specpro round 5 digests

8/3/2019 SpecPro Round 5 Digests

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MONCUPA v ENRILEG.R. No. L-63345

GUTIERREZ, JR; Jan 30, 1986

FACTS:- Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, wasarrested on April 22, 1982, 10:50 P.M., at QuezonAvenue, QC. He was detained at MIG-15 Camp

Bago Bantay. Next day, Apr 23, on the allegationthat he was a National Democratic Front (NDF)staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order(PCO) was issued against him and 8 otherpersons.- After two separate investigations, it wasascertained that Moncupa was not a member ofany subversive organization. Both investigatorsrecommended the prosecution of Moncupa onlyfor illegal possession of firearms and illegalpossession of subversive documents under PD33.- Two separate informations were filed againstMoncupa, one for illegal possession of firearmsbefore CFI Rizal, and the other for violation of P.D.

33 before the City Court of QC. Against the otheraccused, however, the cases filed were forviolation of P.D. 885 as amended.- Moncupa was excluded from the charge underthe Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During thependency of this petition, his arraignment andfurther proceedings have not been pursued. Ashis motions for bail were denied by the lowercourt, Moncupa filed this petition for habeascorpus.- Respondents, in their return of the writ, justifiedthe validity of Moncupas detention on the groundthat the privilege of the writ had been suspendedas to Moncupa.- However, on Aug 30, 1983, respondents filed a

motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983,Moncupa was temporarily released fromdetention on orders of the Minister of NationalDefense with the approval of the President, andthat since the petitioner is free and no longerunder the custody of the respondents, thepetition may be deemed moot and academic...- It should be noted that attached to Moncupa'stemporary release are restrictions imposed onhim:1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by thecondition that Moncupa gets the approval ofrespondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.

2) His liberty of abode is restricted because priorapproval of respondents is also required in casehe wants to change his place of residence.3) His freedom of speech is muffled by theprohibition that he should not "participate in anyinterview conducted by any local or foreign massmedia representatives nor give any press releaseor information that is inimical to the interest of

national security."4) He is required to report regularly torespondents or their representatives.- Moncupa argues that although admittedly histemporary release is an improvement upon hisactual detention, the restrictions imposed by therespondents constitute an involuntary and illegalrestraint on his freedom, and his temporaryrelease "merely shifted the inquiry from thelegality of his actual detention to the legality ofthe conditions imposed by the respondents."

ISSUE:WON the petition has become moot andacademic in view of Moncupa's temporary

release.

HELD:NORatio A release that renders a petition for a writof habeas corpus moot and academic must beone which is free from involuntary restraints.Where a person continues to be unlawfully deniedone or more of his constitutional freedoms, wherethere is present a denial of due process, wherethe restraints are not merely involuntary butappear to be unnecessary, and where adeprivation of freedom originally valid has, in thelight of subsequent developments, becomearbitrary, the person concerned or those applying

in his behalf may still avail themselves of theprivilege of the writ.- Moncupa may have been released from hisdetention cell, but the restraints attached to histemporary release preclude freedom of action.

The reservations of the military in the form ofrestrictions constitute restraints on his liberty,and limit his freedom of movement. It is notphysical restraint alone which is inquired into bythe writ of habeas corpus. The latitudinarianscope of the writ of habeas-corpus, as held inVillavicencio v Lukban, has, in law, remainedundiminished up to the present.- Villavicencio v. Lukban: A prime specification ofan application for a writ of habeas corpus is

restraint of liberty. The essential object andpurpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquireinto all manner of involuntary restraint asdistinguished from voluntary, and to relieve aperson therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Anyrestraint which will preclude freedom of action issufficient....- Caunca v. Salazar: (case involving employment

agencies restricting freedom of movement ofprospective employees/maids) Freedom may belost due to external moral compulsion, to foundedor groundless fear, to erroneous belief in theexistence of the will. If the actual effect of suchpsychological spell is to place a person at themercy of another, the victim is entitled to theprotection of courts of justice as much as theindividual who is illegally deprived of liberty bydeprived or physical coercion.- Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.:Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomesmoot and academic when the restraint on theliberty of the petitioners is l ifted eithertemporarily or permanently. The question to be

resolved is whether the State can reserve thepower to re-arrest a person for an offense after acourt of competent jurisdiction has absolved himof the offense. An affirmative answer (on theground that) the release being merely'temporary', it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal isrepugnant to the government of laws and not ofmen principle. Under this principle the moment aperson is acquitted on a criminal charge he canno longer be detained or re-arrested for the sameoffense.Disposition Petition granted. The conditionsattached to the temporary release of Moncupaare declared null and void. The temporary release

is declared absolute.

CHAVEZ V CA24 SCRA 663 (1968)

Habeas Corpus as remedy in cases of violation ofthe right against self-incrimination.

FACTS:Roger Chavez, Actor Ricardo Sumilang, EdgardoGing Pascual, Pedro Rebullo, Luis Baby Asistioand Lorenzo Meneses and three John Does wereaccused of car napping a Thunderbird car form

Johnson Lee.

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The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy andacquitted all of the accused except for RogerChavez. He was found guilty of qualified theft. Hisguilt was proven basing heavily on his testimonywhen he was called as witness in the proceedingsin the trial court by the prosecution on the firstday of trial for which he stated that he will not

testify.

The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal andthe related MR.

Chavez now comes to the Supreme Court allegingthat he was forced to testify against himself.

ISSUE:Whether or not the remedy of the writ habeascorpus is available.

HELD:Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that clearly Chavezprotested against being asked to be presented as

witness. The Court also ruled that there was nowaiver of his right against self-incrimination.

On the issue of the propriety of the writ the Courtstated:

The course which the petitioner takes is correct.Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It istraditionally considered as an exceptional remedyto release a person whose liberty is illegallyrestrained such as when the accused'sconstitutional rights are discarded. Such defectresults in the absence or loss of jurisdiction andtherefore invalidates the trial and the consequentconviction of the accused whose fundamental

right is violated. The void judgment of convictionmay be challenged by collateral attack, whichprecisely is the function of habeas corpus. Thewrit may issues even if another remedy which isless effective may be availed of by the defendant.

Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appealbefore the Court of Appeals does not preclude arecourse to the writ. The writ may be grantedupon a judgment already final.

Roger Chavez is ordered released.

GUMABON V. DIRECTOR OFPRISONS

37 SCRA 420 (1971)

The SC ruled that the 5 petitioners who continuedto languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus toquestion the legality of their continued detentionpursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez.

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Mario Gumabon, afterpleading guilty, was sentenced to suffer reclusion

perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion withmultiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmaresand Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to thecomplex crime of rebellion with multiple murderand other offenses, and were similarly made tosuffer the same penalty in decisions rendered.

