The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Special Warfare

Trainingthe SpecialOperationsNCO

PB 80–90–1 Winter 1990 Vol. 3, No. 1

Special Warfare

From the Commandant

The overarching mission of the Special WarfareCenter and School is to provide the doctrine, train-ing, materiel and organization for special-operationsforces. The most important ingredient in that wholeprocess has always been, and will always be, the soldier we select and train to man the force. He sym-bolizes and embodies everything we stand for. Hecarries the heritage and legacy of the past, demon-strates our capability today, and holds our hope forthe future. Selecting and training the right soldierrequires a professional, dedicated and capable Spe-cial Forces NCO Corps. The NCO is the cornerstoneto all our training efforts in the schoolhouse as wellas in the operational units.

Special Forces Assessment and Selection is ourselection process. It is a unique privilege afforded tous by the Army which gives us the prerogative ofselecting those we consider to be the right men towear the Green Beret. Our NCOs play a key role inthis selection process. Their input is a necessaryingredient that ensures a quality soldier. NCOsmust recognize the right skills, knowledge and atti-tude of a soldier in SFAS and know that each soldiercan be influenced dramatically by proper NCO lead-ership and training. Since its inception two yearsago, SFAS has had a direct impact on increasing thecompletion rate of the Special Forces QualificationCourse. Special Forces NCOs have made the differ-ence in SFAS because the emphasis has been on theproduct and not the process, which is basically a 21-day observation period.

When the soldier enters into Special Forces quali-fication training, it is again incumbent upon theNCO to provide the structure, guidance and atmo-sphere conducive to learning. Mere platform instruc-tion and testing are not enough. NCOs must becomementors, advisers and role models to guide and moti-vate the student in order to maximize the value oftraining time. Although the Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course students are volunteers, many do nothave a real understanding of Special Forces or spe-cial operations. Training-group NCOs play a criticalrole in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of stu-dents by offering professional advice and sharingtheir Special Forces experiences. The NCO instruc-tor is the medium for relating operational experienceto the material being taught and provides practicalapplications of current doctrine, tactics, techniques

and procedures. The instructor NCO is the initiallink between the student and the operational unit towhich he will one day be assigned. The NCOs mustprovide an accurate portrayal of the role of specialoperations in low-intensity conflict.

The special-operations soldier is not a finishedproduct when he leaves the schoolhouse. Again, theburden falls to the experienced NCOs in the opera-tional units to continue the education process.

The nature of special operations and our role inlow-intensity conflict mean that our units aredeployed right now in various places around theworld. Because of our missions and the small size ofour units, special-operations NCOs have to bedepended upon to do the job on their own and do itright. They may be deployed on short notice andwith little time to train before deployment. This callsfor an NCO corps that is capable, motivated and con-scientious in its pursuit of excellence, regardless ofthe environment. It calls for NCOs who have inter-nalized SOF doctrine in our five basic missions,know their mission-essential task list and are capa-ble of operating across the spectrum of conflict withlittle support or supervision.

NCOs are the most important asset we have —more important than hardware. Consequently, wemust maintain and sustain a quality force. NCOsproduce the product, and the product must be aquality one. We cannot mass produce special-opera-tions forces, which is why the selection and trainingof the Special Forces soldier is critically important.

As an Army theme, “The NCO” has sought toemphasize the importance of the NCO to the Army.In the operational groups and at the Special WarfareCenter and School, every year is the year of theNCO. They are truly the backbone of the force.

Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto

Commander & CommandantBrig. Gen. David J. Baratto

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Cen-ter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission isto promote the professional development of special opera-tions forces by providing a forum for the examination ofboth established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. This publica-tion does not supersede any information presented in otherofficial Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: AUTOVON239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special Warfarereserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copy-righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and theauthor.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve spe-cial operations units. Individuals desiring a private sub-scription should forward their requests to: Superintendentof Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-ton, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Carl E. VuonoGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:William J. Meehan IIBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

Headquarters, Department of the Army

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Departments2 Letters

48 Enlisted Career Notes50 Officer Career Notes52 Update56 Book Reviews

Features4 The Special Forces Q-Course

by Maj. James R. FrickeTraining for Special Forces NCOs is thorough and demanding,

and volunteers must face a number of challenges on the way tobecoming members of SF units.

12 SFAS: Special Forces Assessment and Selectionby Maj. James L. Velky

An examination of the historical background and development ofthe program to select the right soldiers for Special Forces training.

16 Operations and Intelligence: Keeping Pace with SpecialForces Missionsby Maj. Rex H. McTyeire

Designed to train experienced SF NCOs to become assistant-opera-tions-and-intelligence sergeants, O&I’s content has evolved to keeppace with Special Forces missions and doctrine.

22 SWCS NCO Academy: NCOs Training NCOsDrawing on its cadre’s experience and leadership, the SWCS NCO

Academy trains SOF NCOs to be better soldiers and better leaders.28 Early Special Forces Medical Training: 1952-1971

by Lt. Col. Louis T. DorogiThe author traces the development of Special Forces medical train-

ing from its beginnings in 1952 to the extensive program designed tomeet the demands of SF missions and the Vietnam War.

37 NCO Professional Development: The PSYOP Specialistby MSgt. Calvin Rome

A blueprint for NCO development in the new CMF 37 — PSYOP.42 Is Fitness Important for Leaders?

by Sgt. Maj. Henry BoneA senior SF NCO uses historical examples to emphasize the impor-

tance of fitness.44 When You’re On Patrol ...

A series of tips for leaders and team members on weapons, equip-ment and proper procedures.

Spring 1989

Special Warfare Vol. 3, No. 1

ContentsPB 80–90–1

Winter 1990

LIC study insightfulI would like to take this opportu-

nity to compliment the authors of“Between Peace and War: Compre-hending Low-Intensity Conflict.”Their insightful study provides anoutstanding basis for discussionamong those of us concerned withthe present and future challengesposed by low-intensity conflict. As aprofessor who is teaching andengaging in research related to low-intensity conflict, I must say thatthe article will be assigned readingin both my present and futureseminars.

On a broader level, I would liketo compliment your fine publicationfor providing a most meaningfulvehicle by which both academicsand practitioners can develop agreater appreciation of the com-plexities that surround specialoperations. Your bulletin doesindeed enable us to have an out-standing way by which differentviews can be exchanged in an areawhich certainly will grow in signifi-cance in the years to come.

Stephen SloanProfessor, Department of

Political ScienceUniversity of Oklahoma

Solving SF Branch problemsI read with great interest the

article by Capt. Charles King onthe SF Branch (Summer 1989). Asone of those medical-corps officersnot allowed to transfer to thebranch, I have a few comments.Behind Infantry and Military Intel-ligence, the Army Medical Depart-ment has the third-largest numberof SF-qualified (5G) officers. Theyare, for the most part, not continu-

ing players in SF, having reachedhigher rank or other interests.

We currently have a problemobtaining enough medical officersfor SF. Many of them have encoun-tered continuing obstacles to reach-ing, returning or continuing in SF.New medical officers to SFencounter AMEDD pressure to onlystay one or two years and then con-tinue their postgraduate medicaleducation. Most of these neverreturn. The one thing that SFalways did to show that their medi-cal officers were full players on theteam, (making them attend) the “Qcourse,” is no longer done. This wasa powerful recruiting tool. This con-tinual problem of junior physicianswho do not stay and never return,combined with no training thatwould make them more likely toreturn, has dire consequences.

Capt. King’s challenge to theother branches is at the crux of thisproblem. “What are the otherbranches ... doing to fulfill theirobligations to support Army SOF?”My unofficial opinion concerningthe AMEDD’s answer is: nothing.The AMEDD has its hands fullensuring that medically competentphysicians are sent to support thetroops. This they will always do,but that is the limit of their sup-port. Any training beyond medicalcompetence and a very few basicsoldier skills will not be provideddue to preciousness of time to trainphysicians versus the demands ofusing a physician’s time to providepatient care in an extremely busyhealth-care system.

This then leaves us in SF withmilitarily untrained physicians, nocourse to train them (a staff-officercourse will not do — docs deploy),no way to track trained officers,

and no way to ensure their contin-ued association and/or return to SF.

No one wants to see physicianscome to SF, stay in various courses(airborne, flight surgeon, dive med.,etc.) most of their time and thenleave in two years when they arejust finally getting up to speed. Butit will continue like this unlessthought is given to branch-qualify-ing some, thus giving them theskills, and encouraging theirreturn, fully trained, for a laterassignment as group surgeon.

Having gone through SF trainingand AMEDD officer basic andadvanced courses, I can emphatical-ly state that if we in SF do not trainour medical officers, then they willnot be trained for our needs.

Maj. Warner D. Farr, MC/SFSAMEDD Student DetachmentFort Sam Houston, Texas

(Under DA Pamphlet 600-3,Paragraph 18-3, officers who areaccessed into the Special ForcesBranch receive branch code “18”when they complete the SpecialForces Qualification Course,according to Maj. Jan Murawsky,chief of SF proponency in theSWCS Special Operations Propo-nency Office. As far back as Dec. 9,1987, however, an SWCS policy let-ter allowed officers assigned to theprofessional branches — JAG,Chaplain and Medical Corps — toattend the training without receiv-ing the SF Tab.

Officers from professional andsupport branches who are necessaryto support SF-group needs attendthe Q-Course as space permits, Mur-awsky said. Priority for attendanceis given to officers needed to fill SFdetachment-commander slots.

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Letters

2 Special Warfare

Under a current SWCS proposal,all SFQC graduates would beawarded SF tabs. Officers assignedto professional branches would alsobe exempt from completion of SFAS.If the proposal is adopted, Muraw-sky said, those officers who previous-ly attended the Q-Course and werenot awarded a tab would be eligibleto apply for one. — Editor)

UW’s political aspectMaj. Brady has written a timely

and important article on unconven-tional warfare doctrine (Summer1989: “Mass Strategy: A DifferentApproach to Unconventional War-fare”). He has correctly argued thatFM 31-20 does not provide enoughguidance on the political aspects ofsupporting insurgencies.

In LIC, an insurgency is a politi-cal struggle which must be won onpolitical terms. The struggles of theContras and the Afghanistan resis-tance fighters are examples of theneed to properly mix, as Maj. Bradystates, the military strategy withthe political organization. The com-munist followers of Lenin, Mao, orthe Cuban school have spent agreat deal of time studying theseissues, and so must we if we are tocompete successfully.

Now is the time to take anotherlook at the doctrine. However, asMaj. Brady points out, proper doc-trine is not the only answer. Theschool house must include these

ideas in its formal instruction, andthe unit must require continuingprofessional education as part of itsMETL (mission-essential task list).Only through exercises and contin-uing education can these ideasbring fruit.

The long-term success or failureof an insurgent movement candepend on the capability of theoperational special-operations unitthat is advising and assisting it.That unit needs to be provided withthe most sophisticated thinking inthe area of insurgency, and Maj.Brady’s article is an excellentexample.

Lt. Col. William Flavin, SFOffice of the Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Special Opera-tions and Low Intensity Conflict

Non-partisan captionI was really enjoying the (Sum-

mer 1989 issue) ... when suddenly Ireached page 42. The caption on thephoto (soldier holding UNPFK ban-ner) was so far off-base that I justhad to write. My first reaction was“Is this a test?” Then I thought,wistfully, “Maybe they’re trying fora reunion and want to know ifthere’s any of us still out there.”

Anyway, be advised that the sol-dier holding the banner is not amember of any “peacekeepingforces.” He is most definitely from

the second Yun-dae (regiment) ofthe 8240th Army Unit. The initialsstand for United Nations PartisanForces Korea.

I can’t remember the guy, but Ibet a bottle of San Miguel the pic-ture was taken in late 1952 or veryearly 1953, I would guess at Kang-wha-do. Your historians can fill youin on the rest.

Thomas T. JonesIndianapolis, Ind.

(Mr. Jones’ comment refers to aphoto of a soldier holding a bannerwith the initials “UNPFK,” whichwe identified as U.N. PeacekeepingForces Korea. As Mr. Jones and afew other sharp-eyed readers point-ed out, the caption should havecredited the banner to the UN Par-tisan Forces Korea, a unit whichsupported North Korean anti-com-munist guerrillas during the Kore-an War. — Editor)

Special Warfare welcomes lettersfrom its readers but may have toedit them for length. Please includeyour full name, rank, address andphone number (Autovon, if possi-ble). Address letters to Editor, Spe-cial Warfare; USAJFKSWCS; FortBragg, NC 28307-5000.

Winter 1990 3

Four young NCOs in dress uni-forms sit with their classmates atthe graduation exercise for the Spe-cial Forces Qualification Course.As background music plays andushers escort visitors to their seats,the anticipation and elation of thefour NCOs rises, and each reflectson the challenges he had to over-come to arrive at this milestone inhis military career.

Their challenges actually beganprior to the 24-week SFQC. Theyand all other current volunteers forSF must first complete the three-week Special Forces Assessmentand Selection Program. SFAS isstructured to assess volunteers’motivation, mental and physicalcondition and ability to work asmembers of a team. Soldiers do notpass or fail SFAS; based on theirperformance, they are either select-ed or not selected to attend theSFQC. Currently 40-50 percent arenot selected.

Soldiers who are selected returnto their units to await permanent-

change-of-station orders to attendthe qualification course. In themeantime, they are advised tomaintain a high level of physicalfitness and to complete pro-grammed text materials prior totheir return, usually within 6-9months, for the SFQC.

When they return for training,candidates receive briefings andinstruction on upcoming events andcomplete an extensive in-processingwhich includes airborne refreshertraining. Then they are ready tostart the 24-week SFQC (trainingfor SF medics is longer, as will beexplained later). The course beginswith 80 hours of common-leadertraining, required by the ArmySergeants Major Academy as thecore instruction for all basic NCOcourses, for those students whohave not completed the Basic NCOCourse in their previous MOS. Thisblock of instruction, together withSF common-task and MOS-specificinstruction in the SFQC, meets therequirements for BNCOC in theArmy’s NCO education system.

QQQThe

SpecialForces

TheSpecialForces

CourseCourseby Maj. James R. Fricke

4 Special Warfare

After CLT come four weeks ofadvanced individual field training(Phase I), 13 weeks of MOS-specifictraining for tasks required on anoperational A-detachment (PhaseII), and finally the unconventional-warfare training (Phase III) whichtests all the skills the students havelearned in the first two phases.

Phase IFollowing CLT, students move to

the James “Nick” Rowe SpecialOperations Training Facility atCamp Mackall, located approxi-mately 40 miles west of Fort Bragg.Newly renovated, the training facil-ity can house up to 750 students atone time and is a dramatic changefrom the tar-paper buildings of onlytwo years ago.

During the first day at CampMackall, students are introduced totheir Special Forces trainer, whoserves as instructor, mentor andadviser. He will be responsible fortheir training for the next 28 daysand will provide instruction andassistance in all practical exercises.He is available at any timethroughout training to give individ-ual feedback or remedial instruc-tion. His role is not that of a drillinstructor — he does not get thestudents up in the morning; he tellsthem to meet him at a specific loca-tion at a certain time. The student’sown chain of command fills thosehousekeeping roles, and studentsreceive treatment appropriate totheir rank during training.

The first training event in PhaseI is an airborne operation whichends with a cadre-led terrain walk.The objective is to identify studentsweak in land navigation so thatthey can receive additional trainingto help them improve. The addition-al training places the student in aseries of situations in which hemust navigate over varying terrain.

The first week of Phase I givessoldiers training in air operations,small-boat operations and basicsurvival classes designed to teachthem to live off the land. At the endof this survival training, soldiers

complete a graded field trainingexercise to evaluate the field-sur-vival skills they have learned. Dur-ing the FTX students are requiredto build a fire without matches,start a smokeless fire, describe var-ious survival-food sources and con-struct expedient traps and snares.They must cook fish and game,select a shelter site and construct ashelter appropriate to the environ-ment and tactical situation.

During the second week, studentstake the most comprehensive land-navigation program taught by anyArmy school. The program teachesthe soldier to identify terrain fea-tures, find his position on a map,measure ground distance, orient hismap and navigate cross-countryusing a map and compass. Initially,each student takes a land-naviga-tion diagnostic exam which evalu-ates his abilities. Students whoshow weak areas on the diagnosticexam will be monitored closely bythe instructors and may receiveadditional training, as necessary.The final exam is a go/no-go practi-cal exercise over varying terrain inwhich the student must navigate acourse 18 kilometers long and findfour points in nine hours. The

course begins at 2 a.m., forcing thestudent to navigate part of thecourse in darkness. Students whofail the exam will take remedialtraining and re-test 15 days later.

The objective of the third andfourth weeks of instruction, small-unit tactics and patrolling, is toenable the student to develop andimplement techniques for conduct-ing successful combat patrols andoperations. Students learn basiclight-infantry tactics and opera-tions, and this block establishes thefoundation for all follow-on tacticaltraining. Instruction is presented insmall groups, and trainers guidestudents through practical fieldexercises. Students learn the basicsof raids, ambushes and reconnais-sance patrols from squad throughplatoon-size elements. They covermany of the techniques listed inFM 7-70, Light InfantrySquad/Platoon, and the RangerHandbook is used as a ready refer-ence. Instructors also evaluate stu-dents’ performance in leadershippositions during the patrollingFTX. This exercise is flexibleenough to repeat actions on theobjectives or any portions of thepatrol if students’ performance is

Special ForcesQualification Course

Phase I WEEK 1 WEEK 2 WEEK 3 WEEK 4

AIR OPSSURVIVAL

SMALL BOAT OPS

ADV LAND NAV SMALL UNITTACTICS

ADV PATROLLING

Phase II

MOS SPECIFIC TRAINING:

Phase III WEEK 1 WEEK 2 WEEKS 3–4

SPECIAL OPSAIR OPS

DET CROSS-TNGISOL/MSN PREP

UW FTX "ROBIN SAGE"

13 WEEKS

(18B) WEAPONS SERGEANT(18C) ENGINEER SERGEANT(18D) MEDICAL SERGEANT(18E) COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT

Winter 1990 5

incorrect. The rule is to train to thestandard, not to time, and the com-mon-skills training program is pro-gressive and sequential.

Phase IIAfter successfully completing

Phase I, the students attend theirrespective individual specialty-training phase. In this phase, eachsoldier will be introduced to hischosen specialty and taught thoseskills necessary in his role as thejunior NCO on an A-detachment.

Weapons sergeantThe Weapons Sergeant Course

(18B), emphasizes the weapons sys-tems most commonly foundthroughout the world. The trainingplan is conducted in related blocksof instruction and ends with live-fire practical exercises. In addition,the weapons sergeant learns light-infantry tactics.

Lessons learned from the war inAfghanistan have re-emphasizedthe importance of hand-held air-

defense-artillery weapons, and stu-dents receive 33 hours of instruc-tion, from emplacement and opera-tion to identification and engage-ment of targets. They learn thecharacteristics and capabilities ofU.S. and foreign air-defense sys-tems. A majority of the training isspent on practical exercises inwhich the student tracks aircraft ina simulator.

Weapons NCOs also learn thecharacteristics and capabilities ofU.S. and foreign anti-tank weaponsand threat vehicles. They study theoperation, crew duties, targetengagement and maintenance ofselected free-world and opposing-force anti-tank weapons. After 50hours of instruction, the studentstake a comprehensive examinationwhich includes written and hands-on testing.

The next major block of instruc-tion (and sometimes the most diffi-cult for the student) is indirect-fireweapons. The future weaponssergeant learns all aspects, from

forward-observer procedures andmechanical training to fire-direc-tion-center procedures. FDC proce-dures are still taught on the M-16plotting board, a purely mechanicalsystem, to give students a basicunderstanding of the procedures.Students perform maintenance,crew drills and section training onboth U.S. and foreign mortars andfire-control instruments. The indi-rect-fire weapons block consists of134 hours of classes, with a majori-ty of these hours being practicalexercise.

The 18B is also the team’s small-arms weapons specialist who mustbe capable of picking up any systemfrom machine gun to shotgun andteaching the basics. He is capable ofteaching basic marksmanship toindigenous personnel or snipertechniques to soldiers whosemarksmanship is more advanced.He receives 124 hours of instructionon small arms and is capable ofdescribing the cycle of operation,type of cartridge, feed mechanism,locking system, operating systemand sights used on all of the mostcommon weapons systems. He isgiven extensive training on clearingprocedures, disassembly and re-assembly procedures, functionscheck, and immediate-action andremedial-action procedures onweapons. The final exam for thisblock of instruction is both writtenand hands-on. The hands-on por-tion is known as the “pile test” —five weapons are disassembled andplaced in a pile. To receive a “go,”the student must reassemble theweapons and perform a functionscheck on four of the five weaponswithin 30 minutes.

Engineer sergeantThe Engineer Sergeant Course

(18C) teaches soldiers to plan, con-struct and destroy buildings andbridges. The training program ismore than just a demolitionscourse; it encompasses all theduties of an engineer sergeant. Theengineer sergeant learns to readblueprints; to rig lifting devices for

Students in theWeapons Sergeant

Course learn clearingprocedures, assembly

and disassembly ofthe most commonweapons systems

found throughout theworld.

6 Special Warfare

U.S. Army photo

construction projects; to prepare abill of materials; to prepare site andbuilding layouts; and to construct atheater-of-operations building. Thisinstruction includes estimatingrequired materials and mixing,placing, finishing and curing con-crete to design specifications. Field-fortifications subjects provideinstruction on the construction ofwire obstacles, fighting positions,bunkers and shelters. Both fieldfortifications and TO constructionare the basic components neededfor the construction of base campsor civic-action projects.

Students next receive 37 hours ofinstruction on land-mine warfarewhich teaches them the skills theyneed to support combat operations.They learn to describe the nomen-clature, characteristics and func-tions of selected anti-personnel andanti-tank mines; to perform mine-field installation, reporting andrecording; and to perform minefielddetecting and breaching with andwithout mine detectors. One of thepractical exercises the studentmust complete is to have his teaminstall a minefield with practicemines and record them on a mine-field-recording form. Another team

must then clear the minefield,using the minefield-recording form.Through this exercise the studentsgain an appreciation for attentionto detail.

Bridging subjects teach the stu-

dent the skills necessary to design,construct and classify selectedbridges. All students are involvedin the design of a non-standard,semipermanent, fixed bridge, andthey construct the superstructure

and substructure of a timber-trestlebridge.

The majority of the engineertraining is in demolitions. The engi-neer sergeant must have extensiveknowledge of demolitions and thecapability to use explosives in manydifferent ways. He learns to con-struct electric, non-electric and det-onating-cord firing systems, to cal-culate and place charges, and toemploy substitutes for standard-issue items of ammunition andexplosives.

In a block of classified instructionon improvised munitions, the engi-neer student learns to make his ownbooby traps, incendiaries, blastingcaps and assorted protectiondevices. He also learns to recoverand reuse explosives which may becommonly found on the battlefield.

The last major engineer subject istarget analysis and interdiction. Inthe final practical exercise, stu-dents must conduct a demolitionreconnaissance, prepare a demoli-tions folder and present a briefingon the target. Final examinationsare comprehensive and consist ofwritten and hands-on portions.

Medical sergeantAfter completing Phase I, the

medical sergeant currently attendsthe Phase IIA Course at the Acade-my of Health Sciences, Fort SamHouston, Texas. The 31-week PhaseIIA includes an initial 26 weeks ofclassroom instruction on basic aid-man skills, anatomy and physiolo-gy, pharmacology, infectious dis-eases and introduction to care of atrauma patient.

Following an intense week-longtrauma-management field trainingexercise, the medical sergeants aresent to various Army and PublicHealth Service hospitals for a four-week period of “on-the-job” train-ing. There they rotate through avariety of clinical services to gainpractical experience before return-ing to Fort Bragg for the final phase of medical training.

The Fort Bragg instruction is predominantly hands-on. Students

Although students in the Engineer Sergeant Course concentrate on demoli-tions, they also learn construction techniques necessary in base-camp andcivic-action projects.

U.S. Army photo

“After successfullycompleting Phase I,the students attendtheir respective indi-vidual specialty-training phase. Inthis phase, each sol-dier will be intro-duced to his chosenspecialty and taughtthose skills necessaryin his role as thejunior NCO on an A-detachment.”

Winter 1990 7

put the theory they learned at theAcademy of Health Sciences topractical use. Initial classes are inveterinary medicine, which hasproven invaluable in Third Worldcountries, where the health of thefamily water buffalo may be moreimportant than personal health.

The student receives advancedcardiac-life-support training tofamiliarize him with the operationof various types of support equip-ment and the procedures necessaryto treat a variety of cardiac prob-lems. He also learns to recognizekey trouble signs, explain emergen-cy cardiac procedures and useemergency cardiac drugs.

The future medical sergeantreceives 91 hours of trauma man-agement. During this instruction helearns to perform a primary andsecondary survey; manage traumaof the pneumothorax and hemotho-rax, manage trauma of eye, ear,nose and throat; treat non-pene-trating and penetrating injuries ofthe chest, treat penetrating injuriesof the abdomen, fractures, contu-sions, abrasions and wounds toextremities; and perform properairway management.

The medical sergeant expands

on the basic laboratory procedureshe learned at the Academy ofHealth Sciences. He learns tointerpret slides, cultures and spec-imens and to define their generalcharacteristics. He studies bacteri-ology, serology, parasitology, hema-tology, mycology and blood-typecross-match procedures, all ofwhich he will use when conductingpatient examinations.

