socio economic status of muslims in india

7/21/2019 Socio Economic status of Muslims in India

1/6

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Indian Muslims: The Varied Dimensions of MarginalityAuthor(s): Rowena RobinsonSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 10 (Mar. 10-16, 2007), pp. 839-843Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4419333Accessed: 25-03-2015 03:55 UTC

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2/6

entrepreneur

lass of

the

community

have

shrunk. Their

political space

has

been

conspicuouslyabridged.

This

has been

compounded

by physical

and

social

inse-

curity.

Without

ensuring

social

security

and

citizenship

in letter and

spirit,

our

concern for

equity

is more rhetorical

than

sincere.

In

several

parts

of the

country

Muslims constantly face insecurityof life.

A

series of

planned

events of communal

violence,

an

ineffective

and

partisan sys-

tem that

has failed to deliver

justice

to the

victims,

and an unchecked "hate Muslim"

campaign

alienate them from the main-

stream. Such

insecurity

breeds fear and

forces them to

ghettoise.

The

worst suf-

ferers are women. The

political

system,

irrespective

of the

parties

in

power,

has so

far failed to take

up

the issue

squarely.

In

the

current

political

scenario in

India,

the

neighbouring

countries

and

world

over,

determined action

on the

part

of the

po-

litical class to

strengthen

secular forces

seems to

be a distant

dream,

though

we

have

to

constantly

strive

for such an

objective.

Several administrative

measures recom-

mended

by

the committee

to correct the

situationhave to be

looked

at

n

this

political

context.

I

only

wish that the Sachar

Com-

mittee could have

critically

examined

why

some of

the

well

meaning

administrative

measures like the

formation of

NMDFC,

NBCFDC,

Prime

Minister's 15-Point

Programme,

NVs,

etc

-

in

the

past

15

years

have not helped Muslims. In this context

the

measures

suggested

like

(a)

constant

monitoring

nd

evaluation

ystem

ofprogra-

mmes,

and

(b)

building

of a data

bank are

useful.

Though

the

committee has

dealt

with

the

issue of

reservation at

length,

it

has

refrained

rom

making

a

recommenda-

tion

for

reservation orthe Muslim

commu-

nity

as

a whole.

This

is

perhaps

because it

is

a

contentious issue

on the

one

hand,

and

a

large

number of

Muslims

communities

are

already

covered as

part

of

the

OBCs

on the

other.Some

backward

groups

which

have been left out areeither from the state

lists or the

central list or

both,

and have

made

representation

o

the

Backward

Class

Commission

for their

inclusion.

In

my

view,

two other

recommendations

are

very

important

and

may

evoke

a con-

sensus

across the

political

spectrum.

One

of

the

important

measures is

to

form

an

Equal

Opportunity

Commission to

look

into the

grievances

of

the

deprived

groups.

Besides

providing

a

remedial

mechanism

for

different

types

of

discrimination,

it

is

hoped

that

this

would

reassure

Muslims

that

any

unfair ction

against

hemwould

"invitehe

vigilance

f the aw".The econd

recommendations

to

provide

ncentives

to

colleges

anduniversities

private

and

public

-

that have a

"higher diversity

and able to sustain it".

Similarly,

the

government hould ind

ways

andmeans

to

provide

ncentives o builders

of

hous-

ing complexes

to have a more diverse

population mong

its

occupants.

Bi3

Email:

[email protected]

n d i a n

Muslims

h e V a r e d

Dimensions

Marginality

The

Sachar

Committee

Report

brings together

a wealth

of

data

of

immensevalue with

respect

to the

development

and

marginalisationof different ocio-religious

groups,

the

Muslims

in

particular,

in the

country.

This article examinesthe

social,

political

and

economic

profile of

IndianMuslims

emerging rom

the

SCR;

its

regional, gendered

and other

variations;

and

the

implications hereof.

ROWENA ROBINSON

rT

he

Rajinder

Sachar

Committee

Report

SCR)

s of

great

benefit o

scholars and

policymakers.

Until

recently,

cademics

emoaned

he act hat

so little

data

was

available on

Indian

minorities

in

general

and Muslims

in

particular.

t is

indeed

possible

hat,

with

respect

o

Muslims,

he

ghost

of

the

"com-

munal"

hung

so much over

politics

that

sanction orsuchdocumentation as not

available. While some

attempts

at

the

collection

and

analysis

of datahad

begun,

the SCR

brings

ogether

wealthof data

for

the

whole

country

hat

s of

immense

value for

those

seriously

concernedwith

questions

of

the

development

and

marginalisation

f

different

ocio-religious

groups.l

This

paper

xamines he

social,

political

and economic

profile

of Indian

Muslims

as available

o us in the

SCR

in

termsof

its

regional,gender

and other

variations

and ts broaderociological mplications.

