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ARCILLAS V MONTEJO26 SCRA 197

MAKALINTAL ; November 29, 1968;LORA

FACTS- Eustaquio Arcillas died intestate.

- Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of thedeceased, in the November 12 petition soughtthe cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name ofthe deceased and prayed for the issuance of anew certificate of title in the names of the heirs inthe enumerated proportions alleged in thepetition.- It was claimed that at various dates after thedeath of the deceased, several transactionsaffecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominentamong which were the separate sales of theirrespective shares and participation executed by 4other children of the deceased in favor of co-heirVicente Arcillas.- 5 other children of the deceased filed a petition

on November 16 praying for the issuance ofletters of administration in favor of AurelioArcillas, the petitioner preparatory to the finalsettlement of the deceased's estate. The petitionstates that the deceased left an estate consistingof real property in Zamboanga City with aprobable value of not less than P6,000 and thatdeceased left no debts remaining unpaid.- Petitioner filed his opposition to the November12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as LotNo. 276 was included in the estate of thedeceased for which a petition for administrationhad actually been filed and was awaitingresolution, that petition should be held inabeyance until after the Nov 16 petition was

closed and terminated.- Respondent Judge issued an order temporarilyholding in abeyance resolution of the November12 petition until the termination of the intestateproceedings.- In his answer to the November 16 petitionGeronimo Arcillas, this time joined by VicenteArcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposedthe issuance of letters of administration arguingthat inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the onlyproperty left by the deceased and the deceasedleft no debts, the petition for administration wasimproper.- Petitioner insisted that there were still otherproperties of the estate of the deceased besides

Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue withrespondents' view that administrationproceedings could be dispensed with asserting,firstly, that there was no unanimity among theheirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, thatsome of the heirs had been unduly deprived oftheir participation in the estate.- Respondent court denied the November 16

petit ion for the issuance of letters ofadministration and at the same time gave duecourse to the November 12 petition.- Unable to have this order reconsideredpetitioner filed the petition for certiorari withmandamus and preliminary injunction.

ISSUEWON respondent Judge acted properly indismissing the administration proceedings underthe authority of Section 1, Rule 74 of the NewRules of Court upon averments that the estateleft no debts and all the heirs entitled to share inits distribution are all of age

HELD- NO. Under Rule 74.1, if the decedent left no willand no debts and the heirs and legatees are all ofage, or the minors are represented by their

judicial guardians, the parties may, withoutsecuring letters of administration, divide theestate among themselves as they see fit bymeans of a public instrument filed in the office ofthe Register of Deeds and should they disagree,they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.- Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan: sec.1 does notpreclude the heirs from instituting administration,proceedings, even if the estate has no debts orobligation, if they do not desire to resort for goodreasons to an ordinary action of partition. While

Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estateamong themselves as they may be fit, or toresort to an ordinary action of partition, it doesnot compel them to do so if they have goodreasons to take a different course of action. SaidSection is not mandatory or compulsory as maybe gleaned from the use made therein of theword may.- Having decided to institute administrationproceedings instead of resorting to the lessexpensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e.extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action forpartition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed inthe exercise of their discretion granted underSection I of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely

on the ground that the expenses usually commonin administration proceedings may deplete thefunds of the estate.- The resultant delay and necessary expensesincurred thereafter are consequences which mustbe deemed to have been voluntarily assumed bythe heirs themselves so that they may not in thefuture be heard to complain of these matters.

Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claimas to the alleged existence of other properties ofthe deceased aside from the lot in question canbe more adequately ascertained in administrationproceedings rather than in any other action.Disposition Appealed orders set aside

CIRIACO FULE vs. ANASTASIO FULE46 PHIL. 317;

JOHNSON; Sept 30, 1924MARGE

FACTS-Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of

the heirs, presented a petition in CFI Laguna forthe appointment of Cornelio Alcantara asadministrator of the estate. The petitioner allegedthat at the time of the death of Saturnino, he wasowner of P50T worth of real and personalproperty in San Pablo, Laguna and about P30T incash. CFI appointed Cornelio Alcantara as specialadministrator and required him to give a bond ofP8T. Alcantara later presented in court aninventory of the alleged property of thedeceased.-Anastacio, et al opposed the petition and theappointment of the special administrator, allegingthat they were children of Saturnino Fule, thatthey were all of age, that the deceased had left

no debts and that his property had already beenpartitioned among his children during his lifetimein conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code.-Judge Paredes revoked the appointment of thespecial administrator and ordered him to renderan account. He also denied Saturninos petitionand initially suggested that the latter amend hispetition and present an ordinary action forpartition.-Upon hearing on Saturninos MFR/MNT and theopposition thereto, the suggestion was withdrawnand the petition for the appointment of anadministrator was denied upon the principalground that all of the property of Saturnino Fulehad been in the possession of his heirs for many

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years before his death; and that at the time of hisdeath there were no debts and no property to beadministered. From that judgment the petitionerappealed.

ISSUEWON the court a quo committed an error inrefusing to appoint an administrator for the

estate of Saturnino Fule

HELD: NO-Under the provisions of the Civil Code, the rightsto the succession of a person are transmittedfrom the moment of his death; in other words, theheirs succeed immediately to all of the propertyof the deceased ancestor. The property belongsto the heirs at the moment of the death of theancestor as completely as if the ancestor hadexecuted and delivered to them a deed for thesame before his death. In the absence of debtsexisting against the estate, the heirs may enterupon the administration of the said propertyimmediately. If they desire to administer it jointly,

they may do so. If they desire to partition itamong themselves and can do this by mutualagreement, they have also the privilege. TheCode of Procedure in civil Actions provides howan estate may be divided by a petition forpartition in case they cannot mutually agree inthe division.-When the heirs are all of lawfully age and thereare no debts there is no reason why the estateshould be burdened with the cost and expensesof an administrator. The administrator has noright to intervene in any way whatsoever in thedivision of the state among the heirs when theyare adults and when there are no debts againstthe estate.

-And even when there are debts against theestate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay thedebts and divide the property among themselvesaccording to their respective rights, as heirs or aslegatees in case of will, without probating thesame, and the effect of such division is to investeach party with a complete equitable title to theirparticular share of state. (Carter vs. Owens, 41Ala., 217.)Disposition Judgment affirmed, withoutprejudice to the right of the Ciriaco to commencean action for partition of any property left bySaturnino Fule which had not already beenpartition among his heirs.

MALCOLM and OSTRAND, JJ., dissent citingthe policy of the law: that is to encourage definiteand final settlements. They argue that since theestate is alleged to be worth P80T, it is notunreasonable to suppose that there may havehad dealings with others from which claimsagainst the estate may arise, the existence ofwhich cannot be definitely ascertained until

publication of notice to claimants and creditorshas been made. It would seem to be the interestof all parties concerned to have the estatedefinitely settled and that can only be doneproperly through administration proceedings.-Re: Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, Bondad vs.Bondad, and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon: In allthree of the cases it is admitted that there wereno debts and considering the long period whichhad elapsed since the death of the deceased,there could be but little probability of any newclaimants appearing. Under such circumstancesthe court might well be justified in holding thatthe appointment of an administrator wasunnecessary.

-In the present case we are confronted with anentirely different situation. Here there has beenno partition or distribution by agreement amongthe heirs, the petition for administration waspresented within three months after the death ofthe deceased, and the estate is large and itssettlement may give rise to unexpectedcomplications.

CASTILLO V CASTILLO23 PHIL 364

ARELLANO; November 5, 1912MONCH

FACTS- The subject of the suit is a parcel of land inBatangas owned by Simona Madlangbayan. Shedied 7 years ago. It is currently in the possessionof one of her children, Urbano Castillo. There areother descendants of hers who have the sameright to wit: A daughter and some grandchildrenof the deceased brother of full blood of UrbanoCastillo, named Pio Castillo; the daughter of asister of full blood of the same defendant, namedAlfonsa, likewise deceased; and a daughter of ahalf-brother of the said Urbano Castillo, namedEstefano Libingting, also deceased. Theydemanded division of the land- Defendant Urbano Castillo endeavored to prove

that his mother had other property which duringher lifetime she disposed of to the benefit ofsome of the plaintiffs.- The trial court ordered that the land be dividedbetween the plaintiffs and defendant.

