some cases. adoption. family

8/6/2019 Some Cases. Adoption. Family.

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G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO , petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,

MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO,

AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the

Resolution1

of the Court of Appeals2

affirming the Orders3

of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution4

which

denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts5

are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He

was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo,

Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo,Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in

the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19

Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro

Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,

namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition6

with the

respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila7

of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio

Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993

and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in

Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the

petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole

world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March

16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners

(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10)

days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of anOmnibus Motion

8on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July

9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing

their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9

which resolved, thus:



A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the

purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground

for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the

purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate

estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals,

docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order10

dated September 15, 1993. In their petition

for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3)

the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest

efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shoppingwas attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution11

promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was

likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent

Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion

for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners

therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made

prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving

members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are

indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO,

had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO

MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned,

without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO

MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-

heirs xxx.

X X X



Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and

were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than,

P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's

fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the

Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that acondition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to

aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made

involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 22214

of the Civil Code

of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15

and

the character of the relief sought16

in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful

srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC.

No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said

petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceasedperson such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City

of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country

are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17

The

petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative

list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition,

the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners

therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio

Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the

administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such

reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses

and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said

estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in

the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial

of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO.18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an

ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and

filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing

admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and

exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs19

in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil

action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court v is-à-v is, Article 222 of civil

of the Civil Code.



It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for

the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the

said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special

jurisdiction20

and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out

only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as

well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the

defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrownout of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem.

21So it should be in the instant petition for

settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special

proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court v is-à-v is

Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same

by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order

to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every

action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily

include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal

of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is

clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that

earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in

Article 2035(underscoring supplied ).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit'

that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the

plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,

whether at law or in equity.23

A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues

another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the

Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal

provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family,

thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the

same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is

allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates

deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for

any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of

Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, assuch, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

26the

petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and

subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their

right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and

special jurisdiction of the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.



SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA

CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.

RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old

Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of

marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at

Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.

On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1

After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued

to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at

the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City

Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth,2

Affidavit to Use

the Surname of the Father3

(AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed

by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.4

Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of

Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been

questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his

lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:

AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31,

2005.5

I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR

FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO

BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.

x x x x

AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL.

AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD

COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS

ALL.6

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By letter dated November 11, 2005,7

the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent),

denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this wise:



7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.

9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article

176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines"]) provides that:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father,

either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname

of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

a. AUSF8

b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.

c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the child:

1. Employment records

2. SSS/GSIS records

3. Insurance

4. Certification of membership in any organization

5. Statement of Assets and Liability

6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father

unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either

through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the

Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9

for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the

Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof.

The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use

the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.

9255,10

which provides:

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,

and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname

of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in

the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the

father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation

during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate

child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)



They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a

"private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.

For failure to fi le a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was declared in default.

Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law relationship

with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yetunborn child.

11She offered Dominiques handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-

chief.12

Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.13

By Decision14

of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the

Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No.

1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private

handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:

2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by

him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does notcontain any express recognition of paternity.1avv phi1

Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN

DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT"

WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES

THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.15

(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private

handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add

that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in theabove-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by

the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16

Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography

contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the childs paternity.17

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the

trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that

Dominiques Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was

carrying in her womb."18

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing

in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition

made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity;

hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten

instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,



however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the

father must bear his signature, thus:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as

legitimate children.

x x x x

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and

signed by the parent concerned.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon

is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely

articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though

unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the

Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial

evidence Jenie proffered.20

Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of

Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights

could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating

Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY

WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."

In Herrera v. Alba,21

the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing

in relevant part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence

as legitimate children.

x x x x

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or



(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and

signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in

respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where

it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than

such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the

dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of

family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a familyprevious to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if

the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family

bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as

evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe

Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such

conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article

278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a

statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made

by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to

support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters tothe mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various

occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a

written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be

taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to

establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been

made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his

lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in

Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about

two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is

Dominiques.

In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the

requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein

an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,

there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the

acknowledging parent; and



2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,

it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the

acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions

affecting him.22

Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a

signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of

law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary

consideration.23

(Underscoring supplied)

It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of

children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24

Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to

children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."25

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childsbest interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth

certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter

the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela

Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1

of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City,

Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino

parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3

for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was

born on August 31, 1986;4

Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5

and Eugene Dizon Ramos who

was born on August 5, 1989.6

The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and

Amelia Ramos.



Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7

the children were left to

their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there

and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel

Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being

financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November

23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8

to the adoption;

she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who arealready married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam,

USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend

time with the minors; her children gave their written consent9

to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother,

Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors

while in petitioners custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be

rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon

Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the family name of petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.10

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a

case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon

not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.11

The Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) entered its appearance12

but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13

Since her

petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the

written consent executed by her and her siblings.15

The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent

purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized

by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.

