soft governance, hard consequences: the ambiguous status of unofficial guidelines

Soft Governance, Hard Consequences: The Ambiguous Status of Unofficial GuidelinesAuthor(s): Taco Brandsen, Marcel Boogers and Pieter TopsSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 546-553Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3843940 .

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Taco Brandsen Marcel Boogers Pieter Tops Tilburg University

Enhancing

Homeland

Security from

a Public

Administration

Perspective

Soft Governance, Hard Consequences: The Ambiguous

Status of Unofficial Guidelines

Taco Brandsen a senior lecturer at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. His research interests include governance, welfare state reform, and the nonprofit sector. E-mail: [email protected].

Marcel Boogers is a senior lecturer at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. His research interests include central-local relations and e-politics. E-mail: [email protected].

Pieter Tops is a professor at the Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. His research interests include local politics and the innovation of city governance. E-mail: [email protected].

Soft governance is an approach to policy implementation in which the central government relies less on hierarchy than on information to steer local organizations. This

allowsfor a combination of formal accountability and

professional autonomy that improves the quality of public services in both the short and the long term. Guidelines

ofan advisory, unofficial status are one tool that central

government can use for this purpose. However, an

inherentproblem with this approach is that even though guidelines have no

official legal status, in practice, they can take on the character of formal regulation when local

organizations suspect that they cannot choose alternative courses of action, however well reasoned, without being sanctioned. It is a situation that encourages conformist behavior and diminishes the long-term potential for innovation. This phenomenon is illustrated with an analysis of disas? ter management in the Netherlands.

question is complex and calls for expertise that is

costly or difficult for local organizations to obtain because they will be more receptive to outside offers of help. The method can also be used to pave the way for formal legislation at a later stage.

Soft governance is a relatively efficient and light- handed method that central authorities can employ in

raising quality standards. By dispersing guidelines over the organizational field, it can raise the level of expertise and standards of performance with? out having to alter the formal

regulatory framework (which often carries with it financial,

political, and administrative

burdens). Because they are not

binding, unofficial guidelines also leave room for innovative practices at the decentralized level, which, if successful, can later be picked up by the central authorities and disseminated among the field at large. This type of guideline has hitherto been studied most

extensively in the context of European Union decision

making, but it can also be found in many policy areas of multilevel governance.l

However, soft governance can become problematic when, regardless of their unofficial status, guidelines are mixed up with formal mechanisms of accountabil?

ity. In that case, they effectively become an extension of the formal regulatory framework. Of course,

knowledge of the state of the art and best practices is never entirely voluntary in a professional context. Professionalism is incompatible with exclusive reliance on formal regulation (Freidson 2001). For example, one expects surgeons to keep track of advances and common practices in the medical field. Failure to

keep up amounts to misconduct, even if it does not constitute a violation of legal standards. However,

professional autonomy allows the freedom to deviate from commonly accepted notions, to make choices that better fit the circumstances or constitute a

potential improvement on standard practice. The line

Soft governance is a relatively efficient and light-handed

method that central authorities

can employ in raising quality standards.

Effectively

organizing the interaction between central and local authorities is a critical issue in governance studies. Governance is a compli-

cated concept, but one of its key features is dimin- ished reliance on formal authority and greater use of informal authority (Pierre 2000). An increasingly popular variety of this approach is soft governance, in which the central government directs local authorities and agencies, not by hierarchically imposing what should be done but by providing unofficial guidelines on how to improve the quality of local practice. These

guidelines contain information on the state of the art and best practices, as well as advice on what level of

quality should be regarded as the professional standard. Carriers of such information and advice can

range from letters, handbooks, manuals, and Web sites to conferences and network meetings organized by professional associations. Although they are not

legally binding, unofficial guidelines can prove a useful tool for steering the implementation of national

policy. This applies especially when the task in

546 Public Administration Review ? July | August 2006



between unofficial guidelines and formal regulation becomes very thin when the former are interpreted as rules that must be obeyed. This is related to the fear that failure to comply will result in sanctions of some sort. This, in turn, relates to the nature of the "sender" of the guidelines and to political sensitivity concerning outcomes.