Thisarticle

lso

attempts

o

relate

he

SCR

data

and other

documents o the human

security

and

development

concerns of

IndianMuslim

communities.

Within his

framework,

questions

of

affirmative

actionare

also raised.

Population

Distribution

Of

the

593 districts n India

only

nine

are

predominantly

Muslim

(over

75

per

cent

of

the

population

s

Muslim).

These

include

Lakshadweep

nd

eight

districts

in Jammu nd

Kashmir.

Only

11

districts

have a

Muslim

population

f 50

per

cent

to

75

per

cent.

These

are n

Assam,

Jammu

and

Kashmir,

West

Bengal,

Kerala

and

Bihar.

However,

nly

13

per

centof Indian

Muslims

ive

in

these

districts

SCR:30).

Against

this

data,

the extent

to which

Muslims can

and

have

been taken

for

granted

n

publicpolicymaking

ecomes

a little less

astonishing.

Thirty-eightdistrictshave a Muslim

population

between 25

and

50

per

cent.

These districtsaccount or 22

per

cent of

Indian

Muslimsand

are in

statessuch

as

Uttar

radesh,

West

Bengal,

Kerala, ssam,

Bihar,

harkhandndDelhi. n182

districts,

Muslims onstitute etween

10 and25

per

cent of the

population

nd 47

per

cent

of

all Muslims reside in

these

districts.

As

many

as 77 districts ave ess thanone

per

cent Muslims.The main

areas

of Muslim

concentration,herefore,

re in the

Indo-

Gangetic plain,

Jammu and

Kashmir,

Kerala,Assam and south-centralndia

(SCR: 30-31).

Muslimsare

clearly

on the

margins

of

the

structures

of

economic,

social and

political

relevance n India.Thus

it was

that

many

Muslim

groups

in Mumbai

realisedwith a startafter he violence of

1992-93

hat

he lack of

their

representa-

tion

n

the

hierarchiesf

power

made hem

particularly

ulnerableo attack.

Thisdata

also sensitisesus to

the

sense

of

insecurity

of

Muslims

n

Gujarat,

or

instance,

who,

constitute

ust

9

per

cent

of the

state's

Economic and

Political

Weekly

March

10,

2007

839

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3/6

population

and are

scattered

across

vil-

lages

and districts and after

2002

system-

atically

hounded

out

and

not

allowed

to

return.

It

was as a result of

this

insecurity

that

the

Muslim Relief

Committees

made

specific

attempts

o re-housescatteredrural

households

only

in the relative

safety

of

gated community complexes.

Health,

Fertility

and

Population

Growth

While the

sex

ratio

in

India as a

whole

is lower

than

1000,

it

is not

altogether

surprising

hat Muslims show a

better sex

ratio as

compared

to other

socio-religious

groups

(though

why

this

ratio has been

steadily

improving may

need

further ex-

ploration).

Further,

Muslims

have

the

highest

child sex ratio

of

any

social

group

in the

country

(SCR: 33-38).

A

combina-

tionof factorsincluding religious ideology

and

particularly kinship

and

marriage

practices

might

be

working together

to

ensure

that

the

high

devaluation

of

daugh-

ters common

among

Hindus and

many

other

groups

is

diminished

among

the

Muslims. In

keeping

with

this

data,

infant

and child

mortality

is also lower than

average

among

Muslims and is

definitely

farlowerthan

among

Hindus.These

figures

persist

despite

economic

disadvantage

and

lower levels of female

schooling among

Muslims.

In

part,

as

I

have

suggested,

these

features

may

be due to the

close

kinship

networks and

marital

circles

of

Muslims,

contributing

somewhat to the

greater

physical

(and

social)

security

of

the

children. The

possibility

of "within-kin"

marriage

practices

and lower

marriage

payments

might

also

ensure that the

girl

child

is not

considered so much of

a

burden.

For

Muslim

women

who

marry

in more

tight-knit

circles and more often

among

kin,

the

support

of

the

natal

family

in

childcare and in

the

care of the new

mother

may

be of some

importance

in

addingto thesurvival-chancesof thechild,

including

the

girl

child. Even

so,

poverty

and

disadvantage

must

be

partly

respon-

sible for

thatfactthat the

Muslim child

has

a

higher

risk of

being

underweight

n com-

parison

to a child from

another

socio-

religious

community.

Fertility

rates reveal that

fertility

varies

among

the

Muslims as

among

other

groups

in

accordance with

social,

economic

and

regional

factors. Thus one

speaks

here of

average

fertility

rather

than in

any

sense

of

a

"fertility

norm" or or

among

Muslims

(SCR: 39).

