Traditional conflict mechanisms and reconciliation ceremonies in South Sudan

The myriad societies in rural South Sudan have historically had many methods and mechanisms in order to reduce violence and bring back a balance between rival clans or ethnic groups. Ceremonies vary from group to group, but in many of these events weapons were broken (in the past spears) and buried as a symbol of peace, often together with other objects. In addition bulls were usually sacrificed as a means of confirming the agreement. Those who broke the agreement faced spiritual consequences such as curses and even death. In intra-ethnic cases of murder bloodwealth was often required- essentially murderers had to pay back the lost life in cattle wealth1. Hutchinson explains that among the Nuer the initial cost was similar to bridewealth. The family could then find a wife that could bear more children for the family as a replacement for the killing (1996). This changed over time and bloodwealth became much higher than bridewealth.

However, many of these traditional reconciliation ceremonies and conflict mechanisms have been seriously undermined by decades of war and the consequent militarization of societies. In addition, while the church has often taken a lead role in peace engagement, and remains a major actor, it has often been at the expense of traditional mechanisms. In many societies the murder of another person carried with it spiritual consequences and many reconciliation ceremonies involved the ‘cleansing’ of the killer through traditional means. The modern church often sees these ceremonies as animist and non-Christian2. Furthermore, the SPLM/A administration discouraged cleansing rituals as to facilitate civilian participation in warfare.

Meanwhile, the direction international actors take in local peace engagements often lead to the use of widespread peace tropes and generalized terminology. While the use of common peace theories and the modern church are both advantageous to reaching a sustainable peace, it is often at the cost of the already existing mechanisms. Many of these traditional ceremonies and actors are not known or engaged with by NGOs or peace mediators despite still playing important roles. Interestingly the Wunlit talks in 1999, which are frequently cited as a rare success story, included a combination of traditional mechanisms and modern conflict resolution.

For example, the most important Nuer prophet, Ngundeng Bong, died over a century ago, but is still revered by most of the Nuer population as well as 1 Bloodwealth was used for local disputes. It is much harder to agree who was responsible and amounts in large scale conflicts between clans or ethnic groups in which many lives have been lost and cattle stolen. 2 This varies among denominations and individuals- the Wunlit Triangle peace agreement had both church leaders and traditional reconciliation ceremonies.

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non-Nuer (Johnson 1994). Riek Machar has attempted to tie himself to both past and current Nuer prophets, and has used them as a means of mobilization both in the 1990s and the current conflict. Machar brought back Ngundeng’s rod, perceived as a symbol for power, to South Sudan in 2009. Ngundeng’s original prophecies talked about the rise of a leader, and Machar would like to be perceived as the fulfillment of that prophecy (Breidlid & Arensen 2014). In the ongoing conflict he has also reached out to Dak Kueth and other modern Nuer prophets in order to consolidate their influence with the youth into his political movement. Despite their influence, prophets are rarely included in government or NGO peace processes3.

Aside from anthropological studies from before the second civil war, there are no recent studies on the current role of these mitigation mechanisms and actors4. Spiritual leaders often play a dual role of both peace makers and peace spoilers, and therefore need to be included in peace processes. This would help ensure ownership of these engagements. An in-depth study of traditional conflict mechanisms and actors, and how they have been effected, or manipulated, by the war, is necessary.

Breidlid, Ingrid Marie & Michael J. Arensen. 2014. “Demystifying the White Army: Nuer armed civilians’ involvement in the South Sudanese Crisis.” Conflict Trends Issue 3, 2014. 32-38. (http://www.accord.org.za/images/downloads/ct/ct3_14_nuer_armed_civilians_involved_in_south_sudanese_crisis.pdf)

Hutchinson, Sharon. 1996. Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Johnson, Douglas. 1994. Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Oxford University Press.

Abductions

Historically livestock were the primary targets of raids, and the conflicts occurred between the men in the societies who were responsible for defense and carrying out justice in the form of revenge. Academics argue that women and children were rarely the targets of raids and inter-ethnic warfare before the 1990s (Jok and Hutchinson 1999). However, one major exception to this was the abduction of women and children. 3 It is recognized that there exists a risk in legitimizing potential peace spoilers through their inclusion. However, many of these leaders play dual roles- as both peace actors and spoilers. Ensuring they are involved in a positive way is paramount. 4 No research could be found during this desk review. If studies exist please send them in order to update this section.

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Abductions are not a new phenomenon in South Sudan, and records show it has been practiced by many ethnic groups both in the past and even today. Abductions are a means of expanding family or wealth. The social pressures on women to have children, and the fact that children and young women have become ‘property’ to be stolen and sold, has led to abductions being part of the political economy of warfare. The fluid identity found among many ethnic groups means that victims usually become assimiliated into their new culture. As most people are unlikely to admit their involvement in the illicit trade, current information on the issue is extremely limited and more research is urgently needed. Based on various interviews by the author and anecdotal evidence, the issue of abduction in South Sudan appears to be both more complex and more nuanced than one is often led to believe.

The value of women in many South Sudanese societies is closely connected to their ability to bear children. Girls provide a brideprice when they are later married, which helps to cover the original brideprice paid for the mother. Boys are valued as they are able to continue the family lineage, protect the family, and increase the family herds through raiding. If a woman cannot have children, then the original brideprice paid for her can be asked to be returned by the husband’s family. This creates significant social pressures on a woman to have children.

Due to these pressures, there have been child markets in South Sudan as far back as records exist. Information on the trade in children is even harder to find than abductions. Colonial records mention a market outside Bor, in Jonglei State, where children were bought and sold in the past. Sources in Jonglei also referred this market in interviews (Arensen 2012 b). Children were sold or traded, usually in exchange for cattle, to those families who wanted to expand or those who were unable to have their own children. While some of the children were abducted, others were sold by poor families out of economic desperation. In addition children who were born from culturally defined ‘incest’ were often sold, either at the market, or directly. Incest in this case does not adhere to the western understanding of the concept. Among some cultures in South Sudan incest includes relations between people who share patrilineal bloodlines i.e. relations with cousins from your father’s side is deemed incest, while cousins from the mother’s side are marriageable. Who is defined as family, and who is marriageable, can become extremely complex as ethnic groups have different rules and family lines are well known many generations back.

While the market outside Bor has been closed for a long time, some sources claim the direct sale of children has occurred as recently as the late 2000s. The prices for purchasing children in the post-CPA period varied a great deal, from as low as ten cattle to as high as fifty (Arensen 2012 b). As with other illegal markets where the rule of law does not apply, criminals have begun to

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use the market as a means of scamming the desperate. Reports exist of families who have purchased children from criminals, but then later were accused of abduction themselves (ibid). The authorities have later forced them to return the children. This leaves the family without the cattle they originally paid, as well as no child.5 One older Murle woman exclaimed in an interview that she was now ‘owed a child’ as she has been left with no cattle wealth and her ‘son’ was also taken from her (ibid). An older woman with no children or cattle in South Sudan is in a position of extreme vulnerability.

In some ethnic groups the adopted children are given the full rights provided to them as a member of society. They take over the family herds, continue the family legacy and in some cases even receive social positions that are normally passed on through hereditary lines. In Mice or Men Jon Arensen narrates the story of a well-known chief in Pibor at the time (1970s):

One of the prominent chiefs among the Murle is a man who was originally a Masongo (Majangir) from Ethiopia. His story is well known among the Murle people. They say that he was originally captured as a boy by the Anuak when they made a raid on the Masongo. He was later traded to a Murle chief for a single elephant tusk. He was then raised as a son of the Murle chief and has inherited his position. Even though everyone knows his background, he is considered by all to be a Murle and a legitimate chief. (1992:40)

Meanwhile, a Murle man from the 1940s who worked with the Pibor District Commissioner claimed that he was originally Pari and was abducted by Murle in a raid while a baby. However when he was around twelve he was abducted again along with a few dozen other women and children by the Lotuko and was raised as a Lotuko (Jon Arensen 2013). Identity is fluid among many ethnic groups in South Sudan6 and assimilation of one community into another was common in the past. Jok and Hutchinson explain that women have a more flexible ethnic identity than men. Inter-ethnic marriage was a common means of building relations between groups as well as a means of assimilation (2002). The flexibility regarding the identity of women meant that those abducted could be married into their new society and not be treated as an outsider. The increasing use of ethnicity as a means of mobilizing for conflicts in the past thirty years has begun to change this perception, and identity has become more fixed.

5 It is recognized that this is also a convenient excuse for any abductors who want to claim they are the actual victims. 6 The most significant exception being the Dinka, who place great importance upon patrilineal lineage, i.e. Dinka identity is passed down from your father.

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The motivations for abductions are also closely tied to the political economy of warfare. Children are abducted either with the intention of expanding one’s family, or for selling the child in exchange for cattle. Young men might abduct a child for a sister or family member who is not able to have children. Alternatively, he may sell the child to a childless lady or couple. Essentially young women and children are often perceived as ‘property’ to be stolen, sold and bought. Abducted women are usually traded or sold for cattle rather than kept with the abductor himself- as this is commonly considered taboo. Women who are not bought with brideprice are not given the status of a wife in society.7 Young men would historically not be able to marry at a young age due to the high cost of brideprice and their dependence on the extended family to donate the cattle. The two common means for young men to access cattle, and therefore marriage, is by either stealing cattle or by abducting women and children they can exchange for cattle. Young women or adolescent girls are targets, as they have many years of child-bearing age left.

