POLICING COVID19

REPORT BY THE SOUTH YORKSHIRE INDEPENDENT ETHICS PANEL

Foreword

The government response to the coronavirus crisis in March 2020 saw the rapid enactment of emergency powers and restrictions placed on the entire population that were unprecedented in peacetime. This immediately presented the police with a challenging situation as they sought to understand their new powers and distinguish between enforceable regulations and unenforceable government guidance, all of which had the potential to put at risk the trust that the public have in their police force.

Ethical issues have been in play throughout this period and for that reason I asked the Independent Ethics Panel to look in some detail at the police response and to give me some indication as to whether, in their view, the force had acted in ways that were not only ‘necessary, sufficient and proportionate’ but also ‘ethical’. This report is the outcome of their considerations.

The panel’s broad conclusion gives me, and I hope the public of South Yorkshire, reassurance that throughout this intense and rapidly changing period the force has indeed for the most part acted in ways that are ‘necessary, sufficient, proportionate and ethical’ and, as a result, ‘the public in general has a high level of trust and confidence in SYP in the Covid19 context and that there is a widespread consent for the manner in which the county is being policed.’

I thank the panel for the hard work that lies behind this very comprehensive report and the reassurance it gives.

Dr Alan Billings

Police and Crime Commissioner for South Yorkshire

Contents

1. IntroductionPg. 3

2. The Emergency PowersPg. 3

3. Has there been proportionate implementation of the new powers?Pg. 5

4. Complaints, and reports from the public of alleged breaches of the ‘rules’Pg. 9

5. How has the protection of vulnerable groups been managed?Pg. 11

6. Policing Covid19 – longer term issuesPg. 12

7. Areas which SYP might consider for further evaluationPg. 13

8. ConclusionsPg. 14

1. Introduction

1.1The Independent Ethics Panel (the Panel) advises the Police & Crime Commissioner (PCC) and Chief Constable (CC) of South Yorkshire (SY) on ethical issues and supports them – and the Force – in facing the ethical challenges of their work. Our role is that of ‘critical friend’.

1.2Among the most challenging tasks to have been faced by forces in recent years, is policing the emergency provisions which have been enacted to deal with the Covid19 pandemic. The PCC decided that he would focus his activity for 2020-21, for the duration of Covid19, on four areas. One of these is: ‘Ensuring, on behalf of the public, that the police respond in ways that are necessary, sufficient, proportionate and ethical’. He invited the IEP to consider how it might provide assurance around ethical use of the emergency powers.

1.3The Panel agreed on 9 April to respond to the PCC’s invitation by focussing its work on three areas:

a. The Force’s implementation and ongoing use of the new legislation

b. Complaints, and reports from the public of alleged breaches of the ‘rules’

c. The approach being taken to the protection of vulnerable groups.

The CC agreed on 17 April that these were ‘terms for useful enquiry’ by the Panel. This report covers developments up to 30 June 2020.

1.4In addition to its discussions, the Panel’s six members have worked individually on different areas of interest, on which they have contributed to this report. In view of the exceptional circumstances it has not proved possible to carry out on-the –ground observation of police activity, but members of the Panel have had access to SYP written briefings, to senior officers in conversation, to Gold meetings, to material on ‘Back-up Buddy SYP’ (see further below), to relevant media reports, and to information about complaints and public comment. It is of course possible that the Panel has missed something significant, but the consistency of the material available to the Panel has been striking.

2. The emergency powers

2.1Emergency provisions were first enacted on 26 March, and were probably unprecedented in peacetime. The Health Protection Regulations limited freedom of movement and business activity, and gave police new powers of enforcement. Restrictions on some businesses and premises were relaxed on 1 June, while on 8 June, new regulations affecting international travel came into force. Police have taken few if any enforcement measures under those regulations. On 15 June, regulations covering the use of face coverings on public transport came into force, but enforcement has been largely the responsibility of the British Transport Police. Our focus in this report is therefore on SYP’s activity in relation to the Health Protection Regulations.

