Space and Security Policy in SelectedEuropean Countries

Ntorina Antoni, Maarten Adriaensen, and Christina Giannopapa

ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2National Space and Security/Defense Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Priorities and Trends in National Space and Security/Defense Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Abstract

This chapter presents space and security policies of selected European countriesand indicates the main priorities and trends thereof. In particular, it addresses rel-evant strategic documents that show how certain states in Europe use space assetsand applications to ensure security policy objectives. Recent developments at thenational level are linked with space policymaking in the frame of the EuropeanUnion and the European Space Agency.

N. Antoni (*)Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlandse-mail: ntorina.antoni@gmail.com

M. Adriaensen · C. GiannopapaEuropean Space Agency, Paris, Francee-mail: maarten.cm.adriaensen@gmail.com; christina.giannopapa@esa.int

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020K.-U. Schrogl (ed.), Handbook of Space Security,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22786-9_86-1

1

Introduction

Europe is a continent consisting of a multitude of national, intergovernmental, andsupranational organizations with diverse space policy priorities, thereby creating amultifaceted and dynamic space sector. By and large, the European space sector hasbeen interwoven with the European integration process, which has been central inaddressing rising security challenges including climate change, migration, andcybersecurity. Space policies have contributed to reinforcing European cooperationand integration in order to tackle these challenges. In addition, the surge in thenumber of private commercial actors as well as the emergence of a civil-militaryparadigm has resulted in the transformation of the space sector. The advent of a newera in space in combination with particular dynamics in the European space sectorhas put space security at the forefront of policy and regulatory debates.

The main actors in Europe engaging in space and security activities are theEuropean countries, the European Union (EU), and the European Space Agency(ESA). The EU Global Strategy, adopted by the European Council in June 2016, theEuropean Commission Space Strategy for Europe, launched in October 2016, andthe European Defence Action Plan 2016 all stress the importance of space security.More recently, in June 2018, the EU presented the Proposal for a Regulation for aSpace Programme for the EU (European Commission 2018). Furthermore, ESA hasincreasingly contributed to space security “in” and “from” space, as reflected in theCouncil Document “Elements of ESA’s Policy on Space and Security,” issued inJune 2017 (Giannopapa et al. 2018). In December 2019, the Council at the Minis-terial level adopted the “safety and security pillar” along with associated programs.With regard to ESA–EU relations, in October 2016, they signed the Joint Statementon Shared Visions and Goals, while in May 2019 they convened the first joint SpaceCouncil in 8 years (Spacewatch.global 2019). It is also worth mentioning that theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has increased its interest in the use ofspace assets for defense, with the most notable milestone being the adoption of spacepolicy in June 2019 (Euractive 2019). For further information about the institutionaland various space and security programs in Europe, please see the respectivechapters in this Handbook.

The different space security policies of the European countries are to a largeextent determined by national needs and priorities as well as their participation inrelevant space and security organizations. Figure 1 below visualizes the currentstatus of the countries’ membership to ESA, EU, EDA, and NATO (adapted fromPapadimitriou et al. 2019). In the present chapter, the European countries with thelargest ESA annual budget and their defense expenditure as share of their grossdomestic product (GDP) are presented. Namely, these are: France, Germany, Italy,Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK).

The aforementioned countries may be distinguished not only on the basis of theirmembership to these organizations but also based on their space budget. In theabsence of an official grouping of these countries within any of the aforementionedorganizations, their ESA annual budget and their defense expenditure as share oftheir GDP are used in this chapter to classify them into three groups, as seen in Figs.2 and 3.

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National Space and Security/Defense Strategies

The current priorities and trends in national space and security strategies of thementioned European countries derive from space and security elements stipulated instrategic documents. All countries included in this study have established theirstrategic priorities in the field of space and security mainly in the following typesof documents: National Defense Strategy and Doctrine, National Defense Procure-ment Strategy and Policy, National External or Internal Security Strategy, andNational Space Strategy or Policy. Depending on the country, more specific docu-ments complement the strategic landscape, for instance, through a dedicated spacesecurity strategy or through the inclusion of space and security aspects in strategydocuments covering other policy areas. For example, space and security aspects canbe found in maritime strategies and arctic strategies that also stress the importance ofspace-based assets and applications in these domains. An overview of space andsecurity strategic documents, which have been studied to analyze the priorities andtrends in the European countries with the largest space and security budget – France,Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom – is presented in Table 1.