Conflicts further expanded the demand for abductions as families lose their children to war. Those too old to have more children look to adopt or buy children. In South Sudan parents are dependent upon their children to take care of them in old age and to continue the family legacy. A man with no children, especially no sons, is at a great loss in South Sudan, and many groups historically practiced levirate marriage to ensure a man with no children has them even after he dies8. Although based on limited information, those who were in the market for children fell into two categories- families who are unable to have their own, or older women who have lost all their children in conflict (Arensen 2012 b).

Politicised rhetoric and stereotypes of the Murle

There is a widespread narrative found in the media, as well as among both government and NGO officials, that abduction is only practiced by the Murle ethnic group in Jonglei as they have issues of sterility. As the narrative is so common, and false, these stereotypes will be directly addressed. Historic records show abductions was common among many ethnic groups in South Sudan in the past, and in recent years other ethnic groups have also admitted involvement in abductions. For example, Lou Nuer youth admitted in 2012 to abducting women and children from the Murle during major attacks (Arensen 2012 a). While the youth claimed the abductions were only in response to Murle abductions, the stealing of women and children has become part a normal part of the political economy of war in South Sudan. In 7 No interviewed men admitted to keeping abducted women for themselves, but cases of others doing so existed and were reported by officials- the women were kept seemingly as sex slaves and laborers. 8 Levirate marriage is when a widow is married to the brother of her husband, but any children receive the name and legitimacy from the first husband, not the biological father.

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cyclical violence the motivations behind ‘revenge abductions’ loses significance after years of cyclical violence.

The most common abduction myth in South Sudan is that the Murle people abduct due to issues of sterility. This rhetoric has no basis in current medical data, and it is also used as a means to emasculate the Murle, frequently regarded as the pariah of Jonglei State9. Records from B.A. Lewis and Jon Arensen, two Murle experts, show that there were periods in the past where Murle did face fertility challenges. These are likely the source of the current myth. Lewis worked as an administrator during the 1930s and 1940s and claims that the Murle complained of the “infertility of their women” due to the introduction of gonorrhea by the military posted in Pibor (1972). Later Lewis refers to the newfound fertility of the Murle.10 (1972:154,160). Jon Arensen also heard of temporarily reduced birthrates among the Murle in the 1960s due to venereal disease, but it is unclear if this was a continuation of the gonorrhea from Lewis’ time or a new disease. However, a campaign by WHO eradicated the disease in Pibor in the 1960s, and infertility among the Murle has not been identified as a problem in the past fifty years. While the period of reduced fertility increased demand among the Murle for children, abductions were common long before these periods, and not just among the Murle. The administrator BA Lewis states, “it will be interesting to see if the new-found fertility in Murle women will curb the illicit trade in ‘incest children’ for cattle with the Bor Dinka; a practice frowned upon by authority, but difficult to prevent” (1972:160).

Policy implications for protection workers

Records from the 1940s, 1970s, as well as examples from the past few years show administrators struggling with the identification and return of abducted children. In addition further sensitivities and challenges for child protection workers arise when children are too young to remember being abducted and now primarily identify with their new adopted family and ethnic group. For example, one male adult in Pibor refused to return to his original family, as he was old enough to remember being sold when he was a child. As the oldest son in his adopted family he had access to the family herds, and asked why he would want to return to be a seventh child with no cattle wealth or prospects in a family that gave him away (Arensen 2012 b). To complicate the matter, legal adoptions have become increasing common as

9 For more about the rhetoric used about the Murle read “Victims of Discourse: Mobilizing Narratives of Fear and Insecurity in Post-Conflict South Sudan- The Case of Jonglei State” by Ann Laudati (https://www.dropbox.com/s/bjub5w7f5zp3lpy/Laudati%20article%20AGR%2030n1%20June%202011.pdf?dl=0)10 There is some confusion regarding which period Lewis is referring to regarding the ‘new-found fertility.’ His research was originally carried out in the 1930s and 1940s, but his book was published in 1972. It is unclear if his conclusion is referring to the WHO campaign in the 1960s mentioned by Arensen or an earlier medical campaign during the colonial era.

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people try to increase their family through legitimate means. Recent changes in Ugandan adoption law, and the independence of South Sudan, has reduced adoptions from Uganda and Sudan, which people identified as the most common destinations for those wanting children in the past. Easing regulations and accessibility of adoption within South Sudan could be considered as a means of reducing illicit methods of gaining children.

In conclusion, the issue of abductions in South Sudan is far more complex and nuanced than is usually portrayed by the media, government and international actors. The political economy of war, the cultural and economic significance of children for families, the perception of women and children as property, the lack of economic alternatives- and therefore social access to marriage- among young men, the economic desperation of families who sell children, the taboos regarding ‘incest children,’ the cycle that arises from revenge abductions, and the need to replace lost children killed in conflicts are all directly linked to the root causes of abductions within the country. Furthermore new restrictions has meant that families are facing greater challenges in being able to adopt through legal channels. All these influences must be understood and integrated into a holistic approach in order to end the practice of abduction.

Arensen, Jon. 2011. Chasing the Rain. Old Africa Books.

Arensen, Jon. 1992. Mice are Men: Language and Society among the Murle of Sudan. Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Arensen, Michael. 2012. (a) “Murle Age-sets.” AECOM International South Sudan on behalf of USAID. Unpublished.

Arensen, Michael. 2012. (b) “Lou Nuer Youth: Report on the Recent Iteration of the White Army.” AECOM International South Sudan on behalf of USAID. Unpublished.

Hutchinson, Sharon and Jok Madut Jok. 2002. “Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from Southern Sudan.” In Richard Werbner, ed. Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa. London: Zed Books

Laudati, Ann. 2011. “Victims of Discourse: Mobilizing Narratives of Fear and Insecurity in Post-Conflict South Sudan- The Case of Jonglei State” (https://www.dropbox.com/s/bjub5w7f5zp3lpy/Laudati%20article%20AGR%2030n1%20June%202011.pdf?dl=0)

Lewis, B.A. 1972. The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Land rights as a cause of conflict

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Disputes over land rights are one of the primary causes of conflicts with South Sudan. The most common image is of cattle camp youth from rival communities fighting over access to pasture or water points. Access to a fishing pool during a period of food insecurity in 1993 was the flashpoint of the decades long conflict between the Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer. The need for Lou Nuer to have access to permanent water points has been one of the primary reasons for their clashes with both Anuak and Jikany Nuer in the past few decades- in both conflicts the Lou Nuer have gained important land along the Pibor River. Conflicts over administrative borders have also been common source of violence in the post-CPA period, often involving local politicians and government officials. Finally, tensions exist over perceived land grabbing in rural areas.

While clashes frequently occur over resources, existing resource-sharing agreements between local communities are often ignored. Cattle camp youth and elders have annual land-sharing agreements in place- even across ethnic lines. Despite violent clashes between 2011 and 2013, the Murle and Lou Nuer had local border sharing agreements as recently as 2010, led by the cattle camp leaders. In the annual dry season migration by Lou Nuer to Jikany Nuer territory the White Army leaders and elders set out an agreement for the season. Clashes between youth often take place at the cattle camps, and most of these raids take place at the end of the dry season, when cattle camp youth are ready to return home and are not risking the potential loss of access to water points or grazing lands for an entire dry season. These small scale raids also do not necessarily mean the loss of access in the next dry season, when another agreement is made.

Local politicization of state, county and payam borders also plays an important role in fueling local conflicts. Schomerus and Allen found that political borders and decentralization played a significant role in land disputes in South Sudan (2010). After fighting for decades against the centralization of power in Khartoum and the marginalization of the South, the SPLA made decentralization a priority in government documents after the CPA (Schomerus and Allen 2010:22). However, the implementation of this policy has stalled, and power is still extremely centralized- only this time in Juba rather than Khartoum. This is one of the areas in which South Sudan is “at odds with itself”- the policy of decentralization is moving forward in theory, while actual power is increasingly centralized (ibid). The policy of decentralization has led to local power struggles at the county level, particularly regarding border lines. Increasing tensions and conflicts between counties is occurring due to the “ethnicisation of politics at the local level, where counties are being drawn along tribal lines […] fuelling nepotism and patronage in politics” (ibid:39). The competition for political space often occurs along borders- the north/south border, and between states, counties and payams. The perception among many civilians is that access to

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development funds and representation at the state level starts at the county level. Therefore every ethnic group, or clan, wants their own county. However, demarcating borders along ethnic lines also has the potential to increase tensions and fuel conflicts between groups. In addition the “selection of county commissioners […] has been shaped by tribal calculations” (ibid:41). In the interim period from 1972-1983, and later as part of Garang’s ‘caretaker’ system, leaders were intentionally selected from different ethnic groups or regions (ibid:41). This was used as a means of reducing tribalism, but also to ensure administrators did not face pressure or complaints of bias for their own group. In the current system local government leaders are accused of favoritism and potentially exacerbate tensions due to their personal loyalties, rather than act as mediators.

Aside from localized land disputes over resources or political borders, a new potential factor in land disputes in the future will be the sale or loan of land to the commercial sector. David Deng revealed that between 2007 and the end of 2010 over 2.5 million hectares of land were acquired by foreign interests for forestry, biofuel and agriculture uses (2011:7). If tourism, conservation and domestic investments are included then the figure tops 5.5 million hectares- or nine percent of the total land of South Sudan (ibid). The acquisition of land to foreign interests is becoming more common in recent years. It is hoped that the investments will bring in funds, and therefore jobs and taxes, to the local economy. However, without the correct laws and regulations in place to monitor these sales, the continual ‘land grabbing’ instead becomes a potential conflict driver. The lack of implementation, or clear regulations, regarding land rights and tenure in South Sudan at this time means the large scale sale of land is extremely risky and could become major conflict drivers for years to come.

