spaces of extraction

8/4/2019 Spaces of Extraction

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myanmar the state, community and the environment

Spaces of extractionGovernance along the riverine

networks of Nyaunglebin District

Ken MacLean

Contemporary maps prepared by the State Peace and DevelopmentCouncil (SPDC) place most o Nyaunglebin District in eastern Pegu

Division. Maps drawn by the Karen National Union (KNU), however,place much o the same region within the western edge oKaw ThooLei, its term or the ree state the organisation has struggled since 1948to create. Not surprisingly, the districts three townships have dierentnames and overlapping geographic boundaries and administrativestructures, particularly in remote regions o the district where the SPDCand the KNU continue to exercise some control. These competing

eorts to assert control over the same space are symptomatic o a broaderconcern that is the ocus here, namely: how do confict zones becomeplaces that can be governed? What strategies and techniques are usedto produce authority and what do they reveal about existing ormso governance in Burma? In considering these questions, this chapterexplores the emergence o governable spaces in Shwegyin Township,which comprises the southern third o Nyaunglebin District (Figure

11.1).


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spaces of extraction

Figure . Shwegyin Township Mining Area


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For decades, the SPDC and the KNU ought one another to controlthe riverine systems in Nyaunglebin District, and with them the fowo people, inormation, ood and other commodities in the region.

During the mid 1990s, eorts to extract the districts natural resourcesintensied and more regulated orms o violence have since largelyreplaced lethal ones, at least where primary commodities are ound. Thischapter describes how the topography o these riverine systems shapesstruggles by dierent state and non-state actors to control access to suchvaluable resources. Special attention is ocused on the dierent waysmilitary battalions and private business interests compete and collude

with one another to produce a compliant labour orce in low-lyingareas where alluvial gold deposits are extracted and hydroelectricity isto be utilised. The data, drawn rom eld research conducted in thetownship between 2001 and 2005, reveal some o the contradictionsthat have accompanied eorts to consolidate centralised state controlo Shwegyin Township (MacLean and Mahn Nay Myo 2002; ERI andKESAN 2003; ERI 2005; MacLean orthcoming).

Governable spaces

The term governable spaces was coined by Nikolas Rose to explore thenature and the practice o governmentwhat Foucault dened in hispath-breaking lectures on governmentality as the conduct o conduct(Rose 1999:314; Foucault 1991 [1978]). Who, in other words, cangovern? What constitutes governing in a particular cultural and historical

context? And what or who is being governed? To help answer thesequestions, which are ar more complex than they rst appear, Rosedisaggregates the practice o government into our components so as tomore ully examine how changes in the relationship between resources,territoriality and identity produce distinct kinds o spaces.1 The rstcomponent concerns the ways by which sub-populations are dened vis--visone another along axes o dierence such as age, gender, language,

ethnicity, religion, class, comportment and so on. The second involvesthe techniques o government through which authority is constituted


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and rule accomplished. The third emphasises the types o thought,calculation and expertise brought to bear in governmentconcernsthat are not reducible either to those o ideology or economics. Lastly,

the ourth stresses the orms o identication that produce governablesubjects, who need specic kinds o ocial documentation to beeligible or services and to exercise particular rights (see Watts 2004).All our components are, o course, relevant or understanding thediverse orms o government that have emerged in Burmas ormerconfict zones. Moreover, the components are interrelated and, ideally,they should be examined in relation to the others rather than separately.

The discussion that ollows, however, ocuses more narrowly andconcretely on the second component in order to make sense o thesocioeconomic and ecological transormations that have occurred inShwegyin Township in the past decade (c. 19962006).

It is important to note at the outset that these transormations, whichwill be described shortly, have resulted in contradictory outcomes, whichsimultaneously extend and ragment centralised state control o spaceswhere natural resourcesin this instance, gold and hydroelectricity

are located.2 As a consequence, current politico-administrative maps oBurma have become little more than cartographic illusions (Ohmae1995:7) that ail to depict accurately how these areas and the resourceconcessions located within them are governedand by whom. A moreaccurate representation would require dynamic maps with multiplelayers to convey how momentary economic alliances anchored toparticular resource bases have created mosaics o territorial control

(Hardin 2002:ii), which have urther dislocated populations anddevastated the ecosystems they rely on. The ndings also complicateanalyses that continue to stress ethno-nationalist struggles as theprimary cause o the SPDCs counter-insurgency campaigns, somethingit regularly justies by claiming that the Tatmadaw(army) is the onlyinstitution capable o preserving national unity and the territorialintegrity o Burma (ICG 2001; Houtman 1999:59120).

