Anis H. BajrektarevicModern Diplomacy Advisory Board,ChairmanFormer legal practitioner and the pres-ident of Young Lawyers Association ofBiH Bar (late 1980s). Former MFA offi-cial and career diplomat (early 1990s).Research Fellow at the Institute forModern Political-history analyses, Dr.Bruno Kreisky Foundation as well asthe Legal and Political Advisor for CEEat the Vienna-based Political Academy,Dr. Karl Renner (mid 1990s).Senior Legal Officer and PermanentRepresentative to the UN Office in Vi-enna of the Intergovernmental Organ-

ization ICMPD (1990s). Attached to the IMC University of Austria as aProfessor and Chairman for Intl. Law and Global Political Studies (2000s –10s).For past 15 years, he teaches subjects of Geo-political Affairs, InternationalLaw (including Intl. Relations, Law of IOs and EU Law) and Sustainable De-velopment (Institutions and Instruments of ). Besides, he served as a probono expert numerous academic institutions, think-tanks and intergov-ernmental institutions (such as the UN ECE, OSCE, Council of Europe, Amer-ican Bar, Oxford Academy of Total Intelligence, etc.). Professor is editor ofthe NY-based GHIR (Geopolitics, History and Intl. Relations) journal and ed-itorial board member of numerous similar magazines on three continents.The International Institute IFIMES has recently entrusted him as its Depart-ment Head for Strategic Studies on Asia, and its Permanent Representativeto Austria and Vienna-based IOs. Prof. Bajrektarevic is the author of dozens presentations, publications,speeches, seminars, research colloquiums as well as of numerous publicevents (round tables & study trips, etc.). His writings are frequently pub-lished on all five continents (in over 50 countries and in 20 languages).Author of the book Is There Life After Facebook? - Geopolitics of Energyand other Foreign Policy Essays (Addleton Academic Publishers, New York,2013), and the forthcoming book No Asian Century.He lives in Vienna, Austria.Prof. Anis BajrektarevicProfessor and Chairperson Intl. Law & Global Political StudiesE-mail: anis[at]bajrektarevic.eu

Why is Europe able to manage its decline, while Asia is (still) unable to capitalize (on) its success?

MODERN DIPLOMACY SPECIAL REPORT 05

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

No Asian Century

Lessons of the PastMultilateral ConstellationsConfidence building- an attemptMultivector Foreign PolicyTerritorial disputes unresolvedCold War exiled in AsiaMultilateral Mechanisms

Asia needs ASEAN-ization not Pakistanizationof its continent

ow to draw the line between the recent and stillunsettled EU/EURO crisis and Asia’s successstory? Well, it might be easier than it seems: Nei-ther Europe nor Asia has any alternative. The dif-ference is that Europe well knows there is noalternative – and therefore is multilateral. Asia

thinks it has an alternative – and therefore is strikingly bilateral,while stubbornly residing enveloped in economic egoisms. Nowonder that Europe is/will be able to manage its decline, while Asiais (still) unable to capitalize its successes. Asia clearly does not ac-cept any more the lead of the post-industrial and post-ChristianEurope, but is not ready for the post-West world. Following the famous saying allegedly spelled by Kissinger: “Eu-rope? Give me a name and a phone number!” (when – back in early1970s – urged by President Nixon to inform Europeans on the par-ticular US policy action), the author is trying to examine how closeis Asia to have its own telephone number.

By contrasting and comparing genesis of multilateral security struc-tures in Europe with those currently existing in Asia, and by listingsome of the most pressing security challenges in Asia, this policypaper offers several policy incentives why the largest world’s con-tinent must consider creation of the comprehensive pan-Asian in-stitution. Prevailing security structures in Asia are bilateral andmostly asymmetric while Europe enjoys multilateral, balanced andsymmetric setups (American and African continents too). Authorgoes as far as to claim that irrespective to the impressive economicgrowth, no Asian century will emerge without creation of such aninstitution.

Why is Europe able to manage its decline, while Asia is (still) unable to capitalize (on) its success?

H

SPECIAL REPORTS 04

No Asian Century

Thus, what is the state of art of Asia’s securitystructures? What is the existing capacity of pre-ventive diplomacy and what instruments are atdisposal when it comes to early warning/ pre-vention, fact-finding, exchange mechanisms,reconciliation, capacity and confidence– build-ing measures in the Asian theater?

While all other major theaters do have the pan-continental settings in place already for manydecades, such as the Organization of AmericanStates – OAS (American continent), AfricanUnion – AU (Africa), Council of Europe and Or-ganization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope – OSCE (Europe), the state-of-arts of thelargest world’s continent is rather different.What becomes apparent, nearly at the firstglance, is the absence of any pan-Asian secu-rity/ multilateral structure. Prevailing securitystructures are bilateral and mostly asymmetric.They range from the clearly defined and endur-ing non-aggression security treaties, throughless formal arrangements, up to the Ad hoc co-operation accords on specific issues. The pres-ence of the multilateral regional settings islimited to a very few spots in the largest conti-nent, and even then, they are rarely mandatedwith security issues in their declared scope ofwork.

For over a decade, many of the relevant aca-demic journals are full of articles prophesizingthe 21st as the Asian century. The argument isusually based on the impressive economicgrowth, increased production and trade vol-umes as well as the booming foreign currencyreserves and exports of many populous Asiannations, with nearly 1/3 of total world popula-tion inhabiting just two countries of the largestworld’s continent. However, history serves as apowerful reminder by warning us that econom-ically or/and demographically mighty gravitycenters tend to expand into their peripheries,especially when the periphery is weaker by ei-ther category. It means that any absolute or rel-ative shift in economic and demographicstrength of one subject of international rela-tions will inevitably put additional stress on theexisting power equilibriums and constellationsthat support this balance in the particular the-ater of implicit or explicit structure.

Lessonsof the Past

Another striking feature is that most of the ex-isting bilateral structures have an Asian state onone side, and either peripheral or external pro-tégé country on the other side which makesthem nearly per definition asymmetric. The ex-amples are numerous: the US–Japan, the US–S. Korea, the US–Singapore, Russia–India, Aus-tralia–East Timor, Russia–North Korea, Japan –Malaysia, China–Pakistan, the US–Pakistan,China–Cambodia, the US–Saudi Arabia, Russia–Iran, China–Burma, India–Maldives, Iran–Syria,N. Korea–Pakistan, etc.

