soviet policy in horn

8/11/2019 Soviet Policy in Horn

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2/60

Copyright

CNA

Corporation Scanned

October 2003

The

ideas expressedin

this

paperarethoseof the

author

Thepaper does

not

necessarily represent

the

views

of

either

theCenterfor Naval Analysesor the Department of Defense


3/60

PROFESSIONAL PAPER 270 /

J anuary

198

SOVIETPOLICY

IN THEHORNOFAFR ICA

THE DECISION TO

INTERVENE

Richard Remnek

nstituteof

Nava l Studies

CENTER FOR N A V A L

A N AL Y S E S

2 North Beauregard Street Alexandria Virginia

22311


4/60

SOVI ET

POLI CY I N THE HORN OF AFRI CA:

THE DECI SI ON TO I NTERVENE

Thi s paper a t t empt s t o ev al uat e r ec ent Sov i et pol i c y

on t he Hor n of Af r i c a. I t s t empor al f oc us i s t he pe-

r i od

i mmedi a t e l y pr eced i ng and dur i ng t he

Somal i -

Et hi opi an c onf l i c t i n t he Ogaden, r oughl y f r om

1976

t o l at e 1977. I t was t hen t hat t he Sov i et Un i on made

c r i t i c al c omm t ment s t o s uppor t t he De r gu e, Et hi o-

pi a s r adi c al m l i t ar y gov er nment . Thes e dec i s i ons

ul t i mat el y br ought about a maj or di pl o ma t i c r eal i gn-

ment i n t he Hor n. Thi s per i od can t he re f o re be

con-

s i der ed

a

maj or t ur ni ng poi nt

i n

Sovi et pol i c y

on t he

Hor n.

The i nt ent of t hi s paper i s not t o p r ovi de a compr e-

hens i v e hi s t or i c al nar r at i v e doc ument i ng

t he

maj or

event s dur i ng

t hi s

per i od.

Nev er t he l es s , a

s ummar y

of t he

maj or

e vent s ma rk i ng t he s t ages of e s ca l a t i ng

Sovi et m l i t ar y s uppor t f or E t hi opi a i s us ef ul f or

l at e r r ef er ence.

* I

wo u l d l i k e

t o

acknowl edge

t he

v al uabl e as s i s t anc e

i n

t he pr epar a t i on o f t hi s paper of my

c ol l e ague,

Kennet h

G.

Wei s s .


5/60

The

f i r s t Sovi et m l i t a r y

a i d agr e eme nt , a

l i m t ed

one

wor t h

r o ughl y 100 m l l i on f or s e cond- l i ne e qui p-

ment suc h

as T- 34 t a nks , was

s i gne d

i n

Dec ember

1976.

Thi s

was about t he t i me t ha t t he o ut go i ng

For d Adm ni s t r at i on c anc el l ed i t s m l i t ar y gr ant s as -

s i s t anc e pr ogr am I n Febr ua r y 1977, j us t a f ew

weeks

a f t e r

t he

abor t i v e coup f r o m whi c h

t he

pr o - So-

v i e t

Lt .

Col . Me ngi s t u Hai l e

Ma r i a m

emer ged

a s t h e

pr eem nent l eader o f t he Pr ovi s i onal Mi l i t a r y Adm n-

i s t r at i ve Comm t t ee

( or Der gue)

t he

i nc om ng Car t er

Adm ni s t r at i on announc ed t hat m l i t ar y ai d t o Et hi o-

pi a had been sus pended on t he gr ounds of human r i ght s

vi ol at i ons . I n Apr i l , t he Der gue r et al i at ed by ex-

pel l i ng

t he

U. S. m l i t ar y as s i s t anc e adv i s or y gr oup

and cl os i ng down ot her U. S. m l i t a r y

i ns t a l l at i ons ,

i nc l udi ng

t he

once - i mpor t ant

Kagnew co mmuni cat i ons

s t a t i on. The Sov i e t s

soon

s t epped i n t o f i l l t he

v oi d. A l ar ge m l i t a r y ai d agr e ement of a ppr o xi ma t e-

l y

500 m l l i on f or mor e mode r n weapons was s i gned

a f t e r

Mengi s t u' s

t r i p

t o

Moscow

i n

May.

3

I n

J ul y ,

Somal i a c hal l enged t hi s ne w Sov i et - Et hi opi an m l i t ar y

connec t i on

by

i nv adi ng

t he

Ogaden

n

i ni t i a t i ve

t hat e vent ual l y f or c ed

t he

S ovi et s

t o

i nc r eas e t hei r

suppor t f or Et hi opi a. On November 13, 1977 Mogadi s -


6/60

c i o bol d l y r esponded by abr oga t i ng i t s 1974 Fr i end-

s hi p Tr eat y wi t h

Moscow,

t er m nat i ng Sovi et

access

t o

al l nav al

s uppor t

f ac i l i t i es , e xpel l i ng Sov i et adv i -

s e r s ,

and

s ev er i ng d i pl oma t i c r e l at i ons wi t h Cuba.

I n l at e No ve mb er , t he Sov i e t s

i ni t i a t ed

a maj or a i r -

and s eal i f t t o Et hi opi a. And d ur i n g t he nex t mo nt h ,

t he f i r s t

of

appr o xi mat e l y

16, 000

Cuban gr ound c ombat

t r o o ps

ar r i v ed t o t ake par t i n t he f i ght i ng. I n Feb-

r uar y 1978, t he Et hi opi a n c oun t e r o f f e ns i v e i n t he

Ogaden began and by Mar ch, Somal i ar med f or ces wer e

wi t h dr a wn f r om t he Ogaden.

The ma i n i nt ent of t hi s paper i s t o e l uc i dat e t he

f ac t or s t hat appear t o ha ve i nf l ue nc e d So vi e t d ec i -

s i ons

t o

s uppor t

Et hi opi a dur i ng t hr ee s t ages of es -

c al at i ng i nv ol v ement : 1 pr i or t o t he Somal i i nv as i on

i n J ul y ; 2 i n t he af t er mat h of t he i nv as i on; and 3

f ol l owi ng t he Somal i e xpul s i on of t he Sov i et s i n No-

vember . We s hal l al s o t r y t o a na l y z e t he pr i or i t i es

and pr ef er enc es t hat wer e r ef l ec t ed i n t he pol i c y

choi ces made i n

Mos cow

d ur i n g t hes e per i ods . Unde r -

s t andi ng t hes e dec i s i ons i s es s ent i al t o any f ur t her

ev al uat i on

of

S ov i e t

pol i c y.

3


7/60

I n f ew ot her cases of So vi e t i n vo l v eme nt i n t he Thi r d

Wor l d have Sovi e t ac t i ons

had

such

an

i mmed i a t e

an d

c l e ar - c ut i mpac t on event s . Had t he Sovi et s and

t hei r al l i es ( Cubans , Sout h Ye me ni s , L i by ans , et c . )

not come t o t he Der gue s a ss i s t anc e, at bes t , anar -

chy woul d ha ve p r e v ai l e d i n Et hi o pi a an d, at wor st

t he

map of t he Hor n m ght have been r edr awn. That

t hei r ac t i ons di d have such c l ear consequences a f -

f or ds an u nus u al oppor t uni t y t o e va l ua t e Sov i e t pol -

i c y and t o

assess

t he ext ent t o whi ch t he Sovi et s

a chi eved

t hei r obj e ct i v es . We al s o c an c ons i der t he

r easons

f or

So vi e t s uc c es s

or

f ai l ur e :

was

t hei r

pol i cy r eal i s t i c or unr e al i s t i c , ef f ec t i ve or i nef -

f ec t i ve, o r wer e t hey s i mpl y l ucky or un l ucky?

I n

i nt e r nat i onal af f ai r s ,

as i n

s p o r t s ,

i t i s not

j us t what you wi n o r l ose , i t s how you pl ay t he

game.

Thus

que s t i o ns p er t a i ni n g t o t he c on duc t o f

Sovi et f or ei gn pol i c y, such as whet her t he Sov i et s

act ed r e ckl es sl y o r c aut i ous l y , t i m dl y or bol dl y,

obt us el y or pr udent l y , of f er addi t i ona l cr i t er i a by

whi c h t o e va l ua t e t hei r be hav i or .


8/60

One

c onc r et e i ndi c at i on

of t he

Sovi et Uni on s i nt er -

es t i n t he Hor n of Af r i c a has b ee n t he c ont i nuo us de-

pl oyment of a naval squadr on of a ppr o xi ma t e l y 18

s hi ps ( about o ne- t hi r d of whi c h ar e c o mba t a nt s ) i n

adj acent wa t e r s .

4

But

t h i s

o bs er v at i on, of

c o u r s e ,

onl y beqs t he

mor e

i mpor t ant que s t i o n o f why ar e t he

Sovi et s ar e t he re?

As h as o f t en been not ed, t he Hor n of Af r i c a i s s i t u-

a ted

a t t he j unc t i on of t he Red Sea and I ndi an Ocean ,

as t r i de

t wo o f t he

wor l d s most i mpor t ant s hi ppi ng

l anes .

I t has

f r equent l y been assumed t hat because

of

t hei r p r e s enc e

i n t he

a r e a, So vi et wa r s h i ps pos e

a

s er i ous t hr ea t

t o t h e

Per s i an Gul f

oi l

l i f e l i ne.

I n

a gener a l war , one woul d of cour se as sume t hat oi l

t anker s woul d be t a r g e t e d by any S ov i et c o mb at a nt s

r ema i ni ng i n t he

a rea ,

but s uc h a c t i v i t y woul d pal e

i n

s i gni f i c anc e c ompar ed t o ho s t i l i t i es el s ewher e.

I n t he pea cet i me c ont ex t , Sovi et i nt er di c t i o n of oi l

t anker s m ght c ons t i t ut e an i mpr obabl e cas us b el l i .

( Sur e l y, t her e

ar e

b e t t e r

ways t o

s t a r t

a

gener al

war Not

even t hose

i n t he

bus i ne s s

of

i ns ur i ng

oi l

t a n ke r s , such

as

L l oyd s

of

Londo n, t hi nk t ha t

t he


9/60

Sov i et s woul d ac t s o r ec kl es s l y . They r e c ent l y

r ai s ed r at es o n t ank er s t r ans i t i ng t he St r ai t o f Hor -

muz

no t because of t he Sov i e t nava l p re se nce but on

ac count of an i nc r eas ed pos s i bi l i t y of t er r or i s t at -

tacks .

An a l t e r n at i v e ex pl ana t i o n f or t he Sov i et nav al pr e-

s enc e i n t he I n di a n Oc ean i s t h e s t r at egi c t hr eat

t ha t woul d b e pos ed t o So vi et t er r i t or y i f U. S. SSBNs

wer e depl oyed.