The evidence presented here instead indicates that revenue streamsand not national security concerns have long dominated the agenda o


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myanmar the state, community and the environment0

the Tatmadaws battalions in Nyaunglebin District. Moreover, regulatoryagencies there have little or no ability to enorce existing laws related tothe sustainable management o the countrys resources. Recent reports

published on the extractive industries operating elsewhere in Burmasuggest this state o aairs is not limited to the districts waterways, butincreasingly eects the country as a whole (see, or example, GlobalWitness 2003; Images Asia and PKDS 2004; Karen Rivers Watch 2004;and Thaung and Smith in this volume). I true, this means that mucho Burmas remaining natural capital is under serious threat.

Background

Nyaunglebin District is a study in contrasts. The Tatmadaw hascontrolled large areas o the district or decades, especially urban areasand the low-lying plains, which orm a narrow strip o ertile landon both sides o the Sittaung River. As a consequence, beore 2006,these areas experienced only three waves o large-scale, state-sponsoredviolence, each o which entailed the orced relocation o thousands o

Karen civilians: in 19751982, 19881990 and 199799 (Karen Rivers Watch 2004:26; BERG 1998). Interestingly, oral histories collectedrom those aected indicate that the extractive industries continuedto operate through all but the worst moments o violence during eacho these waves (MacLean orthcoming; ERI and KESAN 2003:27).Ocial statistics also support these claims.

Despite the violence, mining operations in Shwegyin Township

were able to extract signicant, i varying, amounts o gold duringthe third wave: 31 kilograms in 1988; 124kg in 1989; 26kg in 1990;and 145kg in 1991 (Pui-Kwan 1991:62). While urther research isnecessary, the inormation suggests counter-insurgency operationswere not antithetical to the pursuit o prot; rather, they appear tohave acilitated the expansion and intensication o the extractiveindustries in the township (see also Frynas 1998; Ferguson 2006).3 Thisis not to suggest that violence has disappeared entirely; abuses remainwidespread and continue to grow more entrenched and burdensome,


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particularly in areas where valuable resources are ound. The violencein the concessions is, however, now largely regulated.

In contrast, the Karen living in the rugged hills that cover

approximately 75 per cent o Nyaunglebin District have endured near-constant warare, suering and loss or the past ve decades (KHRG2001a). Despite the existence o a verbal cease-re agreement, tatmadawbattalions have continued to carry out counter-insurgency operations inremote areas where the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA, themilitary wing o the KNU) still exercises some de acto control. SinceJanuary 2004, when the inormal cease-re began, at least seven more

villages have been abandoned out o ear or destroyed by the Tatmadaw.Tatmadawunits have also built seven new military bases in the districtusing orced labour.

In 2005, renewed military operations in Kyauk Kyi Township,which borders Shwegyin to the north, displaced another 5,900 civilians,raising the total number o internally displaced people in eastern Pegu(Bago) Division to 21,300 (TBBC 2005:234). An unknown numbero people died during this perioddirectly rom the confict, throughmistreatment by soldiers, or rom hunger, injuries and treatable diseases.The most recent oensive, which began in March 2006 in the northernand western parts o the district, will undoubtedly raise the number odisplaced people by as much as another 22,000 (TBBC 2006:22, 379).Surprisingly little is known, however, about the orms o governance inthe transition zone between the plains and the hills, where extractiveindustries have long operated. The next section begins to address this

gap by ocusing attention on the districts waterways, which connectthe plains and the hills.