Indeed, Asia today resonates a mixed echo ofthe European past. It combines features of thepre-Napoleonic, post-Napoleonic and theLeague-of-Nations Europe. What are the usefullessons from the European past? Well, there area few, for sure. Bismarck accommodated the ex-ponential economic, demographic and militarygrowth as well as the territorial expansion ofPrussia by skillfully architecturing and calibrat-ing the complex networks of bilateral securityarrangements of 19th century Europe. Like Asiatoday, it was not an institutionalized securitystructure of Europe, but a talented leadershipexercising restraint and wisdom in combinationwith the quick assertiveness and fast militaryabsorptions, concluded by the lasting en-durance. However, as soon as the new Kaiser re-moved the Iron Chancellor (Bismarck), theprovincial and backward–minded, insecure andmilitant Prussian establishment contested (bytheir own interpretations of the German’smachtpolitik and weltpolitik policies) Europeand the world in two devastating world wars.That, as well as Hitler’s establishment after-wards, simply did not know what to do with apowerful Germany.

The aspirations and constellations of some ofAsia’s powers today remind us also of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, in which a unified, univer-salistic block of the Holy Roman Empire wascontested by the impatient challengers of thestatus quo. Such serious centripetal and cen-trifugal oscillations of Europe were not withoutgrave deviations: as much as Cardinal Riche-lieu’s and Jacobin’s France successfully emanci-pated itself, the Napoleon III and pre-WWIIFrance encircled, isolated itself, implicitly layingthe foundation for the German attack. Finally, the existing Asian regional settings alsoresemble the picture of the post-NapoleonicEurope: first and foremost, of Europe betweenthe Vienna Congress of 1815 and the revolu-tionary year of 1848. At any rate, let us take aquick look at the most relevant regional set-tings in Asia.

By far, the largest Asian participation is with theAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation – APEC, anorganization engulfing both sides of the PacificRim. Nevertheless, this is a forum for membereconomies not of sovereign nations, a sort of aprep-com or waiting room for the World TradeOrganization – WTO. To use the words of onesenior Singapore diplomat who recently toldme in Geneva the following: “what is your op-tion here? ...to sign the Free Trade Agreement(FTA), side up with the US, login to FaceBook,and keep shopping on the internet happily everafter…” Two other crosscutting settings, the Organiza-tion of Islamic Cooperation – OIC and Non-Aligned Movement – NAM, the first with andthe second without a permanent secretariat,represent the well-established political multi-lateral bodies. However, they are inadequate fo-rums as neither of the two is strictly mandatedwith security issues. Although both trans-con-tinental entities do have large membershipsbeing the 2nd and 3rd largest multilateral sys-tems, right after the UN, neither covers the en-tire Asian political landscape – havingimportant Asian countries outside the systemor opposing it.

Further on, one should mention the KoreanPeninsula Energy Development Organization –KEDO (Nuclear) and the Iran-related Contact(Quartet/P-5+1) Group. In both cases, the issuesdealt with are indeed security related, but theyare more an asymmetric approach to deter andcontain a single country by the larger front ofperipheral states that are opposing a particularsecurity policy, in this case, of North Korea andof Iran. Same was with the short-lived SEATOPact – a defense treaty organization for SEAwhich was essentially dissolved as soon as theimminent threat from communism was sloweddown and successfully contained within theFrench Indochina.

Multilateralconstellations

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If some of the settings are reminiscent of thepre-Napoleonic Europe, the Shanghai Cooper-ation Organization – SCO and CooperationCouncil for the Arab states of the Gulf – GCC re-mind us of the post-Napoleonic Europe and itsAlliance of the Eastern Conservative courts (ofMetternich). Both arrangements were createdon a pretext of a common external ideologicaland geopolitical threat, on a shared status quosecurity consideration. Asymmetric GCC was anexternally induced setting by which an Ameri-can key Middle East ally Saudi Arabia gatheredthe grouping of the Arabian Peninsula monar-chies. It has served a dual purpose; originally,to contain the leftist Nasseristic pan-Arabismwhich was introducing a republican type ofegalitarian government in the Middle Easterntheater. It was also – after the 1979 revolution– an instrument to counter-balance the Iranianinfluence in the Gulf and wider Middle East. Theresponse to the spring 2011-13 turmoil in theMiddle East, including the deployment of theSaudi troops in Bahrain, and including theanalysis of the role of influential Qatar-basedand GCC-backed Al Jazeera TV network is thebest proof of the very nature of the GCC man-date.

The SCO is internally induced and more sym-metric setting. Essentially, it came into exis-tence through a strategic Sino-Russianrapprochement (1) , based, for the first time inmodern history, on parity, to deter external as-pirants (the US, Japan, Korea, India, Turkey andSaudi Arabia) and to keep the resources, terri-tory, present socio-economic cultural and po-litical regime in the Central Asia, Tibet heightsand the Xinjiang Uighur province in line.

The next to consider is the Indian sub-conti-nent’s grouping, the South Asian Associationfor Regional Cooperation – SAARC. This organ-ization has a well-established mandate, wellstaffed and versed Secretariat. However, the Or-ganization is strikingly reminiscent of theLeague of Nations. The League is rememberedas an altruistic setup which repeatedly failed toadequately respond to the security quests of itsmembers as well as to the challenges and pres-sures of parties that were kept out of the sys-tem (e.g. Russia until well into the 1930s andthe US remaining completely outside the sys-tem, and in the case of the SAARC surrounding;China, Saudi Arabia and the US).

Confidence building – an attempt

Finally, there is an ASEAN – a grouping of 10Southeast Asian nations (2) , exercising the bal-anced multi-vector policy, based on the non-in-terference principle, internally and externally.This, Jakarta/Indonesia headquartered (3) or-ganization has a dynamic past and an ambi-tious current charter. It is an internally inducedand relatively symmetric arrangement with thestrongest members placed around its geo-graphic center, like in case of the EU equilib-rium with Germany- France/ Britain- Italy/Poland- Spain geographically balancing eachother. Situated on the geographic axis of thesouthern flank of the Asian landmass, the so-called growth triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia represents the core of the ASEAN notonly in economic and communication termsbut also by its political leverage. The EU-likeASEAN Community Road Map (for 2015) willabsorb most of the Organization’s energy (4) .However, the ASEAN has managed to open itsforums for the 3+3 group/s, and could be seenin the long run as a cumulus setting towardsthe wider pan-Asian forum in future.

The SAARC is practically a hostage of megaconfrontation of its two largest members, bothconfirmed nuclear powers; India and Pakistan.These two challenge each other geopoliticallyand ideologically. Existence of one is a negationof the existence of the other; the religiously de-termined nationhood of Pakistan is a negationof multiethnic India and vice verse. Addition-ally, the SAARC although internally induced isan asymmetric organization. It is not only thesize of India, but also its position: centrality ofthat country makes SAARC practically impossi-ble to operate in any field without the directconsent of India, be it commerce, communica-tion, politics or security.

