES, AND PROGRAMS AT CORNELL THAT HAVE PUBLICPOLICY RELEVANCE AND SHOULD BE AFFILIATED WITH THE CORNELL SCHOOL OF PUBLICPOLICY
The committee has also identified multiple research centers institutes and programs at Cornell that might be affiliated with a new School of Public Policy. Examples include: Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Cornell Center for a Sustainable Future, the Center for the Study of Economy and Society, the Center for the Study of Inequality, the Community and Rural Development Institute, Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research, Cornell Institute for Translational Research on Aging, Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture, and Development (CIIFAD).
The committee recommends the creation of several research-‐based institutes housed in the School of Public Policy. The purpose of these institutes would be to facilitate collaborative research, to disseminate basic research for public policy audiences, and to organize a variety of policy forums that will bring to campus policy makers and practitioners. Already existing centers and institutes such as CISER, ISS, BLCC, and Survey Research Center would find their natural homes in a School of Public Policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Making the case for a School of Public Policy is quite easy, especially in large public universities that have distinct public service missions and many other policy-‐related programs that require coursework that is typically part of a graduate public policy program. The external benefit from having a strong public policy school is not that its programs will provide public service per se, but rather that the school can become the nucleus of knowledge creation for use by the public sector. In addition, the courses offered as part of a MPP curriculum in applied economics, quantitative analysis, ethics, public management, and political institutions, for example, also will contribute to the teaching programs in Sociology, Economics, Government, Anthropology, among other areas, to provide depth and breadth in the educational experience, especially for students for whom a traditional discipline-‐based course might not be as well suited.
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References:
Cordes, J., Conger, D., Ladd, H, and Luger, M. (2008 Autumn) "Undergraduate and Doctoral Education in Public Policy: What? Why? Why Not? Where to?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 27(4): 1009-‐1026.
Ellwood, J. W. (2008 Winter) "Challenges to Public Policy and Public Management Education." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 27(1): 172-‐187.
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Appendix US News & World Reports
Rankings of Public Policy Programs August 2009
How the USN&WR rankings work:
The USN&WR rankings are based solely on the results of a peer assessment survey, i.e., responses of deans, directors, and department chairs representing ~269 master's of public affairs and administration programs around the country. Respondents are asked to rate the academic quality of master's programs on a scale of 1 (marginal) to 5 (outstanding). Scores for each school are totaled and divided by the number of respondents who rated that school. The response rate in the 2007 data presented in the Appendix was 40 percent. The lists of schools and individuals surveyed were provided by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration and the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM). The latter organization is one with which many faculty at Cornell are affiliated and whose conferences are attended by several Cornell scholars from different departments around campus. The “specialty rankings” (rankings by specific areas of study also reported in the Appendix) are based solely on ratings by educators at peer schools. Public affairs school deans and other academics are asked to nominate up to 10 programs for excellence in each specialty. Those receiving the most nominations are listed. In terms of the specialty rankings, it is important to keep in mind that nominees are drawn only from the schools surveyed. So, for example, a university like Yale (which offers a degree in environmental management through its School of Forestry and Environmental Studies but not a degree in public affairs) does not show up in these specialty rankings. In the same vein, several of Cornell’s top policy areas located in AEM, ILR, and PAM are also not ranked. The PAM department is a medium-‐sized department (29 faculty lines) within a college, and because it does not offer a MPP or MPA program, it does not fit the description of a “Public Administration” program that is used in the USN&WR and is also not included in the specialty rankings, even though it has significant strength in Health Policy, Social Welfare Policy, and Regulatory Policy. On the other hand, Cornell’s Institute for Public Affairs (CIPA) offers a Masters in Public Affairs degree, and therefore is ranked within the USN&WR (national ranking of 36th in 2007). CIPA is a non-‐department based program with no dedicated faculty lines, and the Director of the Program reports directly to the Provost, not an academic dean. Its mission is focused on a terminal 2-‐year Masters in Public Affairs certification mainly for mid-‐career professionals. The committee recommends that this program be moved to the new School of Public Policy. The synergies between this program and the proposed MPP below are obvious.
