south african democratic model

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South Africa: ExplainingDemocratic Stability

JAN-ERIK LANE & SVANTE ERSSON

Geneva University, Umea University

ABSTRACT Democracy scores for South Africa are now quite high. How is this to beexplained? Testing social, economic, cultural and institutional models of democracy,we suggest that South Africas current democratic stability is best explained by acombination of institutional and political culture factors. The ANC in South Africa is

found to be an interesting example of a dominant party. In contrast to superficiallysimilar cases in Mexico and Taiwan, the position of the ANC is based upon

electoral mobilisation not state monopolisation. However, in the long run anydominant party poses a risk for democracy, especially if contextual conditions donot fully support democratic stability. Civil society is identified as an important

factor that is conducive to democratic vitality in South Africa.

Introduction

The crushing victory of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2004

parliamentary elections in South Africa (SA) raises the question of the

influence of a dominant party upon the functioning of democracy. One of themajor findings in the literature on democracy is that a predominant position for

one political party, which becomes almost identical with the state, makes democ-

racy unstable (Dahl, 1972). However, the ANC is deeply committed to democracy

in South Africa as a result of its long struggle against the Apartheid regime. But

will such a democratic commitment last, and will a democratic spirit suffice?

Democracy in South Africa is entrenched through a system of institutions

that are conducive to the stability of democracy (Lijphart, 1998; Friedman,

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

Vol. 45, No. 2, 219240, April 2007

Correspondence Address: Jan-Erik Lane, Department of Political Science, Geneva University,

UNI Mail 40 Bd Du Pont dArve CH 1211 Geneve 4 Switzerland Email: Jan Erik Lane@


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1999; Mattes, 2002; Pottie & Hassim, 2003; Lodge, 2003; Southall, 2003).

Thus, there is a Constitutional Court with legal review, an Ombudsman,

proportional representation and political decentralisation. At the same time

there is a presidential system of government based upon a dominant position

for one of the political parties. This sets up a problematic that will be resolved

in one of two ways. Either political competition is reinforced through the

emergence of a more balanced party system. Or the institutions of democracy

will be bent in favour of the dominant position of the ANC. As David Welsh

underlines, there are longer-term challenges to the integrity and effectiveness

of the political system of SA, and the worst reaction would be complacency

(Welsh, 2004: 21).

The purpose of this article is to explore these predictions by relating South

Africa to the general analysis of the conditions of democracy among thecountries of the world (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003; Doorenspleet,

2004; Epstein et al., 2006). We will employ the regression technique in

order to isolate the conditions that increase or decrease democratic stability

and then apply these insights to the case of South Africa. In the long run,

South Africa can do no better on democracy than the average country in the

world. Interestingly, at present its democracy score is considerably above its

predicted score from a regression model that takes into account the basic

conditions in democracy research. Such a high level of democracy, we

suggest, would need underpinning by civil society and its culture of toleranceamidst multiculturalism.

The first step in the analysis involves an attempt at mapping the variation in

democracy in SA over time. The second step is a discussion of conditions

promoting democracy both in general and in particular with reference to the

South African experience. Following a distinction between social or economic

factors on the one hand and institutional factors on the other hand, we discuss

political institutions (focusing specifically on the ANC as a dominant party

within a predominant party system in South Africa) social structure and

political culture. On the basis of this discussion we employ the regressiontechnique to test the implications of different models for predicting

democracy in SA. The article ends with a discussion about the implications

for democracy in South Africa in relation both to its political institutions

and to macro-forces within society.

Mapping Democracy in South Africa

There are many democracy indices available in the literature, and they tend by

and large to agree upon country rankings (Munk & Verkuilen, 2002). It is true

that under closer scrutiny the variation in scores over time for specific

220 J.-E. Lane & S. Ersson


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Africa it is generally agreed that the country is today a democracy. Figure 1

presents the scores for South Africa before and after the regime change in

1994 using a standard index of democracy (Freedom House, 2004)1 as well

as an index compiled for South Africa (Fedderke et al., 2001),2 and they

both tend to agree.

