special report – advanced military frontline fortification and barrier solutions

Advanced Military Frontline Fortifi cation and Barrier Solutions

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

Check Point and Base Camp Construction Techniques and Standards

Frontline Fortifi cations and Barriers – Change is Relative….

The American Dilemma on Force Protection and Counter Insurgency

21st Century Frontline Barriers and Fortifi cation

Newer Barrier Materials and Technologies

Next Generation Combat Engineering and Force Protection

Sponsored by

Published by Global Business Media

SPECIAL REPORT: ADVANCED MILITARY FRONTLINE FORTIFICATION AND BARRIER SOLUTIONS


Global Business Media Limited 62 The Street Ashtead Surrey KT21 1AT United Kingdom

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EditorMary Dub

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Contents

Foreword 2Mary Dub, Editor

Check Point and Base Camp Construction Techniques and Standards 3Hesco Bastion Ltd

Working to StandardsAn Unconventional SolutionDiffering Attitudes to RiskThe HESCO Mil 11Other Factors That Could Benefi t From StandardisationHesco Bastion Ltd

Frontline Fortifi cations and Barriers – Change is Relative... 7Marushka Dubova, Defence Correspondent

Permanent or Field Distinction?Construction of First Barriers and Fortifi cation is One of the Most Vulnerable Periods for Armed ForcesWhat Can Go Wrong, Will Go Wrong….Styles of Fortifi cation Change as Warfare ChangesWhy are Military Operations in Cities so Diffi cult?

The American Dilemma on Force Protection and Counter Insurgency 10Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

Clear-Hold-Build

21st Century Frontline Barriers and Fortifi cation 11Meredith LLewelyn, Lead Contributor

Will the Afghan National Forces Follow the Same Method?

Newer Barrier Materials and Technologies 12Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

Force Protection for the Netcentric SoldierForce Protection for Combat and Civilian Uses

Next Generation Combat Engineering and Force Protection 13Don McBarnet, Staff Writer

The Risks That the Latest Barrier Technologies are Designed to WithstandFactors that Weigh Heavily in Decision MakingHigher Protection from Stackable UnitsThe Highest Protection from Overhead Blast Proofi ng for the Most Mission-Critical Assets

References 15

WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 1

Advanced Military Frontline Fortifi cation and Barrier Solutions

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

Check Point and Base Camp Construction Techniques and Standards

Frontline Fortifi cations and Barriers – Change is Relative….

The American Dilemma on Force Protection and Counter Insurgency

21st Century Frontline Barriers and Fortifi cation

Newer Barrier Materials and Technologies

Next Generation Combat Engineering and Force Protection

Sponsored by


Foreword

No war fi ghter would ever dismiss the critical

importance of force protection on operations.

This Special Report looks at the subtleties of force

protection and the demands it makes on combat

engineers to provide a fast, effective and secure

protection from blast and secondary fragmentation.

The opening piece of the Report looks at the

different types of base camps and checkpoints

and discusses the benefi ts of standardization in

erecting force protection structures. Knowledge

of numerous factors such as threat intelligence

and weapons systems is essential in determining

the most appropriate protection and method to

use, depending upon local circumstances. The

article goes on to highlight the different attitude to

risk among different countries and contrasts the

effectiveness of hardened bunkers against fl imsy

tent accommodation. Throughout, the emphasis

is on the use of the correct material which, while

giving protection, does not increase the effect of

the weaponry against which it is defending.

The second piece looks at the complex logistical

challenges of providing force protection in the

hostile and diverse territory of Afghanistan.

Through fi rst hand reports from soldiers on the

ground recorded by a US army military historian,

it details the pressures on ISAF combat engineers

forces to deliver force protection.

The third article refl ects the confl icts, not to say

bitter irony, of the force protection dilemma faced

in counter insurgency, where vulnerability can

become the mechanism for establishing trust, at

a potentially high cost in soldiers’ lives.

As we progress down the timeline to the 2014

drawdown from Afghanistan, the medium-term

future of force protection is considered with all

the attendant uncertainties about the future

budget for Afghan National Forces and negotiations

with the Taliban.