Deng, David. 2011. “The New Frontier: A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment in Southern Sudan.” Norwegian People’s Aid. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/r95amy1vihjaas8/Deng%20-%202011%20-%20The%20New%20Frontier%20A%20baseline%20survey%20of%20large-scale%20land-based%20investment%20in%20Southern%20Sudan%282%29.pdf?dl=0)

Nucci, Domenico. 2004. “Study on arbitration, mediation and conciliation of land and property disputes.” Norwegian Refugee Council. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/wf6flntccm76ph7/Nucci%20-%202004%20-%20Study%20on%20arbitration%2C%20mediation%20and%20conciliation%20of%20land%20and%20property%20disputes-annotated.pdf?dl=0)

Schomerus, Marieke and Tim Allen. “South Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace.” LSE. Pact Sudan and DFID. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/k0fus8mxazgt5jw/LSE%20south%20sudan%20at%20odds%20with%20itself.pdf?dl=0)

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Gender Based Violence

There is no section on gender based violence but it is recognized that readers might be interested in reports on the topic. The three below are recommended.

Hutchinson, Sharon and Jok Madut Jok. 2002. “Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from Southern Sudan.” In Richard Werbner, ed. Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa. London: Zed Books

Small Arms Survey. 2012. “Women and Armed Violence in South Sudan.” (http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/womens-security/HSBA-women-and-armed-conflict.pdf)

Small Arms Survey. 2008. “No standing, few prospects: how peace is failing South Sudanese female combatants and WAAFG.” (http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-13-no-standing-few-prospects.pdf)

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Socio-cultural profiles of Major Ethnic Groups in Greater Upper Nile

South Sudan is an extremely diverse country with dozens of ethnic groups and languages. Further complicating this is that many groups consist of different sub-groups with various dialects. Anthropological studies on groups South Sudan are some of the most well known in the field, particularly Evans-Pritchard’s seminal study on the Nuer from the 1930s. However, decades of war have meant that most research since the 1950s occurred in the period of peace between the first and second civil wars, or were done remotely. Most primary research therefore is either from the colonial period or from thirty to twenty years ago. The challenges of access and security have limited field studies since the mid-1980s, although many anthropologists from before that have continued to write remotely, or have conducted research in refugee camps. Importantly, there are a few excellent exceptions, including South Sudanese academics. In addition, much research carried out in the post-CPA period is still being written and has yet to be published.

It is highly recommended that primary sources by anthropologists are read to complement these short profiles. Some of the better known anthropologists are listed after each profile, with some of their principal works (or at least the most accessible for non-anthropologists), but the list is in no way comprehensive. Social structures are extremely complex and in constant flux. The high amount of ethnic groups in South Sudan means that many peoples have very little anthropological research written about them. The current conflict means that this will likely continue to be the case. A very short list of anthropologists for some of the smaller groups not profiled here is also given. An excellent source for some of the less visible ethnic groups is the Gurtong webpage, which has profiles on dozens of people groups within South Sudan (http://www.gurtong.net/Peoples/PeoplesProfiles/tabid/71/Default.aspx).

A list of the counties where various Nuer and Dinka clans are located is more likely to confuse rather than clarify. Instead the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan is a great visual guide (https://www.dropbox.com/s/s5326kcw57kqcp3/SS%20Ethnic%20Map.pdf?dl=0). Keep in mind many of the borders given between groups are not as well defined or are along exact lines as portrayed on the map- many of these areas are contested, shared or both.

Any mistakes or gaps are the author’s alone. Corrections, clarifications or updates are welcome.

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Ethnic group: Dinka (Jieng or Muony-jang)

Language group: Nilotic

Sub-groups:

There are over twenty major Dinka clans. Some of these include- Rek, Ruweng, Bor, Twic, Nyarweng, Hol, Agar, Gok, Rek, Aliab, Ciec, Thoi, Luach, Ngok, Renk, Malual, Abiliang, Padeng, and Atwot. The Dinka are generally found in Greater Bahr al Ghazal, Greater Bor, and Upper Nile. See the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan for locations.

Related groups: Nuer

Historic movement:

Oral traditions dictate that the Dinka migrated from Gezira between the 14th and 16th centuries due to drought and slave raids. They moved south following the Nile into the Bahr al Ghazal region and are believed to be one of the later groups to arrive in South Sudan.

Livelihoods: Agro-pastoralists

The Dinka peoples are very diverse. Similar to other pastoralists in rural South Sudan and in the wider region, cattle are a central part of Dinka livelihoods and society. The Dinka primarily rely upon livestock, but are also engaged in planting (cultivation) and fishing during the dry season. The importance of fishing and agriculture on food security, however, varies between communities. Like other agro-pastoralists, many Dinka communities are reliant on moving with their cattle in the dry season (usually January to May) to the toic (swamps in the rainy season which turn into pasture in the dry season), where they set up temporary cattle camps. Here the cattle are able to access water and grazing for part of the year. Fishing is usually best in the dry season as the rivers and pools get low and fish are easier to catch. At the beginning of the rainy season (June/July) the people return to their homesteads and fields are planted. This time is often the most significant hunger period for South Sudanese agro-pastoralists, as the cattle are not producing much milk and the fields are yet to be ready for harvesting. Once the harvest is ready people celebrate. At the end of the year drums are often heard from marriage celebrations or dances. Once the dry season returns in January the cattle are taken back to the cattle camps and the cycle starts again.

Historical Social Structure:

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Before the colonial era the Dinka were an acephelous society- meaning they had no hierarchy or centralized system of coordination and control11. Instead the Dinka have been organized into a number of major inter-linked, but independent clans. The leaders that existed before the arrival of the British were either military, religious, kin group, or cattle camp elders who decided when to migrate. Loyalty and identity lied primarily with kin, not with the ethnic group as a whole. This is still the case, although political conflicts have manipulated the threat of the ‘other’ to unify groups that in the past shared little loyalty. The Dinka are incredibly diverse and the language has a number of different dialects. For example, an important system of spiritual leaders found in Bahr al Ghazal never existed among the Dinka in Jonglei (Harrigan 2012). Kinship groups are the primary means of identity and loyalty among the Dinka. According to Harrigan, Dinka kinship is most clearly delineated by the sharing of bridewealth, both in paying and receiving.

The system of chiefs now found across South Sudan was created by the British colonial rule (1898-1956) as a means of civil administration (indirect rule)- primarily for the collection of taxes and solving disputes through customary courts. Chiefs were appointed to represent particular territories, and this system of local governance was reinforced by the GoSS after the CPA (through the Local Government Act in 2008). There are various levels of chiefs and although terminology varies depending on the region, the terms are usually translated to sub-chiefs/headmen, chiefs and paramount chiefs. In modern times one can recognize the hierarchy from the sashes the various chiefs wear when attending official events. Sub-chiefs, or headmen, are given black sashes, chiefs red sashes, while paramount chiefs have a number of lines on their red sashes-indicating the number of chiefs they represent. Harrigan explains that during the second civil war the chieftain system was used as a means of providing recruits as well as supplying food for the SPLA. Each sub-chief was expected to supply five recruits to the SPLA and supply one tin of maize for each family. This was later increased to three tins of maize for each family. The chiefs do not have any economic control over their community members and their primary responsibility is keeping the peace through the solving of disputes. The chiefs sit on customary courts and solve issues such as cattle theft, murder, elopement, and adultery. The courts have the same hierarchy as the chiefs, and if the judgment is appealed then cases move up the chain to higher level chiefs.

Kinship groups among Dinka share cattle and food, but territory is shared among a number of family groups. These kinship groups might coordinate for political representation, collective defense of grazing land or for ceremonies, but they do not share food. Only members of a common kinship group share 11 One major exception to this was the Ngok Dinka in Abyei. Consistent contact with the Baggara from the north led the Ngok to develop a more centralized system (Hutchinson 2012:12)

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food and are responsible for each other. The territorial groups are called wut, which literally translates from Dinka as cattle camp. The protection and defense of the cattle in the territory is shared between the youth belonging to the family groups.

Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:

The common narrative is that the SPLM/A has been “Dinka dominated” from its inception in 1983. However, much like other ethnic groups the relationship between the SPLM/A and the Dinka civilian population has been complex and varied. In the beginning of the rebellion, many Dinka volunteered to join; however, the relationship between the SPLM/A and rural populations has not always been strong12. There were frustrations in Bahr al Ghazal in the 1980s due to their perceived exclusion from military strategy and relief support compared to other parts of the country. The recruitment of children for the Red Army was also not a popular policy, and created frustration with the leadership. While the fall of the Mengistu regime, the SPLA’s primary backer, and the subsequent 1991 split had a unifying effect, the attacks on Dinka villages by the SPLA Nasir faction at the same time led to discontent with the leadership for not being able to provide security. The consequent arming of the Dinka youth in Bahr al Ghazal, also known as Gelweng, led to the use of armed Dinka civilians as proxy militias for the SPLA. The clashes between the two factions, and the arming of civilian militias (i.e. gelweng, see White Army, Gelweng and Titweng section), were causing resentment among the civilians caught in the middle as targets. Furthermore after the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement the SPLA decided to disarm the gelweng to reduce the internal clashes that were occurring. The brutality of the disarmament process also resulted in violent clashes between the youth and SPLA, and created strong grievances against the movement.

Key individuals:

The late John Garang MabiorSalva KiirKuol Manyang

Recommended readings:

Deng, Francis Mading. 1972. The Dinka of the Sudan. Waveland Press Inc. Illinois.

12 For more about the complexity of Dinka civilian relations with the SPLA in Lakes State read Leonardi, Cherry. 2007. “‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in Between ‘Hakuma’, and ‘Home’ During Civil War and It’s Aftermath in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs, 106/424, 391-412.