Waterways as governable spaces

In addition to the Shwegyin River, eight rivers and creeks are ound inNyaunglebin District, the largest being the Baw Ka Hta, the Bo Lo andthe Mawtama. The importance o these navigable waterways is several-old. First, the networks o waterways serve as the primary means by


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which people, ood, inormation and basic commodities circulate withinthe region. Areas where two rivers meet are particularly important sincethey orm spaces where it is cost eective or armed groups to extract

rents and to assert their authority (Scott 1998).4 For this reason, theTatmadawand the KNU/KNLA have ought one another or decadesto control these important transportation routes and to tax those whouse them.5

Second, nearly 250 commercially valuable orchards and gardensare located along the Shwegyin and Pa Ta Law Rivers alone.6 The richalluvial soils that line these rivers are the basis o the districts ood

supply and economy. Indeed, many o the cash crops cultivated inNyaunglebin District are important or regional markets and supplychains that extend to Rangoon (Yangon) and other urban areas. Keycrops include betel-nut, durian, rubber and, especially, shauq-thi, a typeo lemon-lime used widely in Burmese cuisine. The district producesnearly one-third o the countrys shauq-thi supply, which currentlysells or 15 kyatsper ruit in Shwegyin and as much as 50 kyatsa ruitin Rangoon.7 These cash crops, however, are currently threatened

by a multi-purpose hydroelectricity project being constructed onthe Shwegyin River. The dams reservoir is expected to submerge asignicant number o these orchards, which will have a devastatingimpact on the regions economy.

Third, nearly all o the gold deposits in the district are located in itsalluvial soils. Since the late nineteenth century, local inhabitants haveextracted gold rom these areas using a range o low-impact techniques,

primarily to augment their incomes during the dry season. In contrast,large-scale gold-mining operations, which used Chinese-manuacturedhydraulic equipment, appeared only in 1997 during the third wave oorced relocations, yet the equipment has devastated much o the areawithin the space o only a ew years. The units use diesel generatorsto pump water through hoses at extremely high pressure, which isthen directed at the banks o rivers and streams to dislodge soil, rock

and other sediments to expose ore-bearing layers. The resulting slurry,ater passing through variable-sized screens to sort the particulates,


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is commonly treated with mercury to amalgamate the gold. Thesetechniques, while ecient, are extremely destructive and have entirelydrained some water sources and permanently altered others. Many

o the districts remaining rivers and streams are now so pollutedrom the chemical run-o, including acid mine drainage, that Karenarmers report that their ruit and citrus trees are beginning to die. Thepollution has also contributed to outbreaks o malaria, dysentery andinectious skin diseases among miners and tatmadawtroops stationedat the mining sites, as well as people living urther downstream (ERIand KESAN 2003:578).

Fourth, as noted above, the Shwegyin River is the site or a multi-purpose, 75-megawatt hydroelectric dam, one o 11 being built in Pegu(Bago) Division (ASEAN India 2005). The Ministry o Electrical PowerEnterprise announced in late 2000 that it would oversee the constructiono the dam next to the village o Kyaut Nagar, several kilometres outsidethe town o Shwegyin. The Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise, a state-owned utility responsible or the generation, transmission and distributiono electricity throughout the country, is expected to manage the dam on itscompletion. Although construction began in 2001, the project has beendelayed repeatedly due to heavy seasonal rains and corruption, especiallythe thet and adulteration o cement. The corruption eventually becameso severe that in 2004 the SPDC replaced the state-owned companiescontracted by the Department o Electrical Power in Pegu (Bago) Divisionwith two privately owned ones: Olympic Company Limited and Min ANaw Ya Ta.8 The dam was scheduled or completion in late 2006, but

urther delays were expected since work on the intake pipe, spillway andpower station had yet to begin.9 Despite these problems, the ShwegyinTownship Peace and Development Council announced plans to transormthe low-lying plains east o the Sittaung River into vast rubber plantationsbeginning in late 2006 using water diverted rom the dams reservoir.According to a report in The New Light o Myanmar(Anonymous 2005),the plantations will ultimately cover between 50,000 and 100,000 acres

by 2009. An unknown number o small landholders who cultivate cropsin this area will be displaced as a result.