ISSUE/S1. WON the heirs may demand division of the

property2. WON Simona disposed of her property duringher lifetime for the benefit of the plaintiffs

HELD1. YESReasoning It is not a principle authorized by lawthat heirs of legal age may not demand thedivision of a real property, left them by theirpredecessor-in-interest and held by a coheir,without first initiating special intestateproceedings during which a judicial administratoris to be appointed, who alone is vested with thepersonality to claim the property that belongs tothe succession. On the contrary, such heirs are

expressly authorized to do so, unless for thereason of there being unpaid debts, judicialintervention becomes necessary, which was notalleged as a special defense in this suit.2. NOReasoning Such is a question of fact, which maynot be entertained by the Court. The trial courthas already declared the document conveyingproperties to the plaintiffs to be false. And eventhough the said instrument were not false, thetrial court declared it to be void and ineffective.

The alleged gift was in fact null and void sincethere was no acceptance from the donee.

HERNANDEZ V ANDAL

78 Phil. 196TUAZON; March 29, 1947

ICEFACTS-The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, theintervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, andPedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not partieshere, are brother and sisters. They acquired incommon by descent from their father a parcel ofland. Intervenors sold 1800 square meters of thisparcel, a portion which is particularly described inthe deed of conveyance to Zacarias Andal, thedefendant, and Andal's wife in consideration ofP860.

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-After the sale the plaintiff attempted torepurchase the land sold to Andal. Andal, it isalleged, refused to part with the property.Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the onlywitness to testify on her own behalf. Substantiallyshe reiterated the allegations in her twocomplaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, alsotestified. He said that he was in possession of the

land in question until he returned it to theintervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offeredto repurchase the land from him long after hehad bought it, that is when she was about to fileher action.Defendant and intervenors asked that evidencebe allowed to prove that a parol partition amongthe five brother and sisters had been made.Counsel for the plaintiff objected asserting that"under the Rules of Court agreement affectingreal estate may not be proved except by meansof writing subscribed by the person against whomthe p roof is offered." Upon this objection, thecourt ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of theRules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as

under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parolevidence of partition was inadmissible, addingthat to decide the case it had enough with thetestimony and evidence offered by the parties.

ISSUEWON under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules ofCourt (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partitionwas inadmissible

HELDNo.

There is a conflict of authority as to whether anagreement of partition is such a contract as is

required to be in writing under the statute offrauds. One line of authorities holds theaffirmative view; other authorities say no. Thereason for the rule that excludes partition fromthe operation of the statute of frauds is thatpartition is not a conveyance but simply aseparation and designation of that part of theland which belongs to each tenant in common.

The differences in the conclusions reached are"due perhaps to varied phraseology of thestatutes" in the several states. However the casemay be, as enacted in the Philippines, first insection 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure,and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules ofCourt, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a

long line of cases to be applicable to executoryand not to completed or executed contracts. Inthis jurisdiction performance of the contract takesit out of the operation of the statute. The statuteof frauds does not declare the contracts thereinenumerate void and of no legal effect, but onlymakes ineffective the action for specificperformance. (Almirol and Cario vs. Monserrat,

supra.)On general principle, independent and in spite ofthe statute of frauds, courts of equity haveenforced oral partition when it has beencompletely or partly performed."Regardless of whether a parol partition oragreement to partition is valid and enforceable atlaw, equity will in proper cases, where the parolpartition has actually been consummated by thetaking of possession in severalty and the exerciseof ownership by the parties of the respectiveportions set off to each, recognize and enforcesuch parol partition and the rights of the partiesthereunder. Thus, it has been he]d or stated in anumber of cases involving an oral partition under

which the parties went into possession, exercisedacts of ownership, or otherwise partly performedthe partition agreement, that equity will confirmsuch partition and in a proper case decree title inaccordance with the possession in severalty."In numerous cases it has been held or statedthat parol partitions may be sustained on theground of estoppel of the parties to assert therights of a tenant in common as to parts of landdivided by parol partition as to which possessionin severalty was taken and acts of individualownership were exercised. And a court of equitywill recognize the agreement and decree it to bevalid and effectual for the purpose of concludingthe right of the parties as between each other to

hold their respective parts in severalty."A parol partition may also be sustained on theground that the parties thereto have acquiescedin and ratified the partition by taking possessionin severalty, exercising acts of ownership withrespect thereto, or otherwise recognizing theexistence of the partition."A number of cases have specifically applied thedoctrine of part performance, or have stated thata part performance is necessary, to take a parolpartition out of the operation of the statute offrauds. It has been held that where there was apartition in fact between tenants in common, anda part performance, a court of equity would have

regard to and enforce such partition agreed to bythe parties." (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)It is on the effects of rule 74, section 1, of theRules of Court on a parol partition, that there aresharp divergences of opinion among themembers of this Court. This section reads:"If the decedent left no debts and the heirs andlegatees are all of age, or the minors are

represented by their judicial guardians, theparties may, without securing letters ofadministration, divide the estate amongthemselves as they see fit by means of a publicinstrument filed in the office of the register ofdeeds, and should they disagree, they may do soin an ordinary action of partition. If there is onlyone heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate tohimself the entire estate by means of an affidavitfiled in the office of the register of deeds. It shallbe presumed that the decedent left no debts if nocreditor f iles a petition for letters ofadministration within two years after the death ofthe decedent."It is contended that under this rule a verbal

partition is entirely void and cannot be validatedby any acts of the parties short of the executionof a public document and its registration.As a general proposition, transactions, so far asthe affect the parties, are required to be reducedto writing either as a condition of jural validity oras a means of providing evidence to prove thetransactions. Written form exacted by the statuteof frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposesonly." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 171.) Thedecisions of this Court which we have noticedwere predicated on this assumption. The CivilCode, too requires the accomplishment of acts orcontracts in a public instrument, not in order tovalidate the act or contract but only to insure its

efficacy so that after the existence of the acts orcontracts has been admitted, the party boundmay be compelled to execute the document(Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernaez, 45 Phil.,746.)Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and notmerely evidential or partition? In other words, iswriting the that confers legal validity upon theagreement? There no indications in thephraseology of this rule which justify anaffirmative answer to these questions. It must benote that where the law intends a writing or otherformality be the essential requisite to the validityof the transaction, it says so in clear andnequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as

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originally enacted in England and as enacted insome of the states, uses the words "utterly void"with reference to certain transactions. Under theterms of such state transactions required to be inwriting are absolutely void and not merelyvoidable if not made in the manner indicated.Again article 633 of the Civil Code says thatdonation may be valid only when made in a

public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Lawmakes known its intention to have the executionof a public instrument and its registration in theregistry indispensable to the validity of thecontract by using this phrase: " in order thatvoluntary mortgages may be legally created in avalid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code alsoemploys for the same purpose similar expressionwith reference to the execution of a publicdocument: "in order that mortgage may bevalidly constituted." And with respect to theformalities of last wills and testaments, section618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphaticstatement: "No will shall be valid to pass uponany estate real or personal nor charge or affect

the same, unless it be written etc." Otherexamples might be mentioned.Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express orclear declaration that the required publicinstrument is to be constitutive of a contract ofpartition or an inherent element of itseffectiveness as between the parties. And thisCourt had no apparent reason, in adopting thisrule, to make the efficacy of a partition asbetween the parties dependent on the executionof a public instrument and its registration. On theother hand, the opposite theory is not withoutreasonable support. We can think of possiblefactors against the proposition that a publicdocument and its registration were contemplated

as necessary ingredients to give life to a contractof partition so that without them no oral partitioncan bind the parties.1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of whichthe rule under consideration forms a part werepromulgated by the Judicial Department underauthority to deal with matters of procedureexclusively. For this court to prescribe what is tobe a binding agreement between coheirs in thesettlement of their private affairs which in no wayaffect the rights of third parties would be totranscend its rule-making power. We bring outthis limitation upon the authority of this court tomake rules, as an aid to interpretation, as amethod of arriving at the conclusion that section

1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not arule of substantive law of far-reaching importanceand serious juridical and practical implications. Itis to be presumed that the framers of the Rules ofCourt realized the bounds of this court's functionsand did not intend to trespass on purelysubstantive rights of the parties to the partition.