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Deng, Luka Biong. 2010. “Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities in Sudan’s Civil War.” African Affairs, 109/435, 231-250. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/w6jn4eprzkra4a8/Deng%20-%202010%20-%20Social%20capital%20and%20civil%20war%20The%20Dinka%20communities%20in%20Sudan%27s%20civil%20war%282%29.pdf?dl=0)

Harrigan, Simon. “Background paper for Bor, Twic, Ghol and Nyaraweng Dinka” presented at AECOM conference, Nairobi March 2012 (https://db.tt/cusHiNtO)

Jok, M.J. and S. Hutchinson. 1999. “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities.” African Studies Review 42(2): 125-45. (https://db.tt/nkMlG74a)

Leinhardt, Godfrey. 1961. Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Ethnic group: Nuer ( Nei ti naadth )

Language group: Nilotic

Sub-groups (major clans):Some of the major clans among the Nuer include the Lou, Jikany, Gawaar, Bul, Lek, Jegai, Adok, Nyong, Ador, Thiang and Lak. The Nuer are generally found in Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states). See the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan for locations.

Related groups: Dinka

Historic movement:

According to oral traditions the Nuer migrated south from Kordofan to Bahr al Ghazal around 1700 due to drought. In response to slave raids by the Baggara Arabs in the 18th century the Nuer carried out a mass migration to the east across the Nile (Hutchinson 2012). The expansion in the 19th century by the Nuer was one of the largest expansions in Africa at the time. The Nuer moved into Dinka and Anuak lands and assimilated some people while pushing others to migrate. By the end of the century the Nuer had reached all the way to Ethiopia and their territory expanded between three and four times what it was previously. While the Nuer did use violence to expand their territory, marriage and adoption were often used as means of assimilating new groups. Hutchinson explains that many Nuer men would marry their daughters to Dinka and Anuak men as a means of assimilating them (ibid). Those paying bridewealth did not just owe cattle, but also owed cooperation and respect towards their in-laws for as much as eight generations afterwards. This expanded family groups and loyalties and

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eventually sons or grandsons would break away to form his own family group and village.

When the British definitively defeated the Lou Nuer in 1929-1930, the Nuer expansion diminished but did not stop entirely (Hutchinson 2012). According to Nuer oral sources and archives, Lou and Jikany Nuer both continued to expand to the east and attempted to buy land from Anuak and Murle. The Murle took the land back in the 1950s, while the Anuak sold land to the Nuer south of Akobo. In 1982 this agreement came to a head and clashes broke out between Anuak and Nuer over the land rights (ibid). Hutchinson believes the disagreement might have sprung out of differing opinions on what the Nuer bought- either permanent land ownership or temporary access for grazing (ibid). The Nuer pushed the Anuak out of Akobo town and the Anuak are now primarily in Ethiopia, Pochalla and eastern Akobo county. The movement of thousands of South Sudanese to Ethiopia in the 1980s expanded Nuer territory in Gambella, again at the expense of the Anuak. Further clashes in Akobo in 2013 escalated tensions again after the death of an Anuak chief in Akobo who was calling for the Lou to give Akobo back to the Anuak.

Livelihood: Agro-pastoralists

The Nuer share a similar livelihood cycle with the Dinka (see the Dinka livelihood section for an explanation of the annual cycle). The Nuer dry season migratory patterns are too complex and vast to list here. However, like most dry season migratory patterns the cattle are taken to the toic (pastures), nearby the closest permanent or semi-permanent body of water, usually rivers. See map in index of migratory patterns.

Historical Social Structure:

Much like the Dinka, the Nuer ethnic group were historically acephelous and did not have a centralized system of political control before the arrival of the British. Instead the Nuer are divided into between eleven and thirteen sub-groups or clans. Within these clans there are family groupings interlinked through either marriage or descent. In reality this means that loyalty and identity lies with direct family primarily, and then with more extended family units dependent on outside threats. Hutchinson explains it as “brothers should unite against cousins, unless faced with a broader threat, whereupon cousins should all unite to face their common enemy” (2012:13). The consequence of this is very fluid alliances and loyalties outside the small familial units. The internal Nuer wars of the 1990s and early 2000 can be better understood through this lens. A perceived outside threat to all Nuer will unify them, but primary loyalties ultimately lie with small family units, not the ethnic group as a whole or even the major clans.

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In pre-colonial time, Nuer society did have particular individuals responsible for spiritual and ritual aspects of society, such as earth priests and prophets, but they did not have a political role. Despite this prophets did have many followers and the songs (prophecies) of the most influential, such as Ngundeng Bong (1846-1906), still hold significant sway over much of the Nuer population (Johnson 1994). The spiritual leaders held influence due to their perceived powers to bless or curse and foresee the future. Current Nuer prophets are still believed to hold such powers and people go to them for blessings and direction. The British undermined the Nuer prophets as they were perceived as threats to colonial dominance and instead imposed a chieftain structure. Initially weak the government system of chiefs soon became adopted and assimilated into Nuer society.

The authority of government chiefs was directly affected by the two civil wars. As explained in the Dinka section, the SPLA, and the later breakaway factions, initially used the chief system as a means for recruiting as well as supporting their troops through food and other resources. However, high level chiefs (not seen as sympathetic to the political cause) were often targeted during the war years, either by Khartoum or by opposing factions of the SPLA. The current relationship between chiefs, the government, and the opposition varies from county to county. It is highly likely both sides in the current conflict are relying on the chieftain system in many of the same ways they did in the 1980s and 1990s – i.e. as sources of recruitment as well as economic support – albeit not always voluntarily. From quite early on the SPLA-IO has worked with Nuer prophets, such as Dak Kueth, in mobilizating and motivating the White Army.

Relationship with SPLM/A:

The Nuer relationship with the SPLM/A is extremely complex. The below discussion will focus on Riek Machar and his split from the mainstream SPLM/A to create his own movement in 1991 (SPLM Nasir), his rejoining of the SPLM/A in 2002, and then the most recent creation of his SPLM/A in Opposition (IO) after the violence broke in Juba in December 2013. The effects of the 1991 split are analyzed more closely in the militarization section. However, while Machar has received the most attention among the Nuer leaders, his political agenda has not necessarily been supported across the Nuer population or leadership. Machar’s involvement in arming and directing Nuer civilians who targeted civilians in Garang’s homeland in the notorious “Bor Massacre” still defines the political narrative surrounding him. While Machar publicly apologized for his involvement in the Bor Massacre in 2013, in the current conflict the government has also used this event as a means of discrediting him.

Importantly, the manipulation of ethnicity by Machar and other military leaders in the past twenty years has clouded the nuances regarding Nuer

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support for Machar’s positions. Common narratives in the media oversimplify extremely complex realities. It must be remembered that when Machar first split from the SPLM/A in 1991 to form the SPLA Nasir faction, it was not a pure Nuer movement, but Shilluk, some Dinka and other ethnic groups were also represented. Meanwhile, some Nuer leaders remained loyal to the mainstream SPLM/A. The consequent manipulation of ethnicity and targeting of civilians by both sides changed the conflict dynamics from a political and ideological contest to an ethnic one, but it did not start out as an ethnic dispute. Similarly, not only Machar and his Nuer supporters were frustrated with the current leadership within the SPLM: Dinka and Shilluk leaders who had been vocal in their criticism against the government were also arrested in December 2013. Although they have not supported the armed movement of Machar, they are advocating for reform within the party (commonly referred to as the Third Bloc).

Importantly a significant portion of south on south violence in the civil war was actually between Nuer factions in the 1990s. Many Nuer did not support Machar’s decisions to sign an agreement with Khartoum (1997), while others contested him for power. Primary loyalty among many Nuer soldiers lied with certain commanders, often based on kinship, not with Machar himself.

The targeting of Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013 acted as a means of mobilizing Nuer support for the SPLM/A-IO. As Hutchinson explained, among the Nuer brothers will fight brothers unless they have a problem with the cousins - then they will unite against their common enemy. The killings of Nuer in Juba in December 2013 by forces of the government united the Nuer together. Importantly though, the unity is based on the perceived threat against all the Nuer, not on the leadership skills of Machar or the desire to support any particular political agenda. The civilians who are fighting on behalf of the opposition prefer to fight in parallel to the military structures (Breidlid and Arensen 2014). Attempts by the opposition leadership to assimilate them will be very challenging.

In addition the other Nuer commanders, such as Peter Gadet, are not likely to support Machar’s political agenda or possibly even his military leadership. If the current dynamics follows a similar pattern to the 1990s, Machar will struggle to keep control over the various commanders and armed civilians. The longer the current conflict goes on the higher the chance that fragmentations among the opposition will occur as commanders vie for power and soldiers and armed civilians loyalty to Machar is challenged (ibid).

Key individuals:

Riek MacharTaban Deng GaiPeter Gadet

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Breidlid, Ingrid Marie & Michael J. Arensen. 2014. “Demystifying the White Army: Nuer armed civilians’ involvement in the South Sudanese Crisis.” Conflict Trends Issue 3, 2014. 32-38.

Evans-Pritchard, E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Intervention of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____________. 1951. Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Johnson, Douglas. 2009. “The Nuer Civil Wars.” In Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan borderlands. Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (eds). New York: Berghahn Books.

Johnson, Douglas. 1994. Nuer Prophets: A History of Prophecy from the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Oxford University Press.

Jok, M.J. and S. Hutchinson. 1999. “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities.” African Studies Review 42(2): 125-45. (https://db.tt/nkMlG74a)

Hutchinson, Sharon. 1996. Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____________. 2012. “A Guide to the Nuer of Jonglei State, Part One: Nuer and Dinka patterns of migration and settlement” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference, Nairobi March 2012 (https://db.tt/yaFlbZjn)

Ethnic group: Chollo (Shilluk 13 )

Language group: Nilotic

The Chollo are generally based in Upper Nile state around Malakal and the White Nile and Sobat Rivers.