This article will both analyze the problems associated with this promising policy approach and offer suggestions for overcoming them. This will be accomplished using a case study in the area of disaster management in the Netherlands. This example is especially useful for analytical purposes because it pushes the problems of soft governance to the extreme. On one hand, it

provides a context of multilevel governance in which the use of unofficial guidelines is an indispensable instrument. On the other hand, political sensitivity is so high that it seems almost impossible to retain the unofficial nature of the guidelines in practice. We will

briefly discuss the reception of our recommendations,

although we cannot yet fully judge the impact of their

implementation.

This article is the result of a report written for the National Council for Disaster Management (Landelijk Beraad Rampenbestrijding) based on both original research and existing material. The nature and impli? cations of our approach are described in the method?

ology section.

Quality Improvement through Local

Learning and Formal Accountability To understand the problems associated with unofficial

guidelines, it is first necessary to understand how they contribute to quality improvement. How exactly are

they useful in that sense? Essentially, they help to combine two different modes of quality improvement. The first is a process of local learning undertaken by local authorities or agencies seeking to change estab? lished practices on the basis of experience or creative

thinking (March 1999). This type of quality improve? ment is typically undertaken by a small number of innovators. A second way of improving organizational performance is to centrally impose methods and

standards; by encoding them in laws and rules, they will be spread to an entire population of local organi? zations. The latter are then held formally accountable for complying with the regulations.

option is that the government imposes rules and local

authorities follow them without taking any initiative

of their own. We call this bureaucratism, referring to

rule-focused behavior on the part of local officials

(Merton 1964). Though it represents a step forward, it

discourages innovation and leaves local authorities ill

suited to improvise when local conditions call for

deviation from central guidelines?a very realistic

possibility given the nonroutine, unique, and messy nature of disaster management. The converse is that

local authorities themselves develop new insights and

methods, yet there is no central imposition of stan?

dards. This implies that they cannot be held account?

able for quality levels, which is surely unacceptable in

the context of public services; we call this situation enclavism. The fourth and ideal option is that both

types of quality improvement occur simultaneously. In this scenario, which we call synergy, quality stan?

dards are set centrally, but local authorities are free to

develop innovative practices of their own, which can

later be incorporated into nationally set standards if

they prove effective.

This fourth option may seem contradictory: How

can there be room for local experimentation if

standards are centrally imposed? Soft governance, in

the form of issuing unofficial guidelines, offers a way out of this dilemma (Bardach and Kagan 1982). New

insights can be translated into unofficial guidelines and spread from one or a few points of innovation

to the organizational field at large. It is a type of

process that DiMaggio and Powell (1991) describe

as isomorphism. Dissemination can occur through courses, meetings, brochures, Web sites, handbooks, and so forth. Deviance from such advisory guidelines is typically ofa "no, unless..." nature. Professional

conduct requires that local authorities and agencies take account of such guidelines, but they may choose different options when they can offer well-reasoned

arguments for doing so. This may relate to specific local conditions or to a more general conviction that they can do better. Should such initiatives prove successful, they can, in turn, be translated into

unofficial guidelines and spread throughout the field

(mimetic isomorphism) and perhaps ultimately be

incorporated into official regulation (coercive isomor?

phism). This allows a dynamic system of quality con?

trol that both maintains overall quality and allows freedom for innovation.

These two types of processes may occur simultaneously, or not at

all, or alternately (see figure 1). The first, least desirable option is that there is no quality improve? ment whatsoever. Local actors have no desire or capacity to

improve themselves, and the central government does not force them to do so; we label this inertia. Another

In practice, the potential for

synergy can only be realized when local organizations believe

they can deviate from unofficial

guidelines without being sanctioned. However, there are cir? cumstances that undermine this

belief and create the general perception that unofficial

guidelines are official in all but name. The case of

.. .the potential for synergy can

only be realized when local

organizations believe they can

deviate from unofficial guide? lines without being sanctioned.