To the extent the execution and registration of a

notarized instrument are made essentialelements to validity to protect innocent thirdparties, the rule is legitimate and necessary;legitimate because decedents' estates are placedunder the jurisdiction of the courts to administerand distribute. The interests of to partieseliminated, the rule loses its character as one ofprocedure and practice and invades the realm ofsubstantive law.Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursorof section 1 of Rule 74, is enlightening andinstructive. The former after stating that heirsmay apportion and divided the estate amongthemselves as they may see fit by agreementduly executed in writing by all of them, adds the

words "and not otherwise." These words, in ouropinion, were expressive of an intention to makethe written formality inherent element of thevalidity of a parol partition. But what is far, moreto the point is that by logical process of deductionthe elimination from the new rule of the words"and not otherwise" imports the casting awayfrom the prescribed public document of its juralcharacter which the document enjoyed in theformer code. At the same time, the inclusion ofthe aforesaid words in the old provision series toemphasize the necessity of positive and clearlanguage if a given contractual formality is to bethe exclusive basis of the contract's bindingeffect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary

to say that the attaching of jural character to theprescribed public instrument in section 596 of ActNo. 190 is no argument for contending that suchdocument must be clothed with the same raimentin the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture ofprocedural and substantive provisions, havingbeen enacted by the legislative body itself which,unlike this court, was unhampered anduntrammelled, except by the fundamental law, inthe choice of its subjects of legislation.2. The civil law looks upon the role of publicinstruments ill acts and contracts with greaterliberality with a view to better adaptation tohuman frailties and idiosyncrasies. In their blindfaith in friends and relatives, in their lack of

experience and foresight, and in their ignorance,men, in spite of laws, will make and continue tomake verbal contracts. The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall farshort of compensating for the resulting damage,injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So eventhough articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the CivilCode have made provision for public instrument

for all transaction and contracts whose object isthe creation, modification or extinction of realrights in immovables, it has been recognized andheld that verbal contracts may be effectivebetween the parties. A leading case on thissubject is Tunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil.,561), Mr. Justice Willard writing the decision. Itwas said in that case that when the essentialrequisites for the existence of a contract arepresent, the contract is binding upon the parties,and, although required to be in writing by article1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can maintainan action on the verbal agreement without firstbringing an action under article 1279 to compelthe execution of a written instrument. It says that

"article 1279 does not impose an obligation, butconfers a privilege upon both contracting parties,and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use ofsame does not bar his action." It further says thatarticle 1279, far from making the enforceability ofthe contract dependent upon any special intrinsicform, recognized its enforceability by the mereact of granting the contracting parties anadequate remedy whereby to compel theexecution of public writing or any other specialform whenever such form is necessary in orderthat contract may produce the effect which isdesired according to whatever its object. Thisdoctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series ofdecisions perhaps longer than that on any other

legal topic. And it has been extended even toverbal con tracts involving land registered underthe Torrens Act. Do the Rules of Court adhere tothis salutary principle? We can perceive nosufficient ground for the new Rules to depart fromit. No considerations of public policy enter into apartition of hereditary estate among coheirsgreater than those involved in a contract betweenstrangers which operates to create, transmit,modify or extinguish property rights in land. If isbetween strangers the creation, transmission,modification or extinction of real rights may belawfully effected by parol agreementnotwithstanding the requirement that it be put inwriting, the new rule could not be more

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intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership butsimply designation and segregation of that partwhich belongs to each heir.

The requirement that a partition be put in apublic document and registered has, in ouropinion, for its purpose the protection of creditorsand at the same time the protection of the heirs

themselves against tardy claims. Note that thelast sentence of the section speaks of debts andcreditors. The object of registration is to serve asconstructive notice, and this means notice toothers. It must follow that the intrinsic validity ofpartition not executed with the prescribedformalities does not come into play when, as inthis case, there are no creditors or the rights ofcreditors are not affected. No rights of creditorsbeing involved, it is competent for the heirs of anestate to enter an agreement for distribution in amanner and upon a plan different from thoseprovided by law.Disposition Reversed and remanded

MENDIOLA V MENDIOLA

7 PHIL 71WILLARD; November 27, 1906

REAN

NATUREAppeal from CFI decisionFACTS- Mariano Lamberto died in Tacloban leavingsurviving him his widow, the defendant andappellant Claudia Mendiola, and his mother,Silveria, as his only heirs. In his will, left 2/3 of hisestate to his mother and an interest in the otherthird to Justiniano Mendiola, his stepson, the sonof Claudia. Voluntary proceedings were

commenced in CFI of Leyte for a settlement ofthe estate.- Pending such proceedings, Claudia, the mother,Silveria, and Justiniano, the stepson, made anagreement which appears in a notarial documentby which they abandoned the proceeding in theCFI, settled the estate and divided the propertyamong themselves. By the terms of thisagreement, Claudia took possession of all theproperty, agreeing to pay the debts, and agreed,to, and did, pay Silveria Melendres, and

Justiniano.- Nearly 15 years after this settlement, Justinianoand Juliana Lamberto, daughter of Silveria,presented a petition to CFI of Leyte asking that

the will of Mariano Lamberto be proved andallowed and that an administrator be appointedto administer the estate of the deceased.- Claudia Mendiola appeared and opposed theprobate of the will on the ground that the estatehad been completely settled and a partition ofthe property belonging thereto had been madefifteen years before. The court below granted the

prayer of the petition and appointed inadministrator. From this order Claudia Mendiolahas appealed.

ISSUEWON the extrajudicial settlement by agreementor the partition agreed upon should be upheld

HELDYESRatio Where the parties in fact signed anagreement of partition was in the fact made inaccordance with that agreement, all proceedingsin court for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased person were ended. The rights of the

parties to the property involved could no longerbe discussed nor determined in that proceeding.If it were claimed that the partition was broughtabout by fraud or that it was void for any otherreason, such claims necessarily had to bepresented in an ordinary action brought for thepurpose of setting aside the partition.Reasoning Court holds that where prior to theadoption of the present Code of Civil Procedure acontract of partition has in fact been made by allthe persons interested in the estate of adeceased person, such persons interested beingof full age and capacity to contract, no furtherproceedings can be had for the judicialsettlement and administration of that property

until the contract of partition has been set asidein an ordinary action brought for the purpose, andthat in this case, when it was made to appear tothe court below that such a contract of partitionhad in fact been signed by the petitioners of theirgrantors, the court should have dismissed thepetition.DispositionThe judgment of the court below isreversed and the case remanded to that courtwith instructions to dismiss the petition, withcosts to the appellant, Claudia Mendiola

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELGUZMAN. RAFAELA GUZMAN V

JUAN and REINALDO ANOG37 PHIL 61

CARSON; Oct 26, 1917BAUZA

FACTS-Sec. 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure asamended by Act No. 2331 provides for thesummary settlement of estates of deceasedpersons not exceeding P3,000 in value.-It is alleged that 2 parcels of land belong to theestate of deceased. 2 of deceaseds sons denythis, having been in possession for many yearsand claiming to be the absolute owners, not byany right of inheritance from deceased, whonever was in possession and never had any titleto the land in question.- The trial judge proceeded summarily todetermine title to the land and to provide for itsdistribution among the various heirs of the

deceased, over the objections of claimants inpossession.

ISSUESWON the trial judge erred

HELDYES.RatioReasoning When questions arise as toownership of property, alleged to be part of theestate of a deceased person, but claimed bysome other person to be his property, not byvirtue of any right of inheritance from thedeceased, but by title adverse to that of thedeceased and his estate, such questions cannotbe determined in the course of administrationproceedings. The CFI, acting as probate court,has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,which must be submitted to the court in theexercise of its general jurisdiction to try anddetermine the ordinary actions mentioned in theCode of Civil Procedure.

The rules on summary settlement of estates ofsmall value, confers no such jurisdiction. It isclear that there is even less justification for anattempt to exercise such jurisdiction in summaryproceedings than in regular administrationproceedings.

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Disposition We conclude that the judgmententered in the court below should be reversed,and it appearing from the petition and thepleadings filed in the court below that the onlyproperty sought to be distributed in theseproceedings is the real estate claimed by theappellants, and it appearing further, thatpetitioner's decedent died in the year 1899, we

are of opinion that the petition should bedismissed, without costs in this instance, thecosts in first instance to be against the petitioner.So ordered.

VDA. DE FRANCISCO v. CARREON95 PHIL 237

BENGZON; June 28, 1954RICKY

FACTS- In 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned theCFI of Rizal to settle the estate of her husband

Jose M. Francisco consisting of a house and lot.