For a serious advancement of multilateralism,mutual trust, a will to compromise and achievea common denominator through active co-ex-istence is the key. It is hard to build a commoncourse of action around the disproportionatelybig and centrally positioned member whichwould escape the interpretation as contain-ment by the big or assertiveness of its center bythe smaller, peripheral members.

MultivectorForeign Policy

Before closing this brief overview, let us mention two re-cently inaugurated informal forums, both based on the ex-ternal calls for a burden sharing. One, with ajingoistic-coined name by the Wall Street bankers (5) -BRI(I)C/S, so far includes two important Asian economic, de-mographic and political powerhouses (India and China),and one peripheral (Russia). Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran are a few additional Asian coun-tries whose national pride and pragmatic interests are ad-vocating a BRIC membership. The G–20, the other informal forum, is also assembled onthe Ad hoc (pro bono) basis following the need of the G–7to achieve a larger approval and support for its monetary(currency exchange accord) and financial (austerity) actionsintroduced in the aftermath of still unsettled financial crisis.Nevertheless, the BRIC and G-20 have not provided theAsian participating states either with the more leverage inthe Bretton Woods institutions besides a burden sharing, orhave they helped to tackle the indigenous Asian securityproblems. Appealing for the national pride, however, bothinformal gatherings may divert the necessary resources andattention to Asian states from their pressing domestic, pan-continental issues.

Yet, besides the UN system machinery of the Geneva-basedDisarmament committee, the UN Security Council, the Or-ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons –OPCW and International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA (orCTBTO), even the ASEAN Asians (as the most multilateral-ized Asians) have no suitable standing forum to tackle andsolve their security issues. An organization similar to theCouncil of Europe or the OSCE is still far from emerging onAsian soil.

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(1) Analyzing the Sino-Soviet andpost-Soviet-Sino relations temptsme to compare it with the AnticRoman Empire. The monolithic blockhas entered its fragmentation on aseemingly rhetoric, clerical question– who would give the exclusive in-terpretation of the holy text: Romeor Constantinople. Clearly, the one who holds the mo-nopoly on the interpretation has theideological grip, which can easily betranslated into a strategic advan-tage. It was Moscow insisting thatthe Soviet type of communism wasthe only true and authentic commu-nism. A great schism put to an endthe lasting theological but alsogeopolitical conflict in the antiqueRoman theatre. The Sino-Sovietschism culminated with the ideolog-ical and geopolitical emancipationof China, especially after the Nixonrecognition of Beijing China. Besidesthe ideological cleavages, the socio-economic and political model of theRoman Empire was heavily con-tested from the 3rd century onward-sThe Western Roman Empire rigidlypersisted to any structural change,unable to adapt. It eroded and soonthereafter vanished from the politi-cal map. The Eastern Empire successfully re-formed and Byzantium endured as aviable socio-economic and politicalmodel for another 1,000 years. Feel-ing the need for an urgent reshapeof the declining communist system,both leaders Gorbachev and DengXiaoping contemplated reforms.Gorbachev eventually fractured theSoviet Union with glasnost and per-estroika. Deng managed China successfully.Brave, accurate and important argu-mentation comes from diplomatand prolific author Kishore Mah-bubani (The New Asian Hemisphere,2008, page 44-45).

Our history warns. Nevertheless, it also providesa hope: The pre-CSCE (pre-Helsinki) Europe wasindeed a dangerous place to live in. The sharpgeopolitical and ideological default line waspassing through the very heart of Europe, cut-ting it into halves. The southern Europe waspractically sealed off by notorious dictator-ships; in Greece (Colonel Junta), Spain (Franco)and Portugal (Salazar), with Turkey witnessingseveral of its governments toppled by the sec-ular and omnipotent military establishment,with inverted Albania and a (non-Europeminded) non-allied, Tito’s Yugoslavia. Two pow-erful instruments of the US military presence(NATO) and of the Soviets (Warsaw pact) in Eu-rope were keeping huge standing armies, enor-mous stockpiles of conventional as well as theABC weaponry and delivery systems, practicallynext to each other. By far and large, Europeanborders were not mutually recognized. Essen-tially, the west rejected to even recognize manyof the Eastern European, Soviet dominated/in-stalled governments.

Currently in Asia, there is hardly a single statewhich has no territorial dispute within its neigh-borhood. From the Middle East, Caspian andCentral Asia, Indian sub-continent, mainland In-dochina or Archipelago SEA, Tibet, South ChinaSea and the Far East, many countries are suffer-ing numerous green and blue border disputes.The South China Sea solely counts for over adozen territorial disputes – in which mostlyChina presses peripheries to break free fromthe long-lasting encirclement. These moves areoften interpreted by the neighbors as danger-ous assertiveness. On the top of that Sea residesa huge economy and insular territory in a legallimbo – Taiwan, which waits for a time when thepan-Asian and intl. agreement on how manyChinas Asia should have, gains a wide and last-ing consensus.

Unsolved territorial issues, sporadic irreden-tism, conventional armament, nuclear ambi-tions, conflicts over exploitation of and accessto the marine biota, other natural resources in-cluding fresh water access and supply are pos-ing enormous stress on external security, safetyand stability in Asia. Additional stress comesfrom the newly emerging environmental con-cerns, that are representing nearly absolute se-curity threats, not only to the tiny Pacific nationof Tuvalu (6) , but also to the Maldives,Bangladesh, Cambodia, parts of Thailand, of In-donesia, of Kazakhstan and of the Philippines,etc (7) . All this combined with uneven eco-nomic and demographic dynamics (8) of thecontinent are portraying Asia as a real powderkeg.

Territorial disputes unresolved

It is absolutely inappropriate to compare the size of Asiaand Europe – the latter being rather an extension of a hugeAsian continental landmass, a sort of western Asian penin-sula – but the interstate maneuvering space is comparable.Yet, the space between the major powers of post-Napoleonic Europe was as equally narrow for any maneuveras is the space today for any security maneuver of Japan,China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the like.

Let us also take a brief look at the peculiarities of the nu-clear constellations in Asia. Following the historic analogies;it echoes the age of the American nuclear monopoly andthe years of Russia’s desperation to achieve the parity.

