societal aspects of the 2008 super tuesday tornado outbreak
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Societal Aspects of the 2008 Super Tuesday Tornado Outbreak . Kevin Barjenbruch * and Julie Demuth ** *NWS Salt Lake City WFO **NCAR Societal Impacts Program. IWT Workshop: Using the WAS*IS Approach January 22, 2009. NWS service assessments…then. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Societal Aspects of the 2008 Super
Tuesday Tornado Outbreak
WAS* ISWAS* ISweather & society * integrated studies
www.sip.ucar.edu/wasis/
CULTURE CHANGE
Sponsored by the NCAR Societal Impacts Program
WAS* ISWAS* ISweather & society * integrated studies
www.sip.ucar.edu/wasis/
CULTURE CHANGE
Sponsored by the NCAR Societal Impacts Program
Kevin Barjenbruch* and Julie Demuth**
*NWS Salt Lake City WFO**NCAR Societal Impacts Program
IWT Workshop: Using the WAS*IS ApproachJanuary 22, 2009
• Conducted to evaluate NWS performance during significant (high-impact) events
• Usually convened just once or twice a year• Team composition: experts from both inside
and outside the National Weather Service
NWS service assessments…then
NWS service assessments…then• THEN: Inward focus on procedures, actions,
equipment– Internal review of operations in National Centers,
WFOs, CWSUs, RFCs– Informal external review of information with partners– Quantitative assessment
• Damage, verification, fatalities, injuries, etc.
NWS service assessments…now• NOW: Inclusion of external
focus via societal impacts analyses– Super Tuesday, Mother’s Day,
Midwest floods– Qualitative assessment
• Information sources, perceptions, decision-making
Desired outcomes of NWS SAs• Use findings, recommendations, best practices
to:– Improve delivery of hazard information (format,
content, media) to our customers and partners – Improve clarity of hazard information– Focus research and training– Allocate resources
Provide better and more understandable weather
information so that people will take action to protect life and property!
Impacts of the tornado outbreak
• 87 tornadoes– 5 EF-4 tornadoes– 1 tornado had a
122-mile long path
• 57 fatalities– most since May
31, 1985– 13th overall
• 350+ injuries• $520M damage
February 5-6, 2008, tornado outbreak
• National Weather Service (NWS) predictions– Excellent long lead-time info:• First outlook issued 6 days prior• Day before, outlook mentioned
“potentially strong and long-track tornadoes”
– Mixed quality short lead-time info:• Mean official tornado warning
lead time of 18 minutes• Some problems with timely
downstream warnings• Uncertainty wording for
confirmed tornadoes
18 min1 min
T
Ubiquitous questions• This was a well-warned
event, with good information…– … why did so many
people die?– … why don’t people do
what they’re “supposed” to do … to make the “right” decision?
We get frustrated when we put “good” weather information out there and people
don’t make the “right” decisions!
The “right” decision … in a tornado
• Why might someone not take shelter from a tornado?
.
.
.• What is the “right” decision? • Is there a “right” decision?• How and why do decisions get made?
Bottom line … if you want to study human beings, you’d better have a high tolerance for ambiguity!
Societal impacts scope• The task – To try to understand why so
many people died and the details of those fatalities
.
.
.Can learn so much by having people walk you through their knowledge, thoughts, actions … by letting them tell you their
stories!
• An opportunity – To gather empirical information about people’s actual warning response behaviors
Research objectives• For the fatalities, wanted to gather info
about:– Age, gender, warning received, warning source,
warning heeded, shelter sought, structure where they died, availability of safer shelter
• For the survivors, wanted to assess:– what info people had, how they interpreted it
(knowledge)– how people perceived the situation (perceptions)– what decisions people made (decision-making) – what information they had about the fatalitiesThis is a highly interdependent,
iterative process
Methodology• Semi-structured interviews with the public• Targeted, convenience, and snowball
sampling• 41 interviews by 3 sub-teams in the 6 WFOs
visited– We did 17 public interviews over 4 days in the
field, another day on the phone• Audio recorded with consent
Some of the questions• When did you first realize there was a threat of a
tornado? – How did you learn about the threat? (sources,
environmental cues) – What were you thinking after you received that information? (trust? confusion? uncertainty? barriers to
action?) – What did you do next? (confirmation?)