She was appointed guardian ad litem of her threeminor children. One-half undivided share wasadjudicated to Rosa, and the other half in equalparts to the children. The order was registered inthe office of the Register of Deeds, who issued anew certificate of title in the names and in theproportion stated.- In 1948, Rosa mortgaged her share of the realtyto the Carreon sisters for P13,000. In 1950 shesold to the Carreon sisters her interest in theland. The mortgage and the sale were bothinscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds.- However, in a motion of March 14, 1950,

Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother ofthe deceased Jose Francisco, in representation of

the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, seventeen,averred that this minor was a recognized naturalson of the deceased, with legal right toparticipate in his estate, that the previousproceedings were void because Rosa Franciscohad concealed such fact, and because she hadinterests in conflict with those of her 3 sons, andthat the land was private (exclusive?) property of

Jose Francisco of which she could not have beenawarded a portion. Tiburcia prayed for herappointment as guardian ad litem of the 4children; a declaration that Jose Francisco yPalumpon was a recognized natural child of thedeceased with the right to inherit; annulment ofthe previous adjudication (the widow being

entitled to usufruct only); and annulment of themortgage and sale in favor of the Carreon sisters.- When the motion to annul or reopen was calledfor hearing, Macaria Palumpon requested in opencourt the dismissal, without prejudice, of JoseFrancisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition.Her request was granted; but the courtannounced that the 3 minor children's petition for

reopening of the order adjudicating one-half toRosa Francisco, with all consequent effects uponthe mortgage and sale, will be taken up later.- Tiburcia, submitted an "amended motion"wherein she made practically the sameallegations and prayed for identical remedies except those touching the recognition of JoseFrancisco y Palumpon. Overruling objections, thecourt admitted the amended motion, andrendered judgment holding the realty was privateproperty of the deceased Jose Francisco, who hadacquired it 4 years before his marriage to RosaAldana and held that the whole property passedto the 3 legitimate children of the deceased,subject to usufructuary rights of the widow. It

annulled the mortgage and the sale in favor ofthe Carreon sisters, and issued instructions to theRegister of Deeds. The Carreon sisters appealed.

ISSUES1. WON the lower court erred in continuing tohear the motion for reopening, even after thenatural child had withdrawn from the litigation.2. WON the lower court erred in takingcognizance of the annulment of the mortgageand sale, which it could not validly consider as aprobate court.

HELD1. NO.

Ratio Where the title on its face shows that itwas subject to the provisions of Rule 74, Sec 4, athird person who accepts it must take notice thathe is running the risk of interfering with the rightsof minors as provided under Sec 5, Rule 74.Reasoning In her motion, Tiburcia asked forappointment as guardian ad litem for the naturalchild and for the 3 legitimate children. She askedfor remedial measures beneficial to the 4children. Hence, the motion may be regarded asinterposed on behalf of the said 4 children notonly a motion of the natural child. At any rate"parties may be dropped or added by order of thecourt on motion of any party or of its own

initiatives at any stage of the action and on suchterms as are just".- Even if the original motion did not afford legalstanding to the 3 legitimate children, and that itcould not be amended, there is no reason toprevent the lower court from considering suchamended motion as a new and independentpetition filed on behalf of the 3 minor children.

The matter of time might be material in regard toconsidering the "amended" motion as "original"motion; but in this case it is immaterial becauseunder Sec 5 of Rule 74 such motion may belodged with the court within one year after theminors have reached majority; and they are stillminors.- The Carreons complain that they thought suchpetition for readjustment or reopening could takeplace only within 2 years as prescribed by Sec 4of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate oftitle. However, they are conclusively presumed toknow the existence and provisions of Sec 5, Rule74. They accepted the mortgage with theencumbrance annotated; and while it referred to

Rule 74, Sec 4, and did not specifically mentionSec 5, the fact that Sec 4, Rule 74 was notedshould have been sufficient warning that the titlewas subject to the interest of persons undulyprejudiced.

2. NO.Reasoning Several decisions hold that if duringthe summary proceeding some of the heirs claim,by title adverse to that of the decedent, someparcels of land, the probate court has no

jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must bedecided in a separate suit. In this case however,there is no question that the realty belonged tothe decedent; and a separate suit was

unnecessary, specially remembering that in thesesummary settlements the judge is expected to"proceed summarily" and "without delay" "todetermine who are the persons legally entitled toparticipate in the estate, and to apportion anddivide it among them."- The Carreons knew or ought to know the rulepermitting reapportionment even after two years.And Sec 4, Rule 74 (which must be deemedextensible to situations covered by Sec 5, Rule74) expressly authorizes the court to give toevery heir his lawful participation in the realestate "notwithstanding any transfers of such realestate" and to "issue execution" thereon. All thisimplies that, when within the amendatory period

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the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the heirs has authority to directcancellation of such alienation in the same estateproceedings, whenever it becomes necessary todo so. To require the institution of a separateaction for such annulment would run counter tothe letter of the above rule and the spirit of thesesummary settlements.

Disposition Order AFFIRMED.

JEREZ v NIETES30 SCRA 904

FERNANDO; December 27, 1969JOEY

FACTS- Oct. 3, 1960: Nicolas Jalandoni died.- Oct. 27, 1960: A special proceeding for thesettlement of his estate was filed before JudgeNietes, where petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, hiswidow, was appointed as administratrix.- June 14, 1966: project of partition and final

accounting was submitted- June 15, 1966: Judge Nietes gave an orderapproving the partition.- June 29, 1966: respondent Lucilo Jalandoni,alleging that he is an acknowledged natural childof the deceased, and respondent Victoria

Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is anillegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed tointervene on the ground that they were preteritedin the project of partition which they would haverespondent Judge reject for being contrary to law.- July 8, 1966: Judge gave an order allowingintervention and reopening the proceedings topermit the movants "to present whateverevidence they may have to show their right to

participate in the estate of the deceased."- Sept. 21, 1966: CA sustained CFI order.

ISSUESWON CA erred in sustaining CFI order

HELD- It is within the power of respondent Judge toreopen the proceedings and allow intervention.

The question remains, however, whether he didso in the appropriate manner. It is not theexistence of the power but the mode of itsexercise that is open to question.- CA judges were split. The majority held that thedetermination of a prima facie interest in an

estate to justify reopening proceedings for thesettlement thereof is primarily addressed to thesound discretion and judgment of the probatecourt; that, while no supporting documents areappended to the motion to reopen tending toshow the personality to intervene, said motion isnevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimantsof interestand the probate court has authority to

require the submission of at least a prima facieshowing of said interest; that the motion toreopen was filed before the order closing theproceedings had achieved finality and during thereglementary period within which the court stillhad jurisdiction over the case and retained fullpower to amend and control its process andorders; that, because the closure order had notyet become final, the requirements of Rule 38respecting relief from judgment do not apply and,hence, the failure of the motion to reopen toallege any of the grounds therein stated is notfatal; that the better practice in case of theappearance of alleged preterited heirs is tosecure relief by reopening the proceedings by a

proper motion within the reglementary period, itbeing desirable that all aspects of a controversybe ventilated in the same proceeding and thusavoid multiplicity of suits.- The CA minority held that the better policy is torequire the intervenors first to produce primafacie evidence of the claimed civil status beforeopening the door and letting them in. Under Rule12.2, 'a person may, before or during a trial, bepermitted by the court, in its discretion, tointervene in an action, if he has legal interest inthe matter in litigation.' The possibility ofinterlopers getting in for a share in the estatecannot be totally discounted specially consideringthat the present intestate proceedings had been

pending for the last 6 years without a motion tointervene having been filed by the presentclaimants in spite of the notice of publication andthe in rem character of the intestateproceedings.On the power to reopen proceedings and allowintervention- Ramos v. Ortuzar: The only instance that we canthink of in which a party interested in a probateproceeding may have a final liquidation set asideis when he is left out by reason of circumstancesbeyond his control or through mistake orinadvertence not imputable to negligence. Eventhen, the better practice to secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion

within the reglementary period, instead of anindependent action the effect of which, ifsuccessful, would be, as in the instant case, foranother court or judge to throw out a decision ororder already final and executed and reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and disposed of.- Rather than require any party who can allege agrievance that his interest was not recognized in

a testate or intestate proceeding to file aseparate and independent action, he may withinthe reglementary period secure the relief that ishis due by a reopening of the case even after aproject of partition and final accounting had beenapproved.On the exercise of the power- The verified motion on the part of privaterespondents did not suffice to call into play thepower of respondent Judge to allow intervention.