Hy pot het i c al l y

s t a t i oni ng subma-

r i nes

of t he

pr e- TRI DENT ge ner at i o n

i n t he

Ar abi an

Sea of f er s c er t ai n advant ages : m l i t ar y obj ec t i ves

r angi ng f r om deep i n s i d e t he So vi et Eur o pea n hear t -

l and t o We s t e rn Chi na coul d be t a rget ed f r om one l o-

c at i o n; and i f onl y on ac c ount o f i t s phy s i c al c har -

a ct e r i s t i c s t he I ndi a n Oc ean af f or ds s ubmar i nes bet -

t er p r o t e ct i on a gai ns t Sovi et

ASW

t han f o r e xamp l e

t he Eas t er n Me di t e r r a ne an. But t hes e ar e o f f s et by

ver y l ong t r ans i t t i mes be t we en t he nea re s t submar i ne

base i n Guam and t he Ar abi an

Sea. >

The conse-

quent r educ t i on i n t ot al on- s t at i on t i me of U. S.

s t r at egi c s ubmar i ne f or c es woul d have se r i ous l y weak-

ened our o ver al l def ens e c apabi l i t y. I t i s not s ur -

p r i s i n g t her ef o r e t hat U. S. SSBNs ha ve no t pat r ol -

l ed

t hese wa t e r s no r wer e t hey e ver l i kel y t o .

6


10/60

To be

sure ,

t he

Sov i et s have o f t en expr essed f ear s

about a pos s i bl e U. S. s t r at egi c t hr eat f r o m t he I n-

di an Ocean.

But

t hey have

not

seen

f i t t o

upgr ade

s i gni f i c ant l y t he ver y

l i m t ed

ASW c apabi l i t i es of

t he f or ces t hey ma i n t a i n i n t he a rea ; nor have any

l ar ge- s c al e Sov i et ASW exe r c i ses been r epor t ed t o

have t aken pl ace

there .

The Sov i et s t hus appear t o

have act ed as t hough a U. S. s t r at egi c s u bmar i ne

t hr eat f r om t he I ndi an Oc ean di d not e x i s t . Thi s ,

however , does not r ul e out an i nt er es t on

t hei r

p a r t

i n r ec ei v i ng f or mal gua r a nt ees r egar di ng

t he

depl oy-

ment

of

U. S. s t r at egi c f or c es t her e. An d,

as we

s hal l di s c us s b el ow,

t hi s

bec ame a r eal po s s i bi l i t y

pr ec i s el y dur i ng t he per i od under r ev i ew.

Rat her t han a s pec i f i c wa r t i me m s s i o n, s uc h as s e a

i nt er d i c t i on or s t r at egi c def ens e , i t i s i t s peace-

t i me r ol e t hat bes t e xp l a i n s t he Sovi et na va l pr e-

sence i n t he I ndi an Ocean. Thi s i s a r egi on i n wh i c h

t he Sov i et s h ave ac qui r ed i mpor t ant s t at e i nt er es t s .

The shor tes t s ea r out e open year - r ound bet ween t he

USSR s Eur opean

and

P ac i f i c por t s r uns t hr ough t hes e

wat er s .

A

cont i nuous Sov i et naval pr esence

at one of

t he

t wo poi nt s of ent r y i nt o t he I ndi a n Oc ean s i gnal s

7


11/60

t hei r

i nt er es t i n k ee pi ng t h es e s ea l anes open. I n-

deed,

t hei r s ens i t i v i t y

on

t hi s poi nt

was

t r a ns p ar e nt

i n t hei r s har p ne ga t i v e r eac t i on t owar d t he s o- c al l ed

Arab Lake

Red Sea

s e cur i t y pl an t hat s ur f ac ed

i n

ear l y 1977

a

mat t er

t o

wh i c h

we

shal l l at er

r e-

t u r n .

The

S ov i e t Oni o n al s o

has

g r e at l y e x pa nd ed

i t s

t i es

wi t h t he s t a t es o f t h i s r egi on o f enormous human and

c r i t i c al l y i mpor t ant mat er i al r es our c es . Dur i ng t he

past decade , Sov i e t nava l f or ces have been empl oyed

i n

numer ous ways t o s t r engt hen t hose t i es . Exampl es

of

S ov i e t na val d i pl o ma c y

i n t he

I ndi a n Oc ean i n c l u de

of f i c i al

por t c al l s ( f or ex ampl e, a pr ol onged di pl o -

ma t i c v i s i t

t o

Mo ga di s c i o

i n

Apr i l 1970, appar ent l y

t o

s uppor t

t he

Soma l i r egi me agai ns t

an

al l e ge d c oup

a t t e mpt ) , m ne- and har bor - c l ear i ng oper at i ons i n t he

Gul f o f Suez and Bangl adesh ,

r e s pec t i vel y ,

c r i s i s de-

p l oyment s t o count e r Wes t e rn nava l f or ces dur i ng t he

1971

I ndo- Pak i s t ani

War and i n t he a f t e r mat h of t he

Oct ober 1973

Mi ddl e

East War

8

and , mos t r ecent l y ,

i n

s uppor t of Et hi o pi a at t he h ei g ht o f t he Og ad en

War. ^ The So vi e t nav al pr es e nc e i n t he I n di a n

Ocean has t hus been a va l uab l e i ns t r ument o f t hei r

f or ei gn pol i c y i n t he r egi on. But t he nee ds of t he


12/60

Soviet Indian cean

Squadron for

shore based support

Copyright CNA

Corporation Scanned October 2003

al so have been an i mpor t ant obj ec t of S ov i e t f or e i gn

pol i c y.

I n

as s e s s i ng

t he

I ndi an Ocean Squadr on s needs

f or

shor e- based suppor t ,

i t

shoul d

be

kept

i n m nd

t hat

i t s

oper at i ng ar ea i s a ver y l ong way f r om Vl a di vos -

t ok, t he por t f r om whi c h mos t uni t s depl oy. I t t akes

approx i mat e l y t hr ee

weeks

wi t h nor mal t r a ns i t s peeds

of

10-12

knot s

t o

s ai l

t o t h e

Gul f

of

Aden

( a

di s-

tance

of 6, 700 nm) 0

pr i or

t o

obt ai ni ng

i n1972

ex t ens i ve ac c es s t o t he

Somal i port

of Ber be r a , t he

mean l engt h of Sovi et combat ant depl oyment s i n t he

I ndi an Ocean was r oughl y

f i ve mont hs .

Thei r wa r s hi ps

t hus wast ed a hi gh

pr opor t i on

of t hei r t ot al depl oy-

ment

t i me

i n

t r ans i t .

By

l e ng t hen i ng t hos e depl oy-

ment s ,

t he

Sov i et s coul d r educe

t he

pool

of

s hi ps

needed

t o

keep

t he

same number

of

uni t s c ont i nuous l y

en-stat i on.

1

But t he

l onger s hi ps

ar e

depl oyed,

t he

gr e at e r

ar e

t hei r needs

f or

l ogi s t i c suppor t

and

mai nt enance.

And

wi t h

t he

gr eat di s t anc es i nv ol v ed

i n t he

I ndi an

Ocean,

i t i s

i mpor t ant

t o

have access

t o

l oc al

p o r t s ,

wher e suppl i es

can be

obt a i ned

and

r epa i r s made t hat

9


13/60

cannot

be

done s at i s f ac t or i l y

at

sea.

One

i ndi c at i on

of t he v a l ue t ha t t he Sovi et s pl ac e on access t o l o-

cal

p o r t s

i s t he

degr ee

t o

whi ch t hey make

us e of i t .

Wher eas, pr i or t o 1972, Sovi et war sh i ps had made oc -

c as i onal bus i nes s cal l s

t o

I ndi an Ocean por t s ,

i n

t hat year t hey ga i ne d unr e s t r i c t e d ac c ess t o Be r ber a ;

and a f t e r t he ar r i val i n t he f a l l of t hat year of a

bar racks and r epai r s hi p, whi c h s i gni f i c ant l y i m-

pr oved t he I ndi a n Oc ean Squadr on s a bi l i t y t o suppl y

and

r epai r

i t s

uni t s

and

r es t t hei r c r ews on- s t at i on,

t he f r equency of Sovi et oper at i onal v i s i t s i nc r eas ed

shar pl y ( see t abl e I a t r end t hat c oi nc i de d wi t h

t he

l engt heni ng of depl oyment s.

But t he

v al ue

of

l ocal shor e- based suppor t

i s not

l i m t ed

t o por t

ac ces s . I n

1972 Somal i a became t he

second Thi r d Wor l d count r y , a f t e r

Egypt ,

t o g r a n t t h e

USSR ac ces s t o ex t e ns i v e f ac i l i t i es

ashor e.

Sovi e t

ac ces s p r i v i l eges i nc l uded t he exc l us i ve use o f a

l ong- r ange communi ca t i ons s t a t i on and t he r i ght s t o

s t age per i odi c ma r i t i me r ec onnai s s anc e f l i ght s f r om

Somal i ai r f i el ds . Al t hough t he Sovi et s al s o bui l t

( f or t he i r o wn t hough not nec essar i l y e xc l u s i v e use )

a m s s i l e- handl i ng and s t or age f a c i l i t y and an ai r -

f i e l d

at Be r ber a , t hey apparent l y d i d not ac t ual l y

- 10 -


14/60

SOVI ET NAVAL OPERATI ONAL SHI P VI SI TS

I N THE I NDI AN OCEAN 1967 1976

3

1967-

Count r y _1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976

Somal i a

S. Yemen

I r a q

Sr i Lanka - 1

Maur i t i us - -

I ndi a

- -

Kenya

N. Yemen

Paki s t an

Ma l d i v es

I r a n

Tanzani a

Et hi opi a

Kuwai t

Madagascar -

Sey chel l es 1

Sudan -

2

4

4

2

1

1

1

1

5

2

1

1

1

7 22

5 15

1 2

1

7 1

6 2

4

2

2

3

2

1

20 42 61 54

7 14 37 34

8 15 17 8

6 2 5 6

9 1 2 2

3 2 4

2 4 1

1 2

1

1

_

_

75

18

12

6

1

2

3

1

1

-

-

283

134

67

29

24

20

12

9

8

5

3

2

1

1

1

1

1

TOTALS 26 38

45

50

79

129 113 119

601

a

Exc l udi ng v i s i t s

by

oceanogr aph i c r esear ch sh i ps

and

space sup-

por t s hi ps .

b

U. K. col ony unt i l J une 1976.

Sour ce: Adapt ed f r om Di smukes and McConnel l eds. Sovi et Naval

Di pl omacy Tabl e 2. 7.