Similar trends over time for this period (1973 onwards) can also be

identified from other democracy indices. The Polity data scores (Polity,

2004) comes very close to the Freedom House scores, and the Vanhanen

democracy index (Vanhanen, 2000) displays a similar pattern, although the

level of the democracy scores in the latter is lower than in the other democracy

indices, since that index is based on participation and competition.

It should be pointed out and emphasised that these democracy scores for

South Africa today are very high, at or above 9 on a scale from 1 to 10.They indicate not only that South Africa is the only country on the African

continent where one may hope for a consolidation of democracy but also

that South African democracy is on par with European states.3

These judgements on democracy scores for South Africa are complemented

in Figure 2 with data capturing citizens attitudes to the new democracy

introduced in 1994 as they are reported in the Afrobarometer dataset. On

one hand we have an indication as to how satisfied people are with democracy

(SWD); and on the other hand we have the extent to which people support

democracy over other regimes (SFD). Over the period from 1995 to 2006 aplurality are satisfied and tend to support the new political system, although

the trend varies slightly over the years.

Figure 1 Democracy scores in South Africa Sources: The scores displayed are based

South Africa: Explaining Democratic Stability 221


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Various indicators measuring the state of democracy in South Africa suggest

that democracy is in the process of being consolidated. It is obvious that South

Africa today fulfils accepted criteria on political rights and civil liberties. This

state of affairs is to a large extent supported by the citizens of South Africa.

Conditions Promoting Democracy

Democracy, we know, around the world is promoted by a set of social,

economic and cultural factors as well as by institutional factors. These

general conditions include affluence, degree of ethnic fragmentation, religion

(here defined as exogenous conditions) as well as institutions (here defined as

endogenous conditions). Let us start this discussion with political institutions

that may be of relevance for understanding the development of democracy in apolitical system like the one in South Africa.

Institutional Factors: Dominant Party Position

The list of countries with a former one-party system left or right is long,

including among others: the Philippines, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast,

Hungary, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Paraguay, Seychelles, and Cape Verde.

Most of these one-party states collapsed in the democracy wave during the

1990s. A one-party state differs from a predominant party system in terms of

mainly institutional characteristics The one-party state is authoritarian in its

Figure 2. Satisfaction with (SWD) and support for democracy (SFD) in South Africa19952004. Sources: Satisfaction with democracy (SWD): Mattes et al. (2000: 21),Bratton and Cho (2006: 19); Support for democracy (SFD): Mattes et al. (2000: 5),

Bratton and Cho (2006: 17)



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democratic regime. While the dismantling of many one-party states during the

1990s has been well studied, there is little analysis of how a dominant party

system emerges. We introduce the discussion by looking at the role of a domi-

nant party in a predominant party system. Then we examine the role of the

ANC in South Africa and its place in the republic. The relationship between

party system and political regime is an under-researched area where only the

extreme case of a one-party state in a totalitarian regime is unambiguous

(Sartori, 1976). One significant distinction is between the competitive one-

party state and the non-competitive one-party state, as the imposition of a ban

against competing parties would make democracy highly unlikely. Matters are

entirely different when one party retains a dominant position over and against

the others as a result of free and fair elections. In between these two polar

types there is certainly a grey area where dominant parties employ tricks tomaintain their position.

When a one-party state is legally entrenched, then there is little likelihood

of a democratic regime evolving autonomously. Other parties may be allowed

to operate, but they are accorded the status of supporting parties to the

hegemonic one. The one-party legal status is characteristically used for

the total penetration of state and society, meaning that the party fills all key

positions in the bureaucracy and in the key associations of society. Africa

experienced this type of legal one-party state for some time after

independence when the earlier freedom fighters chose to put in place so-calledmodernising regimes based upon a political monopoly for the national

developing party. Such a dominant position for one party has commonly

been achieved through institutional means. This is definitely not the case in

South Africa. The ANC has been very eager not to associate itself with the

African model of a one-party state. Entry for alternative and new parties is

open in the South Africa polity and the small parties are not merely support

parties to the ANC but true contenders.

