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OFFICE OF

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING BENEFITS

UNDER MULTIPLE SOCIAL SECURITY

NUMBERS AT THE SAME ADDRESS

April 2005 A-01-05-25002

AUDIT REPORT



Mission

We improve SSA programs and operations and protect them against fraud, waste,and abuse by conducting independent and objective audits, evaluations, andinvestigations. We provide timely, useful, and reliable information and advice toAdministration officials, the Congress, and the public.

Authority

The Inspector General Act created independent audit and investigative units,called the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The mission of the OIG, as spelledout in the Act, is to:

Conduct and supervise independent and objective audits andinvestigations relating to agency programs and operations.

Promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the agency. Prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in agency programs and

operations. Review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed

legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. Keep the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of

problems in agency programs and operations.

To ensure objectivity, the IG Act empowers the IG with:

Independence to determine what reviews to perform. Access to all information necessary for the reviews. Authority to publish findings and recommendations based on the reviews.

Vision

By conducting independent and objective audits, investigations, and evaluations,we are agents of positive change striving for continuous improvement in theSocial Security Administration's programs, operations, and management and in

our own office.



SOCIAL SECURITY

MEMORANDUM

Date: April 29, 2005 Refer To:

To: The Commissioner

From: Inspector General

Subject: Individuals Receiving Benefits Under Multiple Social Security Numbers at the SameAddress (A-01-05-25002)

Our objective was to identify and prevent individuals from receiving Old-Age, Survivors,

and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits and/or Supplemental Security Income (SSI)payments inappropriately under multiple Social Security numbers (SSN) at the samemailing address.

BACKGROUND

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was alerted to three cases in January 2004where beneficiaries inappropriately received benefits under multiple SSNs at the sameaddress.1 To identify the extent of this situation, we analyzed a data extract of approximately 54 million OASDI and SSI beneficiaries who received benefits inFebruary 2004. Based on our analysis of the SSNs, address information and benefit

records, we identified 354 beneficiaries who may have received benefits inappropriatelyunder at least two different SSNs at the same address. (See Appendices B and C for additional information on background, scope and methodology.)

RESULTS OF REVIEW

Because of our review of these 354 cases, the Social Security Administration (SSA)assessed almost $9.2 million in overpayments for 220 beneficiaries who inappropriatelyreceived benefits under multiple SSNs at the same address. We also believe SSAavoided paying an estimated $1.4 million by stopping these incorrect payments.2

1The Department of Health and Human Services OIG issued a report on a similar issue—Identifying

Unauthorized Multiple Payments to the Same Person at the Same Address(A-04-87-03001),August 1988.2

The future savings is the amount that would have been paid to the beneficiary if SSA had not stoppedbenefits based on action taken during our review. Savings were calculated by taking the lastoverpayment received by the beneficiary multiplied by 12 months. The $1.4 million consists of $160,150 for SSI recipients, $478,200 for OASDI beneficiaries, and $786,864 for beneficiaries receivingboth SSI and OASDI benefits.



Page 2 – The Commissioner

Although this represents a small fraction of the $500 billion SSA pays to over 50 millionbeneficiaries3 every year, 182 of the 220 cases with overpayments are beinginvestigated for possible fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Also, addressing thesecases supports SSA’s Strategic Plan which includes objectives to prevent fraudulentand erroneous payments and to strengthen the integrity of the SSN.4 Our Office of Investigations continues to work these cases.5

The 354 cases we identifiedincluded:

• 29 individuals who receivedonly SSI payments;

• 140 individuals whoreceived only OASDIbenefits; and

• 185 individuals whoreceived both SSI andOASDI benefits.

Working with SSA staff, we found that:

• 182 beneficiaries were overpaid about $8.6 million due to possible fraud.

• 38 beneficiaries were overpaid $565,403 for reasons other than possiblefraud.

• 49 beneficiaries were not overpaid.6

• 85 beneficiaries are still having their cases reviewed. Based on informationwe received from SSA on November 23, 2004, most of these beneficiarieshave received improper payments and the Agency is in the process of takingthe necessary corrective action.