In the tailpiece of the Report, a combat engineer,

recently returned from Iraq, writes about his

experience in commanding force protection

provision. He debates the relative advantages of

many of the most used products.

Mary DubEditor


2 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM

Mary Dub has covered the defence fi eld in the United States and the UK as a television broadcaster, journalist and conference manager. Focused by a Masters in War Studies from King’s College, London, she annotates and highlights the interplay of armies, governments and industry.



Check Point and Base Camp Construction Techniques and StandardsHesco Bastion Ltd

ONE OF the first things that must be known about the above subject is that

it may have a vastly different definition for one person to the next, depending where you are, who you are and where you are from. This article remains general in its content and non specific; this is to avoid some readers saying “well we don’t do it like that”

The fi rst issue to address is what is a base camp and what is a checkpoint? Funnily enough, for me, even as a military person the fi rst thing that springs to mind when asked “what is a base camp?” is the one at the base of Mt Everest! Clearly that is not what is meant here. So for the purpose of this short article I shall regard a base camp as a camp where formed bodies of men (or women) operate from and return to on a regular basis. So a patrol base, forward operating base, combat outpost or main operating base would be included here.

Of course, the difference between base camps is replicated when discussing check points. These can be a hastily erected and operated VCP on a main route or the massive and permanent structures with their elaborate and complex network of routes and search bays at very large military bases over the world. We shall exclude from this article the short term snap VCP that are often used.

Working to StandardsWe then move onto the standards section, which is the main issue I shall discuss in this

article. There is not, as far as I am aware, a unified set of standards for force protection structures and for the construction of a base camp – perhaps there should be an “ISO” for protective structures! Many countries, either individually or in collaboration, carry out a good deal of research and testing but, of course, this is directed at what they believe their threats are, and at what level of protection they believe they require. There is STANAG 2280, which has gone some way to prov id ing a standard, but I would argue that, if you presented this to most NATO engineers as the required standard, they would look at you with a blank expression!

I believe that standards should be set by the type and location of the operation, so I think it is useful for the force protection engineer to have a variety of standards to choose from. Unfortunately, in my experience, this is seldom the case. I would much rather that FP Engineers have a good overall force protection knowledge (not solely restricted to Force Protection Engineering), and the ability to interpret threat intelligence, have good knowledge of weapon systems and their effects, have an extensive force protection product knowledge and a sound knowledge of basic construction techniques. This will then allow them to select the most appropriate protection and method for the local circumstances. I suppose the standard here is “what level of residual risk is acceptable?” It could be a standard set by a nation, but this

A VERY SMALL AND VERY REMOTE BASE

A RATHER COMPLEX BUT STILL AUSTERE CAMP WITH

RUDIMENTARY CHECKPOINT



Many countries, either

individually or in

collaboration, carry out

a good deal of research

and testing but, of

course, this is directed

at what they believe their

threats are, and at what

level of protection they

believe they require.

would then allow the FP Engineer to decide how he achieves that. All of this should result in the most appropriate protective structures being chosen, taking into account all the relevant issues including such mundane issues as “can we get fi ll material?” and if so “what is it?”

An Unconventional SolutionI have seen a very good example of a “Combat Engineer “using his FP knowledge to construct a force protection structure which I am certain would not have conformed to any standard. The scenario – a small combat outpost on top of a hill, only accessible by air or by foot. The threat to the base is therefore from hand-carried weapon systems only, with no signifi cant blast load likely. The problem, of course, is that the base still needs protection, and although he has a supply of the ubiquitous ‘Hesco Mil 1’ unit, he has no obvious fi ll material. However he is surrounded by rocks, and so the very ingenious Combat Engineer (‘improvise and overcome’ is the Engineer’s motto), then decides that rocks are excellent against RPG and small arms fi re and the risk of secondary fragmentation is minimal. So he cuts the Hesco units in half to reduce their width and the amount of rock he needs, gathers some rocks, and fi lls the units to provide the required protection – genius! (the geotextile was removed when the unit was reduced in width). This Engineer’s actions even lead to amendments in our construction guidance. However, although a simple and effective solution, you can rest assured it would not have complied with any national or international standard had one been set. I am certain that on more than one occasion he had to explain his actions.

