ss 20200218 annual humanitarian access review …...2020/02/18 · lifted, which enabled...
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INCIDENTS REPORTED VIOLENT INCIDENTS AID WORKERS KILLED AID WORKERS RELOCATED535 60% 3 129 94
BUREAUCRATIC IMPEDIMENTS84
OPERATIONAL INTERFERENCES
In 2019, the overall humanitarian access to affected people improved, partly due to the signing of the revitalized peace agreement in late 2018. A total of 535 access incidents were reported, compared to 760 incidents in 2018, although many access constraints remained under-reported. However, the operational environment for humanitarians remained challenging due to a relative increase in bureaucratic access impediments. Over half of all incidents involved violence against humanitarian personnel and assets. A third of all incidents occurred in Central Equatoria. Close to 50 per cent of incidents were attributed to State security forces and civilian authorities. Three aid workers were killed in Morobo County, Central Equatoria, while delivering humanitarian assistance. A total of 129 humanitarians were relocated due to insecurity, the most significant incident being the relocation of 26 INGO staff from Maban County, Upper Nile, following a number of intrusions, assaults and theft. The main causes of staff relocations were inter-communal violence and cattle raiding in Upper Nile, Unity and Lakes. Forty-seven staff were detained, which impacted the speed of humanitarian operations. Humanitarians were requested to pay bribes by both State and non-State actors, which led to the detention of staff and threats of eviction. Humanitarian operations were disrupted by active hostilities and military operations in Mundri East
and Yei in Western and Central Equatoria, and Maiwut and Panyikang in Upper Nile. Clashes between the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition forces in Maiwut led to activities being suspended and staff evacuations. Conflict in Kajo-Keji, Lainya, Morobo and Yei counties in Central Equatoria between SSPDF and National Salvation Front led to a number of health workers being killed, the suspension of humanitarian operations and delivery of critical health services. Looting of humanitarian supplies continued to be a challenge in 2019. There were also physical access constraints such as the poor state of roads following the unusually heavy flooding. Moderate access gains were noted in Greater Baggari in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Humanitarians were also able to reach affected people by road and river in Jonglei and Upper Nile. A reduction in road blocks was reported along major roads in Juba, Rumbek-Wau and Unity. Sporadic fighting and security operations disrupted road movements in areas such as Yei, Lainya and Mundri East. Humanitarian organizations were able to visit Ezo, Nagero and Tambura counties in Western Equatoria freely for the first time since 2016. Security restrictions to Pagak, Maiwut County, were lifted, which enabled humanitarian flights to Pagak and Maiwut to resume for the first time since 2017.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of Abyei area is not yet determined. Humanitarian access concerns humanitarian actors’ ability to reach populations affected by crisis, as well as an affected population’s ability to access humanitarian assistance and services. | 1. Civilians include identifiable individuals such as beneficiaries, community leaders, youth or former staff.
Creation date: 18 February 2020 | Sources: OCHA, humanitarian partners | Feedback: [email protected], [email protected] | unocha.org/south-sudan | reliefweb.int/country/ssd | southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info | @OCHASouthSudan | #NotATarget 1
SOUTH SUDAN2019 Humanitarian Access Overview
ACCESS INCIDENTS
170
74
65
5644
40
33
22
1912
January to December 2019
Number of incidents by area
Number of incidents by county
>1001-5 6-10 11-100No data
DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO
SUDAN
CENTRALAFRICANREPUBLIC
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
UGANDA
CentralEquatoria Eastern
Equatoria
WesternEquatoria
UpperNile
Jonglei
UnityWarrap
Lakes
Northern Bahr el Ghazal
Western Bahrel Ghazal
ABYEI REGION
See the reference map on page 5 for more information on the administrative areas
ATTRIBUTED TO INCIDENT TYPEAFFECTED AGENCIES
INCIDENT SEVERITY
2018-2019 INCIDENT TRENDS
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
20182019
54
42
5043 43
3529
58586058
52
48
65
78
3733
5952
80 80 80
49
52
SignificantModerateMinor
40% 36% 24%
UN
NNGO
INGO
50%
14%
36%
Non-State civilian authorities
Non-State armed forces
Civilians1
State civilian authorities
Criminals/unknown
State security forces
Restriction of movement
Active hostilities
Violence against assets
Operational interference
Bureaucratic impediments
Violence against personnel
7%
8%
15%
18%
36%
16%
27%
26%
19%
4%
15%
9%
2Creation date: 18 February 2020 | Sources: OCHA, humanitarian partners | Feedback: [email protected], [email protected] | unocha.org/south-sudan | reliefweb.int/country/ssd | southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info | @OCHASouthSudan | #NotATarget
A total of 319 violent incidents were reported in 2019. Three aid workers were killed in Morobo County, Central Equatoria, while delivering aid. This brings the number of aid workers killed since the conflict began to 115, and represents a sharp decline in aid worker deaths from 2018. The number of relocations dropped significantly in 2019, from 129 staff relocated in 11 incidents compared to 576 staff relocated in 28 incidents in 2018.