Fig. 1 EU, ESA, EDA, and NATO Member States (Papadimitriou et al. 2019) (*Slovenia is anESA Associate Member State)

Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 3

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Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 5

Table 1 Strategic documents on space and security for selected European countries

National Space Law National Space Strategy/Policy

National Security andDefence Strategy/Policy(other relevant domains)

France 2008 Law concerningSpace Operations(French SpaceOperations Act)

2019 Space Defence Strategy2015 Ambition 2020–2015,Space for the climate2012 French Space Strategy

2017 Defence andNational SecurityStrategic Review2015 French NationalStrategy for the securityof maritime areas2013 French WhitePaper on Defence AndNational Security andBill on MilitaryPlanning 2014–2019(updated 2019–2025)

Germany 2007 Satellite DataSecurity Act1990 Law Governingthe Transfer ofResponsibilities forSpace Activities

2010 making Germany’s spacesector fit for the future – thespace strategy of the GermanFederal Government

2018 High-TechStrategy 20252016 White Paper onGerman Security Policyand the future of theBundeswehr

Italy 2018 Space Billcontaining measures forthe coordination of thespace and aerospacepolicies along withimportant regulationsconcerning theorganization andfunctioning of theItalian Space Agency-ASI

2019 Government guidelineson space and aerospace2016 Strategic VisionDocument 2016–2025

2019 National SecurityStrategy for Space2018 Plurennialprogrammatic document2015 White Paper forInternational Securityand Defence

Spain 1995 Royal Decree 278/1995 establishing in theKingdom of Spain theRegistry foreseen in theConvention adopted bythe United NationsGeneral Assembly on 2November 1974

Spanish Strategy for ESA andEU Space Programs 2007–2011

2017 IDS (infodefensa)R&D strategic approach2013 National SecurityStrategy – sharing acommon project2012 National DefenceDirective 1/2012

UnitedKingdom

1986 Outer Space Act Defence Space Strategy (underdevelopment)2015 National Space Policy2015 Space Innovation andGrowth Strategy 2014–20302014 National Space SecurityPolicy2013 Strategy for EarthObservation from Space(2013–2016)2012 UK Civil Space Strategy

2015 National SecurityStrategy and StrategicDefence and SecurityReview

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France

Space and Security StatusFrance is a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Francehas been at the forefront of the elaboration of the EU Common Security and DefensePolicy (CSDP). France is a member of the G7 and G20. France was one of thefounding members of the NATO in 1949. France is a member of EDA and the Euro-pean Union Satellite Centre (SatCen). France is a member of the Organisation forJoint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). France has established and maintainedextensive bilateral relations with European partners on security and defense, notablywith Germany, Italy, and the UK. France was one of the founding member states ofESA in 1975. Also, Paris hosts the ESA Headquarters. Created in 1961, under thejoint supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation andthe Ministry of the Armed Forces, the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES) isthe national space agency, a public administration institution with industrial andcommercial purpose (établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial),charged with developing and executing the French space program. CNES preparesthe French space policy under the responsibility of the Minister for Higher Educa-tion, Research, and Innovation, while it has a partnership with the Ministry ofDefense for military space activities.

Space and Security Elements in Strategic DocumentsSpace operations in France are regulated by the 2008 Law concerning space oper-ations, the “French Space Operations Act” – Loi sur les Opérations Spatiales. TheFrench Space Operations Act sets up a national regime to authorize and control spaceoperations based on international commitments of the French government. TheAct sets out an authorization regime with specific conditions, procedures, andtechnical requirements along with a control regime and mechanism (French Repub-lic 2008). The Act lays down safety and security standards for the Guyana SpaceCentre and defines the liability regime for space activities. The 2012 French SpaceStrategy published by the Ministry of Research establishes a directorate of innova-tion, applications, and science to support new space. It also identifies security anddefense as one of the specific applications and orientation areas for the French spacepolicy (French Republic 2012). In particular, the development axes of the 2012Space Strategy include very high resolution (VHR), secure satellite communications(SATCOM), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and detection and early warning forballistic missiles. Defense aims to fully benefit from the dual use nature of spacesystems (French Republic 2012). On top of that, the CNES ambition 2015 stressesthe relevance of VHR optical observation, electronic intelligence, ultra-secure tele-communications, and space situational awareness (SSA) for defense purposes(CNES 2015).