However, there are other less extreme types of one-party states where a

connection with democracy is far from excluded. Clearly, South Africa fallsinto a category of one-party regimes where there is no legal restriction upon

entry or competition but the elections return one party to political power on

a consistent basis. Among earlier examples of such regimes the dominant

party has not always refrained from using illegal practices against contenders,

but the essential point is that there is no legal prohibition upon the entry of

other parties. There may be intimidation and vote rigging, but this may also

occur even when there is no dominant party. Classical examples of such

predominant party systems are provided by Taiwan and Mexico. The two

countries share striking similarities, particularly in their respective

experiences under single-party rule and in their recent electoral results The



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Institutcional) in Mexico were the only two dominant ruling parties in the

world that survived the democratic transition relatively intact, but they

finally succumbed in presidential elections held in March 2000 and July

2000 in Taiwan and Mexico, respectively. It was the first time that the

Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan and the National Action Party in

Mexico won the presidency. Both presidential winners failed to gain a

majority of the votes and the parties they belong to do not control a majority

of the seats in the legislative assembly either.

A dominant party may arrive at its position by diverse routes. It may

exercise hegemony due to past practices when it was the only legally accepted

party. Thus, it would continue to be the state party even after the regime

evolved towards democracy. Often it is then merely a matter of time before

its position cracks due to the entry of competing parties and a contenderundermines its dominant position as in Mexico and Taiwan. It may exercise

dominance by means of the skilful employment of the electoral system,

relying upon first past the post in combination with the preaching of a national

ideology as in Singapore. These one-party states encompass clientelism in

order to buttress their dominant position by co-opting new elites into their

cadres. It is an open question to what extent this penetration of state and

society is fully achieved or merely presents an opportunity to be undone

when the dominant position cracks.

The case of the ANC and South Africa is entirely different, as its dominantposition derives from its social support and has been retained despite the employ-

ment of the PR election method (Giliomee, 1998; Southall, 1998; see also

Prevost, 2006; Butler, 2007). In many ways, the dominant position of the

ANC resembles the electoral fortunes of the social democratic parties in Scandi-

navia over long periods or the dominant position of the Conservative Party in the

UK under Thatcher, although it must be underlined that the dominant position in

a two-party system is, of course, facilitated by the majoritarian election method.

Could one, then, predict that the ANCs dominant position will falter, as did

that of the Norwegian and Swedish social democrats eventually? Not quite.There are certain factors typical of South Africa that makes such a prediction

improbable. The ANC will for a long time be able to draw upon the inherited

racial cleavages in the country, dividing the Black vote between itself and the

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which does not monopolise the vote of the

Zulus. Thus, the ANC stands strong with voters from among all the Black

tribes as well as with the Indian and Coloured electors, additionally receiving

some support from English speakers. Consequently, the dominant position of

the ANC is today more of a threat to democracy than Scandinavian social

democracy ever was, because there is the risk of a marriage between

domination and concentration of power as has occurred so frequently in



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has a dominant presence in the legislative assembly and the ruling party, the

ANC, enjoys a two-thirds majority in the chamber, which amounts to an over-

concentration of power in a single institution (Labuschagne, 2004: 100).

On the other hand, South Africa, a big country both population-wise and in

territorial size, remains a multi-party system, which is a positive for

democracy. This multi-party system is based upon proportional elections to

parliament, which elects the president who is the head of state and head of

government at the same time. Since the introduction of a democratic regime

there have been three parliamentary elections, all resulting in an unbalanced

multi-party system (Reynolds, 1994, 1999; Lodge, 1999; Fox & Lemon,

2000; Piombo, 2004; Piombo & Nijzink, 2006). Table 1 shows this imbalance

between a giant ANC and a number of smaller parties.

The ANC has actually increased its dominant position in election afterelection reaching a high of 70 per cent in 2004, which is not a good sign.

The earlier state party, the National Party, has virtually collapsed and

entered into a coalition with the ANC. Opposition comes mainly from the

Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance, receiving 12 per cent of the votesin 2004, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which did not score above 10 per

cent in 2004. In terms of party system, South Africa currently equates to a

predominant party system where the effective number of parties has declined

from 2.25 (votes) in 1994 to 1.97 (votes) in 2004.