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Finally, gold-mining companies have since 2004 sought to obtain theTatmadaws permission to move into the headwaters o the ShwegyinRiver and its tributaries once the dam becomes operational. I this occurs,

their migration will spread the environmental devastation connectedto the mining upstream into the Ku Shaw region where NyaunglebinDistrict and Papun District (Karen State) meet. This region orms thewestern edge o the Kayah-Karen/Tenasserim Moist Forests, which islisted as one o the worlds 200 most signicant eco-regions in termso its biodiversity (WWF 2002). The KNU has repeatedly threatenedto attack the mining operations should they move towards Ku Shaw,

a response that could cause the already tenuous cease-re between itand the SPDC to completely collapse.10 Despite these threats, MilitaryOperations Command 21 established a new headquarters in Ku Shawin mid 2006 to carry out counter-insurgency operations in the hillsbetween it and the Mawtama River, which suggests the expansion ogold-mining into this area is likely in the near uture.11

The above developments share two overlapping eatures that reinorceone another over time to create the means through which authority isconstituted and rule accomplished in Nyaunglebin District. The rstis the militarisation o everyday lie. Since 1999, when the third waveo orced relocations ended, the Tatmadaw has constructed (usingorced labour) 17 army camps and 25 SPDC-controlled relocationcentres. Most are ound along the road linking Shwegyin, Kyauk Kyiand Tantabin or along the banks o the Shwegyin River where theconcessions and dam are located (TBBC 2005). The second entails

the regulated orms o violence that govern how dierent tatmadawbattalions, mining companies, private businessmen and constructionrms compete and collude with one another to obtain land and rentsrom those who reside in the area. Caught in the middle are the nowpredominantly Burman migrant labourers, who extract the gold, andthe Karen, whose economic livelihoods and way o lie, based largelyon horticulture and petty trading, are being destroyed. What once was

considered our treasure has now become our sorrow, said one Karenarmer.12 Another displaced armer echoed these sentiments: When


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the next generation is asked where their parents lived, they will notbe able to say anything because the land will have been destroyed andthere wont be anything let to show them.13

Together, these trends, which are accompanied by severe travelrestrictions, ear and worsening pollution, mean that options continue tonarrow or most Karen living along Nyaunglebin Districts waterways. Theonly alternatives are to seek employment as day labourers or the extractiveindustries operating in the district, to become internally displaced peopleor to fee the region entirely. None o these options are attractive andeach carries its own risks, including urther abuses, increased morbidity

and premature death (TBBC 2004; 2005). Since the abuses connected tomilitarisation are well documented, the sections that ollow ocus insteadon the regulated orms o violence in Shwegyin Township.

Regulated violence

Most attempts to understand the reasons or displacement in easternBurma have or entirely justiable reasons ocused on state-sponsored

violence. Between December 1996 and 2005, the Tatmadawand itsarmed proxies orcibly displaced approximately one million people inthis part o the country alone. More than 2,500 villages were destroyed,relocated or abandoned as a result. Despite cease-re agreements withnearly all o the armed groups operating along the countrys easternborder, there are still more than hal a million internally displaced peoplein this region (TBBC 2005). The scale and severity o this violence,

however, has directed attention away rom other orms o displacementthat do not neatly all into categories o those caused by armed confictor large-scale development projects, such as the construction o rail linesor natural gas pipelines (see Robinson 2003).

This is not to suggest that violence is absent in and around the

concessions. The research team collected troubling accounts o physicaland sexual assault, torture, murder and illegal orms o military

conscription. But the number and severity o these incidents appearsto have decreased in areas where natural resource extraction takes place,


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a trend that has been conrmed elsewhere in eastern Burma (TBBC2005:26, 43). Similarly, the Tatmadaws use o orced labour, althoughstill widespread across the country (ILO 2006), has largely disappeared

in the mining concessions as well. Thus the concessions appear toregulate violence by establishing semi-ormal, i still largely arbitraryand extra-legal, rules, which help govern access to particular resourcesand the kinds o rents that can be levied by dierent actors. The twoprimary means or doing so in Shwegyin Township are outlined in thesections that ollow.

Tactics for acquiring property

The extractive industries and tatmadawbattalions operating in ShwegyinTownship have utilised a number o dierent strategies to secure accessto land and steady streams o revenue. Since dierent resources areoten ound in the same spaces, conficts over how extraction is to occurand under whose control are not uncommon. The main strategies,which have changed over time in response to this competition, can be

subdivided into two categories: those related to the extractive industriesand those related to dierent kinds o inrastructure projects in thetownship, the largest o which is the Kyaut Nagar Dam. Althoughsignicant dierences exist between strategies used, they both resultin similar outcomes: displacement.