In terms of security and defense, the French 2017 Defense and National SecurityStrategic Review emphasizes “the need to develop space situational awareness andto ensure the resilience of space capabilities.” It also refers to space as “a provider ofessential navigation, communication, meteorological and imagery services, while

Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 7

also a domain of confrontation where some states can be tempted to use force to denyaccess or threaten to damage orbiting systems.” The list of operational capabilities,required for a coherent and full-spectrum model, includes imagery intelligence(IMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Command and Control (C2), and theprotection and security of space assets requiring adequate SSA. It stipulates that“space is of crucial importance to defense capabilities, while becoming an increasingsource of vulnerability for C2 and surveillance assets. Monitoring objects in lowearth orbits – and watching geostationary orbits, as planned for by the aerospaceoperations command and control system (AOCCS) – is essential to ensuring thesecurity of our space-based assets and conducting operations [. . .] An early warningcapability would enable better characterization of ballistic threats, determination ofthe source of a launch and prediction of the target area.” The strategic reviewfurther stresses the relevance of enhancing satellite-based surveillance for maritimesecurity (French Ministry of the Armed Forces 2017).

Moreover, the 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security andthe Bill on Military Planning 2014–2019 (updated 2019–2025) highlight the strate-gic function of space-based systems: “Outer space has become crucial to theoperation of essential services (French Ministry of the Armed Forces 2013). In themilitary field, strategic autonomy is dependent on free access to and use of space,which make it possible to preserve and develop the technological capabilities onwhich the quality of our defense system and, not least, the credibility of our nucleardeterrent, depend.” The White Paper refers to increasing threats from space debrispromulgation and offensive space weaponry. The Bill foresees the delivery of threeComposante Spatiale Optique (CSO) satellites no later than 2021 and plans thelaunch of a third Syracuse satellite by 2030.

Space, security, and defense policies in France are merged under the recentlyreleased 2019 Space Defence Strategy that intends to respond to challenges from theemergence of New Space (French Ministry for the Armed Forces 2019). As stated,“this new environment implies a Space Defence Strategy founded on the protectionof French capabilities. That involves first and foremost improving Space SituationalAwareness (SSA), especially in order to detect and attribute unfriendly or hostile actsin all orbits of interest and defend against them.” In order to guarantee France’scapacity to act in space, the armed forces aim to “(i) strengthen a space doctrinewhich establishes the ground rules for and typology of military space operations,(ii) overhaul military space governance, and (iii) ensure that they have appropriatecapabilities and human resources.” Accordingly, “military space operations consistin operating space capabilities that provide services in support of governmentauthorities and military operations, thus helping to increase the effectiveness ofaction. They contribute to national security, the robustness of economy and protec-tion of the population. They also include action taken in space to protect assets anddiscourage any aggression. They are organized around four functions: space servicesupport; space situational awareness; operations support; and active space defense”(French Ministry for the Armed Forces 2019). The 2019 Space Defense Strategy isaligned with the previously published security/defense and space strategydocuments.

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Last but not the least, in the maritime domain, the 2015 French National Strategyfor the Security of Maritime Areas addresses the relevance of space-based resourcesfor the monitoring of French maritime areas, including Satellite – Automatic Iden-tification System (SAT-AIS), long range tracking and identification (LRIT), vesselmonitoring systems (VMS), and Earth observation imagery (French Republic 2015).In that regard, France considers requirements for satellite surveillance in maritimeareas. The strategy highlights the weaknesses in resilience and security of SAT-AIS.The strategy refers to the role of industry in providing solutions for the governments’requirements for maritime surveillance including radar or optical satellite imaging,spatial AIS, and satellite communications.

Germany

Space and Security StatusGermany is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Germany is amember of the G7 and G20. Germany was one of the founding members of theNATO in 1949. Germany is a member of EDA and SatCen. Germany is a member ofthe OCCAR. Germany and France have a strong history of cooperation in defense.Germany also works closely with the Netherlands in the defense realm. Germanywas one of the founding member states of the ESA in 1975. The German Ministryfor Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Energie –BMWi) is mainly responsible for Germany’s civilian space activities.