However, when one takes the regional picture into account, then thedominance of the ANC is not so conspicuous. Table 2 shows the regional

composition of vote and seats, based upon the elections to the provincial

assemblies.

Table 1. Parliamentary elections to the National Assembly in South Africa: votes,seats and turnout (%)

1994 1999 2004

Party Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats

ANC 62.6 63.0 66.4 66.5 69.7 69.8DA/DP 1.7 1.8 9.6 9.5 12.4 12.5IFP 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.5 7.0 7.0NNP/NP 20.4 20.5 6.9 7.0 1.7 1.8ACDP 0.5 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5VF 2.2 2.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0PAC 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8UDM 3.4 3.5 2.3 2.3

Others 0.9 0 2.2 1.9 3.7 3.3Turnout [86.9] 89.3 76.7



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Only in two regions is there balanced competition since the ANC has no

majority in Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The Inkatha Freedom

Party receives about 37 per cent of the vote in Natal whereas the Democratic

Alliance and the New National Party together take about 38 per cent of the

vote in the Western Cape. In these two provinces we may talk about multi-

party systems with an effective number of 3.42 (votes) in Western Cape and

2.75 (votes) in Kwazulu-Natal, whereas there are predominant party

systems in Limpopo (1.25) and Mpumalanga (1.33). Nevertheless, South

Africa has a unitary constitution and this means that the system of nine

decentralised provincial governments provides only limited regionalism as a

counterbalance to ANC dominance in the centre.

Accordingly, the dominant position of the ANC in South Africa raises two

questions:

(1) What mechanisms and factors, other than the ANC itself, can prevent the

coming of a party hegemony?

(2) What mechanisms inside the ANC can be identified that would make that

outcome less likely?

Important institutions, exogenous to the ANC, for preventing party hegemony

include parliamentary opposition and legal control. However, in order for the

ANC to remain a clean party, albeit in a strong electoral position, it is vital thatits internal democratic processes function and that it is in contact with civil

society and its organisations. A South African scholar concludes:

The party system is still characterised by competition, even though it has

become slightly more of a predominant-party system. The predominance

Table 2. Provincial election results in South Africa in 2004: votes and seats (%)

ANC DA IFP UDM ACDP NNP

Province Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat Vote Seat

Eastern Cape 79.3 80.9 7.3 7.9 0.2 0 9.2 9.5 0.8 0 0.6 0Free State 81.8 83.3 8.5 10.0 0.4 0 0.9 0 1.3 3.3 0.8 0Gauteng 68.4 69.9 20.8 20.5 2.5 2.7 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.4 0.8 0Kwazulu-Natal 47.0 47.5 8.4 8.8 36.8 37.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.5 0.5 0Limpopo 89.2 91.8 3.6 4.1 1.7 2.0 1.3 2.0 0.5 0Mpumalanga 86.3 90.0 6.9 6.7 1.0 0 1.0 0 1.1 0 0.5 0Northern Cape 68.8 70.0 11.1 10.0 0.2 0 0.5 0 1.9 3.3 7.5 6.7

North West 80.7 81.8 5.0 6.1 0.3 0 1.0 0 1.2 0 0.4 0Western Cape 45.3 45.2 27.1 28.6 0.1 0 1.8 2.4 3.4 4.8 10.9 11.9



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of the ANC alliance is countered by its willingness to cooperate in

government with other non-ruling political parties, but its overall domi-

nance is unlikely to change in the immediate future. (Botha, 2004: 56)

General Conditions Underpinning Democracy: Social and Economic

Factors

Let us now consider the impact of contextual factors like affluence, ethnicity

and religion (Hadenius, 1992; Lipset, 1994; Przeworski et al., 2000). Although

SA is in a much better economic condition than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa,

it is still true that its income inequalities and the high level of black

unemployment, as well as its enormous diversity ethnically and religiously,would or should, following the general models of democracy, threaten to

reduce the stability of the new regime that was put in place after the fall of

Apartheid.