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Overall rankings: title = “Public Affairs”
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Social Policy
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Health Policy and Management
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Environmental Policy and Management
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Public Policy Analysis
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Public Management and Administration
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Public Affairs
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City Management and Urban Policy
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Explaining the rankings
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Appendix D. Increasing Collaboration within Disciplines by Merging Units
Overview
Recent external evaluations of Economics, Psychology, and Sociology have identified significant strengths in each of these disciplines. All three have the potential to be among the top ten in their respective fields, but all three are hampered by a similar problem: In each field, there are significant numbers of faculty on campus, but these faculty members are dispersed across multiple units. This dispersion significantly limits the ability of Economics, Psychology, and Sociology to raise their stature or rankings.
One implication of this dispersion is that the core departments in the College of Arts & Sciences (A&S) are all very small: 20-‐30% smaller than the median size of higher-‐ranked departments in private institutions, and 40-‐50% smaller than the median size of all higher-‐ranked departments, including those in large public institutions. While A&S as a whole is also smaller than its peers (roughly 11% smaller than private competitors and 33% smaller than public competitors), the core departments in Economics, Psychology and Sociology are smaller still.
Of course, size per se is not the goal. Size matters only because it is correlated with the outputs that generate a high national stature -‐-‐-‐ most notably, the number of publications by Cornell authors in flagship disciplinary journals or top university presses, and the number of graduate students who go on to top departments. But a second implication of the dispersion of faculty, and especially of the pursuit of disparate missions that accompanies it, is that it hinders Cornell’s ability to recruit top scholars and train highly marketable graduate students.
The task for our subgroup was to explore new institutional arrangements to overcome these limitations. We did so with several goals in mind:
Improve Cornell’s ranking in these fields, ideally into the “top 10.”
We think that the key is strength in the A&S departments, but we need to be wary of harming the hiring/retention efforts and educational programs of other units.
One obstacle is a mechanical ranking issue: to the extent that rankings are based exclusively on the membership of the A&S department, Cornell may not be reaping the full benefit of the research contributions of faculty outside the A & S departments. In particular, if key individuals currently outside of the A&S departments are brought inside these departments, our rankings might increase.
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Improve interaction among faculty within each discipline, and also across disciplines, especially with respect to research, hiring, strategic planning, and teaching (grad and undergrad).
Improve Cornell’s ability to hire nationally renowned senior scholars and star junior scholars.
In our discussions, we identified a set of possible models for Cornell to consider, some more aggressive than others. We have done our best to flesh out these models, and to identify some of the advantages and disadvantages associated with each. Nonetheless, further thought is clearly required, and we look forward to discussing these models with the full SSTF.
A few further opening comments:
We emphasize that there is no presumption that the same model will be optimal for all three disciplines. We each had reactions about what would work best in our own disciplines, but we decided not to put these in this report in order to avoid influencing the reactions from the full SSTF.
Currently, different units within these disciplines pursue many different missions, although these differences may be overstated. We took the position that we should not necessarily assume the sanctity of all these missions, and indeed that some consolidation may be ideal. Under most models, consolidation will require discussion and negotiation with the relevant deans.
As we identified and debated possible models, we did so from two perspectives. First, what are the long-‐run implications for excellence in the discipline? Second, will the implementation be so painful that our best faculty members leave Cornell and/or our departments lose all semblance of collegiality (thereby affecting long-‐term prospects)?
Historically, some units have been more successful than others in choosing areas, wooing prominent faculty, training graduate students, and so forth. When creating formal institutional links between units, we must be wary of undermining this past success.
Some models require minor reallocations of resources, and others require more significant reallocations. For each, we must address to what extent these reallocations lead to a more optimal allocation in terms of the criteria that generate high national stature.
At this point, we have not addressed the procedures by which these models would be implemented. Should the full SSTF decide to recommend any of these models, or a menu of models from which each of the three disciplines
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might “select,” we will need to add such procedures, recognizing that there may be a tradeoff between the speed of implementation and the likelihood that change leads to negative outcomes.
