50 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

established in October of that yearwhen Sputnik went into orbit. SoonWashington and Moscow opened talkson restricting space-based military op-erations, with the United Nations pro-viding the venue for creating a legalframework on the international gover-nance of space.

With American prodding, theUnited Nations organized a Commit-tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spacein late 1958, which became a majorforum for developing internationalprinciples. The work of this commit-tee, together with diplomatic efforts bythe major nuclear powers, produced anumber of agreements on military ac-tivities in space.

S ince the dawn of the spaceage, developing space-basedsystems has never been apurely technological matter.

The first orbital satellites raised ques-tions on the legality of overflights andactivities in space. The world commu-nity turned by habit to treaty negotia-tions and international law to resolvethe implications of such issues.

Overflights were assumed away asthe United States and the Soviet Unionlaunched scientific satellites to markthe International Geophysical Year in1957. De facto rights on overflight were

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Baucom, USAF (Ret.), is historian of the MissileDefense Agency and the author of The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983.

Space and Missile DefenseBy D O N A L D R. B A U C O M

Artist’s rendering ofBrilliant Pebbles.

Courtesy Missile Defense Agency

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In August 1963, the United States,Soviet Union, and United Kingdomsigned the Limited Test Ban Treaty inMoscow. This agreement, which even-tually had over a hundred signatories,prohibited nuclear testing in space.Two months later, the United Nationsadopted a resolution that banned nu-clear weapons in space and in Decem-ber 1963 passed a resolution establish-ing a set of general rules on the use ofspace. While this document included arequirement for “international consul-tations” before a nation took actionsthat might interfere with the peacefuluse of space, it did not ban militarysystems. The terms of the resolution ef-fectively allowed the United States andthe Soviet Union to deploy militarysatellites. This result was not surpris-ing: deployments had already becomecentral to the space programs of thetwo superpowers.

The next major U.N. space-relatedagreement, the Outer Space Treaty of1967, received unanimous approvalfrom the General Assembly. Signed by66 nations, it mustered a vote of 88–0in the Senate. Its provisions did littlemore than consolidate the terms of theearlier resolutions and recast them inthe form of a binding treaty. The super-powers remained free to deploy mili-tary satellites as long as they did not in-terfere with peaceful activities in space.

Space-Based MissilesWhen the Senate ratified the

Outer Space Treaty, the Pentagon hadbeen pursuing missile defenses for twodecades, starting with the discovery ofGerman wartime plans for an intercon-tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) thatcould have reached New York by 1946.At the outset of the program, limita-tions in sensors, missile controls, andguidance systems required interceptorsto be nuclear-tipped in order to de-stroy relatively small, high-speed tar-gets presented by long-range missiles.The first American missile defense in-terceptor, the Nike-Zeus, was a large,ground-controlled projectile that car-ried a multimegaton warhead.

While the Nike-Zeus was in theinitial stages of development, the Ad-vanced Research Projects Agency

(ARPA) was established as a response tothe launch of Sputnik. Among its firstefforts was Project Defender, the search

for a defense against ballistic missiles.Previously, space-based missile de-fenses were considered impractical be-cause of the on-orbit mass associatedwith a constellation of nuclear-tippedinterceptors. However, when re-searchers gathered in 1960, that per-ception had begun to change. Their

work indicated that it might becomepossible to develop an interceptor thatcould destroy targets by physically col-

liding with them. The en-ergy released by such animpact would be six timesthat of exploding TNTequal to the mass of the in-terceptor. As one study in-

dicated, this hit-to-kill (HTK) concept“removes the necessity of using a nu-clear warhead and replaces it with asimple, cheap, lightweight mechanicaldevice.” That meant weight in orbitcould be reduced by about two orders

the Advanced Research ProjectsAgency was established as a responseto the launch of Sputnik

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Other obstacles included achieving sta-bility in satellites, dealing with coun-termeasures, reducing launch costs,and improving the reliability of space-based systems.

Technology in the early 1960s wasincapable of reifying space-based con-cepts that emerged from Project De-fender. Nevertheless, the projectspawned a stream of research and de-velopment efforts that eventually fedinto the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI), launched in 1983.

Hit-to-KillWhile Project Defender was exam-

ining missile defense concepts, theVought Corporation began focusing onthe homing interceptor-terminal (HIT).Sponsored by ARPA and the Army, thisprogram aimed at producing “a smalland lightweight, spin stabilized, opti-cally guided interceptor that achieveshypervelocity direct impact kill ofreentry vehicles in the exoatmos-phere.” The effort continued into the1970s when HIT technology was ap-plied to the miniature system project(MSP), the development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability for the AirForce. MSP led to the miniature hom-ing vehicle (MHV), which was virtuallyidentical to earlier HIT vehicles. MHVwould serve as the kill vehicle in theASAT system to be launched from theF–15 fighter. The program culminatedin 1985 when MHV destroyed an orbit-ing satellite.