It is clear that in a global perspective South Africa has one of the most

unequal income distributions with its Gini-index coming close to 60. It is

still unclear as to whether income inequality has increased or decreased

over recent years. Some studies indicate a positive development (Gelb,

2003) whereas other studies suggest more inequality (UNDP, 2003a) or

only small changes (Hoogeveen & Ozler, 2005). Since South Africa may beconsidered a middle-income nation in a comparative context, the country

occupies an extreme position when comparing the level of human develop-

ment with the degree of unequal income distributions (see Figure 3).

Another problematic aspect of the social structure of the country relates to

ethnicity and religion. Ethnic and religious fragmentation is not conducive to

either political stability or democratic development, and this is particularly

true for countries on the African continent (Easterly & Levine, 1997). As is

displayed in Figure 4 South Africa is characterised by a high degree of both

ethnic and religious fragmentation when examined from a comparativeperspective.

Looking at such crucial social and economic factors it seems to be the case

that in South Africa there are conditions present that are hardly likely to be

conducive to democratic development.

Political Culture

Political culture in South Africa, however, contains a number of factors that

compensate for a democracy deficit (Diamond, 1997; Paxton, 2002). Political

culture sustains democracy although affluence is not high wealth is unevenly



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Figure 3. Human development and income distribution (Gini index): South Africa in aglobal context. Source: See Appendix

Figure 4 Ethnic and religious fragmentation: South Africa in a global context Source:



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restrains the ANC from attempting to rule more or less autocratically. The

chief danger is, of course, that the ANC would be tempted to employ its

dominant position to create a regime of favouritism, focused upon a strong

president without effective opposition in parliament or from the regions,

engaging in outright clientelism (Sandholz & Koetzle, 2000; Sung,

2004; Xin & Rudel, 2004; see also Lodge, 1998; Hyslop, 2005). Kotze

concludes his up-to-date examination of South African democracy at

various levels:

The nature of democracy in South Africa is the one area in the process of

democratic consolidation and the transition process in general that

remains contested, and in which there is no clear indication of what

the final result will be. (Kotze, 2004: 36)

And Gibson and Gouws (2003: 221) argue that attitudes towards political tol-

erance are crucial for democratic vitality in SA. They state: the lack of pol-

itical tolerance among the mass public will surely have to be addressed.

Below we adduce data suggesting that mass political culture in SA can

support democratic stability.

The international corruption index may be consulted in order to throw light

upon the danger of sultanismus (Chehabi & Linz, 1998). This index covers

some 100 countries on the globe, including several African ones and SA.Figure 5 gives some estimates of the level of corruption in SA today; in the

figure we have reversed the scales, which means that the higher the score,

the more corruption is perceived. South Africa scores lower than the mean

Figure 5 Perceived corruption scores for South Africa and world mean and median



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and median, but over time perceived corruption is increasing somewhat, with

the recorded scores going up.

Another aspect of the political culture is captured by the presence of social

capital and gender equality. These are both factors that may be important for

the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. Figure 6 displays social

capital as measured by interpersonal trust in relation to gender equality as

measured by female parliamentary representation. Although South Africa

scores rather low on the measure of social capital, it comes out higher on

the gender equality indicator.

The strength of civil society in South Africa is clearly a positive for

democracy, especially for its prospective consolidation (Heinrich, 2001;

Kotze, 2003). A democratic regime may be introduced through constitution

making in the short run, but the consolidation of such a regime requires favour-able conditions, such as for instance a vibrant civil society, as Tocqueville under-

lined in his classic nineteenth century study (Tocqueville, 1990). Civil society

theory should be tested in relation to SA, given the emergence of many and vig-

ilant associations during the Apartheid period, such as COSATU (Congress of

South African Trade Unions). COSATU was initiated in December 1985 after

talks between unions opposed to apartheid and committed to a democratic

South Africa. At that time it represented less than half a million workers

Figure 6. Social capital and female parliamentary representation: South Africa in aglobal context Note: Social Capital here refers to interpersonal trust as measured by



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organised in 33 unions. COSATU now has a membership of more than two

million workers, of whom at least 1.8 million are paid up. By international stan-

dards it has been among the fastest growing trade union movements in the world.