The medical sergeant is trained

in surgical procedures and hasextensive graded and ungradedpractical exercises. He performsthe duties of an anesthesiologistduring surgical procedures andmonitors the patient’s signs for the surgeon. During surgery thestudent is required to performmanagement of intravenous fluids,set up surgical fields, performvenous cut-downs and delayed pri-mary closures, and debride, orremove contaminated tissue from,different types of wounds. Thisinstruction is conducted under theclose supervision of his instruc-tor/mentor.

The phase ends with an FTX thattests the student’s skills in a simu-lated combat situation. The entireprogram gives the soldier the skillsand knowledge he may need to pro-vide appropriate medical care toindigenous personnel and teammembers.

Communications sergeantAn A-detachment’s only contact

with the outside world is throughthe skills of the communicationssergeant, and his training must bethorough. All communications onthe team use Morse code, and one ofthe prerequisites for the course isthat a soldier be a graduate of theeight-week Advanced International

Students in the Medical Sergeant’s Course learn to administer anesthesiaand to perform limited surgical procedures under the close supervision oftheir instructors.

U.S. Army photo

Special ForcesQualification Course

FY 90 2 WEEKS 4 WEEKS 13 WEEKS 5 WEEKS

CLT Phase I Phase II Phase III

FY 91 2 WEEKS 5 WEEKS13 WEEKS

MOS Phase CLT Branch Training

8 Special Warfare

Morse Code Course, usually takenjust before Phase I, or capable ofpassing a verification test at 13send and 13 receive word groupsper minute. There are no exceptionsto this prerequisite.

The Communications SergeantCourse teaches related material inprogressive blocks. First the stu-dent receives additional interna-tional-Morse-code training toimprove his code speed to 15 sendand 15 receive groups per minute orhigher. Then he learns cryptograph-ic systems and reinforces hisMorse-code skills with unclassifiedhomework. The course introducesstudents to the common radio sys-tems used in Special Forces groups,but it concentrates on the burstout-station equipment, which com-presses message data into a shortburst transmission which is hard totrace. Students also study antennatheory and radio-wave propagationin detail, learning the basic princi-ples of vertical, horizontal and long-wire antennas, characteristics ofselected antennas and calculationof the most effective antennalength.

The course ends with a field per-formance examination conducted1,500 nautical miles from FortBragg at Camp Bullis, Texas. Thestudent’s final grade is based on hisability to send and receive 32 mes-sages, 20 of which are graded. Thisevaluation measures the student’sability to use Special Forces com-munication-operation instructions,proper cryptographic proceduresand his communications equipmentin an extended field problem.

All students in Phase II aretaught various methods of instruc-tion, since one of their main func-tions will be to teach other soldiers.This basic block of instruction isreinforced in Phase III when thestudents teach classes to their guer-rilla forces.

Phase IIIThe final phase of the qualifica-

tion course combines all of thoseskills learned in the previous 19

weeks. The phase begins with fivedays of special-operations classesfor the enlisted students. Duringthis instruction, students learn thefundamentals of unconventionalwarfare, the complexities of guer-rilla organizations, how to operatein the joint special-operationsarena, and the techniques andprocedures for air operations insupport of UW. These air-operationskills will be used during fieldpractical evaluation Robin Sage,where each detachment is requiredto set up either a resupply dropzone and a message pickup or alanding zone for a short takeoff andlanding aircraft.

Following these classes, the stu-dent detachments cross-train, andeach student instructs his teammembers in the MOS skills he haslearned. After pre-mission training,the team begins five days of isola-tion, during which the team plansits mission and each team memberprepares his portion of a briefback

to explain the team’s plan to sever-al field-grade officers from both theSpecial Warfare Center and Schooland the 1st Special OperationsCommand.

Robin Sage begins with a nightcombat-equipment jump intoremote drop zones in the UwharrieNational Forest in central NorthCarolina. During the exercise, stu-dents perform individual and grouptasks as part of a special-operationsmission. The exercise lasts for 11days and is conducted with a realis-tic guerrilla force and a well-trained, well-equipped and well-motivated counterinsurgency forcemanned by members of the 82ndAirborne Division. Students areevaluated on their abilities to lead,function as members of a detach-ment, plan and conduct missions,and train the guerrilla force.

Upcoming changesEffective Oct. 1, 1990, the SF

Qualification Course will be

A student in theCommunicationsSergeant Coursepractices using a codekey in the field. Inaddition to Morsecode, students learnantenna theory andmust be able to suc-cesfully transmitmessages thousandsof miles.

Winter 1990 9

U.S. Army photo

revised. The major revision will bemade in combining the currentPhases I and III into one nine-weekfield phase. Even though the fieldphase will teach, for the most part,the same subjects now taught inPhases I and III, changes will bemade in the sequence and tech-niques of instruction. Instructionwill still be sequential and progres-sive, beginning with individualskills and progressing to collectiveskills.

The new qualification course willbegin with the MOS phase, the cur-rent Phase II training which con-centrates on the occupational skillsrequired for each individual spe-cialty. The MOS phase will changevery little from the way it is cur-rently taught, but by taking thisphase at the beginning, studentswill have a chance to learn theirMOS-specific tasks before theyattend the field phase.

This change in the Q-Course willproduce a number of advantages. Itwill aid the CommunicationsSergeant Course by eliminating thebreak between the Advanced Inter-national Morse Code Course andthe MOS-specific training. SinceMorse code is a perishable skill, thestudent will benefit by being able to

continue his code training immedi-ately after graduation from AIMC.This should allow students tobecome more proficient and attainhigher code speeds.

Under the current program, med-ical sergeants are required toattend Phase I on temporary dutywhile en route to the Academy of

Health Sciences. Under the newprogram, students will report to theAHS for 31 weeks of training, thenmake a permanent-change-of-sta-tion move to Fort Bragg. In addi-tion to maintaining the continuityof medical training from AHS to themedical training facility at FortBragg, the change will eliminatethe need for students to wait 46weeks after Phase I (training timeat AHS plus Phase II training atFort Bragg) before applying theirSF basic skills in Phase III.

Students will be organized intooperational detachments at thebeginning of the field phase. EachMOS will be represented on theteams, and team members will per-form the specialities for which theyhave been trained. One of the mostprogressive changes of the newcourse will be the manning of theteam-sergeant position on thesestudent A-detachments. Previouslyfilled by a student, the position willnow be held by a cadre memberwho will be responsible for trainingand advising the students throughtheir 58 days of field instruction.(See box, next page.)

The first three weeks of the fieldphase will cover map reading, spe-cial operations and survival. Theinstruction will teach theory, asnow, but will allow more time forpractical exercises to reinforce thattheory. In the fourth week of thefield phase, the detachment com-mander will link up with his team,and collective training will begin.During the next two weeks, theteams will be able to develop theirinternal operating procedures andbond as a team. Their training willinclude small-unit tactics,patrolling and Special Forces opera-tional techniques. The teams willhave an extensive isolation practi-cal exercise, guided by their cadreteam sergeant. During this exerciseeach member will practice hisdetachment role and learn hisresponsibilities in accordance withSF doctrine.

At the conclusion of the practicalexercise, the operational detach-

Three Special Forces students and a member of their guerrilla force (right)discuss a mission during the Robin Sage field training exercise.

U.S. Army photo

“One of the most pro-gressive changes ofthe new course willbe the manning ofthe team-sergeantposition on studentA-detachments. Pre-viously filled by astudent, the positionwill now be held by acadre member whowill be responsiblefor training andadvising the stu-dents through their58 days of fieldinstruction.”

10 Special Warfare

ments will receive their missionbriefings for the unconventional-warfare exercise Robin Sage. Stu-dents will be placed into a week-

long isolation and will prepare aformal briefback to explain theirplan to a senior field-grade officer.Robin Sage will still begin with a

night airborne infiltration into theUwharrie National Forest. Theexercise will be lengthened to 17days to allow students to performthose mission-essential tasks frominfiltration to demobilization.

Following Robin Sage, studentsreturn to Fort Bragg. Those whohave passed the Q-Course will pre-pare for graduation and a SpecialForces assignment. As each newSpecial Forces NCO crosses thestage to receive his diploma, heenters into a new vocation, trainedto meet the challenges of today’sSpecial Forces.

Maj. James R. Fricke is currentlythe commander of F Co., 1st Bn.,1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup, which is responsible forPhase I and Phase II training inthe SF Qualification Course. Hisprevious assignments at the Spe-cial Warfare Center and Schoolinclude serving as the operationsofficer and chief of the Communi-cations Branch, Special ForcesDepartment. He has also servedtours in the 82nd Airborne Divi-sion and the 3rd Battalion, 5thSpecial Forces Group. He is a grad-uate of the Command and GeneralStaff College and the Infantry Offi-cer Advanced Course.

Team sergeant importantin student development

Placing the student detachment under the eye of an experienced SFteam sergeant may be the most important change in the new Q-Course,according to course architects.

The new arrangement is intended to give students a role-model aswell as an introduction to the way an A-detachment functions. “Thestudent detachment officer will have command of the detachment, butnot the SF background,” said Sgt. Maj. Joseph Murray, school sergeant major for the SWCS. “The team sergeant will have severalyears of detachment experience and will be O&I-qualified; he willknow all the MOSs. He will take students just out of their MOS-train-ing phase and teach them to perform as a cohesive unit.”

The new team sergeant will have an important role in the formationof future Special Forces soldiers, Murray said. “The team sergeant willbe assisted by other cadre members, but the main responsibility ofintroducing students to the ‘family nature’ of Special Forces will behis. He will be training the soldiers that he and other SF NCOs willlater work with in the field.”

All NCO instructors fill a critical role in Special Forces training,Murray said, and the SWCS is looking for qualified applicants. NCOsshould have at least five years’ experience on A-detachments; theymay not have served in SWCS previously or be promotable to 18Z(senior sergeant). NCOs interested in applying should submit arequest to the SF Enlisted Branch on a DA Form 4187. Addressresponses to Commander; USTAPC; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisen-hower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.

Winter 1990 11

Less than two years ago, theArmy adopted a new approach inselecting soldiers to attend SpecialForces training: Special ForcesAssessment and Selection.

To gain a better perspective ofwhy the Special Forces assessmentand selection process was estab-lished, a look back at the history ofspecial-mission units is in order.

From the time of the AmericanRevolution, men have volunteeredto serve in units that had differentand inherently more dangerousmissions than those of other units.In most cases, the only require-ments for acceptance in these spe-cial units were physical toughnessand a willingness to join.

During the Second World War,the U.S. had such special-missionunits as the Marine Corps raiderbattalions, Navy underwater demo-lition detachments, Army Rangerand airborne units, the 1st SpecialService Force and the Office ofStrategic Services. With the excep-tion of the OSS, however, at no timeduring or after the war did any of

the special units develop or use anassessment-and-selection processthat was separate from training.

The OSS, due largely to theunconventional nature of itsassigned missions, developed anassessment program for the selec-tion of its personnel. OSS strategicmissions required agents to be ableto work individually as well as withothers in remote sites, underadverse conditions and without anydirect command guidance. The OSSfelt it necessary to assess its volun-teers against set and measurablevariables (relative human require-ments needed to succeed) and selectthose most suited for the mission.

Variables the OSS thought neces-sary for successful service were:motivation; energy and initiative;effective intelligence; emotional sta-bility; ability to get along with oth-ers; leadership; ability to keepsecrets; physical ability; observingand reporting; and ability to devisesubversive tactics.1

To set the stage for assessingthese variables, the OSS included

in its program situational tests inwhich candidates were required tofunction under adverse and stress-ful conditions.2 As the OSS saw it,candidates had to be assessed inrelation to the common level ofstress to which they would eventu-ally be exposed.3

Beginning in the 1950s, theBritish, who had formed special-missions units, the Special Air Ser-vices Regiments, during the SecondWorld War, institutionalized theirselection methods for entry into theSAS. With the exception of the firstpostwar selection course (a simpleweek-long stamina and map-read-ing ability check), the SAS selectionprocess used assessment variablessimilar to that of the OSS. It has not changed signifi-cantly to this day. However, theSAS organized its selection pro-gram into phases of mentally andphysically stressful activities to bet-ter assess and select the “right cutof cloth.”4 In the 1960s, Australianand Rhodesian SAS regimentsinstitutionalized selection programs

SpecialForcesAssessmentand Selection

by Maj. James L. Velky

12 Special Warfare

patterned mostly on the BritishSAS selection model.

Although the particulars of theBritish SAS selection process areclassified, their general concept ofassessment remains much like thatof the OSS: testing men’s bodiesand minds to determine if they canoperate effectively, both as individ-uals and as team members, whileunder prolonged periods of stress.

Also during the 1950s, the U.S.Army began organizing special-mis-sion units known as Special Forces.During those early years and later,volunteers for Special Forces underwent challenging and stress-ful training. However, SpecialForces did not have a selection pro-gram separate from the trainingcourse.

In the mid-1980s, Brig. Gen.James A. Guest and Col. RichardPotter realized a need for a pro-gram to select volunteers to attendSpecial Forces training. Whileassigned as deputy commander ofthe JFK Special Warfare Centerand School, Potter initiated Army-staff-level interest in establishingthe program. Using a platform thatunderlined rising costs in material,personnel and training resources toman, retain and operate combat-ready Special Forces units, Potterconvinced the Army staff that aselection course could save valuabletraining resources and providehighly suitable soldiers for SpecialForces.

Early in 1987, Potter assignedMaj. James L. Velky and MSgt.John A. Heimberger as project offi-cers to develop the concept for aSpecial Forces selection program.The first step they took was todefine personality traits consistentwith successful completion of Spe-cial Forces training and effectiveduty as a Special Forces soldier.

Through coordination with theArmy Research Institute and analy-sis of a two-year study (1985-87) ofsuccessful soldier traits, the projectofficers formulated a basis for iden-tifying desirable personality traits.Next they conducted a study to

determine ways to assess humanbehavior against reasonable stan-dards of suitability. Using datafrom the Army Research Instituteand first-hand experience gainedfrom participation in the AustralianSAS Selection Course, they estab-lished methods and measures toidentify qualities and evaluatepotential for completing SpecialForces training.

Overall, the research involved indeveloping the plan took approxi-mately 14 months and consisted ofplanning and coordination withDepartment of the Army, ArmyTraining and Doctrine Commandand the Army Research Institute.Developers also made coordinationvisits to Navy and Air Force SOFtraining centers and the BritishSAS Selection Course.

In the spring of 1988, with theArmy Chief of Staff and TRADOCapproval, the project officer andseven Special Forces senior NCOsformed a provisional cadre and

received assessment training fromsubject-matter experts at TRA-DOC’s Cadet Command. The cadrethen validated the planned assess-ment-and-selection program bygoing through the entire coursethemselves. The Army ResearchInstitute provided behavioral psy-chologists to assist the validationby observing the cadre as they con-ducted the program.

The validation was valuable inidentifying and certifying proce-dures for assessing certain physi-cal, mental and behavioral traits.Validation also helped to determinethe program’s operational and logis-tical requirements. Shortly afterthe validation, in April 1988, theassessment program was designat-ed Special Forces Orientation andTraining and administered to a testgroup of out-of-session SpecialForces students for additionalrefinement of the procedures.

The results from the test-group’sSFOT confirmed the validity of the

An SFAS candidatetakes a break duringa field activity. Activ-ities during the first10 days assess stu-dents as individuals;during the last 11days, they assess stu-dents as members ofa team.

Winter 1990 13

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

assessment program, and the cadreprepared to run the program on aregular basis. Cadre strengthincreased to 48, including a ser-geant major and an executive offi-cer, and the project officer was des-ignated the program’s first officer-in-charge.

In June 1988, the cadre conduct-ed the first assessment and selec-tion course; from then until June1989, the assessment program con-ducted nine courses, with an aver-age of 190 candidates in each class.Also in June 1989, the assessmentprogram was redesignated the Spe-cial Forces Assessment and Selec-tion Course.

The nature of SFAS is not com-plex nor difficult to understand. Itwas founded to identify soldierswho can be trained to perform effec-tively in unpredictable, adverse andhostile environments and be dedi-cated to their profession.

The SFAS mission is to assessand select all Army active andreserve-component Special Forcesvolunteers for Special Forces train-ing. It assesses soldiers’ potentialfor being independent, yet teamplayers and leaders. To do this,SFAS looks at the level at whichvolunteers demonstrate the follow-ing basic traits:• physical fitness• motivation• intelligence• responsibility• stability• trustworthiness• sociability• leadership

All good soldiers in the Army pos-sess these attributes to some degree.But the level at which they demon-strate these traits and their degreeof potential for being trained to per-form in an adverse environment isnot normally observed nor testedwithin their everyday workplace. Inmost Army career fields, soldiers arenot put into situations that requirethem to operate in uncertainty withlittle guidance, withstand irregularmental and physical demands andwork alone, deprived of rest.

SFAS attempts to capture a sol-dier’s profile by first administering aseries of mental, learning and per-sonality tests, and secondly by pro-cessing the soldier through a seriesof field-related assessment activities.The mental, learning and personali-ty tests consist of the following:• Defense Language Aptitude Bat-

tery• Audio Perception Battery• Wonderlic Personnel (intelli-

gence)• Jackson Personality• Minnesota Multifacet Personali-

ty Inventory (in-depth personali-ty battery)The field-related assessment

activities are in areas of:• physical fitness and swimming

tests• short, medium and long-distance

runs• obstacle course• short, medium and long-range

movements (with weapon andfield equipment)

• military orienteering (withweapon and field equipment)

• log drills• problem-solving events

The field-assessment activitiesare conducted over 21 days. SFAS,

itself, is only 21 days long. After the10th day, candidates may voluntari-ly withdraw from the program. Thisallowance was built into the pro-gram with much consideration.Generally speaking, most youngsoldiers today have grown up in anenvironment in which hardship,rejection and uncertainty are muchless common than they were sever-al generations ago. Thus, they maybecome prematurely demoralized.Forcing attendance until the 10thday allows soldiers time to becomeaccustomed to adversity and tolearn that they can cope with it.

SFAS activities during the first10 days assess how soldiers per-form on their own. The last 11 days’activities assess leadership andhow soldiers function as membersof a team.

An initial selection board is heldat Day 10 to determine whethercandidates will continue in the pro-gram, and a final selection board isheld at Day 21 to determine candi-dates’ suitability for selection toSpecial Forces training.

Soldiers attend SFAS on a tempo-rary-duty-and-return basis; theyreturn to their units after SFAS. Ifselected, soldiers will return to Fort

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

The hardships of the field-assessment activities of SFAS test candidates’endurance as well as their ability to function as part of a team.

14 Special Warfare

Bragg later to attend the SFQualification Course. When soldiersare not selected (by either board),they are counselled on their perfor-mance and advised on how to over-come deficiencies or develop theirtraits if they wish to return toSFAS later.

The unique nature of SFAS istwofold. In addition to selecting theright soldiers for Special Forces, itscreens soldiers who lack, eithertemporarily or permanently, thequalities and potential necessary tocomplete training. This screeningaspect of SFAS saves trainingresources and indirectly frees fieldunits from having to expend addi-tional resources on personnel notsuited or conditioned for SpecialForces service.

In the final analysis, programsthat attempt to assess for requiredqualities and to train at the sametime end up doing neither verywell. The allied SAS organizationsknow this all too well. They knowthat a remote site and a sensitivemission are not the place or time todiscover that a member or leader ofa team is unsuitable because of adeficiency in character or mentalmakeup. They also realize thatafter spending thousands of dollars,hundreds of training man-hoursand other training resources is notthe time to find out that the soldierbeing trained is untrainable orunsuitable to conduct special-opera-tions missions.

The Special Forces Assessmentand Selection program is unique inwhat it accomplishes for the SpecialForces training base and theSpecial Forces community in gener-al. Coupled with changes in SpecialForces recruiting and training,SFAS is part of the most thoroughtraining Special Forces has everhad to offer.

Maj. James L. Velky is current-ly a student at the Army Com-mand and General Staff College.A former infantry NCO whoserved two tours in Vietnam, he

was commissioned in Infantry in 1975 and rebranched to SpecialForces in 1987. Maj. Velky was the project officer assigned todevelop SFAS and served as the first officer in charge of theprogram.

Notes:1 OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment Of

Men – Selection Of Personnel For The OfficeOf Strategic Services, (New York: Rinehart &Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 30-31.

2 Assessment Of Men, p. 38.3 Assessment Of Men, p. 452.4 Tony Geraghty, Inside The Special Air

Service, (Nashville, Tenn.: Battery Press,Inc., 1981), pp. 193-206.

Prerequisites for SFASAll applicants for the Special Forces Selection and Assessment

Program must meet the following criteria.• Must be a male soldier in grades sergeant to sergeant first class.• Must have a high-school diploma or GED.• Must have a GT score of 110 or higher (Linguists need a GT score of

100).• Must be airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training.

(Candidates not already airborne-qualified will be scheduled for air-borne training after completing SFAS.)

• Must be able to swim 50 meters wearing boots and fatigues.• Must be able to meet the standards of the Special Forces physical,

as outlined in AR 40-501.• Must score a minimum of 206 points on the Army Physical Fitness

Test with no less than 60 points on any event, scored for the 17-21age group.

• Must not be within 120 days of a permanent change of station orattending a school that will ultimately require a PCS. (Soldierscompleting an MOS-producing school must serve in that MOS forone year.)

• Must not be a prior airborne or Special Forces voluntary terminee.• Must not be under suspension of favorable personnel action.• Must not have 30 days or more lost time under Title 10, U.S. Code

972 within current or preceding enlistment.• Must not have been convicted by court-martial during the current

term of service.• Must not be barred to re-enlistment.

Completion of SFAS and selection for Special Forces training isvalid for one year. For further information or application, soldiersshould contact the Special Forces Recruiting Office; USAJFKSWCS;Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Phone Autovon 239-1818, commercial(919) 432-1818.

Winter 1990 15

Designed for experienced NCOsfrom all 18-series MOSs, thisintense program prepares NCOs tobecome assistant operations-and-intelligence sergeants and toassume staff positions at all levels.

If carefully selected, highly moti-vated and well-trained soldiers area definition of Special Forces, thenthe Special Forces Operations andIntelligence Course defines theoperational capabilities of those sol-diers and their units.

Special Forces demands excel-lence from its soldiers in all aspectsof their jobs. Often, their responsi-bilities far exceed the skills of a sin-gle career field or military occupa-tional specialty. Special Forces per-sonnel-selection procedures andtraining programs reflect this fact.Only proven soldiers are selectedfor Special Forces training, thentheir qualification-course training,continuous unit training and addi-tional specialized schooling buildson this professional base to createthe scope of capabilities for whichSpecial Forces is known.

Originally an entry-level courseduring the 1960s, on par with theother four basic Special ForcesMOS-producing courses (18B -weapons, 18C - engineer, 18D -medic and 18E - communications),O&I has evolved over the past 27years to provide Special Forces A-detachments with the personneland skills necessary to train, plan,operate and succeed in their mis-sions. Now taught by the SpecialWarfare Center and School’s Com-pany A, 2nd Battalion, 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group, O&I hasbecome the definitive mid-careerchallenge to Special Forces NCOs.

Much more than just anotherSpecial Forces skill, O&I “ties it alltogether” — just as the basic SFcourses build on the previous mili-tary experience of their students,O&I builds on the mid-career expe-rience of SF soldiers. It refines,focuses and extends their experi-ence and adds new skills critical tothe operational capability of SFunits.

O&I specifically trains SF NCOsto fill assistant-operations-and-intel-

ligence-sergeant slots on operationaldetachments; however, the instruc-tion goes much further. Generally,training covers general and specialsubjects, clandestine-operations sub-jects, tactical-intelligence subjects,and operations-related subjects. Keyelements of the training define spe-cial-operations command-and-staffrelationships and detail staff func-tions and responsibilities at all eche-lons, preparing NCOs to fill staffpositions up to and including joint-level assignments.

Operational A-detachments aremuch more than well-led groups ofexpert medics, engineers, communi-cators and weapons men. Theymust be prepared to deploy andfight as an independent organiza-tion, manage much of their owntraining, prepare for deployment ona wide range of missions, functionas a planning cell, perform theirown staff responsibilities, and coor-dinate with a variety of externalcontacts from all services and at allechelons. As a team, members ofthe ODA must manage an array ofintelligence functions that else-

&Keeping pace with Special Forces missions

by Maj. Rex H. McTyeire

16 Special Warfare

where in the Army would requireseveral staff offices with many per-sonnel and different MOSs.

The demands of training andplanning are complex, but whenteams deploy on missions, theirresponsibilities increase significant-ly. On a foreign-internal-defensemission, for example, the detach-ment may be responsible for its ownsecurity, staff and managementfunctions while training a host-country staff to support the forceswhich the same detachment isteaching basic military skills. In anunconventional-warfare mission,the detachment may have a similarfunction in an even more isolatedarea, with communication and sup-port from higher headquarters lim-ited to periodic radio contact. Therequirements for survival, combateffectiveness and mission success insuch a situation demand that sol-diers receive intense training whichcuts across a variety of militaryspecialties and proponency areas.

O&I is also a prerequisite forsome advanced and selective Spe-cial Forces training programs suchas the 180A Special Forces WarrantOfficer Program. Graduates of O&Iqualify for MOS 18F, but they mustrequest the MOS change from theirbasic 18-series MOS. (Currently,18Ds and 18Es are in a criticalshortage, and conversion from those MOSs may be difficult, butsoldiers who request it will be con-sidered on a case-by-case basis.)Regardless of the Special Forcescareer path a soldier chooses, O&Iis an essential career-developmentstep. Falling between the AdvancedNCO Course and the SergeantsMajor Course in the Army NCOeducation plan, O&I neatly fills thegap in required Special Forces oper-ational training.