Total

fertility

rate

(TFR)

figures

how that

among

the four

large

socio-religiousgroupsfertility

s

lowest

among

the

Sikhs,

preceded

by

the

Christians.

t is the

highest

among

the

Muslims.

The

various stimates how

that

Muslim

TFR s

higher

han

he

average

y

0.7 to one

point.

By treatingmigrations theresidual, s

the differencebetweenactual

and

natural

growth

(births

minus

deaths),

the

SCR

tries o makean

assessment

f

the

mpact

of

international

migration

n the

overall

Muslim

growth

n

India.The

igures

how

that

mortality

mong

Muslims

s

lowerand

the

fertility

rate

higher

than

average.

Detailed

analyses

how

that he contribu-

tion of

migration

o

growth

of

Muslims

is due

largely

to

higher

fertility

and

then

secondarily

o

lower

mortality.

The

contribution

f

migration

o

the

growth

differential etweenHindusandMuslims

is small

(SCR:41).

Education

The

Committee

Report

shows

clearly

that he

literacy

and

educational tatus

of

Muslims s

particularly

ow. The

literacy

rate

among

Muslims

is

far

below

the

national

verage

nd his

gap

s

greater

n

urban reasand or

women.

Nevertheless,

regional

differences o also

emerge.

n 10

out of 21 selected

tates,

he

iteracy

ates

among

Muslims

s

found o be

higher

han

the state

average.

These states include

Maharashtra,

ndhra

radesh,

amil

Nadu,

Gujarat

and

Karnataka. n

Kerala,

the

difference

etween

iteracy

ates

of socio-

religious

ommunities

s

minimal.On the

whole,

Muslims are

doing

better

n this

respect

n

the

southand

n

the west

of

the

country.

There s

a

significant isparity

etween

theeducational

tatus

f

Muslimsand hat

of

other

ocio-religious ategories

except

SCs

and

STs).

BothMean

Years

f

School-

ing

(MYS)

and attendance levels

of

Muslimsare owin absolutenumbers nd

in

comparison

with

other

socio-religious

groups.

Again,

there are

regional

varia-

tions. The MYS of Muslims s

lowest in

states uchas

West

Bengal,

Uttar

Pradesh,

Assam

andUttaranchal.

owever,

Muslim

children

avemore

years

of

schooling

han

SCs

and

STs in states

such

as

Kerala,

Bihar,

harkhand,

arnataka, aharashtra,

AndhraPradesh

and

Gujarat.

However,

Muslim

nrolmentates

re

howing

teady

increase. n

1999-2000,

Muslimshadthe

lowest

enrolmentateof all

socio-religious

groups.

However,

n

2004-05,

heMuslim

enrolmentatehad

mprovedignificantly.

It was still

lower

than

he

average

nrol-

ment

ate,

butwas now

slightly

higher

han

that of the

OBCs.

The data shows

the

increasing

nterest

of

Muslims

in

education.

As mentioned

earlier,

the

invisibility

of Muslims at

levels of powerandinfluencestruck he

community

orcefully

after he ferocious

Mumbai violence

of

1992-93.

The

realisation

ave

rise to severalefforts

at

the

grassroots

o drawMuslimsof

capa-

bility

out

of

poverty

into

the

services,

professions

nd various evels

of

govern-

mentand

public

ector

mployment.

imi-

lar

effortsnow

appear

o be

coming

o

light

in

Gujarat

s well.

In

higher

education,

the differences

between Muslims and others stand out

evenmore

harply.

The

disparity

n

gradu-

ationattainmentevels has beenwidening

since

the 1970s

between

Muslims

andall

others n bothrural

ndurban reas. n

the

initial

phases

of

planning,

Muslimshad

a

highergraduate

ttainment ate han

SCs

and

STs. That has now

changed

and the

latter aveovertakenhe

Muslims.

Muslim

disadvantage

mustbe related

o

a

number

of

factors

ncluding

heireconomic

tatus

and

generally

ow educationevels. It

may

also

be in

part

due

to

the

lack

of

employ-

ment

opportunities.

his is

partially

up-

portedby

the

data,

which shows thatthe

unemployment

ate

among

Muslim

radu-

ates is the

highest amongsocio-religious

communities,

both

poor

and not

poor.

It

is

further

upportedy

the act hat

Muslims

do

not see

education s

necessarily

rans-

lating

into

formal

employment.

Muslims

are

badly

represented

n

formal

employ-

ment

and here

s,

moreover,

perception

that

hey

will

be

discriminated

gainst

n

securing

alariedjobs

SCR:15).