At least 47 staff were detained for extended periods in 26 incidents. Central Equatoria was the most insecure area for aid workers to operate, followed by Upper Nile. Criminals or unknown perpetrators were responsible for 44 per cent of all the incidents, while State security forces were responsible for a quarter of incidents. Violence or threats of violence against humanitarian personnel or assets accounted for 60 per cent of all the incidents.
Insecurity led to the relocation of 129 staff in 14 incidents and suspension of activities, with most of the relocations in Upper Nile. Two incidents of inter-communal fighting in Ulang resulted in the relocation of 45 humanitarian staff. A series of compound intrusions in Maban led to the relocation of 26 staff from the area. Over 19 humanitarian assets were confiscated, with threats to staff and demands for cash to negotiate their release. Ambushes and looting of trucks continued, with 14 looting incidents reported. Notable incidents included armed robberies in the Equatorias along Torit-Kapoeta and Torit-Juba roads, and in Terekeka.
Attacks on health facilities and medical staff continued to affect aid operations. Three health facilities were vandalized and looted in Lainya. In Mundri East, medical supplies were destroyed. Ebola Virus Disease screening centres along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Morobo County were closed following attacks that resulted in the death of three staff. Juba continued to face constraints, including threats, intimidation, harassment and detention of humanitarian staff. Movement of aid was restricted in Maiwut and Panyikang in Upper Nile, and Yei and Mundri East in the Equatorias as armed groups contested territorial control.
AID WORKERS KILLED BY YEAR
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
3
11
28
ATTRIBUTED TO
25
30
15
3
INCIDENT TYPE
Active hostilities
Violence against assets and facilities
Violence against personnel
14%
26%
60%
Non-State civilian authorities
State civilian authorities
Non-State armed forces
Civilians
State security forces
Criminals/unknown 44%
25%
18%
8%
4%
1%
RELOCATION OF AID WORKERS
129 aid workers relocated47 aid workers detained
DETENTION OF AID WORKERS
No data 11-100
Number of incidents by county
>1001-5 6-10
3 aid workers killed
44 active hostilities
319 3 47 129VIOLENT INCIDENTS REPORTED AID WORKERS KILLED AID WORKERS DETAINED AID WORKERS RELOCATED
SOUTH SUDAN: Violent attacks affecting aid workers, assets and operations 2019 Humanitarian Access Overview
VIOLENT INCIDENTS
Creation date: 18 February 2020 | Sources: OCHA, humanitarian partners | Feedback: [email protected], [email protected] | unocha.org/south-sudan | reliefweb.int/country/ssd | southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info | @OCHASouthSudan | #NotATarget
84 operational interferences
OPERATIONAL INTERFERENCE
38 restrictions of movement
RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT
Number of incidents by county
>1001-5 6-10 11-100No data
94 bureaucratic/administrative impediment
NON-VIOLENT INCIDENTS
28
INCIDENT TYPE
ATTRIBUTED TO
NON-VIOLENT INCIDENTS BY MONTH
Restriction of movement
Operational interference
Bureaucratic access impediments
18%
39%
43%
21
27
14
21 2119
1414
4
22
12
Criminals/unknown
Non-State civilian authorities
Non-State armed forces
Civilians
State security forces
State civilian authorities 40%
30%
10%
10%
9%
1%
In 2019, a sharp rise in administrative and deliberate impediments on the humanitarian response made the effective delivery of humanitarian aid challenging. The year saw an increase of circulars demanding money, duplicate registrations at state and local levels, imposition of taxes and fees, interference in recruitment processes and inconsistent application of policies. Bureaucratic impediments, operational interference and restrictions in movement in both State and non-State areas accounted for close to half of all incidents. State civilian authorities and security forces were responsible for 71 per cent of the incidents. These demands became so pervasive that many organizations stopped reporting them and many gave in to the demands. A third of the non-violent access constraints were in Juba. However, some positive access gains were reported since the signing of the revitalized peace agreement.