11


15/60

use t hem Wha t ac cess p r i v i l eges t hey

d i d

enj oy wer e

nev er t hel es s qui t e i mpor t ant . The per i od i c s t agi ng

f r o m So mal i

a i r f i el d s

of 11- 38 May ASW and ( on one

occas i on)

Tu 95

Bear D ma r i t i me r econna i s sa nc e ai r -

c r a f t gave t he Sovi e t s ASW cover age and gr eat l y ex-

panded

and i mpr ov ed t he i r a er i a l r ec onna i s sa nc e of

t he I nd i an Ocean.

I t sh oul d be emphasi zed t hat t he ac qui s i t i on of ex-

t ens i ve f a ci l i t i e s as hor e i s no eas y mat t er . Ac c es s

pr i v i l eges t end t o compr om se t he s o ver ei gnt y of t he

hos t nat i on and su bj ec t i t t o n ega t i v e publ i c i t y over

So vi et bases . As an i l l us t r a t i v e exa mpl e , we may

not e t hat

S omal i a' s

so ve re i gn c ont r ol ov er t hese f a-

c i l i t i es

was c al l ed i nt o ques t i o n when t he t eam of

exper t s l ed by Senato r Dewey P. Bar t l e t t was bar r ed

f r om ent er i ng

t he

Ber ber a communi ca t i ons s t a t i on

i n

J ul y 1975. Even t hough

a

hi gh- r ank i ng Somal i of f i c er

( Col onel Sul e i ma n, t he

head

of t he Somal i secr et po-

l i c e and P res i d ent Si ad

Bar r e' s

s on- i n- l aw) had re-

quest ed t he Somal i guar ds t o al l ow t he Bar t l et t del e-

gat i on t o ent er t he i ns t al l at i on, t he r eques t was

evi d ent l y over r ul ed by a Sovi et o f f i c er i ns i d e t he

f aci l i t y.

12

12


16/60

I t

i s under s t andab l e t hen why even t hose count r i e s

i nc l i ned

t o

suppor t

t he

Sovi e t Navy have l i m t ed

t hei r

suppor t

t o t h e

wat er ' s

edqe. And had i t not

been

f or

S omal i a' s s t r o ng des i r e

f or

ar ms , whi c h onl y

t he

Sovi et s

s aw f i t t o

s at i s f y ,

i t i s hi ghl y

unl i kel y

t ha t t he

Sovi e t s woul d have obt a i ned shor e- based

f a-

c i l i t i es even

t her e. - ^

I n t he per i od u nde r c o ns i de r a t i o n, mo r e ov er , ac c es s

t o t h e

Somal i

f a ci l i t i es h ad bec ome mo r e i mpo r t a nt

wi t h t he i ni t i a t i o n of t he I ndi a n Oc ean n av al ar ms

l i m t a t i ons t al ks ( NALT)

i n t he

s pr i ng

of

1977, s ome

s i x years a f t e r a pr oposal t o c ur b naval ac t i v i t y of

non- l i t t or al s t at es i n t he I ndi a n Oc ean had been

r a i s ed

i n a

speech

by Br ezhnev. -

1

-

4

The

d i smant -

l i n g o f wha t t he So vi et s c al l ed t he U. S. bas e o n

Di e go Gar c i a had l ong be en a maj or Sov i e t obj e c t i ve

i n

t he I ndi an

Ocean.

Al t hough t he Sov i e t s have never

i n

f o r m or i n s ubs t anc e equat ed t h ei r f ac i l i t i es i n

Berbera

wi t h t he U. S. base at Di ego

Ga r c i a ,

t hey

never t hel es s c oul d eas i l y h av e r eal i z ed t ha t t hey

woul d hav e l i t t l e l ef t wi t h whi c h t o bar gai n s houl d

t hey

l os e

access

t o Be rbe ra .

- 13 -


17/60

I n f ac t , t he pr ospect t h a t t h e Somal i f a c i l i t i es

coul d be r epl aced r eadi l y must have appear ed r a t her

di m t o t he Sovi e t s on t he eve of t he NALT di scus-

s i ons .

I n

r e t u r n

f or

t hei r s u ppor t ,

t he

Sov i et s

coul d have coun t ed on event ual access t o E t h i opi an

p o r t s

of

Assab

and Massawa, but

even

i n

nor mal t i mes

t hese Red Sea port s are congest ed i n compar i son t o

Berbera.

15

And by t he

s pr i ng

of

1977,

i f not

ear l i er , i t was

c l ear t hat t hes e por t s m ght soon

be

put under se i ge

by

Er i t r e an guer r i l l as .

^

Nor

di d

t he pr ospect s appear much bet t er f or Sov i e t nava l

ac c es s t o Ad en , wh i c h wi t h i t s l ar ge bunk er i ng f ac i l -

i t i es , r e pai r y ar ds , and c ool er t emper at ur es , i s a

f ar be t t e r har bor t han Berbera. Sovi e t war sh i ps had

never enj oyed

t he

same degr ee

of

access

t o

Aden

a s t o

Berbera .

And wi t h t he i mpr ovement i n 1976 of Sout h

Yemen s r el at i ons wi t h Saudi Ar abi a , whi c h

has

per-

s i s t ent l y sought t o reduce t he Sovi e t pr esence i n t he

area , t he pr ospec t s f or access may h av e seemed even

worse. - 7

Thus

i f

onl y

t o

pr es er v e t hei r ba r g ai n i n g power dur-

i ng

t he NALT n egot i at i ons , f r om whi ch t hey had much

14


18/60

t o ga i n, t he Sovi et s had a maj or s t ake i n mai nt a i ni ng

access

t o t he

Somal i f ac i l i t i es .

But why

th e n

di d

they

j eopar di z e t hei r ac ces s by s uppor t i ng Et hi o pi a ?

Obvi o us l y , ac ces s t o naval s uppor t f a c i l i t i e s was n ot

t he onl y f act or dr i v i ng Sovi et pol i c y on t he Hor n at

t he t i me. And i t i s t o t he c ons i der at i on of t he rea-

sons

f or

Sovi e t suppor t

f or

Et hi o pi a t hat

we

shoul d

now

tu r n .

Two y e a r s a f t e r t he ov e r th r ow of

Hai l e

Sel as s i e , t he

Et hi opi an r e vol ut i on

was

ent er i ng

a

c r i t i c a l s t a ge

of

i ns t abi l i t y . Nat i onal i z at i on, l and r e f or ms

and

o t he r

measu res os t ens i bl y des i gned t o upr oot t he ol d i mper -

i al order had pr oduced a b ac k l a s h of r e s i s t anc e and

unrest i n t he c i t i es and c ount r ys i de al i ke. Des pi t e

i t s ni ne - po i nt pl an f or aut o nomy i n Er i t r e a, t he Der -

gue appear ed s t i l l t o be . pur s ui ng a m l i t a r y s ol ut i on

t o t h e

pr o bl e m

but

wi t h di s as t r ous r e sul t s .

A

40, 000- man

peas ant m l i t i a was eas i l y r out ed by

Er i t r ean guer r i l l a s i n t he s ummer of 1976. F u r t h er ,

t he

v i c t or i es

of t he

Er i t r ean i ns ur gent s

( b y t he

s pr i ng of t he f ol l owi ng year , t hey c ont r ol l ed v i r -

t u a l l y

a l l of Er i t r ea exc ept t he maj or t owns) wer e

seve re l y sappi ng t he mor al e o f t he E t h i opi a n Ar my

t he ma i ns t a y of t he r egi me . By l at e 1976, t he Et hi o -

15


19/60

pl an s t at e was d r i f t i n g t owar d d i s i nt egr at i o n and

anar chy .

Ex t e r n a l f or c es wer e

al s o

s pe edi ng t h i s

p rocess

a l ong.

The Sudanese Gover nment , whose r api d l y wor-

s eni ng

r el at i o ns wi t h Mos c ow c ul m nat ed i n i t s expul -

s i on of t he Sov i et m l i t a r y m s s i on i n May 1977, was

ac t i vel y s uppor t i ng t he Er i t r ean guer r i l l as as wel l

as

ot her Et hi o pi an oppos i t i on g r oups , such

as the

l i ber al Et hi o pi a n Democ r a t i c

Uni on.

Not

s ur p r i s i ng-

l y, t ens i ons

mount ed al ong

t he

S uda nes e - Et hi o pi a n

bor der

i n t he

spr i ng.

18

Du r i n g t he pr ev i o us y ea r , bo rder t ens i ons al so had

a r i s e n on t he E t hi o pi an- So ma l i bo r der , but i n connec -

t i on wi t h Somal i a s po l i t i c al ma ne uv er i ng over Dj i -

bout i . ^ By t hi s t i me as we l l , t he r e cr ui t me nt

and t r ai ni ng of Oga de n guer r i l l a s was a l r eady we l l

advanced, but i nsu r ge ncy i n t he Ogaden was not ac t i -

v at e d un t i l ear l y 1977. Thus dur i ng

t he

l as t par t

of

1976

and t he

f i r s t

f ew

mont hs

of

1977 when

t he

i mpor -

t ant i ni t i a l Sovi et s ec ur i t y c omm t ment s t o Et hi opi a

wer e

made , t he i mmedi at e danger t o t h e m l i t ar y r e-

gi me

i n Add i s Ababa l ay not i n t he Ogaden a po i nt

t o wh i c h we s hal l l at er r e t ur n.

16


20/60

Not onl y , f r o m t he Sov i et pe r spec t i v e, was a c l as si c

conf r ont at i on bet ween

t he

f or ces

of progress and r e-

act i on emer gi ng

on t he

Hor n,

but

Sovi et s t at e i nt er -

es t s

wer e

al s o

be i ng cha l l enged

on

anot her i s s ue,

t he

pl an

t o

t u r n

t he Red Sea

i nt o

an

Ar ab Lake. Though

ver y l i t t l e, i f a nyt hi ng, c onc r e t e r egar di ng Red Sea

secur i t y emer ged f r om meet i ngs of Ar a b s t at es i n

ear l y

1977 ( Sudan, Egypt ,

and

Syr i a

at

Khar t oum

i n

Febr uar y; Sudan, YAR, PDRY and Somal i a at Ta' i z z, YAR

i n

Mar ch) , t he Sov i et s saw t hese t al ks as a Saudi -

i ns pi r ed ef f or t t o f or ge a pr o - i mper i al i s t m l i t a r y

bl oc

i n t he

ar ea, wi t h

t he

ai ms

of

o bs t r uc t i ng bot h

I s r ael i and Sov i et s hi ppi ng t hr ough t he Red

Sea,

and

of event ual l y el i m nat i ng Sovi et i nf l uenc e i n t he

ar ea as wel l . I nc re as ed Ar ab s uppor t f or t he Er i -

t reans and ot her oppos i t i on f or c es was t hus seen as

par t of t hi s b roader pl an t o es t abl i sh an unbr oken

cha i n of Ar ab s t at es on t he Red Sea. Wh i l e Sovi e t

i nf l uence i n Somal i a and t o a l esser e x t e nt i n Sout h

Yemen

was

s t i l l s t r ong, Mos cow

may

wel l ha ve f ear ed

t hat i t s

pos i t i on woul d qui c k l y er ode wi t h

t he

br eak-

up

of t he Et hi opi an s t at e.