Thus,

he

low

perceived

returns from

education

do not

help

the cause of retention of

Muslims

n the

ducation

ystem.

Theother

striking

upporting

ata

comes fromthe

veryhighconcentrationf Muslimsnself-

employment

activities.

The

probability

of

Muslims and

SCs

and STs

completing

graduation

s lower

than

for all

other

socio-religiousgroups

especially

in

urbanareas and for

men.

However,

he

pool

of

eligible population

for

higher

education s

increasing

aster

for

SCs

and STs than

for Muslims.This

mustbe related

artly

o

affirmative ction

and the

higher

perceived

returns rom

education

for these

groups.

Being

Muslim reduces he

chanceof

achieving

840

Economic

and

Political

Weekly

March

10,

2007



4/6

educationat

the

secondary

and then at

higher

evels.

This

means hat

sustained

and

targeted

programmes

o

increase

enrolment

nd nsure etentionre

equired

for

Muslims.

Too much

hasbeen

made f the

madrasa

issue.

It is

commonly

nd

alsely

believed

thatMuslims

being

conservative

refer

o

send theirchildren o madrasas,where

theyacquire

eligious

ndother ducation.

At the

all-India

evel,

a

mere

3.

per

cent

of

all

Muslim

hildren

f

school-going ge

are enrolled

n madrasas.

Many

children,

however,

may

attend

"maktabs",

n addi-

tion to their

regular

chool.

The maktab

gives

a

religious

ducation nd

as studies

have

shown,

s a

complement

o,

rather

than substitute

ormainstreamducation.

While

the

number f children

with

Urdu

as their mother

ongue

necessitates

the

provisioning

of education

hrough

this

medium n

different

tates,

Muslims

are

not

averse

to

sending

their children

to

mainstream chools.

Further,

my

own

ethnographic

research

has shown an

increasing

umber

f Muslimswho

want

an

English-medium

ducation

or their

children.

Employment

and Income

Worker

opulation

atiosare lower for

Muslims

than

any

other

socio-religious

community

nd his s moreso

in

the

rural

areas.Muslimwomen areeven worse

n

both ruraland urbanareas; heirlowest

figures

or work

participation

how

up

in

urban reas.

tatewise

igures

or

women'

work

participation

renot

analysed

n the

SCR,

but

we

can

place

ts data

alongside

the

recent

MuslimWomen's

Survey

con-

ducted

y

Hasan ndMenon

2004),

which

sampled

data from 40 districts

panning

12

states.

The

socio-economic tatus

of

Muslim

households

was

compared

witha

sample

of

the

Hindu

population

broken

down

by

caste,

using

a

relative

develop-

ment index.While the data underscored

the dismal numbers of women in the

workforce,

he

reasons were seen

to be

complex.

For

one,

nrural

reas,

ow work

participation

ates

particularly

n

agricul-

ture ink

up

with he ow

rates

f

ownership

of land

by

Muslimsas a whole.

Further,

there is

considerable

difference

across

regions,

the rates in the south

being

higher

than in

the

northernor central

states.This

suggests

hat here

are

varying

structures

of

opportunity

in

place

in

different

regions,

which constitute

Muslim

participation

n

the abourmarket

differently.

Thus,

Muslim women are dis-

advantaged

not

by religion

alone but

by

a

complex

of forces

including

the

play

of

class

and

gender.

Further,

the concentration of

Muslim

workers in

self-employment-

street vend-

ing,

small trades

and

enterprises

ensures

perhaps

that the

community

as

a whole is

far more exposed to the disruptions and

damage

caused

by

urban

conflict

and

violence.

As I have

suggested

elsewhere,

the

immense

fragility

of

Muslim

partici-

pation

in the

economy

and the

low level

of their asset

accumulation

in

general

further

intensify

their

vulnerability

to the

displacements,

physical

and

economic,

caused

by

situations of

continual commu-

nal strife

[Robinson

2005].

As

employees,

Muslims

generally

work

as

casual

labour

and

they

are

very

poorly

represented

in

regular,

salaried

employ-

ment.

In

this

respect, they

are

even

more

disadvantaged

han

SCs and STs

for whom

affirmative action

may

have

improved

standards.

Only

about

27

per

cent of

Muslim workers

in urban areas are en-

gaged

in

regular

work,

while the

share

of

such workers

among

SCs and

STs,

OBCs

and Hindu UCs is

40,

36 and

49

per

cent

respectively

(SCR:

93).

The

participation

of Muslims in formal sector

employment

is far ess

than

he national

average.