According to local sources, eorts to intensiy gold-mining inShwegyin Township began as early as 1995; however, mining companies

did not begin to seek to secure land rights on a large scale until 1997.The initial expansion coincided with the wave o orced relocationsthe Light Inantry Division No.77 was then carrying out along thedistricts waterways. During the rst years o the gold-rush, in whichan estimated 10,000 people arrived in the district, many enterprisingminers simply oered large sums o money to whomever was therecultivating the land and caring or the orchards at the time (ERI and

KESAN 2003:17). This strategy oten worked as previous waves oviolence had led many o the de jurelandowners to relocate elsewhere.


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In many instances, it was impossible to know whether the real ownerwas still alive and, i so, where he or she might be locatedgiven therequency with which Karen living in the area have had to move to

avoid state-sponsored violence or in direct response to it (Burma BorderConsortium 2003:47, 50). When people did return, many ound theirland occupied by kin, riends, neighbours or other internally displacedpeople, which was a source o considerable inter-personal confict.14

For those who remained, the unceasing demands rom tatmadawunits or orced labour, taxes, ood and other materials ensured that mostKaren in the area remained poor and hungry (Burma Border Consortium

2003; AHRC 1999). Given these conditions, it is not surprising thatsome landowners opted to sell property, which may or may not have beentheir own, to representatives o the mining companies when oered topurchase them. While the sums were still many times below real marketvalue, they were nonetheless considerable. Reported amounts rangedanywhere rom 500,000 up to three million kyats.15 Even then, thiswas many times below market value. Gold-mining companies shitedstrategies in 2001 ater construction on the dam began. Since the damsreservoir would eventually food the area, the mining companies optedto work directly with tatmadawbattalions to convince Karen landownersto sell their property at below market prices or ace violent retribution.(The shit in tactics also led to the gradual consolidation o the industry,which by 2003 was dominated by three companies, each o whichemployed between 1,000 and 1,500 labourers: Aye Mya Pyi Sone, KanWa and Ka Lone Kyeik.16 Since most Karen, like other non-Burmans,

lack national identication cards and/or a ull set o title deeds to theirproperty (TBBC 2005), it proved easy to use these quasi-legal, albeitunjust and highly discriminatory, tactics to orce a sale. To date, nearly allo the original inhabitants o Ywa Myoe, Kun Nie, Be La, Htee Ka Hta,Ta Nee Pa and Su Mu Hta villagesa predominantly Karen areahavesold or abandoned their elds due to these tactics.17 Nonetheless, theappearance o legality remains important. As one indication, the orcible

seizure o land without compensation remains rare, even in areas wheresignicant gold deposits are located.


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In contrast, tatmadaw units based at the dam site and theconstruction companies have expropriated large areas o land aroundKyaut Nagar since 2001. In most instances, homes were destroyed

with bulldozers with little or no advance warning. No compensationhas been provided or those displaced by the project.18 Additionally, toobtain sucient ll or the dam, which is 1.1km long and 56m high,Min A Naw Ya Ta and the Olympic Company Limited are using heavyequipment and large teams o day labourers to remove rocks rom thebed o the Ka Tee Chong River. The rocks are then transported tothe dam site by truck. Some enterprising local businessmen have also

hired their own teams o Burman day labourers to nd stones closerto the construction site, which typically involves trespassing on privateproperty and causing damage to elds and orchards. The use o orcedlabour by Light Inantry Brigades Nos 20 and 57 is also common atthe dam site and in connection with other inrastructure projects, againin contrast with the mining concessions, where wage labour is thenorm.19 Forced labour is particularly acute where roads are being eitherupgraded or built anew. This expanding road network has permittedlogging companies to extend their operations into more remote areaso the district. The roads have also enabled the Tatmadawto sustain itssupply lines during the rainy season, allowing it to continue a militaryoensive year-round or the rst time. Forced relocations continue tooccur as well.20 In 2005, a total o six villages were aected; two villageslocated near the dam site were destroyed, while the residents o anotherour villages were orced to relocate as punishment or having contact

with the KNLA.21The continuing patterns o abuse are contributing to a growing

sense o resource atalism (Inbaraj 2004). According to local sources,everyone eels increasingly compelled to participate in the destructiono their ecosystems in order to earn some income beore everything oeconomic value is extracted.22 A Karen man, who lost his orchard tomining companies and now makes charcoal to help pay the ees imposed

on him by the Tatmadaw, explained: I we do not burn charcoal, wewill not be able to eat. But i we do burn the charcoal, it will aect


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the environment. When all the trees are gone, we do not know whatwe will do (KESAN 2003:25). Since Karen residents lack recourse tolegal remedies, the only available alternative is to stand aside and watch

others consume the basis o their economic livelihoods.