Differing Attitudes to RiskOne of the other issues relating to standards is that different countries have differing attitudes to risk. This is neither an accusation nor a slight on any particular nation’s forces. On the contrary, merely that some nations spend more time and effort at the outset of the operation providing the maximum protection that they believe may be required for the duration of their forces’ stay. Others ‘go light’ at the outset and then react to an escalating threat by retro fitting protective measures. This has led to an interesting contrast in the same base, where you have one contingent living and working in hardened bunkers with a minimum of 1m of soil cover for side walls and roofs, and a contingent next door living and working in tents! In 2007, this led to the UK forces rapidly trying to harden their accommodation as the insurgents mounted their nightly attacks on the bases in Basra, whilst the Danish Forces, on the other hand, just sat tight in their bunkers which would have withstood a nuclear holocaust (well probably not, but you get the drift!). Worse still, at that time, many forces could not adapt the layout of their camps to allow force protection barriers to be installed because all the service items such as drainage, power and water were set lengths. I would hasten to add that that is not now the case.

The HESCO Mil 11Of course, being a Brit, I strongly argue that the UK is one of the most proactive with regards to searching out new technologies and methods, and is continually looking for new ways of providing competent and innovative force protection solutions for their deployed



forces. For example, a recent set of trials has proved that a very narrow soil-fi lled HESCO unit can provide an impressive level of protection from fragmentation from a 107mm and 120mm mortar round when it impacts and detonates in close proximity to the wall. HESCO have recently developed the new unit to meet these criteria. Designated the Mil 11, It is only 0.3m deep, 1.2m tall and 1.2m long and is ideal for compartmentalisation, particularly in areas where there is very limited space. This unit is completely recoverable and reusable and, of course, can be covered in a tarpaulin type material to provide a clean wall should there be a need.

Other Factors That Could Benefi t From StandardisationNeedless to say, there are a various other issues that must be addressed and perhaps these should have some degree of standardisation. Entry Control Points, depending on size, must be built with sufficient search bays, badging offi ces, by-pass lanes and vehicle reject lanes. In addition, it is important that the correct material is used in their construction. Care must always be taken to ensure that the material used does not increase the effect of the potential device by becoming signifi cant secondary fragmentation. If material such as concrete is used, then the ECP should be far enough way from occupied areas so that possible secondary fragmentation will not be an issue. Far safer, I believe, to use soil fi lled structures.

I’m guessing that many reading this article will be disappointed that I have not provided defi nitive guidance on standards and construction techniques. My conclusion is that they just

do not exist. However, what I hope this article may do is to ignite a debate as to whether or not we require a set of standards to be created and implemented.

Hesco Bastion LtdHesco Bastion Ltd manufacture and supply the ubiquitous Hesco Concertainer unit as well as other force protection structures such as bunkers and redeployable security fence solutions, many designed specifi cally for expeditionary operations. Further information on the range of Hesco products can be obtained from [email protected]

MIL 11 UNIT



For the war fi ghter, the

ultimate strategic barrier

is a mountain range or

impassable river, which

has provided border

protection for states for

many centuries.

Frontline Fortifi cations and Barriers – Change is Relative….Marushka Dubova, Defence Correspondent

“Why build a wall when Mother Nature has built one for you?”

Major Mark Gasparotto, Kandahar 23 Field Squadron, Canada 20101

THE CRITICAL and strategic role of frontline fortifications and barriers

against insurgents has a longstanding and permanent legacy in the built environment of historic towns and cities throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East. There is a certain irony that the construction of the Great Wall of China in the 8th century BC has a great deal in common with frontline fortification methods used in the 21st century in Afghanistan, i.e. the use of rammed earth on the plains and local rocks in the mountainous regions. For the war fighter, the ultimate strategic barrier is a mountain range or impassable river, which has provided border protection for states for many centuries. What vertiginous terrain or fast flowing water

lack in effectiveness can be reinforced by below freezing temperatures which make frozen earth hard to use as a barrier even with modern earth moving technologies and explosives.