Related groups: Anuak, Pari, Luo

Historic movement:

13 The Chollo are commonly referred to as Shilluk although that is actually an incorrect pronounciation from the past. As a result the correct name, Chollo, will be used instead.

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According to oral tradition the Chollo originally migrated from Bahr al Ghazal around 500 years ago. The founder of the Chollo, Nyikang, separated from other Luo groups and led his people down the White Nile. They arrived at the current location around 1500 AD and decided to settle around Malakal.

Livelihood: Agrarian The Chollo livelihood primarily rely upon fishing and agriculture. Livestock are highly valued, but the Chollo are not as dependent upon cattle for food relative to other groups. In the dry season the livestock do not need to migrate far away into other territories. Many cattle camps were actually on islands in the rivers along which the Chollo kingdom was settled14.

Historical Social Structure:

Unlike most the ethnic groups in South Sudan, the Chollo have a very centralized system of governance. After settling at the junction of the Nile and Sobat rivers around 1500 AD, the Chollo fought wars with the Dinka from 1600-1650. These wars led to the establishment of the Chollo kingdom. The Chollo have a monarchy under a king (reth) who is believed to be divine. He is selected from among the sons of the current king. It is the duty of the reth to perform sacrifices to the original leader, Nyikang, and ensure his shrines are maintained. The kingdom was divided into two political districts (north and south) and fifteen provinces. Each province was led by a paramount chief who reported to the king. The provinces were divided into eleven settlements, each which were led by a chief.

The king still plays a major role in Chollo life today and is responsible for collecting taxes and solving local disputes. The Local Government Act15 gave the king formal authority over civil administration of the Chollo areas. While the king is expected to be politically neutral in his role as the head of the kingdom he has historically been close to the former SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum, and been the rival of another Chollo politician Lam Akol (head of the breakaway SPLM DC party- see below for more details).

Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:

Like many other groups the relationship between the Chollo and the SPLA in the past few decades is mixed. The Chollo community has been divided between the political leaders Lam Akol and Pagan Amum. Akol was a high level commander in the SPLA movement but left the movement with Machar and others to form the SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991. He then left Machar to create SPLA-United in 1993 and signed an agreement with Khartoum in 14 Literature does not state if this is still the case. 15 http://mlgi.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-country/sudan/sub-national-legislation/The%20Local%20Government%20Act%202009.pdf

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1997.16 He stayed aligned to the Khartoum government until 2003, when he rejoined the SPLM/A. After the signing of the CPA Akol was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2005 and 2007, but then left the SPLM/A again. He founded the SPLM Democratic Change (DC) movement in 2009. While some traditional Chollo leaders supported him, others supported the SPLM party instead, including the king (reth) and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum. Akol ran against Salva Kiir for the presidency in 2010, to much chagrin from within the SPLM.

The SPLM DC party has faced major challenges from the SPLM since its inception. Due to Lam Akol’s past alliances with Khartoum, the party has been accused of being a branch of the NCP, and Akol’s call for unity with the north reinforced this assumption. While the SPLM attempted to ban SPLM DC from taking part in the elections (2010) the courts rejected the idea and Lam Akol competed against Salva Kiir for the presidency. While Akol lost, four SPLM DC parliamentary candidates won seats in the election. The SPLA refused to accept the results and arrested the candidates in May 2010. The candidates were restored at the end of August 2010 after the Legislative Assembly voted to give them back their immunity as elected members. However, by this time violence had already erupted in Upper Nile.

A barge attack by unknown persons was blamed on supporters of SPLM DC, prompting a quick deployment of an SPLA division to the area to “clear the area of the Lam Akol militia.” Soon followed reports of human rights abuses against civilians by the SPLA, who allegedly did not differentiate between the militia members and civilians from the community. After a failed ceasefire, fighting erupted in March 2011 which saw Malakal the target of an attack by opposition forces. Although repelled, the operation to clear the town by the SPLA led to serious accusations of more human rights abuses by the military against Chollo civilians.

One of the Chollo commanders involved in the SSDM/A opposition movement in the area, Johnson Olony, accepted an amnesty offer by President Kiir in September 2013 after he received a pardon from the king for killing a Chollo chief. After violence broke out in December 2013 Olony and his men helped the SPLA take control of Fashoda County and later in January helped the SPLA take back Malakal from opposition forces. Because of the support of Olony’s forces to the government/SPLA, Chollo civilians’ have become targets for the SPLM/A IO forces and allied civilian fighters. Meanwhile, as elsewhere in the country, Nuer civilians in and around Malakal have been targeted by the SPLA.

16 SPLA-United was initially the new name for SPLA-Nasir in which both Akol and Machar were leaders. Machar then changed his movement to SSIM (South Sudan Independence Movement) and Lam Akol kept the United named for his own separate movement.

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While the association with Lam Akol led to the targeting of Chollo civilians by the SPLA in 2010, many Chollo have also supported the SPLM mainstream. As stated, the king has politically opposed Lam Akol and has maintained close ties with Pagan Amum, a high level Chollo politician who, until recently, was within the SPLM. However, in response to his avocation for SPLM reform and decision to run for the upcoming Presidential elections, President Kiir dismissed Amum from his position as the SPLM Secretary General in 2013. As this was a clear violation of the party constitution, Amum took the case to court, but was arrested after the violence broke out in December 2013, accused of plotting a failed coup attempt against the President. Pagan was eventually released and is now one of the leaders within the “third bloc”, who are not aligned with either Machar or President Kiir. Meanwhile, as an illustration of constantly shifting alliances in South Sudanese politics, Lam Akol has been involved in the talks in Addis as part of the government delegation, despite being the leader of an opposition party.

In conclusion, the Chollo relationship with the SPLA varies within the community and frequently changes. Historically the Chollo have had more tension with the Dinka than the Nuer due to disputes over land. But currently Olony’s forces are supporting the SPLA against the SPLA/M IO in Malakal, which has led to Nuer retaliation against Chollo communities. On the other hand Pagan Amum, who since the civil war has been a main propagator of the SPLM, is now opposing the president, but is not supporting Machar. Lam Akol was a main opponent of the government, but since December 2013 is again involved with the government. The constantly shifting alliances show a desperate attempt by both sides to find support and allies. It is highly likely the Chollo civilians primary concern is with protecting their community and do not support the political agenda of either party at this time.

Key individuals:

Lam AkolPagan AmumPeter NyabaJohnson Olony

Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1948. The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk of the Nilotic Sudan. Cambridge University Press.

Westermann, Deidrich. 2009. The Shilluk People, their Language and Folklore. Michigan University Press. (reprint of a book from before 1923, which was very well known in its era- not sure if it holds up well now)

Ethnic group: Murle

Language group: Surmic

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Sub-groups: There are four clans- Tangajon, Ngaroti, Kelenya, Nginvach & Lowland Murle and Highland Murle

The Murle are all based in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area which includes the former counties of Pochalla and Pibor. The Murle are all found in the former county of Pibor.

There are four clans, or drumships, within the Murle that all Murle people are part of. These are not as important as B.A. Lewis describes in his work, but especially among the red chiefs the drumships are part of Murle identity. Of the four drumships there are two major ones- Tangajon and Ngaroti- and two minor ones- Kelenya and Nginvach.

Although not actual sub-groups, both in recent years and in the past there has been discussion around the differences between the highland Murle of Boma and the lowland Murle of Pibor. The main differences between the groups exist around livelihoods, with the lowland Murle relying primarily upon cattle and pastoralism. In contrast the highland Murle are dependent upon agriculture. This is due to the existence of livestock diseases around Boma, which make cattle raising untenable. The highland Murle have historically been called “Ngalam” by the lowland Murle, which literally translates as sugar-ants, implying they work in the dirt and lack the prestige of cattle ownership. In recent years the SSDM Cobra Faction of David Yau Yau has escalated tension between the SPLA and the Murle community, which has consequently seen the highland Murle distance themselves more from his movement, and therefore the lowland Murle as a whole. This has led to political leaders and chiefs from Boma embracing the ‘Ngalam’ identity, although this is perceived by many as a mechanism to protect their community from targeting by the military. The recently created Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) will introduce new counties, including Boma, which could further entrench differences depending on management. However, despite differences the highland Murle still identify themselves as members of the Murle group as a whole, and very strong kinship ties exist due to frequent inter-marriage and movement between the two areas.

Historic movement:

The Murle claim to have always lived in the Pibor County area, but academics believe they originated from Southwest Ethiopia. The historic migration into Pibor County occurred from Eastern Equatoria, where Boma was settled first and then the Murle continued to migrate northwest. As with many ethnic groups the arrival of the colonial powers put a halt to Murle expansion to the west towards Bor. Nuer claim that the Murle took Nuer

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grazing land in the 1960s and 1970s along the Nanaam River in the northwest of Pibor County, but major expansion halted about 100 years ago.

Livelihood: Agro-pastoralists

Like many of their neighbors the lowland Murle are agro-pastoralists and primarily depend on their livestock, which they migrate with to the toic and cattle camps in the dry season. In addition they engage in seasonal planting along rivers, fishing and (historically) hunting of the white-eared kob migration. However, around the beginning of the rainy season, when the cattle have stopped producing most of the milk, fishing is exhausted and food storage is beginning to run low, the Murle faces an annual hunger period between June and July. After the return of the rains in May or June planting is carried out for the next harvest, but food is still a major issue as the cattle have dried up and the harvest has yet to come. Once the harvest is ready, the new cattle are born and the cows begin to produce milk again, the annual cycle begins again. This carefully balanced lifestyle is easily affected by external factors, such as conflict, raids and droughts. Missed (lost?) planting seasons in 2011-2013 among the Murle due to conflict and raids significantly reduced their ability to cope for additional shocks.