The following table shows the breakout of beneficiaries and overpayments by type of benefit received.

3 SSA, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2004, pages 8 and 147.

4SSA Strategic Plan 2003-2008, page 22.

5 As of January 2005, two beneficiaries have been arrested.

6 Further review showed that these cases generally represented different individuals, such as twins.

354 Cases Reviewed

185 (52%)

OASDI andSSI

29 (8%)

SSI Only

140 (40%)

OASDI Only




SSI Only OASDI Only SSI and OASDI TOTAL

Overpaid – Possible Fraud 18 $560,612 55 $2,813,216 109 $5,251,661 182 $8,625,489

Overpaid – Other Reasons 7 $28,057 12 $261,904 19 $275,442 38 $565,403

Subtotal 25 $588,669 67 $3,075,120 128 $5,527,103 220 $9,190,892

Not Overpaid 1 $0 27 $0 21 $0 49 $0

Pending Review 3 - 46 - 36 - 85 -

Total Cases and Dollars 29 $588,669 140 $3,075,120 185 $5,527,103 354 $9,190,892

As of April 13, 2005, SSA had recovered $517,905 of the $9.2 million in overpaymentsshown in the table above (about 6 percent).

Beneficiaries Were Overpaid Due to Possible Fraud

SSA has controls in place to detect duplicate payments issued to the same SSIrecipient or OASDI beneficiary. Specifically, the Supplemental Security IncomeDuplicate Payment Project (SSIDPP) is designed to eliminate the possibility of arecipient receiving duplicate payments due to multiple SSI records.7 The Agency runsSSIDPP annually, and cases which meet the matching criteria are identified andtransmitted to the appropriate SSA office to resolve the discrepancies.

Of 29 cases receiving only SSI payments, we found 18 instances of possible fraud.These 18 recipients were overpaid $560,612 and received multiple SSI payments for 56 months, on average. For example:

• A 54-year-old recipient obtained a second SSN using a friend’s last name for the

sole purpose of getting a second SSI payment. From August 1991 untilJuly 2004, SSA overpaid this recipient $89,654.

Additionally, SSA uses its Master File Duplicate Detection Operation (MAFDUP)software to identify beneficiaries who may be inappropriately receiving benefits onmultiple OASDI records. The Agency runs MAFDUP twice annually, and alerts for cases which meet the matching criteria are sent to the appropriate SSA office to bedeveloped and resolved.

Of 140 cases receiving only OASDI benefits, we found 55 instances of possible fraud.These 55 beneficiaries were overpaid over $2.8 million and received multiple OASDI

benefits for 101 months, on average. For example:

• A 71-year-old beneficiary with two different SSNs and her two children wereoverpaid $264,103 since 1971. The beneficiary’s attorney is negotiating with theUnited States Attorney’s office on this matter.

7 SSA, POMS, SI 02310.100.




• An 84-year-old beneficiary with two different SSNs was overpaid $171,052 since1986. The beneficiary admitted knowing that an individual cannot receive two fullbenefits at the same time. The SSA field office staff, working with OIGinvestigators, obtained copies of the beneficiary’s bank statements, showingsufficient funds to repay the overpayment. When presented with this information,the beneficiary wrote a check and repaid the funds that day.

Beneficiaries Were Overpaid for Reasons Other than Possible Fraud

We found 38 of the cases that were overpaid a total of $565,403 did not involvepossible fraud. Examples include improper payments resulting from SSA staff keyingerrors, staff not cross-referencing records, staff establishing benefits under the wrongSSN, etc. Specifically, 7 SSI recipients were overpaid $28,057 (average of $4,008 per recipient) over an average of 12 months; 12 OASDI beneficiaries were overpaid$261,904 (average of $21,825 per beneficiary) over an average of 49 months; and19 beneficiaries who received both SSI and OASDI benefits were overpaid

$275,442 (average of $14,497 per beneficiary) over an average of 37 months.