Tactics for acquiring rents

The militarisation that has accompanied the expansion o gold-miningventures is not simply a means to provide security or these operations.The presence o large numbers o soldiers has also permitted the militaryto strengthen control over the local economy by extracting an array orents, which are commonly dened as the extraction o uncompensatedvalue rom others. The predatory practices employed by tatmadawbattalions and their troops oer a case in point. Beore the 2006 oensive,there were ve battalions based in Shwegyin Township: Light InantryBrigades Nos 589, 598, 349, 350 and Inantry Brigade No.57. Sinceeach o these battalions has to extract rents to help cover operating costsand to make regular payments to their superior ocers, the eld units

compete with one another while stationed temporarily in the concessionsto extort additional resources rom those who live or work in the extractivezones.23 (A similar system o gatesthat is, military check-points whereadditional rents are extractedis in place along the districts roads andrivers but is not discussed here.) This competition also extends down tothose units drawn rom the same mother battalion. Miners and armers,or example, report that units rotate every month and demands or non-

scheduled rents typically occur just beore the soldiers return to theirbase, a practice that decreases the amount o money and ood availableto those who arrive to take their place. According to local sources, mosto the illicitly gained income moves up the chain o command, rst toBrigadier-General Thura Maung Nyi, who heads Division No.77, andthen to Major-General Ko Ko, who is in charge o the Southern RegionalCommand based in Toungoo.24

The rents, although they generate airly predictable revenue streams,are modest compared with the income generated by the gold itsel. During


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Tab

le11.1

Selectedlistofrentsextractedinthem

iningconcessions,

ShwegyinTownship,

20042005

Collectedby

Type

Amount(kyat)

Tatmadawunits

Securityeeorminingcompanies

1020,000per

month(plusadditionalees)

Tatmadawunits

Taxorsmall-businessoperators

400anight

(tea,video,karaokeandcasino/brothel

)

ope

ratingwithinconcessions

Tatmadawunits

Securityeeorsmall-business

1,5003,000pershoppermonth

operators

Tatmadawunits

R

esidencetaxorminers

700perperson

permonth

anddependents

Tatmadawunits

Traveleetoenterand

500perperson

(validoneweektoonemonth

)

exitconcessions

Tatmadawunits

Securityeeorlandowners

12,000perow

nerpermonth

nearminingsites

Tatmadawunits

Permiteesorfrewoodcollection

3,000perperso

npermonth

M

iningcompany

Scavengingee

23,000perpe

rsonperdaytosearchtailings

orgold


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Source:FieldSurveyNo.001(2002);InterviewNos0015(2005),001

2FU(2005)

High-ranking

Leaseeeorminingonprivateproperty

Landownerretains60percentoallgoldextra

cted

military

of

cialsand

businessmen

Tatmadawbattalions

Taxonm

inersemployedbycompany

1,000perminer

permonth

Divisionheadquarters

Concessionee

100,000permo

nth

(separateromamountpaidto

D

epartmentoMines)

Divisionheadquarters

R

entaleeorhydraulic

1500,000perm

achingpermonth(variesaccordingto

equipment(goestoDivisionFund)

productivityos

ite)

Brigadier-General

P

ermissioneepaidby

500,000permo

nth

Th

uraMaungNyi

batta

lionstocollecttheabove


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the early years o the gold-rush, high-ranking tatmadawcommanders,such as General Thura Maung Nyi, and local businessmen, such as PoBaing, reportedly purchased large tracts o land. Under current leasing

arrangements, these men retain 60 per cent o all the gold extracted onproperties they own. According to local sources, each o the miningconcessions (which requently has more than one hydraulic unitoperating within it) produces an estimated 1.5kg o gold dust and fakesa month.25 While not a signicant amount by international standards,the price o gold in Burma has nonetheless increased dramatically inthe past several years, making it a highly lucrative source o income.