Soft Governance, Hard Consequences 547



Figure 1 Types of Quality Improvement

disaster management in the Netherlands provides a clear and striking illustration.

The Case of Dutch Disaster Management

Preparing for Disasters: Inherent Properties In the field of Dutch disaster management, the prob? lems involved in soft governance are pushed to the extreme. On one hand, unofficial guidelines are an almost indispensable instrument for maintaining long-term quality; on the other hand, the nature of the field makes their use very problematic.

The indispensability of unofficial guidelines derives from the fundamental nature of disaster management. Disasters can be defined as events that cause a distur- bance of public safety, threatening the lives and health of many people, the environment, or major material

interests, and require the coordinated effort of several

organizations from different policy fields to avert the threat or limit the damage.2 There is ample literature on coping with these events, as well as many precepts for dealing with them as effectively as possible in

unpredictable and nonroutine circumstances. How?

ever, precious little attention has been paid to the

preparation for disasters, even though it is, in many respects, a unique type of activity. Its characteristics can be summed up as follows:

? Low risk, strong impact: The chances that a disaster will ever occur within any specific locality or region are usually negligible. Statistically speaking, the preparation that local public officials undertake for such an event is almost always a waste of time. However, if a disaster does occur, all hell breaks loose. Its impact is huge, not only for the victims but also for the professionals and

politicians involved (Hood, Rothstein, and

Baldwin2001). ? Preparing for disasters is a job on the side: Given the need to involve local professionals, efforts are very much spread out. As a consequence, the activities involved usually constitute only a minor part of the tasks of any given official. It is

also a thankless job, as there is little to be gained from preparing for disasters. The likelihood that the work will actually prove useful is slim. ? Opportunities for learning are scarce: Given that disasters occur only rarely, it is virtually impossible?especially for local professionals?to gain any sort of experience with such situations. The implication is that it is necessary to collect whatever knowledge there is at the national level and disseminate it effectively. ? Inevitable local involvement: The complex and nonroutine nature of disaster management encourages the establishment of specialized organizational units, but given the need for local

knowledge and instant response, local officials must inevitably be involved. ? Complexity: "Managing" disasters is difficult. Not only is it, by definition, a nonroutine activity, it also requires quick thinking and cooperation among many types of professionals.

Clearly, preparation for coping with disasters is very different from actually coping with disasters. When a disaster occurs, every other business is momentarily set aside; seconds before, preparation for the event

hardly seems worth the bother. To put it simply, there is a world of difference between the minute before and the minute after the disaster. This strange split creates huge problems in dealing with quality control. On one hand, the complex nature of the task and its low priority in day-to-day affairs seem to call for centralization in specialized departments. On the other hand, the need to act swiftly and adapt to local conditions makes it imperative that local authorities

develop the ability to improvise?to learn autono-

mously. This is why in the Netherlands, as elsewhere, disaster management is the joint responsibility of both central and local authorities.

The Institutional Context of Disaster

Management in the Netherlands Dutch disaster management is a complex variety of multilevel governance. Since the 1970s, the

implementation of disaster management in the




Netherlands has been decentralized to the municipal level (an outcome of the Law on Disasters and Grave

Accidents, enacted in 1985). Local authorities are

responsible for the planning and coordination of local disaster management, and operational decision mak?

ing for the implementation of the plans rests with the fire services. Foremost among the other organiza? tions involved are the police, health care services, and various municipal agencies. Provincial authorities

supervise municipal planning, and the Ministry of Home Affairs, bearing systemwide responsibility, is

charged with fostering conditions under which local authorities can best perform their tasks. It is clear that the duties associated with this sensitive task are

spread throughout all the layers of government. What

complicates matters further is that in most cases, local authorities are obliged to cooperate at the

regional level, and the services involved are each organized on a different scale or classed within different

geographic categories.