The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trialalso for the complex crime of rebellion withmultiple murder and other offenses and penalizedwith reclusion perpetua. Each of them has servedmore than 13 years.2. The other accused, however, appealed theirconviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v.Hernandez to the effect that there can be no

complex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape,etc., for these common crimes are absorbed byrebellion. As a result, while those who appealedwere now free, those who did not remained in jail.3. Petitioners now premise their stand on thedenial of equal protection if their plea would notbe granted. They also invoke the codal provisionthat judicial decisions shall form part of the legalsystem of the Philippines, necessarily resulting inthe conclusion that the Hernandez decision oncepromulgated calls for a retroactive effect underthe explicit mandate of the Revised Penal CodeArt. 22 as to penal laws having such charactereven if at the time of their application a finalsentence has been rendered and the convict is

serving the same.

ISSUE:Is the writ of habeas corpus available under thecircumstances?

HELD:Yes.RATIO:1. The write of habeas corpus is the writ ofliberty, "the most important human rightsprovision" in the fundamental law, and one of theprincipal safeguards to personal liberty.InVillavicencio v. Lukban, the remedy challengedthe validity of the order of the then respondent

Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons butwithout legal justification, ordered thetransportation of more than 150 inmates ofhouses of ill-repute to Davao. In the opinion of

Justice Malcolm: The essential object and purposeof the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into allmanner of involuntary restraint as distinguishedfrom voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom

if such restraint is illegal. ANY restraint which willpreclude freedom of action is SUFFICIENT.2. Range of inquiry in a habeas corpusproceeding: No writ if person is in the custody ofan officer under process issued by a court ormagistrate.3. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right isshown to exist, the court that rendered the

judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction andhabeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assailthe legality of the detention.4. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of aconstitutional right, namely, the denial of equalprotection. In the case at bar, the petitionerswere convicted for the very same rebellion for

which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others wereconvicted. Contrary to the mandate of equalprotection, people similarly situated were notsimilarly dealt with. What is required under thisrequired constitutional guarantee is the uniformoperation of legal norms so that all persons undersimilar circumstances would be accorded thesame treatment both in the privileges conferredand the liabilities imposed.5. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length ofimprisonment in accordance with our controllingdoctrine, when others similarly convicted havebeen freed, is fraught with implications at warwith equal protection.

Teehankee, concurring and dissenting:The rule of prospective and non-retroactiveoperation of judicial doctrines, and its corollaryrule of the law of the case, have no applicationhere. Here, the whole question turns simply onthe nature of the crime of rebellion as defined insection 134 of the Revised Penal Code and themaximum penalty imposable therefor undersection 135 of the same Code. The case at barpresents a clear case of an excess in penaltyimposed beyond twelve years ofprision mayorwhich has become illegal by virtue of this Court'ssettled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannotbe complexed with other common crimes. On this

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ground, a crime that the law at the time of theirconviction as well as now punishes only with

prision mayorwhich they have more than fullyserved, would be to deny them theirconstitutional rights of due process and equalprotection of the law.

ABADIA V CASeptember 23, 1994; KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS- Respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan wasarrested in connection with the December 1989coup attempt.- He was brought to the ISG Detention Center inFort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained fornine months without charges.- A charge sheet was filed against privaterespondent by the office of the Judge AdvocateGeneral alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder andConduct Unbecoming an Off icer and aGentleman, respectively.

- A petition for habeas corpus was filed by theprivate respondent with the Court of Appeals onMarch 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed bythe said court's Fourth Division on the groundthat pre-trial investigation for the charges againstthe respondent was already ongoing before a Pre-

Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the JudgeAdvocate General's Office (JAGO).- Three months after these charges were filed,the Pre-Trial Investigative Panel came out with aResolution finding no evidence of directparticipation by the private respondent in theDecember 1989 coup.- Said panel nonetheless recommended thatrespondent be charged with violation of Article

136 of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy andProposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) andthe 96th Article of War in relation to the 94thArticle of War.- Consequently, all existing charges againstrespondent were dismissed and a new charge forviolation of Article of War No. 96 for ConductUnbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman forhaving allegedly been involved in a series ofconferences with other military officers for thepurpose of overthrowing the government,carrying with it the penalty of dismissal fromservice was filed with the General Court Martial(GCM) No. 8.

- Additionally, the Judge Advocate General'sOffice endorsed the filing of charges for violationof Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code to theQuezon City Prosecutor's Office. The CityProsecutor eventually came out with a resolutiondismissing the charges.- Upon private respondent's arraignment (andbefore entering his plea) in General Court Martial

No. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of War,private respondent entered a special motion todismiss the case on grounds of prescription underAW 38. The private respondent contended thatthe offense was supposed to have beencommitted between August to November, 1989,more than two years before his arraignment onApril 22, 1992.- Favorably resolving the motion to dismiss forbeing "substantial . . . meritorious and legallytenable," the General Court Martial dropped thelast remaining charge against private respondent.- The Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted areport to the Chief of Staff quoting the Resolutionof GCM No. 8 for "info/notation".

- Respondent filed a second petition for habeascorpus before the Court of Appeals where heassailed his continued detention at the ISGDetention Center in spite of the dismissal of allcharges against him. He contended that hiscontinued confinement under the circumstancesamounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty"correctable only by the court's "issuance of thehigh prerogative writ of habeas corpus."- The 12th Division of the Court of Appealsordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia,Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile,Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)oproduce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q.

Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for thelatter's continued detention.- 12th Division of CA promulgated the questioneddecision issuing a writ of habeas corpus andcommanding herein petitioners to release theprivate respondent.- Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari

ISSUEWON the Resolution of the 12th Division of CAcontravenes a previous decision by a co-equalbody, the Special 4th Division of the Court ofAppeals which dismissed respondent's petition forhabeas corpus.

HELD- NO. The factual circumstances surroundingboth decisions are different.- First, at the time of the first petition, the privaterespondent was being held in the detentioncenter for eleven months without charges beingfiled against him. The pre-trial investigative panelhad not yet been constituted. Because of his

confinement without charges, a petition for theissuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed inhis behalf on the basis of respondent's avermentthat his arrest and continued detention withoutcharges violated his constitutional rights.- The Fourth Division found adequate supportupholding military jurisdiction over the case ofthe private respondent under the Articles of War.It also noted that the case against the privaterespondent was ongoing and that it would bedifficult to order respondent's release on a writ ofhabeas corpus without giving military authoritiesreasonable time within which to investigate andtry the case. The Court nonetheless urged theChief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "with

all deliberate speed, consistent with hisconstitutional right to a speedy disposition of hiscase."- Second, by the time the subsequent petition forhabeas corpus was before the court's TwelfthDivision (herein respondent court), the JAGO'sPre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed allcases against the petitioner and endorsed thefiling of charges (under Article 136 of the RevisedPenal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor'sOffice. The latter subsequently dismissed thecase.- Moreover at the time the Twelfth Divisionrendered its assailed decision, respondent wasalready languishing in a military detention center

for three years, half of those spent in the limbobetween the GCM's decision dismissing the casesfiled against him and the uncertainty of when themilitary appellate process would finally comearound in either exonerating him or overturningthe GCM's findings. This in spite of the fact thateven during the first petition before the FourthDivision, the court had already urged speedydisposition of the case.- Finally, in dismissing the cases against theprivate respondent, the General Court Martial hadmade a determination that the charges againstrespondent had prescribed under Article 38 of theArticles of War. Conformably with this conclusionand with this Court's ruling in Domingo vs