Besides holding huge stockpiles of conventional weaponryand numerous standing armies, Asia is a home of four (plusperipheral Russia and Israel) of the nine known nuclearpowers (declared and undeclared). Only China and Russiaare parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty – NPT. NorthKorea walked away in 2003, whereas India and Pakistanboth confirmed nuclear powers declined to sign the Treaty.Asia is also the only continent on which nuclear weaponryhas been deployed.

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Mahbubani claims that Gorbachevhanded over the Soviet empire andgot nothing in return, while Dengunderstood “the real success ofWestern strength and power …China did not allow the studentsprotesting in Tiananmen Square”.Consequently, Deng drew a sharpand decisive line to avoid the fate ofRussia, and allowed only perestroika.China has survived, even scoring theunprecedented prosperity in onlythe last two decades. Russia has suf-fered a steep decline in the after-math of the loss of its historicempire, including the high suicideand crime rates as well as the severealcohol problems. Gorbachev him-self moved to the US, and one vodkabrand labels his name.

(2) The membership might be ex-tended in the future to East Timorand Papua New Guinea.

(3) Symbolic or not, the ASEAN HQis located less than 80 miles awayfrom the place of the historical, theNAM–precursor, the Asian–AfricanConference of Bandung 1955.

(4) Comparisons pose an inaccuracyrisks as history often finds a way torepeat itself, but optimism finallyprevails. Tentatively, we can situatethe ASEAN today, where the pre-Maastricht EU was between theMerge Treaty and the Single Euro-pean Act.

(5) The acronym was originallycoined by Jim O’Neill, a chief globaleconomist of Goldman Sachs, in his2001 document report: “BuildingBetter Global Economic BRICs”. Thisdocument was elaborating on coun-tries which may provide the Westwith the socially, economically andpolitically cheap primary commodi-ties and undemanding labor force,

On the western edge of the Eurasian continent,neither France, Britain, Russia nor the US had a(recent) history of direct armed conflicts. Theydo not even share land borders. Finally, only India and now post-Soviet Russiahave a strict and full civilian control over its mil-itary and the nuclear deployment authoriza-tion. In the case of North Korea and China, it isin the hands of an unpredictable and non-transparent communist leadership – meaning,it resides outside democratic, governmentaldecision-making. In Pakistan, it is completely inthe hands of a politically omnipresent militaryestablishment. Pakistan has lived under a directmilitary rule for over half of its existence as anindependent state. What eventually kept the US and the USSR fromdeploying nuclear weapons was the dangerousand costly struggle called: “mutual destructionassurance”. Already by the late 1950s, both sidesachieved parity in the number and type of nu-clear warheads as well as in the number andprecision of their delivery systems. Both sidesproduced enough warheads, delivery systems’secret depots and launching sites to amply sur-vive the first impact and to maintain a strongsecond-strike capability (10).

As is well known, the peak of the Cold War wasmarked by the mega geopolitical and ideolog-ical confrontation of the two nuclear super-powers whose stockpiles by far outnumberedthe stockpiles of all the other nuclear powerscombined. However enigmatic, mysterious andincalculable to each other (9) , the Americansand Soviets were on opposite sides of theglobe, had no territorial disputes, and no recordof direct armed conflicts. Insofar, the Asian nuclear constellation is addi-tionally specific as each of the holders has a his-tory of hostilities – armed frictions andconfrontations over unsolved territorial dis-putes along the shared borders, all combinedwith the intensive and lasting ideological rival-ries. The Soviet Union had bitter transborderarmed frictions with China over the demarca-tion of its long land border. China has fought awar with India and has acquired a significantterritorial gain. India has fought four mutuallyextortive wars with Pakistan over Kashmir andother disputed bordering regions. Finally, theKorean peninsula has witnessed the direct mil-itary confrontations of Japan, USSR, Chinese aswell as the US on its very soil, and remains asplit nation under a sharp ideological divide.

Cold War exiled in Asia

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finally suggesting to the West to bal-ance such trade by exporting itshigh-prized final products in return.The paper did not foresee either cre-ation of any BRIC grouping or thenomadic change of venue places ofits periodic meetings. O’Neill initiallytipped Brazil, Russia, India andChina, although at recent meetingsSouth Africa was invited (BRICS) withthe pending Indonesia (BRIICS).

(6) Tuvalu, a country composed oflow-laying atoll islands, faces an im-minent complete loss of state terri-tory. This event would mark aprecedent in the theory of intl. law –that one country suffers a completegeographic loss of its territory.

(7) Detailed environmental impactrisk assessments including the no-go zones are available in the CRESTAreports. The CRESTA Organization ispowered by the Swiss RE as a con-sortium of the leading insurance andreinsurance companies.

(8) The intriguing intellectual de-bate is currently heating up thewestern world. Issues are fundamen-tal: Why is science turned into reli-gion? Practiced economy is basedon the over 200-years old liberal the-ory of Adam Smith and over 300-years old philosophy of Hobbes andLocke – basically, frozen and rigidlycanonized into a dogmatic exegesis.Scientific debate is replaced by ablind obedience. Why is religionturned into political ideology? Reli-gious texts are misinterpreted andideologically misused in Europe, ME,Asia, Americas and Africa.Why is the secular or religious ethicsturned from the bio-centric compre-hension into the anthropocentricenvironmental ignorance? The reso-nance of these vital debates is grad-ually reaching Asian elites.

Once comprehending that neither the preventive nor pre-emptive nuclear strike would bring a decisive victory butwould actually trigger the final global nuclear holocaustand ensure total mutual destruction, the Americans and theSoviets have achieved a fear–equilibrium through the haz-ardous deterrence. Thus, it was not an intended armamentrush (for parity), but the non-intended Mutual AssuranceDestruction – MAD – with its tranquilizing effect of nuclearweaponry, if possessed in sufficient quantities and impen-etrable configurations – that brought a bizarre sort of paci-fying stability between two confronting superpowers.Hence, MAD prevented nuclear war, but did not disarm thesuperpowers.

As noted, the nuclear stockpiles in Asia are considerablymodest (11) . The number of warheads, launching sites anddelivery systems is not sufficient and sophisticated enoughto offer the second strike capability. That fact seriously com-promises stability and security: preventive or preemptiveN–strike against a nuclear or non-nuclear state could becontemplated as decisive, especially in South Asia and onthe Korean peninsula, not to mention the Middle East. (12)

A general wisdom of geopolitics assumes the potentialityof threat by examining the degree of intensions and capa-bility of belligerents. However, in Asia this theory does notnecessarily hold the complete truth: Close geographic prox-imities of Asian nuclear powers means shorter flight timeof warheads, which ultimately gives a very brief decision-making period to engaged adversaries. Besides a deliber-ate, a serious danger of an accidental nuclear war istherefore evident.