Permanent or Field Distinction?For today’s combat engineers working for the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan or elsewhere on disaster relief or humanitarian work, there is one key distinction when building frontline fortifications at a Forward Operating Base (FOB) or headquarters: whether a base is to be a permanent or temporary field construction. Douglas R. Cubbison2 describes the diffi culties in one region of Afghanistan, building temporary force protection for several FOBs in Nuristan as part of the counter insurgency operation. First,

PHOTOGRAPHER: SPC TIA SOKIMSON, US ARMY

Members of Afghanistan National Security Forces fi ll HESCO with rocks to build a defensive position at Out Post Fawlad in Naray

District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, November 2011. The reconstruction operation is part of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion,

27 Infantry Division Task Force No Fear’s mission to set up an over-watch, enabling ANSF to rebuild OP Fawlad after it was

overrun by the Taliban last June.



he follows the ancient Sun Tsu admonition in the “Art of War” to know the enemy and how he is fortifying himself:

“The area is spectacularly rugged, and is divided into numerous small river valleys separated by steep mountain ridges routinely in excess of 10,000 feet. The Waigal Valley is located within two Afghan provinces, Nuristan to the north, and Kunar Province to the south. The provincial boundary is located approximately one kilometer south of Wanat within the Waigal Valley. All of the valleys of Nuristan, the Waigal Valley not excepted, are rocky, deep, narrow and steep sided, most of them classic examples of V-shaped valleys.”

One international observer simply stated:“The terrain is mountainous, indeed, this is

one of the most topographically forbidding operating environments in the world.3 Furthermore, they (the Safi Pashtun) have reinforced the natural advantages of the mountainous terrain with ancient inexpensive and highly effective measures:”

The Safi Pashtun of the Pech Valley typically reside in compounds, which the English Army in the 19th century consistently referred to as “Forts.” These compounds are enclosed by sturdy walls, sun dried over decades to assume the consistency and strength of concrete, and with firing platforms and observation towers incorporated into their design.4

To hold and quell the counter insurgency, two FOBs were constructed for the United States1-32 Mountain Infantry and its successors, 2-503rd Airborne Infantry. The troops arrived with little if any cultural familiarization or language training.5 Insuffi cient time was available for any focused mountain training or mountain warfare preparations, to include high altitude acclimatization, mountaineering equipment acquisition or specialized physical fitness training.6 However, they got on with the job. They prepared and built the FOB.

Construction of First Barriers and Fortifi cation is One of the Most Vulnerable Periods for Armed ForcesAny new military installation is at its most vulnerable in the fi rst few days of its inception. At this time, protective barriers such as HESCOs and stone walls are still under construction, defensive positions such as guard towers and FOB entrances are still being established, defensive obstacles such as concertinas are being installed, fi elds of fi re are being cleared, the best possible positions for heavy weapons systems are still being identified, permanent and redundant communications are being established. A certain amount of confusion is

attendant as heavy construction is underway, and different contractors and workers circulate through the new installation. And the vulnerability of the build was exacerbated by poor intelligence and weak risk assessments so the men were working without potable water and local ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) surveillance by UAVs.

What Can Go Wrong, Will Go Wrong...The use of heavy equipment, outside local contractors and the very real threat of hostile action at the moment of build, created signifi cant diffi culties for the coalition forces. The details offered by Cubbison from fi rsthand accounts is revelatory:

“The logistical approach was for COP Kahler to be constructed by a Jalalabad-based Afghan construction company, with CH-Chinook helicopter fl ights delivering specialized supply loads such as the ANA (Afghan National Army), 120mm mortar tube and Engineers’ equipment. Accompanying the construction company were intended to be several LN “Jingle” trucks carrying the majority of the logistical supplies necessary for COP Kahler, recognizing that even fi ve heavily laden HMMWVs could not carry everything that the 2nd Platoon required. Unfortunately, there were problems with the construction company, including lack of a Route Clearance Package to ensure that the road from Blessing to Wanat (which had been the location of several previous IED attacks) was safe, and a lack of a combat escort to enable them to safely move into Wanat. ‘Chosen Company’ had never worked with this Afghan construction company before. At one time, several trucks actually began moving to Wanat, but turned around before arrival, complaining (almost certainly truthfully) that: “...the AAF (Anti Afghanistan Force) were watching the road.” This complex logistical plan required an Afghan construction company to work to a meticulous time schedule in coordination with an American Route Clearance Package and combat escort between Camp Blessing and Wanat.”7

The two forward bases were constructed as planned but after several weeks of high intensity warfare and a high level of casualties on both sides the FOBs were abandoned as the counter insurgency had deteriorated in the area. They were replaced by UAV activity.