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Minister of National Defense, the lower court wascorrect in stating that the respondent could nolonger be tried b the General Court Martial if aperiod of two years had elapsed prior to thearraignment of the accused.- Clearly, the circumstances, noted above, hadchanged so radically in the intervening periodthat the appellate court's Twelfth Division had no

choice, given the incredible delay in forwardingthe documents to the military appellate authority,but to issue the writ.- The mantle of protection accorded by theissuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends toall cases of illegal confinement or detention bywhich a person is deprived of his liberty, or bywhich the rightful custody of any person iswithheld from the person entitled thereto."- Petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence ofspecific rules relating to review of casesdismissed by military tribunals in violating theright of the accused to a speedy trial and in

justifying his continued confinement. Courtuphold the proposition that courts should decline

to exercise jurisdiction because the law itselfprovides no time frame for the proper militaryauthorities to review the general court martial'sdismissal of the respondent's case would meanthat we would be sanctioning the suggestionimplicit in petitioners' argument that theConstitution's guarantees are guaranteesavailable not to all of the people but only to mostof them.Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED.

ORDOEZ V. VINARAO[In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Oscar De

Guzman]239 SCRA 114; J. Romero; Dec 8, 1994

NATURE:Original petition for habeas corpus filed directlybefore SC

FACTS:-Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez was tried andconvicted by RTC San Jose City Br. 39 for violationof the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging inparticular the fact that de Guzman willfully andunlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana. Hewas sentenced to suffer the penalty of lifeimprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine andcosts. This decision was affirmed in toto by theSupreme Court.

-Several years after his conviction, SC in People v.Simon (July 29, 1994), interpreted Sec.20 ofRA6425 as last amended by RA7659 [effectiveDec 31, 1993] to mean that if the quantity of themarijuana involved is less than 250grams,imposable penalty shall be w/in range of prisioncorreccional (6mos and 1day to 6yrs).-De Guzman has been serving sentence since July

1984 or for more than 10yrs now. Petitionersallege that his continued detention in theNational Penitentiary is a violation of his basichuman rights and that, therefore, he should bereleased from prison without further delay. In aidof judicial administration, petitioners furtherrecommend that all prisoners similarly situatedbe likewise released from prison.

ISSUE:WON de Guzman is entitled to benefit from thereduction of penalty introduced by the new law.

HELD: YES.-The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of

illegal confinement or detention by which anyperson is deprived of his liberty upon a verifiedpetition setting forth: (see Rule 102.3)1. that the person in whose behalf the applicationis made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;2. the officer or name of the person by whom heis so imprisoned or restrained;3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrainedof his liberty; and4. a copy of the commitment or cause ofdetention of such person.Disposition Petition is granted. Writ of habeascorpus issued.Director of New Bilibid Prisons commanded toforthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's

discharge from confinement unless he is beingdetained for some other lawful cause, to makedue return of the writ, and to submit a completeinventory of all other prisoners therein similarlysituated within thirty days, to relieve them fromfurther confinement.

GORDULA V ENRILE125 SCRA 152

ABAD SANTOS; October 24, 1983

NATUREPetition for habeas corpus

FACTS- The petition for alleges that Yolanda Gordulawas arrested without warrant by elements of theMetrocom Intelligence Service Group [MISG]under the command of respondent Abadilla.petitioners exerted efforts to locate her. Amongother steps, they visited the ConstabularySecurity Group [CSG], the PC-INP Stockade, PC

12, MISG, M-2, Special Operations Group [SOG],and the Metrocom Investigation Unit [MIU]. Theysaid they did not detain Yolanda. Petitioners alsomade inquiries with the Ministry of NationalDefense, the Office for Detainee Affairs and theCivilian Relations Division. Her detainment wasneither confirmed nor denied.- On April 19, 1983, petitioner Leticia H. Gordulawent to M-2 [intelligence Unit], Camp Crame,Quezon City. There she was allowed to see M-2'slog book. On page 41 of said log book waswritten: #1831 18-13-15/83 MISG SCR- Petitioner Leticia was told that the abovenumbers refer to her sister YOLANDA. She wasfurther told that YOLANDA was had been brought

to MISG sometime in the evening of April 18,1983, and that YOLANDA was now detained atMISG.- A writ of habeas corpus was issued and askedrespondents to file a return. Respondents, in theirreturn asked for the dismissal of petition,averring that Yolanda is not in the custody of themilitary and that the logbook entry referred to bythe petitioners does not relate to the detention of

Yolanda but rather to the letter-communication ofpetitioners dated April 11, 1983, requesting theHonorable Minister of National Defense to locatethe whereabouts of Yolanda.

ISSUE/S

1. WON petition should be dismissed

HELD1. YESReasoning Considering that the respondentshave persistently denied having Yolanda H.Gordula in their custody and absent convincingproof to rebut their denial, the Court isconstrained to dismiss the petition.

The writer has received a letter from Mrs. LolitaGordula who lives in Virginia Beach, Virginia,U.S.A. Mrs. Gordula, who is Yolanda's mother,asks that the case be decided.

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This is the response to the request. Mrs. Gordula,I commiserate with you but this is the best thatcan be done under the circumstances

Disposition Petition is dismissed withoutprejudice to the filing of another as may bewarranted by new factual circumstances

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OFJUSTICEGR 132601

Puno; 19 January 1999

FACTS:For resolution are public respondents UrgentMotion for Reconsideration of the Resolution ofthis Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarilyrestraining the execution of petitioner andSupplemental Motion to Urgent Motion forReconsideration. It is the submission of publicrespondents that: the Supreme Court lost its

jurisdiction over the case at bar after the

judgment attained finality and hence can nolonger restrain the execution of the petitioner.This came because of:a. the public pronouncement of President Estradathat he will veto any law repealing the deathpenalty involving heinous crimes.b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al.,

that they are against the repeal of the law;c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution torepeal the law only bears his signature and thatof Senator Pimentel.

ISSUES1. Whether the court loses all its powers over thecase upon attainment of finality of its own

judgment?2. Whether the issuance of the TRO by the SCsuspending the execution of petitionerencroaches upon executive prerogatives?

HELD:The power to control the execution of its decisionis an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot bethe subject of substantial subtraction for ourConstitution7 [Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987Constitution.] vests the entirety of judicial powerin one Supreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be estabished by law. To be sure, the mostimportant part of a litigation, whether civil orcriminal, is the process of execution of decisions

where supervening events may change thecircumstance of the parties and compel courts tointervene and adjust the rights of the litigants toprevent unfairness. It is because of theseunforseen, supervening contingencies that courtshave been conceded the inherent and necessarypower of control of its processes and orders tomake them conformable to law and justice.8

[Section 5(f), Rule 135.] For this purpose, Section6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by lawjurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicialofficer, all auxiliary writs, processes and othermeans necessary to carry it into effect may beemployed by such court or officer and if theprocedure to be followed in the exercise of such

jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by lawor by these rules, any suitable process or mode ofproceeding may be adopted which appearsconformable to the spirit of said law or rules." Itbears repeating that what the Court restrainedtemporarily is the execution of its own Decision togive it reasonble time to check its fairness in lightof supervening events in Congress as alleged by

petitioner. The Court, contrary to popularmisimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of alaw enacted by Congress.