Besides COSATU there are many more free associations in South Africa. This is

well portrayed in Figure 7 where civil society is measured by the workforce in

relation to trade union density. Currently, South Africa, viewed in a global

context, comes out rather low on these indicators. Nevertheless, there is apotential for growth within these sectors of society.

Model Estimations: Predicting Democracy Scores for SA

This section analyses the empirical evidence concerning the sources of

democratic vitality in South Africa. We first look at economic and social

factors, and then institutional ones, and finally examine the role of civil

society and a culture of tolerance. The aim of the model estimations presented

in Table 3 to Table 5 is to test how well different models predict the democ-

racy score for South Africa 4 Predicting the democracy score for SA does not

Figure 7. Trade union density and civil society: South Africa in a global context. Note:Civil society here stands for civil society workforce as estimated by Salamon et al.

(2003). Sources: See Appendix



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prediction. What we look for is what impact different factors may have upon

consolidating democracy in South Africa. What, specifically, is the impact of

social and economic factors, institutional factors and political culture factors?

We start by looking at how well different models capturing social and

economic factors may predict the democracy score for SA in the period

between 1995 and 2003. From Table 3 we can see that the predicted scoresgo from 5.74 to 8.25.

The model (1) with the lowest predicted democracy score includes income

distribution, religious and ethnic fragmentation. These structural factors are

disadvantageous in the South African case. Yet, a model (3) covering

human development and Protestantism only increases the prediction by one

unit. Significantly, it is model (6) that includes all the structural variables

which arrives at the predicted score closest to the observed democracy

score. Still it is the case that from a model including social and economic

factors we may expect a quite high democracy score for SA.

There is thus a prediction deficit and our next step is to test the predictive

Table 3. Predicting democracy scores for South Africa: economic and social forces

Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Incomedistribution

coeff 20.012 0.037 0.038 0.036

t-stat 20.51 1.79 1.97 1.82HDI 2001 coeff 7.892 9.437 9.006 9.327

t-stat 7.73 8.28 8.27 7.42ELF coeff 22.416 23.316 0.560

t-stat 22.87 23.92 0.62Protestants coeff 0.060 0.047 0.041 0.039

t-stat 4.46 4.36 3.91 3.68Rel fragment coeff 1.772 1.235 0.463

t-stat 1.72 1.26 0.57

Constant coeff 7.526 6.300 0.1042

1.6182

1.7812

2.364t-stat 7.53 11.80 0.14 21.16 21.35 21.59

Adj rsq .068 .201 .386 .374 .451 .443N 117 147 142 119 118 117Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25

Predicted 5.74 6.28 6.93 7.03 7.89 8.25

Sources: See Appendix.

Note: Coeff unstandardised regression coefficients; t-stat corresponding t-statistics; Adj

rsq adjusted r square or explained variance of the model; N number of countries included

in the analysis; observed score the democracy score based on the Freedom House normalised

index; predicted score predicted democracy score arrived at from the corresponding regression

model.



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democracy from a set of favourable political institutions (Linz & Stepan,

1996; Diamond, 1999; Lijphart, 1999; Reynolds, 2001). However, favourable

institutions in SA have to work themselves out while also taking into account

the dominant position of one party, the ANC. As stated above, a dominant

position for one party is all the time and everywhere a negative for

democracy.

The predicted scores vary from a low 6.41 to a high 9.43. The models (1 and

2) with the lowest predicted scores include the presence of a dominant party( size of the largest party). As soon as we eliminate this variable from the

models tested the predicted democracy scores increase. In fact we may

arrive at a model (5) where the predicted score is higher than the observed

score this model includes the presence of proportional representation and

parliamentarism. There is thus no doubt that institutional factors are important

for predicting democracy for a country like South Africa.