Styles of Fortifi cation Change as Warfare ChangesWhile the complexity of modern FOB construction refl ects the reality of 21st century ISAF counter insurgency methods in Afghanistan, strategic changes in types of fortifi cation have responded



While the complexity

of modern FOB

construction refl ects the

reality of 21st century

ISAF counter insurgency

methods in Afghanistan,

strategic changes in

types of fortifi cation have

responded to advances

in warfare techniques.

to advances in warfare techniques. The advent of mediaeval cannon, and in the 19th century of explosive shells, has changed methods of fortification. The supremacy of American air command with the use of missiles and bunker busting bombs has made almost all forms of fortifi cation vulnerable to direct attack. The threat of nuclear war after 1945 changed the stakes again and forced a trend in the 20th century towards concrete bunkers and deep underground tunnels. The director of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) noted before the United States Congress in 2006 that deep underground tunnels are still not vulnerable to American military action, while insurgents who choose combat in a built urban environment inhabited by noncombatants leave the most technologically equipped army in the world constrained.

Why are Military Operations in Cities so Diffi cult?As Dr. Tony Tether, Director of DARPA explained:

“Cities are filled with buildings, alleys, and interlocking tunnels, which provide practically limitless places to hide, store weapons, and maneuver. Cities are hubs of transportation, information, and commerce, and they are homes for a nation’s fi nancial, political, and cultural institutions. Cities are densely packed with people and their property. Adversaries can mix in among the people and property, using them as shields to limit our military options. And insurgents don’t just mix in, they blend in, making it even harder. In

this environment, our current war fighting technology that works so superbly in the open and even in the rugged natural terrain of the traditional battlefi eld is less effective. Our current standoff reconnaissance technology was simply not designed for urban environments. Our weapon systems are not as precise as we would like, and our vehicles and tactics that work so effectively in the open are not optimized for close-quarter operations.”8

PHOTOGRAPHER: WO GARETH DAVIES, RAF

An Afghan National Army soldier looks out from behind his HESCO barrier over the Morghab Valley, Afghanistan.



The American Dilemma on Force Protection and Counter InsurgencyDon McBarnet, Staff Writer

The force protection dilemma in counter insurgency, ”Sometimes, the more you

protect your force, the less secure you may be” is a bitter truth that points to the very nub of the purpose of counter insurgency operations, which is to quell the insurgency. How? The American fi eld manual explains:

“Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed against the effectiveness of using larger unit bases. These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.”

Clear-Hold-Build The essential vulnerability, pattern of communication between local population and counter insurgency forces and emerging trust, is the effective counter insurgency mechanism. This is followed according to the theory by stabilisation operations, which again need rapid transitional housing for schools, community centres and health clinics. These can be built out of the same materials as the reinforcements for FOBs. But as Cubbison explains, in many areas the ISAF forces were not doing this, for instance in the Waigal valley in Nuristan, for lack of training and leadership.

“We also didn’t go off the FOB unless there was a patrol” one trooper reported, and “We didn’t interact with them as a soldier goes. We just pulled security mostly and they didn’t come near us and we didn’t go near them.”

Even when serving together with an ANA (Afghan National Army) Company at Wanat, there was almost no interaction between the ANA soldiers and the Paratroopers except at the leadership and ETT level. Similarly, throughout the campaign there was very limited interaction between the Paratroopers and the Waigal Valley population, except at the leadership level. The result of this lack of positive interaction was a very high level of intensity of combat and many coalition soldiers killed. The high level of kinetic operations also left many local dead, increasing the level of counter insurgency operations. The FOB had to be abandoned because of the problems of resupply and was replaced by UAV activity.

“Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be”Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, PP1-27 15 December 2006

PHOTOGRAPHER: WO2 GLENN HARTWELL, BRITISH ARMY

A group of Royal Engineers fi x a roadside culvert. Taken while

serving on Operation Herrick 15 with Engr Fd Sqn 2, 29 AES,

35 Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers.