In 2003, one kyat tharo gold (1.53 grams) sold or 90,000 kyats inShwegyin Township (ERI and KESAN 2003:55).26 By April 2006,concerns about the stability o the regime and related infationarypressures drove the price to a record high o 500,000 kyats per tical(16.3g), according toXinhua (21 April 2006). At these rates, 1.5kg ogold a month would provide an astronomical return, especially whencompared with the gross domestic product per capita in Burma, whichis estimated to be a mere US$1,700 (CIA 2004).

These ndings, which are summarised in Table 11.1, support aworking hypothesis that the ee structure is not simply an extra-legalmeans to create wealth.27 The system, which osters competition withinand between dierent segments o the Tatmadaw, appears to establisha ramework where ambitious ocers, by strategically redistributinggoods and services (including rights to collect rents), can advance theircareers (see also KHRG 2001a). The arrangements also suggest that

regulatory controls on the extractive industries are, at best, weak (seeGutter 2001). At worst, the sta members who work or the governmentdepartments representing dierent ministries are complicit in theabuses occurring around them. The Department o Mines, to oer oneexample, is charged with implementing the terms o the 1994 MyanmarMines Law. Among other things, the law requires permit-holders tocreate sae conditions or workers; to use land and water in accordance

with existing laws; and to pay royalties o between 4 and 5 per centon all gold extracted (SLORC 1994). These and other requirements


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specied under the law, however, appear never to have been enorced bythe Department o Mines. In act, local inormants make no reerenceto the department in any o their accounts.

Conclusion

What accounts or or contributes to these orms o government alongthe waterways o Nyaunglebin District? In part, living conditionsthroughout much o the country have deteriorated to the point that,in order to eed themselves, many people now have to participatein practices that are morally corrosive and result in environmentaldegradation. One clear sign o this can be ound in the concessionsthemselves. While some o the labourers working along the riverinenetworks are rom the area, the majority o the miners are landless,economic migrants (ethnic Burmans, Shan and Chinese), who opt toperorm the work despite the dangers involved and the act that payscales are rarely sucient to meet daily expenses given high rates o localinfation. This emergent proletarian class, however, remains internally

subdivided as all o the extractive industries exhibit a strong preerenceor hiring workers rom their own ethnicity and men earn considerablymore than women, even when they perorm the same task. Additionally,Karen are employed only as a last resort, which leaves commercialcharcoal production and the harvest o rattan and bamboo as the ewways subsistence armers and internally displaced people can earn cashto purchase medicine, cooking oil and other necessities (ERI 2003). This

is not to imply that people who live and work in the concessions lackagency; rather, it is to convey that or Burmans and non-Burmans alike,their scope or action, especially or anything beyond mere survival,has become sharply circumscribed in the past decade (Heppner 2005;Cusano 2001; TBBC 2005; Agamben 1998).

More generally, this case study has emphasised some o the keyprocesses that make ormer confict zones governable, namely: the

militarisation o everyday lie and the regulated violence that hasaccompanied it. The ndings reveal that contradictory modes o


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government currently exist along the waterways o NyaunglebinDistrict, especially in Shwegyin Township, where mining concessionsoverlap those areas aected by the construction o the Kyaut Nagar

Dam. The various actors involvedtatmadaw battalions, miningcompanies, construction companies and related state agencieshavedevised quite dierent strategies and techniques or constituting theirauthority and or disciplining their labourers, even though they operatealong the same short stretch o the Shwegyin River. Some o theseactors have ound ways to collaborate with each other, whereas otheractors continue to work at cross purposes. Still other actors manage to

do both simultaneously: the erce competition or rents not only pitstatmadawbattalions against one another, but against their own soldiers,who seek to extract yet more resources rom the mining companies andtheir labourers beore rotating out o the mining concessions.

