Leonardo

Reply to Roy R. BehrensAuthor(s): David CarrierSource: Leonardo, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue: Visual Art, Sound, Music and Technology (1987),p. 210Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578361 .

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processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

processes. As this has not been confirmed by neurological research, it tends to be regarded as highly speculative and is sometimes cited as the Achilles' heel of gestalt theory. Thus, if one intended to present gestalt psychology in an un- favorable light, it would be expedient to focus almost exclusively on isomorphism while ignoring the lasting and more valuable findings with which it is identified in virtually every definition except Carrier's.

2. In Carrier's essay, we are told that "psychologists studying perception today are not especially concerned with gestalt psychology". This is true, since gestalt psychology is an historical phenomenon which flourished 50 years ago. On the other hand, Carrier does not mention that virtually all of the findings of gestalt psychology (excepting the one that he dwells on, isomorphism) have been absorbed by subsequent schools of psychology. In other words, among psychologists studying perception today, each and every one makes use of psychological principles which were initially championed by gestalt psychology.

3. To my knowledge, Carrier's essay is the only synopsis of gestalt psychology that omits the "principles of perceptual organization", including such factors as figure/ground, similarity grouping, proxi- mity grouping, continuity, closure, et cetera. If Carrier is not consciously aware of these perceptual principles, he employs them naively whenever he writes: printing his essay in black ink on white paper, by clustering letters to formulate words, by indenting paragraphs, and so on. In the education of an artist, as distinct from the training of philosophers and art historians, these principles of perceptual organi- zation-also known as 'unit forming factors' or 'design principles'-are studied in the freshman year. That we unavoidably see the world in accordance with these principles would appear to be confirmed by the universality of visual camouflage (both natural and military), which is the deliberate use of these laws for deceptive purposes.

Roy R. Behrens Ballast Quarterly Review

113 West Gaston Savannah, Georgia 31401 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

The focus of my reply to Rudolf Arnheim was on Arnheim's theory of art, not, as Behrens implies, on a general discussion of gestalt psychology. For that reason, most of his informative discussion is quite beside the point. My goal was not to

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey

discredit gestalt psychology, but to point to the ways in which gestalt psychology as presented by Arnheim does not, so I argued, adequately address the issues presented in my article, which Arnheim so kindly took the time to discuss.

As for the claim that gestalt psycho- logists have dropped reference to iso- morphism, I would note that Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 50-1) presents a traditional statement of that doctrine. As for the claim that present-day psycho- logists use the principles of gestalt psychology, I would call attention to Herbert Simon's denial that perception of three-dimensional figures is "'holistic' in any simple sense" (Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought, New Haven and London, 1979, p. 359) and the account of perception to be found in Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco, 1976). That we make figure/ground distinctions and the other discriminations mentioned by Behrens is a fact known long before the creation of gestalt psychology; how to explain this capacity is an issue worth study. My point, simply, is that the ways gestalt psychology talks about these capacities, at least as we find in Arnheim's books, do not provide a productive mass of understanding visual art. Behrens' reply would be more effective could he demonstrate how a psychologist might provide the art historian with ways of describing paintings.

David Carrier Department of Philosophy

CArnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.

REPLY TO ROY R. BEHRENS: CONCERNING ISOMORPHISM

Roy R. Behrens' observations on the abiding usefulness of the gestalt principles in artistic theory and practice should be supplemented by a comment on 'iso- morphism'. This concept is not limited to the relation between perceptual pheno- mena and the corresponding neurological processes. It refers to any structural analogy between patterns located in different media, and in this broader sense it is of central relevance to gestalt theory itself as well as to its applications in the arts. When one tries to understand how the melodic and harmonic patterns of music or the motions of a dancer convey their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

their expressive meaning with such striking immediacy, the isomorphic relation between the shapes and colors perceived and the meanings transmitted by them is the only base from which a concrete analysis of practical examples can be

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper

undertaken. The same is true for the spontaneous symbolism of compositional patterns in painting, sculpture and architecture. I myself have spent a lifetime demonstrating by any number of examples how this most effective tool allows us to deal with the interaction of form and content in the arts.

Behrens is correct in saying that the particular neurological mechanisms pro- posed by W. K6hler on the basis of his experiments have led to controversy. This does not mean that the general notion of an isomorphic relation between the processes of perception and those taking place in the nervous system should be discarded. To me it has always seemed most economical to assume that when experiences are subject to gestalt principles, their physiological correlates will turn out eventually to be gestalten also. Beyond that, we had better leave the nervous system to the experts.

Rudolf Arnheim 1113 South Seventh Street

Ann Arbor, Michigan U.S.A.

COMMENTS ON "THE EVOLUTION OF ITALIAN PAINTING: A

QUANTITATIVE INVESTIGATION OF TRENDS IN STYLE AND CONTENT FROM THE LATE GOTHIC TO THE ROCOCO

PERIOD"

While an article on empirical aesthetics (Leonardo 19, 217-222, 1986) is welcomed in a journal such as Leonardo, I have some comments or observations not only about Martindale's noble efforts but about empirical research in the arts as well. My problems with Martindale's paper are both conceptual and methodological.

Methodological Concerns

Since many of the research workers in this field are psychologists, they use students from Psychology 100 classes, students who are by definition naive subjects. Should not some comparisons be made with subjects from art, design and art history classes? I question the relevance of those theories of empirical aesthetics that are based upon the responses of naive subjects only. George Dickie at the University of Illinois made these same observations in a paper published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

published more than 20 years ago that was entitled "Is Psychology Relevant to Art?" The questions posed in Dickie's paper seem to be more than relevant to Martindale's research. A second problem is, why select artists based on listings in an

Commentaries Commentaries Commentaries Commentaries 210 210 210 210

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