Many local contractors

may hope that the ANF

will follow the same policy

of using local labour and

contractors to reinforce

coalition forces troops

and their equipment.

21st Century Frontline Barriers and Fortifi cationMeredith Llewellyn, Lead Contributor

Writing in early 2012 when the handover to Afghan National Forces is in

process, and the timeline for the drawdown of 33,000 American forces has recently been pulled forward to fall 2012 with more to leave in 20139, it is a difficult to foresee how a largely Afghan government led armed force will use frontline fortifications in the medium term. However, the current trend towards using local contractors to implement frontline fortifications and barriers may well continue.

Major Mark Gasparotto of the 23rd Field Squadron, based at Kandahar described in 2010 the complexity for the trained combat engineers in building force protection and barriers for FOBs. They were tasked with building a small base: “To construct a small FOB” at Ma’sum Ghar for A company and a large one in the vicinity of Pashmul for the Afghan National Army Garrison. “A task that would take 4 months.” In the process of building, the engineers took many casualties and, as they worked, the task changed from building a new base to “to improving natural defensive features offered by Ma’sum Ghar”.10 The work required heavy machinery and:

“Because of the condition of our own heavy equipment, we attempted to hire civilian contractors to perform force protection works at Patrol Base Wilson. None would accept the very lucrative contracts offered due to Taliban threats of retribution and intense violence in the area.”11

ISAF forces rented D8 dozers from locals at a very lucrative rate, to which they added welded steel plates a process they called “Mad Maxing”. During their use they needed “two Route Clearance Packages in support of the mission”. Part of their mission was to clear ground of the dried mud walls built to fortify and defi ne boundaries of Afghan fi elds and compounds, a process they found extremely taxing because “a mud wall bordered each fi eld” and around every

building was a wall “one metre thick and one and half metres wide”. They eventually changed the nature of the task and built around the natural defensive features that the Afghans had left.12

Will the Afghan National Forces Follow the Same Method?Many local contractors may hope that the ANF will follow the same policy of using local labour and contractors to reinforce coalition forces troops and their equipment. Whether they will be able to afford to do so at the same rate in the medium term will be determined by the rate of funding from Congress, the success of negotiations with the Taliban and the type of settlement that can be achieved in the disparate regions of Afghanistan. What is almost certain is that the high levels of spending will be diminished as the United States tries to reduce its fi nancial and military commitment to the country.

“In Force Protection ‘completion’ is a relative concept’, whereby you never seem to complete the upgrading of a FOB or a battle position” Major Mark Gasparotto, Kandahar 23 Field Squadron, Canadian 2010

PHOTOGRAPHER: SSGT MARK BURRELL, US ARMY

A 120mm mortar round fl ies out of the launcher as mortar-men

assigned to Troop C, 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry Regiment,

Task Force Bandits, take cover while at Observation Post

Mustang in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar Province, 2011. “It

gets pretty intense sometimes when fi ring, especially if a fi re-

fi ght is going on,” said one of the mortar-men.



Newer Barrier Materials and TechnologiesDon McBarnet, Staff Writer

The type of fortification installed and its particular features have developed

markedly with changes in the way that modern counterinsurgency practices have developed. While Leonardo da Vinci drew pictures of gabions made of wickerwork that could be filled with earth and rubble for rapid fortification of renaissance military fortifications, 21st century gabions are frequently made from wire mesh for permanence. Some manufacturers like Defencell offer packs, which are man – portable and provide a lower logistical footprint. One cubic meter of packed defence cell will make 100 cubic metres of barrier. They of fer a multifunctional unit that can be used for low fragmentation force protection which provides interior walls, tent compartmentalization, containerized housing units (CHUs), and critical asset protection, alongside larger gabion perimeter walls. Their flexibility is such that they can be used as vehicle barriers, guard post protection and checkpoints.