Bes i des t hese per cept i b l e negat i ve consequences

of

Sovi et i nac t i on, t her e wer e pos i t i ve i nduc e me nt s

f or

- 17 -


21/60

t he

Sovi et s t o ac t i n s uppor t of E t h i opi a . To t he

wor l d s o c i al i s t c ommuni t y , Sov i e t s uppor t woul d

p r o v i d e c o nf i r ma t i o n t h at t h e USSR wa s n ot onl y wi l -

l i n g

but

i nc r e as i ngl y abl e

t o

p e r f o r m

i t s

pr o l et ar i -

an

i nt er nat i onal i s t d ut y

t o t h e

wor l d r ev ol ut i onar y

mov ement .

To t he

Th i r d Wor l d

and t o

Af r i c a

i n

pa r -

t i c ul a r , s uc h s uppor t woul d de mons t r at e S ov i e t abi l -

i t y t o

s t abi l i z e r egi mes

and i n t he p r o c e s s t o

d ef e nd

t he i r

t er r i t or i al i nt egr i t y . And wi t h t he U. S.

m l i -

t a r y

r ol e

i n t he Thi r d Wor l d r e c edi n g, u ns t abl e r e-

g i me s t her e m g ht l ook i nc r e as i ng l y t o t he USSR as a

v i s i t i ng

f i r eman.

I t

has al s o be en wi de l y not ed t hat Et h i o pi a of f e r s

c er t ai n i nt r i ns i c benef i t s

t o t h e

USSR

as a

c l i ent

s t at e. W t h t he s ec ond l ar ges t popul at i on i n Bl ac k

Af r i c a ( t en t i mes l ar ger t han t hat of Somal i a) , wi t h

r es our c es s uf f i c i ent

t o

j us t i f y good

p r o s pe c t s f or

l ong- r un e conom c d ev el o pme nt , and wi t h i t s c api t a l

t he h ea dq ua r t e r s of t he OAU ( t hanks l ar gel y t o i t s

i ndependent hi s t o r i c al t r a di t i on) , Et hi opi a i s bo t h

an

i mpor t ant Af r i c a n c ount r y

and t he key

s t a t e

i n t he

Af r i c an

Hor n.

Cl ear l y , S ov i et i nv ol v eme nt i n Et hi o-

pi a of f er ed t hem an oppor t uni t y t o ex pand t hei r i n-

f l uenc e i n Af r i c a.

- 18 -


22/60

But Moscow s r eal i z at i on of t hi s oppor t uni t y r emai ns

pr obl emat i c . An uns t abl e Et hi opi a , one hi ghl y de-

pendent upon Sovi et suppor t ,

was

l i kel y

t o be f ar

l ess

i nf l uent i al

i n

Af r i can af f ai r s t han

a

s t abl e

Et hi opi a. But wi t h i ncr eas i ng s ec ur i t y and s t abi l -

i t y , Et hi opi a was l i kel y t o be mor e i ndependent o f

t he USSR. I f t h e r e i s one t h i ng t ha t

Moscow

shoul d

have l ear ned by t hi s poi nt f r om i t s i nvol vement i n

t he

Thi r d Wor l d,

i t i s not t o

ex pe ct g r at i t ude

f or

past

f av or s .

Al l of t hi s of course i s not t o deny

t he l i kel i hood t hat a l ef t i s t , s t a bl e and i ndependent

Et hi opi an gover nment woul d shar e

Moscow s

v i ews

on

mat t e r s

of

i nt er nat i onal i mpor t ance.

An

i ndependent

Et hi opi a af t er al l need not aut omat i c al l y be ant i -

Sov i et .

Wh i l e t her e wer e ampl e pos i t i ve and nega t i ve r easons

f or t he Sovi et s t o suppor t Et hi opi a , s uc h s uppor t al -

so

ent ai l ed r i sks . I ndeed,

a t t h e

out set

of

t h ei r

i nvol vement i t was not c l ear t ha t t he Sov i e t s woul d

be abl e to r ever se t he pr ocess of anar chy and di s i n -

t egr at i on

i n

Et hi opi a.

- 19 -


23/60

Never t he l es s ,

t hey may have had reason t o bel i eve

tha t E t hi o pi a wo ul d n ot bec ome a no t her q ua gm r e l i k e

Vi et nam.

I n t he

f i r s t pl ace, t hey

may

wel l have been

c o nf i dent t ha t t hey c oul d t i p t he m l i t ar y bal anc e i n

t he Hor n i n Et hi opi a' s f a vor . Unl i k e Vi et n am, t he

amount

of

ar ms a v ai l a bl e

t o t h e

i ns ur gent s

was

l i kel y

t o be l i m t ed. Though Ar a b pet r odol l ar s c oul d buy

l i ght ar ms

on t he

open mar ket , t hey coul d

not buy ma-

j or weapons t hat woul d gr eat l y i mpr ove t he i ns ur -

gent s '

c hanc es of ho l di ng k ey c i t i es i n t he per i pher y

a pr e r equi s i t e f or i nt er nat i onal r ec ogni t i on.

As ma t t e r s t ur ned o ut , Somal i a d i d ,

of course ,

sup-

por t t he i ns u r g ent s i n t he Oga den, as wel l as i n

o ther r egi ons

of

E t hi o pi a , wi t h mos t

of t he

resources

avai l abl e

t o i t s

l a r g e, mo de r n , Sov i et - equi pped

ar -

m

y20

n

ac t i on t ha t pr o babl y c a ug ht t he So

v i et s by s ur pr i s e. But ev en t he

Somal i

e xc ept i o n

t ends t o

prove

t he

poi nt .

No

West er n gover nment

wo ul d al l ow even t hi r d pa r t i e s

t o

t r ansf er weapons

t o

a st a t e engaged i n bl at ant aggr es s i on i n cont r aven-

t i on of t he

OAU' s

pr i nc i pl e of t he i nvi ol abi l i t y of

Af r i can bo rder s . Though Soma l i a

was

abl e

t o

f i nd

al -

t er nat i ve s our c es of POL, m l i t ar y t ec hni c i ans ,

l i ght

- 20 -


24/60

ar ms, and even spar e par t s f o r maj or weapons , i t

coul d not make up i t s

l os ses

of maj or

weapons . 1

Thus, t he Somal i o f f ens i ve seemed doomed f r om t he

s t a r t .

A second f act or was t he mor a l e of t he Et hi op i an Ar my.

By ear l y

1977

the re wer e r epor t s

of l ar ge- s cal e

t r oop def ec t i o ns

and

r umor s

of

mu t i n y

i n t he

Second

Di v i s i on bas ed i n Asmar a.

mf ac t , some of t he

def eat s t hat

t he

Et hi opi ans s uf f er ed

i n t he

s ummer

of

1977 s eem l ar gel y r el at ed t o d i s a f f e c t i o n among t he

t roops .

I n J ul y t he f or t i f i ed c i t y of Ker en, whi c h

took

t he Br i t i s h t hr ee mont hs t o wr es t f r om t he I t a-

l i ans i n 1941, f el l t o t he Er i t r eans af t er a t hr ee-

day

bat t l e.

23

I n

Sept ember ,

t he

Soma l i s capt u red

t he i mpor t ant t ank base of J i gj i ga af t er Et hi opi an

uni t s had mut i ni e d.

24

What ever concer n

t he

Sovi et s

may

have

had f or t he mo-

r al e pr obl em i n t he Et hi o pi a n ar my, i t does not s eem

t o ha ve a f f ec t ed t hei r beha vi or . Wel l bef or e t he 25

year

ol d

U. S. - Et hi opi an m l i t a r y r el at i ons hi p

was

t er m nat ed i n Apr i l 1977, t he Sovi et s had r epor t edl y

wi l l f ul l y s ought t o r epl ac e t he Uni t ed St at es as

Et hi opi a s p r i nc i pal

armorer.

25

But

t hi s honor

al s o ent ai l ed a r es pons i bi l i t y f or t he def ens e of

- 21 -


25/60

Et h i o pi a s bor der s t ha t went wel l bey ond v er b al s up-

p o r t . And i n

J u l y 1977, when Somal i a empl oyed

Sovi et - made weapons

t o

i n va de

t he

Ogaden,

t he

So vi e t

dut y

t o

r espond

was

even g r eat e r .

I t

s eems r eason-

abl e t o assume t he re f o re t hat t he Sov i e t s woul d have

done somet hi ng mor e t han si mpl y s t age

an

e va c ua t i on

of f or ei gn adv i s e r s had t he E t h i o pi a n Ar my whol l y

col l apsed under t he pr essur e o f t he Soma l i and Er i -

t r ean o f f ens i ves i n t he summer of 1977. I n poi n t of

f ac t , t he one a ct i on t hat ma de t he i s s ue of E t hi o pi a n

mor al e l ar gel y i r r el ev ant , i . e. , t he c omm t ment of

l ar ge number s o f Cuban t r oops i n d i r ect combat , was

not

t aken unt i l December 1977

- -

wel l af t er

t he

ba t -

t l e l i nes had s t abi l i z e d and t he mor al e of Et hi o pi a s

ar med f or ces had i mpr oved, t hanks l ar ge l y t o t he

l ar ge- s c al e i n f l ux of So vi e t weapons and t o t h e pa-

t r i o t i c r esponse t o t h e

Somal i i nv as i on.

The

i nt r o-

duc t i on o f Cuban t r oops was t hus not a mat t er of nec-

es s i t y.

The one maj or danger t hat t he Sov i e t s appear t o have

under es t i mat ed was Somal i a s s har p nat i onal i s t i c r e-

sponse

t o

t hei r s uppor t

f or

Et hi o pi a . They k new

of

c our s e t hat t hi s de ci s i o n woul d

not be

wel come

i n Mo-

gadi s c i o. They

may

al s o ha ve a nt i c i p at e d i nc r e as ed

22


26/60

Somal i s uppor t f or g uer r i l l as

i ns i de

t he Oqaden and

ot her

p a r t s of

Et hi opi a.