There must be proof beyond allegations in suchmotion to show the interest of the privatemovants. In the absence thereof, the action takenby respondent Judge could be consideredpremature.

Dispositive CA resolution MODIFIED in the sensethat Judge Nietes, or whoever may be acting inhis place, is directed to require Lucilo Jalandoniand Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to presentevidence to justify their right to intervene in SPNo. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.

Jalandoni. In the event that they could so justifysuch a right, the lower court on the basis of suchevidence is to proceed conformably to law.

RAMOS V. ORTUZAR89 PHIL 730

August 21, 1651CHRIS CAPS

FACTS- 1905-1914. Percy Hill cohabited w/ MartinaRamos & had 6 children, incl Richard & MarvinHill. The others died in infancy. Percy acquiredlands and started improving them until his death.- 1914. Percy canonically married Livingstone &had 3 children, now in US. Livingstone died.- 1924. Percy married Ortuzar & had 1 daughter.- 1937. Proceedings for settlement of Percysestate started. Ortuzar was administratrix.- 1940. Distribution of estate was made.- 1947. Ortuzar & her daughter, and Percyschildren by Livingstone, sold the land to Bustos.

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- Martina Ramos, Richard & Marvin Hill broughtthis action in CFI Nueva Ecija to annul partition ofestate and the sale.- Court found that Ramos had not been marriedto Percy, that Richard & Marvin wereacknowledged natural children, that the sale wasnull and void. Court allotted estate amongRichard & Marvin Hill, and Percys children by 1 st

and 2nd

wives.- Both parties appealed.

ISSUES1. WON Martina Ramos and Percy Hill werelegally married2. WON CFI was correct in giving course to theaction to annul the partition

HELD1. NO- No certificate of marriage or entry thereof inCivil registry was presented, nor has explanationof the absence been offered.- Ramos story: She and Percy were living

together when her husband said he was going toget a helper. Percy came back with a womanwho did not look like a maid at all. Percybegged her to forgive him. She let the womanstay provided her husband gives her a housewhere she can run a store and she continues tomanage the lands in question. Court: Thisconduct only confirms that they were notmarried. And no intelligent man like Percy wouldbe so unmindful and so reckless to publicly marrytwice while first wife was alive and live with hisnew wife in plain sight of his former wife &children.- Also, soon after Ramos and Percy separated,Ramos and Teodoro Tobias began living together.

TCT, mortgage deed, deed of sale, birthcertificates of their children say that Ramos andTobias are husband and wife.2. NO- Ramos never entered appearance in Percysintestate proceedings. She came forwardclaiming to be Hills wife 6 yrs after partition &adjudication of estate and after records havedisappeared.- Percy and Livingstone possessed theseproperties adversely, exclusively and publicly andin concept of owners. Whatever right Ramos hadhas been lost by prescription. She slept over heralleged right for more than 30 yrs.

- It also appears that in Percys intestateproceedings, Richard & Marvin Hill intervened orsought to intervene. Hearing was held andtestimony was taken, but the petition tointervene was denied. It appears that all thefacts raised in this present suit were alleged,discussed and adjudicated in the expediente ofPercys intestate.

- Proceeding for probate is one in rem. Courtacquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,thru publication of notice. Any order that may beentered therein is binding against all of them. Afinal order of distribution of estate vests title tothe land of estate in distributees. There is noreason why these shouldnt apply to intestate

proceedings.- The only instance in w/c a party interested in

probate proceeding may have final liquidation setaside is when he is left out by reason ofcircumstances beyond his control or thru mistakeor inadvertence not imputable to negligence.Even then, the better practice is reopening of thesame case by proper motion w/in the

reglamentary period, not an independent actionw/c might have effect of another judge throwingout a decision already final and executed.

PEDROSA v. CA353 SCRA 620

Quisumbing, J.; March 5, 2001INA

FACTS- Ma. Elena Rodiguez Pedrosa is the adopted childof spouses Rosalina and Miguel Rodriguez. Thespouses had no other children. When Miguel died,his collateral relatives filed an action in the CFI to

annul the adoption of Ma. Elena. (surprisingly, theadoptive mother was one of the petitionersthere.) The CFI upheld the validity of theadoption. The collaterals and the widow appealedto the CA; but while the proceedings wereongoing, they entered into an extrajudicialsettlement of the estate of Miguel, without theparticipation of Ma.Elena, who was already ofmajority age at that time. Eventually, the CAupheld the validity of the adoption. But by thistime, the collaterals and the widow hadpartitioned the estate. They published in anewspaper the fact of partition AFTER they

settled the partition. (For perspective, theproperty in question is some 226k sqm.)-Ma. Elena asked the collaterals and the widowfor her share. They refused to give her becauseshes not a blood relative. So she filed an actionin the CFI to annul the partition. CFI dismissed forbeing filed out of time. The action was filed 3years 10 months after the extrajudicial

settlement. CA affirmed CFIs dismissal.

ISSUEWON the period in Rule 74.4 (2 years) applies inthis case.

HELDNO.- The 2-year period in Rule 74.4 applies only forvalidly executed extrajudicial settlementswherein the one assailing the same participated.A valid ej settlement, per Rule 74.1, means thatall the persons or heirs of the decedent havetaken part in the extrajudicial settlement or arerepresented by themselves or through guardians.

- The contention that Ma.Elena was representedby the adoptive mom doesnt hold because shewasnt a minor anymore. The fact that the ejsettlement was published after the partition isalso of no value because the notice is supposedto be given BEFORE the ej settlement, to call allthe heirs to participate. The exclusion of heirs inthe ej settlement is fraudulent.- Clearly, the 2-yr period doesnt apply to Ma.Elena. The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicialsettlement" upon the ground of fraud may befiled within 4 years from the discovery of thefraud. Such discovery is deemed to have takenplace when said instrument was filed with theRegister of Deeds and new certificates of title

were issued in the name of respondentsexclusively.- Since Ma. Elena is the adopted child, she alongwith the widow are the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez,to the exclusion of the latters collateral relatives.

The collaterals, who got around 90% of the estatein the ej settlement, have no right to the same.However, the properties that were alreadytransferred to 3rd persons must be recovered in aseparate case because there can be no collateralattack on Torrens Titles.- Ma. Elena wasnt able to prove damages dueher so the court awarded nominal damages ofP100k.

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HEIRS OF REYES V REYESAPPLE

CUIZON v RAMOLETE129 SCRA 495

GUTIERREZ; May 29, 1984JOJO

FACTS- In 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for theregistration of several parcels of land located atOpao, Mandaue City. The decree of registrationand the OCT was issued in 1976 in the name ofMariano; and in that same year, a TCT coveringthe property in question was issued to his childIrene.- In 1970, he distributed his property betweenhis two children, Rufina and Irene Cuizon. Part ofthe property given to Irene consisted largely ofsalt beds which eventually became the subject ofthis controversy.- In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with

Reservation of Usufruct involving the said saltbeds in favor of the petitioners: Francisco &Rosita Cuizon(children of Rufina) and PurificacionCuizon. However, the sale was not registeredbecause the petitioners felt it was unnecessarydue to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.- In 1978, Irene died. In the extrajudicialsettlement of the estate, her alleged half sisterand sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all theproperty of the decedent including the propertyin question. After the notice of the extrajudicialsettlement was duly published in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed adeed of Confirmation of Sale wherein sheconfirmed and ratified the deed of sale of 1971

executed by the late Irene and renounced andwaived whatever rights, interest, andparticipation she may have in the property inquestion in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently,a new TCT was issued in favor of the petitioners.- Thereafter, a petition for letters ofadministration was filed before the Cebu CFI byrespondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selectedby the 17 heirs of Irene to act as administrator ofthe estate of the decedent. The petition wasgranted.- Antigua as administrator filed an inventory ofthe estate of Irene. He included in the inventorythe property in question which was being

administered by Juan Arche, one of thepetitioners. In 1979, the probate court grantedAntiguas motion asking the court for authority tosell the salt from the property and praying thatpetitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt tothe administrator. Subsequently, on 3 differentoccasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with theaid of several men, sought to enforce the order of

the court. Hence this petition.- The thrust of the petitioners' argument is thatthe probate court, as a court handling only theintestate proceedings, had neither the authorityto adjudicate controverted rights nor to divestthem of their possession and ownership of theproperty in question and hand over the same tothe administrator. Petitioners further contendthat the proper remedy of the respondentadministrator is to file a separate civil action torecover the same.- On the other hand, the administratorcontended that the deed of sale of 1971 lost itsefficacy upon the rendition of judgment andissuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon in