The Murle in Boma do not seasonally migrate, as they rely primarily upon agriculture. While less food insecure than the lowland Murle, the highland Murle also missed planting season in 2013 due to conflict between SSDM-CF and the SPLA. Stability and secure planting seasons are key for 2014 if the Murle are going to improve their food security.

Historical Social Structure:

a. Age-setsThe key structures in Murle society are the age-sets. Male youth from a certain age segment become members of an age-set and this is an identifier throughout life. Each age-set has an animal, color scheme and a scarring pattern particular to them. Once you learn these it is often easy to tell which age-set people belong to. Women wear the colors or get the markings of their husband, and small girls wear the color of their father.

Age-sets last for life, but it is when the men are young and single that they matter most. The men want to fight and prove themselves, and through this get access to adolescent women at the dances they hold. There tend to be two active age-sets- the dominant one which holds dances and who are most responsible for defense and protection of the tribe (currently the Botonya), and the one below them who are trying to establish themselves as a full-fledged age-set (currently the Lango).

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Within each age-set there is no clear structure or hierarchy of leadership. Youth either look to those who are from a red chief family, and therefore have the ability to curse, or youth with proven ability in terms of speaking, hunting or fighting. Raids are not planned or known by an entire age-set, but by geographical proximity and personal relationships. This is also apparent by the number of Murle youth usually involved in raids, between five and twenty.

Murle Age-sets in descending order (oldest to youngest): MaraDorongwaMudenTittiBotonyaLango

b. Red Chiefs One of the original studies of the Murle, by B.A. Lewis, focused on the existence of four drumships, led by red chiefs. More recent academics believe these structures were exaggerated in importance, but they still play a role in Murle society. The role of red chief holds the most influence among the age-sets and Murle community. The Red Chief’s power is based on his religious authority, in particular the ability to curse people. There are four clans, two major ones- Tangajon and Ngaroti- and two minor ones- Kelenya and Nginvach. There are “leaders” of each clan amongst the red chiefs, but they are purely the eldest male present from the family at a time. Any male members of the red chief families have the power to curse, which means each age-set has descendants of the red chief clans who hold some level of influence. The role of red-chiefs has decreased in recent decades due to increasing external influences such as the political economy of the civil war. In addition since red chiefs identity is passed down patrilineal lines (from fathers to sons), the high number of red chiefs in modern Murle society seems to have reduced their influence relative to the past.

Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:

The Murle have had a poor relationship with the SPLM/A in the last couple decades. In the beginning of the southern rebellion members (including commanders) of the Murle were involved, as illustrated by the army mutiny in Pibor in 1983, along with Bor and Pochalla. Boma was one of the first SPLA bases, and it was never lost to the north during the Second Civil War. However, a few years after the start of the movement a high profile Murle leader was killed in Ethiopia by other members of the SPLA. While the causes of his death are debated, his death led to a major reduction of support for the movement among the Murle population, who perceived a bias against them and other minority groups in the fledgling movement. Consequently a

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Murle leader (Sultan and Red Chief), Ismael Konyi, looked to Khartoum for support in arming his local militia, Pibor Defense Force (PDF) in order to protect the Murle community against the SPLA.

Despite the use of Boma as a major base throughout the war, the SPLA were never able to recapture Pibor after Konyi’s PDF captured it in 1992. The historic ties with the government in Khartoum, and their resistance against the SPLA during the war, have increased animosity between the Murle and their historic ‘rivals’ of the Nuer and Dinka. Despite this, it must be remembered that many Murle remained loyal to the SPLM/A and some rose to the rank of Brigadier General. Meanwhile the highland Murle in Boma hosted one of the main SPLA bases throughout the war, although like in the rest of the country tension existed between the soldiers and the community ‘supporting’ (hosting) them.

In more recent years (post-CPA) the SSDF Cobra Faction, led by David Yau Yau, has dominated the headlines on Pibor. David Yau Yau first rebelled after losing in the 2010 elections in Pibor County. At the time it was not a major movement and a peace agreement was signed with the government in June 2011. However, after the forced disarmament of the Murle by the SPLA in early 2012 Yau Yau went back to the bush. The general frustration with the government among the Murle youth after the disarmament prompted a mass recruitment into his forces. SPLA positions were targeted, culminating in the loss of Boma (when?). The SPLA, led by Peter Gadet, carried out a counter-insurgency campaign in which they recaptured Boma, but they could not defeat the movement entirely and the campaign further damaged relations with the civilian Murle population. A peace deal was finally reached in 2014 thanks to the work of the church as a mediator and the nation-wide conflict between the government and SPLA-IO. The government needed to ensure the Murle did not join the opposition and the Murle benefitted from the newly created Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) led by David Yau Yau. While the deal is politically convenient for both the government and Yau Yau for the time being, it remains fragile.

Key Murle individuals:

Ismael KonyiKennedy GainDavid Yau YauBaba Medan

Further Reading:

Andretta, E. 1985. “A Reconsideration of the Basis of Group Cohesion among the Murle of the Southern Sudan.” University Microfilms International.

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Arensen, Jonathan E. 2012. “Murle Ecology” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference, Nairobi March (https://db.tt/HRZgPkWZ)

________. 2012. “Murle History” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference, Nairobi March (https://db.tt/b8CgJ3u6)

________. 2012. “Murle Political Systems and Age-sets” presented at AECOM Jonglei conference, Nairobi March (https://db.tt/JdrQQYAm)

________. 1992. Mice are Men: Language and Society among the Murle of Sudan. Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Lewis, B.A. 1972. The Murle: Red Chiefs and Black Commoners. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Ethnic group: Anuak (Anyuak, Anywaa)

Language group: Nilotic (Luo)

The Anuak are now mostly found in East Akobo and Pochalla in South Sudan and Gambella in Ethiopia.

Related groups: Chollo

Historic movement:

The Anuak share an oral history with the Chollo, but have different names for the leaders. The Chollo name of Nyikango, who led the Chollo people up the Nile to settle in Malakal, is instead named Akango in Anuak. His brother, Gilo, continued to migrate up the Sobat River and this migration is the start of the Anuak. The Anuak originally settled in the Baro, Sobat and Gilo river areas, but were pushed further east by the Nuer migration in the 19th century. It is said that Gilo’s grandson, Cuwai, was the first Anuak king and his descendants are the Anuak people.

Livelihood: Agrarian

The Anuak are now primarily agrarian and rely on cultivation, not livestock. The king even reduced the bridewealth price of Anuak women as a means of reducing the numbers of livestock they held, which reduced them as targets of raids by neighboring Murle and Nuer. As a result the Anuak do not have a seasonal migratory route like their pastoralist neighbors.

Historical Social Structure:

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The Anuak also have a kingdom like the Chollo who they broke away from hundreds of years ago. The system of rule was through a federation of villages, which had their own headmen and court system. These headmen are under the sub-chiefs who report to the independent king (nyie), who is above all Anuak, much like the Chollo king. Historically the villages were constantly competing for the title of nyie, but this was stopped by the British. The colonial powers were tired of the feuding and selected one family to hold the title of ‘king of kings’ in a copy of the feudal system in Ethiopia at the time. The Nyie Agada Akway and his descendants were made the permanent holders of the title.

Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:

As stated in the Nuer section the Anuak lost land in the 19th century due to the Nuer expansion and then again in the 1980s when the Nuer moved further into Ethiopia with the SPLA bases there. In the 1980s the Anuak also lost land in Akobo to the Lou Nuer and continually are pushed further east. The Anuak are now also losing land on the Ethiopian side of the border in Gambella. With all land being nationalized the Ethiopian government is distributing it to major agricultural corporations and forcing the Anuak out. This is part of the reason for an Anuak rebellion against the Ethiopian government in the last few years. The further loss of traditional Anuak land on the Ethiopian side of the border has also emboldened them to push back on their land rights against the Lou Nuer in Akobo. Those living in diaspora are calling for the restoration of traditional land to the Anuak and the armed movement in Gambella has received an inflow of arms, presumably from the Eritreans. In 2013 a Lou Nuer man who was found dead near Akobo led Lou Nuer youth to retaliate against an Anuak chief in Akobo County who has called for the return of Anuak to their homeland in Akobo. His consequent death at the hands of the Nuer youth escalated tensions between the Nuer and Anuak in Akobo and the Anuak moved further east towards Pochalla. In December 2013 when the fighting broke out in Juba, the Nuer SPLA were pushed out of Pochalla to Akobo by the Dinka soldiers supported by the Anuak population. Like in much of the country, historical local disputes, such as those between the Lou Nuer and Anuak, are likely the primary reason the Anuak have sided with the government in the current conflict.

Key individuals:David OkwierKing?Further Reading: Evans-Pritchard

Feyissa, Dereje. 2011. Playing Different Games: the paradox of Anywaa and Nuer Identification Strategies in the Gambella region. New York: Berghahn

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Books.

_____________. 2009. “Conflict and Identity Politics: The Case of Anywaa-Nuer Relations in Gambela, Western Ethiopia.” In Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa: Sudan, Uganda, and the Ethiopia-Sudan borderlands. Gunther Schlee and Elizabeth Watson (eds). New York: Berghahn Books.

Kurimoto, E. 2001. “Capturing Modernity among the Anywaa of Western Ethiopia.” In Rewriting Africa: Toward Renaissance or Collapse. E. Kurimoto (ed.). Osaka: Japan Centre for Area Studies.