Space and Security Elements in Strategic DocumentsSpace activities are governed by the Law of 8 June 1990 Governing the Transfer ofResponsibilities for Space Activities (Raumfahrtaufgaben Übertragungsgesetz) andthe 23 November 2007 Satellite Data Security Act (German Federal Ministry ofJustice 1990, 2007). The Law delegates the responsibility for the management of theGerman space program from to DLR (German Aerospace Center – DeutschesZentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt).

The 2010 German Space Strategy addresses space security based on the approachof “whole-of government security preparedness,” which includes not only space-based early warning for impending crises but also increased sensitivity for theimportance of an unhindered use of satellite systems for national security (BMWi2010). Accordingly, “Satellite data and services make a vital contribution, notably todisaster relief and management, environmental and climate protection, to warning ofthreats, development aid, border monitoring, and arms control. In this regard, it isstated that:

– “Military operations are now inconceivable without the support of space-basedsystems;

– Space systems in the domains of communication, navigation and Earth observa-tion make a decisive contribution to the ability to conduct an effective foreign andsecurity policy and to achieve whole-of-government security preparedness;

Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 9

– Wherever possible, exploit synergies between civil developments and dual-usetechnologies when further developing system capabilities and strategically impor-tant competences in key technologies” (BMWi 2010).

In the context of security and defense, the 2016 White Paper on Security Policyand the Future of the Bundeswehr notes that satellite systems are a fundamentalcomponent of Germany’s critical infrastructure. All aspects of national and interna-tional communication and navigation decisively depend on them. The White Paperthus stresses the need for monitoring these critical systems. In line with the EDACapability Development Plan (CDP), Germany’s common security priorities in theWhite Paper include UAVs, air-to-air refueling, satellite communication, cyberprotection, and cyber defense (German Federal Government 2016). The 2015 JointConcept for Space, commissioned by the Ministry of Defense, acknowledges thatspace is an operational domain of its own. Space support to operations has becomean indispensable military function and as such, it requires the establishment ofsituational awareness and of the necessary command and control functions for thespace domain (Japan Space Forum 2015).

What’s more, the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of theBundeswehr from 2006 highlights the capability category of intelligence collectionand reconnaissance and the procurement of the SAR(Synthetic Aperture Radar)LUPE space-based reconnaissance system. Using a joint approach: efficient com-mand, control, and information systems of the armed forces ensures the capability toexercise command and control worldwide. The White Paper describes joint thatnetworkable radio equipment and “SATCOMBw”, satellite-based communicationssystem, are important prerequisites for network-enabled operations (German FederalGovernment 2016).

Finally, the 2025 high-tech strategy emphasizes using the potential of key tech-nologies for the benefit of the industry including space technologies (GermanFederal Government 2018). In particular, “to ensure technological sovereignty inthe area of satellite infrastructure,” the strategy elaborates on the establishment of theInstitute for Satellite Geodesy and Inertial Sensors of DLR in Hanover and Bremen,the DLR Institute for Quantum Technologies in Ulm, and the DLR Galileo Compe-tence Center in Oberpfaffenhofen. The most important objective is to supportindustry in the transfer of research results from the field of quantum technologyand artificial intelligence into practical application including the aerospace sector(German Federal Government 2018).

Italy

Space and Security StatusItaly is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Italy is a member of theG7 and G20 and was one of the founding members of the NATO in 1949. Italy is amember of EDA and SatCen, as well as OCCAR. At the bilateral level, Italy andFrance have active collaboration on space, reflected in annual summits organized

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since 1982. Italy was one of the founding member states of ESA in 1975. In Italy,responsibility for space activities has recently been put directly under the supervisionof the Prime Minister.

Space and Security Elements in Strategic DocumentsThe Italian Parliament approved on 22 December 2017 the new 2018 Space Billcontaining measures for the coordination of the space and aerospace policies alongwith important regulations concerning the organization and functioning of the ItalianSpace Agency – ASI. ASI reports directly to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Billmainly provides that the management and coordination of space and aerospacepolicies are assigned to the Presidency of the Council. The Bill also established aninter-ministerial Committee that will be responsible for defining the government’sorientations in the sector (Italian Parliament 2018).