Demands that NGOs register at national and state level delayed how organizations responded in 2019. Local authorities made new requests for land rental fees in locations where NGO compounds had been present for years. Authorities also demanded that agencies pay land subscription fees in Fangak in Jonglei, Fashoda and Panyikang in Upper Nile, and Yei in Central Equatoria. When agencies refused, they were threatened and had their movements restricted. Demands for agencies to recruit from certain communities also led to humanitari-ans being threatened in Pibor in Jonglei, Ezo in Western Equatoria, and Aweil Centre in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. The introduction of new bureaucratic requirements for transportation of supplies and the movement of humanitarian convoys resulted in delays. The demand for aircraft landing fees affected humanitarian movement in several areas, such as Duk and Fangak in Jonglei, and Fashoda and Nasir in Upper Nile. Heavy charges at checkpoints continued throughout the year and the illegal taxation on contracted trucks disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid. There were incidents where humanitari-ans were unable to cross frontlines due to illegal permit demands and new travel authorization conditions.
3
NON-VIOLENT INCIDENTS REPORTED216 84 38
OPERATIONAL INTERFERENCES RESTRICTIONS OF MOVEMENT94
BUREAUCRATIC ACCESS IMPEDIMENTS
SOUTH SUDAN: Non-violent access constraints 2019 Humanitarian Access Overview
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
4
TOP 10 MINOR INCIDENTS
ATTRIBUTED TO
Administrative movement restrictions
Physical assault, injury, killing
Heavy and changing requirements
Other operational interference at field level
Humanitarian compound burglary
Suspension of humanitarian operations
Interference in response administration
Robbery, theft, ambush
Illegal fees, bribery
Threat, intimidation, harassment, extortion 20%
18%
12%
8%
7%
7%
7%
6%
3%
2%
Non-State armed forces
Non-State civilian authorities
Civilians
Criminals/unknown
State civilian authorities
State security forces 30%
25%
21%
15%
5%
4%
TOP 10 MODERATE INCIDENTS
ATTRIBUTED TO
Interference in response administration
Interference in response location
Suspension of humanitarian operations
Physical movement restrictions
Detention, arrest
Physical assault, injury, killing
Illegal fees, bribery
Other operational interference at field level
Threat, intimidation, harassment, extortion
Robbery, theft, ambush 23%
16%
11%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Non-State civilian authorities
Non-State armed forces
Civilians
State civilian authorities
State security forces
Criminals/unknown 29%
26%
17%
15%
9%
4%
Other operational interference at field level
Suspension of humanitarian operations
Administrative movement restrictions
Illegal fee, bribery
Relocation of staff
Humanitarian compound burglary
Looting
Physical movement restrictions
Physical assault, injury, killing
Robbery, theft, ambush
TOP 10 SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
ATTRIBUTED TO
18%
9%
8%
7%
6%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
Non-State civilian authorities
State civilian authorities
Civilians
Non-State armed forces
State security forces
Criminals/unknown 31%
26%
15%
12%
11%
5%
Creation date: 18 February 2020 | Sources: OCHA, humanitarian partners | Feedback: [email protected], [email protected] | unocha.org/south-sudan | reliefweb.int/country/ssd | southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info | @OCHASouthSudan | #NotATarget
2019 Humanitarian Access OverviewSOUTH SUDAN: Severity of access constraints
DEFINITIONS OF INCIDENT SEVERITY
SIGNIFICANTSerious incidents causing severe impact on staff, assets or response (e.g. prolonged detentions, staff injured/killed, assets stolen/damaged, premises attacked, insecurity causing relocation of staff or suspension of activities)
MODERATEIncidents with serious effect on staff, assets or response (e.g. staff detained for a day, staff threatened, injured or robbed, assets slightly damaged, partial lootings, burglary, temporary restriction of movement)
MINORIncidents of minor severity, without notable impact to staff, assets or response (e.g. staff temporarily stopped, assets temporarily confiscated, negligible theft/robbery)
DEFINITIONS OF ACCESS CONSTRAINTS
Bureaucratic/administrative impediments: Complex bureaucratic requirements affecting timely and principled delivery of humanitarian assistance (e.g. taxation, fees or duties, delays or denials of required paperwork, heavy procedures, changing rules or requirements)
