space countermeasures hands on program (chop) capt mark w. marasch chief, space chop space vehicles...
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SpaceCountermeasures Hands On
Program (CHOP)
Capt Mark W. Marasch
Chief, Space CHOP
Space Vehicles Directorate
Air Force Research Laboratory
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Where We Have Been:Space CHOP AFSPC Contacts
• 26 Jan 01 Col Tom Fitzgerald, SMC/AX & Lt Col Clay, SMC/MT
• 9 Jan 01 Maj Gaines, DRCC & LtCol Moss, DOYD
• 13 Nov 00 Col Roberts, DRC
• 22 Sept 00 Lt Gen Dekok, CV & BGen Hamel, DR
• 10 Aug 00 BGen Hamel, DR
• 3 May 00 SWC/DOG / Air, Space & Aggressor Symposium
• 23 Feb 00 Col Ryals, SWC/CV
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What is Space CHOP?Definition of Countermeasure
• From Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (www.m-w.com):coun·ter·mea·surePronunciation: -"me-zh&r, -"mA- Function: noun Date: 1923
: an action or device designed to negate or offset another; especially : a military system or device intended to thwart a sensing mechanism (as radar) <electronic countermeasures>
• Space CHOP uses the broadest definition
• Space CHOP is named and modeled after BMDO CHOP (now called HARDFAC)
• The term CHOP implies the “bad guy” element
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What is Space CHOP?Why We Exist
Our purpose is nicely stated in the Rumsfeld Space Commission Report (Jan 2001):
“If the US is to avoid a ‘space Pearl Harbor,’ it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on US space systems.”
“Those hostile to the US can acquire on the global market the means to deny, disrupt or destroy US space systems by attacking satellites in space, communication links to and from the ground or ground stations that command the satellites and process their data.”
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What is Space CHOP?Mission
• To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by:
–Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development,
–Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge
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What is Space CHOP?Why We are Unique
• To assist our customers in identifying and reducing space systems vulnerability by:
– Performing open source-based analysis and hardware development,
– Using simulated threat teams composed of junior officers with limited system knowledge
• Identification--we focus on the unknown threat
• Space Systems--we do not duplicate BMDO CHOP
• Open Source--have no access to classified system information, and use COTS hardware
• Hardware Development--not typically involved in excercises
• Limited System Knowledge--teams are calibrated
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What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 1
Known to Owner Unknown to Owner
Unknown by Others
Known by Others PublicPublic BlindBlind
PrivatePrivate UnknownUnknown
*Proportions are not necessarily equal.
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What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 2
Known to Owner Unknown to Owner
Unknown by Others
Known by Others PublicPublic BlindBlind
PrivatePrivate UnknownUnknownSecretsSecrets
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What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 3
Known to Owner Unknown to Owner
Unknown by Others
Known by Others PublicPublic
PrivatePrivate UnknownUnknownFir
st-W
orl
d
Fir
st-W
orl
d
Ass
essm
ents
Ass
essm
ents Blind =Blind =
DANGERDANGER
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What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari Window 4
Known to Owner Unknown to Owner
Unknown by Others
Known by Others PublicPublic
PrivatePrivate UnknownUnknownFir
st-W
orl
d
Fir
st-W
orl
d
Ass
essm
ents
Ass
essm
ents Blind =Blind =
DANGERDANGER
Space CHOP Space CHOP Vulnerability Vulnerability
Assessments & Assessments & HardwareHardware
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What is Space CHOP? Pseudo-Johari RESULT
Unknown by Others
Known by Others PublicPublic BlindBlind
PrivatePrivateUn-Un-
knownknown
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How Space CHOP Does Business:Space CHOP Operation
• Built on BMDO CHOP’s successful history & methods
• Rapid prototyping of less-than-peer Rest Of World (ROW) hardware
– Fast response
– Strict ROW simulation
• Referee team monitors the team’s activities
• Small, custom-built teams (CGOs andjunior DoD civilians)
– Perform studies, design, and buildhardware
How vulnerable is this ground station?
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• Streamlined acquisition process
• All missions are funded by the customer
– Space CHOP does not receive AFRL/VS funds
• Wide potential customer base--all space-dependentorganizations and systems are potentially vulnerable
– AFSPC, USSPACECOM, NRO, AFRL, SMC, NASA...
– Commercial and allied governments’ assets
How Space CHOP Does Business:Space CHOP Operation
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How Space CHOP Does Business:Mission Architecture
S CHOP Manager
S CHOP Advisor
CHOP Team
CHOP Core
MISSION TEAM (ROW SIMULATION)
Space CHOP MANAGEMENT
Referee Team
CUSTOMER
= Customer/ US Asset
= Briefed Mission Control Team
= Non-briefed Mission Execution Team
Defines the mission Provides fundingPopulates Referee TeamCustodian of final results
Recognized experts that focus the team•Customer representatives•Technical Experts•Others as required
Guides each Red Team“Stewards” customer’s fundsProvides infrastructure
Red team ROW simulation Researches the missionDevelops solutionsBuilds Hardware
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How Space CHOP Does Business:Potential Targets
AbstractDirect
Bomb
Attack
Cyber
Atta
ck
Direct
ed E
nerg
y
RF Ja
mm
ing
Threat Spectrum
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How Space CHOP Does Business:Mission Flow
StartFreewheeling Mission
Open Source Research
General Vulnerability Analysis
Concentration on Specific Vulnerabilities
Threat Plan, Design, Cost Estimate
Fabrication
Team Testing 1st World Testing
StartDirected Mission
End
Customer End
Customer
Customer End
End
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Benefits to Space CHOP Team Members
• Develop Understanding of System and Mission
• Understand Enemy Thought Processes
– See Vulnerabilities of Our Own Systems
– Understand What Information to Protect
• Hands-On Experience
• Fun and Satisfying
• Who we can use:
– Junior Military and Civilian With Technical Degrees
– Properly Calibrated--Must NOT Know Too Much!
– Permanent Party and Borrowed
– Hardware-Oriented People With Initiative
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Mission HistorySince July 99
•SCM-1 Threat-Representative RF Noise Source • AFSPC/SWC• Completed Fall 99
•SCM-3 GPS Data Collection Mission• AFSPC/CN• Completed Jan 00
•SCM-4 Theater Events System Vulnerability Study• USSPACE J33• Completed Dec 00
•SCM-5 Satellite Emulator• AFRL, SMC• Completed Dec 00
•SCM-6 Sensitive Mission• AFRL/VS• In Progress
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Summary
• Facilities are in place
• The Core Team is in place
• Security procedures are in place
to protect the results
• Ready for business
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Points of Contact
• Captain Mark W. Marasch, USAFDSN 246-7547, Comm (505) [email protected]
• Mr. John Holbrook, USAFDSN 246-2875, Comm (505) [email protected]
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Example Mission:Donutsat
• Freewheeling Mission: Attack the morale and effectiveness of US law enforcement agencies by disabling the Donutsat System.
• Team is simulating a terrorist threat.
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Example Mission:Donutsat
• Team analyzes entire Donutsat system using open-source materials.
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Example Mission:Donutsat
• The team identifies vulnerabilities of the system, and proposes threats.
SUGAR
VIRUS
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Example Mission:Donutsat
• The customer asks the team to do a detailed design of a donut decoy.
• The team designs, builds, and tests this device.
• The customer takes delivery of this device, and does their own testing to determine its effectiveness.
• The customer chooses whether or not to share this data with other organizations using this system.
– Local Police
– County Sheriff
– State Patrol
– FBI