2.2 The new powers have been intrusive to personal and business life to a degree well beyond the previous experience of police officers. The legislation did not expand current general police powers, to stop and search, or to enter, search and seize, subject to a warrant, or to stop vehicles. It did give the police specific powers of enforcement,

· in relation to the closure of premises;

· directing a person outside their home ‘without reasonable excuse’ to return there, using reasonable force if necessary, or

· directing a person in charge of a child to take the child home;

· directing persons in a public place to return to their home where they were part of a gathering.

But such powers could only be exercised if the officer considered that it is a ‘necessary and proportionate means of ensuring compliance’.

2.3 A failure to comply with the requirements of the Regulations without reasonable excuse constitutes an offence. A fixed penalty notice (FPN) offers the opportunity to discharge liability for conviction - reduced if paid within 14 days.

2.4 Even the original Regulations were not as restrictive as Government guidance implied. While the public was told that we could leave our homes for only four purposes – exercise, essential food or medical supplies for self or a vulnerable person, medical needs, and travel to work if absolutely necessary - the law was not as restrictive as this. There were in fact not 4 but 13 listed purposes for which a person could leave home if they had ‘reasonable excuse’ and, moreover, that list of excuses was not exhaustive. Potentially, any need could represent a reasonable excuse, but it had to be justified as such. The list changed with each amendment of the Regulations.

2.5 The confusion in government messaging left the public and – initially at least, it appeared, the police - unclear. Subject to the need to have a reasonable excuse for being out of their home, a member of the public could not be restricted as to:

· the place where they might take exercise

· the work which they might do away from home

· the number of times that they could leave their home with a reasonable excuse

· any particular measurement of social distancing, such as two metres

· (if over-70 or in the highly vulnerable category) confinement to their homes.

2.6 All of these high-profile ‘restrictions’ were covered in Government guidance (which has no binding legal effect), rather than in regulations (which do). Most members of the public were unaware of any such distinction when complying with the perceived restrictions on their activities. One may speculate that that may have been what the authors of the policy intended, in using the catch-all word ‘rules’ (as in, for example: ‘social distancing rules’).

2.7 The confusion brought with it risks to public confidence in policing. First, in the early stages, not all police officers made the distinction between enforceable regulations and unenforceable guidance. That is entirely understandable in view of the haste with which forces were expected to adapt to their new powers, but in a society in which policing is by consent, the Panel does not think it acceptable that Government should be exposing police officers to the risks associated with exceeding their powers.

2.8 Of course, most people would say that it has been a positive to society that officers have seen it as their role to ‘engage, explain and encourage’ citizens to follow the guidance, even if the guidance could not be enforced.

2.9 The second risk to confidence in policing is that members of the public were reporting breaches of ‘the rules’ to the police (see further below), which were not breaches at all, and could not be enforced. This led to some complaints to both SYP and the PCC that police were not ‘enforcing the rules’.

3. Has there been proportionate implementation of the new powers?

3.1 Having now established the rather complex context in which the police have been operating, we turn to the first of the three areas on which we originally focused.

3.2 SYP made use of joint NPCC and College of Policing guidance documents, which were updated with each amendment of the Regulations. The national documents owed much to material produced by SYP Legal Services. Central to that guidance was the ‘Four Es’ approach which has been fundamental to policing the restrictions:

· Engage

· Explain

· Encourage

· Enforce.

3.3 The fourth ‘E’ was advised to be a last resort and deployed only if the other three ‘E’s were unsuccessful in obtaining public compliance. Where to pitch police activity in any individual situation is a matter for the officer’s discretion, in accordance with the National Decision-Making Model (NDM).

3.4 In the Covid19 context, the judgements which officers have made include:

· whether an individual has a ‘reasonable excuse’;

· whether to persuade or direct on the one hand, or to issue a FPN on the other;

· whether to use reasonable force to remove a person to their home.

Judgements such as these are often difficult to make in ‘normal’ circumstances, but this is what officers learn to do in their initial training, and on the job. In this crisis, the onus to get it right has been all the greater, not only because lives and health have potentially been at risk, but because public support for the restrictions has partly depended on the way they have been policed.