Brief Overview of the Four Models
(1) Coordinating Committee: Individual units retain their current autonomy, but aCoordinating Committee with representation from each unit is charged withoverseeing the full disciplinary community.
(2) Super-Department: A large department is “shared” by multiple colleges. It isfunded and administered by multiple colleges and serves multiple colleges, butoperates as a single unit.
(3) Absorption: We focus on one core department, and absorb lines from other unitsinto this department.
(4) Extensive Joint Appointments: We create links between component units viahaving many people with joint appointments.
List of Issues to Address for Each Model
In which college do the lines reside (who funds them)?
What missions are being pursued, and who is pursuing each mission?
What undergraduate and graduate programs are being served?
Who makes tenure decisions, and what is the procedure?
Who makes hiring decisions, and what is the procedure?
Do faculty share a common physical space?
How is “leadership” chosen (department chairs, committee chairs, etc)?
What is the structure of graduate education in the discipline -‐-‐ how many official fields and distinct curricula, how are graduate students funded, etc?
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Model (1): Coordinating Committee
Under this model, the individual units retain their current autonomy (lines, missions, curriculum, hiring, and tenure), but a Coordinating Committee, with representation from each unit, is charged with overseeing the full disciplinary community. Its mandate would include:
Identifying opportunities for the discipline as a whole -‐-‐-‐ e.g., an expansion into some particular subfield.
Identifying hiring or infrastructure needs that would serve multiple units, but which no single unit is likely to fill in isolation.
Identifying synergies in the curricula across units.
Coordinating a recruiting strategy early each year.
In addition to such coordination, the Coordinating Committee might also have some formal input into decisions. For example:
Write a report each year that goes to the administration (relevant deans and vice provost for social sciences) that provides an assessment of the disciplinary community and recommendations for the future.
Control some hiring resources, perhaps controlling some lines that could be allocated to any of the component units, perhaps controlling bridging funds.
Independent input on hiring, perhaps by preparing an independent recruiting report early in the year that goes to the relevant deans, perhaps by writing an independent assessment of candidates at some point in the process.
Independent input on tenure decisions, perhaps by providing an independent advisory assessment of candidates at some point in the process, perhaps by having the power to add someone to tenure review committees or ad hoc committees.
The composition of the Coordinating Committee could take one of two forms. First, it might include the formal leadership of each of the relevant units -‐-‐-‐ e.g., department chair and DGS. Second, it might intentionally exclude leaders and instead be comprised entirely of rank-‐and-‐file members of each unit.
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Discussion
To be effective, this model requires that the units are motivated to work together; otherwise the individual units can just ignore the Coordinating Committee. To address this issue, numerical representation of each department must not be trivial (15%?).
We think the prospects for coordination are especially high in undergraduate and graduate education. If it did nothing else, a Coordinating Committee could be helpful in identifying and eliminating duplication in undergraduate course offerings, and in ensuring the fair exchange of TA resources across units with shared responsibility for teaching large undergraduate courses. A Coordinating Committee could also help assess whether there need to be so many graduate fields in these three disciplines, and to explore whether the funding of graduate students could be more consistent across units (but only if there are resources to raise all funding packages to a level that allows Cornell to compete for the strongest talent).
A major plus of this model is that, compared to the super-‐department model discussed below, it more easily unites all members of a discipline currently dispersed in a number of different departments. For example, the most likely super-‐department for Psychology would consist of the Psychology Department and Department of Human Development. Such an arrangement omits input from psychologists in ILR and the Johnson School and from neuroscientists in NB&B.
A major con for this model is that it does not address the mechanical ranking issue. Because the individual units remain completely separate, any ranking that depends exclusively on the membership of the A&S department will be unaffected. Joint appointments may help mitigate this problem (see our discussion of joint appointments in Model 4).
A second con, although perhaps a relatively minor one, is that a coordinating committee with nontrivial representation also imposes a nontrivial additional service burden on faculty. Because service needs do not scale down perfectly with faculty size, we suspect that Cornell faculty already spend more time in meetings than peers at larger departments.
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Model (2): Super-Department
Under this model, a large department is “shared” by multiple colleges. It is funded and administered by multiple colleges, and it serves multiple colleges.