Referring to O&I as an intelli-gence course could be a larger errorthan referring to an A-detachmentas an infantry squad (and depend-ing on the audience, will generatean equally emotional response).Intelligence skills and subjects arepart of the training, but they are

integrated into the course withoperational planning and conductportions to support the full scope ofSF and special-operations missions.

Early classes sent students to FortHolabird, Md., for intelligencetraining, and later to Fort Huachu-ca, Ariz., after the IntelligenceSchool moved there.

Now, the entire O&I course isconducted at Fort Bragg, whichallows better management of thecourse flow, and the tailoring ofintelligence subjects by the SpecialForces cadre ensures that the sub-ject matter will be appropriate tospecial operations. The primarily18F cadre is augmented by selectedNCOs from the intelligence MOSwho improve O&I training by pro-viding experience in fields such asinterrogation, intelligence analysisand order of battle. They also serveas liaisons with intelligence propo-nents to ensure the currency anddoctrinal accuracy of the tactical-intelligence blocks of instruction.

As Special Forces has evolvedover the years, the O&I courselength and content have alsochanged. After growing to 16 weeksat one point, in 1988 O&I lost fourweeks to the emerging 18-seriesAdvanced NCO Course. The CMF-18 common-skills subjects in thesefour training weeks, now a part ofSF ANCOC, are building blocks toO&I. ANCOC completion is there-fore important to provide the bestpossible academic preparation forO&I. Subsequent course modifica-

Students in the O&I Course work as a group during an operational plan-ning practical exercise. Such exercises evaluate individual and group abili-ties to plan and conduct Special Forces operations.

U.S. Army photo

“Originally an entry-level course duringthe 1960s, on parwith the other fourbasic Special ForcesMOS-producingcourses, O&I hasevolved over the past27 years to provideSpecial Forces A-detachments withthe personnel andskills necessary totrain, plan, operateand succeed in theirmissions.”

Winter 1990 17

tions have brought O&I back to 13weeks.

The course curriculum is one ofthe most academically intense anddemanding in the U.S. Army. Tomeet the multi-disciplined require-ments of Special Forces operationsand the standards of the O&Icourse, soldiers are expected to beproficient in the critical componentsof many different intelligence, oper-ational, and technical MOSs, as wellas having significant SF profession-al knowledge and experience.

Many of the projects, command-post exercises and practical exercis-es require the application of SFskills not taught or refreshedbecause of the course’s fast pace.Tailored external-proponency mate-rial such as intelligence, photogra-phy and some operations-relatedsubjects are supplemented by gen-eral Special Forces- and special-operations-oriented blocks that linkthe puzzle pieces together andadapt them to the special-opera-tions environment.

The external-proponency subjectsalone, if taken as they are taught

elsewhere in U.S. Army school sys-tems, would require approximatelyone full year of continuous school-ing. The tight O&I classroom sched-ule is further intensified by student

research projects and home-studyrequirements.

O&I academic standards arehigh, strict and consistentlyapplied. A minimum score of 75percent is required for each gradedarea, and students with two failingscores will be recommended for aca-demic relief. The course attritionrate exceeds 20 percent — a signifi-cant figure, since this is not anentry-level course, but an advancedschool for selected SF career NCOs.Since the adoption of the currentstandards and grading scheme,only one class has defeated the 20-percent attrition statistics: SFO&IClass 1-90 suffered only a 13-per-cent academic loss. Cadre memberschallenge each class to be the firstto graduate 100 percent.

Resident students consistentlyhave their favorite subject areas:the blocks on Special Forces photog-raphy and clandestine operationsusually head the popularity list.Although intense and academicallytough, these blocks involve hands-on application and interesting prac-tical exercises, and each studenteasily identifies the value of thetraining to ODA operational

O&I Course Prerequisites

■ SSG/E6 or above and 18-series MOS qualified. 1

■ 3 years experience (AC or RC) in 18-series MOS in oper-ational Special Forces unit. 1

■ Minimum of 12 months’ service remaining upon com-pletion of the course.

■ Final SECRET security clearance, with hard-copy docu-mentation.

■ Airborne-qualified male on current jump status, with aminimum of one static-line jump completed within the 3months prior to start date.

■ Command verification of APFT passed within 30 daysprior to start date.

■ Graduation from Advanced Noncommissioned OfficerCourse (ANCOC). 1, 2

1. May be waived for sister-service special-operations personnel with equiv-alent qualifications and experience in their respective SO units.

2. Special Forces ANCOC scheduled to become a prerequisite effectiveOct. 1, 1990.

A student team deploys during the O&I field training exercise. The FTX is a week-long performance-oriented exercise to evaluate what students havelearned in O&I.

U.S. Army photo

18 Special Warfare

requirements. The week-long end-of-course field training exercise isalso very popular and gives the stu-dents opportunities to apply muchof what they have learned through-out the course. The FTX consists ofan isolation phase, an airborneinfiltration of the exercise area, andstudent field projects, including amessage pick-up; link-up withindigenous assets; and receiving,identifying and exfiltrating anevader.

Among the more controversialblocks of instruction, both with stu-dents and proponency reviewers atall levels, are the order-of-battleblocks and the intense training onSoviet order of battle, organizationand structure. These subjects, how-ever, are critical to many relatedO&I blocks. O&I students aretrained to tie their specific intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield,or IPB, and order-of-battle knowl-edge and the balance of their tacti-cal-intelligence training into the

existing operational scenario. Sovi-et order-of-battle subjects providethe illustration necessary for stu-dents to develop a thorough under-standing of intelligence operationsand specific ODA mission activitiesand support requirements.

Soviet order of battle is the best-documented and the most currentof what is available in the Armyand Department of Defense sys-tems, and it is maintained in readi-ly available student references.Overall, in spite of its depth andcomplexity, Soviet order of battlepresents the best possible studenttraining model. Creating an artifi-cial order of battle for training orusing a simpler Third World modelwould result in significant losttraining value, with few gains.

Students need to understand andbe able to apply conventional intel-ligence-analysis systems in order totrain host-country conventionalforces in a FID environment. Inmany of the possible UW scenariosand other SF mission contingencies,opposing forces will apply elementsof Soviet doctrine, equipment andorganization.

In mid- to high-intensity conflictscenarios, SF or special-operationsdeployments may be conducted to

O & I Course SynopsisGeneral and Special Subjects–

■ SF Photography and Filmless Camera System

■ JSOA and SOF Mission Planning

■ Fingerprint Identification Systems

■ Maps and Overlays w/Foreign Maps andSymbols

■ Target Interdiction, Analysis and Systems

■ SOF Case Studies and Research

■ SOF NBC Doctrine

Tactical Intelligence Subjects–■ Intro. to Intelligence; Order of Battle and IPB

■ Collection, Processing, Dissemination and theIntelligence Estimate

■ Imagery and Infrared Map Interpretation

■ Soviet Forces, Organization, Equipment andCapabilities

■ Soviet Military History, Doctrine and PowerProjection

■ Soviet Electronic Warfare and NBC Threat

■ World Threat and NBC Updates

Clandestine Operations Subjects–■ Introduction, Security, Operational Skills and

Techniques

■ Non-technical Communications: AppliedTechniques and Procedures

■ Intelligence Limitations and Constraints

■ Elicitation, Interrogation and Interviews

Operations Related Subjects–■ Introduction, OPSEC and Classified

Document Control

■ Training Management

■ Assisted E & E and Detachment EvasionPlanning

■ Tactical Deception Operations

■ Combat Orders: Battalion, Brigade and Higher

■ SOF Command and Control

■ SOF Staff Roles, Responsibilities, Planningand Estimates

■ Aircraft Capabilities and Conduct of AirborneOperations

“Among the more con-troversial blocks ofinstruction, both withstudents and propo-nency reviewers ... arethe order-of-battleblocks and the intensetraining on Sovietorder of battle, orga-nization and struc-ture. These subjects ...are critical to manyrelated O&I blocks.”

Winter 1990 19

support larger conventional opera-tions, and a clear comprehension of the intelligence systems and doc-trine applied at higher echelonswill enable SF ODAs and B- and C-detachments to make a morevaluable contribution to theatertactical or strategic objectives. O&Igraduates, with their skill in IPB,as well as Soviet order of battle anddoctrine, will be critical to thiseffort in SF operational and staffpositions.

Another debated aspect of thecourse involves a recent significantchange to the program of instruc-

tion. Area studies, for years a stan-dard student-production effort inthe curriculum, have been deletedas a graded student project.

Current SWCS philosophy main-tains that ODAs will not producedetailed area studies, but will havethem provided as part of the intelli-gence support to SF operations. TheODA will then apply the area studyto unit and pre-deployment train-ing and supplement it with specificmission-related area research, sincemission-area analysis and areaassessment remain team missions.

Area studies are still taught in

O&I, but now as a planning toolrather than as a product of theODA. Each student receives a com-pleted area study and is assigned arelated research project. The areastudy and research project are thenapplied in the training-manage-ment and operational-planningphases of the course. Studentsdevelop mission-essential task listsand graded programs of instructionfrom their area study, individualresearch and mission scenarios.

The area-study and mission-plan-ning changes tie in to other coursechanges. Targeting-analysis andtargeting-systems blocks have alsobeen brought on-line to fit into acomprehensive SF team-level mis-sion-planning sequence called theCombined Area Study MissionAnalysis Program. Developed in thefield by the 10th Special ForcesGroup to fill an operational plan-ning gap, CASMAP was expandedby the 5th Special Forces Groupand has been integrated into O&I.

The program is a set of compre-hensive operational-preparationprocedures which outline supportand staff-management functionsfrom A-detachment through SF-group levels in support of teamtraining, preparation and deploy-ment needs. CASMAP guides teamand support actions from garrisontraining through operational prepa-rations, isolation, deployment, areaassessment, exfiltration and after-action procedures to ensure conti-nuity between operational and sup-port elements.

Advances and changes in specialoperations and SF have acceleratedin recent years, with each step for-ward generating doctrinal andtraining changes in the O&I course.Special Forces, as an Army unit and as a career field, is improvedevery time an SF NCO steps to thepodium to receive his O&I diploma,prepared to take his knowledgeback to the field. Every O&I gradu-ate knows that he has done farmore than punch a career ticket: bycompleting O&I, he has identifiedhimself as a member of the pool of

180ASF WARRANT

PROGRAM

SPECIAL FORCESASSESSMENT & SELECTION

SF QUALIFICATIONCOURSESF

BNCOC

ARMYWIDECONVENTIONALASSIGNMENTS

SF–SOFASSIGNMENTS

ECHELONSABOVE ODA

ADD'L OPN'LASSIGNMENTS:

–SWCS INSTRUCTOR–NOMINATIVE SOF ASSIGNMENT

ODA OPNSSERGEANT18Z

SGMACADEMY

OPERATIONALSF ASSIGNMENT

SFANCOC

18ECOMO

18DMED

18CENG

18BWPNS

3 YEARMINIMUM

OPERATIONALSF ASSIGNMENT

O&I18F

ASSTO&I

O&I in CMF18 Career Progression

20 Special Warfare

leadership from which will bedrawn future SF warrant officers,SF team sergeants and special-operations sergeants major andcommand sergeants major. He is asenior professional among a group

of exceptional professionals: SpecialForces noncommissioned officers.

Maj. Rex H. McTyeire currentlycommands Co. A, 2nd Bn., of the

Special Warfare Center andSchool’s 1st Special Warfare Train-ing Group. He served more thannine years enlisted time on A-detachments in both engineer- andassistant-operations-and-intelli-gence-sergeant slots before attend-ing Officer Candidate School. Hisassignments have included dutywith the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10thSpecial Forces Groups as well as46th Company, S.F., Thailand. Hisoverseas experience includes serv-ing on a mobile training team toSomalia, varied national-intelli-gence assignments for U.S. ArmyOperations Group, and other nomi-native special-operations assign-ments. Ranger- and scuba-quali-fied, Maj. McTyeire is a chartermember of the Special ForcesBranch and holds degrees fromNew York State University atAlbany.

Upcoming changes to O&ISoldiers considering O&I or scheduled for attendance should be

aware of two changes which will become effective Oct. 1.Students who report for O&I training after that date will have

the 18F MOS posted to their records upon graduation from thecourse. O&I graduates currently receive an additional skill identifi-er upon graduation and may apply for the 18F MOS after theyreturn to their units. SF units have shown shortages of soldiers in18F because O&I graduates’ records were not being updated,according to Sgt. Maj. Robert Gron, SF enlisted manager in theSWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. The new procedurewill allow the Army to keep better track of 18Fs. Soldiers’ units willstill determine whether the MOS will be their primary or sec-ondary.

Also effective Oct. 1 will be the requirement that soldiers attendthe Advanced NCO Course before being eligible for O&I. Active-component soldiers will have to attend the SF ANCOC, given at theSWCS NCO Academy. Reserve-component SF soldiers may use anyANCOC to qualify until the SF ANCOC-RC comes on-line, sched-uled for August 1991.

Winter 1990 21

The mission of the SWCS NCOAcademy is to train NCOs to leadand train their soldiers to fight andwin.

Established in August 1987, theNCO Academy has its origins in thecreation of the Special Forcescareer-management field 18 in1985, according to 1st Sgt. PeterVan Borkulo, the NCO academy’sdeputy commandant. With its ownCMF, Special Forces also had therequirement to professionally devel-op its enlisted soldiers.

The Army’s NoncommissionedOfficer Education System providedthe regulatory requirement todevelop skill-level-three (basic NCOcourse) and skill-level-four(advanced NCO course) training foreach MOS within the CMF. As aresult, the Special Warfare Centerand School began to look for effec-tive ways to conduct BNCOC andANCOC using existing courses.This approach was further expand-ed to include the newly formedPSYOP MOS under the proponencyof the SWCS.

SF BNCOC was the first require-ment tackled. The lowest rank onan A-detachment is staff sergeant.Armywide, staff-sergeant duties aredesignated as skill-level-three. TheSFQC is the entry-level course forSpecial Forces which providestrained soldiers to fill positions onA-detachments; therefore, theSFQC was determined to be skill-level-three.

Of the three requirements for allNCOES courses — common-leadertraining, MOS-specific training andCMF common-task training — allbut a one-week block of common-leader training was already con-tained in the SF QualificationCourse, Van Borkulo said. The one-week block, developed and fur-nished by the Army SergeantsMajor Academy, was added to theQ-Course in July 1986 and admin-istered by the 1st Special WarfareTraining Battalion, at that timeresponsible for all student training.With the addition of CLT, the quali-fication course also became theapproved BNCOC for Special

Forces soldiers.Advanced NCO training for SF

was a different matter, not as easilyfixed, because there were no SFskill-level-four tasks identified. SFNCOs continued to attend theANCOC of their previous conven-tional MOS, and though the com-mon-leader-training portion wasstandard, the MOS and CMF com-mon-task training did not meet theunique needs of SF NCOs. “SFNCOs who attended the InfantryANCOC, for instance, learnedmechanized tactics,” Van Borkulosaid. The SWCS had to begin devel-opment of a separate SF ANCOC.

Before the course could be devel-oped, however, a distinction had tobe made between skill-level-threetasks of junior-level NCOs andskill-level-four tasks of more seniorNCOs. Generally, experiencedsenior NCOs serve in more supervi-sory roles. The SWCS focused onidentifying those tasks that sepa-rated the new SF NCOs from themore capable, seasoned A-detach-ment soldiers.

NCOsTrainingNCOs

22 Special Warfare

SWCS NCO ACADEMY

At first the SWCS consideredconverting the Special Forces Oper-ations and Intelligence Course intothe SF ANCOC, since it coveredadvanced operational techniques,Van Borkulo said, but not all seniorSF NCOs would need the intelli-gence subjects which the coursecovered.

“In January 1988, the Center andSchool took the ‘O’ (operations)from O&I to form the CMF 18 skill-level-four common-task portion ofthe SF ANCOC,” Van Borkulo said.The ANCOC common-leader train-ing was already developed by theSergeants Major Academy. All thatremained was to define MOS train-ing necessary at skill-level four.

“SWCS made the separationbetween the junior- and senior-levelNCOs’ tasks,” Van Borkulo said.“The junior NCO is more hands-on,while the senior NCO has more todo with supervision, analysis andplanning — for example, the juniorweapons NCO takes weapons apartand puts them back together; thesenior weapons NCO plans theranges, employment, training,resupply and security.”

Corresponding to the develop-ment of the programs of instructionwas the establishment of an NCOacademy to teach them. In August1987, SWCS selected CSM HenryBone to be the first commandant ofthe academy. “There was no man-power, no budget and no buildings,”Van Borkulo said. “There was onlya need for the CMF to have a cen-tralized activity for NCO profes-sional-development training. TheCenter and School gave CommandSergeant Major Bone the authorityto hand-pick the cadre he needed.”

In December 1988, the academywas subject to accreditation by theArmy Training and Doctrine Com-mand. “Normally, accreditationwould come after two years,” VanBorkulo said, “but since therequirement to establish CMF-18professional-development trainingactually began in 1986 with the cre-ation of the career field, we weredue, even though the academy had

been operating for less than a year.”Despite the short time for prepara-tion, the academy was fully accred-ited by TRADOC.

The academy teaches its coursesusing the small-group instructionmethod. The cadre assigned to theNCO Academy are called small-group leaders — they must teachand demonstrate to students thestandards of leadership, training,technical and tactical competenceand overall professionalism, VanBorkulo said. Their function is to bementors, role models and coun-selors for the students.

Most classes are led and conduct-ed by the students themselves.There is no lecture; students learnby discussion. The small-groupleader is present, but only to moni-tor the process, to occasionallyinterject training objectives and tomake sure that those objectives arecovered. Small-group instructionplaces the responsibility for learn-ing on students themselves, boththrough group participation andassignment as student-discussionleaders. It teaches students how to

think more than what to think andencourages them to share theirexperiences.

Small-group instruction is notunique to the SWCS NCO Academy.“Small-group instruction is used inmost other NCO academies, too,”Van Borkulo said, “but it works par-ticularly well for us (SOF), becauseeach small group functions in amanner similar to an A-team.”Group discussion allows students,all of them experienced NCOs, toshare information and evaluate thecourse content in light of their ownexperiences. A critique of the coursealso goes back to the SWCS Direc-torate of Training and Doctrinewith student comments. One of thebest things about the academy’straining is its flexibility, VanBorkulo said. As soon as a doctrinalchange is approved, it can beincluded in the instruction for thenext class.

The cadre emphasize that theyare there to help students. Currentlythe SF ANCOC, for example, hasabout a 1-2 percent attrition rate,mostly for administrative reasons.

SSgt. Donny H.Boles, an instructorat the NCO Academy,inspects of one of theAcademy’s students.

Winter 1990 23

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Disciplinary dismissals are unusual. “When you look at all the courses

SF soldiers can go to, SFQC andANCOC are the only ones theyhave to go to,” Van Borkulo said.“They have to go to the Q-Course toobtain an 18-series MOS, and theyhave to get ANCOC if they want tobe promoted to master sergeantand stay in the Army.” Other cours-es such as Military Free Fall;Underwater Operations; Survival,Evasion, Resistance and Escape;and Operations and Intelligence areimportant, he says, “but those arefor mission enhancement, depend-ing on the unit and team you’reassigned to. After the Q-Course,everyone has to attend ANCOC. ...ANCOC takes an NCO out of the A-team mindset and lets him see howthe team fits throughout the entirespectrum of conflict.”

SF ANCOCTo attend the SF ANCOC, sol-

diers must first be active orreserve-component enlisted soldiersin the rank of staff sergeant orsergeant first class. They must bequalified in a CMF 18 MOS, beBNCOC graduates and be on jumpstatus. Active soldiers are selected

by PERSCOM; reserve-componentsoldiers are recommended by theirunit commanders.

The 12-week course is dividedinto three phases. In Phase One,soldiers spend five weeks on com-mon-leader training, which includes advanced leadership tech-niques, counseling, training man-agement, a live-fire exercise andlight-infantry tactics.

Phase One ends with a four-daylight-infantry field training exercisethat includes a tactical airborneoperation followed by movement toa defensive position. During theFTX, each class is organized intothree light-infantry platoons, andeach small group becomes a squad.Squads receive missions in whichthey must perform reconnaissancepatrols, set up ambushes, and con-struct and remove wire obstaclesand protective mine fields. The FTXtests soldiers’ land-navigation skillsand ensures that they are familiarwith conventional tactics. It alsoallows the small-group leader toevaluate each soldier’s leadershipcapabilities in a simulated combatsituation.

The three-week Phase Two isdevoted to training in the technicalaspects of the different SpecialForces MOSs, mostly in a supervi-sory role. There are actually fourdifferent programs of instruction,one for each MOS. The medicalsergeant receives training in pre-ventive medicine and in setting upa dental program, a pharmacy, anaid station and civic-action pro-grams. Weapons sergeants learnthe employment of various weaponssystems, including indirect fire, air-defense and anti-tank weapons.

Engineer sergeants receivesupervisory training in target anal-ysis and interdiction, the breachingof obstacles and barriers, explosiveordnance and the planning and con-struction of a base camp.

Communications sergeantsreceive training on establishing com-munications from base camps tolocal patrols and to a Special Forcesoperations base, which could bethousands of miles away. They alsolearn supervisory duties in acquir-ing supplies of communicationsequipment and supplies for mainte-nance and minor repair of communi-cations equipment. Soldiers whoalready have the 18F MOS, assis-tant operations and intelligencesergeant, attend the MOS trainingof their secondary SF MOS.

The four-week Phase Three is

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

SSgt. Donny H. Boles, an instructor, briefs NCO Academy students on thesmall-group instruction method on which the Academy’s training is based.

“When you look at allthe courses SF sol-diers can go to,SFQC and ANCOCare the only onesthey have to go to ...They have to go tothe Q-Course toobtain an 18-seriesMOS, and they haveto get ANCOC if theywant to be promotedto master sergeantand stay in theArmy.”

24 Special Warfare

dedicated to Special Forces com-mon-task subjects at skill-level fourand covers intelligence-gatheringtechniques, detachment isolation,organizational operations and base-camp selection. This phase includesa tour of a selected historical battle-field which allows students to com-pare the curriculum and nine prin-ciples of war (objective, offensive,mass, economy of force, maneuver,unity of command, security, sur-prise and simplicity) to the actualconduct of the battle.

The third phase ends with afour-day foreign-internal-defensecommand-post exercise. Duringthe CPX, each small group is orga-nized as an A-detachment. Givenan operations plan, the group mustprepare annexes for weapons, medical, engineer and communica-tions plans and give a detachmentbriefback.

An important aspect of ANCOCis the Leadership AssessmentDevelopment Program. LADP isTRADOC-dictated and is conductedArmywide as part of NCOES, VanBorkulo said. LADP complementsthe small-group-instruction conceptalready used in ANCOC because ittakes advantage of the attentionstudents receive from their small-group leader. Throughout thecourse, students are assigned to asmany different leadership duties aspossible. Small-group leadersassess students’ leadership traitsand counsel them to point out weakand strong areas. The assessmentis done to help the students developas leaders, not to eliminate themfrom the course.

Another aid to student develop-ment are the diagnostic examsgiven early in the ANCOC program,before students begin their MOStraining. Diagnostic exams areadministered by instructors fromthe 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup, which conducts the MOStraining. Since ANCOC is designedto teach students skill-level-fourtasks, the exams verify that theyhave the prerequisite skill-level-three knowledge.

The SF NCO: A Self-PortraitHow do SF NCOs see themselves? Members of ANCOC Class 3-89

wrote essays on the importance of the NCO to Special Forces. Here area few of their comments:

NCOs are the primary, small-scale, resource managers of SpecialForces. They ensure that the maintenance and accountability of teamequipment are kept up-to-date and up to standards. Although officersrun the staff and command operations, it is SF NCOs who handlemost of the planning, coordinating, preparing, and conduct of SF mis-sions — they are the lifeblood of Special Forces.

SFC George M. Walker, Co. C, 1st Bn., 1st SF Group

Physically, there are few jobs as demanding as being an SF NCO.The SF team member must maintain a level of physical fitness thatallows him to accomplish many different missions. A detachmentmember might be tasked to hump a rucksack one day and participatein a scout swim the next.

SFC James E. Sparks, 160th Special Operations Avn. Regt.

It is the nature of Special Forces soldiers to be leaders, not followers.However, you will find them, leaders all, working together as one cohesive team, understanding the role and the necessity of being fol-lowers to meet one single purpose — mission accomplishment.

SFC Kenneth E. Harris, JFKSWCS

While an officer’s career quickly progresses to higher levels of com-mand, the NCO spends most of his career at the detachment level.The combined military time among the NCOs on an A-detachment caneasily total over a century of experience. It is this experienced, highlytrained NCO that makes Special Forces a unique organization.

SFC Jerry T. Griffin, JFKSWCS

The NCO is the heart and soul of Special Forces. He is the soldierwho serves on the ODA the longest. The most important thing he cando is to train and assist the new detachment commander. This com-mander needs all the support he can get; he spends the least amountof time on the ODA and, therefore, must learn as much as he can asquickly as he can. Any competent detachment commander will seekthe knowledge and advice of his most experienced team memberswhen confronted with situations he is uncertain about.