3.5 In the early weeks of the restrictions, it became clear that there was wide variation in policing approaches. Some of these brought negative publicity for some forces, but SYP largely avoided negative publicity in its use of the emergency powers. A few over-zealous tweets by officers, giving examples of what they considered to be ‘inessential travel’, appeared in the early weeks. There was an online backlash against a Doncaster sergeant’s apparently sarcastic tweet about an ‘essential saunter in jeans as exercise’ at the end of April, but the tweet was quickly disowned by the District Commander. More widely publicised was footage of an officer attempting to prevent a family from being out in their garden in Rotherham. The Force described this as a well-intentioned, but misinformed, act by the officer concerned, and, crucially, apologised for the error and made it clear that the officer had been spoken to. The Force’s approach in these and other situations, by contrast with certain other incidents elsewhere in the country, was to acknowledge errors, and it is our judgement that speedy responses by SYP will have prevented any loss of public confidence in its approach to policing.

3.6 From the start, the Force emphasised to the public that enforcement would be a last resort. In a statement within a couple of days of the start of the lockdown (released to the media and sent out through SYP’s Neighbourhood Alerts messages) the CC said: ‘we will inform, encourage and support. Where we find people are not willing to comply, we will move to enforcement once we understand the detail of the legislation’. The CC issued a further message to the public on 13 May as the restrictions were relaxed for the first time, re-affirming the priority of the first three ‘E’s; enforcement (he said) continued to be for the times when it was absolutely necessary and proportionate.

3.7 On 7 April, the CC had been able to report to the PCC’s Public Accountability Board that the overwhelming majority of the public appeared to be respecting the restrictions. Up to the immediately preceding weekend (i.e 10 days after the introduction of the emergency powers), no FPNs had been issued in South Yorkshire. By contrast, other forces in England and Wales were already handing out FPNs, with Lancashire taking an early lead in numbers issued. Subsequently more rural forces had that doubtful distinction.

3.8 Things changed in SY the following weekend, and by 27 April, SYP had issued 258 FPNs, according to figures published by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). This placed SYP in the mid-range of Force responses. However, in the subsequent two months, the rate of issue of FPNs slowed down considerably.

3.9 On 27 July, the NPCC issued a more detailed breakdown of FPN statistics. They cover the period from 27 March to 25 May. They show that in that period, SYP issued 367 FPNs altogether, of which 101 were to BAME individuals. That equates to 1.9 FPNs for every 10000 white residents of SY, and 7.3 for every 10000 BAME residents (based on population figures for mid-2016). About 27% of FPNs were issued to BAME individuals, when if FPNs were distributed equally across the entire population of SY, a proportion of 10% would be expected. The national disparity rate (defined as the rate for 10000 BAME citizens as a ratio of rates for 10000 white citizens) is 1.6; in SY this is 3.8. In other words, a BAME individual is 3.8 times more likely to be issued with a FPN in SY than their white counterpart.

3.10 One relevant factor suggested by the NPCC report which accompanies the statistics is that people in the 18-34 age group accounted nationally for 57% of all FPNs. The issue of FPNs is therefore not distributed equally across all age ranges. Indeed, if they were, a rate of only 14% would be expected. The Panel has previously commented in another context (stop and search) that there is likely to be a higher proportion of BAME individuals in the 18-34 age group than in older groups, and in that age group generally, trust in the police may be lower than in older groups. In this context, that may show itself in a reduced tendency to comply with the first three E’s, leading officers to have to resort to enforcement.

3.11 At 367, among a population of about 1.5 million over 60 days, the overall FPN numbers do not in themselves appear excessive, but we do not doubt that the Force will wish to investigate the factors which have led to the ‘disparity’ rate in SY being more than twice that of the national figure. It is possible for example that the numbers reflect multiple incidents in a limited number of areas, rather than a consistent picture across SY.

3.12 The Force might find it helpful to be supported in this work by an external scrutiny panel, which could look at a sample of cases in which FPNs were issued. Body cam footage will be available in many such cases. This approach would not be new for SYP. For some years, the Force has use an external scrutiny panel to look at a sample of stop and search incidents, as a way of obtaining assurance of appropriate use of the powers.