SSA Does Not Detect All Duplicate Benefits Paid Under Different SSNs

SSA’s controls do not identify all beneficiaries receiving OASDI benefits and/or SSIpayments inappropriately under multiple SSNs at the same mailing address. AlthoughSSIDPP detects duplicate SSI payments, it is only run once a year—allowing for overpayments to be larger and span longer periods of time than if they were detectedand resolved sooner.8 Also, although SSA runs MAFDUP twice annually to detectduplicate OASDI payments, the 140 cases we reviewed either were not identified byMAFDUP or were identified and not resolved.9

Furthermore, we were not able to identify any controls in place, such as SSIDPP or MAFDUP, to detect beneficiaries receiving both SSI and OASDI benefits under differentSSNs. The SSIDPP only detects multiple SSI payments, and MAFDUP only detectsmultiple OASDI benefits. Over half of the beneficiaries we identified for review receivedbenefits from both programs, where the individual was collecting:

• SSI payments under one SSN and OASDI benefits under a different SSN;

• SSI payments and OASDI benefits under one SSN and a second SSI paymentunder a different SSN; or

• SSI payments and OASDI benefits under one SSN and a second OASDI benefit

under a different SSN.

8On February 24, 2005, SSA staff informed the OIG that—as of January 2005—SSIDPP would be run

quarterly.

9 We included recommendations for MAFDUP in our March 2005 report, Individuals Receiving Multiple Auxiliary or Survivor Benefits (A-01-05-25015). We provided the 140 OASDI cases to SSA systems staff for review of MAFDUP processes.




Of 185 beneficiaries receiving both SSI payments and OASDI benefits, there were109 cases of possible fraud. These 109 beneficiaries were overpaid over $5.2 millionand received multiple SSI and OASDI benefits for 97 months, on average. For example:

• A beneficiary in Chicago received SSI payments under one name/SSNcombination from May 1985 through June 2000, while working under another name/SSN combination until June 1996—when she began receiving disabilitybenefits. Our investigators determined that the woman was receiving a thirdbenefit payment (widows benefits) under her ex-husband's SSN. The totaloverpayment amounted to $117,160 and judicial action is pending in this case.

• A 63-year-old individual with two SSNs was overpaid $78,731 since1991 because she received SSI payments while working and later collectingdisability benefits under another SSN.

The following chart shows that individuals receiving both SSI payments and OASDIbenefits are susceptible to receiving improper payments, similar to SSI only recipientsand OASDI only beneficiaries—where SSA has data matching programs in place.

We received the following comments from an SSA employee who reviewed some of thecases we identified:

In the past, we have received a listing of SSI only cases where it appeared that

one individual might be receiving on two SSI records, and typically the cases didnot involve fraud or overpayments. The OIG audit listing also included [SSI] onlycases, but additionally, [OASDI] only cases and concurrent cases … Many of thecases involved fraud and/or large overpayments … Our field offices are workingwith OIG, Office of Investigation[s], in the cases involving fraud … we recommendthis process be done annually and sent to the regions for development. Asmentioned, the results were far more significant than the annual SSI-only listingwe have historically received.

Average Number of Months Overpaid

56

12

101

49

97

37

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Possible Fraud Other Reasons

M

o n t h s

SSI

OASDI

SSI and OASDI




Obtaining Multiple SSNs

Generally, SSA assigns an individual only one SSN. Protecting the integrity of the SSN is essential to the proper posting of reported earnings, the payment of SSA benefits, and the prevention of fraud and SSN misuse. SSA hasimplemented several initiatives to protect the integrity of the SSN. For example, SSA now requires mandatory interviews for all applicants for originalSSNs who are over age 12 (lowered from age 18) and requires evidence of identity for all children, regardless of age. In addition, SSA has established anEnumeration Center in Brooklyn, New York, that focuses exclusively onassigning SSNs and issuing SSN cards.