One of the greatest thinkers and humanists ofthe 20th century, Erich Fromm wrote: “…mancan only go forward by developing (his) reason,by finding a new harmony…” (13)

There is certainly a long road from vision andwisdom to a clear political commitment and ac-corded action. However, once it is achieved, theoperational tools are readily at disposal. Thecase of Helsinki Europe is very instructive. To befrank, it was the over-extension of the super-powers who contested one another all over theglobe, which eventually brought them to thenegotiation table. Importantly, it was also aconstant, resolute call of the European publicthat alerted governments on both sides of thedefault line. Once the political considerations were settled,the technicalities gained momentum: therewas – at first – mutual pan-European recogni-tion of borders which tranquilized tensions lit-erally overnight.

Politico-military cooperation was situated inthe so-called first Helsinki basket, which in-cluded the joint military inspections, exchangemechanisms, constant information flow, earlywarning instruments, confidence–buildingmeasures mechanism, and the standing panelof state representatives (the so-called Perma-nent Council). Further on, an important clearing house wassituated in the so-called second basket – theforum that links the economic and environ-mental issues, items so pressing in Asia at themoment. Admittedly, the III OSCE Basket was a source ofmany controversies in the past years, mostlyover the interpretation of mandates. However,the new wave of nationalism, often replacingthe fading communism, the emotional chargesand residual fears of the past, the huge ongoingformation of the middle class in Asia whosepassions and affiliations will inevitably chal-lenge established elites domestically and ques-tion their policies internationally, and a relatedsearch for a new social consensus – all thatcould be successfully tackled by some sort ofan Asian III basket.

Multilateralmechanisms

Clearly, further socio-economic growth in Asia is impossiblewithout the creation and mobilization of a strong middleclass – a segment of society which when appearing anewon the socio-political horizon is traditionally very exposedand vulnerable to political misdeeds and disruptive shifts.At any rate, there are several OSCE observing nations fromAsia (14) ; from Thailand to Korea and Japan, with Indonesia,a nation that currently considers joining the forum. They areclearly benefiting from the participation. (15)

Consequently, the largest continent should consider thecreation of its own comprehensive pan-Asian multilateralmechanism. In doing so, it can surely rest on the vision andspirit of Helsinki. On the very institutional setup, Asia canclosely revisit the well-envisioned SAARC and ambitiouslyempowered ASEAN (16) fora. By examining these two re-gional bodies, Asia can find and skillfully calibrate the ap-propriate balance between widening and deepening of thesecurity mandate of such future multilateral organization– given the number of states as well as the gravity of thepressing socio-political, environmental and politico-militarychallenges.

In the age of unprecedented success and the unparalleledprosperity of Asia, an indigenous multilateral pan-Asianarrangement presents itself as an opportunity. Contextual-izing Hegel’s famous saying that “freedom is…an insightinto necessity” let me close by stating that a need for thedomesticated pan-Asian organization warns by its urgencytoo. Clearly, there is no emancipation of the continent; there isno Asian century, without the pan-Asian multilateral setting.

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No one can yet predict the rangeand scope of their responses, inter-nally or externally. One is certain;Asia understood that the global(economic) integration can not be asubstitute for any viable develop-ment strategy. Globalization, as ex-perienced in Asia and observedelsewhere, did not offer a shortcut todevelopment, even less to social co-hesion, environmental needs, do-mestic employment, educationaluplift of the middle class and generalpublic health.

(9) The Soviet Union was envelopedin secrecy, a political culture, emi-nent in many large countries, whichthe Soviets inherited from the TsaristRussia and further enhanced – a fea-ture that puzzled Americans. It wasthe US cacophony of open, nearlyexhibitionistic policy debates thatpuzzled Russians – and made bothsides unable to predict the moves ofthe other one. The Soviets were con-fused by the omnipresence of overtpolitical debate in the US, and theAmericans were confused by the ab-sence of any political debate in theUSSR. Americans well knew that thereal power resided outside the gov-ernment, in the Soviet Politburo.Still, it was like a black-box – to use avivid Kissinger allegory, things werecoming in and getting out, but no-body figured out what was happen-ing inside. Once the particular decision hadbeen taken, the Soviets imple-mented it persistently in a heavy-handed and rigid way. Usually, thepolicy alternation/adjustment wasnot coming before the personalchanges at the top of the SU Polit-buro – events happening so seldom.On the other hand, the Soviets wereconfused by the equidistant constel-lation of the US executive, legislativeand judicial branches

How can we observe and interpret (the distance between)success and failure from a historical perspective? This ques-tion remains a difficult one to (satisfy all with a single) an-swer... The immediate force behind the rapid and successfulEuropean overseas projection was actually the two ele-ments combined: Europe’s technological (economic) ad-vancement and demographic expansion (from early 16thcentury on). However, West/Europe was not – frankly speak-ing – winning over the rest of this planet by the superiorityof its views and ideas, by purity of its virtues or by clarityand sincerity of its religious thoughts and practices. For asmall and rather insecure civilization from the antropo-ge-ographic suburbia, it was just the superiority through effi-ciency in applying the rationalized violence and organized(legitimized) coercion that Europe successfully projected.The 21st century Europeans often forget this ‘inconvenienttruth’, while the non-Europeans usually never do.

The large, self-maintainable, self-assured and secure civiliza-tions (e.g. situated on the Asian landmass) were traditionallyless militant and confrontational (and a nation-state ‘exclu-sive’), but more esoteric and generous, inclusive, attentiveand flexible. The smaller, insecure civilizations (e.g. situatedon a modest and minor, geographically remote and periph-eral, natural resources scarce, and climatically harshly ex-posed continent of Europe) were more focused, obsessivelyorganized, directional and “goal–oriented” (including the in-vention of virtue out of necessity – a nation-state). No won-der that only Asian, and no European civilization has evergenerated a single religion. Although it admittedly doctri-nated, ‘clergified’ and headquartered one of the four MiddleEast-revelled monotheistic religions, that of Christianity. Onthe other hand, no other civilization but the European hasever created a significant, even a relevant political ideology.

– for the Soviet taste, too oftenchanged, the chaotic setup ofdozens of intelligence and other en-forcement agencies, the role of themedia and the public, and the influ-ential lobby groups that crosscut theUS bipartisanism – all which partici-pated in the decision prep and mak-ing process. Even when brokered,the US actions were often altered orreplaced in zigzagging turns. The USwas unable to grasp where the Com-munist Party ended and the USSRgovernment started. By the sametoken, the Soviets were unable tofigure out where the corporateAmerica ended and the US govern-ment started. Paradoxically enough,the political culture of one pre-vented it from comprehending andpredicting the actions of the otherone. What was the logical way forone was absolutely unthinkable andillogical for the other.