3.13 There is another aspect of the statistics which may require investigation. Among all forces, SYP has the fourth highest proportion of records where ethnicity is marked as ‘unknown’. This occurred in 28 of the cases where FPNs were issued.

3.14 On a more positive note, senior officers continued to be impressed by the SY public’s response generally. In an interview with a member of the Panel on June 1, ACC Hartley (Gold) and Supt McCurry (Silver) described compliance with requirements and requests from the NHS and SYP as ‘excellent’ and ‘remarkable’.

The Force’s internal arrangements

3.15 The Panel has informed itself about the Force’s approach. A Standing Gold Group for planning and operational oversight was set up at the beginning of February - long before the pandemic spread across the country. Shortly after the emergency powers were announced by the Government in the third week in March, SYP established a Covid19 Co-ordinating Centre. This offered a single contact point for advice.

3.16 The Force also instituted a dedicated Covid19 Intranet page, and daily briefings, starting on 26 March. Sergeants and Inspectors received a briefing on the morning of 28 March. By 30 March ‘educational road checkpoints’ were in place, with officers engaged with members of the public to provide advice and guidance on ‘essential travel’. There was however some ambiguity in the messages, and it must be remembered that the Force had no additional powers to stop vehicles. The checkpoints were said to be ‘to help us determine whether journeys by drivers are essential’. If their reason was not deemed essential ‘officers would remind them to stay at home’ (but officers had no power to enforce in these circumstances).

3.17 On 3 April, the daily briefing (and a supporting video message from Silver) reinforced to officers that there were a number of exemptions to the restrictions on leaving home, and advised them to empathise with members of the public on their particular set of circumstances. In particular, officers were reminded to show common sense when they encountered key workers.

Back up Buddy SYP

3.18 A key element in the SYP Gold Group’s communication with its officers and staff during the Covid19 crisis, has been Backup Buddy SYP - an app which provides useful information in easily accessible form. It has been used to offer reminders and advice on wellbeing, including on mental health (with good links to support services), and information on Covid19 symptoms and what to do if they manifest themselves. Also available are summaries of briefings on policing dung the restrictions. Behind the pages are comprehensive links to additional information as required.

3.19 The front page opens with a briefing by the CC which contains a supportive message for those on front line duties and the need to protect themselves and their colleagues. The approach is motivational but re-assuring. Further on the subject of welfare, the Force was also able to source plenty of protective equipment. Furthermore, the level of ‘abstraction’ (i.e sickness absence) was never a concern to the SCT during this period.

Legal Services

3.20 SYP’s Legal Services department (joint with Humberside) has played a central role, issuing detailed fact sheets on the emergency powers, which contained practical guidance as to proportionate implementation of the powers. They formed the foundation of SYP’s briefings to officers and staff. In mid-May, they signalled a change in focus from policing the ‘stay at home’ restrictions to policing of gatherings. The fact sheets clearly distinguished between the enforceable regulations and the unenforceable Government guidance. A reminder was also given that social distancing ‘remains unenforceable by law’, but that the public should still be encouraged to adhere to it.

3.21 The fact-sheets were wide-ranging in scope. For example, those issued on 14 May covered

· examples of ‘reasonable excuses’

· gatherings on private premises

· children

· funerals and burial grounds

· homelessness

· prohibition notices in respect of business premises.

Fact sheets have been kept up-to-date as regulations and government guidance has changed. Officers were advised to print off the practical guidance or store it on their phones, to assist in policing the easing restrictions.

3.22 While these have undoubtedly been very useful documents for planning and briefing senior staff, they are quite lengthy and written in quite complex language which repays detailed study. Although they were intended to support frontline officers, those officers were working under time pressures with high levels of anxiety at times which can make it more difficult to digest new information.

3.23 The strength of SYP’s planning and communication arrangements produced what appears to have been an efficient flow of information, guidance and instructions with a balance of messages about undertaking duties while also taking care. The Force appears to have moved swiftly to implement the necessary structures and tools. Back-up Buddy deserves special mention.

3.24 No doubt however there will be a need for evaluative work to be undertaken in due course, and we will return to this in our conclusions.