Muslim

men are

over-represented

n

street

vending

(more

than 12

per

cent as

opposed

to the

national

average

of less than 8

per

cent),

while women tend to work from home to

a

much

larger degree

(70

per

cent)

than

the

average

(51

per

cent).

As

suggested

by

the

SCR,

traditional

barriers

to women's

mobility

as

well as

childcare and other household

responsi-

bilities

may play

a

big

role

in

keeping

Muslim women

within

the confines of their

homes and

close to the

neighbourhood.

However,

there are also other

possible

reasons

that

need

to be

explored.

Muslims

live in

certain

areas in

the cities

and feel

"safer"

in

doing

so

leading

to

their

ghettoisation. Urban ethnic conflict and

the threat

of

violence tend

to

result

in the

confining

or

huddling

of Muslims

into

community-dominated

enclaves.

For

women

in

particular,

here is a

great

sense

of fear

in

going

outside of these commu-

nity-bound neighbourhoods.

Their secu-

rity,

and that of their

children,

is

felt to

be better assured within the

ghettos.

Since

large

numbersof Muslims are self-

employed, developing

skillsand

extending

credit

should be the focal

points

of

any

positive

initiatives

for

the

community.

Further,

he

provision

f

social

ecurity

nd

social

safety

nets

becomes

important

for

such

self-employed

workers.

At

the

macro-level,

ectorswhichare

important

for

Muslims

such as

apparel,

uto-repair

and electrical

machinery,

re

potentially

high-growth

ectorsand

policy

initiatives

focusing

on them

may

yield employment-

related dividends for Muslims (SCR:

101-3).

On

the

whole,

more

Muslims han

others re o befound

n

production-related

activities

and

transport

quipment pera-

tion. About

34

per

cent of Muslims

are

engaged

in

such

occupations

as

against

21

per

cent of all workers.

Again,

Muslimsare

more

highly

repre-

sentedthan others

n

sales related

work;

Muslim

participation

s

relatively

ower n

professional,

echnical,

lerical

andmana-

gerial

work,

particularly

n urbanareas.

Muslim

participation

s lower than

the

workers

f other

ocio-religious roups

n

regular

salaried

jobs

especially

in

the

government

r in

largepublic

and

private

sector

enterprises.

urther,

t is found hat

they

tend o

be

more

nsecure

andvulner-

able in

termsof conditionsof work.

This

is not

only

because of

their

sizable

pre-

sence

n

informal

ector

employment,

ut

also because heir

ob

conditions

length

of

contract,

ocial

security

enefits nd

he

like)

even as

regular

workersare

poorer

than

hose or other

ocio-religious

roups

(SCR: 108).

Muslimsare

very poorlyrepresented

n

defenceand ecurityelated ctivities. his

is a

matter f some concernbecause t

is

crucially

inked o the senseof

well-being

and

security

about

life and

assets

per-

ceived

by

the

community.

The shareof

Muslims n

"public

order

and

safety

acti-

vities" at the

Central evel is

just

about

6

per

cent,

while hatof Hindu

upper

astes

is 42

per

cent. At

the

state

evel,

the share

of

Muslims s

barelyhigher,

at

7

per

cent.

Only

4

per

cent of Muslims

are

engaged

in

defence-related

ctivities. everal

eports,

including

the

Srikrishna Commission

Reporton the 1992-93riots in Mumbai,

havestated

hat he

police

areoftenbiased

against

Muslims and that

special

efforts

are

needed o recruitmore

persons

rom

minority

backgrounds

s well as to de-

communalise he

police.

Diversity

n

the

police

forces has a

place

in

producing

greater

mpartiality

nd

promoting

he rust

of

citizens.

Inthe current

ok

Sabha,

here

are

only

36

Muslimsof

543 candidates.

There

are

only

3

per

cent Muslims

n the

IAS,

1.8

per

cent in the

IFS

and a mere4

per

cent

Economic

and Political

Weekly

March

10,

2007

841



5/6

in

the

IPS.There

re4.5

per

centMuslims

in he

railways

nd

hey

are

overwhelmingly

at the

lower evels.

In

the

postal

services

and

banks,

Muslims

are

very poorly

rep-

resented. ven

nthe

universities,

here

are

only

4.7

per

cent Muslims

SCR:

165-7).

Thereare state-wise

differences;

Andhra

Pradesh,

Tamil

Nadu,

Gujarat

and

Kamatakao somewhat etter hanother

states.There

s a crucialneed to

enhance

Muslim

resence

nd

participation

n

public

spaces

and increase heir

role

in

public

policymaking.