Such departments already exist in the biological sciences: three departments have roughly 50% of their lines in A&S and 50% of their lines in CALS. Each department operates as a single unit (and its offices are in the same location), but serves both colleges. For more information on these arrangements, see our attached appendix.
Some details for what this might look like in the social sciences:
Lines: Individual lines are owned/funded by individual colleges. Ideally, there will be an initial agreement about the number of lines provided by each college, and some way to enforce that colleges do not later renege.
Mission: To be determined by the new department along with the relevant deans. Perhaps the new department will serve all the missions of the component units, but perhaps a new consolidated mission will emerge that satisfies everyone.
Curriculum: Again, to be determined by the new department along with the relevant deans. The unified department would offer one or more majors, and each of those majors might be available to students from one or more colleges (in Biology, there is a single Biology major, and it is available to students from both A&S and CALS).
Hiring: Probably follow the Biology model. Search procedure and appointment is made in accordance with the college that funds the open line. Within these constraints, the entire department conducts the search and votes as one group on the proposed candidates.
Tenure decisions: There are a few possible models here:
(i) Biology Model: Each super-‐department is assigned a Lead Dean,and the tenure procedure for ALL cases (regardless of which collegefunds the relevant line) follows the procedure for the Lead Dean’scollege. There will be a single vote in which every tenured super-‐department member gets a vote. For cases where the line is fundedby another college, the Lead Dean will assemble the ad hoc committeein consultation with the Funding Dean, and it is expected that the adhoc committee will consist of at least one member from each college.The Lead Dean will prepare a recommendation to the Provost, but theFunding Dean will have the opportunity to write a conflictingrecommendation in the event of disagreement.
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(ii) For each candidate, the tenure procedure follows the tenureprocedure for the college that funds the line. Again, though, there willbe a super-‐department vote in which every tenured faculty member inthe super-‐department gets a vote.
(iii) Hybrid: The tenure procedure is the same for ALL cases(regardless of which college funds the relevant line), perhapsfollowing the procedure for the Lead Dean’s college, or perhapsfollowing a new procedure designed for this department. However,the Funding Dean will assemble the ad hoc committee, and theFunding Dean will prepare a recommendation to the Provost.
Note: The advantage of the first and third is that there is a uniform procedure for all super-‐department members. The advantage of the second is that non-‐lead deans retain more control over their lines.
Space: It is highly desirable that the super-‐department be housed together in shared space, so that it truly has the culture of a single department (as in the shared Biology departments).
Graduate Program: Ideally, the super-‐department would consolidate graduate education in the discipline into a single field/curriculum. All graduate students in the super-‐department would operate under the same funding rules and packages (that would be competitive with our peers, of course). Students with specialized interests would be accommodated under concentrations within the common graduate program.
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Discussion
The main advantage of this approach is that it would create a large and prominent “core” department that eliminates the dispersion of faculty (especially if the space issue is solved), while at the same time multiple colleges are still served.
In addition, there are potential cost savings associated with this model -‐-‐-‐ for instance, instead of having, say, 45 people spread across independent units, we could create a super-‐department of roughly 40 that would most likely be overall better, at least in the long term and if we assume that the resources for the new unit are sufficient for us to compete with our higher-‐ranked peers for faculty and graduate student talent.
A second advantage is that the hiring prospects for this larger “core” department might be better for some units than under the current structural arrangement. It might help in units outside A&S, where potential recruits sometimes express
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reservations about joining a department that lacks the core disciplinary name. It also might help in the A&S units, where potential recruits sometimes express reservations about the narrow coverage of a department.
Possible pitfalls:
The super-‐department model requires that the relevant deans work well together and perceive a shared mission. As such, we probably would involve at most three colleges in any one super-‐department. It would also be useful to have a few strategic joint appointments with disciplinary faculty in non-‐participating units.
For the super-‐department model to work, we probably need to have some narrowing of mission. Hence, a major part of the formation of a super-‐department is a process to decide what the mission will be (indeed, when assessing the feasibility of this model, it will be important to assess to what extent the relevant Deans will permit a consolidation of the missions). In addition, all members of the newly formed department should have inputs and a vote in the establishment of governing procedures for all aspects of faculty decision making.