4. Complaints, and reports from the public of alleged breaches of the ‘rules’

4.1 One of the ways in which public reaction to police activity can be judged is through complaints made to the Force or the PCC. Covid19 related complaints have overwhelmingly focussed on perceived failures to enforce the restrictions.

4.2 In the period to 30 June, 56 Covid-related complaints were received by the Force’s Professional Standards Department (PSD). None of these were complaints that police action had been disproportionate, or about the issuing of FPNs. PSD reports that all complaints were successfully resolved within PSD by the Complaints Resolution Team through dialogue with the complainant and, where applicable, the respective District or Department.

4.3 The majority of the complaints were from members of the public, unhappy that the police were not taking sufficient action in response to reports of breaches of social distancing ‘rules’. Many of these complainants will have confused regulations with guidance (see above) and failed to understand that social distancing (for example) was not dealt with in regulations and was unenforceable. Officers were, however, able to engage with the public, and explain the health imperative behind the guidance on social distancing.

4.4 There were also some 11 complaints that police officers themselves had not adhered to those ‘rules’ when dealing with members of the public. There were media reports at the time about public concern that police had attended Barnsley Hospital for an ‘NHS clap’ in April, without adhering to 2 metres social distancing, but only 2 of the 11 complaints received were in relation to this incident. Police participation in this way was not repeated.

4.5 Far greater than the numbers of complaints about police inaction, however, were the reports made to the police about other members of the public. From as early as 28 March, the Force made it known that there was a dedicated form on its website for reporting breaches of the ‘Government’s new measures’. ‘There may be times where you know people and organisations may fail to comply with these measures’. If the public is going to make such reports, to encourage them to do so by using an online portal, rather than by ringing 999 or 101, seemed a sensible measure to adopt. Many hundreds of such reports were made. Senior officers reported that there was a spike at weekends in these on-line reports. Whereas a typical daily figure was around 120, over the weekend of 30-31 May for example, 137 and 178 reports were received. No prosecutions resulted but advice was given. Some of those reports had roots in other issues such as neighbour disputes, we understand.

4.6 Advising the public that reports should be made online rather than by telephone communicated the message that such reports were welcome while avoiding tying operators down on the telephone. We assume that the Force had no wish to use police time on investigations of minor breaches, and this messaging will have made it possible to filter those out. More broadly, the Force will have wanted to balance the necessity for enforcement in certain circumstances, with the need not to damage relationships within neighbourhoods, which might lead to trouble in the future, requiring intensive police resources.

4.7 Some reports of breaches were not regarded as minor. Consistent with a shift of focus to policing public gatherings once the early restrictions were relaxed, resources were deployed in response to reports of young people meeting up in parks in breach of the Regulations. To the relief of local residents, police dispersed a group of more than 20 people in Ferham Park in Rotherham in mid-May, for example.

4.8 Serious concerns were reported to police in two neighbourhoods, where disturbances arising from existing community tensions required the investment of considerable resources of time and information. Persistent reports were made that restrictions on gatherings were not being respected in the Page Hall area of Sheffield, leading to increased tension between minority communities. These difficulties had pre-dated COVID19 and reflected local politics as well as strains resulting from the pandemic.

4.9 They were dealt with initially by an ‘educational’ approach, with the distribution of leaflets in relevant languages and engagement with community and faith leaders. University students with language skills were then asked to explain to those whose command of the English language was poor, the need to abide by restrictions. The same approach was then adopted in the second area where disturbances arose from community tensions – Hexthorpe in Doncaster - and in both neighbourhoods, progress was achieved.

Businesses

4.10 Senior officers report that police relations with businesses have not been problematic. While there has been a small amount of correspondence to the PCC from businesses which were unable to work during the restrictions, the Panel is not aware of any widespread concern among businesses about police activity. Following reports from members of the public, however, SYP has taken enforcement action against a small number of licensed premises, which continued operating in breach of the restrictions.

Policing in Ramadan

4.11 There had been concern about how Muslim communities in SY would respond to the restrictions during Ramadan, which started on 23 April. This concern was of a wholly different order from any about the other two major religious festivals of Easter and Passover, both of which also took place during the currency of severe restrictions. The reason for that level of concern about Ramadan was the centrality of daily congregational worship and extended family meals, concluding with the festival of Eid al-Fitr.