1976.ISSUEWON a probate court has jurisdiction over parcelsof land already covered by a TCT issued in favorof owners who are not parties to the intestateproceedings if the said parcels have beenincluded in the inventory of properties of theestate prepared by the administrator.HELDNOIt is a well-settled rule that a probate court or onein charge of proceedings whether testate orintestate cannot adjudicate or determine title toproperties claimed to be a part of the estate andwhich are equally claimed to belong to outside

parties. All that the said court could do as regardssaid properties is to determine whether theyshould or should not be included in the inventoryor list of properties to be administered by theadministrator. If there is no dispute, well andgood; but if there is, then the parties, theadministrator, and the opposing parties have toresort to an ordinary action for a finaldetermination of the conflicting claims of titlebecause the probate court cannot do so.- For the purpose of determining whether acertain property should or should not be includedin the inventory, the probate court may passupon the title thereto but such determination isnot conclusive and is subject to the final decision

in a separate action regarding ownership whichmay be instituted by the parties.- As held in Siy Chong Keng v CIR, the mereinclusion in the inventory submitted by theadministrator of the estate of a deceased personof a given property does not of itself deprive theprobate court of authority to inquire into theproperty of such inclusion in case an heir or a

third party claims adverse title thereto. To holdotherwise would render inutile the power of thatcourt to make a prima facie determination of theissue of ownership recognized in the abovequoted precedents. The correct rule is that theprobate court should resolve the issue before itprovisionally, as basis for its inclusion in orexclusion from the inventory. It does not evenmatter that the issue is raised after approval ofthe inventory because apparently, it is notnecessary that the inventory and appraisal beapproved by the Court.- In the instant case, the property involved is notonly claimed by outside parties but it was sold 7years before the death of the decedent and is

duly titled in the name of the vendees who arenot party to the proceedings. Having beenapprised of the fact that the property in questionwas in the possession of third parties and moreimportant, covered by a TCT issued in the namesuch third parties, the probate court should havedenied the motion of the administrator andexcluded the property in question from theinventory of the property of the estate. It had noauthority to deprive such third persons theirpossession and ownership of the property.- Even assuming the truth of the privaterespondents' allegations that the sale ofDecember 1971 was effected under suspiciouscircumstances and tainted with fraud and that

the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and soleheir of Irene remains open to question, theseissues may only be threshed out in a separatecivil action filed by the respondent administratoragainst the petitioners and not in the intestateproceedings.

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs.PASTOR T. QUEBRAR, ET AL.

MAKASIAR; January 31, 1984ATHE

FACTS

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- Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond inthe amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of theQuebrar, as administrator of estates of Chinsuyand Lipa. In consideration of the suretyshipwherein the Luzon Surety was bound jointly andseverally with the defendant Quebrar, the latter,together with Kilayko, executed two indemnityagreements.

- Defendants paid P304.50 under each indemnityagreement or a total of P609.00 for premiumsand documentary stamps.- CFI approved the amended Project of Partitionand Accounts of defendant-appellant- Luzon Surety demanded from the defendants-appellants the payment of the premiums anddocumentary stamps from August 9,1955.- The defendants-appellants ordered a motion forcancellation and/or reduction of executor's bondson the ground that "the heirs of these testateestates have already received their respectiveshares. The court ordered the bonds cancelled.- Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted toP2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of

P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 toOctober 20, 1962. The defendants-appellantsrefused to pay the said amount of P4,872.00arguing that both the Administrator's Bonds andthe Indemnity Agreements ceased to have anyforce and effect, the former since June 6, 1957with the approval of the project of partition andthe latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment of the stated premiums.

ISSUEWON the administrator's bonds were in force andeffect from and after the year that they were filedand approved by the court up to 1962, when theywere cancelled, therefore, defendants are liable

to Luzon Surety

HELDYES. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Courtrequires the administrator/executor to put up abond for the purpose of indemnifying thecreditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It isconditioned upon the faithful performance of theadministrator's trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64Phil. 134).Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law,the surety is then liable under the administrator'sbond, for as long as the administrator has dutiesto do as such administrator/executor. Since theliability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of

the administrator and embraces the performanceof every duty he is called upon to perform in thecourse of administration it follows that theadministrator is still duty bound to respect theindemnity agreements entered into by him inconsideration of the suretyship.Reasoning:a. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor

T. Quebrar, still had something to do as anadministrator/executor even after the approval ofthe amended project of partition and accounts on

June 6, 1957.The contention of the defendants-appellants thatthe administrator's bond ceased to be of legalforce and effect with the approval of the projectof partition and statement of accounts on June 6,1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellantPastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administratorafter June 6, 1957, for administration is for thepurpose of l iquidation of the estate anddistribution of the residue among the heirs andlegatees. And l iquidation means thedetermination of all the assets of the estate and

payment of all the debts and expenses (Flores vs.Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there werestill debts and expenses to be paid after June 6,1957.And in the case ofMontemayor vs. Gutierrez(114Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned evenbefore the termination of the administrationproceedings. Hence, the approval of the projectof partition did not necessarily terminate theadministration proceedings. Notwithstanding theapproval of the partition, the Court of FirstInstance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdictionover the administration proceedings of the estateof Chinsuy and Lipa.

b. The sureties of an administration bond areliable only as a rule, for matters occurring duringthe term covered by the bond. And the term of abond does not usually expire until theadministration has been closed and terminated inthe manner directed by law Thus, as long as theprobate court retains jurisdiction of the estate,the bond contemplates a continuing liabilitynotwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond bythe defendants-appellants.

The probate court possesses an all-embracingpower over the administrator's bond and over theadministration proceedings and it cannot bedevoid of legal authority to execute and makethat bond answerable for the every purpose for

which it was filed. It is the duty of the courts ofprobate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estateof the deceased persons by intervening in theadministration thereof in order to remedy orrepair any injury that may be done thereto

DIEZ v. SERRA51 Phil. 283

VILLAMOR; December 24, 1927GLAISA

FACTS- Diez applied to the CFI Occidental Negros forletters of administration of the estate of thedeceased Florencia Diez alleging that he is abrother of the said Florencia Diez who lastresided at Negros; that the deceased at the timeof her death was a widow and left no will; that thedeceased left realty consisting in a share of one-third of lots; that the deceased left sevenchildren.- Court granted the application, ordering the

appointment of Diez as administrator, upon hisfiling a bond in the sum of P5,000. Diez presentedan inventory of the property under hisadministration.- The administration functioned for two yearsuntil a child of Florencia, Tomas Serra for himselfand as guardian of his six minor brothers andsisters, put in a special appearance, contestingthat court's authority to take cognizance of thisintestate estate, on the ground that the deceasedFlorencia Diez resided in the municipality of San

Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, at the time of herdeath, as evidenced by the death certificate.- The North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. filed anintervention in this case, as creditor of the

intestate estate for a mortgage loan granted tothe administrator, with the authorization of thecourt, maintaining the validity of theseproceedings, and asking for the dismissal of thespecial appearance of Tomas Serra et al.- The court denied the petition of the specialappearance.

ISSUEWON Tomas Serra et al can contest thecompetency and jurisdiction of CFI of OccidentalNegros to take cognizance of and act in theproceeding for the settlement of the intestateestate of the deceased Florencia Diez

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HELD- NO. This administration has functioned for twoyears, and the appellants after that period haveappeared in this case, too late to availthemselves of the benefits offered by section 113of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it would seemthat the only remedy left to them is to ask for thereopening of the proceedings in the lower court

that assumed jurisdiction.- In order to render valid a grant of letters ofadministration the view is generally acceptedthat certain jurisdictional facts must exist. Thesefacts are that the person on whose estate theletters are being granted is in fact dead, and thatat the time of death he was a resident of thecounty wherein letters are being granted, or if nota resident that he left assets in such county. Ithas been said that the fact of the death of theintestate and of his residence within the countyare foundation facts upon which all thesubsequent proceedings in the administration ofthe estate rest, and that if the intestate was notan inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,

and left no assets in the state, and none cameinto it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred onthe court to grant letters of administration in anycounty. A probate court has jurisdiction to grantadministration of the estate of a person who atthe time of his decease was an inhabitant orresident in the county, without proof that he leftan estate to be administered within the county.- Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedureprovides that the jurisdiction assumed by a Courtof First Instance for the settlement of an estate,so far as it depends on the place of residence of aperson, or of the location of his estate, shall notbe contested in a suit or proceeding, except in anappeal from that court, in the original case, or

when the lack of jurisdiction appears in therecord. In the present case the lack of jurisdictiondid not appear in the record at the time when thecourt a quo that appointed the administratorfound itself competent, and no appeal was takenfrom the order decreeing said appointment.