Under this model, there is a tension between the autonomy of the department and the goals of the involved deans. For instance, the department might want to move in a direction that maximizes its stature in the discipline, while the component deans might want to influence the direction of the department so as to better serve their own missions. The extent of this tension might differ by discipline, but it must be explicitly addressed before implementing a super-‐department.
Open questions:
The existing Biology super-‐departments are in the most general colleges -‐-‐-‐ is this what has made them work?
If there is a Lead Dean, it will most likely be the A&S Dean in all cases -‐-‐-‐ is this a problem? Is this necessary?
Will faculty work well together, and see value in a unified department? Or will the arranged marriage be so troubled that faculty who are strong enough to get jobs at similar-‐ or higher-‐ranked institutions all leave Cornell? Or, worse still, stay and are disgruntled?
Are there ways to ensure salary equity over time across the colleges -‐-‐-‐ e.g., so that the average salaries for lines from each participating college are roughly the same? Should we even insist on salary equity, recognizing that in
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the context of limited resources, some inequity is inevitable given cross-‐faculty differences in research productivity, outside interest, etc?
Finally, what would happen to the faculty “orphans” (and their lines) under this model if the super-‐department includes units that are currently interdisciplinary? For example, a “natural” super-‐department in economics might include the economists in PAM, but not the handful of sociologists in PAM. Unless these sociologists are absorbed by another disciplinary unit, the risks of marginalization and eventual departure are extremely high, which would result in a net loss of sociologists on campus. Absorbing them into a disciplinary unit would entail a transfer of lines and resources (e.g., graduate student funding packages, TA packages, etc) across colleges; see Model 3, below.
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Model (3): Absorption
Under this model, we focus on one core department, and absorb lines from other units into this department. In the end, a large core department is housed entirely within one college, which functions as one department in all respects.
Absorption may be immediate (e.g., moving bodies as well as lines), or it may be long-‐term (e.g., moving lines only as they become vacant through normal attrition, retirement, etc). It also need not entail all members of the “sending” department(s). This would allow some sorting based on intellectual fit and related criteria, which may help Cornell avoid some of the internecine battles that plague many of the large and epistemologically diverse programs. It would also allow the “sending” college to retain the mission of the existing unit, albeit in attenuated form.
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The major advantage of this model is that it creates a larger core department, but also eliminates some of the constraints that emerge if the new unit has formal connections to multiple colleges. In particular, it may be that a college’s overall mission forces its department to adopt missions that are marginal to – and not rewarded by – the broader discipline. If so, perhaps we do not want that college to have formal authority over subfield coverage, tenure standards, and so forth.
At the same time, the core department may need to take on the current function of the units in the sending colleges. Otherwise, those colleges might feel the need to create new social science units that meet those needs, thereby recreating our current problem. The absorption model thus makes more sense if the sending college is willing to trim the scope of its mission, or meet it in other ways.
To the extent that the need is serving undergrads who want to major in social sciences, a possible solution is for the sending and receiving colleges to agree that the sending college’s students can major in the receiving college’s new, larger department.
We need explicit discussion of how the lines are accounted for. How many lines does the sending college lose? How many lines does the receiving college gain? (Similar questions emerge around the number of graduate students.) If absorption entails a major drain on the receiving college’s resources, the model is probably not politically feasible.
We would also need some commitment from the receiving dean on the long-‐run size of the department. There is some worry that if bodies and lines are transferred to the receiving college, the receiving college might, over time, merely shift some of those lines into other departments. To prevent this, one might, for example, formally agree that the absorbed lines are in addition to, not replacements for, existing line
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allocations. This would also help politically with implementation, in that the faculty in the receiving college’s department would not feel like they traded open lines for which they could recruit strategically for faculty who they had no input on hiring or promoting.