4.12 Great efforts were taken nationally (including a recorded video message to all Muslims from the Prince of Wales) and locally in South Yorkshire, to explain the importance of adhering to restrictions. SYP officers and staff were briefed ahead of Ramadan, drawing attention to guidance from the National Association of Muslim Police. Officers and staff were told that SYP’s approach would continue to be led by engagement. The PCC also sent out two letters to all local mosques, and there were other written and video communications from other authorities in South Yorkshire, including from the Lord Lieutenant. In Sheffield, for example, Inspector Colette Fitzgibbons contributed to a video-recorded direct message alongside Muslim community leaders.

4.13 The Panel has been told that these measures were successful. Early breaches at one mosque were reported to SYP by neighbours, but in an example of pragmatic and sensitive policing, these breaches were ended following the intervention of others in the Muslim community.

5. How has the protection of vulnerable groups been managed?

5.1 From the start, it was understood that the restrictions would present additional difficulties for vulnerable groups, such as:

· street sleepers

· refugees and asylum-seekers

· victims of domestic abuse (DA)

· children

· the mentally ill, including dementia sufferers, and those with severe neuro-atypical conditions such as autism

· those in modern slavery

· those with physical disabilities whose mobility would be restricted.

5.2 The Force – rightly in our view - interpreted ‘vulnerability’ in a broader way than the specific groups mentioned above, anticipating that those neighbourhoods which bear the greatest economic and social burdens would be most vulnerable. SYP – largely through neighbourhood teams - has therefore been a key participant with other agencies in the Local Resilience Forums (LRF). The LRF have been alert to this broader understanding of vulnerability. The police’s local contact networks have been active and have been refreshed; tension monitoring has been carried out regularly. The voluntary sector has told the Panel of its appreciation that in this complex situation, the police have been seen to ‘get it right’.

5.3 Specific provision was made in the Health Regulations for the homeless and DA victims.

Homelessness

5.4 SYP Legal Services issued targeted advice on dealing with begging, rough sleeping and homelessness, periodically updated. The homeless still had to observe the restrictions on public gatherings. Local authorities made arrangements to house rough sleepers in otherwise empty hotel accommodation.

5.5. In the first few weeks, Sheffield City Centre Neighbourhood Policing Team carried out daily ‘outreach’ patrols to engage with rough sleepers, supported by the charity Framework. The focus was on ensuring that those on the streets understood what help was available. On 15 April, City Centre Inspector John Mallows reported that ‘a small minority’ had yet to seek help from the local authority, and officers would continue to engage with those individuals to ‘encourage compliance’.

5.6 A member of the Panel with strong links in the voluntary sector has reported a doubling of demand on a small charity which supports homeless veterans. The charity is concerned about the impact on this group when current government support ends and are anticipating increased demand because of growing unemployment, a deterioration in mental health and in family breakdown. This view of the impact of Covid19 on homelessness is shared across the voluntary sector, and will no doubt increase the pressures of policing the streets. It seems to be accepted that the social and economic impact of the pandemic will extend well into the future, with unpredictable implications for policing.

Domestic Abuse

5.7. There had been considerable public concern about the risk of an increase in DA cases during the lockdown period. SYP gave widespread publicity to the ‘silent solution’ – a service available to those dialling 999 in emergency situations whereby if the caller then presses 55, an operator can listen in and make an assessment as to what help the caller requires.

5.8 In the middle of April, the Force also introduced an online portal through which the public could make reports of DA and promised that such reports would be monitored 24/7, and would be responded to in the same way as if a report had been made via 101.

5.9 Around the same time, SYP issued a message about ‘Inspire to Change’, a programme for men and women ‘who have been abusive, controlling or violent towards their partner’. This directed such individuals to useful videos and to a website which explained more about the programme.

5.10 These measures gave reassurance to those who were at risk of DA, and SYP has been praised for the steps it has taken to reassure the public. It is significant that there was no reduction in the level of service provided to victims.