But t hey appar ent l y d i d not

t hi nk t ha t Somal i a woul d t ake advant age

of Et hi opi a' s

di s i nt egr at i on and of t he Der gue' s m l i t ar y vul ner a -

bi l i t y ( t o whi c h t he c onver s i on f r om U. S. t o So vi et

ar ms cont r i but ed)

by

mount i ng

a

l ar ge- s cal e i nv as i on.

I n

t he

s pr i ng,

t he

ma i n t hr eat s

t o

Et hi opi a' s s ecur -

i t y wer e i n Er i t r ea and al ong t he Sudanese bor der ,

not i n t he Ogaden. I n Apr i l , Moscow appar ent l y gave

Ad di s

Ababa assur ances t hat Mogad i s c i o woul d not a t -

tack the Ogaden. 7 Al t hough t hi s i n f o r mat i on was

d i s c l osed by Et h i opi an gove r nment sour ces a f t e r t he

Somal i at t ac k, i t nev er t hel es s s eems t o r ef l ec t f ai r -

l y

accur a t el y Sovi et t h i nk i ng at a t i me when t hey

wer e pr omot i ng a pax Sovi et i c a i n t he r egi on . I f t he

Sovi et s d i d m s j ud ge Somal i i n t e nt i ons , t hen what

pr ompt ed t hi s m s c al c ul at i on?

I t i s

pos s i bl e t hat ,

h av i n g

r ega rde d Somal i a ' s l ead-

er s as r evol ut i onary democr a t s i n good s t and i ng ,

t he Sovi et s under es t i mat ed t he f or ce of Somal i na-

t i onal i s m

as

bot h Et hi opi an

and

Somal i sour ces

al -

l ege.

8

But i t i s

per haps

mor e

l i kel y t hat

t he

Sov i et s ov er es t i mat ed t hei r

own

l ever age over

t he So-

mal i s .

Sovi et c onf i denc e d er i v ed not s i mpl y f r om So-

- 23 -


27/60

mai l r el i anc e upon Sovi et ar ms , oi l , t ec hni c i a ns and

a i d.

2

9

Ra t h er , Mos cow may have f e l t t ha t Moga-

di s c i o had l i t t l e c hoi c e but t o ac qui es c e t o t he So-

v i et dec i s i on t o s uppor t Et hi opi a. The Sov i et s , as

we

h av e a l r ea dy no t e d, pr o ba bl y r eas oned c or r ec t l y

t ha t no Wes t er n s t a t e woul d under wr i t e mi l i t a r i l y a

Somal i gambl e t o achi eve by f o r c e of ar ms t hei r ambi -

t i ons f or a gr eat er Somal i a. Mo r e ov er , t o av er t a

maj or Soma l i i nvas i on wi t h t he weapons on hand, t he

Sov i et s mi g ht e v en h av e i n t i ma t e d

t o

Mo ga di s c i o t ha t

t hey

woul d do what was necessar y t o he l p Et h i op i a r e -

pel s uc h a n a t t a ck . 0

Whi l e

we do not

know t ha t

t he

Sov i et s t hr ea t ened

t o

a ppl y t he s t i c k t o So ma l i a t o a voi d a war , we do know

t ha t t hey wer e o f f e r i ng a car r ot t o pr omot e what

woul d have become a pax Sovi et i ca on t he Hor n. I n

what appear s t o have been a count er

i ni t i a t i ve

t o

Sa udi / Suda ne s e ef f or t s

t o

f or ge

an

Ar ab bl oc

of Red

Sea s t at es , t he Sov i et s , f ol l owi ng c l os e on t he he el s

of t he Cubans,

pr oposed

i n Apr i l t hat Et hi opi a and

Somal i a j o i n Sout h Yemen and i nd ep en de nt Dj i bout i i n

a f eder at i on of Ma r x i s t s t at es , i n whi c h Er i t r ea and

t he Ogaden woul d r ece i ve subst ant i a l aut onomy. Re-

ga r dl e s s o f whe t he r t he So vi et s t h ou gh t t ha t t he So-

24


28/60

mai l s

woul d r eadi l y accept t he pl an, t hey seem never -

t hel es s

t o

hav e ho ped t ha t Mo ga di s c i o wo ul d r ea l i z e

that i t s ambi t i ons coul d be accommodat ed bes t t hr ough

Mos cow' s

medi a t i on. 1

The

Sov i et s

m ght

have

been pr epar ed t o o f f er Somal i a any t h i ng s hor t of

hoi s t i ng a

Somal i

f l ag over t he Ogaden

( e . g . ,

unhi n -

der ed

r i ght s of

passage

f or Somal i her dsmen, r es t r i c -

t i ons upon

t he

Et hi opi an m l i t ar y pr es enc e

i n t he r e-

gi o n, e t c . ) . However , t he Sovi e t s appear t o have

c ons i s t e nt l y

abi ded

by t he pr i nc i pl e of t he i nv i ol a-

bi l i t y of sover ei gn borde rs , even dur i ng t he c r i t i cal

per i od af t er

t he

Somal i assau l t when

t he

bat t l ef i e l d

s i t uat i on

was i n

doubt .

As mat t er s t ur ned out , of course , t he Somal i s r ej ec t -

ed

t he

Sovi e t / Cuban f eder at i on scheme

and

opt ed

f o r a

m l i t a r y

s ol ut i on t o

Soma l i a ' s

nat i onal pr obl em

Thi s gambl e pr obabl y

was

based upon

t he

bel i ef s t hat

t her e woul d be no bet t er t i me t ha n t he present t o em-

pl oy f or c e ( c er t ai nl y not af t er Et hi opi a' s t r ans i t i on

t o Sovi et weapons sys t ems was compl et ed) and t ha t

E t hi o pi a was t oo f ar gone f o r t h e Sovi et s t o save

anyway. 32

- 25 -


29/60

The a v ai l a bl e e vi de nc e t hen s ugges t s t hat t he Sov i e t s

m s cal c ul at ed

i n

e x pec t i ng

t he Somal i s t o

ex er c i s e

g r eat e r p r udence .

As a

Sov i e t comment a r y expl a i ns :

The Sov i et Uni on, f or i t s par t , di d ev er y t h i ng

p os s i bl e t o a ve r t a n ar med c on f l i c t b et we en

Et hi opi a

and

Somal i a . However , when

t he

l eader s

o f t he l a t t e r c ount r y desp i t e common sense and

t he ef f or t s o f t he t r ue f r i ends of t he Somal i

peop l e began i n t he summer o f 1977 m l i t a r y op-

er at i ons aga i ns t Et h i o pi a and Somal i

t roops

i n-

vaded i t s t er r i t or y, t he Sov i et Uni on, as al ways

i n

s u c h s i t u at i o ns , c ame out on t h e s i de of t he

v i c t i m of a ggr es s i on: at t he r eques t of t he

Et h i opi an gove r nment t he Sov i e t Un i on r ender ed

Et hi opi a mat er i al

ai d t o

r epul s e

t he

a t t a c k .

Our c ount r y di d s o p r o c ee di ng f r om t he pr i n-

c i pl ed pur pos e s

of i t s

f or e i gn pol i c y, des pi t e

t he f ac t t hat b ec a us e of t hi s t her e c oul d ha ve

( and

di d i n f ac t ) ens ue unf r i e ndl y ac t s by t he

Somal i l e ad er s h i p agai ns t t he Sov i et

Uni o n. 33

The bas i c pr i nc i pl es of Sovi et f or ei gn pol i c y

a s i de , a f t er J ul y 1977 t hei r o pt i ons wer e c ons t r ai n-

ed. They had l i t t l e c hoi c e but t o s uppor t E t h i o pi a ,

par t i c ul ar l y a ga i ns t an ac t of aggr es s i on comm t t ed

wi t h Sov i e t - made

weapons. The

S omal i a t t ac k

al s o r e-

pr esent ed an

open chal l enge

t o

Sovi et pol i c y

on t he

Hor n, wh i c h , i f una ns wer ed, woul d t ar ni s h t he USSR' s

i mage as a bona f i de super power .

- 26 -


30/60

However ,

t he Sovi et s c ame t o Et hi opi a ' s ai d s l owl y,

i n a

man ner i n di c at i v e

of

t hei r i nc r eas i ng

d i f f i c u l t y

i n s t r addl i ng

bot h camel s on t he Hor n. For sever al

weeks

f ol l owi ng

t he

Somal i as sau l t , Sov i e t weapons

del i v er i es t o Et hi opi a wer e re por t edl y s l ow and l i m-

i t ed.

34

At t he

same t i me , t hough Sov i et del i v -

er i es

of maj or

weapons s ys t ems

t o

Somal i a

had

ceased,

s h i pmen t s of l i ght ar ms and s par e par t s r epor t edl y

c on t i n ued,

t hough

on a

r educed scal e

and

wi t h

de-

l ays

5

Ther e wer e ot her i nd i c a t i o ns

of

Sov i et

i n t e r es t i n pr es er vi n g t he Somal i c on nec t i on , t he

most i mpor t ant aspect of wh i c h a f t e r t he Somal i

r egi me had l os t much of i t s r evol u t i onary democr a t -

i c al l ur e, 36 had

become

t he

naval access

pr i vi l eges . Even af t er S ovi et weapon s del i v er i es t o

Somal i a had f i nal l y s t opped, pr obabl y b y m d- Oc t ober

at

t he l at es t ,

Mos cow

e vi den t l y s ou ght t o pr es er ve

some

sembl an ce of i t s m l i t ar y as s i s t a nc e pr ogr am i n

Mogadi s c i o. Though Sovi et m l i t a r y a dv i s e r s who f i n -

i s hed

t hei r t our s

of

dut y wer e

not

r epl aced

an d

t hose

who

r emai ned wer e

i n

ef f ec t q uar an t i n ed

i n

compounds

f or s ec ur i t y

reasons

by t he Somal i a ut hor i t i es , t her e

wer e s t i l l s ur pr i s i n gl y l ar ge n umber s l ef t when t hey

wer e

or der ed t o l eave i n November . ( Accor di ng t o of -

- 27 -


31/60

f i c i a l

Somal i sources ,

1, 678 m l i t a r y a dv i s er s and

t hei r f am l i es wer e evacuat ed at tha t t i me.

37

I n

add i t i on , Moscow s i gned

t wo

econom c

ai d

pr ot oc ol s

wi t h Mo ga di s c i o af t er t he Somal i a t t a c k , 8 un-

doub t ed l y

t o r em nd Soma l i a not onl y o f i t s pr es s i ng

needs f or econom c devel opment , but al so of t he en-

dur i ng va l ue of Sovi et a s si s t a nc e f or t hi s pur pose.