As HIT technology was transition-ed into the Air Force ASAT program,the Army Safeguard missile defensesystem began a short operational lifespan. Safeguard was a layered systemwith two types of nuclear-tipped inter-ceptors. The long-range Spartan, anoutgrowth of the Nike-Zeus program,was designed to attack incoming war-heads at the edge of the atmosphere.Warheads that got past Spartan wouldbe destroyed inside the atmosphere bythe high-speed, short-range Sprint.

Safeguard, which became opera-tional in 1975, had a major disadvan-tage; the detonation of the nuclearwarheads on Spartan and Sprint wouldblind its radars. It was further limited

in magnitude. Boost-phase interceptwas no longer mere fancy; it was aconcept regarded as “sufficientlypromising to warrant increased study.”

Several of the concepts for space-based interceptors (SBIs) advanced in1960 were capable of boost-phase killand were collectively known as ballis-tic missile boost intercept (BAMBI).One of them was the space patrol ac-tive defense (SPAD). It included a 30-ton satellite with an infrared scannerto pick up boosters, a computer to cal-culate their tracks, and 140 intercep-tors weighing 300 pounds each. Firedfrom the host satellite, each intercep-tor would deploy a wire web with a ra-dius of 15 to 50 feet containing many

1-gram pellets fixed along the radialwires. Although the pellets could dam-age ICBM nose cones, causing them toburn up on reentry, they were de-signed to attack vulnerable fuel tanksin the booster. Striking at velocities upto sixty thousand feet per second, theywould inflict catastrophic damage. Toensure system effectiveness, 500 satel-lites would be orbited at an altitude of250 miles above the earth.

Among the challenges of develop-ing such a system was using infraredsensing devices to detect missilelaunches and guide interceptors totheir targets. If the former seemedmanageable, the latter did not. “Sev-eral magnitudes of improvement” wererequired for the second function.

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by the ABM Treaty and the 1974 proto-col to that agreement, restricting signa-tories to a single missile defense sitewith a hundred interceptors. Moreover,it prohibited deployment, if not devel-opment, of space-based missile defensesystems. Since Safeguard could onlydefend ICBM silos near Grand Forks inNorth Dakota, and could itself be over-whelmed by a Soviet attack, Congressacted to terminate the system in 1976.

With the end of Safeguard, theArmy focused missile defense onexoatmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors.Work on this program culminated in1984, when a homing overlay experi-ment (HOE) test vehicle collided withan unarmed reentry vehicle over thePacific Ocean, verifying the principlesbehind exoatmospheric HTK intercep-tors. HOE success pointed toward arevolution in interceptor design; nu-clear warheads were no longer requiredto achieve a reasonably high kill-prob-ability. The accomplishments of thisprogram, along with earlier work onHIT, provided a strong technology basefor the space-based interceptor pro-grams pursued under SDI.

The Role of InterceptorsPresident Ronald Reagan an-

nounced the decision to begin the SDIprogram in 1983. After a year of studyand two and a half years of researchand development, the Secretary of De-fense approved the acquisition of thephase I architecture for the strategicdefense system (SDS).

The principal weapon system inthe SDS architecture was a constella-tion of several hundred SBIs. Similar toSPAD, it included large garage satelliteswith up to ten interceptors and twospace-based infrared sensor systems.The boost surveillance and trackingsystem (BSTS), an Air Force programabsorbed under SDI, would detectlaunches and track missiles throughoutbooster burn. The space surveillanceand tracking system (SSTS) would trackbuses and then follow warheads oncethey separated from the buses.

The SDS phase I architecture hadtwo major deficiencies: it was toocostly and space-based assets, especiallySBI, were vulnerable to Soviet ASAT sys-tems. To overcome these problems, theSDI Organization (SDIO) replaced SBI

with Brilliant Pebbles (BP). Since eachinterceptor had a sensor, on-boardcomputer, and communications capa-bility, it could operate autonomouslywithout the large supporting satellitesof SBI. Furthermore, BP interceptorswould be mass produced, using off-the-shelf components that were largely

commercial grade, making them rela-tively inexpensive. Moreover, replacingSBI with Brilliant Pebbles meant thatinstead of dealing with only a few hun-dred large, lucrative targets (SBI satel-lites containing multiple interceptors),Soviet ASAT systems would have tofind, attack, and destroy thousands ofsmall, inexpensive interceptors. Attack-ing these interceptors with ASATs wasnot cost-effective.