The main political institutions of SA have certainly been framed as

bulwarks against an authoritarian regime. Thus, they include PR, a strong par-

liament, a constitutional court, an Ombudsman and political decentralisation

to nine regions. When compared with other constitutions, the South African

Table 4. Predicting democracy in South Africa: Institutional factors

Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Lgst party coeff 20.064 20.064 t-stat

29.29

29.39

Elect syst coeff 1.153 1.138 2.134 2.122 2.340t-stat 4.14 4.13 6.56 6.56 6.25

Ombudsman coeff 1.032 1.027 1.627 1.607 t-stat 5.34 5.36 7.07 7.12

Parliam SA 0 coeff 0.677 t-stat 2.06

Parliam SA 1 coeff 0.791 1.615 1.594 2.680t-stat 2.46 4.07 4.05 6.35

Federalism SA 1 coeff 20.412

t-stat2

1.12Federalism SA 0 coeff 0.236 0.225

t-stat 20.65 20.49Constant coeff 8.476 8.464 3.547 3.540 4.415

t-stat 14.97 15.14 14.18 14.21 17.50Adj rsq .722 .727 .554 .557 .399N 143 143 143 143 143Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25

Predicted 6.41 7.41 8.69 8.86 9.43

Sources: See Appendix.



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executive and the nature of the state. The president is elected by parliament but

serves as both head of state and leader of the government. He/she can beremoved from office by a vote of no confidence in parliament. Is this

presidentialism or parliamentarianism? It is difficult to say, which is why

we classify SA as either presidential or parliamentary in Table 4. There is

extensive political decentralisation in South Africa, as the regions have their

own assemblies, premiers and budgets. But is this federalism? We doubt it,

but have classified SA in both ways in Table 4.In their thorough examination of presidentialism in Presidents and

Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (1992) Shugart

and Carey entirely bypass the presidency in SA, which was actually created

before the making of the new constitution after the fall of Apartheid. Here

we have an interesting example of strong presidentialism without direct

election of the president. Shugart and Carey identify three criteria for strong

presidentialism: (a) popular election of the chief executive; (b) the terms of

the chief executive and assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on

mutual confidence; (c) the elected executive names and directs the

composition of the government (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 19). The SA

Table 5. Predicting democracy in South Africa: political culture

Predictors Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Perceivedcorruption 2003

coeff 20.071 20.734 t-stat

20.46

26.35

Female parliamentaryrepresentation 1998

coeff 20.020 20.000 20.006 0.045t-stat 20.97 0.00 20.28 1.52

Number of NGOsaround 2000

coeff 0.002 0.001 0.001t-stat 4.17 1.91 4.29

Trade union densityin the 1990s

coeff 0.032 0.013 t-stat 2.21 1.10

Civil society workforce

coeff 0.058 0.018 0.062 t-stat 0.64 0.25 1.13

Social capital:

interpersonaltrust 19901995

coeff 0.033 20.032 0.051 20.043

t-stat 1.842

1.64 3.372

0.021

Constant coeff 3.917 6.817 12.499 7.142 5.376t-stat 6.67 4.49 11.37 19.61 10.26

Adj rsq .626 .605 .536 .531 .394N 35 28 57 28 57Dem score Observed 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25 9.25

Predicted 7.22 7.68 7.80 8.13 8.47

Source: See Appendix.



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powers of the South African president are truly impressive an institutional

heritage from the earlier constitution of SA.

Finally we move from political institutions to political culture. In Table 5

we use a number of indicators of political culture, such as the strength of

civil society in a set of countries, in order to establish how, generally speaking,

a variation in civil society strength impacts upon the level of democracy

civil society strength is measured via various indicators. In addition, variables

capturing perceived corruption, social capital and gender equality are included

in the models tested.

The models tested in Table 5 differ in one respect from the previous

models. The number of countries included is lower due to the availability

of data although for all models data for South Africa is included. As dis-

played in Table 5 the predicted democracy scores for SA go from 7.22 to8.47. The model (1) with the lowest predicted score only include civil

society-related variables whereas the model (5) with the highest predicted

scores includes civil society, social capital and gender equality. Yet it is

the case that this model also predicts a lower score than the observed

one. Political culture in its various manifestations is clearly conducive to

consolidating democracy in SA, but cannot itself predict the high observed

score for the country.