Infrastructure and

Poverty

It is

disturbing

o note

thatwith

respect

to

other

ocialand

physical

nfrastructure

as

well,

Muslims re

poorly

erved.Muslim

concentration

illages,

as the

Census

of

2001

shows,

are not well served with

"pucca"

pproach

oadsor ocalbus

stops.

A

large

number f Muslimconcentration

villages

in states

such as

West

Bengal,

Uttar

Pradesh,Bihar, Assam,

Jharkhand

andJammu nd Kashmir ack

postal

and

telegraph

ervices.

Several of these

are

states with

a

high

Muslim

population.

Further,

here

s a clear nverse

association

in small

villages

between

the

proportion

of Muslim

population

ndthe

availability

ofeducationalnfrastructure.nmost

tates,

the

proportion

f

Muslim concentration

villages

with medical

facilities

is lower

than the

proportion

f all

villages

with

such acilities SCR:139-49).Thesefacts

regarding

ducation,

physical

infrastruc-

tureandhealth acilities ndicate

a

distinct

bias

in

public

service

provisioning

in

Muslimconcentration reas.

Muslims

ave

poor

access

o bank

redit.

The

average

ize

of

credit s

meager

and

low

compared

to

other

socio-religious

groups.

The

percentage

of households

availing

bank

acilities

s

much ower in

villages

where the Muslim

population

s

high

and this

could be

partly

because of

non-availability

f such facilities. This

amounts to the financial exclusion of

Muslims and has

far-reaching

conse-

quences

for

a

community already

economically

ulnerable

ndeducationally

backward.

or

those

primarily ngaged

n

self-employed

work,

access to

credit

s

a

crucial

nput.

n

sum,

the

data

shows

that

Muslims

ace

high

levels of

poverty

and

their

condition s

only slightly

better han

thatof

SCs

and

STs. Relative

deprivation

of Muslims is much

higher

in

urban

ratherthan

rural areas. The economic

conditionsof urban Muslims have not

improved

as

much as the other socio-

religious

ommunities.

Conclusion

On the whole it is clear that Muslims

suffer

from

deprivation

n almost

every

front.

While

hey

are

doing

omewhat etter

in certainrespectsin some states (for

instance n the

south),

hey

are

generally

extremely

ackward

nd ive

nthe

shadow

of

vulnerability

nd

poverty.

t has been

suggested

that the

relatively

better-off

position

f Muslims

n

south ndia

s

partly

related o thefactthat ome

of these

states

have

remained

argely

undisturbed

by

communal

ioting.

ndeed,

whilecommu-

nal

violence

may

notbe a cause orMuslim

backwardness,

here s

some evidence

o

argue

that the

expectation

of

recurring

violence

may play

a

very

important

ole

in

depressing

ortunes,

ostering

nsecu-

rity

and

increasing

ocial and economic

vulnerability

Razzack

nd

Gumber

002;

Mishra

nd

Singh

2002;

Robinson

005].

Demographic

ransition

s

also under-

way among

Muslimsas

among

others. n

many

parts

of

the

world,

here

appears

o

be

a

tendency

towards

higher

fertility

among

ethnic

minority.

Promoting

ecu-

rity

and

well-being

oulddomore o

depress

fertility

rates than

any

panic

reactions.

Moreover,

he

strengths

f Muslim

kinship

and

family patterns

houldnot be over-

looked

as

they

seem

to better

nfantsur-

vival rates and the sex ratio. A proper

understanding

f Muslim amilialandkin

relations

may

be

central to

promoting

family

planning

ndchild-oriented ealth

measures.

A

very

mportant

spectbrought

ut

by

thedata s the

cleardiscrimination

gainst

Muslims

n

the

sphere

of state

provision

of

public

services of all kinds. There

is

urgent

need

to

rectify

this imbalance.

Among

Muslims,

some

groups

are

worse

off

thanothers.

Apart

rom

regional

differences, lass,

casteand

gender

work

to produce urthernequalities f access

and

achievement.Muslim

OBCs

consti-

tutej

ust

over40

per

cent

of

the

otal

Muslim

population.

Muslims s

a whole

ag

behind

Hindu

OBCs

and the

Muslims

OBCs are

worse off than he

general

Muslim

popu-

lation. This

suggests

that the

benefitsof

entitlementsor the

backward lasses are

not

reaching

he MuslimOBCs.The SCR

recommends

hat

he MuslimOBCsneed

additional ttention.

There are also

several Muslim

castes

socially,

educationally

nd

economically

on

par

with the SCs.

They

suffer from

stigma

and social exclusion due to

their

status. Such

groups experience

cumulative

disabilities. The SCR has

recommended

these

groups

be

treated

as most backward

classes and several

measures

including

reservation be made available to them. It

would

perhaps

be more

pertinent

o

argue

that hesegroupsshould beincludedamong

the list

of SCs.