Over the years, research has revealed several flaws in local practices, notably, the coordination among the

parties involved, the huge differences in expertise and

experience, and, in many cases, the lack of willingness or ability to comply with even the most basic legal requirements (Algemene Rekenkamer 2000). Succes- sive disasters have tragically, but quite effectively, accelerated efforts to improve the overall quality of

preparation. Two in particular have sparked an entire flock of projects. In May 2000, a fireworks factory in the town of Enschede exploded on a Saturday after-

noon, killing 22 people. It was sheer luck that the death toll was only this high, given that the factory was located right in the middle of a residential area. The next New Year's Eve, 14 teenagers burned to death in a cafe in the village of Volendam. Both incidents were investigated by independent commit? tees whose reports contained long lists of recommen? dations for improving disaster management (Oosting 2001). These subsequently gave rise to new regula? tions, as well as to several projects aimed at strength- ening organizational capacity and expertise at the local level. In the process, the Ministry of Home Affairs

adopted a far more active role with regard to policy implementation. Formal requirements have been

tightened extensively, for instance, requiring munici?

palities to draw up detailed contingency plans, con? duct risk analyses, and submit to closer inspection by ministry officials.

In addition, the ministry has issued a steady number of unofficial guidelines of various shapes and sizes,

providing information and further defining quality standards for disaster management at the local level; these are now collected in an official handbook on disaster management, the Handboek Rampenbestrijd- ing. These standards range from acceptable response times for rescue services and methods of efficient

communication to recommendations on the color of

fire engines and the maximum length of firemens

beards. During the 1990s, the use of such guidelines was inevitable. After the damning evaluations of past

policy and a few painful disasters, it became clear that

overall quality needed to be upgraded. It was unrealis-

tic to suppose that all of the hundreds of local authori?

ties, some of them very small, would be able to

manage this by themselves. The larger organizations were able to create specialized departments for this

purpose, but many of the smaller ones had only a

single official working on disaster management, often

only part time. At the very least, the majority needed

support in terms of information and advice to raise the

quality of disaster management to an acceptable level.

As we have noted, preparing for potential disasters is

extremely unlikely to pay off. In most cases, public officials set their priorities elsewhere (as, indeed,

inspections have often shown). Therefore, in the

Netherlands, information and advice on how to

improve quality needed to be accompanied by official

requirements to use these tools to actually bring

quality to a set standard. This, at least, would ensure

a minimum overall level of quality. However, if such

requirements were too rigid, they would obstruct local

experimentation and adaptation to peculiar local

circumstances. This would be ironic, as many present

quality standards were developed on the basis of past local experiments.

Unofficial guidelines offered a way out of this

dilemma. They provided the central government with

a method of translating localized experience and new

insights into generally available information without

having to go through lengthy formal procedures (and, as critics suggest, without having to provide the fund?

ing that local authorities might be entitled to if the

suggestions were formally imposed). Even if it had

been desired, it would have been impossible to issue all

ofthe relevant information in the form of official rules.

The pace of technological and social development in

the field of disaster management is such that there is

generally a gap between the time when the most

up-to-date information can be issued (especially given the ability to disseminate it) and the time when it has

passed through the legal process and all ofthe political consultations involved. Yet the guidelines also offered

the freedom for professional autonomy. In short, their

use has proved well geared to the needs of the field.

Methodology The report from which this article derives was based

on data from a number of sources:

? Twenty-six interviews with respondents from the

Ministry of Home Affairs, health services, fire

services, police, municipalities, and

nongovernmental organizations. Respondents




included both policy makers at the national level and practitioners at the level of implementation. ? Evaluation reports on the handling of major disasters, particularly by the Oosting (Enschede) and Polak (Volendam) committees and by the Court of Audits (Algemene Rekenkamer 2000). ? Legal documentation, notably the Handbook on Disaster Management {Handboek

Rampenbestrijding), the Law on Disasters and Grave Accidents (Wet Rampen en Zware

Ongevallen) and the Law on the Quality Improvement of Disaster Management {Wet

Kwaliteitsbevordering Rampenbestrijding). ? Strategic policy documents (especially ROB

2003; VNG 2002). ? Data from supervisory instruments monitoring the preparation of fire services, health services, and

municipalities. ? Existing research in this field (e.g., Ellemers

2001; 't Hart and Rosenthal 1990; Van Duin

1992; Versteden 2001).

