Soria vs Desierto

GR No. 153524-25, January 31, 2005

Facts:

Soria and Bista were arrested on may 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the May 14, an election day) without a warrant of arrest by the public respondents for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Later, it was found out that Bista has a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. Soria was detained for 22 hours while 26 days had elapsed before Bista was released.

Petitioners alleged that he could only be detained for 18 hours while Bista could only be detained for 36 hours following the rule set forth in Art. 126 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

The public respondents for their part contended that the petitioners were timely delivered to the proper judicial authorities and that in computing for the periods provided in Art. 125, it should be construed as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days.

Issue:

Whether or not public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception.

Ruling:

No. Based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.)

In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 2001 at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.

With respect with petitioner Bista, the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day).Further, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention. The complaints against him were seasonably filed in the court of justice within the 36-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority

People vs Nabong

GR No. 172324, April 4, 2007

Facts:

Nabong, Laguit, and Ladio were construction workers who were found guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide committed against “AAA”, a 22 year old accountant.

On review, Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication (they had a drinking spree prior to the commission of the crime) and low degree of instruction in his favor.

Issues:

1. Whether or not intoxication may be considered as a mitigating circumstance in this case.

2. Whether or not the lack of instruction may be appreciated in his favor.

Ruling:

1. No. For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur

his reason. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties.

2. No. Nabong’s alleged lack of instruction cannot be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one’s act. Besides, one does not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person.

People vs Ampatuan

GR No. 188707, July 30, 2014

Facts:

Dujon, a detainee of PDEA volunteered to provide information on the alleged drug activity of Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog. The Regional Director of PDEA ordered Dujon to contact Ampatuan to verify the former’s claim. Dujon and Ampatuan subsequently came to an agreement that the latter will deliver a jumbo sachet of shabu worth Php 70,000.00.

Ampatuan, together with Sarip and Tumog delivered the shabu to Dujon at the meeting place secured by the PDEA. After handing over the said shabu, the PDEA operatives then barged in and arrested Ampatuan and her group.

Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog now deny that a sale of an illegal drug has transpired.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a sale of an illegal drug has been established.

2. Whether or not there was an entrapment.

3. Whether or not Dujon as a principal witness is qualified and credible.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are present in the case at bar. These elements are as follows:

1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and

2. the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence the corpus delicti of the case. In this case, the corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. The Court ruled that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish the elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the (1) identity of accused-appellants as the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.

2. Yes. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. Otherwise stated, the idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from the criminal. It is elementary that entrapment and instigation are different. In instigation, the instigator induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Further in instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests the same to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

While it is true that it was Dujon who initiated the illegal sale, it does not disprove the fact of illegal sale and habitual activity of illegal sale of shabu of Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog. They brought the illegal shabu all the way from Cotabato to Davao, and handed the same to Dujon. Evidently, they voluntarily resolved to commit the crimes as charged. Thus, what transpired in the instant case was a legitimate buybust operation and not instigation.

3. Yes. The Court held that the qualification and credibility of Dujon as a principal witness cannot be assailed. The law has specifically provided for the immunity of informants from prosecution and punishment. Section 33, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identitiesand arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,That the following conditions concur:

(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described above;

(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;

(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;

(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the information and testimony of said informant or witness; and

(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.

Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or witness.

The allegation that Dujon is engaged in illegal sale, indeed even the fact that Dujon is a detainee charged with violation of the law is not a disqualification from immunity since such is not equivalent to a previous "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."