SFC James K. Cashion, Co. C, 3rd Bn., 5th SF Group

Most SF NCOs, when they’re together, bring up the little things that are wrong with SF. However, when these same individuals arewith people outside of SF, by the way they talk, you would swear thatthey were Special Forces recruiters.

SFC Randy M. Imbrescia, JFKSWCS

The type of NCO who is attracted to SF is a professional soldier. ...He is not the type of person who came to get a little tab for his shoul-der or a piece of felt to wear on his head. You could take away the SFtab and the Green Beret and you still would have the SF NCO.

SFC Michael E. Bacon, Co. C, 1st Bn., 1st SF Group

Winter 1990 25

Because of various problems,some students cannot pass thediagnostic exams. “It doesn’t meanthat a soldier didn’t learn what heshould have in the Q-Course,” VanBorkulo said. “He may have a ‘highdecay’ skill, or he may not havebeen able to sustain his traininglevel. Sometimes new systems comeon line and his unit might have hadlimited amounts of the new equip-ment. Or the soldier may have beenin staff assignments and need arefresher.”

Soldiers whose scores on thediagnostic exam are unsatisfactoryreceive remedial instruction from1st Special Warfare Training Groupinstructors during “non-academichours” (their free time at night) tobring them up to skill-level three sothat they will be ready to enter theMOS phase.

Upcoming changesOne of the challenges to the

course curriculum is to stay currentwith changes in SF doctrine, andCSM Reginald Salinas, comman-dant of the SWCS NCO Academy, isdirecting the integration of SpecialForces joint planning and opera-tions into SF ANCOC.

“Special Forces is moving moreand more into the joint arena. BothFM 31-20 (Special Forces Opera-tions) and FM 100-25 (Doctrine forArmy Special Operations Forces)reflect this increased emphasis onjoint operations,” Salinas said.

A curriculum review board heldat the SWCS in January 1990approved a milestone in the evolu-tion of SF ANCOC: In fiscal year1991, instruction in CMF 18 skill-level-four common tasks will placemore emphasis on the relationshipbetween Army SOF and conven-tional forces and on the role of Spe-cial Forces in joint operations.

Other coursesThe academy also teaches two

other courses: the five-week, three-day PSYOP Basic NCO Course,which trains soldiers in common-leader skills, intelligence-related

topics and MOS-specific subjectsneeded to plan and develop aPSYOP campaign, and the two-week common-leader-training por-tion of the SFQC.

Prerequisites for PSYOP BNCOCare that active and reserve PSYOPenlisted personnel be sergeants orpromotable specialists or corporalswho have completed the PrimaryLeadership Development Courseand have served at least six monthsbetween PLDC and BNCOC. Theymust have passed their skill-quali-fication test within 12 months andmeet the fitness and weight stan-dards in Army Regulations 350-15and 600-19. Active soldiers areselected by PERSCOM; reserve sol-diers are recommended by theirunit commanders. The course cur-rently runs one class per yearbecause of the low number of sol-diers in the career field.

PSYOP BNCOC, also based onthe principle of small-groupinstruction, is taught in threephases. Phase I, 11 days, consistsof common-leader training, as pre-scribed by the Army SergeantsMajor Academy, and NCO-develop-ment instruction. The four-dayPhase II covers intelligence-relatedsubjects such as classification andmarking of documents, agenciesavailable to support the intelli-gence-collection effort, and intelli-gence preparation of the battle-field. Phase III, 13 days, coversPSYOP-specific subjects such astarget analysis, printed propagan-da, analysis of enemy propagandaand PSYOP in support of specialoperations.

Phase III includes the four-dayfield-training exercise “SierraRegion.” During the exercise, stu-dents enter a fictitious host coun-try within the Sierra Region byparachute. Once in the area, theyperform a variety of exercises,including loudspeaker operationsand leaflet drops, which demon-strate their ability to function insupport of a special-operationsmission.

Common-leader training in the

SF Qualification Course has beenexpanded from its original oneweek to a two-week block ofinstruction taught by NCO acade-my small-group leaders at thebeginning of the course. It isrequired instruction for thoseSFQC students who did not com-plete BNCOC in their originalMOS. Soldiers who attend the com-mon-leader portion of SFQC receivetwo diplomas upon graduation —one for SFQC and one for BNCOC.

New coursesIn the future, the SWCS NCO

Academy plans to add two morecourses to its curriculum: ResidentPhase 2 of the reserve-componentSF ANCOC, and the PSYOPANCOC.

Phase 2 of the SF ANCOC–RCwill be a resident MOS phase of thecourse for reserve-component sol-diers who have already completedPhase I, U.S. Army Common Lead-er Training. Common-leader train-ing is conducted at selected U.S.Army National Guard regional mili-tary academies and U.S. ArmyReserve Forces schools. Soldiersenroll in those courses throughtheir units. (Individual-mobiliza-tion-augmentee and IndividualReady Reserve soldiers must enrollthrough the Army Reserve Person-nel Center.)

Resident Phase 2 will be 21 dayslong; it will contain the same skill-level-four MOS and SF common-task training covered in the active-component ANCOC, and a gradedcommand-post exercise. Trainingwill be conducted using the samesmall-group instruction as in othercourses at the academy.

During the MOS portion, stu-dents will be grouped by MOS, butin the SF common-skills and CPXtraining, each group will mix sol-diers with different specialties,regional orientations and experi-ences to get a better cross-section ofteam members’ strengths and topromote the exchange of ideas.

To make up for the shortening ofthe course, the NCO academy will

26 Special Warfare

send soldiers read-ahead lessonmaterials and doctrinal referencesdealing with SF common skills andcertain NCO-development subjects.By completing the read-ahead pack-et before beginning Phase 2, sol-diers will be prepared to enter theresident phase. Soldiers may com-plete the read-ahead materialsbefore, during or after taking PhaseI, but in any case, they must com-plete them within 15 months priorto Resident Phase 2.

The course will run once per year,with a maximum of 96 students. Tobe eligible, soldiers must bereserve-component (not AGR)enlisted members of CMF 18;sergeant first class, staff sergeant(promotable) or staff sergeant serv-ing in an sergeant-first-class posi-tion; a graduate of BNCOC (anyMOS); a graduate of Phase I,ANCOC–RC (U.S. Army CommonLeader Training); have a secretclearance; and be selected by the

unit commander or sergeant major(IMA/IRR must be selected byARPERCEN). The pilot course forSF ANCOC-RC is scheduled to runin August 1991.

The PSYOP ANCOC will be anine-week, two-day course, alsotaught once per year, to trainenlisted PSYOP specialists inadvanced levels of MOS skills, com-mon-leader techniques and intelli-gence-related subjects. Scheduled to begin in fiscal year 1993, thecourse will be open to BNCOC-qual-ified sergeants first class, staffsergeants (promotable) or staffsergeants serving in sergeant-first-class positions.

Training at the SWCS NCOAcademy covers a variety of coursesand subjects, and Van Borkulopoints out that the academy is onlypart of the program — all elementsof the Center and School contributeto a soldiers’ training. “Every activi-ty in the SWCS touches the soldier

while he’s in the academy,” he said.There are also limits to what the

academy can accomplish. “We man-age students and mold them. ...We’re not here to cleanse the force –we’re not to be a discriminator as towho should be a master sergeant inSpecial Forces. ... We make sure wetrain the soldiers the unit has seenfit to train,” Van Borkulo said. “Weare an extension of the command-ing general’s training strategy forCMF 18. We are not doctrine writ-ers; we don’t write the lessons; wedon’t add, modify or delete what thecommanding general says will betaught. We’re NCOs trainingNCOs.”

This article was written by thestaff of Special Warfare with thecooperation of the cadre of theSWCS NCO Academy.

Winter 1990 27

The origins of Special Forcesmedical training can be traced backto the experiences of the Office ofStrategic Services in World War II.

Much of the strength of the OSSlay in its ability to tailor its forcesto the specific exigencies of the mis-sion. But from the small Jedburghteams (three-man operationalteams) to the larger 32-man teams,an inherent weakness remained:No medical support was routinelyavailable within the organizationalstructure.

Col. Aaron Bank, who was largelyresponsible for the Special Forcesconcept, recalls that among hismost vivid memories of the OSSwas the absence of any organicmedical capability, often resultingin needless death and sufferingamong OSS operatives. The needfor medical support became a primeconsideration when Bank had thesubsequent opportunity to shapethe future Special Forces tables oforganization and equipment.1

The formation of the initial Spe-

cial Forces group in the summer of1952 was a logical outgrowth of themilitary planning of the Cold Warera. In case of general or limitedwar, the captive nations of EasternEurope, as well as other nationsunder Communist dominance, pre-sented a fertile resistance potentialfor military exploitation.

The ongoing Korean War merelyfocused on the necessity to organizethe required forces to accomplishlong-range penetration of enemyterritory and organize guerrillaresistance when possible. The plan-ning carried out at Department ofthe Army-level reached fruitionwith the approval for the organiza-tion of unconventional-warfarecapabilities under the aegis of theOffice, Chief of Psychological War-fare, headed by Brig. Gen. RobertA. McClure.

Many of the assigned staff per-sonnel had OSS experience as wellas first-hand experience with resis-tance and guerrilla elements duringWorld War II. Men such as Col.

EarlySpecial ForcesMedical Training1952 – 1971by Lt. Col. Louis T. Dorogi

From humblebeginnings in

1952, SF medi-cal training

evolved into anextensive pro-gram to meet

the demands ofSF missionsand the chal-lenges of the

war in Vietnam.

28 Special Warfare

(later Brig. Gen.) Russell W. Volck-mann no doubt drew on vast experi-ence with Filipino guerrilla groupsin formulating global unconvention-al-warfare plans, while others, suchas Bank, synthesized their OSSinsight in reviewing the require-ments for the force structure neces-sary to carry out the unconvention-al-warfare mission.

As a special staff section underthe Department of the Army,OCPW directed the establishmentof psychological-warfare training atthe Army General School at FortRiley, Kan. This was quickly fol-lowed by the transfer of the 1stRadio Broadcasting and LeafletGroup from Fort Riley to FortBragg to form the nucleus of thefuture Psychological Warfare Center.2

Bank arrived in April 1952 to takeinterim command of the first contin-gent of “psy-warriors” coming fromFort Riley and, by May 16, 1952, thePsychological Warfare Centerbecame operational. Col. Charles H.Karlstad soon took over the com-mand as Bank left to become thefirst commander of the initial Spe-cial Forces group, the 10th.3

Initial medical supportWith a highly favorable response

from a large number of volunteers,the newly activated SF unit wasquickly able to select the best-quali-fied personnel. The medical portionof the 10th Group tables of organi-zation and equipment listed no par-ticular requirements for the singleenlisted medic required for eachdetachment. With the authorizedgrade of E-7 in each operationaldetachment, medical-personnelinput was to consist of only“damned good medics!” asexpressed in the words of its firstgroup commander.4

The importance of selecting the“effective” man for Special Forcesduty was underscored by the psy-chological studies conducted soonafter the formation of the 10th Spe-cial Forces Group. There was anacute need for selection criteria to

ascertain probable performance inan operational setting, well prior toactual deployment, to assure mis-sion success. Once a team wasdeployed on an operation, it was toolate to worry about its personnelcomposition.

Exhaustive studies combinedstandard psychological-measure-ment techniques with “effective-ness” criteria generated by SpecialForces. The findings highlighted aneed for older, mature personnelpossessing the necessary physicalstamina and showing a preferencefor non-routine, outdoor work, as

well as specific rejection of detailedbusywork. Other indices developedby the studies showed that therewas a higher probability of effec-tiveness among those with a pastwillingness to assume family andcommunity responsibility andamong those who didn’t ascribe anyparticular glamor or excitement totheir occupation.5

The work for organizing the med-ical-support activities and futuremedical training and qualificationof the enlisted volunteers fell to 1stLt. Robert E. Elliott of the MedicalService Corps. Arriving on July 18,

1952, Elliott was the first ArmyMedical Department, or AMEDD,officer assigned. Within a brief butfuriously paced period, he designeda training program to fit the needsof the Special Forces medic.

Through coordination with theMedical Field Service School at FortSam Houston, Texas, 28 personnelwere sent in November of 1952 toattend the Chief Medical Aidman’scourse, a course specificallydesigned for Special Forces. It wasthe prototype for what eventuallybecame the mid-level course in the1970s for the Special Forces medic— the 300F-1 Course. Later, select-ed personnel were sent to the NavyCorpsman School.6

Other AMEDD officers rapidlyfollowed, with Capt. Dan Black,Medical Corps, becoming the firstphysician assigned. He was soon toreceive a full complement of Medi-cal Service Corps officers; 1st Lts.Valentine A. Larsen, Donald E.Bristow and Vernon H. Newgard.Initially, there were no require-ments for the medical officers to beparachute-qualified. This, however,was quickly changed. Newgardbecame the first AMEDD officer tograduate from the PsychologicalWarfare Officer Course, despitebeing enrolled two weeks after thebeginning of the course.7

Most of the Medical ServiceCorps officers were initiallyassigned to non-medical duties,with some assigned primary dutiesas Infantry (MOS 31542).

The enlisted medics participatedin a continuous training program to upgrade their medical proficien-cy, in addition to performing theirregular garrison medical duties.The prevailing philosophy was thatthe enlisted personnel were, inessence, independent aidmen andphysician substitutes in a general-warfare situation. The restrictionsthat applied to stateside medicinewould not be valid in a guerrilla sit-uation — especially when evacua-tion from behind enemy lines wasout of the question. The lives ofteam members would depend on

“The prevailing phi-losophy was that theenlisted personnelwere, in essence,independent aidmenand physician sub-stitutes in a general-warfare situation.The restrictions thatapplied to statesidemedicine would notbe valid in a guerril-la situation — espe-cially when evacua-tion from behindenemy lines was outof the question.”

Winter 1990 29

the enlisted medic who was on-site.The training covered procedures,

such as appendectomies, whichwere normally anathema to anyoneother than physicians. The primaryfocus was on emergency medicaltraining, with some obvious limita-tions — training had to be didacticrather than applicatory. Hence, pro-cedures such as emergency appen-dectomies were explained exhaus-tively and re-emphasized to providea preliminary basis for the medics,in case they were faced with thedecision to operate.

The medical cadre of the 10thGroup felt no hesitation in channel-ing the training towards these hith-erto sacrosanct areas because of afirm conviction that operationalnecessity dictated the approach.Elliott realized that the initialreluctance on the part of physiciansto provide this type of trainingwould be quickly overcome oncethey were familiar with the opera-tional concept of Special Forcesunits. Obviously, there were limits

to the training, but he felt the focuson progressively sophisticated med-ical training was fully justified.

Bad TölzBy the late summer of 1953, the

10th Group was alerted for over-seas movement. Commensuratewith the activation of the 77th Spe-cial Forces Group at Fort Bragg inSeptember 1953, the 10th departedto Bad Tölz, Germany, Nov. 10,1953.8 Its relocation closer to antici-pated operational areas no doubtheightened the feeling of necessityfor increased medical proficiency.

Accompanying the 10th as itssurgeon was 1st Lt. Bill E. Free-land, Medical Corps. He was abear of a man, nearly 300 pounds,9and thoroughly dedicated to ensur-ing the medical preparedness ofSpecial Forces. Freeland imple-mented an effective program of on-the-job training to establish andmaintain medical proficiency: Atselected U.S. military hospitalsand dispensaries in Germany, Spe-

cial Forces medics received a vari-ety of experiences.

Training programs in locationssuch as Munich, Ansbach, Hohen-fels and Grafenwohr lasted abouttwo months. Some of the trainingwas at dispensary-level, while anumber of Special Forces medicsreceived more sophisticated train-ing in surgical procedures. Subse-quently, there was little uniformityin the training program, except forlimited assurance that each SFmedic received the same level oftraining. The value of the training,however, was in the subordinationof many stateside medical restric-tions to the training needs of themedics. With the cooperation of thesupporting medical facilities, the“hands on” training was far superi-or to that which medics receivedstateside. The stateside emphasison purely didactic training was sup-planted by more realistic appliedtraining in Germany.10

With the passage of the LodgeAct of 1954, the enlistment in theU.S. armed services of aliens fromvirtually all the captive nations ofEastern and Central Europe pro-vided linguistic and area familiari-ty with many of the intended opera-tional areas of the 10th Group. Thefacilities of Flint Caserne at BadTölz became strapped with increas-ing training requirements. Qualifi-cation of newly assigned personnel,not only in parachute, but in spe-cialty skills, as well as SpecialForces training, occupied much ofthe unit’s efforts. The extensivemedical training created a burdenfor the unit, but at the same timeprovided an opportunity to practiceinstructional skills that were needfor working with guerrilla units.11

OkinawaBy 1957 the formation in Oki-

nawa of the 1st Special ForcesGroup, the third active group, fore-shadowed increasing personnel-pro-curement problems that were toplague all Special Forces units inthe future. With units spread fromEurope to the Pacific, there was no

SF medics demon-strate the proper way

to rappel with apatient on a stretcher.

30 Special Warfare

U.S. Army photo

central medical guidance from thePsychological Warfare Center.

As of that time, no medical officerhad been designated as the Centersurgeon to oversee the medicaltraining and needs within the Spe-cial Forces. There was no hard-and-fast rule for conformity in the train-ing of medics beyond the commontraining received at Fort SamHouston. Each Special Forces grouphad a surgeon authorized, who pre-scribed medical training for theunit as he saw fit.

In Okinawa the 1st Group facedan even more acute problem. Theonly AMEDD officer initiallyassigned to 1st Group was Capt.Sigurd Bue, Medical Service Corps,who was given non-medical dutiesas the group S-2 officer.12 Enlistedpersonnel conducted the groupmedical program. The unit waswithout a physician for two yearsuntil the arrival of Maj. (later Col.)Valentine B. Sky, Medical Corps, inDecember of 1959.13

The geographic spread of SpecialForces units assured that parochialneeds and interests of each groupwere met. It assured little, if any,focus on the common needs forstandardization of training, beyondthat offered at Fort Sam Houston.At the same time, other factors con-tributed to growing personnel prob-lems — the post-Korean War cut-back in available military assets,standard attrition of trained medi-cal personnel, and a replacementsystem that failed to provide aproper input of trained and experi-enced medical replacements.14 Thatneed for standardized, realistictraining was eventually addressedby the Surgical Research Laborato-ry at Fort Bragg.

Surgical Research LabThere are no formal documents

attesting to the initial formation ofthe Surgical Research Laboratory.15

Its ad hoc genesis is rooted in thedesire of a Womack Army Hospitalsurgeon, Capt. John L. Bond, Medi-cal Corps, to provide additional sur-gical practice for hospital physicians.

In the summer of 1959, Bondsecured the necessary administra-tive approval from hospital authori-ties to establish a small surgicalresearch facility in the “old hospital”area across Ardennes Road fromWomack. Lacking sufficient man-power to maintain the facility, henegotiated an informal arrange-ment with the surgeon of the nearby77th Special Forces Group. Inreturn for access to the facility, the77th detailed SFC Ralph C. Drouinto maintain the laboratory.

The benefit was mutual to say theleast. The arrangement allowedboth the hospital physicians as well

as Special Forces medics an oppor-tunity for hands-on training.

The first NCOIC, Drouin, was anextraordinarily well-qualifiedmedic, possessing not only the req-uisite medical skills, but an equalability to “locate” needed medicalsupplies and equipment in theabsence of available funding.16

In September 1959 the first classof four Special Forces medicsattended the Surgical ResearchLaboratory. Drouin later recalled:“The initial training was more orless played by ear. By using certainmedics, Dr. Bond and myself, wetried different procedures to seehow well the enlisted men would

pick up on these procedures ... seehow much they could handle andjust what we could give them.”17

The Special Forces medicslearned how to perform a venouscut-down and administer proper IVfluid therapy. Medics acting in asurgical capacity would perform thenecessary debridement, primary ordelayed primary closures, insertnecessary drains, and take turnsassisting each other or in operatingthe anesthesia apparatus on loanfrom Womack.18

The early training program forSpecial Forces was flexible: much ofthe instruction was predicated onthe desires of the group surgeon andthe interests of the medics. Thoughthere was a lot of discussion, therewas little attempt to establish acomprehensive program. Thischanged rapidly as reports werereceived from Laos and returningSF medics described their Laotianexperiences.

The need for more advanced med-ical training was clear. SubsequentSpecial Forces requests for estab-lishment of such a course at FortSam Houston were rejected. Return-ing from Fort Sam Houston afterfailing to secure the necessaryapproval for the course, the 7th Spe-cial Forces Group surgeon (the 77thwas renamed the 7th in June 1960),Capt. William B. Radcliffe, realized:“We would have to take full respon-sibility for advanced training our-selves, and (I) set myself to take thetask of developing the best programpossible — by Special Forces, forSpecial Forces, right on post at FortBragg.”19

The opportunity to establish theneeded training course arose whenthe next contingent of eight medicswas selected for pre-mission train-ing before going to Laos. Radcliffeobtained permission to establish anuninterrupted five-week trainingcycle for them at the SurgicalResearch Laboratory. He construct-ed a course of instruction which cen-tered on as much hands-on trainingas could be provided. Trainingincluded debridement, endotracheal

“The early trainingprogram for SpecialForces was flexible...Though there was alot of discussion,there was littleattempt to establisha comprehensiveprogram. Thischanged rapidly asreports were receivedfrom Laos andreturning SF medicsdescribed their Lao-tian experiences.”

Winter 1990 31

intubation, suture techniques andlimb amputations. It was followedby other procedures such as prepa-ration and sterilization of surgicalpacks, induction of general anesthe-sia, operating-room routines, steriletechniques and postoperative care.

Students learned new medicaldiagnostic techniques, as well aslaboratory and pharmacologicalskills, via extensive seminars.20 Ofspecial significance was the instruc-tion: The bulk of it was given byenlisted medics under the technicalsupervision of Doctors Radcliffe andBond. Limitations on the availabili-ty of medical officers necessitatedthis approach. The actual manage-ment of the Laboratory fell to SFCE. Grant Madison in May of 1960.With a cadre of six medics detailedfrom the 7th SF Group, the facilityexpanded. By December of 1960, the7th SF Group became the sole userof the Laboratory, as a consequenceof waning interest by the hospitaland the departure of Dr. Bond frommilitary service.21

The Surgical Research Laborato-ry was from its inception a 7thGroup activity supervised by itssurgeon, but with the rapid expan-sion of counterinsurgency forcesdirected by the Kennedy adminis-tration, the training mission of thefacility shifted. In late 1961, withthe activation of the Special ForcesTraining Group, the laboratorybecame the central training facilityfor advanced medical training for allSpecial Forces medics.

AMTSWith the need to revise and

streamline all Special Forces train-ing, the newly constituted MedicalTraining Committee of the TrainingGroup took over the task of revisingmedical training. The laboratorywas promptly renamed the SpecialForces Advanced Medical TrainingSchool. Even while the AMTS wasbeing organized, there were exter-nal pressures for moving all medi-cal training to Fort Sam Houston.Preliminary discussions with repre-sentatives from the Office of the

Surgeon General and personnelfrom the Medical Field ServiceSchool gave strong indications thatthe AMTS at Fort Bragg was injeopardy. The relocation concept, forthe time being, was quickly aban-doned after a brief visit by the Sur-geon General to the Special War-fare Center.22

Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heatonseemed suitably impressed with thetraining at the AMTS, and upon hisreturn to Washington, wrote Capt.David G. Paulsrud, the Center sur-geon, the following:

“I also want to congratulate you

on the excellent program of instruc-tion which you have institutedthere, and after seeing at first-handthe enthusiasm and competence ofall of you, I have no doubt thatthese men will be fully capable ofmeeting the tremendous challengethat awaits them. You are indeedengaged in a most critically impor-tant mission and I congratulate youon your extraordinary achieve-ments. I am firmly convinced thatthis course of instruction shouldcontinue at Fort Bragg and not bemoved to Fort Sam Houston. Thisdecision was very easy to makeafter my visit to your surgical labo-

ratory and classrooms.“Please be assured of my continu-

ing support and accept my expres-sions of great respect and gratitudefor what you and the members ofyour staff are accomplishing for allof us.”23

The strong support by Heaton, aswell as the establishment of theCenter surgeon’s office, presagedsubsequent changes to the trainingcycle of Special Forces medics. Afteran initial five weeks of branch train-ing at Fort Bragg, medics took eightweeks of basic medical training(MOS 910) at Fort Sam Houston.This was followed by 10 more weeksof further didactic medical trainingin the Special Forces Aidman (Air-borne) course (MOS 911.2). Atselected CONUS hospitals, SpecialForces medics received on-the-jobtraining for the next nine weeks aspart of the applicatory phase of the911.2 Course (later the 300F-1course).

Returning to Fort Bragg, themedics underwent an eight-weekintensive Advanced Medical Train-ing Course at the AMTS. Successfulcompletion led to more branchtraining, namely a grueling two-week field training exercise cover-ing the whole spectrum of trainingreceived. Those finally completingthe training could expect to beassigned to a Special Forces unit.

Once assigned, medics, as well asthose with other Special Forces spe-cialties or skills, could expect furthercross-training, on the basic andadvanced unit level, often followedby more exotic forms of training suchas underwater operations or high-altitude-low-opening parachuting.

Understandably, attrition rateswere high (30.7 percent), and in1962, fewer than 100 medics gradu-ated from the AMTS.24 The followingyear the number of graduates morethan tripled (305), but the attritionrate increased to 40 percent.