• Have you ever been in a similar type of extreme-weather situation in the past? (experience, false alarms)– Did anything from that experience influence what you did during this most recent event?– Have you ever been warned about an extreme weather event in the past that did not occur?
• Think back over the entire tornado event, from the time you learned there was a tornado threat through when the tornado actually occurred.– Do you feel that any of the information you received was unclear?– Is there any other information you would have liked to have had?
Data analysis• Analyzed iteratively, cooperatively by 2
coders• Coded with Excel
– Pre-determined categories – Categories created inductively during analysis
• Caveats and considerations!! – Balance between scientific rigor and rapid
operational needs– First step, hopefully leading to more related work
in the future (more in-depth studies, various weather contexts, etc.)
Findings − knowledge • People get information from multiple sources
– Majority via television– Also commonly from other people (family, friends,
neighbors, co-workers)• People get information multiple times• NOAA Weather Radio was used, but not
common• Tornado sirens are useful, but…
– Misconceptions about sirens as a warning device• Local EMs confirmed this is a problem; one is actively
trying to correct this via newspaper and radio– Misconceptions about what sirens mean
Findings − perception• Integration of seasonality, weather salience,
situational awareness about the event– Majority of people associate tornado outbreaks as
occurring in March or later…– … so many minimized threat because they
perceived it as being outside “traditional” tornado season
– … BUT, for many people, situational factors (e.g., unusually warm temps) heightened their awareness
Findings − perception (cont)
• Personalization of the threat– People often seek confirmation of the threat; a
single source of info will not necessary spur protective action• E.g., Atkins, AR, woman and couple
– Many people recognize a risk exists, but believe that their personal risk is less or that they aren’t at risk at all (optimism bias)• E.g., Hardin County, TN, family; Arkansas family
Findings − decision making• NOT a singular event• Happens numerous times throughout the
warning process• Implicit part of people’s gathering and
interpreting weather information to evaluate their risk
Findings − sheltering• Sheltering definitions– Safer = safer relative to one’s current location
(e.g., frame home is “safer” than mobile home)– Safest = a basement, storm cellar, or safe room
• Decision to shelter– Vast majority of people who received warning
heeded it and sought shelter in best location available to them …
– … but less than half of people had a “safest” shelter available
– Very few people who received a warning opted not to shelter
Findings − 57 fatalities• Collected as much good data as we could• Nearly 2/3 of victims were in mobile homes
– 15 in houses, 4 in warehouse, 1 in vehicle, 1 unknown
• Warning and sheltering info for victims– Of the 18 people we had warning info about
• 11 people heeded the warning, 3 did not, unknown for 4• 10 people sought shelter, 5 did not, unknown for 3
– … but most did not have an safest sheltering option• 8 people did, 34 did not, unknown for 15
– … and many did not have a safer sheltering option• 17 did, 21 did not, unknown for 19
Opportunities – National Scope
• Establish a ‘pool’ of societal impacts experts– Communication, sociologists, anthropologists,
economists, GIS specialists, etc.• Develop a common set of societal impacts
survey questions, tailored as appropriate
NWS should consider adding a Societal Impacts Program to operational branches of NWSH and Regions, to organize and focus
these efforts
Opportunities – Regional/WFO Scale• Gather impacts/socio-demographic data for
local events • Utilize academic community for research
initiatives– Resource for survey methods, questions,
analyses– Utilize COMET grants, NSTEP process
• Build partnerships!This workshop is a great first-step!
Broader lessons learned• Value of having some exposure to
quantitative and qualitative research• Emergency managers are invaluable• Partnerships among social scientists,
research meteorologists, operational meteorologists, broadcasters, emergency managers and other practitioners, policy makers, etc.– Building this community!– Interest and willingness to work together, to
listen, learn, exchange ideas!
Discussion questions• Would more definitive wording (call to action
statements) in warnings & statements may prompt better protective response?
• Should we continue with the watch / warning / advisory methodology?
• Should mandatory protective action be taken at longer lead times (e.g., evacuating mobile home parks, dismissing classes, large-venue considerations)?
• Should local, state, and federal governments partner (legislate?) to build local shelter facilities?
Acknowledgements• Super Tuesday service assessment team
members– Especially Mike Vescio, Daniel Nietfeld
• NWS• NCAR Societal Impacts Program and WAS*IS• Contact
– Kevin Barjenbruch ([email protected])– Julie Demuth ([email protected])
www.sip.ucar.edu