The Court through the 1987 Constitution for thefirst time was given the power to promulgaterules concerning the protection and enforcementof constitutional rights. The Court was alsogranted for the first time the power to disapproverules of procedure of special courts and quasi-

judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987Constitution took away the power of Congress torepeal, alter, or supplement rules concerningpleading, practice and procedure. In fine, thepower to promulgate rules of pleading, practiceand procedure is no longer shared by this Court

with Congress, more so with the Executive. If themanifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is tostrengthen the independence of the judiciary, it isinutile to urge, as public respondents do, that thisCourt has no jurisdiction to control the process ofexecution of its decisions, a power conceded to itand which it has exercised since timeimmemorial.

2..No Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution is onlythe source of power of the President to grantreprieves commutations and pardons and itcannot be interpreted as denying the power ofthe courts to control the enforcement of theirdecisions after finality. In truth, an accused who

has been convicted by final judgment stillpossesses collateral rights and the same can beclaimed in the appropriate courts.

The suspension of such a death sentence isundisputably an exercise of judicial power. It isnot a usurpation of the presidential power ofreprieve though its effect is the same -- thetemporary suspension of the execution of the

death convict. In the same vein, it cannot bedenied that Congress can at any time amend R. ANo. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to lifeimprisonment. The effect of such an amendmentis like that of commutation of sentence. But by nostretch of the imagination can the exercise byCongress of its plenary power to amend laws beconsidered as a violation of the power of thePresident to commute final sentences ofconviction. The powers of the Executive, theLegislative and the Judiciary to save the life of adeath convict do not exclude each other for thesimple reason that there is no higher right thanthe right to life.

MARTINEZ V MARTINEZ

BADILLO V FERRER152 SCRA 407

GANCAYCO; July 29, 1987

FACTS-Macario Badillo died intestate on Feb 4, 1966,survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and 5 minorchildren: Alberto 16, Nenita 14, Hilly 12, Cristy 9,and Maria Salome 5. He left a 77sqm land inLumban, Laguna with a house erected thereon,valued at P7,500 (PROPERTY). Hence, each minorplaintiff inherited a 1/12 share or P625 each.-Jan 18, 1967: Ferrer, in her own behalf and as

natural guardian of minor plaintiffs, executed aDeed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of thePROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was soldto defendant-appellants. Register of Deedsrecorded such and issued new TCT.-Nov 11, 1968: Modesta Badillo, Macarios sister,was able to obtain guardianship over minors andtheir property, without personal notice to theirmother, who was alleged could not be locatedinspite of the efforts exerted.-July 23, 1970: Modesta, as guardian, filed forannulment of the sale of minors share,conceding the validity of the sale of widowsshare, and asked that as co-owners, they be

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allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption.TC completely ruled in favor of minor-plaintiffs,herein appellees.

ISSUES1. WON appellees can still exercise legalredemption2. WON sale was valid and binding upon

appellees

HELD1. NO.Ratio The right of legal pre-emption orredemption shall not be exercised except within30 days from notice in writing by the prospectivevendor, as the case may be. The deed of saleshall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendorthat he has given notice thereof to all possibleredemptioners. (Art. 1623, CC)

The father, or in his absence the mother, is thelegal administrator of the property pertaining tothe child under parental authority. If the property

is worth more than P2,000, the father or mothershall give a bond subject to the approval of theCourt of First Instance. (Art. 320, CC)When the property of the child under parentalauthority is worth P2,000 or less, the father or themother, without the necessity of courtappointment, shall be his guardian. When theproperty of the child is worth more than P2,000,the father or the mother shall be consideredguardian of the childs property, with the dutiesand obligations of guardians under these rules,and shall file the petition required by section 2hereof. For good reasons the court may, however,appoint another suitable person. (Rule 93.7)Reasoning Using these provisions and relying on

Villasor v Medel (an analogous case; minorplaintiff received property together with cousinsby donation from grandmother), SC concluded:After Macarios demise, Ferrerautomatically became the minors legalguardian, their property being less thanP2,000 each. As such, she acquired theplenary powers of a judicial guardian exceptthat power to alienate or encumber herchildrens property without judicialauthorization.When Ferrer signed and received on Jan 18,1967, her copy of the Deed of ExtrajudicialPartition and Sale, such document servedas the required written notice in Art. 1623

and she received it also on behalf of herchildren. The period of redemptioncommenced then.Right after Modestas appointment as guardian(Nov. 11, 1968), she tried to redeem the widowsportion of the PROPERTY but the period for legalredemption has clearly expired.2. NO.

Reasoning Appellants contend that the sale isvoidable. If it is annulled, restitution of thingsreceived by both parties is proper. But theyconcede that the minors can only be required torestore partially to the extent of benefits tothem.SC said that voidable contracts arise from vice ofconsent. In this case, however, appellee minorswere not even parties. Their names were merelydragged into the contract by their mother whoclaimed to represent them. This contract isunenforceable having been executed by onewho has acted beyond her powers. Ferrerwas only granted the power of administration, not disposition.

The appellee minors never ratified the sale.In fact, they question its validity. Hence,the contract remains unenforceable. Norestitution may be ordered from thembecause the law does not sanction any.In sum, appellants can retain the 7/12 of thePROPERTY but must return the 5/12, representingappellee minors share.Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision underreview is hereby modified accordingly andappellants are directed to deliver possession ofabove appellees share (5/12), with nopronouncement as to costs.

GUERRERO VS TERAN13 Phil 212

JOHNSON; March 19, 1909

NATUREAppeal from a judgment of the CFI

FACTS- Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors MariaManuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz,filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recoverthe sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that Teranhad been the administrator of the estate ofAntonio Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906.

- Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 butclaimed that the latter owed him P482.14.- CFI found that Teran, as administrator of saidestate, owed Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46.

ISSUEWON Leopoldo Teran is liable.

HELDNO.Reasoning Teran was the duly appointed andrecognized representative of the minors MariaManuela and Maria del Carmen in theadministration of their interests in the estate ofAntonio Sanchez Munoz from Sept.17, 1901until March 18, 1902.- Teran was appointed as administrator of saidestate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a bondof 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithfulperformance of his duties as such representative.- On March 18, 1902, the CFI of Albay appointedMaria Munoz y Gomezas guardian for said minorsand she gave the required bond for the faithful

performance of her duties as such guardian.- While there are some indications that Terancontinued to act as the administrator of saidestate after the appointment of Maria Munoz yGomez, up to Oct. 6, 1906, yet the fact existsthat said Maria Munoz was the actualrepresentative of the minors from and afterMarch 18, 1902 until Oct.6, 1906, and thereforeshe, must be held responsible for the propertybelonging to said minors during the period.- Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not aresident of the Philippines at the time of herapppointment, was removed as guardian by theCFI. Felix Samson was then appointed asguardian. The mere fact that she was removed as

guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmenfrom liability to the minors during the time thatshe was duly acting as said guardian. If duringthe time that she was the guardian she allowedother persons to handle the property of her wardsand if any mismanagement or loss occurredthereby, the responsibility must fall upon her.

Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minorsbetween March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, theyhave a right of action only against said MariaMunoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and underthe law the administratrix of the property of theirestate.- Teran was liable for losses only during the timethat he was acting as the legal representative of

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come in and admit the allegation. The court,before it can make the decree as provided for inthe law, must have before it competent evidencedemonstrating the facts necessary to sustain thedecree, and that evidence must be clear anddefinite. The law is not satisfied unless the courthas before it facts which will justify the decree. Inproper cases, of course, the admissions made by

way of answer or otherwise by the party allegedto be a spendthrift may be taken intoconsideration by the court in the determination ofthe question involved and, under certaincircumstances, will doubtless be sufficient tosustain a decree of incompetency; but even suchadmissions should be received with caution, for incases of this character the foundation of thepetition is, in a way, the incompetency of theperson against whom the petition is directed andthe court should accept his admissions withconsiderable hesitation. If there is doubt the courtshould, in spite of his admissions, proceed withthe hearing of the case and require theproduction of evidence substantiate the

allegation of incompetency. Except by his ownconsent, it is legally impossible to declare a andincompetent and deprive him of his propertywithout clear and positive evidence upon whichthe declaration and the deprivation are based.Dispositive Proceedings to declare the

petitioner an incompetent and all orders, judgments, and decrees made and entered insaid proceedings are null and void.

SANTOS V. LOPEZ1 SCRA 1332

PAREDES; Apr 29, 1961

FACTS- Doa Justina is 93. Afflicted w/ infirmities, bed-ridden, blind and all alone.- Faustino asserts Wong Heng is exploiting Justinaand appropriated use, enjoyment, ownership ofher properties by fraud.- Faustino presented petition for appointment ofguardian over person & prop of Justina.- Judge Lopez authorized Faustino to bringdoctors. The doctors recommended transfer of

Justina to hospital.- Justina was confined.- Dec 1, 1951. Justina expressed desire to go backhome.

- Dec 11. Lopez decreed continuousconfinement.- Dec 21. Lopez appointed Gochangco asspecial guardian over person of Justina.- Faustino presented alleged affidavit of Justinathat she desires to stay in hospital and shedoesnt want a guardian except Faustino.- Lopez insisted in carrying out her order, saying

there are 57 contending parties claiming to berelatives, that Justina has no will, that otherrelatives charge Faustino w/ selfish motives. Shesays it was w/in power of court, in guardianshipproceedings, to appoint special / temporaryguardian.- Faustino went to SC.- Dec 24. Lopez appointed Gochangco asregular guardian. Faustino appealed to the CA,which certified the case (appointment as regularguardian) to the SC and is now pending.

ISSUEWON court has authority to appoint Gochangcoas special guardian

HELDISSUE NOT RESOLVED. Because of appointmentof Gochangco as regular guardian, presentpetition is MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

SINGCO V LONGA

MARGATE V RABACAL

ENRIQUEZ ET v A. S. WATSON &CO.

141 SCRA 436Trent; March 30, 1912

FACTS The eight plaintiffs (Rafael, Antonio, Trinidad,Cayetano, Rosario, Gertrudis, and CarmenEnriquez, and Antonio Gascon ) each have a one-eighth undivided interest in 3 properties inEscolta, City of Manila. The properties wereleased to the defendant for a period of twelveyears with permission to renew the lease for afurther period of six years. Seven of theseplaintiffs were of age when they executed thiscontract of lease. The other, Antonio Gascon, wasa minor. At the time this contract of lease wasexecuted, the minor was represented by his

judicial guardian. The guardian having obtained

authority or permission of the court to enter intothis contract of lease for and on behalf of hisward, the action of the guardian in executing saidcontract was approved by the probate court.Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant for therescission and declaration of nullity of thecontract of lease. The RTC ruled in favor ofdefendants.

Other FactsDefendant commenced destruction of a wall of abuilding in the leased premises, writ ofpreliminary injunction prayed for.Philippines Drug Company intervened. It allegedthat it is the actual owner of the pharmacysituated in the leased premises, which formerlybelonged to the defendant.

ISSUEWON the contract of lease is voidable because ofthe minority of one of the lessors

HELDNO

Article 1548 of the Civil Code reads:The husband can not give in lease the property ofthe wife, the father and guardian, that of the sonor minor, and the administrator of property, nothaving a special power, for a period exceedingsix years.Article 398 of the same code provides:The decision of a majority of the coowners as tothe management and better enjoyment of thething owned in common shall be obligatory.There shall be no majority, unless the resolutionhas been adopted by the coowners representinga majority of the interests which constitute theobject of the community.Should there be no majority, or the resolution of

the latter is seriously prejudicial to the partiesinterested in the thing owned in common, the judge, at the instance of a party, shall decreewhat may be proper, including the appointmentof an administrator.- Counsel for the plaintiffs do not claim that thecontract of lease which was made for a period ofmore than six years is seriously prejudicial to theinterests of the minor, nor do they claim that saidcontract, of itself, prejudices in any way theminor's interest.- In the execution of the contract of lease underconsideration, the minor was represented by his

judicial guardian, who not only asked the courtfor and obtained authority to execute this

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contract of lease on behalf of his ward, but hisact, after the execution, was approved by thecourt. The interest of the minor has not beenprejudiced by reason of the fact that this contractof lease was executed for a term of more than sixyears. Under the doctrine laid down by thesupreme court of Spain, it would appear that thiscontract of lease would not be valid if the minor

had not been represented by his guardian. Theminor having been represented by his dulyappointed guardian, there can be no questionabout the validity of this contract of lease.

LICHAUCO V TAN PHO

LIM CHU LAN v. LIM CHU KUNG.R. No. 31316

STREET; December 28, 1929

NATUREAppeal from an order of the CFI Manila removingthe appellant, Lim Chu Kun, from the position of

guardian of the minor, Lim Chu Lan andappointing in his stead one Chin Chong Gui,husband of Lim Chu Lan.

FACTS- Lim Chu Lan is now over 20 years of age andthe wife of Chin Chong Gui.- A motion was filed by Lim Chu Lan where it isstated that the estate of the minor is in the handsof Lim Chu Kun, a brother of Lim Chu Lan, in thecharacter of guardian.- The value of the estate of the petitioner endingwith the year 1927 was in the amount ofP333,496.04 and that the annual average incomeof the petitioner's property has been more than

P15,000.- Lim Chu Lan contracted marriage with ChinChong Gui and since that date, the guardian, LimChu Kun, has supplied no maintenance to the LimChu Lan. She therefore asks that her guardian berequired to supply maintenance in the amount ofP500 per month and that he be substituted in theguardianship by the petitioner's husband, ChinChong Gui.