(10) As Waltz rightfully concludes:“Conventional weapons put a pre-mium on striking first to gain the ini-tial advantage and set the course ofthe war. Nuclear weapons eliminatethis premium. The initial advantageis insignificant…”… due to the sec-ond strike capability of both belliger-ents. (‘The Spread of NuclearWeapons: A Debate Renewed’ byScott D. Sagan and Kenneth N Waltz,2003, p. 112).

(11) It is assumed that Pakistan hasas few as 20 combat/launchingready fission warheads, India is be-lieved to have some 60, and Korea (ifany, not more than) 2-3 only. EvenChina, considered as the senior nu-clear state, has not more than 20ICBM.

SPECIAL REPORTS 18

Post Scriptum

H.E. Mr. Dato’ Misran KARMAIN, the ASEANDeputy Secretary GeneralH.E. Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka PUJA, Indonesia’sAmbassador and Permanent Representative tothe UN and other IO’s in Vienna (currently Di-rector-General for ASEAN Affairs in the Indone-sian Foreign Ministry)H.E. Ms. Nongnuth PHETCHARATANA, Thai Am-bassador and Permanent Representative to theOSCE, UN and other IO’s in Vienna (currentlyThai Ambassador in Berlin)H.E. Ms. Linglingay F. LACANLALE, the Philip-pines’ Ambassador to Thailand and the UNESCAP H.E. Mr. Khamkheuang BOUNTEUM, Laos’ Am-bassador and Permanent Representative to theUN and other IO’s in ViennaH.E. Mr. Ba Than NGUYEN, Vietnam’s Ambassa-dor and Permanent Representative to the UNand other IO’s in ViennaH.E. Mr. Ibrahim DJIKIC, Ambassador and for-mer OSCE Mission Head to AshgabatHowever, the views expressed are solely thoseof the author himself.

For the past twelve years I hosted over 100 am-bassadors at my university, some 30 from Asiaalone. Several of them are currently obtaining(or recently finished) very high governmentalpositions in their respective countries. That in-cludes the Foreign Minister posts (like the for-mer Korean ambassador Kim Sung-Hwan, orthe former Kazakh ambassador YerzhanKazykhanov), as well as the SAARC Sec-Generalpost (former India’s Ambassador Kant Sharma),or candidacy for the OIC Secretary-General post(including the former Malaysian Ambassador tothe UN New York, Tan Sri Hasmi AGAM, cur-rently the SUHAKAM Chairman in KualaLumpur). It would be inappropriate to name them here.However, let me express my sincere gratitudefor all the talks and meetings which helped anearly ‘fermentation’ of my hypothesis claim assuch. Finally, I would like to name the followingpersonalities (in their current or past capacities)for the valuable intellectual encounters andtheir sometimes opposing but always inspiringand constructive comments in the course ofdrafting the article:

Acknowledgments

(12) Israel as a non-declared nuclear power is be-lieved to have as many as 200 low-powered fissionnuclear bombs. A half of it is deliverable by the mid-range missile Jericho II, planes and mobile (hide andrelocate) launchers (including the recently delivered,nuclear war-head capable German submarines). Iransuccessfully tested the precision of its mid-rangemissile and keeps ambitiously working on the long-range generation of missiles. At the same time, Iranmay well have acquired some vital dual-use (so far,peaceful purpose) nuclear technologies. There is aseed of nuclear ambition all over the Middle East,with Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the least shy ones.

(13) “The Art of Loving”, Erich Fromm, 1956, page76. Fromm wrote it at about the time of the Ban-dung conference.

(14) The so-called OSCE–Asian Partners for Cooper-ation are: Japan (1992), Korea (1994), Thailand(2000), Afghanistan (2003), Mongolia (2004) andAustralia (2009). Within the OSCE quarters, particu-larly Thailand and Japan enjoy a reputation of beingvery active.

(15) It is likely to expect that five other ASEAN coun-tries, residentially represented in Vienna, may for-malize their relation with OSCE in a due time. Thesame move could be followed by the Secretariats ofboth SAARC and ASEAN.

(16) In Europe and in Asia – even when being at theHQ in Jakarta, I am often asked to clarify my (overly)optimistic views on the ASEAN future prospects. TheASEAN as well as the EU simply have no alternativebut to survive and turn successful, although cur-rently suffering many deficiencies and being farfrom optimized multilateral mechanisms. Any alter-native to the EU is a grand accommodation of eitherFrance or Germany with Russia – meaning a returnto Europe of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries– namely, perpetual wars and destructions. Any al-ternative to the ASEAN would be an absorptive ac-commodation of particular ASEAN member statesto either Japan or China or India – meaning fewerlarge blocks on a dangerous collision course. Thus,paradoxically enough in cases of both the EU and ofASEAN, it is not (only) the inner capacitation but theexternal constellations that make me optimisticabout their respective success.

Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Verticalization of His-torical Experiences: Europe’s and Asia’s Se-curity Structures – Structural Similaritiesand Differences”, Crossroads, The Mac ForeignPolicy Journal, Skopje (Vol. I Nr. 4) 2007 Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Institutionalization ofHistorical Experiences: Europe and Asia –Same Quest, Different Results, Common Fu-tures”, Worldviews and the Future of HumanCivilization, (University of Malaya, KualaLumpur, November 2008) Malaysia (2008) Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Destiny Shared: OurCommon Futures – Human Capital beyond2020”, the 5th Global Tech Leaders Symposium, Singapore-Shanghai March 2005 (2005)Bajrektarevic, Anis, “Structural Differencesin Security Structures of Europe and Asia –Possible Conflicting Cause in the SEA The-ater”, The 4th Viennese conference on SEA,SEAS Vienna June 2009 (2009)Duroselle, J.B., “Histoire Diplomatique –Études Politiques, Économiques et Sociales”,Dalloz Printing Paris (first published 1957), 1978Friedman, George, “The Next 100 Years”, An-chor Books/Random House NY (2009)Fromm, Erich, “The Art of Loving”, PerennialClassics, (page: 76) (1956)Hegel, G.W.F., Phänomenologie des Geistes(The Phenomenology of Mind, 1807), OxfordUniversity Press, 1977 (page: 25 VII)Mahbubani, Kishore, “The New Asian Hemi-sphere”, Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group(page: 44-45) (2008)Sagan, S.D. and Waltz, K.N., “The Spread ofNuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed”,(page: 112) (2003)

References

SPECIAL REPORTS 22

s the recent maritime contests in both theSouth and the East China Sea has shown, Bei-jing underestimated an emotional charge thatthe territorial disputes carry along, as well as theconvenience given to the neighbors to escalatethese frictions in order to divert public attention

from their own pressing domestic socio-economic and political is-sues. A costly, spiral and dangerous game of the reinvigorated na-tionalistic rhetoric, it presently instigate a climate that could easilyhijack the next Asian decade as a whole.