___________. 1992. “Natives and Outsiders: The Historical Experience of the Anywaa of Western Ethiopia.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 43: 1-43.

Perner, Conradin (‘Kuacakuoro’)

Ethnic group: Maban

Language Group: Nilotic

Sub-groups: The Maban are frequently grouped as part of the greater Burun peoples, which consist of several other independent groups- Uduk, Jumjum, Ragreg, Ganza, Mopo, Mayak, Mabano, and Buldid. These groups are spread across the Sudanese-South Sudanese border between Southern Blue Nile and Upper Nile.

Related groups: Shilluk

Historical Migratory patterns:

Another Luo group the Maban are said to have separated from the Chollo at Soba (near Khartoum). It is believed this occurred after the fall of the Makkura Kingdom. The Maban arrived at their location between the east bank of the Nile and the Ethiopian highlands via the Baro River.

Livelihood: Agrarian

Although the Maban own livestock their primary means of livelihoods is cultivation. Like the other agrarian groups in South Sudan they do not rely on seasonal migration in the dry season.

Historical Social Structure:

Like most of the Nilotic groups the Maban did not have a centralized system of administration or control until the arrival and imposition of the British

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chieftain system. Their split with the Chollo occurred before the latters creation of a centralized system (i.e kingdom) and therefore the Maban do not share it. Spiritual leaders had influence historically, but no political influence.

Relationship with SPLA and other armed groups:

The recent appearance of the Mabanese Defense Forces (MDF) has brought the Maban into the current conflict. The MDF has targeted Nuer NGO staff in an apparent retaliation for losses from clashes against SPLA-IO in July.

Anthropologists of additional people groups not profiled above:

Atuot people- John Burton

Bari, Tenet and Lutuho peoples- Simon Simonse

Didinga people- J.H. Driberg

Mundari people- Jean Buxton

Pari people- Eisei Kurimoto

Uduk people- Wendy James

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Glossary

Major armed groups in South Sudan

SPLM/A- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army

The SPLM/A, formed in 1983 after the Bor mutiny, was engaged in more than two decades of civil war against the Khartoum regime. John Garang was the leader of the movement, until he was killed in a helicopter clash in July 2005. As part of its official rhetoric of the “New Sudan”, the SPLM/A called for a secular and democratically reformed state. It initially received support from the Ethiopian Mengistu regime until its collapse in 1991. The same year tensions in the leadership saw the creation of the breakaway SPLA-Nasir faction led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong (Machar re-joined the SPLM/A in 2002). Tensions within the SPLM leadership in 2013 prompted President Kiir to dismiss Riek Machar from his position of Vice President, and later Pagan Amum was removed from his post of SPLM Secretary General. These tensions came to a boil in late 2013 after top politicians walked out of a SPLM meeting, after which violence broke out within the Presidential guards in Juba, escalating into a nation wide conflict.

Anyanya and Anyanya II

Anyanya was the name of the Southern rebel movement involved in the first civil war between 1955 and 1972.

The Anyanya II uprising started in the late 1970s, and was initially made up of a number of independent Nuer groups pushing for independence from Sudan. Support from the Mengistu regime (Ethiopia) in 1982 helped organize the movement, but Mengistu later decided to support Garang and the newly formed SPLA in 1983. Clashes occurred between the SPLA and Anyanya II in the years that followed. The Anyanya II forces were largely integrated into the SPLA between 1988 and 1990, although not all- the most significant exception being Paulino Matiep. Despite joining forces with the SPLA, many of the Nuer Anyanya II stayed in their areas of origin, and then joined the side of the SPLA-Nasir faction after the 1991 split.

SSDF- South Sudan Defense Force

The South Sudan Defense Force was the name given to the southern rebel groups who signed the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in Khartoum. These groups included Riek Machar’s forces (SSIM)

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and other independent commanders. Machar left in 2000 to form the SPDF and the SSDF was then led by Gatluak Deng until late 2002 and afterwards Paulino Matiep.

SSDM/A- South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army

Former SPLA General George Athor began SSDM/A after losing the election for governor of Upper Nile in 2010. See the post-2005 insurgency section for more.

SSLM/A- South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

Peter Gadet began the SSLM/A in 2011 when he defected from the SPLA. After a few attacks he signed a ceasefire later that year, but other splinter factions who disagreed with his decision to sign a ceasefire continued to use the name.The SSDM/A and SSLM/A later joined into one movement around 2012, which can lead to confusion as the acronyms are often interchanged when speaking of movements such as Yau Yau’s.

SSIM/A- South Sudan Independence Movement

The South Sudan Independence Movement was the name taken by Machar’s faction in late 1994 (the earlier names being SPLA-Nasir and SPLA-United). The name was taken to highlight the group’s political goal of southern independence from Sudan, which was different from the official rhetoric of the SPLA. SSIM/A was a signatory to the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 and it became part of the newly formed SSDF. Machar later left in 2000 to form the anti-government SPDF.

SPLA-United

The name SPLA-United has been used by two different groups, neither which exists today, which leads to confusion. Initially it was the new name for Riek Machar’s SPLA-Nasir faction between March 1993 and 1994. The addition of new individuals in the leadership led to a name change, and SPLA-United was selected to replace SPLA-Nasir. However, in 1994 the name changed again to SSIM/A.

The second usage of SPLA-United was for the Shilluk movement of Lam Akol. Akol was expelled from the original SPLA-United by Machar in February 1994. When Machar changed the name of his movement to SSIM/A, Lam Akol took on the SPLA-United moniker for his own movement. The Lam Akol SPLA-United later joined the government in 1997 as part of the Khartoum Peace Agreement.

SPDF- Sudan People’s Democratic Front/Defense Forces

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The Sudan People’s Democratic Front or Sudan People’s Defense Forces (the political branch and the military branch) were a rebel movement formed by Riek Machar in 2000. It later merged with the SPLM/A in January 2002.

SPLA-Nasir

The faction that split from the SPLA, led by Riek Machar, Gordon Kong and Lam Akol, in 1991 was initially called SPLA-Nasir, from the town in Upper Nile where they had their main base. This group later changed its name to SPLA-United in 1993, and then Riek Machar changed it to SSIM/A in 1994.

SPLA-Torit/Mainstream

After the 1991 split, those who remained loyal to John Garang came to be called SPLA Mainstream, to differentiate them from those who were loyal to the new faction(s). They were also called SPLA-Torit, as the town of Torit in Eastern Equatoria was the main base of Garang´s faction at the time.

Red Army

The Red Army, or Jesh Amer, was part of a military unit within SPLA, consisting of boys from many parts of the country. The boys received military training by the SPLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This occurred in refugee camps in Ethiopia, where only boys were placed, as well as schools within South Sudan - both of which were administered by the SPLA. (see Child Soldiers section for more details)

White Army

The White Army, or dec bor in Nuer (alternatively dech bor or dech en bor), is the term used to describe armed Nuer civilians who mobilize for defense and aggression. The White Army is primarily made up of untrained fighters, and is led and coordinated by youth leaders from within the community structures. The White Army first gained notoriety as a proxy militia in the wars within the SPLA in the 1990s on the side of the SPLA Nasir faction. In recent years it has been used as a means of defense and aggression in inter-ethnic clashes between the Nuer and Murle ethnic groups in Jonglei. Currently it has sided with Riek Machar’s SPLA-in-Opposition due to the perceived threat towards Nuer, but once again it is largely independent and has its own parallel leadership structures.

Titweng/Gelweng

The titweng, or gelweng, literally translate as “cattle guards” in Dinka. After SPLA-Nasir raids into Dinka territory in the early 1990s the community

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demanded protection or weapons for self-protection. They received the weapons and training in how to use them. What began as a community defense structure turned into a proxy militia for SPLA-Torit/Mainstream. The group fought alongside the SPLA in 1997 in its push to capture Bahr al Ghazal. After the Wunlit Peace agreement between the Nuer and Dinka in 1999, the gelweng began to use the guns to fight amongst themselves, which led to a consequent SPLA disarmament in 2000.

SSUM/A- South Sudan Unity Movement/Army

The South Sudan Unity Movement/Army was started by Paulino Matiep in 1998. It included his earlier Anyanya II and SSDF forces and was supported by the Sudanese government. It was based in Mayom and was primarily made up of Bul Nuer.

Smaller militia groups:

Gabriel Tanginya, Gordon Kong and Simon Gatwich all had individual armed movements. They were supported by Khartoum and were made up of different Nuer sections. Tanginya’s militia was primarily Lak Nuer and was based in Fangak, Kong’s was primarily Jikany Nuer and was based in Nasir, and Gatwich’s was primarily Lou Nuer and was based in Waat.

Johnson, Douglas. 2003. Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: Currey.

Human Rights Watch. 2003. Sudan, Oil and Human Rights. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wctp9hmacqksq1/Sudan%20Oil%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf?dl=0)

Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurvey.org)

Key People

John Garang de Mabior- Garang was the head of the SPLM and Commander-in-chief of the SPLA. He was shortly a member of Anyanya I but then was integrated into the Sudanese army at the end of the first civil war (1972). He rose to the rank of colonel and was initially sent to put down the Bor mutiny but then joined them. He was one of the founders of the SPLA in 1983 and received support from the Ethiopian Mengistu Regime over his southern rivals Anyanya II. Garang called for a secular and united Sudan, in contrast to Anyanya II’s demands for independence. He tragically died in July 2005 in a helicopter crash and Salva Kiir took over as the head of the SPLM and First Vice President of Sudan.