BASA V MERCADO61 PHIL 632

GODDARD; July 26, 1935OWEN

FACTS- CFI Pampanga allowed and probated last willand testament of Ines Basa. Atilano Mercado

(respondent) was appointed the administratorand was declared the only heir of the deceasedunder the will. The administration proceedingswas closed. Joaquin Basa (petitioner) filed amotion praying that proceedings be reopenedand alleged that court lacked jurisdiction to act inthe matter because there was a failure to complywith requirements as to the publication of the

notice of hearing and that Ing Katipunan is not ageneral circulation in Pampanga as prescribed inthe following section of the Code of CivilProcedure:

SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will.When a will is delivered to a court having

jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appointa time and place when all concerned mayappear to contest the allowance of the will, andshall cause public notice thereof to be given bypublication in such newspaper or newspapersas the court directs of general circulation in theprovince, three weeks successively, previous tothe time appointed, and no will shall be alloweduntil such notice has been given. At the hearing

all testimony shall be taken under oath,reduced to writing and signed by thewitnesses."

- First publication: June 6, 1931Third: June 20, 1931Hearing: June 27, 1931NOTE: only 21 days after the date of the FIRSTpublication instead of THREE FULL WEEKSBEFORE the day set for the hearing

ISSUES1. WON Sec 630 means publication requirementconstitutes three full weeks before the date ofhearing2. WON Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general

circulation in Pampanga

HELD1. NORatio First publication of the notice need not bemade twenty-one days before the day appointedfor the hearing.Reasoning- HISTORY OF Section 630 > Code of CivilProcedure of State of Vermont. SC of Vermontstated in In re Warner's Estate:

Date of examining and allowing final account ofadministration and for decreeing the residue ofthe estate to the lawful claimants of the same:December 19, 1919

Order to this effect: November 28, 1919Date of Publication: December 4, 11 and 18,1919 (three weeks successively)

NOTE: This was 'public notice' to all personsinterested of the time and place ofexamining and allowing said account andmaking decree of distribution, and wassufficient even though the hearing on the

administrator's final account was set forDecember 19, only fifteen days after the date ofthe first publication.2. YES- record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaperof general circulation as it is

> published for the dissemination of local newsand general information> has a bona fide subscription list of payingsubscribes> published at regular intervals and> trial court ordered the publication to bemade in Ing Katipunan precisely because it wasa "newspaper of general circulation in theProvince of Pampanga."

- no attempt has been made to prove that it wasa newspaper devoted to the interests orpublished for the entertainment of a particularclass, profession, trade, calling, race or religiousdenomination- fact that there is another paper published inPampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 tobe exact) and that certain Manila dailies alsohave a larger circulation in that province isunimportant. No fixed number of subscribers isnecessary to constitute a newspaper of generalcirculation.Disposition TC affirmed

RODRIGUEZ V BORJA

17 SCRA 418REYES JBL; June 21, 1966

TERRY

NATUREPetition for CertiorariFACTS- Fr. Rodriguez died in Manila. On March 4, 1963,respondents Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered tothe Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last willand testament of Fr. Rodriguez.On March 8, 1963,Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed apetition for leave of court to allow them to

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examine the alleged will, which was withdrawn- On March 12, 1963, the Rodriguezes, petitionersherein, filed before CFI of Rizal a petition for thesettlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguezalleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguezwas a resident of Paranaque, Rizal, and d iedwithout leaving a will and praying that MariaRodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix

of the estate.- On same day, Pangilinan and Jacalan filed apetition for the probation of the will delivered bythem on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by theparties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque,Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the CatholicChurch of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from 1930 up to thetime of his death in 1963; that he was buried inParanaque, and that he left real properties inRizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.- The Rodriguezes contend that since theintestate proceedings in the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filedin CFI Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date,

the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertainthe petition for probate.- Pangilinan and Jacalan, aver that the CFI ofBulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upondelivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Courton March 4, 1963, and that the case in CFIBulacan therefore has precedence over the casefiled in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

ISSUEWON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the caseHELD

YES- The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vestedupon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Fr

Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petitionfor its allowance was filed until later, becauseupon the will being deposited, the court could,motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the timeand place for proving the will, and issued thecorresponding notices as under Sec 3, Rule 76, ofthe Revised Rules of Court- The use of the disjunctive in the words "when awill is delivered to OR a petition for the allowanceof a will is filed" plainly indicates that the courtmay act upon the mere deposit therein of adecedent's testament, even if no petition for itsallowance is as yet filed. Where the petition forprobate is made after the deposit of the will, thepetition is deemed to relate back to the time

when the will was delivered. Since the testamentof Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered toCFI Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiatedintestate proceedings in CFI Rizal only on March12, 8 days later, the precedence and exclusive

jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan is incontestable.- But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule76 speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court

having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar theBulacan court did not have it because thedecedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We cannot disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years ofresidence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan(1930-1963); but even if we do so, and considerthat he retained throughout some animusrevertendi to the place of his birth in Rizal, thatdetail would not imply that the Bulacan courtlacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions,the power to settle decedents' estates isconferred by law upon all CFIs, and the domicileof the testator only affects the venue but not the

jurisdiction of the Court ( In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil.239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs.

Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies thatthe late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he leftpersonal property in Hagonoy, province ofBulacan. That is sufficient in this case.Disposition Petition for certiorari is DENIED.

CASTANEDA V ALEMANYGR 1439

WILLARD; March 14, 1904MAIA

NATUREAppeal from judgment of CFI Manila allowing willof Dona Juana Moreno

FACTS- the CFI Manila allowed the will of Dona JuanaMoreno, holding that all the legal formalities hadbeen required with in the execution of the will- appellants (through Alemany, administrator ofthe properties of minors Leandro and Paz Gruet,children of Dona Juana) question this ruling,contending that said will was not written in thepresence and under express direction of thetestatrix as required by Code of Civil Procedure.- on the other hand, appellees contend that thegrounds for the disallowance of a will are limitedto those enumerated in the same code

ISSUEWON the CFI erred in allowing the will

HELDNORatio the evidence shows that the will of Dona

Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in thepresence of three witnesses, who signed it as

witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and ofeach other. It was therefore executed inconformity with the law.Reasoning Section 618 of the Code of CivilProcedure reads: No will xxx shall be valid topass any estate, real of personal, nor charge oreffect the same, unless it be in writing andsigned by the testator, or by the testator's namewritten by some other person in his presence,and by his express direction, and attested andsubscribed by three or more credible witnesses inthe presence of the testator and each of theother. xxx- all that the quoted provision requires is (a) thatthe will be in writing, and (2) either the testator

sign it in himself, or, if he does not sign it, that itbe signed by someone in his presence and underhis direction. Who does the mechanical work ofwriting the will is a matter of indifference- here, the will was typewritten in the office of thelawyer, but this fact is of no consequence(court did not elaborate).- the only purpose of the proceedings under thecode for the probate of a will is to establishconclusively as against everyone, and once forall, the facts that a will was executed with theformalities required by law and that the testatorwas in a condition to make a will (Sec. 625)- judgment in such proceedings determines andcan determine nothing more. The court has no

power to pass upon the validity of any provisionsmade in the will. It can not decide, for example,that a certain legacy is void and another onevalid. It could not in this case make any decisionupon the question whether the testratrix had thepower to appoint by will a guardian for theproperty of her children by her first husband, orwhether the person so appointed was or was nota suitable person to discharge such trust. All suchquestions must be decided in some otherproceeding.- grounds on which a will may be disallowed arestated the section 634 (now sec.9, rule 76).Unless one of those grounds appears, the willmust be allowed. They all have to do with the