5.11 The PCC has also increased funding to support charities working in the DA field.

6. Policing Covid19 – longer term issues

6.1 During the course of its work, the Panel agreed that it would also report on the ethical aspects of longer-term policing issues associated with Covid19 restrictions. This may be a subject to which the Panel is asked to return in the future, and inevitably, what we say here is of an interim nature.

6.2 The focus of police activity during the pandemic has already changed, largely shifting from policing restrictions on individuals to those on gatherings, no doubt because these were seen as the most likely vectors of the disease as its virulence reduced.

6.3 We have not seen any public recognition by Government of the changing challenges which the police might face as the pandemic continues. However, there is evidence that senior police officers were thinking ahead. As long ago as 19 April Chief Superintendent Paul Griffiths, President of the Police Superintendents’ Association, writing in the Independent on Sunday, said that we should look forward to a ‘more volatile and agitated society’ and that as some of the restrictions begin to be eased, ‘….we need to think about how to best support, help and engage with our communities so they can get through what has been a really significant impact on every aspect of their lives.’ He feared a surge in police incidents.

6.4 What neither he nor anybody else foresaw, was that public gatherings during the pandemic would be thrust to centre-stage, by the killing of an African-American man by a US police force, sparking a vigorous wave of protest across the world. The explosion of ‘Black Lives Matter’ (‘BLM’) concerns brought protestors to the streets in May/June. Because they were public gatherings of more than 6 people, they were technically against the law in the UK under the Health Regulations at that time. SYP wisely decided not to try to stop these gatherings from taking place, and in SY they passed off peacefully, and without disorder, despite the total numbers of those involved over the period being estimated at 3500. Photographic evidence suggests that a good many protestors observed the social distancing guideline of 2 metres.

6.5 This review by the Panel is confined to the policing of the Covid19 restrictions, so we do no more than mention in passing that some people in the UK appear not to appreciate the significant differences between policing in the USA and in the UK. There is of course no room for complacency, but the sophisticated recruitment and training procedures which we have seen for ourselves in SY, together with public support for ‘policing by consent’, and the quality of leadership and regulatory structures, put policing in the UK in a different context from that in the USA. Nevertheless, as the disparity revealed by FPN statistics has shown, there is much yet to be understood about policing of minority ethnic communities in the UK.

6.6 It is not possible to predict what other issues might bring citizens on to the streets, but so long as the pandemic subsists, it will add complexity to public order policing.

6.7 More generally, it is now accepted that restrictions resulting from the pandemic may not be uniformly relaxed. Decisions about the management of the Covid19 crisis are taken nationally but can feed resentment, anxiety and challenge locally. In comments to a member of the Panel on 1 June, senior officers acknowledged that the re-imposition by Government of restrictions or a lockdown – if they became necessary in SY - could be problematic. If the evidence were to be stark, e.g a big jump in the re-infection rate locally or a significant increase in the daily death rate, then such restrictions may be easier for a reluctant population to accept. On the other hand, if the statistics move in the wrong direction but into a grey zone where the case for re-imposition is less obvious, that may be more challenging. However, even in such a tricky scenario, those senior officers see no reason to depart from the policy of enforcement as a last resort.

Potential surveillance issues arising from Covid19

6.8 Well before the pandemic, electronic intelligence gathering, algorithm-led predictive analysis and artificial intelligence as an aid to decision-making, were matters for live debate. There is a struggle to find the right balance between individual and collective rights, between privacy and surveillance, between the collection of necessary, proportionate knowledge, its storage and retrieval, and disproportionate intrusion.

6.9 The Panel has already undertaken work with SYP on these issues, and published a report in January 2020 (‘The ethical issues arising from digital policing’, accessible on the PCC’s website). With no end in sight to the pandemic, there is the potential for the police, in both enforcement and surveillance functions, to find themselves at the sharp end of public disquiet. For example, if police were expected to enforce a requirement on a citizen to make personal, Covid-relevant information accessible on their device in connection with a ‘Track and Trace’ strategy for control of the spread of Covid19, what would be the right balance between the acquisition and retention of data for the purpose of public safety on the one hand, and the protections afforded to the private citizen on the other? This is a question of national application but it may be that the Panel will wish to grapple with it.