Speculations over the alleged bipolar world of tomorrow (the so-called G-2, China vs. the US), should not be an Asian dilemma. It isprimarily a concern of the West that, after all, overheated China inthe first place with its (outsourcing) investments. Hence, despite a(cacophony of voices, actually of a) distortive noise about the pos-sible future G-2 world, the central security problem of Asia remainsthe same: an absence of any pan-continental multilateral settingon the world’s largest continent.

Asia needs ASEAN-izationnot Pakistanization of its continent

A

What China wants in Asia: 1975 or 1908 ?

On the eastern, ascendant flank of the Eurasiancontinent, the Chinese vertigo economy isoverheated and too-well integrated in thepetrodollar system. Beijing, presently, cannotcontemplate or afford to allocate any resourcesin a search for an alternative. (The Sino econ-omy is a low-wage- and labor intensive- cen-tered one. Chinese revenues are heavily dependent on ex-ports and Chinese reserves are predominantlya mix of the USD and US Treasury bonds.) Tosustain itself as a single socio-political and for-midably performing economic entity, the Peo-ple’s Republic requires more energy and lessexternal dependency (1). Domestically, the de-mographic-migratory pressures are huge, re-gional demands are high, and expectations arebrewing. (2) Considering its best external en-ergy dependency equalizer (and inner cohe-sion solidifier), China seems to be turning to itsmilitary upgrade rather than towards the res-olute alternative energy/Green Tech invest-ments – as it has no time, plan or resources

to do both at once. Inattentive of the broaderpicture, Beijing (probably falsely) believes thata lasting containment, especially in the SouthChina Sea, is unbearable, and that –at the sametime– fossil-fuels are available (e.g., in Africaand the Gulf ), and even cheaper with the helpof battleships. (3)

In effect, the forthcoming Chinese militarybuildup will only strengthen the existing, andopen up new, bilateral security deals (4) ofneighboring countries, primarily with the US –as nowadays in Asia, no one wants to be a pas-sive downloader. Ultimately, it may create apolitico-military isolation (and financial burden)for China that would consequently justify and(politically and financially) cheapen the bolderreinforced American military presence in theAsia-Pacific, especially in the South and the EastChina Sea. It perfectly adds up to the intensified demo-nization of China in parts of influential Westernmedia. (5)

Hence, the Chinese grab for fossil fuels or its military com-petition for naval control is not a challenge but rather aboost for the US Asia-Pacific –even an overall– posture. Cal-ibrating the contraction of its overseas projection and com-mitments – some would call it managing the decline of anempire – the US does not fail to note that nowadays half ofthe world’s merchant tonnage passes though the SouthChina Sea. Therefore, the US will exploit any regional terri-torial dispute and other frictions to its own security benefit,including the costs sharing of its military presence with thelocal partners, as to maintain pivotal on the maritime edgeof Asia that arches from the Persian Gulf to the IndianOcean, Malacca, the South and East China Sea up to thenorthwest–central Pacific.

Is China currently acting as a de facto fundraiser for the US?

A real challenge is always to optimize the (moral, politicaland financial) costs in meeting the national strategic objec-tives. In this case, it would be a resolute Beijing’s turn to-wards green technology, coupled with the firm buildup ofthe Asian multilateralism. Without a grand rapprochementto the champions of multilateralism in Asia, which are

SPECIAL REPORTS 24

(1) Most of China’s economicgrowth is attributed to outsourcedmanufacturing. The US, the EU,Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, andother Asian and non-Asian OECDcountries predominantly take ad-vantage of China’s coastal areas astheir own industrial suburbia. It re-mains an open question how muchthis externally dictated growth ofChina has a destabilizing effect onthe inner compact of the Sino na-tion.

(2) The geopolitical event of theyear is ahead of us. The forthcoming18th Congress of the China’s Com-munist Party should soon decide onits leadership for the next 10 years.In the secretive, opaque world ofCPC decision making, the ongoingcontest between taizi dang (childrenof senior Party figures and heroes ofthe Revolution) and tuanpai (partymembers of a modest social back-ground who successfully playedtheir careers in the CommunistYouth League) is an important onealthough not the only ideologicaland socio-political power-strugglepuzzling the future of China.

(3) Since the glorious Treasury Fleetsof Admiral Zhèng Hé have been dis-mantled by the order of the Man-darin bureaucracy in 1433, China hasnever recovered its pivotal naval sta-tus in the Asia-Pacific.

(4) More bilateralism (triggered byunilateralism) is not only less multi-lateralism– essentially, it is a setbackfor any eventual emancipation of thecontinent.

(5) In late September 2012, Chinaput its first aircraft carrier (the Liaon-ing) into service with a lot of paradedomestically and huge anxiety in itsneighborhood.

Indonesia, India and Japan, there is no environ-ment for China to seriously evolve and emergeas a formidable, lasting and trusted globalleader. (6) Consequently, what China needs inAsia is not a naval race of 1908, but the Helsinkiprocess of 1975. In return, what Asia needs(from China and Japan) is an ASEAN-ization, nota Pakistanization of its continent. (7)

Opting for either strategic choice will reverber-ate in the dynamic Asia–Pacific theatre. (8)However, the messages are diametrical: An as-sertive military – alienates, new technology –attracts neighbors. Finally, armies conquer (andspend) while technology builds (and accumu-lates)! At this point, any eventual accelerated ar-mament in the Asia-Pacific theatre would onlystrengthen the hydrocarbon status quo, andwould implicitly further help a well-orches-trated global silencing of consumers’ sensitivityover the record-high oil price. With its present configuration, it is hard toimagine that anybody can outplay the US in thepetro-security, petro-financial and petro-mili-tary global playground in the decades to come.Given the planetary petro-financial-media-tech-military causal constellations, this type of

confrontation is so well mastered by and wouldfurther only benefit the US and the closest ofits allies. China’s defense complex is over-ideol-ogized, under-capitalized, technologically out-dated and innovation-inert, while the US’ islargely privatized, highly efficient, deployableand prime innovative. Thus, even in security do-main, the main China’s problem is not a navalor overall military parity, but the disproportion-ate technological gap. After all, China’s armywas not meant (by Mao) and maintained (byDeng and his successors) to serve the externalprojection purpose. It was and still remains anideological enterprise of cohesion, an essentialcentrifugal force to preserve territorial integrityof this land-colossus.Within the OECD/IEA grouping, or closely: theG-8 (the states with resources, infrastructure,tradition of and know-how to advance the fun-damental technological breakthroughs), it isonly Japan that may seriously consider aGreen/Renewable-tech U-turn. Tokyo’s externalenergy dependencies are stark and long-last-ing. Past the recent nuclear trauma, Japan willneed a few years to (psychologically and eco-nomically) absorb the shock – but it will learn alesson.