In July 2019, the National Security Strategy for Space was presented to promote a“systemic” strategy for national security (Italian Presidency of the Council ofMinisters 2019). The strategy was based on the March 2019 Government guidelineson space and aerospace (Italian Prime Minister’s Office 2019). The strategic objec-tives of the National Security Strategy for Space are: (a) “to ensure the security ofspace infrastructures (according to the two Anglo-Saxon terms, safety and security),regarded as enablers of the national infrastructure as a whole; (b) to safeguardnational security, including through space, by ensuring access to and use of nationalsecurity capabilities in any given situation; (c) to strengthen and protect the institu-tional, industrial and scientific sectors, also with a view to protecting nationalclassified information; (d) to promote a space governance capable of ensuringsustainable, safe and secure space operations at international level; (e) to ensurethat the development of private initiatives in the space sector (upstream and down-stream) is consistent with the country’s overriding interests” (Italian Presidency ofthe Council of Ministers 2019).

According to the Strategy, safety is defined as “a set of measures put in place toensure protection against unintentional events,” while security is defined as “a set ofmeasures to guarantee security against malicious activities or actions carried out byopposing parties.”

Additionally, the ASI Strategic Vision Document 2016–2025 highlights the useof space assets also for security and defense purposes (ASI 2016): “Earth observa-tion data for needs of crisis management, security, defense, and disaster monitoring:

– Space Situational Awareness (SSA), Space Traffic Management, Confidencebuilding measures, Code of Conduct;

– Promotion of institutional services: climate, environment, managing the cycle ofrisks and emergencies, weather-sea and atmosphere monitoring, national securitywith maritime surveillance, border control and humanitarian aid;

– Development of domestic GNSS activities, Public Regulated Service (PRS)security center, interference monitoring center, PRS terminals, interfaces andnetworks for domestic users; Ensure Italy’s role and participation in the processesof multilateral international coordination in various international contexts of a

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global nature, like the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of OuterSpace (UNCOPUOS) in strategic sectors like Earth observation (Group on EarthObservations – GEO; Committee on Earth Observation Satellites – CEOS),exploration of the universe (International Space Exploration CoordinationGroup – ISECG), Medicine and Microgravity (International Space Life SciencesWorking Group – ISLSWG), the analysis of space debris (Inter-Agency SpaceDebris Coordination Committee – IADC), satellite navigation (InternationalCommittee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems – ICG) and security” (ASI2016).

Concerning security and defense, the Italian White Paper for International Secu-rity and Defence from 2015 regards space as “a strategic element for preserving thesafety of the ‘national system’ and increases the solidity of the political, economicand social structures” (Italian Ministry of Defence 2015). In addition, the PlurennialProgrammatic document (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale – DPP) that pro-vides the multiyear plan of the Italian Defence, includes investments to be made inthe space component (Italian Ministry of Defence 2018). Space funding includes€212 million in the Cosmo SkyMed second-generation synthetic aperture radarsatellite over 4 years and €18,4 million in the Multinational Space-based ImagingSystem (MUSIS) – Common Interoperability Layer over the 3 years covered by theDPP.

Spain

Space and Security StatusSpain is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Spain is not a memberof the G7 but is invited as a permanent guest member to the G20. Spain has been amember of NATO since 1982. Spain is a member of EDA and SatCen. Spain joinedOCCAR in 2005. Spain became ESA Member State in 1979. In Spain, the Ministryof Economy and Enterprise (Ministerio de Economía y Empresa) is in charge ofdrafting and implementing government policy on economic matters and reforms,including space affairs.

Space and Security Elements in Strategic DocumentsThe Royal Decree 278/1995 of 24th February 1995 on space exploration, establishedthe Registry of Objects Launched into Outer Space as provided for in the Conventionadopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 November 1974 (SpanishPrime Minister’s Chancellery 1995).

The 2013 National Security Strategy acknowledges that outer space has become adomain where confrontation is possible (Spanish Government 2013). In addition, the2015 Ministry of Defence Master Plan of Space Systems highlights the importanceof space capabilities for the development of military operations (Spanish Ministry ofDefence 2015). This master plan proposes a set of actions to guarantee the mainte-nance of the existing space capabilities (communications, observation of the earth,

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navigation and positioning). In addition, it has classified space systems in thefollowing four families: communication – earth observation – navigation and posi-tioning – surveillance and monitoring. From a technological and industrial point ofview, it emphasizes the importance of maintaining effective coordination betweenpublic institutions and between these institutions with the industry, avoiding dupli-cations to optimize the benefits from the made investments (Spanish Ministry ofDefence 2015).