300F-1 CourseThe precursor to the Special

Forces mid-level medical trainingcourse in the 1970s was the Medical

“The basic featuresof Special Forcesadvanced medicaltraining wereretained throughoutthe Vietnam period,virtually withoutmajor changes until1966. In March ofthat year the SpecialForces Basic Aid-man’s School wasopened at Fort Braggunder the control ofthe Medical TrainingCommittee.”

32 Special Warfare

Aid Procedures Course (8-R-911.2)offered at Fort Sam Houston. Alongwith the rapid expansion of coun-terinsurgency forces in 1962, thecourse was renamed to reflect itsSpecial Forces student input. Fromthen on it was known as the SpecialForces Aidman (Airborne) Course,with only a minor change later inthe course number (8-R-F-16 to300F-1).

For the next three years, thecourse, though operational, waspending formal approval of thecourse content by the ContinentalArmy Command. In 1963 the coursecontent was modified to reflect theimpact of Vietnam on the opera-tional duties of Special Forcesmedics. Vietnam requirements dic-tated the addition of veterinary sub-jects, as well as practice-teaching inbasic medical subjects. The teachingrole assumed paramount impor-tance for future SF medics.25

It is interesting to note that anon-Special Forces physician hadperhaps the most significant impacton the Special Forces Aidman (Air-borne) Course. Lt. Col. (later Col.)Roger A. Juel, Medical Corps, wasfirst associated with Special Forcestraining in 1959 by providing someon-the-job training opportunities inOkinawa for medics from the newlyactivated 1st Group.

Juel was able to observe first-hand the apparent lack of uniformi-ty in the qualifications of thosemedics and noted that one of thegreatest drawbacks was the lack ofdiagnostic capability among the SFmedics. The apparent lack of ade-quate preparation in this respectproduced what he called “an awfullot of empiric medicine. If thepatient got well, the treatment gotcredit, where this is not alwaystrue.”26

He also noted one of the otherproblems that was to become a sig-nificant hindrance in the expansionof Special Forces medical assets —the sudden influx of young andinexperienced medics. After hisreassignment in 1962 to Fort SamHouston, Juel took over direction of

the Special Forces medical trainingconducted at the Medical Field Ser-vice School. He was able to modifythe course content appropriately toresolve many of the shortcomings henoted during his Okinawan tour.Training was made more rigorous;innovative approaches, such as theuse of a mock dispensary, gave stu-dents a more realistic setting inwhich to demonstrate overallknowledge gained.

“By use of a mannequin as apatient, the student obtained thepatient’s history of illness and/orinjury as well as other basic infor-mation concerning the patient. Adiagnosis was determined, treat-ment was prescribed, and evacua-tion as needed ... and each phase ofhis training was tested, such asanatomy, physiology, pharmacy,nursing, types of evacuation, andmedical and surgical treatment. Inthe detection of weak areas, imme-diate on-the-spot critique was madeand re-teaching was accomplishedeffectively.”27

From about 1963 on there were anumber of variations of training atFort Bragg which entailed sendinggraduates of the 300F-1 training tothe Clinical Specialist (MOS 91C)

Course prior to the AMTS. This waspredicated on a reduced attritionrate of 91C graduates attending thelast phase of SF training (10 per-cent vs. 40+ percent).28

Vietnam focus: 1963-71The basic features of Special

Forces advanced medical trainingwere retained throughout the Viet-nam period, virtually without majorchanges until 1966. In March ofthat year the Special Forces BasicAidman’s School (MOS 91A) wasopened at Fort Bragg under thecontrol of the Medical TrainingCommittee.

The cumulative effect of the basictraining being conducted underSpecial Forces control was a subse-quent reduction the following yearin the overall length of the medicaltraining cycle from 37 to 32 weeks.This included a reduction of 91Atraining from 10 to eight weeks anddecreasing training at the AMTS byone week to seven weeks. This theo-retically signaled the availability ofmore medics per year for deploy-ment. Though not without hurdles,the wisdom of bringing the 91Atraining to Fort Bragg was borneout by higher academic grades (10

A medic from the 1st Special Forces Group conducts sick call for Rhade villagers near Ban Me Thout, Vietnam, in March 1962.

U.S. Army photo

Winter 1990 33

points per man) among graduatesof the advanced Special Forcestraining.

In 1966 further changes increasedthe workload of the Medical Train-ing Committee — formalization ofthe Special Forces Advanced Medi-cal Laboratory Procedures Courseand assumption of responsibility foroperation of its own unit dispensary.Though personnel authorizationsseemed adequate, there was a con-tinual problem of securing enoughenlisted instructors and retainingthem. The overall shortage of Spe-cial Forces medical personnelassured that few instructors wouldlast a year before receipt of ordersto Vietnam.29

Reorganization of the U.S. ArmyJohn F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter (Airborne) in 1968 led to arealignment of functions. The U.S.Army John F. Kennedy Center forMilitary Assistance was created,sharing equal status with the U.S.Army Institute for Military Assis-tance, which absorbed the SpecialForces Training Group.

All enlisted Special Forces medi-cal training now fell under theMedical Division, Operational Spe-

cialties Department, of the SpecialForces School and thus no longerunder the staff supervision of theCenter surgeon. The remainingtechnical control exercised by thesurgeon was inadequate and pre-saged many of the training prob-lems that were to emerge in subse-quent years.

Throughout the year, increasedpressure by representatives of theCONARC surgeon’s office focusedon returning the eight-week Spe-cial Forces Basic Aidman’s Course(MOS 91A) to Fort Sam Houston.CONARC deemed the 12-week 91ACourse taught at the MedicalTraining Center adequate for pro-viding the necessary input to the300F-1 Course, despite insistenceto the contrary by the Center andthe Institute.

A trial program initiated byCONARC admitted 35 91A studentsgraduating from Fort Sam Houstonto the 300F-1 Course. During thefirst six weeks of the 300F-1 Course,14 of these students dropped out,while out of 19 students completing91A training at Fort Bragg, onlytwo were dropped for academic rea-sons. For the remainder of 1969 and

the next calendar year, the statusquo prevailed, despite intensereview and discourse on the pro-posed transfer.30

In 1971, by the direction of theOffice of the Surgeon General, allSpecial Forces enlisted medicaltraining was transferred to FortSam Houston despite the ferventobjections of the Center and theInstitute. The transfer was to be fol-lowed by a reduced training cycle,elimination of a number of SpecialForces-essential subjects from theprogram of instruction and theexclusion of Special Forces-qualifiedtraining cadre. There was littledoubt at Fort Bragg that the revi-sion would produce a lesser-quali-fied medic.

The unexpected and belatedreprieve of the previous SpecialForces medical-training programcame when the first graduatingclass under the new systemreturned to Fort Bragg and wastested by the Medical Division ofthe U.S. Army Institute of MilitaryAssistance. The Center HistoricalSupplement for 1971 noted:

“The majority of students failedthis examination in the followingareas: operating room techniques,surgical procedures (amputations,wound debridement, venous cut-downs, and tracheostomies); steriletechniques, and certain medicalsubjects peculiar to Special Forcesoperations. Headquarters CONARCwas advised of the situation, withthe recommendation that additionalpost-MOS medical training beauthorized on Fort Bragg to fullyqualify the trainees as SpecialForces enlisted medics prior to theirassignment to operational units.Authorization was received to con-duct a 4 1/2 week post-MOS medicalqualification course.”31

The balance sheetFrom their infancy in the 1950s,

Special Forces units’ reason forbeing has been to develop, organize,equip and direct indigenous forcesin the conduct of guerrilla warfare.As early as 1961, however, doctrinal

SFC Larry Dickinson, a medic from the 46th Special Forces Company,examines a child as part of a civic-action program conducted in Thailandin November 1967.

U.S. Army photo

34 Special Warfare

recognition could be found foranother mission in Army FieldManual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfareand Special Forces Operations,namely, to “advise, train and assistindigenous forces in counter-insur-gency operations.”32 The formermission required relatively modestmedical assets, with primary focuson well-qualified enlisted medicalpersonnel capable of operating inde-pendently.

Juxtaposed against conventional-warfare methods, wherein the moreserious medical problems are evacu-ated to a higher level of medicalcare, unconventional warfare placesan increased demand and responsi-bility on the lower levels of SpecialForces medical support. Medicalevacuation for more definitive medi-cal care was not expected to beavailable. Thus, there was an obvi-ous need for more physician-orient-ed training for the enlisted SpecialForces medic.

Counterinsurgency warfare inVietnam required a number ofchanges to accepted tenets of Spe-cial Forces medical support. Theopenness of most counterinsurgencymedical efforts, in contrast to thecovert medical requirements ofunconventional warfare, and thenecessary interface with existingmedical organizations and facilities,in contrast to UW’s virtual isolationfrom higher echelons of medicalcare, produced requirements differ-

ing from those anticipated by theexisting medical doctrine.

A new lexicon of terms evolved,reflecting the medical operationalrealities of Vietnam. During theVietnam era the training hadbecome the most lengthy and con-

centrated, as well as perhaps themost controversial, of the five basicSpecial Forces skills. The enlistedtraining cycle was best, with multi-ple hurdles beginning with theselection process, followed byparachute, medical training andSpecial Forces branch training. Thetotal time invested was well over 40weeks.

Doctrinal focus on the mainte-nance and improvement of the

health of guerrilla units was chal-lenged by the need for health-and-sanitation improvements among theindigenous civilian populations ofSoutheast Asia. Special Forces med-ical training, always extensive andrigorous, responded well to thatchallenge. From its humble begin-nings in 1952, it evolved into a for-malized training cycle distinguishedby the fact that it was the only formof medical training for enlisted per-sonnel not always fully under thecontrol of Fort Sam Houston.

Lt. Col. Louis Dorogi, USAR, is amember of the Medical ServiceCorps and is currently director ofofficer courses, 1033rd U.S. ArmyReserve Forces Schools, Portland,Maine. In more than 14 years ofactive service, he served in a num-ber of special-operations medicalassignments, including medicalsupply officer for the 7th SF Group,medical supply officer for the Wal-ter Reed Army Institute of ResearchField Epidemiological Survey Teamin Vietnam, and executive officerand plans, operations and trainingofficer for the Surgeon Section ofthe JFK Center for Military Assis-tance. From 1975 to 1978, he servedas historian in the Medical HistoryUnit of the Army Center for Mili-tary History.

Notes:1 In a letter to the author on 24 March 1976, Col. Bank described

some of the thinking that went into organizing Special Forces teams.Many of the old OSS operatives and veterans were able to translatetheir knowledge and experiences into shaping the basic operationalunit of the Special Forces, the A-team, or Special Forces operationaldetachment. An initial consideration of placing physicians on eachoperational detachment was quickly dropped when the plannersrealized the lack of available assets. Originally only one medicallyqualified team member was contemplated. Bank wrote:

“Based on my OSS experience I was determined to eliminate onemajor flaw in the conduct and support for unconventional opera-tions. That flaw was in the area of medical aid and support. I wouldnever forget how a neighboring Jed(burgh) team had lost a lieu-tenant who had been dropped initially in my sector because of lackof trained personnel. ... No medical personnel were in the entireJed(burgh) operation. I also had noted that many of the guerrillas Ihad organized had a latent fear of the consequences of gettingwounded in action because of the lack of proper and immediate med-ical support. This in turn affected their efficiency and morale.”

2 Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Psychological War-fare Center Questionnaire, Fort Bragg, N.C., 5 September 1952.

3 The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was formally activatedon 11 June 1952, per General Order 33, Fort Bragg, N.C., dated 18June 1952. See Unit History Data Card for Headquarters & Head-quarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

4 Telephone conversation on 12 March 1976 with Col. Aaron Bankand letter from Col. Bank to the author, dated 24 March 1976.

5 Herbert I. Abelson, Factors Related to the Effectiveness of Spe-cial Forces Personnel, The George Washington University HumanResources Research Office, HumRRO Control No. A-3513, 5 August1954.

6 Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C.,“Weekly Activities Report,” 15 November 1952. Also see Maj.William L. Posey, “Special Forces Medical Training,” (a studentpaper written for the Communicative Arts Program), Fort Leaven-worth, Kan.: Army Command & General Staff College, April 1970, p.1.

7 Headquarters, Special Warfare Center, Special Orders Number1119, Paragraph 1, dated 27 October 1952.

8 Historical Data Card, 10th Special Forces Group. The 77th Spe-cial Forces Group was initially composed of many personnel from the10th.

9 According to Dr. Freeland and Lt. Elliott, the 10th Special Forces

“A new lexicon ofterms evolved,reflecting the medicaloperational realitiesof Vietnam. Duringthe Vietnam era thetraining had becomethe most lengthy andconcentrated, as wellas perhaps the mostcontroversial, of thefive basic SpecialForces skills.”

Winter 1990 35

36 Special Warfare

Group had to design and construct a suitable parachute harness forFreeland to permit him to become parachute-qualified.

10 Telephone conversation with retired Maj. Robert E. Elliott on 3March 1977.

11 Beverly Lindsey, “The Center Story: Behind the Iron Curtain,”Veritas 14 (July-September 1975) : 16, and telephone conversationwith retired Maj. Robert E. Elliott on 3 March 1977.

12 Telephone conversation with retired Col. Sigurd Bue on 23March 1977.

13 Personnel data card (Office of the Surgeon General) for Col.Valentine B. Sky, Medical Corps.

14 “Tough, Triple Volunteers of the Army’s 10th Special Forces,”Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 1 August 1959, p. 3.

15 Also known as the Surgical Laboratory, Clinical Research Labo-ratory and Advanced Medical Training School in later years.

16 SFC Drouin was a graduate of the Naval Hospital Corps School,the Independent School for Medical Corpsmen, Dental TechnicianSchool, Dental Laboratory School, the Surgical Technician School,and the Para-rescue and Survival Schools and the Medical SpecialistAdvanced Course at Fitzsimons General Hospital.

17 Personal communication from retired SFC Ralph C. Drouin tothe author on 24 February 1977.

18 Personal communication from Drouin.19 Personal communication from William B. Radcliffe, M.D. to the

author on 12 September 1976.20 Personal communication from Dr. Radcliffe and interview with

Sgt. Maj. E. Grant Madison on 1 October 1975.21 Capt. William B. Radcliffe, Letter of Commendation, Office of

the Group Surgeon, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st SpecialForces, Fort Bragg, N.C., 16 August 1960. The letter describes inglowing terms SFC Madison’s contributions to the operations of theSurgical Research Laboratory. Also, telephone conversation betweenDr. John L. Bond and the author, 13 July 1976.

22 Personal letter from Dr. David G. Paulsrud to the author dated 1 November 1976, p. 3.

23 Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heaton to Capt. David G. Paulsrud, 7thSpecial Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., 27 April 1962. Personal filesof Dr. David Paulsrud.

24 Special Warfare Center, Historical Report, 1963, pp. 66-67.25 Office of the Surgeon, Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Warfare

Center, Army Medical Service Activities (RCS MED-41 (R4)), FortBragg, N.C., 1963, p. 1.

26 Interview with Col. Roger A. Juel, Medical Corps, at Fort SamHouston, Texas, on 17 December 1976, pp. 5-6.

27 Brooke Army Medical Center, Army Medical Service ActivitiesReport (RCS MED-41 (R4)), Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1963, p. 112.

28 The Surgeon General, United States Army, Annual Report, FY1963, pp. 111-112.

29 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (Air-borne), Historical Supplement, 1966, p. 63. Headquarters, Depart-ment of the Army, Special Forces Training Group (Airborne), ArmyMedical Service Activities Report (Annual) 1967, Fort Bragg, N.C., 5March 1968, p. 3. Medical Section, JFK Center for Military Assis-tance, Army Medical Activities (RCS MED-41 (R4)), Fort Bragg, N.C.,13 April 1971.

30 Headquarters, Department of the Army, JFK Center for Mili-tary Assistance, Army Medical Activities (RCS MED-41 (R4)), FortBragg, N.C., 1969 & 1970. Surgeon, JFK Center for Military Assis-tance, “Special Forces Medical Training,” Disposition Form to Com-manding General, JFK Center for Military Assistance, 14 September1970.

31 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance,Spartan Historical Supplement, 1971, Fort Bragg, N.C., p. 41.

32 Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and SpecialForces Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Septem-ber 1961, p. 18.

While the rest of the Army is con-solidating career-managementfields and specialties and reducingauthorizations, psychological opera-tions is looking for ways to expandand grow, and PSYOP NCOs whoplan to grow with their MOS needto be aware of their professional-development requirements.

On Feb. 23, 1990, the Office ofthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Per-sonnel, Headquarters, Departmentof the Army, approved the estab-lishment of Enlisted Career Man-agement Field 37, PsychologicalOperations, and Military Occupa-tional Specialty 37F, PsychologicalOperations Specialist.

CMF 37 is a one-MOS careermanagement field, containing theprivate-to-sergeant-major accessionMOS 37F. The new CMF/MOS willbe formed from personnel currentlyholding MOS 96F, PSYOP Special-ist, which is currently part of CMF96, Military Intelligence.

PSYOP has had a long relation-ship with MI, first with MI MOSsbeing documented with the SQI

“W,” psychological operations, thenwith the establishment of MOS 96Fin October 1985 by reclassificationof other military-intelligence assets,mainly MOS 96B (intelligence ana-lyst). Initially, establishing aPSYOP specialty within CMF 96seemed like a logical step. But asthe MOS matured, it became appar-ent that a continued tie to militaryintelligence, with the SWCS actingas the subproponent, placed theMOS in an awkward position ofhaving two masters. This promptedthe SWCS to request assumption offull proponency for 96F and to pro-pose the creation of a PSYOP-spe-cific CMF/MOS.

The Army has established con-version milestones in order tophase the new CMF/MOS into all ofits data bases. The first milestoneof which soldiers in the field will beaware will be the publication of theOctober 1990 Update 3, MilitaryOccupational Classification Struc-ture. The details of the CMF willappear in the AR 611-201 portion ofthe update.

The next significant milestonewill occur in September 1991 —personnel reclassification. FromSept. 1-23, 1991, affected soldiers’personnel service centers will revisepersonnel records, publish ordersand submit transactions on theStandard Installation/Division Per-sonnel System, SIDPERS, theArmywide computerized personneldata base. The reclassification ismerely a case of a number changefrom 96F to 37F — soldiers’ dutiesand assignments will not bechanged.

Until the reclassification is com-pleted, the enlisted MilitaryPolice/Military Intelligence Branchof the Combat Support Career Divi-sion, Enlisted Personnel Manage-ment Directorate at PERSCOM willcontinue to manage 96F/37F. Uponfull implementation of CMF37/MOS 37F, MOS 96F will bedeleted and personnel managementwill most likely fall under theenlisted Special Forces Branch ofthe Combat Arms Career Divisionof the EPMD at PERSCOM.

ThePSYOPSpecialist

NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

by MSgt. Calvin Rome

Winter 1990 37

One of the most significantchanges with the implementation ofCMF 37/MOS 37F will be theexpansion of grade authorizations,including sergeant-major positions.The operations-sergeant position inthe S-3 of a PSYOP group, current-ly graded for master sergeant, willbe upgraded to a staff-sergeant-major position. The other sergeant-major position provided for in thestandards of grade is for the activecomponent only. A master-sergeantposition in the Office of the Directorof Psychological Operations andCivil Affairs, J9, of the U.S. SpecialOperations Command will beupgraded to staff sergeant major.Another position which is a candi-date for upgrading to staff sergeantmajor is the position of CMF man-ager in the proponency office of theSWCS.

Because of the time required todevelop new training, the SWCShas signed a memorandum ofagreement with the Army Intelli-gence Center and School, Fort

Huachuca, Ariz., to allow PSYOPspecialists to continue attendingthe Military Intelligence AdvancedNCO Course until SWCS gets aPSYOP-specific ANCOC on-line,scheduled for fiscal year 1993.

Another aspect of the conversionto CMF 37 will be the requirementfor PSYOP enlisted collar insignia.Upon reclassification to CMF 37,PSYOP soldiers will no longer beable to wear the Military Intelli-gence branch insignia. The finalstep of developing a PSYOP-specificenlisted collar insignia will make aclean break with MI. The SWCSSpecial Operations ProponencyOffice has sent solicitations to bothactive and reserve-componentPSYOP units asking for sugges-tions and proposals for an enlistedcollar insignia.

Other proposals still in the earlystages of development for MOS 37Finclude airborne training (for activesoldiers) and language training aspart of the initial-entry trainingpackage.

Professional developmentTo meet the Army’s requirement

of training and leading, the PSYOPNCO must have a wide range ofmilitary knowledge and skill andmust demonstrate job proficiency inall aspects of psychological opera-tions. Perishable skills, such as for-eign-language proficiency and air-borne operations, must be trained,learned and maintained on a con-tinual basis.

Professional development forPSYOP soldiers, with the exceptionof MOS-specific training, is similarto that of other MOSs. Generally,the Army uses a three-levelapproach to professional develop-ment: institutional, unit andindividual.

On the institutional level, the keycomponent is the NCO EducationSystem. NCOs must be skilledtrainers and leaders, able to trainsoldiers while demonstrating theirown proficiency. Trainers needenthusiasm, innovation, the abilityto motivate others, and the abilityto learn and communicate the sub-ject matter. NCOES provides train-ing in all these areas. For thesequence of NCOES courses for thePSYOP MOS, see the NCO profes-sional-development chart (nextpage).

Ideally, NCOES is sequential,progressive and provides soldiersthe training they need prior to pro-motion. (It does not, however,include functional courses such asthe First Sergeant Course.) Thisapplies equally to all branches ofthe Army. NCOES has four levels:

• Primary. Primary-level train-ing prepares specialists andsergeants for NCO duties. The Pri-mary Leadership DevelopmentCourse is a non-MOS-specific lead-ership course built around basicsoldier skills. Unit commandersselect and schedule soldiers forattendance.

• Basic. Basic-level training pre-pares sergeants for duties as staffsergeants. The Psychological Oper-ations Basic Noncommissioned Offi-

CMF 37PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

00Z50E9

37F50E8–E9

37F40E7

37F30E6

37F20E5

37F10E3–E4

TRAINEE

COMMANDSERGEANT

MAJOR

PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONSSPECIALIST

38 Special Warfare

cers Course emphasizes PSYOP-related subjects, intelligence func-tions and common-core leadershiptasks. Soldiers attend PSYOPBNCOC at the Special WarfareCenter and School NCO Academy.The Army Personnel Commandnominates the best-qualified sol-diers to attend training, and theunit commander has the option toapprove, substitute for, or defer acandidate. The PSYOP BNCOC isfive weeks, three days long and isconducted once per year.

• Advanced. Advanced-leveltraining prepares staff sergeantsand sergeants first class for dutiesas senior noncommissioned officers.PSYOP specialists currently attendthe MI ANCOC, which emphasizes

the skills required by senior NCOsin the military-intelligence environ-ment, along with a common core ofleadership training developed bythe U.S. Army Sergeants MajorAcademy. A Department of theArmy selection board chooses stu-dents annually, and PERSCOMcontrols class scheduling. The MIANCOC is 10 weeks long. TheSWCS is developing a PSYOP-spe-cific ANCOC which is scheduled tobe taught at the SWCS NCO Acade-my beginning in fiscal year 1993.

• Senior. The Sergeants MajorCourse at the Army SergeantsMajor Academy at Fort Bliss,Texas, is the capstone of theNCOES. Consideration for selectionis limited to master sergeants and

first sergeants in the publishedzone who request consideration. AnArmy selection board chooses sol-diers annually for both resident andnon-resident schooling, and PER-SCOM schedules classes. The resi-dent course requires a permanent-change-of-station move and is 22weeks long. The non-residentcourse is taught in five phases. Thefirst four phases are completedthrough correspondence, requiringapproximately two years. PhaseFive is a two-week resident phasetaught at the USASMA.

One of the primary considera-tions of professional development atthe unit level is the allocation oftraining time. The commandershould provide time not only for

E2 4–6 MO

E3 6–12 MO

E4 12–26 MO

E5 1 1/2–5 YRS

E6 5–8 YRS

E7 9–13 YRS

E8 14–18 YRS

E9 18–22 YRS

RECRUITER

DRILL SGT

SR DRILL SGT

RC ADVISOR

RECRUITER

RC ADVISOR

ROTC CADRE

PLDC

37F BNCOC

CMF 37 ANCOC

SGM ACADEMY

PSYOP TM MEMBER

LOUDSPEAKER TM CHIEF

AUDIO-VISUAL TM CHIEF

37F AIT INSTRUCTOR

SENIOR SERGEANT IN:–PROPAGANDA DEV CTR–TARGET ANALYSIS TM–PROPAGANDA OPN SECT–THREAT ANALYSIS TM

TAC DISSEM PSG

37F AIT INSTRUCTOR

FIRST SERGEANT

GP/BN OPS SGT

USSOCOM J-9OPS SGT

PROMOTION TOMOS 37F50 E9

STAFF SGM

SR OPS SGT IN APSYOP GP S-3

BCT

AIRBORNE SCHOOL

37F AIT

BASIC LANGUAGETRAINING

PSYOP CRSE (ACCP)

INTERMEDIATE LANGUAGE

JOINT PSYOP STAFF

1SG COURSE

BEGIN COLLEGE WITHA PERSONAL GOAL OFOBTAINING A DEGREE

CONTINUE COLLEGE WITHA PERSONAL GOAL OF ANASSOCIATE’S DEGREE

CONTINUE COLLEGE WITHA PERSONAL GOAL OF ABACHELOR’S DEGREE

CONTINUE COLLEGE WITHA PERSONAL GOAL OF ANADVANCED DEGREE

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

USSOCOM J–9SR OPS SGT

MOS 37F NCO Professional Development

GRADE ASSIGNMENTS OTHER NCOES OTHER CIVILIAN

TRAINING AND EDUCATIONEXPERIENCEYOS

PREFERRED DEGREES:POLITICAL SCIENCEPSYCHOLOGYSOCIOLOGYJOURNALISMINTERNATIONAL RELATIONSMARKETING/ADVERTISINGTELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENTGEOGRAPHY, ECONOMIC/POLITICALFOREIGN AFFAIRS

OR SECOND LANGUAGE

PLANNING COURSE

Winter 1990 39

common-task training, primaryMOS training and NCO-develop-ment-program classes, but also forPSYOP-related training. Languagetraining and maintenance is aprime example of an area which iscritical to PSYOP but rarely allo-cated sufficient training time. Thisis because of the complexity in pro-viding effective training and a lackof command emphasis. The alloca-tion of unit training time is aninvestment in the future of theArmy and PSYOP, and its valuemust not be underestimated.