SC

Christians

and

Muslims

have been

struggling

to

be accorded the

same benefits that are

granted

to

SCs

professing

the

Hindu,

Sikh,

and neo-

Buddhist

religions.

SC Christians

and

Muslims are not

recognised

as

such

under

the

law

and are not

eligible

for the

benefits

of

positive

discrimination.

The Constitutional Order of

1950

listed

SCs and STs

using

the list

employed

by

the Government

of

India

(Scheduled

Castes)

Order of

1936.

The

1950

Order

specifies

that

no

person professing

a

re-

ligion

otherthanHinduism

may

be

deemed

SC

status.

The limitation

has been under-

stood in terms of the

logic

that

religions

such as Islam or

Christianity

claimed

the

principle

of human

equality

and

therefore

there could

strictly

not

be

any

"Scheduled

Castes" in

these communities.

Apart

from

all its other

problems,

such

an

argument

cannot

any

longer

be

defended

since the

Order has

already

been

amended

in

1956

to

include

Sikh Dalits

and

again

in

1990

to

include

Buddhist Dalits.

These

are

both

religions

that

espouse

the

idea

of

equality.

In

the

ight

of these

amendments,

t

would

appear

hat he

continued exclusion of Dalit

Christians and Dalit Muslims

from the

benefits

of

reservations

amounts

to reli-

gion-based

discrimination

and

contravenes

constitutional

principles

prohibiting

dis-

crimination on

the

grounds

of

religion,

race, caste,

sex or

place

of

birth.

The idea

of

quotas

for

SC

Muslims or

affirmative

action for other

sections of

the

community

should not be

considered

religion-based

decisions.

The relevant facts are that

Muslims are among the most deprived of

India's social

groups

and

communities and

their

social,

occupational

and

economic

profile

is

appalling. Marginalisation,

dis-

crimination,

violence

and social exclusion

have

further

depressed

Muslim

aspirations

and

pushed

down

levels

of

achievement.

A

very large

section of the

Indian

popu-

lation

is

being

left behind in

the

drive

towards

development

and this can bode no

good

for the

nation.

[13

Email:

[email protected]

842

Economicand

Political

Weekly

March

10,

2007



6/6

Note

1

The

2001 Census had collected

data on the

socio-economic condition of

religious

groups

and

his

is invaluable.

Prior o

that,

he

NSS

and

NHFS

surveys

offered

sample

data. The

work

of Abusaleh Shariff

and the National Council

for

Applied

EconomicResearchwas

noteworthy.

Much of their data came out

in the India

DevelopmentReport

of 1999.

Again,

a

recent

survey

of Muslim women

by Zoya

Hasan

and Ritu Menon

(2004)

provided

some

revealing

data.

References

Hasan,

Zoya

and Ritu Menon

(2004):

Unequal

Citizens:

A

Study

of

MuslimWomen n

India,

Oxford

University

Press,

New Delhi.

Mishra,

V

andS

K

Singh

2002):

Status

fMinorities

in South

Asia,

Authors

Press,

Delhi.

Razzack,

Azra

ndAnil

Gumber(2002):

ifferentials

in Human

Development:

A

Casefor

Empower-

ment

ofMuslims

n

India,NCAER,

New

Delhi.

Robinson,

Rowena

(2005):

Tremors

of

Violence:

Muslim Survivors

of

Ethnic

Strife

in Western

India,

Sage,

New

Delhi.

onditionedives

Given

the

disparities

in

Indian

society

which

affect

Indian

Muslims some

built-in

due to various reasons and some created

by

the

stepmotherly

reatment

meted out

by

the

state

-

the

government

hould show the

will

to

implement

he various

recommendations

f

the Sachar Committee.

M

A KALAM

'-

T

he Muslims of India as well as

others looked forward to the

release

of

the

Sachar

Committee

report.l

The

quite transparent

and lucid

write-up

done with a

high

degree

of

can-

didness

and

n a

forthright

manner ame

as

a

big surprise

o

many given

the kid

gloves

with in which

most

commissions,

high evel,orwhatever,etup bythestate

deal withthe

ssue(s)

concerned. n

terms

of

datacollation

and

putting

ogether

all

these

in

one

single

volume,

the

effort

is

unparalleled.

articularly

o,

as data

of

the

kind

hat hiscommittee btained

as

never

been

attempted

nIndianher

history,

not

evenafter

ndependence

ndnoteven

when

the

GopalSingh

Committeewas set

up

in

the

1980s.