The strength of the approach is that it has incorporated the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders, which means that it has been possible to construct the

analysis without bias toward any particular interests

(in a field in which perspectives diverge sharply). The downside is that it has, for practical reasons (mainly time pressure), proved impossible to conduct research on the quantitative extent ofthe problem. However, all concerned signaled the problem, even if perspec? tives on preferred solutions differed radically.

Obstacles to Soft Governance In practice, the possibility of deviation from unofficial

guidelines has been severely hampered by two condi? tions: (1) the strong political controversy surrounding outcomes, and (2) the ambiguous role of the Ministry for Home Affairs. It has effectively turned potentially helpful advice into a source of great uncertainty and

annoyance among local officials.

To begin with, the legitimacy of deviating from guide? lines, whatever their legal status, is challenged in a

strongly politicized context. Though a measure of local discretion is necessary from the perspective of

quality improvement, it will not easily be accepted as

legitimate in a highly inflamed political environment. It all depends on a very simple question: How does one deal with errors of judgment? In the context of

quality improvement, an error represents an opportu? nity to improve future performance. The way to go is

by trial and error, judging from experience what works and what does not. But after lives have been lost in an explosion or a fire, and the pack is baying for

blood, those formally who are responsible would be ill advised to publicly describe these events as useful errors. At best, they can justify their actions by demonstrating that they acted in concordance with

national standards. In the aftermath ofthe Enschede and Volendam disasters, public attention focused on

"who did it" and, in relation to public officials, whether the rules had been followed and whether these rules were adequate. Nothing less than perfec- tion was demanded, and the consequences for those found to have performed below this standard were severe. The formal enquiries following the incidents

consequently showed a strong inclination to focus on

adherence to general standards. Unofficial guidelines were used as standards for determining whether local

officials and politicians had performed their duties

adequately. As a result, some of these people lost their

jobs. In other words, despite their lack of legal status, the unofficial guidelines became part of the frame of

reference in the accountability process. The commit? tees conducting the enquiries held that the people responsible should have acted on the information

supplied by the central government as part of their

professional responsibility. This understandably caused

great uncertainty among professionals and administra?

tors, encouraging legalistic, rule-following behavior. Even well-reasoned deviation from unofficial rules came to be perceived as a political risk. Trial and error has become error and trial.

Another problem related to the "sender" of the guide? lines, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which combines the roles of policy maker, inspector, and center of

expertise. Many local organizations suspect that the "recommendations" issued by the central ministry departments are, in fact, more than simply advisory in

nature. There is a widespread feeling that failure to

comply with the unofficial guidelines will lead to

damaging reports by the inspection agency, which is

formally an independent department but still a part of the same ministry. Regardless of whether it is justified, this perception encourages conformist behavior. In

practice, it makes the status of unofficial guidelines highly ambiguous. There are instances in which the

ministry has strategically capitalized on this ambiguity by hinting that they are mandatory while shirking away from the financial obligations that formalizing the guidelines would entail. For instance, one cover letter begins with the explicit statement that the

guidelines contained within the document are not

legally binding, but it ends with the sentence, "We

expect you to have implemented these guidelines within a years time."3

Other developments have thickened the fog envelop- ing the guidelines. For a start, their number has grown to such an extent that it is now impossible for any single individual or even department to keep track of them. Not even the ministry itself has a full inventory ofthe guidelines it has issued over the past few years. There are anecdotes of ministry officials losing their own guidelines and having to call professionals to ask for a paper copy. Recent attempts to streamline the




available information and to formalize parts of it have

improved the situation, but the body of relevant infor? mation remains formidable. This has added to the

uncertainty over what needs to be done because it is not realistic for local officials to implement or even know all of the relevant information and standards,

especially as disaster management often constitutes

only a minor part of their daily activities.