Force Protection for the Netcentric SoldierAn essential feature of next generation gabions and material is that it does not cause radio frequency interference and it does not affect IED detection or jamming. A further key feature for high intensity confl ict is that it reduces the risk of secondary fragmentation, so that in the event of a hit, the injuries incurred by the soldier are not

worse than if there had been no protection at all. HESCO Bastion also offers the Concertainer unit. This has properties which include a medium-term life span of 3 years, advanced ground stabilization and a polypropylene geotextile skin. The combination of its polypropylene geotextile skin and the natural properties of the fill material ensure ventilation and waterproof ing and faci l i tate thermal regulation in all climates.

Force Protection for Combat and Civilian UsesThe process of successful counter insurgency requires forces to go through a 3 step process of Clear, Hold and Build. The value of modern gabions is that they can be used at all stages of the process. While HESCOS have become an integral part of FOBs they are also a valuable tool in creating transitional housing, building schools or clinics or community centres, which are critical for the ‘Build’ stage of counter insurgency operations. As the Afghan operation approaches handover to the Afghan government forces, the gabions will still have a role in disaster recovery operation and civilian operations. The United States army used them after the earthquake in Haiti with the dual role of armed forces in disaster recovery and civilian support in emergency. The gabions and force protection also have high functional value in fl ood control or protection of critical national infrastructure.

PHOTOGRAPHER: WO GARETH DAVIES, RAF

An RAF Merlin helicopter takes off in a cloud of dust from Patrol Base Shazad, Helmand Province.



The highest levels of

blast and fragmentation

protection at the right

price have been the

primary consideration for

ISAF Combat Engineer

Commanders in Iraq

and Afghanistan facing

extreme violence.

Next Generation Combat Engineering and Force ProtectionDon McBarnet, Staff Writer

The highest levels of blast and fragmentation protection at the right price have been the

primary consideration for ISAF Combat Engineer Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan facing extreme violence. And many ISAF coalition countries use HESCO barrier products. The type of force protection provided has to be constructed at operation tempo to mitigate vulnerability whether creating a vital sanger, a perimeter fence or a blast mitigated command headquarters with overhead protection. Force Protection covers not just troops, but in a COB (Contingency Operating Base) security for aircraf t, fuel supplies, ammunition and communication equipment. Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have used HESCO extensively:

“HESCO has delivered approximately 90% of Force Protection capability in Iraq since 2003.”14

HESCO barrier products have also been used extensively by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other international institutions, like the UN and embassies. HESCO is such a frequently used product that its name has become a generic term.

As Major Sean Matten describes: “It is omnipresent in every modern battlefi eld.

It is fl exible, and offers superb protection from horizontal blast and fragmentation if fi lled correctly with effective spoil. Hundreds of metres of HESCO can be delivered with very little transport needed; four trucks of fl atpacked material, with the addition of locally won fi ll, would cover a hundred metres. It is easy to store and its ease of assembly makes it ideal for short-notice tasks. In addition, it only requires a front-loading piece of plant like a JCB to fi ll it with locally-sourced spoil.”15

The Risks That the Latest Barrier Technologies are Designed to WithstandThe commanding combat engineer has a formidable task to mitigate the risks of 21st

century counter insurgency forces and terrorists. Government offi cials and NGOs are as easy targets for counter insurgents as soldiers in a confl ict where civilians can present as valuable a target as military personnel. Barriers and frontline fortifi cation have to be able to withstand initial and secondary blast damage plus fragmentation that can be as injurious as the fi rst impact. Only some of the highest specification protective products on the market can withstand 81mm mortar rounds and 155 mm quick-fused artillery shells, and rocket fi re up to 30 NEQ (Net Explosive Quantity).

Factors that Weigh Heavily in Decision MakingWhere cost and speed of emplacement are primary concerns, the latest designs can help. HESCO products can challenge the time it takes men to fi ll sandbags dramatically by offering long concertinaed gabions that can be erected by two men in a very short period with little training. The latest products can even be placed on uneven terrain. Earth, small stones, rocks, gravel, coarse sand, concrete, and aggregates can be used for the counterweight fi ll. Some types of fi ll do not work, for example, large rocks, large unbreakable pieces of earth, light sand, dust or snow. The coverings offered for gabions are welded zinc-aluminium coated steel wire mesh joined with vertical, helical coil joints. The units are lined with a heavy-duty non-woven polypropylene geotextile, which contains the fill. There was evidence that the effect of UV light diminished the life cycle of the polypropylene, but new treatment has addressed the problem and made the propylene more durable.