F ur t her , t hough t he Sovi et s made known t hei r sympa-

t hi es f or Et hi opi a by empha s i z i ng r es pec t f or t he

pr i nc i pl e

of

t er r i t or i al i nt egr i t y

as the

bas i s

f o r a

negot i a t ed set t l ement of t he conf l i ct ,

39

t hey

avoi ded

a nt a goni z i ng Soma l i a unnec es s a r i l y by not di -

r e ct l y ac c us i ng

i t of

aggr es s i on a ga i ns t E t h i opi a

un-

t i l

a f t er

Moga di s c i o' s

uni l at er a l abr ogat i on of t he

f r i ends hi p t r eat y and t e r m na t i on of Sovi et nava l f a-

c i l i t i es i n

November .

( I n t he

i nt er i m r eac t i onar y

Ar a b a nd i mper i a l i s t s t a te s wer e a c c us ed of s et t i ng

Soma l i a a g ai ns t Et hi opi a a nd of s eek i ng t o unde r m ne

bot h t he r evol ut i onary ga i ns of t he Soma l i r eg i me and

Sovi et - Somal i

rel at i ons.

40

But wh i l e t he Sov i et s c l ea r l y s ought t o pr es er v e

t hei r t i es t o Somal i a, pr essur es mount ed f or t hem t o

s tep up t hei r suppor t f or Et hi opi a. Af t er

weeks

of

i nt ens i ve

di pl oma t i c ef f or t s , a negot i a t ed, pea c ef ul

28


32/60

r es ol ut i on of t he c onf l i c t was nowher e i n s i ght . The

Sov i et s

and Somal i s

r emai ned

s o f ar

apar t t ha t when

Si ad

Bar r e f i na l l y ma de hi s l ong- del a yed v i s i t t o

Moscow i n l at e

Augus t ,

Br ezhnev d i d not even gr ant

hi m an a ud i ence .

41

Per haps i n r ec ogni t i on of t he

bl eak peace pr ospect s i n t he near t e r m Moscow r e-

por t edl y agr eed

t o

c omm t

an

addi t i onal $385 m l l i on

o f moder n weapons t o Et hi opi a at t hi s t i me. 2

The l ev el of Sov i et weapons del i ver i es t o Et hi opi a

i ncr eased

soon

t h e r e a f t e r . 3 com ng at a t i me

when E t h i opi a

was

r at her des per at el y s e ek i ng

t o

r enew

i t s m l i t a r y t i es

t o t h eU. S.

44

t h i s i nc r eas ed

Sovi et comm t ment may have r emoved some Et hi opi an an-

x i et i es

r egar di ng

Mos cow' s

f enc e- s i t t i ng.

But Addi s

Ababa

was

s t i l l ups et wi t h

t he

c ont i nuat i on

of

S ov i et

ar ms del i v er i es t o Somal i a. I n

f a c t ,

Mengi s t u an-

gr i l y r emar ked dur i ng a Sept ember 18t h pr ess conf er -

ence: I f s oc i al i s t c ount r i es ar e s t i l l s uppl yi ng

ar ms

t o Somal i a ,

t hen t hi s

i s not

onl y v i o l at i ng

one' s pr i nc i pl es , but al s o t ant amount t o c ompl i c i t y

wi t h

t he r eac t i onar y Mo ga di s c i o

r e gi me.

4

^

Thi s

embar r as i ng pub l i c r ebuke

may

ha ve c o nt r i but ed

t o t he

Sovi et dec i s i on, ev i dent l y t aken soon t her ea f t er ,

t o

t er m nat e al l a r ms del i v er i es t o Somal i a. By m d-

- 29 -


33/60

Oct ober , t he Sovi et Ambas s ador t o Et h i op i a announced

publ i c l y t hat S ov i et weapons d el i v er i es

t o

Somal i a

had st opped. 6 Et h i opi a' s s oc i a l i s t benef ac t or s

al s o

seemed r esponsi ve

t o

Men gi s t u ' s r eques t s

f or ad-

di t i onal s uppor t dur i ng

t he

l at t er ' s secret v i s i t

t o

Havana

and Moscow at t he end of

Oct ober

47

f or

t he number of Cuba n m l i t a r y a dv i s er s i n E t hi op i a

s har p l y i nc r ea s ed du r i n g t he next t wo

weeks

f r o m 150

t o

400.

48

Though

t he

Sovi et s wer e cl ear l y t i l t i ng i nc r eas i ng-

l y t owar d Et hi op i a , on the eve of t he Soma l i dec i s i on

t o expel t hem Moscow' s suppor t

f or

Et hi opi a

was

s t i l l

not open - ended. Soma l i a l l egat i ons to the con-

t r a r y , ^ t he ev i dence ava i l abl e does not i ndi cat e

t hat Cuban combat uni t s wer e di r ec t l y i nvol ved i n t he

f i ght i ng as yet . Nei t her t he mass i ve ai r - and sea-

l i f t s of Sovi et mat er i el nor t he i nf l ux of Cuban

s ol di er s bega n u nt i l af t er t he Soma l i expu l s i on .

By hol d i ng i n r eser ve cons i der abl e power t o pun i sh

Soma l i a and by pr eserv i ng, mor e i n f or m t han i n sub-

s tance, i t s r e ma i ni ng t i es t o Somal i a, t he Sov i et

Uni on may have hoped t hat t h i s f i nal st ep woul d not

be t aken. I ndeed,

t he

f i r s t of f i c i al Sovi et r es pons e

- 30 -


34/60

t o t h e Somal i dec i s i o n a dj u dge d t hat c hauv i ni s t

moods had pr evai l ed over common sense i n t he Somal i

gover nment .

5

0

Ther e ar e gr o unds t o shar e t hi s So vi e t v i e w t ha t t he

So ma l i de c i s i o n, t ak en a f t e r a ma r a t ho n 10- hour ses -

s i o n o f t he Cent r al Co mm t t e e of

Somal i a' s

r ul i ng Re-

vol ut i onar y Soc i al i s t

Par t y

51

was

i l l - c onc ei ved.

At

b e s t , i t r epr esent ed somet h i ng of a d es p er a t e gam-

bl e t ha t Wes t e rn ai d woul d be f or t hc om ng i n r e t u r n

f or t he ev i c t i on of t he Sovi et s . The

Soma l i s

c e r -

t a i nl y seemed

t o b e bui l di ng a

case

f or

such

sup-

por t by al l egi ng t hat a Sov i et - Cuban- Et hi opi an i nv a-

s i on of Soma l i a was i mm nent .

g

u

t

o t h er t han

t he

pos s i bl e

r el eas e of

s ome r epor t ed $300 m l l i o n

t hat Saudi Ar abi a

had put up as a

bount y

f o r t h e

ev i c t i on

of t he Sovi et s ,

5

- * t h e

Somal i s r e c ei v ed

l i t t l e t a ngi bl e r ewar d f o r

t he i r

deed .

Havi ng undoubt edl y f or ewar ned Mogadi sc i o about t he

pos s i bl e c ons equenc es of s uc h ant i - So vi et a c t i o ns ,

Moscow

was v i r t ual l y obl i ged t o r es pond i n k i nd t o

Somal i a ' s

l es e

maj est e .

Hence, Moscow and Havana de-

c i ded

t o

u pgr a de dr a ma t i c al l y

t he

l ev el

of

t he i r sup-

- 31 -


35/60

por t f or Addi s Ababa. The f i r s t s i gn of t hi s s hi f t

was t he

ar r i val ,

a f ew

da ys a f t e r

t he

Somal i ev i c t i on

not i c e,

of

Gener al V. I .

Petrov,

Deput y

Commander - i n-

Ch i e f of Sov i e t Gr ound For ces , t o d i r ec t t he war

agai ns t t he Somal i s.

5

' * A f ar mor e obv i ous s i gna l

came t owar d t he end of t he mont h when t he maj or So-

v i e t a i r l i f t s commenced.

And by t he

f ol l owi ng mont h,

Cuban t roop uni t s began ar r i v i ng i n Et hi opi a t o as -

s ume a di r e ct r ol e i n t he f i ght i ng.

Ot her f a c t o r s i n addi t i on t o Somal i a ' s

open

c hal l enge

c ont r i but ed t o t h i s Sov i et - Cuban de c i s i on t o i nt er -

vene di r ec t l y

and

ma s s i v el y

i n t he

Ogaden war . W t h

Moga di s c i o

h av i n g pl ay ed i t s l as t ac e, t her e was

now

not hi ng

t o

pr event

t he

Sovi et s f r om s peedi ng

up

t he t i met a bl e f or t he pr os ec ut i on of t he war . W t h

t he Un i t ed St at es and ot her West ern powers f i r m y op-

posed t o t he t r ansm ss i on of weapons t o t he Somal i s

f r om even t hi r d par t i es

as

l ong

as

Somal i ar med

f or ces r emai ned

i n t he

Ogaden,

t he

Sov i e t s coul d we l l

have

pr e di c t e d t ha t

a

m l i t ar y

c onf r ont a t i on

wi t h

t he

West was h i ghl y unl i ke l y as l ong as no Sov i e t combat

f or c es par t i c i pat ed

i n t h e

f i ght i ng

and

Sov i e t

obj ec-

t i ves r e mai ned l i m t ed

t o t h e

e xpul s i on

of

Somal i

f or c es f r om t he Oga den. I n f ac t , d i r e c t i nv ol v eme nt

- 32 -


36/60

gave t he Sovi e t s and Cubans g r eat e r cont r ol over t he

out come

of t he war and

made

i t

ea s i er

f or

t hem

t o r e -

s t r ai n t he Et hi opi ans f r om i nvadi ng

Somal i a .

5

Mor eov er , t he Sov i et s may hav e f el t t ha t a l a r g e-

s c al e Cuba n m l i t a r y pr es enc e r e ma i ni n g i n t he Ogaden

a f t e r

t he

i nevi t abl e def eat

of Somal i

ar med f or ces

woul d not onl y d i scour age anot he r Somal i a t t ack , but

al s o i nhi bi t Et hi opi an r epr i s al s agai ns t Oga deni

t r i bes men. I nde ed, t he

15, 000

Cuban t r oops manni ng

gar r i s ons i n t he Ogaden af f or d Moscow and Havana s i g -

ni f i cant

pot ent i al l ever age i n f ut ur e deal i ngs wi t h

Mogadi sc i o .

Br oader pol i t i c al c ons i der at i ons al s o

may

have

af -

f ec t e d

Moscow s dec i s i on t o i nt er vene i n t he Ogaden.