Such practices have simultaneously extended and ragmented thecentralised state control o spaces where natural resources are located. Thisapparent contradiction is made possible by revenue fows that generateand sustain powerul patronclient networks that cross-cut the boundaries

imagined to separate state rom non-state institutions (see Nordstrom2000, 2006; Roitman 1998). So while the military, administrative andeconomic reach o the regime is clearly growing stronger in NyaunglebinDistrict, the means by which its authority is exercised remains ar romcoherent or benign. The dam, as will be recalled, will displace the gold-mining companies, providing them with the opportunity to extendtheir operations towards Ku Shawa move that will likely lead to

urther armed confict between the Tatmadawand the KNU, as well asenvironmental degradation. Additionally, the dam will enable a massivecommercial plantation east o the town o Shwegyin to be created. Ithis occurs, several thousand more armers will lose their land and thedistricts economy, once based on a diverse array o crops, will be replacedby a single, non-edible commodity: rubber. These cascading orms odisplacement, which ollow those that have already orced most o theKaren population that once lived along Nyaunglebin Districts waterways

to leave (MacLean orthcoming), indicate that the transormation oShwegyin Township is ar rom over.


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Notes

1 For a discussion o the dierences between governance and governmentality,see Rose 1999:1524. The emphasis here will be on governance.

2 Other important resources include timber, charcoal, bamboo and rattan.3 Interview Nos: 003 (2002), 002GM (2004), 001, 003, 002FU (2005). Unless

noted, all interviews were conducted by EarthRights International and are onle with the organisation. To protect inormants identities, interviews as wellas eld documents and surveys are reerred to by number rather than name.

4 Scott reerred to such sites as potential state spaces, however, they are equallyopen to control by other (armed) groups, as is the case here.

5 The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a splinter group allied with

the SPDC, conducted itsel similarly, but as o mid 2005 is no longer ociallyactive in the district.

6 Field Survey No. 002 (2004).7 Interview Nos 001, 006 (2005).8 Field Document Nos 003, 006 (2005).9 Field Document Nos 003, 006 (2005)10 Opinions remained divided on the broader signicance o the 2006 oensive.

Some argue that the cease-re still holds and that the operations were narrowly

intended to create a larger buer around the new capital in Naypyitaw, topunish anti-cease-re actions within the KNU (especially Brigade No.2), andto secure access to natural resources in areas still patrolled by the KNLA. Othersassert that the oensive is really a precursor to a much larger one intendedto bring all o Nyaunglebin District and northern Karen State rmly underRangoons control. Among other things, this would acilitate the completiono large hydroelectricity projects along the Salween River.

11 Interview Nos 0056 (2005).12 Interview No. 006 (2005).13 Interview No. 006 (2005)14 Interview Nos 002FU (2005), 003 (2005); Field Document No.009

(2005).15 Field Document No. 002 (2004).16 Interview No. 003 (2005).17 Field Survey No. 001 (2002); Interview No.002FU (2005).18 Interview Nos 001, 004 (2005).19 Interview Nos 002, 004 (2005).

20 Field Document No.009 (2005); Interview No.118 (2004); ERI 2005:1718.


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21 Interview Nos 0035 (2005); Field Survey No. 004 (2005); TBBC 2004:67,2005:80.

22 See also Interview Nos 0012GM (2004), 002, 005 (2005); ERI and KESAN

2003:2835; KESAN 2003:25, 28.23 Field Survey No. 001 (2002); Interview Nos 0015 (2005), 0012FU(2005).

24 Interview No. 117 (2004). DKBA units have reportedly posed as tatmadawtroops in the past to collect ees rom miners, which results in the sameproblem. Interview Nos 0012FU (2005).

25 Local sources typically reer to the number o hydraulic mining machinesoperating in a general area, such as a stretch o river, instead o concessionsperse. Between 20 and 30 hydraulic units have been operating along the Shwegyin

River between the dam site and Kan Nee since 2003. Other sources, however,place the total closer to 50 machines. These gures do not include machineson other nearby tributaries, or example, the Mawtama River, where miningis similarly widespread, and parts o Kyauk Kyi Township, where at least 40machines were operating in 2004. Interview Nos 117 (2004), 004, 007 (2005);Free Burma Rangers, email communication with author, 19 April 2006 and13 May 2006.

26 Field Document No. 002 (2005).

27 Field Survey No. 001 (2002); Interview Nos 0015 (2005), 0012FU(2005).

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spaces of extraction

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