Higher Protection from Stackable UnitsNot all areas to be protected have a constant risk factor. The height of the protective enclosure can be raised by stacking the units, so the

“There is a military saying that you join the Royal Engineers, travel the world, meet new and interesting people and then surround them in HESCO”. Major Sean Matten, Royal Engineers 201013



latest HESCO gabions offer scalability and potential upgrading should risk levels escalate. Similarly, many newly designed HESCO units are recyclable and can be moved for use elsewhere. The reduction in the logistical footprint of fortifi cation structures is strategic, so many structures are packed into easily stacked and transportable ISO units to reduce the level of truck movements, forklift truck use and manpower for loading and unloading. And of course the ISO units once empty can be used for another purpose.

The Highest Protection from Overhead Blast Proofi ng for the Most Mission-Critical AssetsIt is for the overhead protection of critical assets such as command headquarters and ammunition stores that the latest technologies have been employed. A new locating cup designed by the British company QinetiQ, allows the ubiquitous ISO container to become the supportive roof of a blast proof structure. “A specially designed and manufactured locating cup is fitted to the four corners of an ISO container frame or similarly confi gured product. These cups provide the central support to the steel roof beams. The roof beams in turn locate into the Concertainer units.”16 This Extended Overhead Protection reduces risk from VBIED (Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Devices) and targeted mortar and rocket attacks.

While in some areas, Alaska and the smaller Jersey concrete barriers can offer easy crane positioning for some perimeter fencing, they have limited flexibility and often a higher

logistical footprint. The proven value of the next generation HESCO products backed by the latest technologies in material and engineering science present tried and tested proven force protection against an opposing force that can never be underestimated.

PHOTOGRAPHER: LT BRIAN GLEESON, US ARMY

The Taliban were attacking with small arms fi re from the mountains and fi elds around us. US Forces were denying the enemy the

use of that mountainous terrain by shooting this 120mm mortar on to the mountain tops. However, the Taliban manoeuvred to

the fi elds and began shooting at the mortar team. They had to stay as low as possible, behind the HESCO barrier, to keep from

getting shot. The HESCO took a lot of bullets that day, but our guys all walked out of there a little dustier, but unscathed.

The proven value of the

next generation HESCO

products backed by the

latest technologies in

material and engineering

science present tried

and tested proven force

protection against an

opposing force that can

never be underestimated.



References:1 Clearing the Way: Combat Engineers in Kandahar 23 Field Squadron Author – Edited by Major Mark Gasparotto. 2010, ISBN softcover 978-1-926582-54-2, hard cover ISBN 978-1-925582-55-9

2 Douglas R. Cubbison is a Military Historian with the Research and Publication Team, U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as the Command Historian with the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. the.honoluluadvertiser.com/.../ M11470421119.PDF – United States






8 Statement by Dr. Tony Tether, Director Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities House Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives March 29, 2006

9 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13893464 23 June 2011, BBC News

10 p.75 Clearing the Way; Combat Engineers in Kandahar 23 Field Squadron Edited by Major Mark Gasparotto. 2010, ISBN softcover 978-1-926582-54-2, hard cover ISBN 978-1-925582-55-9.



13 Major Sean Matten, Royal Engineers: http://www.ingenia.org.uk/ingenia/issues/issue37/matten_basra.pdf



16 http://www.hesco.com/prod_eops.asp

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resource for senior military and

defence industry professionals.

• Up to the minute Industry and Technology News and other content available to

all site users on a free of charge, open access basis.

• Qualified signed up members are able to access premium content Special

Reports and interact with their peers using a variety of advanced online

networking tools.

• Designed to help users identify new technical solutions, understand the

implications of different technical choices and select the best solutions

available.

• Thought Leadership - Advice and guidance from internationally recognised

defence industry key opinion leaders

• Peer Input - Contributions from senior military personnel and defence industry

professionals

• Independent Editorial Content - Expert and authoritative analysis from award

winning journalists and leading industry commentators

• Unbiased Supplier Provided Content

• Designed to facilitate debate

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