The individual’s role is the most-often neglected. It is the individu-al’s responsibility to “be all he canbe,” and NCOs are ultimatelyresponsible for their individualdevelopment. An NCO’s ability tolearn, teach, train, counsel and actindependently is dependent onbasic education skills, including theability to write and speak. Onemethod of improving both basicskills and PSYOP-specific skills isto pursue a college degree in a fieldrelated to the PSYOP mission.While a college degree is not arequirement for promotion, aPSYOP NCO with a degree is morecompetitive in the selection processfor promotion. (Some relateddegrees for the PSYOP NCO arelisted on the professional-develop-ment chart.) Other educationalopportunities include:

• The Army CorrespondenceCourse Program, which provides fornon-resident study of military-related subjects. Courses availableand their prerequisites can befound in DA Pamphlet 351-20.

• Suggested professional-readinglists on general military subjects,which should be available throughthe unit command sergeant major.A suggested reading list on PSYOP-specific topics is available throughthe Special Warfare Center andSchool’s Co. A, 3rd Bn., 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group.

• Individual hobbies (such asphotography, ham radios, comput-ers, etc.), which can be directlyrelated to requirements within the

PSYOP mission and can play animportant role in PSYOP-specificprofessional development.

The PSYOP NCO must be theleader and the example for thesoldiers under his or her care.Physical fitness and military bear-ing are the bedrock attributes thatdevelop a leader who projects confi-dence, and the PSYOP NCO mustbe physically and mentally fit tofight, train and lead.

NCO promotionsNCO promotions are managed

through two systems, semi-central-ized and centralized. The semi-cen-tralized system is used to select sol-diers for promotion to sergeant andstaff sergeant. The centralized sys-tem selects NCOs for promotionto sergeant first class, mastersergeant and sergeant major, andfor appointment to commandsergeant major.

Under the semi-centralized sys-tem, to be selected for promotion tosergeant and staff sergeant, NCOsmust appear before a local promo-tion board. Based on an evaluationof the NCO’s past performance andpotential, the board awards promo-

tion points, which are a major fac-tor in determining if the soldier willbe selected for promotion. SinceJuly 1, 1986, the Primary Leader-ship Development Course has alsobeen a requirement for promotionto staff sergeant.

Under the centralized system,the authority for selecting and pro-moting NCOs to the top threegrades rests with Headquarters,Department of the Army. The cen-tralized system relies completely oninformation contained in the NCO’sOfficial Military Personnel File andon the NCO Personnel Qualifica-tion Records (DA Form 2A and 2-1).

To increase the possibility ofselection for promotion, PSYOPNCOs should ensure that theirrecords reflect that they have metall prerequisites, as outlined in thepromotion board’s guidance instruc-tion, prior to the suspense date. The DA photo is a critical part ofthe OMPF. To be competitive, NCOsmust present a professional person-al appearance, and their uniformsmust conform to standards provid-ed in AR 670-1. Height and weightshould be proportional and withinthe limits established by AR 600-9.

Instructors show a student how to wear and operate a mobile loudspeakerduring PSYOP advanced individual training. MOS training is only part ofthe overall training necessary for NCO professional development.

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

40 Special Warfare

NCOs should make sure that alltheir efforts toward professionaldevelopment, whether institutional,unit or individual, are reflected inthe OMPF. Even the most proficientand professional NCOs in the MOSwill not receive promotions, schoolsand assignments if their OMPFs

are not accurate and current.Soldiers can receive free copies of

their OMPF microfiche by sendinga personally signed request withname, Social Security number, andaddress to: Commander,USAEREC; Attn: PCRE-FF; FortBenjamin Harrison, IN 46249-5301.

They can also visit USAEREC atFort Benjamin Harrison to reviewtheir files in person. Make appoint-ments by calling AV 699-3361, com-mercial (317) 542-3361.

MSgt. Calvin B. Rome is current-ly the Psychological Operationsand Civil Affairs Enlisted Managerin the Special Operations Propo-nency Office of the SWCS. Afterserving the first 10 years of hiscareer in Army Aviation, he trans-ferred to Military Intelligence,where he served for five years as aninterrogator, MOS 97E. He laterserved as the first sergeant ofHeadquarters and HeadquartersCompany, 9th PSYOP Battalion,and as the operations sergeant ofthe 1st PSYOP Battalion. His mili-tary schools include training at theDefense Language Institute in Chi-nese Mandarin and Korean, andthe SQI “W” Course, PsychologicalOperations.

Phone numbers for PSYOP soldiers

• PSYOP enlisted assignments manager, PERSCOM; commercial(703) 325-9363, AV 221-9363.

• NCOES branch (BNCOC, ANCOC), PERSCOM; commercial (703)325-5361, AV 221-5361.

• MI ANCOC manager, MI Branch, PERSCOM; commercial (703)325-6430, AV 221-6430.

• NCO Academy, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. (MI ANCOC); commercial(602) 538-8935/36, AV 879-8935/36.

• Special Operations Proponency Office, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg,N.C.; commercial (919) 432-6406, AV 239-9002/6406.

• Co. A, 3rd Bn., 1st Special Warfare Training Group, USAJFKSWCS(PSYOP advanced individual training); commercial (919) 396-5511,AV 236-5511.

• NCO Academy, USAJFKSWCS (PSYOP BNCOC); commercial (919)396-2897, AV 236-2897.

Winter 1990 41

A leader must always be at theforefront of the soldiers he leads.Not only in time of war, but also intraining, the leader must displayand constantly set the example forhis subordinates. This is especiallytrue in the area of physical fitness.

A successful leader must projectthe image of mental, physical andspiritual “wellness” to his soldiers,adversaries and to the people of hiscountry. His bearing, shown by pos-ture, overall appearance, and man-ner of physical movement, is anoutward display of the state ofinner feelings and confidence. Bear-ing can either hurt the confidenceof soldiers or help inspire them.1

History teaches the importance offitness on the battlefield. A demon-stration of the physical qualities ofleadership under the most adverseof conditions was exhibited by Lt.Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who orga-nized and led the retreat fromBurma of an unorganized mob ofmen and women — Chinese,British, Burmese and a few Ameri-cans — in May, 1942.

A rapid advance and unexpectedenveloping movement by theJapanese had resulted in a disas-trous defeat for the Chinese andBritish forces. The normal line ofretreat was cut off, and there wasno choice but to hike through thejungle.

Stilwell led the group 140 milesfrom Burma into India, more thanhalf of that distance on foot. Thegroup had to contend with heat andalmost incessant rain, tangled jun-gles, insect-ridden swamps, and7,000-foot mountains. Manybecame ill with dysentery. Some ofthese, and those wounded prior tothe march, had to be carried onstretchers. After 20 days, however,Stilwell led a well-organized anddisciplined band into India. Stil-well, at the age of 59, had accom-plished this feat through what oneauthor has called “superb leader-ship coupled with indefatigableenergy and excellent physicalcondition.”2

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, whoserved as a division, corps, and

IS FITNESSIMPORTANTFORLEADERS?by CSM Henry Bone

42 Special Warfare

army commander, speaks of physi-cal fitness as one of the most impor-tant ingredients of leadership.“Because of strenuous and unremit-ting physical training, I was able tokeep up with the best of my troopsin the hottest sectors and thetoughest terrain and climate.”3

Ridgway also prescribes what hebelieves the standard for comman-ders of large units should be. “Thedivision commander should havethe physical endurance, stamina,and reserves of his best infantrybattalion commanders, becausethat is where he belongs — withthem — a good part of the time.”4

Ridgway feels that a leader shouldbe in excellent physical condition atall times, since at any time, hecould be thrust into a combat situa-tion, and there will be no time toget into shape.

It is hard to predict the kinds ofphysical challenges soldiers willface in future wars; however, inalmost any situation, there will be

times when leaders will be requiredto function with less rest than theirsoldiers. It is also likely that enemyrear operations will pit truckdrivers, clerks and cooks againstenemy parachutists in hand-to-hand combat. Leaders have aresponsibility to ensure that theyand their soldiers are physically fit,able to endure the rigors of combat.

A glimpse of the future battlefieldcan be seen in the 1973 “Yom Kip-pur” war. Egypt and Syria used rel-atively modern Soviet weapon sys-tems, and Syria deployed its equip-ment using the Soviet military doc-trine of continuous military opera-tions. According to one source,“This resulted in a battlefield thatwas probably unmatched in termsof the levels of sustained terror andstress applied to soldiers and theleaders of both sides.”5

Physically fit soldiers are betterable to withstand stress in peace orwar partly because of the psycho-logical dividends of physical condi-

tioning. These dividends come inthe form of heightened alertness,greater self-confidence and aggres-sive, competitive attitudes — fac-tors which will be critical on anybattlefield.

CSM Henry Bone is currently thecommand sergeant major for the2nd Battalion, 7th SF Group atFort Bragg.

Notes1 U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Mili-

tary Leadership, p. 125.2 L.A. Pennington, The Officer as a Leader

(New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1948), pp.111-112.

3 Robert L. Taylor and William R. Rosen-bech, Military Leadership in Pursuit ofExcellence (Boulder, Colo.: Frederick A.Praeger, 1984), p. 25.

4 Taylor and Rosenbech, p. 28.5 James G. Hunt and John O. Blair, Lead-

ership on the Future Battlefield (New York:Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), p. 615.

Winter 1990 43

Editor’s note: The following article is taken fromB-720 Tips, published in 1988 by the 7th SF Group.B-720 Tips was, itself, based on B-52 Tips, publishedby the 5th SF Group in 1970, but updated to includechanges in weapons, equipment and doctrine.

Leader tips•No individual or team can practice or train too

much or too often.•Teamwork is the key to success and will only come

through constant training and rehearsal.•While on a mission, minimize fatigue; tired men

become careless.•If you show confidence, your team will have

confidence.•Always have an alternate plan. Think ahead.•If you lose your temper, it will effect your judg-

ment. Keep cool.•Don’t be afraid to take advice from your team

members.•Realism must be injected into all phases of train-

ing, such as zeroing weapons at targets in the jungle,using live training aids for prisoner-of-war snatch orambush practice, etc.

•Conduct at least half of your training at night.•Teams that have a good physical training program

have fewer health problems.

•Have a pre-mission and post-mission checklist toensure that nothing is left behind.

•Correct all personal, individual and team errors onthe spot.

•Use tact when reprimanding your personnel, espe-cially indigenous team members. If possible, take theman aside to criticize him. This enables him to reactpositively to the criticism, since he will not lose face,feel ridiculed or lose self-confidence.

•Conduct English classes for your indigenous per-sonnel, especially interpreters. Conduct classes foryour U.S. personnel in your indigenous team members’language.

•Don’t set patterns in your operations.•Never do the obvious.•On patrol, stay alert at all times. You are never

100-percent safe until you are back home.•Have team members write down tips and lessons

learned, and collect and consolidate them at the end ofeach mission.

•Don’t arbitrarily make all “tips of the trade” yourteam SOP. Always consider METT-T (mission, enemy,terrain, troops and time available).

Uniform and equipment common to all•Wear lightweight BDUs on operations: even when

soaking wet at night, BDUs are remarkably “invisible”to night-vision goggles. OG-107 jungle fatigues, howev-er, appear completely black when wet, and a man’s sil-houette can be clearly and easily seen by an enemyusing night-vision goggles.

•Don’t use luminous tape; it’s easily spotted at longdistances with NVGs.

•Wear loose-fitting and un-tailored clothing on fieldoperations. Tight-fitting clothing often tears or rips,allowing mosquitoes and leeches easy access toexposed parts of the body.

•Tuck your jacket into your pants. You can’t use thelower pockets because of your load-carrying equipmentanyway, and in a contact, you can temporarily stuffexpended magazines inside your shirt.

•Gloves will protect hands from thorns, poisonousplants and insect bites, provide camouflage and aid inholding a weapon when it heats up from firing. Avia-tor’s gloves work well.

•Sew in a section of VS-17 panel to cover the insidetop of your field hat for use as an emergency daylightposition marking signal to friendly aircraft. In the cen-ter of that, sew a 2”-by-2” piece of USAF “burn tape”for use as a nighttime position marking signal to AC-130 gunships (2” by 2” is the size recommended by theAC-130 low-light/night-television operators).

•Sew the same signal pattern inside your fatigueshirt, since hats are easily lost in firefights or pursuitsituations.

•Do not hang clothing on green bamboo if you planon wearing it afterward; the fuzz on the bamboo is just

WhenYou’reOnPatrol...

44 Special Warfare

other, they will see glowing “cat-eyes”).•When moving at night, only every other man

should wear his NVGs. Point and trail always wearNVGs.

•“Starlight” NVGs and thermal viewers complementeach other, and should be used in combination; e.g., the point should wear PVS-5/7 NVGs, and the slack(the man behind the point) should use the thermal-imaging sight.

Weapons tips•Never assume that your weapon is clean enough on

an operation. Clean your weapon daily.•Always carry rifle-cleaning equipment on opera-

tions; i.e., bore and chamber brushes, cleaning rag andpatches, cleaning rod with handle and tip, and a smallvial of weapons oil. A shaving brush is very useful.

•When you fire your weapon, shoot low, particularlyat night; ricochets will kill just as well, and most peo-ple hit the ground when shooting starts.

•Use one magazine full of tracer during infiltrationand exfiltration. If taken under fire during infil orexfil, the tracers can be used to identify enemy posi-tions to friendly air support.

•The last three rounds in each magazine should betracer to remind the firer that he needs a fresh maga-zine. Alternate: The last eight rounds are three tracerfollowed by five ball.

•Quietly replace the cartridge in the chamber ofyour weapon each morning. Condensation may cause amalfunction.

•Oil the selector switch on your weapon daily andwork the switch back and forth, especially during therainy season. This will prevent the common occurrenceof a stuck switch.

•Always carry your weapon with the selector switchon “safe.”

•Use a plastic muzzle cap or tape to keep water anddirt out of the barrel.

•To improve noise discipline, tape all sling swivels.•Rig the jungle sling so it is easily adjustable (for

easy transition from rappel/fast-rope to carry/fire).Tape a spare field dressing to the sling at the stock,using a single strip of wide cloth tape with a quick-release tab.

•Check all magazines before going on an operationto ensure they are clean and properly loaded and thatthe springs are oiled and functioning. Magazine prob-lems cause the majority of weapons malfunctions.

•Place magazines upside down in their pouches tokeep out dirt and water.

•Do not retrieve your first expended magazine dur-ing contact; it will consume valuable time.

•If you use a PAQ-4 aiming light on an M-16A2 rifle,you must modify the hand guard to allow the thumbswitch to travel far enough to activate the light. Usingthe serrated edge of your bayonet, file down the area

like itching powder. Of course, clothing should not beremoved or hung-out on patrol.

•If your mission requires long ropes, consider theuse of 1-inch nylon tubing instead. It is much lighter,much more compact and just as strong.

LCE/ruck tips•Be sure that all snaps and buckles are taped. Do

not use paper tape.•Always carry a sharp knife or bayonet on patrol.•Always wear your load-carrying equipment buckled

when not sleeping. If you’re wounded, your teammatescan drag you by your LCE shoulder straps.

•For survival, each individual should carry a cut-down MRE in his pants cargo pocket, and one tube ofbouillon cubes in the first-aid pouch on his LCE. Onebouillon cube dissolved in one canteen of water willprovide energy for one or two days.

•Don’t use two-quart canteen covers to carry 30-round magazines. You can fit eight magazines inone, but once you take the first one out, the others rat-tle loudly and spill out easily. Use regular ammopouches.

•Sew a long slim pocket on the side of your ruck toaccommodate the long antenna, or use an accessory kitbag clipped and tied to the side of the ruck.

•Ensure that the snap link on your rucksack issnapped through the loop in the upper portion of yourrucksack-carrying straps or the frame, so you won’tlose it during exfil when you snap it on a ladder orextraction fast-rope.

•Insect repellent leaks and spills easily, so put it ina zip-lock bag and isolate it from your other equipmentin the rucksack. Also, squeeze air from the repellentcontainer and screw the cap on firmly.

•Always use the water from canteens in or on yourrucksack before using water in the canteens on yourbelt. This will ensure a supply of water should youditch or lose your rucksack.

•Test the shoulder straps on the rucksack beforepacking it for patrol. Always carry some parachutecord to repair straps on patrol.

•Use a waterproof bag in the rucksack to protectequipment while on patrol. This is extremely impor-tant during the rainy season.

•Camouflage your rucksack with black spray paint.

Night-vision-goggle tips•At night, carry night-vision goggles in a claymore

bag around your neck on your chest. This allows easyaccess and protects the NVGs from the elements.

•Always carry a spare battery for your NVGs.•When in an observation post at night, scan with

NVGs for only a few moments every five minutes or so.If you scan continuously, you increase the chance of the enemy spotting your position (when two personsusing NVGs in the passive mode look directly at each

Winter 1990 45

under the thumb switch (between the eighth and 10thribs from the slip ring) about one-quarter inch. This isnot a problem on the M-16A2 carbine, because thehand guard is smaller.

M-203 gunner tips•In dense jungle, carry a 3:1 ratio of buckshot to HE,

with two star clusters and two star parachutes for sig-nalling aircraft.

•In the jungle, point and trail men should be M-203gunners with buckshot in the chamber.

•If you fire HE in the jungle at night, be ready tohave it bounce off a tree limb right back at you and gooff in your face.

•Oil your M-203 with 30- or 40-weight motor oil,especially the trigger, safety housing and slide, due torain and humidity in the jungle.

SAW gunner tips•Silence ammo in plastic drums by making inserts

from tablet-back cardboard covered with acetate. Cutto fit two per drum.

•When moving, use a 30-round magazine in theSAW. Attach a drum once in position.

•SAW drum pouches are tightly-fitted and tend topop open when you drop into the prone; use cloth tapewith quick-release tabs to prevent this. Two-quart can-teen covers are acceptable substitutes.

Claymore tips•Claymores are factory-packed “backward”; i.e., to be

emplaced from the firing position to the mine position,with the excess wire left at the mine. Correct by remov-ing all the firing wire from the plastic spool, discard thespool, re-roll the wire in an “S” or figure-8 fashion, andreplace it in the bag so the mine can be emplaced firstand the wire laid back to the firing position. The clack-er with circuit tester attached is pre-connected to thefiring wire and stowed in the mine pouch. The unitcommander must make the decision whether to primethe mine before departing on the mission or only to putthe shipping plugs on the electric and non-electricblasting caps to speed priming during emplacement.

•Dual-prime each claymore for both electric andnon-electric firing. The time fuse should be pre-cut for30-, 60-, or 120-second delay, for pursuit or break-con-tact situations. However, the burn time on the fusebecomes undependable the longer the fuse is exposedto wet or humid conditions.

•Waterproof your non-electric firing systems.•Carry the claymore in the rucksack so it’s immedi-

ately accessible; after breaking contact it can be quick-ly armed and emplaced on the back trail (even whileit’s still in the ruck) to delay pursuers.

•Claymores placed around your position (observa-tion post, ambush, remain-overnight, etc.), should beemplaced one at a time by two men, with one man

emplacing the mine and the other standing guard.•Never emplace a claymore in a position that pre-

vents you from observing it.•Because you only emplace a claymore where you

can observe it, if you are operating in dense jungle, youmay want to consider cutting your firing wire in half,since you won’t use more than 50 feet or 15 meters ofwire. This makes emplacement and recovery easierand cuts weight.

•Claymores should be emplaced so the blast paral-lels the team and the firing wire does not lead straightback to the team position. If the claymores are turnedaround by the enemy, they will not point at the team.

•Determine in advance who will fire each claymoreand who will give the command or signal to fire.

Grenade tips•Make continuous daily checks on all grenades

when on patrol to ensure that the primers are not com-ing unscrewed.

•Do not bend the pins on the grenades flat. Therings are too hard to pull when needed.

•Fold paper tape through the rings of grenades andtape the ring to the body of the grenade. The papertape will tear for fast use, while plastic or cloth tapewill not. It also keeps the ring open for your finger,stops noise and prevents snagging.

•All team members should carry a mixture of frag-mentation, CS and white-phosphorous grenades ontheir belts for the following reasons:

- Fragmentation grenades are good for inflictingcasualties.

- CS grenades are ideal for stopping or slowing downenemy troops and dogs pursuing your team, and areeffective in damp and wet weather, whereas CS pow-der will dissipate.

- WP grenades have a great psychological effectagainst enemy troops and can be used for the samepurpose as CS grenades. The use of CS and WP at thesame time will more than double their effectiveness.

•Thoroughly train and test your indigenous troopsin grenade-throwing, particularly WP. Not all of themwill be adept at baseball-style throwing.

•Violet and red are the smoke colors most visiblefrom the air; however, in dense jungle or wet weather,use WP to signal aircraft.

•Notify aircraft before signalling with WP; gunshipsor fighter-bombers may mistake it for a marking rock-et indicating an enemy position, and attack you.

•Camouflage smoke, CS and WP grenades, usingblack or OD spray paint.

•Smoke grenades should be carried in or on the packand not on the LCE. You don’t fight with smokegrenades, and if you need one, 99 times out of 100 youwill have time to get it from your pack.

•Each team should carry one thermite grenade fordestruction of either friendly or enemy equipment.

46 Special Warfare

cycle the TEMIG to make sure it is “off” and not silent-ly transmitting.

•Don’t try to weatherproof your hand mike with aplastic wrapper; water condenses on the inside any-way, the wrapper rustles loudly, and at night, it shineslike a signal light when viewed through NVGs.

•Always carry a spare hand mike in a waterproofbag.

•Don’t carry your spare hand mike where it mightget crushed when you drop your ruck.

•Clean all contacts daily with the eraser end of apencil.

•Waterproof your communications-electronics oper-ating instructions, or CEOI, and authentication tablesby laminating them with acetate or putting them in aplastic zip-lock bag.

•Constantly check your CEOI to ensure yourauthentication tables are folded open to the pageshowing the most current set. This will prevent dan-gerous delays when your AC-130 requests authentica-tion, especially at night.

•Carry a single strand of claymore firing wire orWD-l cut to your operating frequency for use as a field-expedient antenna. Secure one end (stripped of insula-tion) to the radio with an antenna base, then string the wire straight up to a branch (omni-directional), orlay it on the ground in the direction of the receivingstation (uni-directional).

•Minimize radio traffic.•Do not send “same” or “no change” when reporting

team location. Always send your coordinates.•Repeat grid coordinates sent to you to ensure accu-

rate copy.•The operational base must avoid making unneces-

sary, unscheduled radio checks just because theyhaven’t heard from a team for a while. Be patient.

•Whisper into the hand mike while in the field.Exhale first, then speak, or your transmission willsound like a tire leaking air. To mask your voice, cupyour hand over the hand-mike mouthpiece and yourmouth.

•Always remain calm and professional, no matterwhat happens. Screaming or speaking in emotional,angry or desperate tones will cause the operationalbase to doubt your judgment and the accuracy of what-ever you’re saying.

•Do not carry rubber baseball-style CS grenades;they were designed for riot control on city streets andare inadequate in the jungle.

Commo tips•Commo is everyone’s responsibility, not just the

commo sergeant’s.•Always inventory and inspect your radios, kit bags,

secures and sensors before and after all missions.•Place a plastic cover over your PRC-77/KY-51 and

wrap them in an additional waterproof bag.•Pre-set frequencies on the PRC-77 so that a quick

turn of the dials will put you on the desired frequency.This is especially helpful at night when you want toavoid a light.

•Carefully inspect your X-mode cable for bent pinsand dirt in the female connectors.

•Take along secure hand-held radios with earphonesand whisper mikes for internal in-position teamcommo during ambush and prisoner-of-war snatchmissions.

•Perform pre-mission radio checks:- with your radio and secure packed in your ruck

exactly the way you will carry them in the field;- after your crypto has been loaded;- with and without the secure hooked up;- with your operational base, helicopters, fire sup-

port, the hatchet team, other teams operating adjacentto your area of operations, and your internal radios;

- bending the X-mode cable while receiving/transmit-ting to check for excessive static and/or loss of commo.

•Before a mission, always place fresh batteries intoyour commo gear and sensors, especially the BA-1372memory battery for the KY-57.

•Always carry spare PRC-77 and KY-57 batteries,but do not remove the spares from their plastic wrap-ping prior to use or they may lose power.

•Carry the lithium BA-5598 batteries for the PRC-77; this cuts weight, and since the spare is in the bat-tery cover, it speeds emergency replacement.

•Ensure the PRC-77 battery cover vent is opera-tional, because of the gases produced by the lithiumbatteries.