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personal condition of the testator at the time ofits execution and the formalities connectedtherewith. It follows that neither this court nor thecourt below has any jurisdiction in thisproceedings to pass upon questions raised byappellants relating to the appointment of aguardian for the children of the deceased.- It is claimed by appellants that there was no

testimony to show that the will executed was thesame will presented to the court and concerningwhich this hearing was had. It is true that theevidence does not show that the document incourt was presented to the witnesses andidentified by them, as should have been done.However, it appears that it was assumed by allthe parties during the trial that the will aboutwhich the witnesses were testifying was thedocument then in court. No suggestion of anykind was then made by the counsel for appellantsthat it was not the same instrument.Disposition Petition is denied. Decision affirmed

ATILANO G. MERCADO V JUDGE

SANTOS66 PHIL 215

LAUREL, J: 1938BSJ

NATUREPetition for review on certiorariFACTSOn May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed inthe CFI of Pampanga a petition for the probate ofthe will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Withoutany opposition, and upon the testimony ofBenigno F. Gabino, one of the attestingwitnesses, the probate court, on June 27, 1931,admitted the will to probate. Almost three

years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenorsherein moved ex parte to reopen theproceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of thecourt to probate the will and to close theproceedings. Because filed ex parte, the motionwas denied. The same motion was filed a secondtime, but with notice to the adverse party. Themotion was nevertheless denied by the probatecourt on May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court,the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935.

It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., 16sixteen months after the probate of the willof Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa deLeon filed with the justice of the peace

court of San Fernando, Pampanga, acomplaint against the petitioner herein, forfalsification or forgery of the will probatedas above indicated.

ISSUEWON the probate of the will of the deceased wifeis a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged

forgery of the said will

HELDYES.- Sec. 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure providesas to the effect of judgment:"SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a

judgment or final order in an action or specialproceeding before a court or judge of thePhilippine Islands or of the United States, or ofany State or Territory of the United States, having

jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order,may be as follows:

"1. In case of a judgment or order against a

specific thing, or in respect to the probate ofa will, or the administration of the estate ofa deceased person, or in respect to thepersonal, political, or legal condition or relation ofa particular person, the judgment or order isconclusive upon the title of the thing, thewill or administration, or the condition orrelation of the person: Provided, That theprobate of a will or granting of letters ofadministration shall only be prima facie evidenceof the death of the testator or intestate:

Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit asto the conclusiveness of the due execution of aprobated will. It says:

"SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusiveas to Execution. No will shall pass either the realor personal estate, unless it is proved andallowed in the Court of First Instance, or byappeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowanceby the court of a will of real and personal estateshall be conclusive as to its due execution."

In Manahan vs. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), weheld:

". . . The decree of probate is conclusive withrespect to the due execution thereof and itcannot be impugned on any of the grounds

authorized by law, except that of fraud, in anyseparate or independent action or proceeding.

In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:"The probate of a will by the probate court having

jurisdiction thereof is usually considered asconclusive as to its due execution and validity,and is also conclusive that the testator was

of sound and disposing mind at the timewhen he executed the will, and was notacting under duress, menace, fraud, orundue influence, and that the will isgenuine and not a forgery."

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is aproceeding in rem. The provision of notice bypublication as a prerequisite to the allowance of awill is constructive notice to the whole world, andwhen probate is granted, the judgment of thecourt is binding upon everybody, even againstthe State. This court held in the case of Manalovs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil.,938):

"The proceeding for the probate of a will is one inrem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires

jurisdiction over all the persons interested,through the publication of the notice prescribedby section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, andany order that may be entered therein is bindingagainst all of them.

"Through the publication of the petition for theprobate of the will, the court acquires jurisdictionover all such persons as are interested in saidwill; and any judgment that may be renderedafter said proceeding is binding against theworld."

FLUEMER VS HIXG.R. No. L-32636

MALCOLM; March 17,1930MEL

NATUREAppeal from CFI decision denying the probate ofthe document alleged to by the last will andtestament of the deceased.

FACTS- Petitioner alleges that the will was executed inElkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by

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Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, andthat the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated,by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and ascertified to by the Director of the National Library.

Judge of First Instance Tuason denied the probateof the document alleged to by the last will andtestament of the deceased.- While the appeal pending submission in thiscourt, the attorney for the appellant presented anunverified petition asking the court to accept aspart of the evidence the documents attached tothe petition. One of these documents disclosesthat a paper writing purporting to be the waspresented for probate on June 8, 1929, to theclerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia,in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths ofDana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, thesubscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to berecorded and filed. It was shown by anotherdocument that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, theclerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator,cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward

Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it isto be noted that the application for the probate ofthe will in the Philippines was filed on February20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginiaappear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.

These facts are strongly indicative of an intentionto make the Philippines the principaladministration and West Virginia the ancillaryadministration.

ISSUEWON the will should be allowed

HELDNO

Ratio: No attempt has been made to comply withCivil Procedure, for no hearing on the question ofthe allowance of a will said to have been provedand allowed in West Virginia has been requested.

There is no showing that the deceased left anyproperty at any place other than the PhilippineIslands and no contention that he left any in WestVirginia.Reasoning As stated by the lower court, therequirements of the law were not met. There wasno was printed or published under the authorityof the State of West Virginia, as provided insection 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Norwas the extract from the law attested by thecertificate of the officer having charge of the

original, under the sale of the State of WestVirginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code ofCivil Procedure. No evidence was introduced toshow that the extract from the laws of WestVirginia was in force at thetime the alleged willwas executed.- In addition, the due execution of the will was notestablished. The only evidence on this point is tobe found in the testimony of the petitioner. Asidefrom this, there was nothing to indicate that thewill was acknowledged by the testator in thepresence of two competent witnesses, of thatthese witnesses subscribed the will in thepresence of the testator and of each other as thelaw of West Virginia seems to require. On thesupposition that the witnesses to the will residewithout the Philippine Islands, it would then theduty of the petitioner to prove execution by someother means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)- It was also necessary for the petitioner to provethat the testator had his domicile in West Virginiaand not establish this fact consisted of therecitals in the CATHYwill and the testimony of

the petitioner. Also in beginning administrationproceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands,the petitioner violated his own theory byattempting to have the principal administration inthe Philippine Islands.DISPOSITIONJudgment affirmed

GUERRERO VS TERAN13 Phil 212

JOHNSON; March 19, 1909

EVA

NATUREAppeal from a judgment of the CFI

FACTS- Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors MariaManuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz,filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recoverthe sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that Teranhad been the administrator of the estate ofAntonio Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906.- Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 butclaimed that the latter owed him P482.14.- CFI found that Teran, as administrator of saidestate, owed Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46.

ISSUE

WON Teran managed and administered theestate of Sanchez Munoz from 1901-1906

HELDNO. Teran was the duly appointed and recognizedrepresentative of the minors Maria Manuela andMasria del carmen in the administration of theirinterests in the estate of the said AntonioSanchez Munoz

from Sept.17, 1901 untilMarch 18, 1902.- Teran was appointed as administrator of saidestate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a bondof 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithfulperformance of his duties as such representative.- On March 18, 1901, the CFI of Albay appointedMaria Munoz y Gomezas guardian for said minorsand she gave the required bond for the faithfulperformance of her duties as such guardian.- While there are some indications that Terancontinued to act as the administrator of saidestate after the appointment of Maria Munoz yGomez, up to Oct.6, 1906, yet the fact exists thatsaid Maria Munoz was the actual representative

of the minors from and after March 18, 1902 untilOct.6, 1906, and therefore she, as such guardianand administratrix of the estate, must be heldresponsible for the property belonging to saidminors during the period while she was theiractual guardian.- Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not aresident of the Philippines at the time of herapppointment, was removed as guardian by theCFI. Felix Samson was then appointed asguardian. The mere fact that she was removed asguardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmenfrom liability to the minors during the time thatshe was duly acting as said guardian. If duringthe time that she was the guardian she allowed

other persons to handle the property of her wardsand if any mismanagement or loss occurredthereby, the responsibility must fall upon her.Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minorsbetween March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, theyhave a right of action only against said MariaMunoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and underthe law the administratrix of the property of theirestate.- Teran was liable for losses only during the timethat he was acting as the legal representative ofthe said minors in the management of theirestate, from Sept.17, 1901 up to the ti

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