J us t

a f ew days pr i or t o

Mogadi sc i o s

abr o ga t i o n of

t he F r i ends h i p Tr eat y, Egy pt i a n P r es i de nt Sa da t ma de

hi s

dr amat i c announcement t hat

he

woul d v i s i t J er us a-

l em a move t hat unhi nged pl ans f or r e c onv en i ng

mul t i l a t e r a l t al ks a t Geneva and suddenl y r emoved t he

Sovi et s f r om pl ayi ng a di r ec t r ol e i n t he Ar a b- I s -

r ael i peac e negot i at i ons .

Moscow

may hav e hoped t hat

a gr aphi c demons t r at i on o f Sov i et i nt e r v en t i o n c apa-

b i l i t i e s woul d convey t he message t hat t he USSR coul d

s t i l l pl ay a maj or r ol e i n obs t r uc t i ng, i f not i n

- 33 -


37/60

pr omot i ng, peace

i n t h e Mi dd l e

East

and

woul d

be

nei t h er i qnor ed

no r s l i ght ed.

I t

s houl d al s o

be

added t hat

Mosc ow s r easons f o r i n-

t er v eni ng

on a

l ar ge s cal e

i n t he

Ogaden

war

seem

l ar gel y i nd ep end ent

of

c ondi t i ons

on t he

ba t t l e f i e l d .

I t

i s t r ue t hat

Mo ga di s c i o s

abr o ga t i o n of t he S ov i e t

F r i ends hi p T r e a t y c oi nc i ded wi t h t he l as t ma j o r

Soma-

l i

of f ens i ve

of t he

war .

But t h e

d r i v e agai ns t

t he

Et hi opi an pos i t i ons i n t he Ogaden had j us t a bo ut

peaked by t h e t i me t hat t he f i r s t S ovi et a i r l i f t s be-

gan. 6

whi l e

t he

s i t uat i on

on t he

bat t l ef i e l d

r emai ned

s er i ous ,

i t i s

doubt f u l t hat

t he

Et hi opi ans

needed muc h

mor e

t h an an i n c r e me nt a l i nc r eas e i n So-

v i e t / Cuba n s uppor t t o b l u nt t he

Somal i

of f ens i ve.

Of cou rse ,

t hey r ece i ved much mor e t han t h i s .

By

c o n t r a s t , i t i s

wor t h r ec al l i ng t h at d ur i ng

t he

per i -

od

i n wh i ch t he E t h i opi an f or ces may have needed So -

v i et

a s s i s t anc e

t he

mo s t , t h at

i s , i n t he weeks

i mme-

d i at e l y

f ol l owi ng t he Somal i at t ac k, ver y l i t t l e of

i t

was t o be

had .

I t was

onl y

a f t e r

Et hi opi an

de-

f ens e l i nes had s t abi l i z ed out s i de of Har ar i n l at e

Sept ember t hat Sovi et ar ms began

t o

pour i nt o Et hi o-

pi a.

- 34 -


38/60

The

j oi nt S ovi et - Cuban de ci s i on

t o

i nt er v ene

i n t he

Oqaden

War al s o e nt a i l e d pr obl e ms and c os t s i n i t s

i mp l ement a t i on. St agi ng a l ar ge- s c al e ai r - and sea-

l i f t was q ui t e dema nd i n g, pr obabl y mor e f or pol i t i c a l

than

f or

t e chni c al reasons. Most

of t he

s t at es t hat

Sovi et t r a ns por t pl anes over f l ew ei t her d i r ec t l y sup-

por t ed (wi t h s uppl i es and adv i s er s ) or wer e sympa-

t het i c t o t he Somal i s dur i ng t he c onf l i c t . I n or der

t o

ai r l i f t mat e r i el

t o

Et hi opi a,

t he

Sov i e t s f ound

i t

necessary

t o empl oy a wi de va r i e t y o f

f l i ght

r o u t e s ,

t o

abuse

t he Mont r eux

Convent i on s pr ov i s i ons

f or

over f l i ght s t hr ough Tur ki s h ai r cor r i dors ^ t o en-

g ag e wi del y

i n

s uc h s u bt e r f ug es

as

l i s t i ng f al s e

f i -

nal d es t i nat i ons ( us ual l y

Aden,

whi ch s er ved as a ma-

j or

t r anssh i pment poi n t

f or

ma t e r i e l

t o Et hi o pi a) ^

and, on one oc cas i on, t o s ubs t i t ut e m l i t ar y t r a ns -

por t s f or t he c i v i l i an ai r c r a f t f or whi c h over f l i ght

pe r m s s i o n had be en g r ant ed. 9

The

Sovi et s a l s o

had t o

s ur mount c e r t a i n t e c h ni c a l

pr obl ems connect ed wi t h

t he

s eal i f t . W t h

t he

r ai l -

r oad connect i on

t o

Dj i bout i c u t , Addi s Ababa

had t o

r e l y on t he road t o Assab, wh i ch r an t hr ough Af a r and

35


39/60

Er i t r ean t er r i t or y subj ec t

t o

quer r i l l a

a t t a c k . Be-

cause

of

both congest i on

at t he port of

Assab

and t he

adapt abi l i t y of Aden' s

Khor maks ar

ai r po r t t o amphi b -

i ous t r ans por t oper at i ons , t he Sov i et s ma de e x t e ns i v e

us e of t ank l a ndi n g s hi ps i n t he seal i f t .

60

I n

l ar ge par t

t o

pr ot ec t t hi s s eal i f t ,

t he

Sovi et s al s o

i nc r eas ed t he numbe r of t hei r naval uni t s t o t h e

hi ghe s t l ev el ev er ma i n t a i n ed i n t he I ndi an

Ocean. "

Mor eover , t hey di d so af t e r t hey had

l os t t hei r ac ces s

t o

Ber ber a

a

f e at t ha t s u gges t s

t ha t t he Sov i et Navy has no t f ound ex t ens i ve access

t o s hor e- bas ed f a c i l i t i e s nec es s ar y i n t he per f or ma-

nce of even some of i t s mor e demandi ng peacet i me m s-

s i ons

.

Even

bef or e

t he

f i r s t Sovi et ai r l i f t s , Moscow

had a l -

r eady comm t t ed near l y 1 bi l l i on i n m l i t ar y ai d t o

Et hi opi a , but a t l eas t s ome of t hi s c os t wi l l ev en-

t ual l y

be

r epa i d. However ,

t he

i nt er vent i on i t s el f

ent ai l ed

s ubs t ant i al addi t i ona l cos t s , i nc l udi ng

t hos e di r e c t l y c onnec t ed wi t h s t agi ng t he ai r - and

s eal i f t ,

as

we l l

as

t hos e r e l at ed

t o t h e

r epl acement

by Sov i et ai r def ens e pi l ot s of Cuba n pi l ot s on as -

s i gnment i n Et hi opi a. 62

- 36 -


40/60

I n

compar i son

t o t he

i nt er v ent i on s ec onom c c os t s ,

i t s pol i t i c al c o s t s have appear ed

t o be

i nconsequen-

t i a l .

The

U. S. Gover nment , c l a i m ng t hat

t he

S ov i et

na va l b ui l d up at t he he i g ht of t he war c as t d ou bt

upon t hei r s i nc er i t y and i nt er es t i n I ndi a n Oc ean na-

val l i m t at i ons , s us pended t he t al ks af t er t he f our t h

r ound i n February 1978

63

But t he S ov i et s p r obabl y

s aw t hi s s i mpl y as a c o nv en i ent pr et ex t . The n egot i -

at i ons

had

been ef f ec t i v el y de r a i l e d anyway

by

t hei r

l os s of

Ber ber a.

F u r t h e r ,

t he

Sovi et s

m ght

ha ve a nt i c i pa t e d t hat

i l l

f eel i ngs among Ar ab

s uppo r t e r s of

Somal i a ar oused

by

t hei r i nt er vent i on wer e l i kel y t o be t r ans i ent at

bes t . I n v i ew of t he f ac t t hat e f f ec t i v e meas ur es

wer e not t aken t o o b s t r u c t t he Sovi et ai r - and sea-

l i f t , t he Ar a b r eac t i on does not appear t o h av e been

very severe . Thei r suppor t f or Somal i a was undoubt -

edl y t empered by t he knowl edge t hat Mogadi s c i o was

engaged

i n t hi nl y - di s gui s ed aggr es s i on a ga i ns t a s ov-

er ei gn s t a t e. 4

- 37 -


41/60

I f t he

u l t i mat e obj ec t i ve

of

Sovi et pol i c y

i n t he

Hor n

was t o es t abl i s h a pax So vi e t i c a, i n wh i c h al l

s t a t e s

i n t he

r egi on woul d

be

l i nked

i n a

f eder a t i on

t hat woul d r e s ol ve age- ol d ho s t i l i t i e s , and wi t h e ac h

count r y maki ng sur e

p r o g r e s s

unde r Sov i et t ut el a ge

t owa r ds s o c i a l i s m t he n o bv i o us l y Mos c ow has not suc-

ceeded.

What

t he

So vi e t s ha ve c l ear l y a c c o mpl i s h ed

has been t o br i ng an appr ec i abl e degr e e of s t a bi l i t y

t o

Et hi opi a

and i n so

do i ng t hey

may

have

cut

shor t

any r emot e pl ans t o es t a bl i s h a c ons er vat i ve m l i t a r y

bl oc

of Ar ab s t a t e s i n t he r e gi on. W t h

Somal i

ar med

f or c es ( but

no t

guer r i l l as ) e xpel l ed f r om

t he

Ogaden

and i ns u r g enc y i n Er i t r ea and i n ot her r e gi o ns i n a

s t a t e

of

r e m s s i on,

t he

r a di c al l ef t i s t m l i t a r y

l e ade r s of E t h i o pi a ar e f ar mo r e s ec ur e t oday t ha n

ever bef o re .

But t he

Der gue s dependence upon Sovi et

support does not appear t o have g i ven

Moscow

g rea t

i nf l uenc e

i n shapi ng t he subsequent cour se o f t he

Et hi opi an r evol ut i on. I n f ac t , t he avai l abi l i t y of

Sovi et weapons may have embol dened Mengi s t u t o seek

m l i t ar y s ol ut i ons t o Et hi opi a s pol i t i c al pr o bl ems .

W t h Et hi opi an f or c es o n t he of f ens i v e i n Er i t r ea,

t he Dergue s ear l i e r pr oposal s f or r egi ona l aut onomy

38


42/60

t her e appear t o be some t hi ng o f a de ad l et t e r f or t he

t i me bei ng. Whet her

t he

Dergue wi l l

be any

mor e suc-

c es s f ul t han i t s pr edec es s or i n i mpos i ng i t s aut hor -

i t y

i n Er i t r e a by sheer f or ce of ar ms r e ma i ns t o be

seen.