•Ensure the cover vent is on the same side as thebattery connector.

•After you put the battery in your TEMIG beacon,

Winter 1990 47

The calendar-year 1989 E-7 selection rate for soldiers in CMF 18 was oneof the highest in the Army, with an overall selection rate of 44.4 percent,compared to the Army average of 15.6 percent. From a field of 478 eligibleNCOs, 212 were promoted. The following figures show how other ArmyCMFs fared:

CMF 11 – 11.7 percent CMF 12 – 16.7 percentCMF 13 – 8.3 percent CMF 19 – 10.7 percentCMF 31 – 7.4 percent CMF 91 – 12.3 percent

The average time in service for SF soldiers promoted in the primary zonewas 10.5 years, while the average time from the secondary zone was 7.7years. The Army average time in service for the primary zone was 12.7years, and from the secondary zone, 9.5 years. Average ages for CMF 18soldiers were 29.9 years for the primary and 28.2 years for the secondaryzone, in comparison to the Army average of 32.9 and 30.0 years for thosesame zones. The average CMF 18 primary-zone time in grade, 4.6 years,was better than the Army average of 5.4 years, but the secondary-zoneaverage time in grade, 2.7 years, was the same as the Army average. Thefollowing matrix shows the breakdown within the CMF by MOS:

Primary Secondary TotalsMOS nr zn nr sel % nr zn nr sel % cons sel %18B 45 40 88.9 96 33 34.4 141 73 51.818C 26 23 88.5 75 9 12.0 101 32 31.718D 11 10 90.9 68 61 89.7 79 71 89.918E 32 20 62.5 116 8 6.9 148 28 18.918F 3 2 66.7 6 6 100.0 9 8 88.9Total 117 95 81.2 361 117 32.4 478 212 44.4

Questions related to professional development or assignment of SF sol-diers in grades through master sergeant (sergeant majors have their ownbranch) should be directed to either Capt. Jeffery Waddell or MSgt. Thom-as Rupert at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate at PERS-COM. Phone AV 221-8340/5497, commercial (202) 325-8340/5497, or write:Commander; USTAPC; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alex-andria, VA 22331-0452.

The command sergeants major/sergeants major branch at PERSCOM hasinstalled a new after-hours answering service. Senior enlisted soldiersmay call the service to ask questions, voice their assignment preferencesand pass along important information. The answering service will be acti-vated between 5 p.m. and 6 a.m. (eastern time) daily. Questions will beanswered either by phone or in writing within three working days, accord-ing to PERSCOM. To use the service, call AV 221-7686, commercial (703)325-7686.

1989 E-7 selection rate44.4 percent for CMF 18

Contact enlisted branch forinformation

Sergeant-major branch hasafter-hours number

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Enlisted Career Notes

48 Special Warfare

The newly released list for the Special Forces Advanced NCO Course con-tains the names of 194 SF NCOs. This number represents an overall selection rate of 44.8 percent, versus the average rate for combat arms of34.5 percent. Those NCOs selected will be integrated into the currentCMF 18 list and scheduled to attend class. ANCOC scheduling is nowautomated, and soldiers will attend the course according to primary mili-tary occupational specialty and date of rank. The Army’s goal is to have asoldier attend CMF 18 ANCOC within two years of his promotion tosergeant first class. PERSCOM will no longer delete a soldier fromANCOC without written notification from his unit. Tentative dates forupcoming SF ANCOC classes are:

Class no. Start date End date

3-90 Sept. 4, 1990 Nov. 29, 19901-91 Jan. 7, 1991 April 4, 19912-91 May 6, 1991 July 28, 19913-91 Sept. 8, 1991 Dec. 7, 1991

Beginning Oct. 1, the Basic NCO Course will be required for promotion tosergeant first class. according to the Army Personnel Command. Soldiersare nominated to attend BNCOC by PERSCOM. Unit commanders mustconfirm the nomination and ensure that soldiers meet the eligibilityrequirements in Chapter 5, AR 351-1, Individual Military Education andTraining. Commanders must also ensure that soldiers attend BNCOC asscheduled — only under extreme circumstances should soldiers bedeferred from the training, and if a soldier is unable to attend, his statusmust be reported through the chain of command to PERSCOM. Comman-ders also have the option to substitute other qualified soldiers. Sergeantsfirst class who have not attended BNCOC and who have a date of rank ofJuly 31, 1988 or earlier should receive priority for BNCOC training.

Soldiers who apply for Special Forces training through the Bonus Exten-sion and Retraining Program, BEAR, no longer need to submit an exten-sive packet. Under the BEAR program, the Army awards a bonus to sol-diers who reclassify from an over-strength MOS to a shortage MOS. SFapplicants through BEAR will now complete Special Forces Assessmentand Selection before initiating their BEAR packets. After SFAS, a soldierinterested in the BEAR program should provide his re-enlistment NCO acopy of his SFAS certificate of completion. The re-enlistment NCO will for-ward the certificate and BEAR packet to PERSCOM for processing. AtPERSCOM, the Retention Management Branch, along with the SpecialForces Branch, will process the application, and the soldier will bescheduled for the Special Forces Qualification Course.

PERSCOM releases selection list for SF ANCOC

BNCOC to become requirement for SFC

Army streamlines BEARpacket for SF applicants

Winter 1990 49

• Functional Area 39 officers are required to have either their foreign-language proficiency or a qualifying score (85 or better) on the DefenseLanguage Aptitude Battery posted on their Officer Record Briefs. FA 39officers who have not yet taken the DLAB should take steps to test assoon as possible. Those who have taken the test and failed to qualifymay retest after waiting six months from the date of the original test.Language qualification is important, and officers should be sure thattheir ORBs correctly reflect their language proficiency — officers whofail to take the DLAB or to attain a qualifying score will lose their FA39 designation.

• FA 39 officers who anticipate going to a fully-funded graduate degreeprogram must ensure that their records at PERSCOM contain both acomplete college transcript and a current score on the Graduate RecordExamination.

• The current time line for the FA 39 graduate program calls for classesto begin at Fort Bragg in September. There will be 30 student positionsin the 12-month program. FA 39 officers interested in attending shouldcontact their branch assignment officer now, before submitting an appl-ication, to determine whether they are competitive for selection. Forfurther information, contact Maj. Georgia Bemis, SWCS Special Opera-tions Proponency Office, at AV 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

An Army selection board will meet at PERSCOM from Aug. 21 to Oct. 5,1990 to consider captains for promotion to major. Zones of considerationwill consist of eligible captains with the following active-duty dates ofrank: above the zone – June 1, 1984 and earlier; promotion zone – June 2,1984 to April 1, 1985; below the zone – April 2, 1985 to March 1, 1986. Noarrival date for OERs to go before the board has been published; however,OERs normally should arrive at PERSCOM, error-free, approximately 60days before the board convenes. The board will accept written communica-tion from all eligible officers as long as it deals with the consideration oftheir records. The board will not accept communications from other par-ties on behalf of eligible officers or communications from officers underconsideration or other parties which contain criticism or reflect upon thecharacter, conduct or motives of any person. Communication should beaddressed to President, Major, Army Promotion Selection Board; Attn:TAPC-MSB; 200 Stovall St.; Alexandria, VA 22332-0441. Correspondenceshould arrive not later than the convening date of the board in order to beconsidered. Eligible officers should review their official military personnelfiles and officer record briefs before the convening date of the board. TheSF Branch recently mailed copies of their most-current ORB and a copy oftheir OMPF microfiche to all eligible SF officers. Officers who have notreceived a copy should contact the branch. Promotion results from theboard are scheduled to be released in late January 1991.

FA 39 officers should checklanguage proficiency

Major selection boardto convene in August

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Officer Career Notes

50 Special Warfare

The SF Branch is looking for Spanish-speaking volunteers for reassign-ment to Panama. Currently the tour for captains assigned to the 3rd Bn.,7th SF Group is one year, unaccompanied. This means that the branchrequires 25 captains each year who have a minimum language rating of1/1 in Spanish. SF captains with 36 months on-station who are interestedin attending the Defense Language Institute for Spanish should contactthe branch.Besides the Panama assignments, there are four exchange positions forcaptains in Latin America which require language-qualified officers, nor-mally rated at 2/2. All positions are one year, unaccompanied.• Exchange officer with Colombia’s Lancero (Ranger) School — Must be

airborne and Ranger-qualified and willing to attend the Lancero course.The officer serves as an instructor at the school. Position is available inMarch 1991, but the officer must begin school in January 1991. Lan-guage training is available.

• Exchange officer at the Argentine Mountain School — Course requiresa Spanish speaker, preferably with mountaineering experience. Courseis one-year-long and will make the officer an expert climber and skier.Course begins January 1991.

• Adviser to a Colombian special-operations unit in Bogota — Officermust be a senior captain. Position is available in June 1991.

• Guest instructor at the Jungle Operations School in Manaus, Brazil —This is a new position; it will require an officer who is self-reliant andable to handle an environment which may provide little U.S. Army sup-port. For further information on any of these positions, contact Capt.John Bone at AV 221-3175, commercial (703) 325-3175.

Year-group 81 officers who have not yet completed the nine-week secondphase of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth,Kan., have until the end of FY 90, according to Lt. Col. John E. McNett, CAS3

operations officer. Failure to attend may jeopardize promotion and staff-col-lege selection. Graduation from CAS3 is now a prerequisite for enrollment inthe Command and General Staff Officer nonresident Course. Phase II classesin FY90 are also open to captains in year groups 82 and later who have com-pleted their advanced courses and Phase I of CAS3. For report dates, officersmay refer to the Army Training Requirements and Resources System comput-er network or call the CAS3 operations office at AV 552-2113/2602.

The Special Operations Staff Officer Course is an eight-week course for majorsand senior captains, designed to allow SOF officers to make the transition fromoperators to planners and strategic thinkers. The course is organized into threephases: national strategic policy formulation (foreign policy, national interestsand power, and national strategy); USSOCOM (operational concept, roles, mis-sions, command relationships, SOF of the various services); and doctrine (jointoperations, special-operations procedures, joint-task-force planning, AirLandBattle, low-intensity conflict, SF operations, PSYOP, civil-military operationsand campaign planning). There is also a guest-speaker program, briefings onregional hot spots and an automated planning command-post exercise. Stu-dents attend the course in a TDY-and-return or TDY-en-route status. Thecourse is currently running two classes per year. For more information, contactMaj. Steve Bucci at AV 239-5608, commercial (919) 432-5608.

SF Branch looking forSpanish-speaking captains

YG 81 officers should finishCAS3 Phase II this year

SOSOC trains officers to be strategic thinkers

Winter 1990 51

Army reactivates 3rd SFGroup at Fort Bragg

The Army has reactivated the 3rd Special Forces Group at FortBragg, more than 20 years after itsdeactivation.

The 3rd Group was reactivated inceremonies at the John F. KennedyMemorial Plaza June 29, becomingthe fifth active-duty Special Forcesgroup. Maj. Gen. James A. Guest,commander of the 1st Special Opera-tions Command, uncased the unit’scolors with the assistance of the newgroup commander, Col. PeterStankovich, and command sergeantmajor, CSM Billie Phipps.

In a separate ceremony that sameday at Fort Bragg’s Pike Field, the3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, whichhad remained at Fort Bragg whenthe 5th Group moved to Fort Camp-bell, Ky., was redesignated the 1stBn., 3rd SF Group. The battalionretained its commander, Lt. Col.Frank J. Toney. The 3/5th colors were taken to Fort Campbell for aceremony July 2 in which a new3/5th was activated under the com-mand of Lt. Col. Michael D. Shaw.

The 3rd Group, based at FortBragg, now consists of a headquar-ters and one battalion, but a secondbattalion is scheduled for activationin 1991, and a third in 1992. Thegroup will number approximately1,400 soldiers when fully manned,according to Maj. Craig Barta, publicaffairs officer for 1st SOCOM.

Originally activated at Fort Braggin 1963, the 3rd Group was deacti-vated in December 1969. The new3rd Group beret flash retains thegold, red, black and white quarters ofthe old flash, officials said, but itsborder is solid black rather thanmulticolored as the old flash was.

SOF units name soldiers,NCOs of the year

Special-operations units at FortBragg have announced their selec-tions for the 1990 Soldier and NCOof the Year.

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command has chosen SSgt.David L. Wein as the NCO of theYear and Spec. Luciano Gonzalez asthe Soldier of the Year. Wein is anintelligence sergeant assigned toCo. A, 2nd Bn., 7th SF Group. Gon-zalez is a PSYOP specialistassigned to Detachment A, 1st Bn.,4th PSYOP Group.

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School has selected SSgt.Donny H. Boles as its NCO of theYear and Spec. James C. Brock asits Soldier of the Year. Both soldiersare assigned to the 1st Special War-fare Training Group. Boles, 25, isan instructor in the medical detach-ment of Co. D, 1st Bn. Brock, 29, is

an assistant instructor for PSYOPcourses taught by Co. A, 3rd Bn.

SWCS seeks new SF enlistment option

The SWCS is seeking approval toimplement a new Special Forcesenlistment option which will help toprovide long-term sustainment forSF personnel strength.

The Special Forces EnlistmentOption, also known as “3 + 3,” wouldidentify and tag Army recruits forfuture service in SF. Applicantswould agree to serve six or moreyears active duty and two years inthe individual ready reserve. Theywould serve approximately threeyears in an initial-training militaryoccupational specialty before beingeligible to begin the SF selection andtraining process.

The Army would guarantee 3+3enlistees initial training in one ofnine selected MOSs, basic airbornetraining and a slot in SF Assess-ment and Selection, according toSgt. Maj. Robert Gron, SF enlistedmanager in the SWCS SpecialOperations Proponency Office. Sol-diers would attend the SF Qualifi-cation Course if selected afterSFAS. Upon completion of theSFQC, they would reclassify into aSpecial Forces MOS, be assigned toan SF unit and spend the remain-der of their enlistment in SF.

Soldiers enlisted under the planwould also be paid an enlistmentbonus upon completion of advancedindividual training for their initial-training MOS. The amount of thebonus has not yet been determined,Gron said.

Current plans call for the pro-gram to use initial training MOSsof 11B (infantry), 11C (mortarman),12B (combat engineer), 19D

New 3rd SF Group beret flash

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Update

52 Special Warfare

(armored scout), 31C, G, or V (com-munications), or 91 A or B (medic),Gron said.

Enlistees would have to be high-school graduates or equivalent, U.S. citizens, have no physical pro-files or partial profiles, volunteerfor airborne, SFAS and SFQC train-ing, and meet any prerequisites fortheir initial-training MOS.

After enlistment, they wouldhave to complete basic andadvanced training in their initial-training MOS, serve three years inthat MOS and complete airborneschool before being eligible for theSFAS and SFQC. Before SFAS andSFQC, they would have to pass amedical exam, be able to obtain aninterim secret clearance, and swim50 meters in fatigues and boots.They would also have to score aminimum of 206 overall (with aminimum of 60 points in eachevent) on the Army PT test, gradedby the standards for the 17-25 agegroup, regardless of their age.

Units must now requesttraining products

SOF units which expect toreceive new soldier training prod-ucts should remember that theymust now request them.

Since Jan. 1, 1990, the ArmyPublications Distribution Center inBaltimore, Md., no longer automat-ically sends STPs to units. Instead,the unit must identify its require-ments for STPs on DA Form 12-99-R (used for ordering publications)and send the information to thePublications Distribution Center.Instructions for completing theform are contained in DA Pamphlet25-33.

New STPs for SF communica-tions, engineer and weapons NCOsare scheduled to be fielded in Octo-ber 1990. STPs include soldier’smanuals, trainer’s guides and jobbooks and are used in training sol-diers and in preparing them fortheir skill-qualification tests.

For information on SF SQTs orSTPs, contact the SWCS Direc-torate of Training and Doctrine,

SF Development Branch, AV 239-5000/8286.

New SOF training facilitynamed for Col. Rowe

A $6.2-million special-operationstraining complex near Fort Bragghas been dedicated to the memoryof a Special Forces officer killed inthe Philippines last year.

The James N. “Nick” Rowe Spe-cial Operations Training Facility,dedicated Feb. 8, is located at Camp Mackall, 35 miles southwestof Fort Bragg. The new complexconsists of 42 buildings, including a

dining facility, billets, classrooms, amedical clinic, and administrativeand storage facilities, according toCatherine Cook, chief of the SpecialWarfare Center and School’s Engi-neer Branch. The new buildingswill replace metal and tar-paper-covered buildings which had beenused for several years.

Rowe was killed in an ambushApril 21, 1989 in Manila, where hewas assigned as the ground forcesdirector for the Joint U.S. MilitaryAdvisory Group. Communist rebelslater claimed responsibility for hisassassination.

The new training complex, pro-viding more than 92,000 squarefeet of space, will be used by sol-

diers in the Special Forces Assess-ment and Selection Program, theSF Qualification Course, and someportions of the Survival, Evasion,Resistance and Escape training,which Rowe helped to establish.

Captured as an SF adviser inVietnam in 1963, Rowe later orga-nized the SERE training at FortBragg based on his experiencesduring more than five years of cap-tivity in South Vietnam. He servedas commander of the SWCS’s 1stSpecial Warfare Training Battalionprior to his assignment to thePhilippines.

At the dedication ceremony,Rowe’s widow, Susan, assisted Lt.Gen. Gary E. Luck, commander ofthe Army Special Operations Com-mand, and Brig. Gen. David J.Baratto, commander of the SWCS,in unveiling an eight-ton blood-granite rock containing a bronzeplaque with a relief bust of Roweand a memorial inscription.

Delta seeking recruitsThe 1st Special Forces Opera-

tional Detachment-Delta is current-ly recruiting worldwide for soldiersto plan and conduct a broad rangeof special operations.

Delta is the U.S. Army’s special-operations unit organized for theconduct of missions requiring arapid response with surgical appli-cation of a wide variety of uniqueskills and the flexibility to maintainthe lowest possible profile of U.S.involvement. Because of this,Delta’s soldiers are carefully select-ed and specially trained.

Delta affords officers and NCOsunique opportunities for profession-al development. Both undergo thesame assessment, selection andtraining and, after training, areassigned to operational positionswithin the unit. Training and experi-ence gained while in Delta are muchin demand, and soldiers will enjoyexpanded assignment opportunities.

Delta conducts worldwide recruit-ing twice a year prior to its fall andspring assessment-and-selectioncourses. Recruiting for the fall

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Winter 1990 53

course is currently scheduled at thefollowing installations: Okinawa(July 16-20), Fort Campbell (July16-27), and Fort Bragg (throughoutJuly and August).

General prerequisites are:• Volunteer• Active-duty Army• Male• U.S. citizen• Pass a HALO/SCUBA physical

and eye examination• No limiting physical profile• Airborne-qualified or volunteer

for airborne training• Pass a background security

investigation and have at least asecret clearance

• Minimum age of 22• No history of recurring disci-

plinary action• Pass the five-event physical-fit-

ness qualification test (invertedcrawl; run, dodge and jump; push-up; sit-up; and two-mile run) and100-meter swim, all while wearingfatigues and boots.

NCO prerequisites are:• Rank of sergeant (E-5) thru

sergeant first class (E-7)• Four years’ minimum time in

service• Passing SQT score in primary

MOS (MOS immaterial)• Minimum GT score of 110• Two years’ active service

remaining upon selection.Officer prerequisites are:• Captain or major (branch

immaterial)• Advanced-course graduate• College graduate (BA or BS)• Minimum of 12 months’ suc-

cessful command (company, battery,troop, Special Forces A-detachment,or aviation platoon).

For information on recruiting vis-its, the unit, prerequisites and train-ing, call Delta recruiters at AV 236-0689/0649 or call collect on the com-mercial line, (919) 396-0689/0649.

Delta is also interested in the fol-lowing MOSs in a support role:18D, 18E, 25Z3/4, 43E3, 55R3,63B3, 71L3/4 and 76Y3/4. For infor-mation on support prerequisitesand assignment opportunities, call

Delta’s support recruiter, MSgt.Fred Johnson, at AV 236-0960 orcall collect on the commercial line,(919) 396-0960.

New field sterilizer beingdeveloped for SF use

The Special Warfare Center hasperformed a design and conceptevaluation and requested an imme-diate purchase of a sterilizer for useby Special Forces medics.

SF units will use the new steriliz-er on surgical packs and instru-ments in the field. The new steriliz-er will be a replacement for older

models which have been deletedfrom the supply system. The equip-ment currently being used for ster-ilization is actually a steam pres-sure cooker, which is too heavy andbulky for use by Special Forcesunits, according to James Fether-son, equipment specialist in theSpecial Warfare Center andSchool’s Directorate of CombatDevelopments.

The prototype sterilizer wasdeveloped by the U.S. Army MedicalBioengineering Research and Devel-opment Laboratory, Fetherson said.It is cylindrical, 10 inches wide and14 inches long. Constructed of analuminum alloy, it weighs only 11pounds when empty. Its sterilizing

chamber is 10 inches long by 7 1/2inches wide, and it can sterilizeinstruments in 30 minutes.

With the current steam pressurecooker, instruments and surgicalpacks may get wet from condensa-tion, and this could lead to bacterialcontamination of the packs, Fether-son said. The new sterilizer works bydry heat: its sterilizing chamber issurrounded by a water jacket whichin use is filled with boiling water.The water can be heated using eitherthe internal 110-volt electric heateror a variety of external heat sources,including gas and wood.

The sterilizer is now operationaland scheduled for fielding in 1991.For further information, contactJames Fetherson at AV 239-1816.

Approval pending for CivilAffairs MOS

The Army Personnel IntegrationCommand is considering a proposalby the Special Warfare Center andSchool to establish a separateenlisted career field for reserve-component Civil Affairs specialists.

A CA-specific MOS would allowthe Army to retain soldiers’ skills inCivil Affairs and not lose the timealready spent training them, ac-cording to MSgt. Calvin Rome ofthe SWCS Special Operations Pro-ponency Office. It would offer sol-diers greater promotion and career-progression opportunities withintheir MOS.

Enlisted soldiers in Civil Affairsunits are currently drawn from 18different MOSs and earn the CivilAffairs special-qualification identi-fier “D” by attending the two-weekCivil Affairs Operations Course.Soldiers frequently return to theiroriginal MOS for career develop-ment, Rome said.

Because of their small number,active-component Civil Affairs sol-diers would not benefit from a sepa-rate MOS and were not included inthe proposal, Rome said.

The SWCS submitted its proposalin February. USAPIC will send theproposal to all affected major com-mands and proponents for comment

Prototype of the new field sterilizerFile photo

54 Special Warfare

before submitting it to the ArmyDeputy Chief of Staff for Personnelfor final approval. The entireapproval process should take 6-9months.

Upon adoption of the proposal,SWCS would develop resident andnon-resident instruction, trainingliterature, basic and advanced NCOcourses and skill-qualification testsfor the new MOS, 38A. The currentmilestone for completing thesetasks is October 1992, contingenton final approval of the CA MOS.

Under the SWCS proposal, reclas-sification would be open to reserve-component soldiers of any MOS whohave an SQI “D.” If granted prior toJan. 1, 1990, the SQI “D” wouldhave to have been awarded onorders by a competent authority,whether the soldier was school-trained or trained through a localtraining and qualification program.After Jan. 1, 1990, the soldier wouldhave to have graduated from theCivil Affairs Operations Course,have served in a CA unit for oneyear, have completed one annualtraining period and have been rec-ommended by a CA commander.

For further information, contactMSgt. Calvin Rome, SWCS Propo-nency Office, at AV 239-6406, com-mercial (919) 4332-6406.

Military Group-El Salvadorcommended for service

The chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff has awarded the Joint Meri-torious Unit Award to personnelassigned to the U.S. Military Group -El Salvador between Oct. 1, 1986and June 2, 1989.

The award, granted Feb. 5, cred-its the milgroup with furtheringnational-security interests and for-eign-policy objectives of the U.S. inLatin America. Specifically, it citesthe organization for serving as thefocal point for economic and human-itarian relief during the earthquakeof 1986, supporting mayoral andlegislative elections, and ensuringthe safety of observers during theSalvadoran presidential electionand inauguration.

The award applies to militarypersonnel who were permanentlyassigned to joint billets, temporaryadditional duty or temporary dutyfor 90 days or more during the cov-ered period.

Construction begins on free-fall simulator

Construction has begun at FortBragg on a $5-million facility to beused for training parachutists inmilitary free fall.

The Military Free Fall SimulatorFacility will contain an enclosed,vertical wind tunnel to simulate the

effects of free fall for students inthe Military Free Fall ParachutistCourse, taught by the Special War-fare Center and School. Suspendedin a column of moving air, studentswill be able to learn and practicebody-stabilization maneuvers inrelative safety.

The wind tunnel’s fan will gener-ate winds up to 132 miles per hourwithin the training chamber, whichwill be approximately 18 feet highand 14 feet in diameter. The mov-ing air will be strong enough tosupport two jumpers wearing fullparachute equipment and 50-poundrucksacks, according to 1st Sgt.Johnny King of Co. B, 2nd Battal-ion, 1st Special Warfare Training

Group, which conducts military freefall training.

The construction project alsoincludes a 32-student classroom, anoperator control room, communica-tions and equipment rooms and aparking area, according to Cather-ine Cook, chief of the EngineerBranch at the SWCS. The facilitywill contain more than 11,000square feet.