Political culture, especially civil society in SA, is of considerable import-

ance to democracy and to its consolidation. Two variables the number ofNGOs and levels of interpersonal trust are strongly and positively related

to democratic stability in general. They also help stabilise democracy in

SA, reducing the democratic deficit considerably. The organisation of civil

society is conducive to softening the dangers of the dominant position of

the ANC in the polls. This should not be unexpected, nor is it surprising.

After all, the roots of ANC include the free associations in the private sector.

ConclusionThe consolidation of democracy in South Africa is vitally important for the

future of the entire African continent. Today South African scores are very

high on the standard democracy indicators. At the same time there is one

political party that has strengthened its grip on power in election after election

to such an extent that it now has a dominant position. There are two major

bulwarks against a possible deterioration in democracy, currently buttressing

the rule of law in the country, we suggest. First, there is the institutional frame-

work, which reduces the democratic deficit even when affluence and perceived

corruption are taken into account. Second, there is the civil society carpet of

free associations from which the ANC largely stems This relatively strong



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political culture in South Africa that reinforces democratic vitality.

Nevertheless, more effective competition in the party system would certainly

help in further stabilising the new democratic regime. Increased inter-party

competition, in particular, would deter any sultanistic (Bermeo, 2003)

deviations of the type which have already hurt many other African countries

badly after independence was won from European colonialism.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for CCP and the

editor for their helpful comments and suggestions; the usual caveat applies!

Notes

1. It is well known that the scores on civil liberties and political rights go together and therefore

well could form the basis of a one-dimensional democracy index; seeBanks (1989: 675). For

any given year the democracy score is arrived at through the following computation:

democracy score ((14 (political rights score civil liberties score)/12 ) 9) 1.2. This index measures the level of political and civil freedoms in South Africa from 1934 to

1997 and varies between 0 (no freedom) and 200 (freedom). The construction and

interpretation of the index is detailed by Fedderke et al. (2001: 108113).

3. According to the Economistindex of democracy for 2006, South Africa comes very closeto the countries classified as full democracies, scoring 7.91 to compare with Mauritius

scoring 8.04 (see Kekic, 2006: 3). Another attempt to measure the level of democracy in

South Africa in 2004 arrives at a score of 63 of a potential 100 (see Graham & Calland,

2005: 37).

4. For a study employing a similar design, see Vanhanen (2004).

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Appendix 1. Variables, indicators and data

Abbreviation Description Sources

Civil society Civil society organisation workforceas share of economically activepopulation

Salamon et al.,2003

Dem score The Freedom House scores have beenadded and normalised so that a lowdegree of democracy scores 1 and ahigh degree of democracy scores 10

Freedom House,2004

Elect syst Election system as a dummy variablewhere 1 proportional systemsand 0 non-proportional systems

Reynolds & Reilly,1997; Rose, 2000

ELF Ethno-linguistic fragmentation index Alesina et al., 2003Federalism Federalism as dummy variable where

1 federalism and 0 non-federalism

Watts, 1999

HDI 2001 Human development index UNDP, 2003bLgst party Estimated size of the largest party at

an election as a percentage of thetotal vote

Vanhanen, 2000

Lngnp/capita 2002

Natural logarithm of GNP/capita inUS $ expressed as purchasing

power parities

CIA, 2004

Number ofNGOs

Number of non-governmentalorganisations 2000

UNDP, 2002

Ombudsman Occurrence of the Ombudsmaninstitution as a trichotomousvariable with higher scores for anearly institutionalisation

InternationalOmbudsmanInstitute, 1999

Parliam Parliamentarianism as a dummyvariable where1 parliamentarism and 0 non-parliamentarism

Derbyshire &Derbyshire, 1999

Perceivedcorruption

Perceived corruption where higherscores indicate less corruption andlower scores more corruption

TransparencyInternational,2006

Protestants Percentage of the populationestimated to adhere to the Protestantcreed

Barrett et al., 2001

Rel fragment Religious fragmentation index Alesina et al., 2003Social capital Percentage of sample in a country

expressing interpersonal trust19901995

Inglehart et al.,2000

Trade uniondensity

Trade union membership aspercentage of non-agriculturallabour force 1995

UNDP, 2002



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south african democratic model

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