All in all, local officials are not sure how to deal with the ministry's guidelines, but know they could become the scapegoat if disaster strikes. Soft governance it

may be, but the practical consequences have proved hard indeed. The resulting behavior has predictably leaned toward bureaucratism. It is undeniable that the overall level of quality in the preparation for disasters has risen in the short term. However, long-term im?

provement hinges on local experience and may be

severely hampered by harsh judgments that frighten local authorities into conformity.

Potential Solutions Soft governance combines accountability and learn?

ing, but it can prove problematic when local organiza? tions believe that any deviation from the unofficial

guidelines constitutes an unacceptable risk. Effectively, advisory methods and standards become an extension of the formal regulatory framework,

cancelling out the beneficial effects they might have in en-

couraging innovation and flex-

ibility. Is there any way to overcome this problem?

The easy answer is to formalize all unofficial guide? lines, a solution supported by the National Public Administration Council (ROB 2003). This is not a real solution, though: It would effectively end the

uncertainty, but also harm quality improvement in the

long term. In any case, it is doubtful whether it is

realistically possible to incorporate all of the relevant information into the legal framework, as this would result in regulation at a level of great detail. A second

option is to let the uncertainty persist in the hope that it will become less severe over time. Indeed, it is to be

expected that ambiguity will diminish as political sensitivity decreases (for example, in disaster manage? ment, when there are no major disasters over a num? ber of years). However, to expect it to disappear may be wishful thinking. Given the fundamental nature of the problem, uncertainty will continue to inspire conformity, meaning that, in practice, unofficial

guidelines are as good as formalized. In this sense, these seemingly opposite courses of action lead to the same outcome.

There are, nonetheless, ways out of this deadlock. We recommend that uncertainty can be reduced by

(1) clear commitment to quality standards and

(2) changing the sender of the unofficial guidelines from the central authorities to nongovernmental organizations. In the field of disaster management, the committee that commissioned this research has received these recommendations favorably. They were considered acceptable by all parties involved, and our report has even been discussed at the national cabinet level.4

But one must make two qualifications: To begin with, elements of these solutions were already on the politi? cal agenda. Our recommendations merely system- atized, explicated, and elaborated ideas that were

already floating around in this policy field. In that

sense, we can only claim credit for adequately sensing possible solutions within prevailing political currents.

Furthermore, although political acceptance is itself a measure of success in policy recommendations, it does not tell us whether the solutions ultimately will work in this particular context. It will be some years before the effect of any such measures can be known.

Clear Commitment to Quality Standards Deviation from central guidelines on professional grounds will always be regarded as problematic, but

especially so in a politically charged context (e.g., in the turbulent aftermath of a disas?

ter). The tension may be relieved

by shifting part of the discussion to moments when feelings are not running so high. This can be done by making professional

decisions more explicit and granting them a more official status. We suggest a system of self-regulation in which the responsible local organizations periodi- cally (e.g., annually) commit themselves to the meth? ods and standards for which they later wish to be held accountable. By doing so, they can choose to follow the guidelines issued by the central government, but

they may also propose alternatives of their own and choose the level of quality to which they aspire. Any discussion on whether such alternatives are desirable can be directly judged and approved by democratic

decision-making bodies (in the disaster management case, municipal councils). After this, the standards will be set until the next (annual) review. The quality standards will act as the frame of reference for the

accountability of local organizations. Such a phased system should ensure some measure of certainty for local officials while allowing them the freedom to deviate from national guidelines if they think they can do better. Those who are unwilling or unable to choose differently will simply commit themselves to

existing guidelines.

Of course, even this procedure cannot offer assurance

during periods of high political sensitivity, such as the

Deviation from central guide? lines on professional grounds

will always be regarded as problematic, but especially so in a

politically charged context.




aftermath of disasters. Such circumstances may not allow the reign of reason. Besides, it is unlikely that all relevant professional decision making could be made

subject to such a procedure. However, it at least offers some form of insurance policy to local officials.