Operational interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities: Direct interference (usually by political or military actors) with humanitarian activities (e.g. pressure to work in specific areas or link assistance to political or military agenda, interference in methodology or selection of staff/ vendors/ beneficiaries)
Restriction of movement of organizations, personnel or goods within or into the country: Impediments to freedom of movement as experienced by humanitarian partners to reach affected people and transport essential relief items (e.g. physical restrictions such as checkpoints, administrative restrictions or blockages granting access into/in the country)
Violence against humanitarian personnel: Politically or economically motivated violence, as well as exposure to incidental violence, directly affecting humanitarian personnel while on duty (e.g. threats of violence, harassment, physical assault, detention/arrest, robbery)
Violence against humanitarian assets and facilities: Politically or economically motivated violence, as well as exposure to incidental violence, directly affecting humanitarian assets and facilities (e.g. compound burglaries, looting of items, destruction of assets, commandeering/hijacking)
Active hostilities, military operations and inter-communal conflict impeding humanitarian operations: Implications of hostilities, military activities or inter-communal conflict by parties to the conflict or other weapon bearers for the movement of people and goods (e.g. suspension of operations or relocation of staff)
SEVERITY OF INCIDENTS
Violence against humanitarian personnel remained the most prevalent access difficulty in South Sudan in 2019. Nearly a quarter of all incidents were significant in their severity and severely impacted the humanitarian response. Harming staff, physical assaults, detentions, compound incursions, ambushes, theft and looting were the most significant incidents reported. State authorities, criminals/unknown and non-State authorities were each responsible for close to a third of the significant incidents. Moderate and minor incidents accounted for 36 and 40 per cent of all incidents respectively, and largely involved unnecessary administrative procedures, illegal taxation and fees, interference with operations, threats and intimidation of staff, theft and compound intrusions.
Yei
Lui
Ezo
Ibba
Akot
Ayod Waat
Nyal
Renk
Kaka
Dajo
Guit
RajaLeer
Adok
Tonj
Boma
Nasir
Wullu
Bunj
Mogos
Adior
Narus
Magwi
Pibor
Mvolo
Tonga
Akobo
Melut
Oriny
Mayom
Yirol
Lafon
Nzara
Mundri
Lainya
Maiwut
Nimule
Kongor
Warrap
BalietAtar 2
Nagero
Maridi
Ikotos
Morobo
Cueibet
Kapoeta
Pochala
Awerial
Yomding
Turalei
Gogrial
Tambura
Kuajiena
Terekeka
Lunyaker
Chukudum
Abiemnom
War-Awar
Kajo-keji
Riangnhom
Gok-MacharOld Fangak
Duk FadiatMaper
Bor
Wau
Juba
Torit
Aweil
Yambio
Rumbek
Kuajok
Bentiu
Malakal
S O U T H S U D A N
S U D A N
C E N T R A LA F R I C A N
R E P U B L I C
D E M O C R A T I CR E P U B L I C O F
T H E C O N G O
E T H I O P I A
K E N Y A
U G A N D A
JONGLEI
LAKES
UPPER NILE
UNITYWARRAP
WESTERNEQUATORIA
EASTERNEQUATORIA
WESTERN BAHREL GHAZAL
CENTRALEQUATORIA
NORTHERNBAHR ELGHAZAL
Raga
Pibor
Wau
Juba
Lafon
Uror
Ayod
Wulu
KapoetaEast
Ezo Ibba
Yei
Baliet
Renk
Duk
Maban
Akobo
Bor South
Tambura
Budi
Nagero
Melut
Torit
Maridi
Nyirol
Pariang
Terekeka
Yambio
Jur River
Nzara
Tonj North
Fangak
Manyo
Pochalla
Mvolo
Aweil Centre
Koch
Twic
Abyei region
Ulang
Guit
Magwi
TonjSouth
Cueibet
LongochukAweil East
Twic East
Awerial
Panyijiar
Yirol East
Mayom
Ikotos
Lainya
Maiwut
Panyikang
Yirol West
Tonj East
MundriWest
Aweil West Canal/Pigi
MundriEast
Fashoda
Rubkona
KapoetaNorth
Leer
Gogrial East
Mayendit
Kajo-keji
Rumbek North
Aweil North
GogrialWest
Luakpiny/Nasir
Rumbek East
RumbekCentre
Abiemnhom
Morobo
AweilSouth
Malakal
KapoetaSouth
International boundary
State boundary
County boundary
Undetermined boundary
Abyei region
Country capital
State capital
Administrative centre
0 10050 km
Primary road
Secondary road
Tertiary road
Main river
SOUTH SUDANBase map with roads and rivers
The administrative boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of Abyei area is not yet determined.Creation date: January 2020 | Sources: OCHA, SSNBS | Feedback: to [email protected] | unocha.org/south-sudan | reliefweb.int/country/ssd | southsudan.humanitarianresponse.info