ISSUEWON there is sufficient ground to remove LimChu Kun as the guardian of Lim Chu Lan.

HELD

YES. The order appealed from was a properexercise of the discretion vested in the Court ofFirst Instance in such matters, since it is clearthat in the language of section 574 of the Code ofCivil Procedure the appellant had shown himselfto be unsuitable for the position of guardian ofthe petitioner.- The fact of marriage alone introduces a change

in the conditions of guardianship over a minorwoman, and although the marriage of a girl whois under guardianship does not ipso facto abolishthe guardianship over the property, it doesterminate the guardianship over the person.- Moreover, the existence of a guardianship overthe estate of a married woman in other handsthan those of the husband is in certain respectsundesirable, since the husband is legally entitledto the management of conjugal property, and theearnings of the paraphernal property of the wifeconstitute community property. Therefore, if thehusband is found to be a suitable person, he isthe proper individual to fill the office. In the casebefore us it is not shown that the husband is unfit

for the office to which he was appointed by thetrial court.- The sum of P500 per month is not improper fora person having the standing of the petitioner inthe community, in view of the size of the capitalof her estate and its earning capacity.Disposition The order appealed from will beaffirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs againstthe appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THEGUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN

PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON VPHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

3 SCRA 751JBL REYES; December 28, 1961

FACTS- 1957 - Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson, motherof a veteran who died in World War II, becameentitled to certain accrued insurance benefitsworth P10,738 and a monthly deathcompensation for the rest of her life extended bythe United States Veterans Administration. CFI LaUnion found Carmen to be an incompetent andappointed PNB as guardian of her estatecomprising the monies due from the VeteransAdministration.

-1960 Carmen alleged she had regained hercompetence and filed a petition for terminatingthe guardianship and delivery of the residuaryestate. Attached was a medical certificateattesting that she was mentally competent andpossessed full knowledge of her environmentalsurroundings. This was opposed by VeteransAdministration that by reason of her advanced

age (78), physical and mental debility, she wasstill an incompetent within the meaning ofSection 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court.- Francisco Bengson, the son of the ward, filed a"Manifestation" to the effect that he was thepersonal guardian of the incompetent; that ifappointed guardian of her estate instead of PNB,he will comply with all the provisions of the Rulesof Court, will not ask any remuneration for hisservices, and will file a nominal bond.- CFI - ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointedguardian of the ward's estate to substitute PNBupon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties.

The required bond was filed and letters ofguardianship issued to Francisco Bengson.

- MFR - denied but raised the bond to P13,000,based on a finding that the cash balance of theestate then amounted to P11,464.34 plus themonthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 perannum. Hence, this joint appeal by the PhilippineNational Bank and the Veterans Administration.

ISSUEWON PNB should be removed as guardian ofCarmen

HELDNORatio Since the Rules enumerate the grounds forremoval of a guardian, a guardian cannot be

legally removed from office except for the causestherein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno).Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs.Ribaya) has been held sufficient ground forremoval, premised on the logic that antagonisticinterests would render a guardian unsuitable forthe trust. To the extent that a court uses itsdiscretion in appraising whether a person isunsuitable or incapable of discharging his trust,that much it can be said that removal isdiscretionary. But the discretion must beexercised within the law, and when the latter haslaid down the grounds for removal of a guardian,discretion is limited to inquiring as to theexistence of any of those grounds.

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Reasoning- The grounds for which a guardian may beremoved are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of theRules.

"When a guardian becomes insane or otherwiseincapable of discharging his trust or unsuitabletherefor, or has wasted or mismanaged theestate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to

render an account or make a return, the courtmay, upon reasonable notice to the guardian,remove him, and compel him to surrender theestate of the ward to the person found to belawfully entitled thereto . . ."

- No pretense is made in this case, and nothing inthe record would indicate, that there was anylegal ground upon which the removal of PNB asguardian was founded.- Neither in Francisco Bengson's manifestationnor in the orders of the lower court is it made toappear that PNB had become incapable ofdischarging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, orthat it had committed anything which the Rulesincludes as grounds for removal. On the contrary,

it appears incontestable that all throughout, PNBhas discharged its trust satisfactorily.- That it has received commissions allowed by lawfor its services is no ground to remove it,especially since the Bank's commission averagesno more than P100.00 a year and is offset byinterest on the ward's deposit and the sum thatthe son would probably have to disburse in bondpremiums.- Neither is it sufficient to base removal on theunsubstantiated opinion that it would be morebeneficial to the interests of the ward and moreconvenient for the administration of the estate.- A guardian should not be removed except forthe most cogent reason; otherwise, the removal

is unwarranted and illegal.Disposition Orders are reversed

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OFINCHAUSTI

IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALSand ZENAIDA C. BOBILES

205 SCRA 356REGALADO; January 24, 1992

FACTS

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobilesfiled a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6)years old and who had been living with her familysince he was four (4) months old, before theRegional Trial Court of Legaspi City,

The court a quo, finding the petition to besufficient in form and substance, issued an orderdated February 15, 1988 setting the petition forhearing on March 28, 1988. The order was dulypublished, with copies thereof seasonably servedon the Solicitor General; Assistant ProvincialFiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat,father of the child; and the social worker assignedto the court. A copy of said order was posted onthe bulletin board of the court and in the otherplaces it had required for that purpose. Nobodyappeared to oppose the petition.

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirementshaving been proved at the hearing, the

testimonies of herein private respondent,together with that of her husband, DioscoroBobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of theDepartment of Social Welfare and Developmentwere taken and admitted in the proceedings.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court renderedjudgment granting the petition for adoption. CAaffirmed. Hence, this recourse.

The petition for adoption was filed by privaterespondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,1988, when the law applicable wasPresidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a

petition for adoption may be filed by either of thespouses or by both of them. However, after thetrial court rendered its decision and while thecase was pending on appeal in the Court ofAppeals, Executive Order No. 209, the FamilyCode, took effect on August 3, 1988. Underthe said new law, joint adoption by husbandand wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitionercontends that the petition for adoption should bedismissed outright for it was filed solely byprivate respondent without joining her husband,in violation of Article 185 of the Family Codewhich requires joint adoption by the spouses. It

argues that the Family Code must be appliedretroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles,as the latter did not acquire a vested right toadopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of herpetition for adoption.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Family Code requirement of joint adoption by the H and W should be appliedretroactively.2. Whether or not, on the assumption that thenon-inclusion of the H as co-petitioner is a

jurisdictional defect, only the W would be deemedto be the sole adopter.

HELD

1. NO.

RATIO

From a procedural standpoint, we start with the

premise that Article 185 of the Family Code isremedial in nature. Procedural statutes areordinarily accorded a retrospective constructionin the sense that they may be applied to pendingactions and proceedings, as well as to futureactions. However, they will not be so appliedas to defeat procedural steps completedbefore their enactment.