The 2017 IDS (infodefensa) R&D strategic approach for the defense industrystresses that “it is possible that new programs in other areas, such as space,unmanned aircraft, in-flight refueling aircraft and electronic warfare [..] will beimplemented in the short term, and that they will undoubtedly represent an oppor-tunity for Spanish companies” (IDS 2017). The Spanish space industry is primarilyinvolved in contracts of high added value in the areas of qualification of flight andground equipment and the development and operation of satellite systems. There arealso several space centers located in Spain, the most important being namely theEuropean Space Astronomy Centre (Madrid), the Madrid Deep Space Communica-tion Complex (NASA), and Boeing’s European Centre for Research and Technology(also located in Madrid).

The United Kingdom

Space and Security StatusThe UK will hold the presidency of the G7 in 2021. The UK was one of the foundingmembers of the NATO in 1949. Brexit has ended British obligations that includepermanent involvement in the institutional structures and decision-making processesof the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and The Common Security andDefence Policy (CSDP) in the EU. However, this does not automatically precludeany future involvement in defense and security cooperation. The UK is not involvedin the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defense. The UK isa permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member of the G7 and G20.The UK is currently a member of EDA and SatCen. It is also a member of OCCAR.The UK has developed strategic alliances with various international partners throughmultilateral and bilateral cooperation. Since the 1940s, the UK and the USA havebeen close military allies relishing the so-called the Special Relationship. The UKwas one of the founding member states of the ESA in 1975. The Department forBusiness, Enterprise, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is the parent department of UKSpace Agency and has the lead for space affairs in the UK.

Space and Security Elements in Strategic DocumentsThe 1986 Outer Space Act governs and regulates national space activities, includinglaunch and operations of space objects. The Outer Space Act 1986 is the legal basisfor the regulation of activities in outer space carried out by organizations or indi-viduals established in the UK or one of its overseas territories or crown dependencies(UK Government 1986).

Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 13

The UK Government published the National Security Strategy and the StrategicDefence and Security Review: “A Secure and Prosperous UK,” on 23 November2015 (UK Government 2015a). The two documents comprise the Government’sstrategic decisions on defense and security. The former focuses on the country’s“ends” or objectives, while the latter addresses the “ways” and “means” to achievethem. The Strategic Defence and Security Review 15 key investments include theestablishment of a Space Operations Control Centre and Skynet 5 Beyond Line ofsight satellite communications before 2025, and the upgrade of the Space OperationsControl Centre and investment in the next generation of secure strategic communi-cations after 2025. Accordingly, the Royal Air force will improve its capabilities inSpace Surveillance and Tracking (SST). It will also develop a high-altitude commu-nication relay capability. The Joint Forces Command will provide new satellitecommunications and “future proof” the navigation and targeting services based onspace assets (UK Government 2015a).

Space is an official part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure, as declared bythe UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. The UK Air and SpaceDoctrine recognizes that the UK relies not only on space for its national securityinterests but also for its economic prosperity (UK Ministry of Defence 2017). UKspace capabilities are inherently dual-use, provided that the same environment,technology and infrastructure, are used to meet both military and civil operations.Space services play a pivotal role in contributing to UK national security, thestrength of the economy, and the delivery of public services (UK Ministry ofDefence 2017). According to the air and space doctrine, space power makes apivotal contribution to the potency of UK military power, both as an enablingdomain and, increasingly, as an operating domain (in its own right). It is also thedomain which makes the most significant contribution to the effectiveness of all theinstruments of national power. Space power is defined as “exerting influence in,from, or through, space.” Diplomatic, military and economic credibility, togetherwith a coherent strategy, play a large part in the ability to influence (UK Ministry ofDefence 2017).

The Ministry of Defense is expected to release its first dedicated defense spacestrategy, a plan in line with its ambition for developing and improving Britain’smilitary space capabilities. The ministry outlined four objectives which may becomethe guiding priorities of the DSS later this year: “to enhance the resilience of spacesystems; to improve operational effectiveness; to enhance space support to frontlinetroops; and to support wider government activities” (UK Ministry of Defence 2019).