7. Areas which SYP might consider for further evaluation

7.1 Policing the restrictions necessitated by a pandemic is a hitherto unique situation, but one which now seems likely to be ongoing. Retrospective evaluation is an effective way of assessing how well the initiatives taken, have served the public and the needs of frontline officers. Such an evaluation should be done adopting a positive approach so that if necessary lessons can be learnt. Our suggestion is for a ‘What worked well?’ and ‘What could be improved?’ approach.

7.2The Force may wish to evaluate in this way:

· the content and frequency of the information provided to the public

· how effective the channels of communication were

· how well this served the needs of different groups

· how well police officers and staff have felt informed and supported

· how much use has been made of Back-up Buddy

· how effective the Legal Services briefings were as learning tools for the front-line.

7.3 As we have already said, we do not doubt that the Force will wish to establish why the ‘disparity’ rate for enforcement against BAME citizens in SY is more than twice that of the national figure. We believe this should be done as a matter of urgency, and the use of an external scrutiny panel should be considered. It would also be constructive to investigate FPN records where ethnicity is marked as ‘unknown’.

8.Conclusions  

8.1 Our over-arching conclusion on the available evidence, is that at a time of a rapidly-evolving and unprecedented crisis, and challenge for society, SYP has been largely successful in:

· Maintaining the trust and confidence of the population

· Acting consistently within the ethical requirements of contemporary policing

· Responding sensitively and appropriately to the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups

· Demonstrating a strategic approach alongside operational and tactical planning.

8.2 The challenges of this crisis are unprecedented as the entire population, rather than smaller groups, has been affected by regulations and requirements, none of which one would wish to see in place under normal circumstances.

8.3 The national 4Es for the Covid19 emergency – engage, explain, encourage, enforce - reflect the principles set out in the Code of Ethics (College of Policing 2013). They place high value on protection of the vulnerable, transparency, accountability and fair treatment, as well as on maintaining good order.

8.4 The ‘engage, explain, encourage’ strands appear to have been effective in gaining public support in SY. Difficult measures have so far been broadly accepted without the necessity for widespread enforcement activity.

8.5 ‘Enforcement’ has been a last-resort response, as the CC announced that it would be at the start of the pandemic restrictions. That approach is consistent with the considerations urged on individual officers by the NDM.

8.6 Although evidence to date does not suggest a general over-use of enforcement action in SY, further work is needed to establish why the ‘disparity’ rate for enforcement against BAME citizens in SY is more than twice that of the national figure.

8.7 The public has not made complaints of over-zealous enforcement. This is all the more notable when one considers the lack of advance notice of the Regulations and subsequent changes to them and to guidance. The Force had to be agile and swift in reacting.

8.8 Public reporting mechanisms have been well-used (some no doubt because of misunderstanding of police powers) but at no stage have SYP’s resources been unequal to the task.

8.9 The Force has engaged with the public as a whole – through news stories, emailed Neighbourhood Alerts and on the streets – and where something has gone wrong, the Force has put it right.

8.10 Sustained efforts were directed towards looking out for vulnerable groups in society, and SYP has been praised for this by those working in the field.

8.11 The Force itself recognizes that there is no room for complacency about the retention of the trust and confidence of citizens. Going forward, we see the potential threats to the maintenance of trust and confidence as including these:

· The ‘new normal’ requires protracted restrictions of differing kinds – perhaps in selected areas - and with differing degrees of severity

· The challenge of a complex situation which clearly requires enforcement of the law but for which resources may be inadequate, for example the policing of a large number of wilfully non-compliant but otherwise non-violent citizens

· The disparity in the use of enforcement powers in different communities (unless well explained).

These potential threats are of course national-level risks, and it is not inevitable that they actually threaten the maintenance of public confidence.

8.12 Our assessment on the available evidence is that the public generally has a high level of trust and confidence in SYP in the COVID19 context and that there is widespread consent for the manner in which the county is being policed. It has undoubtedly helped that police duties have been almost universally seen as in pursuit of a public good, and not as partisan, or reflecting a national or local political agenda.

South Yorkshire Independent Policing Ethics Panel

5 August 2020

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