SPECIAL REPORTS 26

However, the media underreportedthree important details: (i)this So-viet-constructed vessel is over 20years old (bought from Ukraine in1998); (ii) its runway deck cannotsupport any aircraft landing; (iii)China’s best tactical jetfighter J-8 (acopycat of the Soviet MIG 23s, 30-year-old technology) is not designedfor landing on any aircraft carrier.From the military technology pointof view, China is still well-behindwere e.g. the Imperial Japan wassome 80 years ago – as the Liaoningcarrier is neither home-made nor ofany practical use for either the SinoNavy or its Air Force.

(6) More on the pan-Asian securityarchitectures and preventive diplo-macy in: Bajrektarevic, A. (2011) NoAsian century without the pan-AsianInstitution, GHIR (Geopolitics, His-tory, and Intl. Relations) 3 (2) 2011,Addleton Publishers NY

(7) An ASEAN summit in June 2012failed to issue a joint communiquéfor the first time in its 45-year historyafter an open disagreement over thewording of a section on the SouthChina Sea territorial claims. Cambo-dia, the current ASEAN chair, wasseen by several member states ofstonewalling in support of its ally,China. Quickly absorbing the shock,the ASEAN diplomatic offensive hasstarted, primarily shuttled by the In-donesian Foreign Office. One of thechief negotiators recently told me inJakarta:“The biggest threats (relatedto the South China Sea territorial dis-putes, rem. a.) to ASEAN’s centralityare the gnawing moves that ulti-mately pit its 10 members againsteach other.” The views I’ve heardwhile in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkokthis fall, well-corresponded with theconcerns expressed in Jakarta: “Whatwill be rejected is the seeming habit

For such an impresive economy and considerable demog-raphy, situated on a small land-mass which is repeatedlybrutalized by devastating natural catastrophes (and de-pendent on yet another disruptive external influence – Araboil), it might be that a decisive shift towards green energyis the only way to survive, revive, and eventually to emanci-pate. An important part of the US–Japan security treaty is the USenergy supply lines security guaranty, given to (the post-WWII demilitarized) Tokyo. After the recent earthquake-tsunami-radiation armageddon, as well as witnessing thecurrent Chinese military/naval noise, (the cabinet of the re-cently reconfirmed PM Noda and any other subsequentgovernment of ) Japan will inevitably rethink and revisit itsenergy policy, as well as the composition of its primary en-ergy mix.

Tokyo is well aware that the Asian geostrategic myopias arestrong and lasting, as many Asian states are either lockedup in their narrow regionalisms or/and entrenched in theireconomic egoisms. Finally, Japan is the only Asian countrythat has clearly learned from its own modern history, allabout the limits of hard power projection and the strong re-pulsive forces that come in aftermath from the neighbors.Their own pre-modern and modern history does not offera similar experience to the other two Asian heavyweights,China and India. This indicates the Far East as a probablezone of the Green-tech excellence (as much as ASEAN mightbe the gravity center of the consolidated diplomatic andsocio-political action) and a place of attraction for manyAsians in the decade to come.

of major powers – be they China or the US – to define coun-tries as allies or adversaries…and so, riling ASEAN’s divi-sions.”

(8) Historically, both Europe and Asia had a weak centrewith the continent’s peripheries traditionally pressing on asoft centre. With the strengthening of 19th century Ger-many (Bismarck’s Greater Prussia), and of late 20th century’sDeng’s China, the centre started pressing on its peripheriesfor the first time in modern history. One of the central secu-rity dilemmas between Bismarck and Helsinki times was‘how many Germanys’ Europe should have to preserve itsinner balance and peace. Europe and the world have paidan enormous price in two world wars to figure it out. Withthe bitter memories of Nazism still residing in the body andsoul of the continent, the recent unification of Germany wasonly possible within the Helsinki’ tranquilized Europe.

As one of the exceptionally few world regions,Southeast Asia so far holds both what is other-wise missing in many other world’s theaters –stabilized demographic growth and an impres-sive economic growth. However, the demo-graphic and economic growth poses anadditional environmental stress, which – if notunder check – may result in confrontational do-mestic policies and practices aimed at to max-imize a grab for finite, scarce resources.

Hence, be the outside world Kantian or Hobbe-sian (be it driven by the sense of higher civiliza-tional mission and common ASEAN destiny, orby the pragmatic need to strengthen the na-tion’s position), all necessary means are here!To register its future claims, the SEA – as well asany other theater – have to demonstrate itslasting and decisive vision and will.

Tentatively, we can cluster that will aroundthree main tasks:(i)Prosperity: Support to all three sides of theknowledge triangle: research (creation ofknowledge); development/innovation (appli-cation of knowledge); education (dissemina-tion of knowledge), as well as the promotion oflife itself; (ii)Solidarity: Human dimension enhance-ment through promotion of cohesion policies,including the full respect of authenticity as wellas the preservation and promotion of indige-nous socio-cultural and environmental diversi-ties; (iii)Security: Enhancing the human-centered(socio-economic) safety, based on free- dom,justice and inclusive collective (environmentaland socio-political) security.

This opportunity should be understood as his-tory’s call – which both invites and obliges atthe same time. Or, as Hegel reminds us thatsince: “reason is purposive activity…” the stateshould be: “…the actuality of the ethical Idea,of concrete freedom…” for all. An effectivelong-range prosperity, solidarity as well as (ex-ternal or internal) security cannot be based onconfrontational (nostalgia of ) ‘religious’ radical-ism and other ideological collisions. Clearly, itcannot rest on the escapist consumerism, cor-rosive socio-economic egoism and exclusion,restriction and denial, but only on promotionand inclusion. Simply, it needs to be centeredon a pro-active, participatory policy not a reac-tive, dismissive one.

Post Scriptum on the ASEAN

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