Changing the Sender: Involving Nongovernmen- tal Organizations in Soft Governance There are many fields, such as disaster management, in which local officials need to be supported by experts because it is unrealistic to expect them to have the

specialized knowledge required. Central government departments may have the required expertise, but they tread a fine line between guidance and imposition. Therefore, we suggest that, insofar as possible, unofficial

guidelines be issued by nongovernmental organizations? specifically, by independent centers of expertise and

professional associations. Channeling information and recommendations through institutions that clearly have no supervisory authority may diminish the ambiguity of their status. In the context of Dutch disaster man?

agement, the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten

(Association of Local Authorities) and the Nederlands Instituut voor Brandweer en Rampenbestrijding (Netherlands Institute for Fire Services and Disaster

Management) have been of growing significance in

training and informing local professionals. They have

encouraged the creation of networks of expertise by organizing regional meetings and by establishing virtual communities on the Internet.

However, one must be careful to shift this function to the private sector without embedding it firmly within the overall system of governance. Obviously, the downside of such a move is that guidelines issued by nongovernmental organizations are more likely to be

ignored. This will occur especially when government inspectors are believed to use a separate and different evaluative framework. Ideally, there should be adjust? ment between the activities of these parties, yet they should not appear to be too close, for nongovernmen? tal organizations might seem to have been co-opted. In all likelihood, adjustment will rely less on structure and procedure than on informal relations. In addition, associations and institutes may have to go through an internal process of professionalization to live up to their expanding role.5 One ofthe reasons the Dutch

Ministry of Home Affairs took up its role as a center of expertise during the 1990s was that, at least ini-

tially, there were no other parties qualified to handle this function. It is only after years of capacity building that private organizations have been in a position to take over.

It should be emphasized that the involvement of

nongovernmental organizations in distributing infor? mation does nothing to change the need for a clear and legally binding regulative framework imposed by the central government. The challenge is to find the

right balance between the scope of official and unof? ficial guidelines.

Conclusion In this article, we have attempted to describe a prob? lem that mars the implementation of soft governance, an approach that relies on unofficial information and advice rather than hierarchy to steer local officials. This

approach is most useful for reconciling the demands of

public accountability and professional autonomy, which encourages the long-term improvement ofthe

quality of implementation. However, its benefits may be nullified in a highly sensitive political environment, when unofficial guidelines are, in daily practice, per? ceived as official. This may happen when local organi? zations believe they run a high risk of being sanctioned for deviating from the guidelines, even when they have

well-argued professional reasons for doing so. This

favors conformist behavior and discourages local ex-

perimentation and learning. Though this may lead to

quality improvement in the short term, it closes off a source of innovation that could further improve qual? ity in the long term. This problem is particularly likely to occur in contexts of high political sensitivity and multilevel governance. When this occurs, there are no definitive solutions. It is more realistic to try to contain the tensions than to aim to resolve them.

Notes 1. This approach is part of the so-called open method

of coordination (e.g., Ahonen 2001; Zito, Radaelli, and Jordan 2003).

2. This definition is derived from the Dutch Law on Disasters and Grave Accidents {WetRampen en Zware Ongevallen).

3. Guideline Information and Advice Centers Follow?

ing Disasters {Richtlijn Informatie- en Adviescen- trum na Rampen), 2002.

4. An event that, in all modesty, has made us glow with pride.

5. A pressing problem is the lack of capacity and established networks at the local level. Effectively disseminating information requires a minimal

capacity within local organizations to absorb and

apply it, but this is difficult when professionals are scattered over small units with insufficient organi? zational slack to incorporate or develop innova- tions. It has proved especially difficult in the case of the Dutch fire services, which have traditionally been fragmented and often operate on a semipro- fessional basis. Recently, initiatives have attempted to strengthen their capacity in an attempt to allow more effective interaction with the central govern? ment and with nationally operating institutes and associations.

References Ahonen, Pertti. 2001. Soft Governance, Agile Union:

Analysis ofthe Extensions ofOpen Coordination in

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soft governance, hard consequences: the ambiguous status of unofficial guidelines

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