A related worry pertains to the student-‐faculty ratios in the new unit. If lines are moved from one college to another but students are not, it is likely that the number of students taught per line would go down -‐-‐ which might create an incentive for the receiving dean to reduce the department size. The drop in the student-‐faculty ratio may be attenuated somewhat by eliminating the current caps on A&S courses, caps that are necessary because demand exceeds the supply of TA resources. Nevertheless, we would want a formal commitment and agreement that the receiving dean will not hold declining student-‐faculty ratios against the department. (And we note that in some ranking systems low student-‐faculty ratios are a plus and therefore should not be undercut.)
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Model (4): Extensive Joint Appointments
Under this model, we create extensive links between departments through significant numbers of joint appointments. This can be done as a “stand alone” model or, as we recommend, in conjunction with one of the coordinating committee models discussed above.
We suspect that there are considerable cross-‐departmental differences in how the terms “joint appointment” and “courtesy appointment” are defined, and what rights and responsibilities come with each. We do not see any point in recommending that the various units adopt a common language, but for the purposes of the SSTF’s discussion, here is our terminology:
Joint appointments have full citizenship rights and responsibilities in the receiving department. They have a vote in departmental decisions, in exchange for which they are expected to attend meetings, serve on departmental committees (albeit in recognition of their responsibilities to their “home” units), and/or teach courses that are cross-‐listed in the receiving department. In some departments, voting joint appointments are only offered to faculty whose lines are partly funded by the receiving unit; in others, voting joint appointments can have 0% lines in the receiving unit. We do not feel that there should be a blanket policy governing whether votes are contingent on the source of the salary.
Courtesy appointments are more honorary than participatory. Courtesy appointments do not have a vote in the receiving unit, but are also not expected to commit much time or energy to the department. In some departments, courtesy appointments are invited to participate in some or all faculty meetings, although experience suggests that they rarely avail themselves of the opportunity to attend more meetings.
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Discussion
In general, we think joint appointments are more effective than courtesy appointments at creating cross-‐unit integration. They may also be more helpful in solving the mechanical ranking issue. We note, however, that even joint appointments’ contribution to a departments’ rankings depend on whether external assessors think of them as “real” members of the department or not. This is an empirical question, and unfortunately one that cannot be addressed with the extant data.
One issue with joint appointments (as defined above) is that the receiving department may resent ceding control over departmental decisions to faculty
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members whose fates are not intimately tied to the department. Acknowledging this concern, a 1997 external review team for Sociology recommended that joint appointments be made following three principles: (1) reciprocity, wherein faculty in the core units are offered joint appointments in the non-‐core units at roughly the same rate as the reverse; (2) proportional governance, wherein influence over hiring, promotion and tenure, and membership decisions is tied to active participation in the department (thereby preventing “fly-‐by” votes) and possibly delimited by area; and (3) coordinated exchange of time and other resources, facilitated by the administration, so that joint appointments can become more directly involved in departmental activities. The latter may require additional funds, especially if most of the joint appointments go in one direction (because the sending units must be compensated).
The external review team also alluded to a fourth principle, namely that the proportion of votes in a department held by joint appointments should be small enough that non-‐stakeholders cannot, on their own, drive important departmental decisions.
Assuming these four principles are met, integration through joint appointments might be a politically feasible change to implement. Not only does it entail relatively little major structural change, but it also allows department stakeholders to have some agency in deciding which extra-‐departmental faculty members are offered joint appointments.
We urge caution, however, because the joint appointment model has been advocated for the social sciences since at least the late 1990s, and thus far it has met with limited success. Joint appointments have been adopted extensively in one field, and it’s not clear that the dispersion problem has been solved. In addition, joint appointments have been advocated for another field, and have met with some resistance.
Finally, we note that joint appointments and a Coordinating Committee seem complementary, and perhaps we should think of them as part of the same model. In particular, if different units in the field had a more coordinated curriculum, with many shared courses and cross-‐listed courses, then there would already be a teaching stake for everyone. (Consolidation of graduate fields would also help on this dimension.) Although we suspect the “stakeholder” issue more often comes to the fore in decisions about hiring and promotion, joint responsibility for teaching may help alleviate the perception that joint appointments do not have as high of a stake in the fate of the receiving unit.
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