Procedural matters are governed by the law inforce when they arise, and procedural statutesare generally retroactive in that they apply topending proceedings and are not confined tothose begun after their enactment although, withrespect to such pending proceedings, they affect

only procedural steps taken after theirenactment.The rule that a statutory change in matters ofprocedure will affect pending actions andproceedings, unless the language of the actexcludes them from its operation, is not soextensive that it may be used to validate orinvalidate proceedings taken before it goes intoeffect, since procedure must be governed by thelaw regulating it at the time the question ofprocedure arises.

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from thepurely procedural, aspect of a case is substantivein nature and is subject to a more stringent rule.

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A petition cannot be dismissed by reason offailure to comply with a law which was not yet inforce and effect at the time. As long as thepetition for adoption was sufficient in formand substance in accordance with the law ingovernance at the time it was filed, thecourt acquires jurisdiction and retains ituntil it fully disposes of the case. To repeat,

the jurisdiction of the court is determined by thestatute in force at the time of the commencementof the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whetherin criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannotbe ousted by subsequent happenings or events,although of a character which would haveprevented jurisdiction from attaching in the firstinstance.

REASONING

Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theoryimplies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobilesas a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence

its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score.It could not be taking exception only on theground of non-joinder since petitioner must beaware that non-joinder is not a ground forthe dismissal of an action or a specialproceeding. We further apprehend that thisobjection has been raised for the first time onappeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shallclarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in itsaforestated assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides forretroactive effect of appropriate relevantprovisions thereof, subject to the qualificationthat such retrospective application will not

prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights inaccordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivityand extent does not depend upon events foreignto the will of the holder.The term expresses theconcept of present fixed interest which in rightreason and natural justice should be protectedagainst arbitrary State action, or an innately justand imperative right which enlightened freesociety, sensitive to inherent and irrefragableindividual rights, cannot deny. Vested rightsinclude not only legal or equitable title to theenforcement of a demand, but also an exemptionfrom new obligations created after the right has

vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,private respondent had the right to file a petitionfor adoption by herself, without joining herhusband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed herpetition, she was exercising her explicit andunconditional right under said law. Upon her filingthereof, her right to file such petition alone and tohave the same proceed to final adjudication, in

accordance with the law in force at the time, wasalready vested and cannot be prejudiced orimpaired by the enactment of a new law.

When private respondent filed her petition inSpecial Proceeding No. 1386, the trial courtacquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance withthe governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter ofsubstantive law, the established rule is that the

jurisdiction of the court is determined by thestatute in force at the time of the commencementof the action.

2. NO

RATIO

The H, Dioscoro, submitted an affidavit of consentwhich he affirmed in Court when he testified onthe same.

Under the circumstances then obtaining, and byreason of his foreign residence, he musthave yielded to the legal advice that anaffidavit of consent on his part sufficed tomake him a party to the petition. This isevident from the text of his aff idavit.Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in theformal requirements should yield to and be

eschewed in the higher considerations ofsubstantial justice. The future of an innocent childmust not be compromised by arbitrary insistenceof rigid adherence to procedural rules on the formof pleadings.

REASONING

We see no reason why the following doctrines inAmerican law should not apply to this case and,for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settledrule therein that adoption statutes, as wellas matters of procedure leading up toadoption, should be liberally construed tocarry out the beneficent purposes of the

adoption institution and to protect theadopted child in the rights and privilegescoming to it as a result of the adoption. Themodern tendency of the courts is to hold thatthere need not be more than a substantialcompliance with statutory requirements tosustain the validity of the proceeding; to refusewould be to indulge in such a narrow and

technical construction of the statute as to defeatits intention and beneficial results or to invalidateproceedings where every material requirement ofthe statute was complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not theduty of the courts to bring the judicial microscopeto bear upon the case in order that every slightdefect may be enlarged and magnified so that areason may be found for declaring invalid an actconsummated years before, but rather toapproach the case with the inclination to upholdsuch acts if it is found that there was asubstantial compliance with the statute. 20 Thetechnical rules of pleading should not be

stringently applied to adoption proceedings, andit is deemed more important that the petitionshould contain facts relating to the child and itsparents, which may give information to thoseinterested, than that it should be formally correctas a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally heldthat a petition will confer jurisdiction if itsubstantially complies with the adoption statute,alleging all facts necessary to give the court

jurisdiction.

In determining whether or not to set aside thedecree of adoption the interests and welfare ofthe child are of primary and paramountconsideration. The welfare of a child is of

paramount consideration in proceedings involvingits custody and the propriety of its adoption byanother, and the courts to which the applicationfor adoption is made is charged with the duty ofprotecting the child and its interests and, to bringthose interests fully before it, it has authority tomake rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily,the approval of the adoption rests in the sounddiscretion of the court. This discretion should beexercised in accordance with the best interests ofthe child, as long as the natural rights of theparents over the child are not disregarded. In theabsence of a showing of grave abuse, theexercise of this discretion by the approvingofficial will not be disturbed.

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In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to andconferred by the decree of adoption will be forthe best interests of the child. His adoption iswith the consent of his natural parents. Therepresentative of the Department of SocialWelfare and Development unqualifiedlyrecommended the approval of the petition for

adoption and the trial court dispensed with thetrial custody for several commendatory reasons,especially since the child had been living with theadopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, thesaid petition was with the sworn written consentof the children of the adopters.

The trial court and respondent court actedcorrectly in granting the petition for adoption andwe find no reason to disturb the same. As foundand aptly stated by respondent court: "Given thefacts and circumstances of the case andconsidered in the light of the foregoing doctrine,We are of the opinion and so hold that the decreeof adoption issued by the court a quo would go along way towards promoting the welfare of the

child and the enhancement of his opportunitiesfor a useful and happy life."

REPUBLIC V TOLDENO

REPUBLIC V MILLER

LAZATIN v CAMPOSGR No. L-43955-56

TEEHANKEE; July 30, 1979

FACTS:- Jan 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestatein Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita deAsis, and his adopted twin daughters,

respondents Nora and Irma. Margaritacommenced an intestate proceeding before CFI.Several persons intervened, claiming to beadmitted illegitimate (not natural) children ofMariano.- April 11, 1974, Margarita also died, leaving aholographic will. During her lifetime, Margaritakept a safety deposit box at the People's Bankand Trust Company, which either she or Noracould open. Five days after Margarita's death,Nora opened the box and removed its contents:(a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers andthose of her sister Irma; and (c) jewelry belongingto her and to her mother. Nora claims that sheopened the box in good faith, believing that it

was held jointly by her and her mother. Her solereason for opening it was to get her stockcertificates and other small items. When she wasto close it, the bank personnel informed her thatshe needed court authority, in view of hermother's death and so, she removed everything.- June 3, 1974, private respondents filed apetition to probate the will of Margarita. Ramon,

son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.Clara, filed a motion claiming that Margarita hadexecuted a subsequent will and demanding itsproduction. He also prayed for the opening of thesafety deposit box. Nora admitted that sheopened the box but there was no will or anydocument resembling a will therein.- Upon order of the probate court, the deposit boxwas opened on Nov 6, 1974, at which time it wasfound to be empty, because Nora had alreadyremoved its contents.- Nov 22, 1974, seven months after Margaritasdeath, petitioner Renato intervened for the firsttime in the proceedings to settle the estate ofMariano as an admitted illegitimate (not natural)

child. On the same date, petitioner's son, Ramon,filed a petition in the estate proceedings ofMargarita to examine private respondents on thecontents of the safety deposit box. Probate courtordered Nora to deliver the properties taken fromthe box to the Clerk of Court.- The two cases were then transferred to the salaof Judge Campos, Jr., who issued an orderrequiring Nora to produce all those papers anditems removed from the safety deposit box withinone week. Nora deposited with the Clerk of Court,not the items themselves, but two keys to a newsafety deposit box which could only be openedupon order of the court. (She was later held incontempt.)