Students in the Military Free FallCourse currently train in the verti-cal wind tunnel at Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio. Besides allowing theSWCS to consolidate all its military-free-fall training at Fort Bragg, thenew wind tunnel will be larger, pro-vide greater wind speeds and have alower noise level than the one atWright-Patterson, Cook said.

Work began on the free-fall simu-lator April 30; current estimatescall for completion in late 1991. Thenew facility will be located on Gru-ber Road, near the current SWCSmotor pool.

Since July 1988, the SWCS hasbeen the U.S. Special OperationsCommand proponent for military-free-fall-training, responsible eitherto conduct training or approvetraining techniques for all USSO-COM units.

TDY students must bringcopies of records

Students who attend SWCScourses in a temporary-duty-and-return status must now bring a ver-ified copy of their DA Form 2A and2-1 when they report for training.

Upon completion of training, sol-diers will have the appropriateMOS, SQI or additional skill identi-fier posted to their records. Stu-dents who report for training in apermanent-change-of-station orTDY-en-route status will continueto bring their records as they havein the past. For further informa-tion, contact Sgt. Maj. Robert Gron,Special Operations ProponencyOffice, at AV 239-9002/2415.

Artist’s sketch of the Free Fall Simulator

Winter 1990 55

Inside Spetsnaz - Soviet SpecialOperations: A Critical Analysis.Edited by Maj. William H. BurgessIII. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,1989. ISBN 0-89141-339-1. 312pages. $24.95.

At the beginning of the 1980s, adefector from the Soviet Army, writ-ing under the pseudonym of ViktorSuvorov, both alarmed and thrilledWestern audiences with tales of der-ring-do by a heretofore unknowngroup of super-soldiers — the spet-snaz.

But Suvorov’s accounts of thespetsnaz were not much more thanwar stories gleaned from conversa-tions overheard at numerous “O-club” bars. Unfortunately, much ofwhat Suvorov said was accepted atface value. Hence, a distorted viewof the true nature of the Soviet spe-cial-ops threat has taken hold in theWest.

Fortunately, Inside Spetsnaz -Soviet Special Operations: A Criti-cal Analysis, is now available. Thisis a very important book, and as thetitle suggests, analyzes criticallySoviet special operations. Compiled,partially written, and edited byWilliam Burgess, a U.S. Army major and Special Forces officerassigned to the John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and School,the book contains a series of essayson Soviet special ops from the Span-ish Civil War through Afghanistan.

The book makes three points thatset it apart from the majority ofspetsnaz books. First, it avoids thehype and hero worship often associ-ated with books on elite forces. Forinstance, a chapter by Jim Short onspetsnaz “Organization, Capabili-ties, and Countermeasures” wasbased on an interview with the com-

mandant of the Ryzan Higher Air-borne Forces Command School, Lt.Gen. A. E. Slyusar, and as a resultprovides reasoned insight into selec-tion and training of Soviet airborneand special-ops officers. Further-more, Kristen Amundsen’s chapter,“Spetsnaz and Soviet Far NorthStrategy,” gives the reader a well-researched, carefully analyzed pic-ture of Soviet special operations inScandinavia. In particular, Amund-sen provides a convincing explana-

tion of the motives for Soviet spet-snaz excursions into Sweden andNorway.

Second, Burgess, in his chapter,“Spetsnaz and the Deep Operation,”provides the best definition in West-ern literature of spetsnaz. Spet-sial’noe naznachenie (special pur-pose/appointment) is impreciselyemployed by the Soviets. On the onehand, Soviets use it to refer to elite,highly trained commandos, and onthe other hand, use it in reference

to the more prosaic air-assaulttroops. Burgess argues convincinglythat in order to understand what ismeant by spetsnaz, one must leavebehind Western conceptions of spe-cial-operations forces. Instead, onemust look at the spetsnaz in thecontext of the deep battle. The Sovi-et Army is doctrinally committed tofighting in depth, with certain unitsassigned targets well behind the en-emy’s forward edge of the battlearea. Hence, those units assignedspecial targets in the enemy rearare “special purpose,” or spets-ial’noe naznachenie — spetsnaz forshort. Yet, Burgess notes, whileunits may be special in the sensethat they have a special mission and are special-operations capable,they are not necessarily dedicatedspecial forces — spetsnaz.

In spite of this blur over what con-stitutes a spetsnaz unit, Burgessdoes note that usually the personnelassigned to these spetsnaz units arecarefully chosen and trained. Butthis is not always the case. For in-stance, some of the spetsnaz brig-ades assigned to fronts are made uplargely of two-year conscripts. Whilethey may be good soldiers, two yearsof training is hardly enough time toturn a conscript into a seasoned,well-trained, special-ops soldier.

The third major contribution ofthis book is that the authors showthat Soviet spetsnaz operations areneither new nor ignored in the openSoviet press. Owen Lock’s chapteron spetsnaz operations in the Span-ish Civil War is a good example. TheSoviet “pulp” press, such as Molo-daia Gvardiia and Voenizdat, hasturned out cheap, large-run “warmemoirs” for decades. Yet Westernanalysts have generally ignoredthese personal accounts in favor of

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Book Reviews

56 Special Warfare

works by more prominent figures inprestigious presses such as Nauka.Lock simply collected a number ofthese “pulp” memoirs and used themto piece together an excellent pictureof Soviet spetsnaz activities duringthe Civil War.

James Gebhardt’s very fine studyon Soviet naval spetsnaz operationsin the Arctic during the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation is another exam-ple of this approach. Moreover, Geb-hardt’s study strongly suggests,without saying so explicitly, that it ispossible to forecast probable Sovietintentions for naval spetsnaz deploy-ment in the far north in the event ofwar, based on their past employmentduring the Second World War.

Inside Spetsnaz is a “must read”for those within the special-ops com-munity. But it should also be readby all those who take an interest inSoviet military developments andcapabilities.

Paul H. VivianIntelligence analyst4th PSYOP GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

The Training of Officers: FromMilitary Professionalism toIrrelevance. By Martin Van Crev-eld. New York: The Free Press,1990. ISBN 0-02-933152-8. 134pages. $19.95.

Martin Van Creveld has producedan important work in The Trainingof Officers, if not for the accuracy ofhis analysis, then for the questionsit raises and the issues with whichit deals. In a very short book, hegives an overview of the history ofofficer training at the critical senior-staff level and attempts to analyzethe problems with the Americansystem as it exists today. These areambitious and important goals.Unfortunately, Van Creveld obvious-ly has an agenda that he wishes topursue from the outset, and onegets the distinct impression that hisanalysis was far from unbiased.

Van Creveld has organized thebook well and simply. He begins

with a short introduction that setsthe stage and establishes the frame-work for analysis. It is here that oneperceives a definite bias toward theIsraeli system over the U.S. methodof officer development. Next, VanCreveld does the historical traceand goes into comparisons of theGerman, French, British, Russian/Soviet and U.S. systems. His fourthchapter is titled “Problems,” and init, he delves a bit more deeply intosystemic deficiencies that wereidentified earlier. Finally, in his lasttwo chapters, he passes judgmentand offers recommendations.

Van Creveld’s style is above-aver-age in readability, and he managesto avoid being overly academic. Thisis laudable, since most scholars whofancy themselves military expertsare not prone to easy decoding byreaders. Van Creveld is straightfor-ward and clear, and he manages tobe insightful without wordiness.This book is clearly not light read-ing, but the style allows one todigest it without resort to extraordi-nary effort.

Van Creveld’s scholarship is alsoquite good. It took a healthyresearch effort to summarize thehistories of multiple nations’ efforts

at training their officers. The mainproblem with his scholarship is theobvious preconceived notions that,in the opinion of this reviewer, leadto faulty conclusions. This in turngives the book its weak areas.

Van Creveld traces the history ofofficer training back to the Spartansand Alexander the Great. This maybe interesting, but the relevance istangential at best. He intimatesthat since Alexander needed little orno formal military training, why doour officers need any? This portionof the book could have easily beenleft out.

The author castigates the U.S.system on two fronts. On one hand,we do not select officers as the Is-raelis do: That is, making all spendseveral years as enlisted men, andgiving no value to nor having anyprerequisite for formal education.But on the other hand, he wants afar more intellectually rigorous sys-tem of staff-officer education, suchas the Prussians used. The questionis, how do you develop officers capa-ble of a two-year staff college thatrequires entrance exams, has realgrades and is accredited to provideMAs and PhDs (his recommenda-tions), if you have an officer corpsthat is assessed with no formal education?

Van Creveld also concludes thatthe explosion of graduate study insuch fields as security studies,international-relations theory andforeign policy that occurred in theU.S. in the 1950s and 1960s was adirect by-product of an overabun-dance of officers who had nothingbetter to do but get civilian degrees.This is pure nonsense. The percent-age of military officers in programssuch as those noted is small, and inmany cases, nonexistent. He alsodemeans the U.S. officer corps bysaying that, except on rare occa-sions, officers, regardless of theirdegrees, “cannot seriously hope tocross swords with the real expertsin government or at the universi-ties” (p. 77). As one who has encoun-tered such “experts” in both areas, Ican say that such statements are

Winter 1990 57

self-serving and false. “Experts” likeVan Creveld are self-proclaimed andoften know little or nothing beyonda bombastic exterior and a flurry ofrhetoric designed to befuddle thelistener. Not only are many educat-ed officers capable of standing upintellectually to their civilian coun-terparts, but they often surpassthem and play key roles in policyand security matters.

A final point is Van Creveld’s con-tention that since most future con-flicts will be of the low-intensityvariety, our officers can no longerjustify their education. Somehow, heseems to think LIC is a simple envi-ronment. This, too, shows the“depth” of his “expertise.”

The book does offer some goodsuggestions, however. The need foran increase in the quality of the fac-ulty at the Command and GeneralStaff College and War College levelsis quite appropriate. This is not tosay the present faculties are unqual-ified, but to emphasize that an as-signment to one of these schoolsshould be career-enhancing, not adetriment. Van Creveld’s other rec-ommendations, such as entranceexams, two years’ staff college andone national War College (threeyears), all of which should occur ear-lier in careers, are worth consider-ing. Several programs are already ineffect — there is a two-year programat Fort Leavenworth that leads to amaster’s in military science, andthere is a program to accredit allsenior service schools — but VanCreveld seems to have been un-aware of them, and of the fact thatcivilian education is not a factor inpromotion.

Overall, Van Creveld opens upmany interesting subjects. While hebadly misses the mark on some, heis on-target with others. Any officerinterested in the education of ourpeers should at least read this bookas food for thought. It does not holdthe key, but it can start the search.

Maj. Steven BucciUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

The Soldier’s Load and theMobility of a Nation. By S.L.A.Marshall. Reprinted Quantico, Va.:The Marine Corps Association,1980 (Original copyright by theAssociation of the United StatesArmy, 1950). 120 pages. $2.

S.L.A. Marshall was one of thefinest American military historiansof this century. Rather than dealingwith grand battle plans and nation-al strategies, Marshall wrote aboutthings that impact on the life of thecommon soldier and about war asthat soldier sees it. His concern wasnot with the ebb and flow of armiescriss-crossing continents, but ratherwith the trials and tribulations ofthe “dogface” or “grunt” on the line.It is in this vein that The Soldier’sLoad and the Mobility of a Nation iswritten.

This short monograph, as the titleimplies, is divided into two parts. Inthe first, Marshall argues that theAmerican Army tends to send sol-diers into battle overloaded withexcess equipment. This causes themto tire quickly, decreasing theirmobility and thus their effective-ness. Fatigue is exacerbated by thedegenerative physical effects of the

sustained fear one naturally experi-ences in combat. Frightened sol-diers tire quickly, and loads easilycarried in training become unbear-able in combat.

Marshall argues that the fightingsoldier should carry only thoseitems that he will need for personalprotection and to advance againstthe enemy on the first day of thebattle. Items such as entrenchingtools, extra clothing and severaldays’ rations are not of immediateuse to the soldier and so should becarried in the supply trains to bedelivered when needed.

The second section of the bookdeals with logistics from anotherangle. Marshall argues here that fartoo much of the U.S. logistics systemis concerned with providing soldierswith accessories and comforts theydon’t need. He complains that whileall effort in war should be directedtoward putting steel on target, theArmy logistics system staggers “un-der a burden of soft drink machines,mammy singers, and lollypops.”

The consequences of burdeningour supply lines with “mountainousquantities of nonessential materielcan only be and must ever be thatless fire is delivered upon theenemy. A lean and strong-goingrifleman cannot spring fully armedand ready from the brow of an armythat is elsewhere rolling in fat.”Marshall calls for a more mobiledoctrine that not only streamlinesboth combat and combat-service-support units, but also reorients theindividual soldier to put ruggednessand personal strength above person-al comfort.

Marshall’s arguments are cogentand pertinent, clear and concise. Hewas a soldier writing for soldiersabout soldiers. The book is pepperedwith numerous real-life examples,based on personal observations andinterviews, that Marshall uses tosupport his position. One of themost poignant is the number of sol-diers who lost their footing on thebeaches of Normandy and drownedwhen the tide came in because theycould not get back up under the

58 Special Warfare

loads they carried.The Soldier’s Load is just as rele-

vant now as it was the day it waswritten. To be sure, today’s Army isundeniably better in any number ofways than the Army Marshall wroteabout 40 years ago. However, oneonly has to look about the Army to-day at soldiers marching underheavy rucksacks and weighted pis-tol belts to see that few of Marshall’s warnings and recommen-dations have been heeded. It may beas Marshall said that there are “toomany jokers down the line who stillhaven’t gotten the word.”

Lt. Col. Robert H. Van Horn Jr.U.S. Army Element Defense

RepresentativePakistan

Tanks in the Wire: The FirstUse of Enemy Armor in Viet-nam. By David B. Stockwell. Can-ton, Ohio: Daring Books, 1989.ISBN 0-938936-70-0. 204 pages.$17.95.

In the early morning of Feb. 7,1968, North Vietnamese infantrysupported by PT-76 light amphibi-ous tanks assaulted and overran theU.S. Army Special Forces “A” campat Lang Vei on the Laotian border.The battle for Lang Vei was a des-perate, bloody struggle of menagainst steel, and an epic fight forAmerican Special Forces. As such,there has long been a place in Spe-cial Forces history for a book tellingthe full story of Lang Vei.

Unfortunately, Capt. David B.Stockwell’s Tanks in the Wire is notthat book. The book is unclear, poor-ly constructed, incomplete, inaccu-rate and badly researched, with toomany confusions about names,ranks, units, places, events anddates. It offers no insights into thebattle and no lessons for the future.It begins with a mediocre forewordby an Armor officer who was at thesiege of Khe Sanh, instead of one ofthe camp’s survivors or someonewho was in the chain of command atthe time of the battle. The introduc-

tion is by a Maj. James G. Johnson,who has no apparent connection tothe battle, to Special Forces or toany other aspect of the story.

The entire relevant and availablehistorical record is not used. Impor-tant and interesting details are leftout, e.g., that the Montagnards whodrifted into Khe Sanh after the bat-tle were disarmed and then pushedback out of the camp. One has toread very carefully to realize thatthe Marines at Khe Sanh in fact didnot conduct supporting fires for thedefenders during the attack. Everymajor point is repeated two or threetimes throughout the text, leadingone to conclude that there is enoughmaterial in the book to make a fairarticle on the subject. Stockwell doesnot do a proper battle analysis to an-swer the fundamental questions ofwhether the fall of Lang Vei was in-evitable, whether it was a failure ofintelligence or operations (or both),what the fundamental problems ofthe situation were, or what the ulti-mate lessons for Special Forces are.In fact, remarkably few of the book’spages are devoted to the battle itself.

A “where are they now” chapteron personalities is superficial andpoorly put-together, with gaps andloose ends that could have beencured with perseverance and a few

well-placed phone calls and/or an in-quiry to the Armywide locator, theVeterans Administration, or both.For example, the author cites Sp4Franklin H. Dooms as “believed tobe a command sergeant major stillon active duty”: Sgt. Maj. Doomswas serving with the 10th SpecialForces Group at the time the bookwas being written. In a similarlapse, the author says of Lt. Col.Daniel F. Schungel that “[i]t is be-lieved he retired from active duty asa brigadier general.”

The author is reasonably objec-tive, but he places too much empha-sis on the perceptions of too few ob-servers, including people who didnot actually participate in the battle.Although the maps included withthe text are very well done, a greatmany of the book’s photographs areunintelligible. The book also lacksorganizational charts that wouldhave aided understanding of thetext.

Overall, the book is extraordinari-ly poorly edited. The first sentenceof the first page of the first chaptercontains a blatant typographicalerror. There are nearly undecipher-able sentences such as the following:“The women and children, some2,200 civilians who followed theirmen in the tradition of poor field ar-mies, pitched tents, drew water andprepared a midday meal while theLao colonel went inside the SpecialForces camp to confer with CaptainFrank Willoughby, the camp com-mander of the 5th Special ForcesGroup (ABN).”

The book is also loaded with irrel-evant, unattributed and otherwiseeasily disproved hearsay such as:“One unsubstantiated, but intrigu-ing report exists. A 12-man detach-ment was reported to have been sentfrom FOB-3 to Lang Vei consistingof members of a SOG team. Theteam was sent after the Marine re-fusal to reinforce the Lang Vei camp,and the team was ambushed nearKhe Sanh Village. Only three mem-bers of the team survived, and theywere held prisoner in Laos for eightmonths until a heliborne assault on

Winter 1990 59

their POW camp rescued them.”Even the press package that was

provided by the publisher along withthe review copy of the book waspoorly done. The lead sentence of alaudatory article that appeared inthe Fort Knox post newspaper refersto “when North Vietnamese tanksrolled in Lang Vei Feb. 7, 1968, kil-ling several U.S. Marine CorpsGreen Berets (emphasis added).”Another article from the same paperclaims that Stockwell has attendedthe “Special Forces Operationscourse, and the Marine Corps’ Am-phibious Warfare school,” when infact, as the author freely acknowl-edges, he has taken only nonresi-dent correspondence subcourses inthese subjects. Perhaps if the pub-lisher had paid greater attention togetting such details straight, a bet-ter book would have resulted.

Stockwell is commended for mak-ing the effort to capture the historyof the battle at Lang Vei, and byimplication, members of the SpecialForces community are to be castigat-ed for failing to do so. Yet, Stockwellhas failed utterly. This book has nomeasurable utility to special-opera-tions or intelligence soldiers, and isnot worthy of a place in anyone’slibrary. The full history of the battleof Lang Vei remains to be written.

Maj. William H. Burgess IIIUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

The Jesuits: The Society ofJesus and the Betrayal of theRoman Catholic Church. ByMalachi Martin. New York: LyndenPress, 1987. ISBN 0-671-54505-1.525 pages. $19.95.

Malachi Martin, a former Jesuitpriest and controversial chronicler ofpolitical intimacies inside the Vati-can, offers an electrifying and inci-sive account of the Jesuit Order andits alleged fundamental shift awayfrom loyalty to the Pope and towardservice to a “People’s Church” inwhich assuaging worldly needs isparamount.

The author links the modern-dayfollowers of Saint Ignatius Loyolawith liberation theology, which plac-ing them at odds with capitalismamidst Western democratic trap-pings. He characterizes them asactive participants in a worldwideMarxist revolution in the developingworld and details their formationand growth, together with the originof their contemporary stance againstpapal obedience.

The author is especially critical ofthose former Jesuits and one Mary-knoll who are members of the San-dinista government in Nicaragua.The Cardenal brothers, Fernado andErnesto, together with MiguelD’Escoto, are portrayed as those whoespouse a preferential option for thepoor (the bywords of liberation theol-ogy), but who live in comfortablehomes expropriated from the oustedmiddle class in Nicaragua, who shopat specially designed hard currencystores, who dine at luxury restau-rants restricted to party members,who enjoy unlimited supplies of gas-oline and water and who vacation inthe mansions of the Somasa dynasty.

Military thinkers, especially thoseconcerned with revolutionary war-fare in terms of its parameters andthe threat that it poses, will findMartin’s work indispensable and

should peruse and reflect upon itwith great care. The author’s caveatthat “there remains no hard evi-dence that the world is rushing tonuclear incineration” gives credenceto the belief that the Soviets areusing the threat of nuclear war orconventional confrontation as ascreen for their true intention of along-term indirect campaign againstthe United States — which we referto as low-intensity conflict.

Martin places the Jesuits, togeth-er with their influence on other Ro-man Catholic orders, square in themiddle of the fray, to the extent thatthey are aligned with other politicaltheorists who believe that onlythrough Marxist revolutionarystruggle can true progress and jus-tice ensue for the Third World’s“have nots.” Acceptance in whole orin part of this premise exacerbates(if not making totally impossible)the difficulties of those espousingorderly democratic change, in thatChurch officials once identified withthe conservative status quo, espe-cially at the local or parish level,now form an integral part of the rev-olutionary struggle. The scope andintensity of the warfare is at oncebroadened and deepened by a newally, who very well may provide theimpetus for interminable Vietnamsand Nicaraguas.

This provocative tome caused thisreviewer to want to explore in depththe roles and political beliefs of theChristian missionary community inthe Third World. Are we in the de-mocratic West contributing monetar-ily to the very ideology which haspromised to subsume us? Are webeing subjected in the process to aSoviet disinformation campaign inour own country meant to confuse usin terms of the realities of the con-flict? Are returning Christian mis-sionaries unwittingly or wittinglyparticipating in this process? Suchquestions and others equally trou-blesome leap from this text. TheJesuits may prove to be the most elo-quent and well-documented warningconcerning a relatively new Sovietglobal strategy which has success-

60 Special Warfare

fully incorporated Marxist revolu-tionary thought, Third Worldnationalism and disinformation inthe West to the ultimate demise ofour system of government.

Lt. Col. David A. DeckerCounter-Revolutionary Warfare

CommitteeDepartment of Joint and

Combined OperationsUSACGSC

Americans at War: 1975-1986, AnEra of Violent Peace. By DanielP. Bolger. Novato, Calif.: PresidioPress, 1988. ISBN 0-89141-303-0.496 pages. $24.95.

A lot of U.S. critics have made alot of money in the last two decadesproclaiming what is wrong with theU.S. military establishment —everything.

Their writings, asserting that U.S.officers never read anything andthat the U.S. armed services alwaystry to stifle their truths, can befound continuously on the new-books racks of every service libraryin the country. Their plaints that noone listens to their lonely voices canbe heard on nationwide talk shows.

Capt. Daniel P. Bolger’s Ameri-cans at War takes on these criticsand the conventional wisdom todemonstrate what really happenedduring America’s military operationssince the fall of Saigon. Bolger con-cludes that, for the most part, theyhave done quite well. He is thus acourageous man.

Bolger is an active-duty officer aswell as a historian, and he is now onthe history faculty of the U.S. Mili-tary Academy. Bolger has alreadyestablished a solid reputation withhis book on U.S. Army advancedtraining, Dragons at War, 2/34Infantry in the Mojave.

Bolger maintains that of the sevenU.S. military operations since 1975,only two, the aborted Iran hostage-rescue attempt and the Marine mis-sion in Beirut, can be considered fail-ures. As for the other five, the U.S.rescued the Mayaguez and its crew

unhurt, brushed off an admittedlyinept Libyan air challenge (re-member Col. Khadafy’s “line ofdeath”?), rescued more than 600American students from a defendedisland and battered Khadafy’s terror-ists’ schemes, all at reasonable costs.

Of course, none of these operationswere flawless, and Bolger doesn’thesitate to point out our mistakesand to name names. In the Beirutdisaster, for example, he breaks newground by laying most of the blameon the Marine commander for hismisbegotten concept that his troopsshould be used as a “presence,”rather than as a combat-ready force.As to the Iran hostage-rescue mis-sion, Bolger concludes that this maywell have been something simplybeyond the military capacities of thenation, barring an improbable run ofluck. He also wonders if the heli-copter, cranky and vulnerable, hasmuch of a combat future.

But the record is the more impres-sive when we realize that the earlieroperations took place in the depress-ing aftermath of Vietnam. And itmust also be remembered that theseoperations, the successes and thefailures, were planned on shortnotice in a Washington in which anyimportant secret would soon beleaked by someone nursing agrudge, and in a world in which

friendly governments invariablycounselled caution and public opin-ion was usually hostile. In the wakeof the Libyan bombings, prominentmembers of the British LabourParty put out a book entitled MadDogs (not referring to Khadafy andcrew), and an eminent SouthAfrican liberal proclaimed that shehad given up all hope for the U.S.

In no case, even in the failures inIran and Beirut, Bolger says, werethere any significant lapses ofcourage or character, and rarely didU.S. forces display anything lessthan a high level of professionalism.He also points out that, again in con-trast to the conventional wisdom,higher political and militaryauthorities did not micro-manageany of these operations but allowedthe commander on the spot to get onwith the job. Here is an instructivecontrast to Vietnam and perhapssome evidence that we do on occasionlearn from history.

A hoary journalistic maxim statesthat bad news sells, and the publici-ty and sales enjoyed by America’sself-appointed military critics and“experts” hardly undermine thistruth. But if Bolger’s impressivework achieves the wide and influen-tial readership it deserves, it willspeak well for the nation.

Stanley SandlerCommand HistorianUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

Book reviews from readers arewelcome and should address sub-jects of interest to special-opera-tions forces. Reviews should beabout 400-500 words long (approxi-mately two double-spaced typewrit-ten pages). Include your full name,rank, daytime phone number(preferably Autovon) and yourmailing address. Send review to:Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Winter 1990 61

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Special Warfare

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: ATSU–PAOFort Bragg, NC 28307–5000

PIN: 067289–000