At t he pr esent t i me , i t appea r s t ha t t he Der -

gue' s pol i c i es

ar e

sowi ng

t he

seeds

of

f ut ur e i ns t a -

b i l i t y .

Wher e Sovi et ef f or t s

do

seem

t o

have

met

wi t h some

bel at ed s uc ces s i s i n t he or gani z at i on of a r ul i ng

pol i t i cal par t y, t he Et hi opi an Wor ker s '

P a r t y ,

sched-

ul ed t o be f or med i n t he Fal l of

1979

65

But

whet her t hi s vanguar d par t y wi l l i ns t i t ut i onal i z e

t he Et hi opi a n r ev ol ut i on, as Mos c ow woul d l i ke , o r

wi l l mer el y s t r engt hen

Me ngi s t u' s

power s t i l l f ur -

t her , i s unc er t ai n. I t i s i ns t r uc t i ve t o not e t hat

t he Somal i

m l i t a r y r egi me al s o f or med

i n

1976 what

t he Sovi e t s t e rmed

at t he

t i me

a

vanguar d par t y

onl y t o j oi n t he f or ces of r eac t i on dur i ng t he f o l -

l owi ng

year .

I t i s qui t e pos si bl e t hat des pi t e t hei r

b e s t e f f o r t s , t he Sovi et s may ha ve a c c ompl i s h ed l i t -

t l e

mor e t o e ngi ne er r ev ol ut i onar y c ha nge i n E t h i o pi a

than

t o

s t r engt hen Meng i s t u ' s power

base.

- 39 -


43/60

Wher eas Sov i e t qa i ns

i n

Et hi opi a

may

t u r n

out t o be

l es s i mpr es s i v e t han at f i r s t g l anc e, t hei r

l os s es

i n

Somal i a may al s o not be as i r r e t r i e va bl e as t hey i ni -

t i al l y s eemed. I n t he f i r s t pl ac e, t he Sov i et s now

appear

t o

ha ve mor e

or

l ess made

up f or

what t hey

l os t i n Somal i a wi t h combi ned access t o suppor t f a-

c i l i t i es i n

E t hi opi a

and

Sout h Yemen. ( Though,

as

has been not ed

above,

t he Sovi et s had l i t t l e r e as on

t o ex pec t s uc h a f or t ui t ous

out come. )

Sec ondl y , des p i t e t he t e r m nat i o n of t he Sov i et pr e -

s enc e i n Somal i a, t hey had not l os t al l t hei r i nf l u-

enc e i n t hat c o unt r y . Wh i l e t he f or mer ba s i s of

t hei r r e l at i ons hi p ( i . e . , a rms f o r access ) no

l onger

can be r e c o n s t r u c t e d ,

s ome

l i m t ed

rapproche-

ment cannot

be

r ul ed

out i n t he

f ut ur e. 6 i n

f a c t , s h oul d t he So ma l i s e ve r s eek a n ego t i a t e d s et -

t l ement

on t he

Ogaden,

t he

Sov i et s

and

Cubans woul d

be

t he

l o gi c a l me di a t o r s . T hu s , ho we ve r r emot e

p ros -

pec t s f or a pax Sov i e t i ca on t he Hor n may pr esent l y

a ppe ar , t hey ex i s t nonet hel es s .

The one

maj or

l os s

t he

Sov i et s s uf f e r e d t hat

may

wel l

be i r r et r i evabl e

i s an

I ndi a n Oc ean t r eat y . Al t h ou gh

40


44/60

t he Sovi et Uni on seems

now t o

have r ega i ned

i t s

bar-

gai ni ng c hi ps af t er t he l os s of Ber ber a, t he Uni t e d

S t a t e s may have , f or v ar i ous r eas ons ( i nc l udi ng t he

ev ent s i n

I r a n) ,

l os t i nt er e st i n t he t al ks i n t he

i nt e r i m

I f

t al ks

are not

r esumed, t hen Moscow wi l l

have

l os t

an

ex cel l ent oppor t uni t y

t o

obt a i n some

i m-

por t ant l egal guar ant ees s a t i s f yi ng

a

maj or Sov i e t

s ec ur i t y concer n.

So vi e t

l os s es

i n Somal i a and mor e

s i gni f i c ant l y

i n

t he suspens i on of t he I ndi an Ocean t al ks s hou l d be

wei ghed

agai ns t t hei r gai ns i n Et hi opi a. The pos s i -

bi l i t y cannot

be

r u l ed

out

t ha t

t he

S ov i e t s woul d

have ac t ed d i f f e r ent l y had t hey f or eseen t he out comes

of t hei r s uppor t f or Et hi opi a. At t he out s et o f

t hei r i nv ol v eme nt , t he Sov i et s appa r e nt l y t h ou gh t

t hey coul d have t he i r cake and eat i t t oo. The r ea-

sons f o r t h e

S ovi et s

t o

c ome

t o

Et hi opi a' s as s i s t anc e

wer e ev i dent l y s uf f i c i ent l y s t r ong f or t hem t o t ake a

c al c ul at ed r i s k t hat t hey woul d

not

a l i ena t e Somal i a

t o t h e po i nt of event ual l y f or f ei t i ng t hei r acc es s

t o naval s uppor t f ac i l i t i es t her e . To be sur e t hi s

r i s k, whi c h was based upon t he assumpt i on t hat Soma-

l i a woul d pur sue i t s r at i onal s el f - i nt er e s t s , may

have appear ed qu i t e sma l l a t t he t i me. But t he poi n t

- 41 -


45/60

i s

t h a t t h e y

t ook

i t nonet he l ess . Had t hey not

want ed t o t ake any chances of j eopar di z i ng t hei r ac -

c e s s ,

t hey woul d never have suppor t ed E t h i opi a i n t he

f i r s t pl a ce . Thus , al t h ou gh

t he

Sov i et s

di d not ge t

what t hey had hoped f or on t he Hor n , t he r esu l t s of

t hei r ac t i ons , on bal anc e, bear an i mpr i nt of t he

choi ces t hey made.

F ur t h er mor e , t her e i s r eas on t o b el i e v e t ha t t he So-

v i e t s woul d h av e ac t ed

muc h

t he s ame e ve n had they

pr edi c t ed Somal i a s r esponse.

I t i s

wor t h not i ng

t ha t i n t he cas e of

E gy pt ,

whos e n av al s u ppor t f a ci l -

i t i e s

wer e mor e i mpor t ant oper a t i onal l y , but n ot po-

l i t i c al l y

( NALT) ,

t han t hose

of

Soma l i a , conce rn

f or

t he

l os s

of

nava l acces s

d i d not

al t er

t he

f undamen-

t al t h r u s t

of

Sovi et f or ei gn pol i c y, whi c h

was

i ni m -

cal

t o

Egypt s i nt er es t s .

I n t he

Hor n

t he

Sov i et s

t r i ed t o accommodat e Somal i

s ens i t i v i t i es ,

but t hey

never gave

i n t o

Mogadi s c i o s demand t hat t hey

not

s uppor t Et hi opi a . They

may

have r ecogni zed t hat sub-

m t t i ng

t o

Soma l i b l ackma i l over acces s woul d e s t ab-

l i s h a n ex t r emel y da ng er ous pr ec edent e nt a i l i n g

gr eat er l ong- t er m di l e mma s t h an l os i ng ac ces s and

t her eby j eopar di z i ng

t he

s t r ong p rospec t s

f or an I n-

di an

Ocean

t r e a t y .

- 42 -


46/60

From t he

Sov i et

pe r s p ec t i v e,

t her ef or e,

i t

seems t hat

Mos cow

gai n ed mor e t han i t l os t on t he Hor n. The So-

vi et s

al s o

can

cl ai m t hat

i n

s uppor t i ng Et h i o pi a ,

t hey

wer e

d oi ng

t he

r i ght t hi ng. Thr ough

t he

course

of t hei r i nv ol v ement , t hey di d

i ndeed

pur s ue ( more

t han l es s)

a pr i nc i pl ed pol i cy. By per f or m ng

t hei r

pr o l et ar i an

i nt er nat i onal i s t dut y t owar d

a

r evol ut i onar y r egi me i n ext r em s , by

d ef en di n g

t he

i n v i o l a b i l i t y

of

sover e i gn bor der s ,

by

as s um ng

r e-

s pons i bi l i t y f or pas t dec i s i ons

( e . g . ,

t o a r m f i r s t

Somal i a and l at er Et hi opi a) , and f i nal l y , by ac t i ng

bol dl y , but not r as hl y , when openl y c hal l en ged, t he

Sovi et s wal ked

on t he

s i de

of t he

ange l s

i n t he

Hor n.

- 43 -


47/60

FOOTNOTES

1. Washi ngt on Post ,

May 7, 1977, p. Al and Mar ch 5,

1978,

p. Al .

2. Washi ngt on Post , Mar ch 5, 1978, p. Al O. I t i s

wor t h addi ng t hat

dur i ng t he

pr e vi ou s

t wo

years ,

t he For d Adm ni s t r at i on had i nc r eas ed s i gni f i -

c ant l y t he l evel of U. S. weapons del i ver i es t o

Et hi opi a . Consu l t U. S. Ar ms Cont r ol

and

Di sar -

mament Agency. Wor l d Mi l i t ar y Expendi t u r es and

Ar ms

Tr ans f er s , 1967-76

( Washi ngt on, DC: GPO,

1978 ,

p.

129.

3. Washi ngt on P o s t , Mar ch

5,

1978,

p.

Al O.

4.

The

Sovi et I ndi an Ocean Squadr on,

i n

f a c t ,

has

hi s t or i c al l y s pent mos t

of i t s

t i me

i n t he

Gu l f

of

Aden.

5. Thi s ar gument was f i r s t pr esent ed i n Geof f r ey

J uk es , The I ndi an Oc ean i n Sov i et Nav al Pol i c y ,

Adel phi

Paper s ,

No. 87,

( May

1972 .

6. Thi s poi nt was made i n J ames M. McConnel l The

Sov i et Navy i n t he I nd i an Ocean i n Sovi et Naval

Devel opment s, edi t ed by Mi chael MccGwi r e ( New

York: Pr aeger P ubl i s he r s , 1973 , pp. 389-406.

7. Lt . Cmdr . W l l i am F . Hi c kman, Sovi et Nav al Pol -

i cy

i n t he I ndi an Oc ea

soviet policy in horn

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