- Aug 20, 1975, Renato filed a motion tointervene in the estate of Margarita as anadopted child, on the basis of an affidavitexecuted by Benjamin Lazatin, brother ofMariano, which stated that Renato was an"illegitimate son" of Mariano and was lateradopted by him. This affidavit was later modifiedto state that petitioner was adopted by bothMariano and his wife Margarita.- Lower court allowed Renato to intervene asadopted son in the estate of Margarita. ButRenato presented no decree of adoption in hisfavor. Instead he attempted to prove that he hadrecognized the deceased spouses as his parents;he had been supported by them until their death;

formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" butwas compelled to change his surname to "Sta.Clara" when the deceased spouses refused togive consent to his marriage to his present wife;that at first, he and his wife stayed at theresidence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita,but a few months later, they transferred to theMercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by

the deceased spouses, where they continuouslyresided up to the present. Photographs were alsointended to be presented, e.g., photo of Irmawhere she addressed herself as his sister; photoof him and Margarita when he was a boy;document showing that his real name is "RenatoLazatin."- Lower court barred the introduction of Renatosevidence as they do not prove or have notendency to prove the existence of any judicial

proceeding where the adoption was taken upby any court. Neither do the evidence tend toestablish the presence of any record of aproceeding in court where the adoption washeld. The evidence, however, tends to prove a

status of a recognized natural child which,however, is not the legal basis for which Renatoand Ramon seek to intervene.- Renato then filed in both cases a motion todeclare as established the fact of adoption inview of Nora's refusal to comply with the ordersof the court to deposit the items she hadremoved from the safety deposit box ofMargarita, invoking Rule 29.3 ROC. Court deniedmotion.- April 26, 1976, Nora deposited with the courtthe items she had removed from the safetydeposit box. An inventory was conducted, and theitems surrendered consisted only of pieces of

jewelry and stock certificates.

- The lower court, ruling on Renatos motion fordefinite resolution on his previous motion todeclare as established the fact of adoption,issued an order stating that he has failed toestablish such status.

ISSUE:WON Renato has established his status asadopted child of the deceased spouses.

HELD:NO- Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in remwhich creates between two persons a relationshipsimilar to that which results from legitimate

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paternity and filiation. Only an adoption madethrough the court, or in pursuance with theprocedure laid down under Rule 99 is valid in this

jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but iswholly and entirely artificial. To establish therelation, the statutory requirements must bestrictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is anabsolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never

presumed, but must be affirmatively proved bythe person claiming its existence. The absence ofa record of adoption has been said to evolve apresumption of its non-existence. Where, underthe provisions of the statute, an adoption iseffected by a court order, the records of suchcourt constitute the evidence by which suchadoption may be established.- Renato's proofs do not show or tend to showthat at one time or another a specific court ofcompetent jurisdiction rendered in an adoptionproceeding initiated by the late spouses an orderapproving his adoption as a child of the latter. No

judicial records of such adoption or copies thereofare presented or attempted to be presented. He

merely claims that he was judicially adoptedbetween the years 1928 and 1932. He did notshow which court decreed such adoption, and hecited no witnesses to such proceeding. Thecertification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manilathat pre-war records were destroyed or burneddoes not furnish any legal basis for a presumptionof adoption in his favor. This is because there wasno proof that he was really adopted in Manila orthat an adoption petition was filed in CFI Manilaby the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a

judgment of approval was rendered by said court.Moreover, if there was really such adoption, hecould have conveniently secured a copy of thenewspaper publication of the adoption as

required under Rule 99.4 or a certification of thepublishing house to that effect. The one who gavethe written consent to the adoption (Rule 99.3),whether the parents or orphanage, also does notappear.- The absence of proof of such order of adoptionby the court cannot be substituted by parolevidence that a child has lived with a person, nothis parent, and has been treated as a child toestablish such adoption. Even evidence ofdeclaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime,that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, andthat he had adopted him, and of the fact that thechild resided with the deceased, as a member ofhis family, from infancy until he attained his

majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact ofadoption. Nor does the fact that the deceasedspouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized andreferred to Renato as an adopted childnecessarily establish adoption. Withal, theattempts of Renato to prove his adoption by actsand declarations of the deceased do notdischarge the mandatory presentation of the

judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of hisevidence is rather to establish his status as anadmitted illegitimate child.- Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissiblewhere the records of adoption proceedings wereactually lost or destroyed. But, prior to theintroduction of such secondary evidence, theproponent must establish the former existence ofthe instrument. The correct order of proof is asfollows: Existence; execution; loss; contents;although this order may be changed if necessaryin the discretion of the court. The sufficiency ofthe proof offered as a predicate for the admissionof an alleged lost deed lies within the judicialdiscretion of the trial court under all the

circumstances of the particular case. Here,Renato failed to establish the former existence ofthe adoption paper and its subsequent loss ordestruction.- Renato is also mistaken in claiming Rule 29should be applied to consider as established thefact of his adoption due to the refusal of Nora toproduce the document of adoption, because first,the fact or real existence of his adoption had notbeen established; second, there is no proof thatsuch document of adoption is in the possession ofNora; third, the motu proprio order of the courtfor Nora to produce the items retrieved from thesafety deposit box cannot be treated as a modeof discovery of production and inspection of

documents under Rule 27; and fourth, the itemsdeposited in the box have already beensurrendered by Nora and no document ofadoption in his favor was listed as found in thebox.- As a necessary consequence, Renato cannotproperly intervene in the settlement of the estateof Margarita as an adopted child because of lackof proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estateproceeding, it is a requisite that he has aninterest in the estate, either as one who would bebenefited as an heir or one who has a claimagainst the estate like a creditor. A child byadoption cannot inherit from the parent byadoption unless the act of adoption has been

done in strict accord with the statue. Until this isdone, no rights are acquired by the child andneither the supposed adopting parent or adoptedchild could be bound thereby. The burden ofproof in establishing adoption is upon the personclaiming such relationship. He must provecompliance with the statutes relating to adoptionin the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.A

fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate canbe gained by a claimant who failed to submitproof thereof, whether the will is probated or not,intervention should be denied as it would merelyresult in unnecessary complication. To succeed, achild must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted,acknowledged illegitimate natural child or naturalchild by legal fiction or recognized spurious child.Disposition Petition dismissed.

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