Because of on-board sensors, Bril-liant Pebbles undercut requirementsfor BSTS and SSTS when it replaced SBI

in 1990 and became the principalweapons system in a modified SDSphase I architecture. Since BSTS wasoriginally taken from the Air Force tobe part of SDI, and since the servicestill required an early warning andtracking capability, BSTS and SSTS wereturned over to the Air Force and

evolved into the current space-based infrared system program.

The Cold War ended as Bril-liant Pebbles was being inte-grated into the strategic defensesystem architecture. A subse-

quent review advocated a new focusfor SDI—limited missile attacks. In thenew world order, it would no longer benecessary to defend against a massiveSoviet ICBM attack. The most likelythreat against the American homelandwould be an unauthorized or acciden-tal attack by one or two hundred So-viet warheads. Another was the prolif-eration of missile technology andweapons of mass destruction, whichmade it increasingly important to pro-tect deployed U.S. forces and alliedpopulations and forces from shorter-range missiles.

the Cold War ended as BrilliantPebbles was being integrated intothe strategic defense system

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interceptors, became the basic ap-proach to missile defense under Presi-dent Clinton. A major reason for thistack was the commitment of his ad-ministration to the ABM Treaty.

Under Reagan, and to a lesser ex-tent under Bush, the United States at-tempted to use arms control negotia-tions to transition from offense-basednuclear deterrence to relying increas-ingly on strategic defenses. The ulti-mate goal was eliminating strategic nu-clear weapons.

On the other hand, the Clintonadministration considered arms con-trol at least as important to guarantee-ing the nuclear peace as strategicweapons. According to the head of theArms Control and DisarmamentAgency (ACDA), administration policysought “to protect us first and fore-most through arms control. . . .” 1

Under that position, it followed thatstrengthening the ABM Treaty en-hanced national security.

In line with this view of armscontrol, ACDA denounced the inter-pretation by the previous administra-tion of the ABM Treaty, which wouldhave allowed development and per-haps deployment of space-based inter-ceptors. Moreover, since space-basedsystems were not compatible with ef-forts to strengthen the treaty, it is notsurprising that the Secretary of De-fense removed Brilliant Pebbles fromthe demonstration-validation phase ofthe acquisition process and reduced itto a technology base program. By theend of 1993, the Ballistic Missile De-fense Organization (BMDO), formerlySDIO, was forced to completely cancelthe eviscerated program. Paradoxi-cally, the greatest triumph of BrilliantPebbles came after the death of theprogram in a joint BMDO–NationalAeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) mission.

By January 1992 it had becomeapparent to SDIO that the agencywould not be allowed to demonstratethe effectiveness of the technologiesdeveloped under Brilliant Pebbles.Since NASA had earlier approachedDOD about the possibility of usingSDI-developed technologies in its ownprogram, SDIO agreed to use BP com-

The central element in the archi-tecture would be a thin constellationof several hundred BP interceptors,providing an overarching upper tier tocomplement both deployed theatermissile defenses and a limited nationalmissile defense system. As such, Bril-liant Pebbles became the key integrat-ing element of a concept known asglobal protection against limitedstrikes (GPALS).

An America-led coalition wasfighting a war against Iraq in less thana year. In the midst of that conflict,which featured the first operational en-gagements between ballistic missilesand missile defenses, the President an-nounced that GPALS would be the ar-chitecture for SDI. Following the GulfWar, Congress passed the Missile De-fense Act of 1991. This law appeared tosupport the expeditious deployment ofthe GPALS system, including BrilliantPebbles. But it was a compromise be-tween Republican advocates of missiledefense and Democratic defenders ofthe ABM Treaty. In effect, the law gave

half a loaf to treaty supporters and halfto those who considered rapid deploy-ment of missile defenses to be an ur-gent national priority—and neitherside was fully satisfied.

After it interpreted the Missile De-fense Act, DOD pursued a vigorousGPALS program that included substan-tial funding for the space-based BP sys-tem. This provoked a strong reactionfrom Democrats, who considered Bril-liant Pebbles a threat to the ABMTreaty and beyond the pale of the law.When the Democrats gained control ofCongress in 1992, they passed legisla-tion that severely reduced spending onBrilliant Pebbles and prohibited in-cluding it in GPALS architecture,thereby fracturing an integrated globalmissile defense concept into separatecomponents for national and theatermissile defense.