Furthermore, the Strategic Defense and Security Review called for a ministerialcommittee on security and prosperity and the development of the UK National SpacePolicy. The mandate included the process to “mitigate space weather impacts,improve forecasting, protect the space environment by using civil and militarycapability, work with international partners, recognize the criticality of satellitenavigation, need for enhanced resilience, and innovation in the field of resilientsatellite communications” (UK Government 2015a). The Strategic Review refers tothe December 2015 UK National Space Policy which has a dedicated section onsafety and security of space (UK Government 2015b).

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The overarching 2015 National Space Policy links the UK civil space strategy(July 2012) with the National Space Security Policy (April 2014). It aligns with theUK Government’s Science and Innovation Strategy and the National SecurityStrategy. In addition, the 2015 updated Space Innovation and Growth Strategy setsout a partnership between industry, government and academia in order to develop,grow and exploit new space-related opportunities. The 2015 National Space Policyclearly articulates cross-government reliance on space-enabled capabilities. Space isthe environment which makes the most significant contribution to the effectivenessof all the instruments of national power (UK Government 2015b).

Finally, the UK Space Agency published in October 2013 a strategy for earthobservation from space (2013–2016) in the context of the National Space Policy, theNational Space Security Policy (April 2014), and expands on the themes of the UKCivil Space Strategy (July 2012). The strategy concentrates on civil Earth observa-tion requirements but recognizes that some civilian space systems could be dual usein nature and be capable of supporting national security requirements (UK SpaceAgency 2013).

Priorities and Trends in National Space and Security/DefenseStrategies

Security and defense-related aspects of space activities cover a wide range ofactivities, mainly divided into two categories: priorities for security from space andpriorities for security in space.

The “Security from Space” priorities consist of disaster management, resourcemanagement, transport and communications, environment, climate change andsustainable development, external security including foreign policy and bordersurveillance, internal security including support to justice and home affairs, military,and financial. The “Security in Space” priorities consist of defensive space securityand control, offensive space security and control, space surveillance and tracking,space weather, near earth objects, orbital debris mitigation, space traffic manage-ment, active debris removal, and access to space.

The European countries’ military space capability priorities point toward severalkey areas in line with the identified priorities for space in the frame of the EDACapability Development Plan 2018. National defense strategies and policies definesatellite systems as critical infrastructure (enabling domain) and identify space as aseparate operating domain. Military operations are inconceivable without the sup-port of space-based systems. Space-based assets and applications are essential tonavigation, communication, meteorological, and imagery services, early warningand ballistic missile interception. Space systems make a decisive contribution to theability to conduct an effective foreign and security policy and to achieve whole-of-government security preparedness including defense aspects in a holistic approach.Strategies and policies increasingly call for the full exploitation of synergies betweencivil and military developments and dual-use technologies when further developingsystem capabilities and strategically important key technology competences.

Space and Security Policy in Selected European Countries 15

What is more, space is perceived as a domain of socioeconomic development andis essential for security and defense. The list of operational capabilities, required fora coherent and full-spectrum force model include inter alia: IMINT, ELINT, C2, andthe protection and security of space assets. SSA underpins all other space roles, as itprovides an understanding of the space environment. It enables the timely assess-ment of and response to space threats, risks, and events, both natural and man-made.Defense White Papers and Strategies are explicitly referring to the increasing threatsfrom space debris promulgation, space weather, offensive space weaponry, as well asthe inherent vulnerability of space-based systems from interference and cyber-attacks. In this context, multiple member states are in the process of elaboratingdedicated space defense strategies and revising their organizational structures.

Conclusion

This chapter provides evidence of the trend towards increasing relevance for securityand defense in national space policy initiatives of the presented European countries.The identified national space, security, and defense strategies demonstrate an evo-lution of European states priorities to dual use utilization. The policy developmentsat national level, in combination with the recent EU and ESA policy-makinginitiative, recognize the important role of space for security and defense. They alsodemonstrate the increasing relevance of security and defense in Europe, in general,which to some extent could be framed as the necessity for Europe to further enhanceits own security and defense.

Disclaimer The contents of this chapter and any contributions to the Handbook reflect personalopinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Space Agency (ESA).

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