But

unfortunatelyothing

ame

up

as a result f the

GopalSingh

Committee

recommendations.

nd,

to

say

the

least,

those

thoughts

do recurwhen one thinks

of the

findings

and recommendationsf

the

present

ommittee.Commissions nd

reports,

ad

o

say,

cannever

be a

substitute

for

political

will;

political

will thatoften

refuses

o

rise above electoral

quations,

andis

guided by

coalition

calculations.

Though

he

army

refused o

give

infor-

mation

about

employment

f

Muslims n

its

ranks,

he

navy

and

he

air

orcedid so.

That n

itself

s

remarkablen

theonehand

while it is

also

disappointing

hat,

one

of

the

argest

rmies n a

democratic

ountry

and

whichhas

impeccable

redentialsor

being

confined to the barracksand has

not

delved into

the

political

arena as has

happened

n othercountries with

whom we

share

borders,

did not deem it fit to

let the

people

know how

many

Muslims

fight

for

the

country.

It

is

another

matter

that

the

Sachar Committee

in

its own

wisdom,

or

otherwise,

decided not to use

the data

that

was

supplied by

two of the

three

wings

of

our

defence forces. On

the

other

hand,

an

institution like the Union Public Service

Commission

(UPSC)

which has

been

negotiating

to

keep

itself out of the

right

to informationorbithas

given

data

thatwas

not available in the

public

domain. The

public

sector units

(PSUs),

banks and some

private

sector

orgnisations

too

have

pro-

vided data that is

immensely

revealing.

However,

a valid criticism that

has been

levelled

against

the

committee

by

different

quarters

and at

different levels is that t did

not

have a

single

woman member. The

committee

attempts

to

pre-empt

this when

it

says:

During

the committee's

interactionwith

women's

groups,

some of them

seriously

articulated

grievance

hat t did not have

any

woman

member.The committee ried

to

make

up

for this

by convening

a half-

a-day meeting

with women's

groups

dur-

ing

its visits to the

states.

In

addition to

that,

women

social activists

n

large

num-

bersattended he

meetings

of allthe

groups

and

expressed

their

points

of view and

apprehensions

in

an

open

and frank

manner.Their

input

was

intensive and to

the

point

about

the various matters ike

education,

medical

facilities,

Anganwadi

requirements,

tc.Thecommitteealso held

one

full

day meeting

n Delhi in

July

2006

exclusively

for

women from all

over

India

(p

xiii).

While

it

is

possible

to

appreciate

or

even

sympathise

the

way

the

committee defends

itself on

this

count,

no

justification

could

be

adequate

for not

having

at least one

(full)

woman member on the committee.

It is

imperative,

one

feels,

to have a woman

member as the

way proceedings

take

place,

interviews

are conducted and

sen-

sitivity

is

given

to data that is collected

could be

qualitatively

different due to the

positive

gender

bias that

goes

into

such

an exercise.

Islands of Utter

Neglect

Before we

get

into

an

analysis

of some

of the

micro-level

data,

it is

pertinent

to

note that at no level can the charge of

minority

appeasement

hold

any

water

after

one

goes

through

the Sachar Committee

Report

even

cursorily.

Delimitation of

con-

stituencies

in

Muslim

majority

areas

or

where

the Muslim

presence

is substantial

and

earmarking

such

constituencies for

scheduled

castes,

is

one of the

ways

in

which

Muslim

participation

n

the

electoral

process

of

contesting

for

different

posts

has been

thwarted.

It

is

doubly

distressing

to

note

that

many

such

constituencies do

not

even have

significant

scheduled caste

habitations/populationBanks haveovertly

earmarked

Muslim-dominated

reasas

non-

recovery

or red and

danger

zones as

re-

gards advancing

loans

to

Muslims and

these same

banks have

enough

evidence

with

them

to

the

contrary

n

what

they

have

designated

as

"negative

geographical

zones".

Compared

o the

general

population

or

any

other

section of the

population,

Muslims,

in

fact,

have

defaulted much less

in

clearing

their

debts and

have

paid

back

in a

better manner.

Areas with

significant

Muslim

popula-

tion

suffer on

many

counts: no

pucca

approach

roads,

hardly any

bus

stops,

no

basic

services,

no

physical

infrastructure,

fewer

schools,

and

so

on. Such a state of

affairs is not

confined to

a

particular

district

or state but

has been

replicated

in

all

areas where

there are

large

numbers of

Muslims.

How is it

that there is

such

remarkable

consistency

in

creating

and

recreating

islands of

utter

neglect?

The

report

says, "Compared

to the

Muslim

majority

areas,

the

areas

inhabiting

fewer

Muslims had

better

roads,

sewage

and

Economicand Political

Weekly

March

10,

2007843

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