16

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a

Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for

adoption because of the following reasons:

1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt,

Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they

need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins thepetitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors

developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As

young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection

and well being.



In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and

Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further

recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was

already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to

enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their

paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their

mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption,

they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her

children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which

she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her

children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children willbe in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her

children.18

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia

Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia

assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said

petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon

Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they bedeclared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with

considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive

parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding

changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.19

The OSG appealed20

the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief 21

for the oppositor-

appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE

PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II



THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN

CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO

ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22

reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to

adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit

of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam,

USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a

job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24

on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated

August 12, 2004.25

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26

on September 7, 2004, assigning the following

errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE

AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT

FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt

the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit

of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c)

whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28

that

adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramountconsideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or

orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to

allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person

of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus

be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30

the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters

leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges



of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and

interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position

should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and

jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests

of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.31

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right

to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby

required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government

instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and

adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said

adopter and the latters souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental

relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best

interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.

Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parentalrights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit

the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the

Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was

able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent

to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in

support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because

when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the

guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided forthe childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.

Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was

pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.

Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social

worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was

already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be



obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the

biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent

of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which

evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33

The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial

and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filialaffection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

34

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment.35

To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of

adoption.36

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia

Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family?

A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.



Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?

A No, sir.38

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

x x x x

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal

grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their

guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor

children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also

sends financial support but very minimal.39

x x x x

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

x x x x

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works

and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty

counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40

x x x x

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and

comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing

support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she

decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance

medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic

helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law

who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and

have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed

that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his

legitimate family regular support.



Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who share

minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are

continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.41

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their

mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while

abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her nowdeceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal

problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as

compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal

ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the

adopter.42

It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount

consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has

to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance

and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43

Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes

precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been

formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is

necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the

evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for

which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere

identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on

documents unless formally offered.44

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed

by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners

children45

was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same

way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46

which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered

authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé

d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the

country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the

country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or

document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the

same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep

a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public

or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public

or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of

legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,

acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall

certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly

authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of

which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of



instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and

seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same

can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone

who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of

the makers.47

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her

legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is

only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings.48

Petitioner

contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a

house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings

have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its

comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it

appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor

adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keepingwith the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of

prospective parents should also

be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be

adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report49

forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of

the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are

already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years

old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month.

Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at

Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the

limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial

aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While

petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in

stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation

between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that

her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court,

therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are

legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from

filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009



IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1

dated

15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.

1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and

Michael Jude P. Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo

Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain

Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to

make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children2

were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and

Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She

was born on 15 March 1977.3

Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of

birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive

schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November

1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5

given under Republic Act No.

85526

(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed

separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.

1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and

already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7

Michael

also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewiseexecuted an Affidavit of Consent

9for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was

considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10

The DSWD issued

a similar Certification for Michael.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court



On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since

petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court

ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and

Article 185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June

2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions underSection 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was

untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his

qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise

of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental

authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations

and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried,

can singly adopt.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the

State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal

maxim "dura lex sed lex " is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not

necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,

while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been

emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed

the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the

trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of

RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt . - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral

character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically

capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position

to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of

sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the

adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;



(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: P rov ided , That

his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living

in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption

and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by

his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal

capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her

country as his/her adopted son/daughter: P rov ided, further, That the requirements on residency andcertification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of

consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a

relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of

his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: P rov ided, howev er, That

the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint

parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife

is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal

situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the

spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption

were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining

her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be

adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not theillegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There

are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set

forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic

of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the

filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4)



he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as

the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived

pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or

affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

E ffects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been

emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the

development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13

The father and the mother shall

jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14

Even the remarriage of the

surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person

to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18years of age

16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall

then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17

However, parental authority is merely just one of the

effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V

EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. P arental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties

between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the

adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intentsand purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters

born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support

in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights

of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)

had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,

except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the

adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent

and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.

18Therefore, even if

emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with

all the rights19

of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive

support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the

adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are

entitled20

such as support21

and successional rights.22



We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of

the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for

unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow

childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the

adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained

to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23

But, as we have ruled in Republic v .

Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the

children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said

purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it

is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a

position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot

be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law

on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis

supplied)1avv phi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions

with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be

possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior

Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It

is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the

dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint

adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the

petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

some cases. adoption. family

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