Post-Cold War RealitiesBifurcation of missile defense,

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ponents in a space probe known asClementine. The mission called for theprobe to orbit the moon for over twomonths and then depart the cislunarregion for a rendezvous with the aster-oid Geographos.

The probe was launched in early1994 and completed the lunar portionof its mission. But while maneuveringfor its flight to Geographos, a com-puter failure caused an extended burnof the altitude control system, deplet-ing fuel and leaving the vehicle inca-pable of completing the second part ofthe mission. Nevertheless, Clementineserved as a viable test in which 23 mis-sile defense technologies performedsuccessfully, including many deriveddirectly from Brilliant Pebbles.

Clementine was the high watermark in space-based missile defenses.During the remaining years of theClinton administration, space-basedmissile defense programs were largelylimited to preparations for a far-termtest of a high-power, space-based laserand the development of sensors thatcould cue ground-, sea-, and air-basedmissile defense systems.

George W. Bush assumed the pres-idency determined to deploy effectivemissile defenses in the shortest possi-ble time. In support of this goal, theSecretary of Defense reorganizedBMDO and renamed it the Missile De-fense Agency (MDA) to prepare a set ofoptions to reorient the missile defenseprogram. These options were not to ex-clude ideas that conflicted with theABM Treaty; they would be judgedstrictly on their technical merit. Fur-thermore, to end the bifurcation ofmissile defense into theater and na-tional systems, a division that seem-ingly pitted U.S. interests against othernations, MDA would plan an inte-grated, layered defense to protect bothAmerica and its allies against ballisticmissiles of all ranges.

The system that emerged fromthis restructuring divides the missiledefense mission in three segments:boost, mid-course, and terminal—themajor phases of ballistic missile flight.In theory, each segment could incor-porate land-, sea-, air-, and space-based elements in the future. More-

over, all three segments will be inte-grated into a single ballistic missile de-fense system (BMDS) through bothbattle management and commandand control systems.

To ensure the best technical andoperational options in developingBMDS, Bush withdrew the UnitedStates from the ABM Treaty. Now, in-stead of designing a system to mini-mize violations of the treaty and then

negotiating changes to preserve theagreement (the approach of the previ-ous administration), MDA is drawingon the potential of all systems based onland, at sea, and in the air and space.

Although withdrawal from theABM Treaty ended the legal strictureson developing space-based missile de-fense systems, it did not assure thatsuch systems would rebound to the position accorded to them in the SDIprogram. Indeed, the emphasis of thepresent administration on early deploy-ment of the most effective defensespossible means that the immediatefocus in the program must be onground-based systems, mid-course andterminal, since work on these systemshas been steadily sustained by fourPresidents. Thus the first operationalsystem based on work that flowed fromthe SDI program will be the Patriot Ad-vanced Capability-3 terminal system,which is currently being operational-ized. This will be followed by theground-based midcourse system, whichshould provide a limited defensive ca-pability in the form of an Alaskan testbed system, scheduled to be opera-tional in late 2004 or early 2005.

Under these conditions, space-based systems have been put on theback burner. The space-based laser pro-gram, which included a 2012 space-based experiment under the last ad-ministration, has now become atechnology program focused on proj-ects related to low power laser applica-tions (tracking, imaging, and weaponguidance) and to high-power technolo-gies that might feed into a future

space-based laser project. And work onspace-based HTK interceptors is in-cluded under a broader research anddevelopment project for kinetic energyboost phase interceptors.

Although the concept of space-based missile defenses using HTK inter-ceptors emerged in 1960 from ProjectDefender, two decades of low-level ef-forts were required to bring this con-cept to fruition in the BP interceptor

that was integrated in SDSphase I architecture. The tech-nologies developed for Bril-liant Pebbles were successfullydemonstrated in the Clemen-tine probe after the Clinton

administration killed the former pro-gram. Thus, in a sense, Clementinewas the climax of space-based missiledefenses in the United States.

Space-based missile defenses havenot achieved a comeback under theBush administration despite the U.S.withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.Given the potential of space-basedweapons as boost-phase missile killers,it seems unlikely that BAMBI-like con-cepts will completely lose their luster.Rather, they are likely to wait in thewings until better technologies and anew strategic setting call them back tocenter stage. JFQ

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1 John D. Holum, “Remarks to a Confer-ence Cosponsored by the Center for Na-tional Security Law and the ABA StandingCommittee on Law and National Security,”June 10, 1994.

to ensure the best technical andoperational options, Bush withdrewfrom the ABM Treaty