Salva Kiir- Kiir was the chief of military operations for SPLA-Torit/Mainstream after the 1991 split and escorted thousands of children, and those

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accompanying them, to Kenya. Later Kiir was commander for Bahr al Ghazal in 1999 and strongly supported the Wunlit Peace agreement between the Dinka and Nuer. He was made SPLA Chief of Staff in late 1999 and then took over in 2005 as the head of the SPLM and commander-in-chief of the SPLA after Garang’s death. He won the first election for president and has held the position ever since. In December 2013 he accused his former Vice President Riek Machar, and others, of an attempted coup. The consequent violence in Juba escalated into the current conflict.

Riek Machar- the first Vice President in South Sudan, but was dismissed by Salva Kiir in July 2013. Machar has historically had a tumultuous relationship with the SPLM/A and has been behind a number of factions over the years. Machar has been involved in SPLA-Nasir (which became SPLA-United and then SSIM/A), SSDF, SPDF and SPLA-IO. See the Nuer profile section for more details.

Kuol Manyang- previously Manyang was the Governor of Jonglei state until his appointment in July 2013 as the Minister of Defense. As with many high level SPLM politicians Kuol Manyang was previously a high ranking official in the SPLA and was at one time in charge of the Bahr al Ghazal region.

Gordon Kong- Kong was a veteran of Anyanya from the first civil war and was an original founder of the SPLM/A. He then joined the Anyanya II movement calling for independence between 1983 and 1988. He was central in the reconciliation of Anyanya II and the SPLA in the late 1980s when most of Anyanya II was integrated. He left the SPLA in 1991 as a leader of the SPLA-Nasir faction. After the 1997 agreement he was made a commander in the SSDF movement (pro-government umbrella group) and was based in Nasir.

Lam Akol- Lam Akol was one of the leaders of the SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991 along with Gordon Kong and Riek Machar. He was expelled from the movement by Machar in 1994, after which he created his own SPLA-United group made up of Shilluk forces. His SPLA-United was a signatory to the 1997 Fashoda peace agreement. In 2009 he formed the SPLM-Democratic Change (DC) political party and ran against Salva Kiir for the presidency. See Shilluk profile section for more.

Kerubino Kuanyin Bol- Kerubino was an Anyanya officer who was integrated into the Sudanese army after the 1972 agreement. He led the Bor mutiny and was part of the formation of the SPLA in 1983. He was put in prison by Garang in 1987 but escaped in 1992 and joined the SPLA-Nasir faction of Machar in 1993. Kerubino had a Dinka militia group under him that was supported by the Khartoum government from 1994. He later joined the SPLA in 1998 but then defected again later the same year and fled to Matiep ’s SSUM/A in Mankien for safety. He was killed in September 1999 by Gadet ’s forces who captured Mankien after defecting from Matiep that month.

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Peter Gadet- Gadet was originally a member of the Sudanese Army and was sent to fight on behalf of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq regime against the Iranians in the 1980s. He later joined the SPLA but joined the SPLA-Nasir faction after the 1991 split. He was then given an officer’s post under Paulino Matiep’s Bul Nuer forces. After the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 Gadet became a key commander in Paulino Matiep’s SSUM/A militia. He then left the SSUM/A in September 1999 and fought against the Sudanese government. In early 2000 he joined the SPLA and then began to fight the SPDF forces under Machar later that year. In 2002 he then rejoined the government. Gadet was slow in accepting the Juba Declaration in 2006 which created suspicion when he began integration later. His brutal reputation while fighting with Paulino Matiep, then with the SPLA, and later with the SSDF also preceded him. Civilian populations were devastated in some of his attacks and many Bahr al Ghazal Dinka and Nuer in Unity hold significant grievances towards him to this day. Small Arms Survey believes his defection is related to the perception that former militia leaders were being overlooked for promotions, instead given to younger Dinka SPLA loyalists. He left the SPLA in March 2011 and started the SSLM/A movement. After attacks on Mayom and Mankien, in which more than 250 people were killed, he signed a ceasefire and later joined the government in August 2011. Gadet was one of the first to defect in December 2013 to the SPLA-IO and has been the commander for Jonglei, and more recently Unity state.

Paulo Matiep- Matiep is unusual as he was never a member of the SPLA. Originally a member of Anyanya in the first civil war, Matiep was not integrated into the Sudanese Army after 1972, as many others were. He rebelled again in 1975 and went to Ethiopia and returned in 1985-1986 as Anyanya II. The reconciliation in the late 1980s between the SPLA and Anyanya II by Gordon Kong did not include Matiep, presumably due to attacks by the SPLA on Anyanya II in 1983. Matiep was supported by the government and fought alongside Omar Bashir (before the 1989 military coup that would put him in power until today) while recapturing Mayom in 1989 from the SPLA. He joined the SPLA-Nasir faction in 1991 and was integrated into the SSDF after the 1997 agreement. However, he fought against Machar´s SSDF forces from 1997 over the governorship of Unity, which was won by Taban Deng Gai. In 1998 he started the SSUM/A which was again supported by Khartoum. He then expelled Taban Deng from Unity in 1999.

Taban Deng Gai- Twice governor of Unity, under both Sudan (1997-1999) and South Sudan (2005-2013). Taban Deng joined the SPLA in the 1980s but joined the SPLA-Nasir breakaway faction in 1991. He is related by marriage to Riek Machar. After the 1997 agreement with Khartoum, he became the leader of the new UDSF political party. He won an election to be governor of Unity in 1997 but was expelled in 1999 by Paulino Matiep. In 2000 he joined

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Machar’s new movement which then reunited with the SPLA in 2002. He was appointed as the governor of Unity again in 2005 and was seen as President Salva Kiir´s close ally. He won the contested elections in Unity state in 2010 against Angelina Teny, the wife of Riek Machar. However, over the last years he had a fall-out with the President who dismissed him from the governorship in 2013. Since December 2013 he has been a member of the SPLA-IO and represents them in the Addis peace talks.

Ismael Konyi- Former governor of Jonglei and ally of Sudan as head of the Pibor Defense Forces (PDF) during the second civil war. Signed an agreement in 2006 with the GOSS and became a peace and reconciliation adviser to the president.

David Yau Yau- After losing the 2010 parliamentary elections (state assembly) David Yau Yau began a rebellion in his home county of Pibor. Unlike many of the other movement leaders, Yau Yau had no previous military experience. He signed a peace agreement in 2011, but defected in 2012 after the brutal SPLA disarmament of the Murle at the beginning of the year. This time he received much more support from the youth, and his movement changed its name to SSLA- Cobra Faction. Interestingly, Gadet was the commander sent to lead the counter-insurgency operation against David Yau Yau in 2013 and captured the main base (in Boma?), but failed to kill Yau Yau himself. Yau Yau signed a new peace agreement with the government in 2014 providing for a newly created Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA)17 that does not report to the state governor in Jonglei but to the president’s office instead. Yau Yau has been made the head of the GPAA.

Johnson, Douglas. 2003. Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: Currey.

Human Rights Watch. 2003. Sudan, Oil and Human Rights. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/6wctp9hmacqksq1/Sudan%20Oil%20and%20Human%20Rights.pdf?dl=0)

Small Arms Survey (www.smallarmssurvey.org)

Terms and Acronyms

acephelous- applying to a society that has no hierarchy or centralized system of coordination and control. Acephelous societies are ones that are ‘flat,’ not ‘vertical,’ when it comes to social structures. For example, rather than a king, or even chiefs, the ‘highest’ social structure is often the head of a family.

17 The new GPAA has seen two counties (Pibor and Pochalla) divided into seven new counties.

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agrarian- cultivators, or agriculturalists. Primarily reliant upon planting and growing crops for food security and livelihoods, most agrarian cultures also own livestock, but are not reliant upon it for food or income.

agro-pastoralist- anthropological term for those who are reliant on both livestock and cultivation. Very few societies are completely pastoralist and also rely on some level of planting or fishing as part of the annual food cycle. Many societies in South Sudan are agro-pastoralists- cattle are the primary focus, but as they rely on planting as well as fishing and hunting at different times of the year.

age-set- a peer group shared across a society. Young men from a certain age range from across the entire ethnic group identify primarily with their peers from the same generation. Loyalty is highest with one’s age-set, not with clans or regions. Each age-set has identifiers to differentiate from the others, and age-sets often compete between themselves for influence and power. Girls identify with the age-set of their father, and later their husband or boyfriend’s age-set.

brideprice (bridewealth)- payment made to the family of the bride by the family of the groom in order for a marriage to be approved socially. Among pastoral communities it is most frequently paid in the form of cattle, but also goats, money, guns and other items can be included. Bridewealth is the more current term (anthropological term).

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA in 2005.

pastoralist- herders. Primarily reliant upon livestock (sheep, goats, camels, cattle) for livelihoods and food security.

toic- grazing land or pasture for livestock. The toic is where cattle are taken in the dry season to access water and food. In the rainy season it often turns to swamp.

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Maps

Major Seasonal Migration Routes by State- OCHA state maps with known migratory routes added

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UNDP Community Consultation Report Unity State 2012- Seasonal Migration and Cattle Raids (link)

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UNDP Community Consultation Report Unity State 2012- Seasonal Migration and Cattle Raids (https://www.dropbox.com/s/dvsud0ymnozkm5p/UNDP-SS-Unity-consult-12Read.pdf?dl=0)

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For larger versions:Ethnic Map: https://www.dropbox.com /s/s5326kcw57kqcp3/SS%20Ethnic %20Map.pdf?dl=0Jonglei Map: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ie32oh6n0yhmks3/Jonglei%20State%20Migrations.pdf?dl=0 Upper Nile Map: https://www.dropbox.com/s/rgcd97s5qqmqedw/Upper

%20Nile%20Migrations.pdf?dl=0

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