The following table shows the range of time between the issuance of two SSNsunder which benefits were paid for the 220 cases with overpayments. Themajority of these SSNs were issued more than a year apart.10

Time Period Between SSNsBeing Issued

CasesOverpaid

Unknown 16

Same month 20

Same year, over 1 month apart 14

1 to 5 years apart 32




21 to 25 years apart 27Over 25 years apart 23

Total 220

Benefits Issued Under Different Names

Our review of the 220 cases with overpayments showed that some beneficiaries notonly had different SSNs, but they were also receiving benefits under different lastnames.

• 154 beneficiaries received multiple benefits using different last names—146 involved possible fraud and 8 did not.

• 66 beneficiaries received multiple benefits under the same last name—36 involved possible fraud and 30 did not.

10 Based on feedback from SSA staff and OIG investigators, several of these individuals appear to havefraudulently obtained the second SSN by providing false information or documents to SSA.




The criteria SSA uses to identify duplicate payments includes matching on name.Therefore, if the names are different, SSA is less likely to identify them. Once allinstances of possible fraud have been worked through resolution, we will revisit thesecases to identify additional common characteristics regarding SSN integrity and misuseto share with SSA. (See Appendix D for prior OIG reports on SSN integrity.)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SSA’s controls do not identify all individuals receiving OASDI benefits and/or SSIpayments inappropriately under multiple SSNs at the same mailing address. Further, aportion of the individuals we identified appeared to have obtained benefits fraudulently—and SSA and the OIG continue to address this. To assist SSA in preventing fraudulentand improper payments and to strengthen the integrity of the SSN, we recommend thatSSA:

1. Develop a match to identify and prevent beneficiaries inappropriately receivingboth OASDI and SSI benefits under different SSNs.

2. Ensure that all beneficiaries inappropriately receiving multiple OASDI benefits atthe same address are identified and that appropriate action is taken.

3. Run SSIDPP more frequently than once per year.

AGENCY COMMENTS

SSA agreed with our recommendations. The Agency is planning to conduct a yearly

match—beginning in February 2006—to identify and prevent beneficiaries receivingboth OASDI and SSI benefits under different SSNs at the same mailing address. Inaddition, SSA took action on the OASDI cases and started running SSIDPP quarterly.(See Appendix E for SSA’s comments.)

SPatrick P. O’Carroll, Jr.



AppendicesAPPENDIX A – Acronyms

APPENDIX B – Scope and Methodology

APPENDIX C – Background

APPENDIX D – The Social Security Number

APPENDIX E – Agency Comments

APPENDIX F – OIG Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments



Appendix A

Acronyms

MAFDUP Master File Duplicate Detection Operation

MBR Master Beneficiary Record

OASDI Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance

OIG Office of the Inspector General

POMS Program Operations Manual System

SSA Social Security Administration

SSI Supplemental Security Income

SSIDPP Supplemental Security Income Duplicate Payment Project

SSN Social Security Number

SSR Supplemental Security Record

U.S.C. United States Code



B-2

This match resulted in 1,329 cases for possible inclusion in our review. We thenobtained the Numident record3 for each beneficiary and compared the place of birth,parents, full names, other names used, and any other information on the record tohelp determine if the SSNs belonged to the same person or different individuals,such as twins with similar names. In addition, we reviewed the MBRs and SSRs to

compare phone numbers, bank account information, and any other informationavailable to help in making the determination.

After our matching processes and additional reviews, we had 381 cases where webelieved individuals might be inappropriately receiving benefits under multiple SSNsat the same address. Prior to sending these cases to SSA to confirm their identitiesand assess whether payments were appropriate, 27 duplicate payments weredetected by SSA and resolved. We referred the remaining 354 cases to SSA for review and requested that any instances of possible fraud be referred to the Office of the Inspector General’s Office of Investigations.

After obtaining feedback from SSA on our cases, we quantified the amount of overpayments assessed by the Agency. We also calculated future savings for thenext 12 months where SSA stopped the improper payments.

We conducted our audit between May 2004 and February 2005 inBoston, Massachusetts. We found the data used for this audit were sufficientlyreliableto meet our audit objective. The entities audited were the Field Offices andProgram Service Centers under the Deputy Commissioner of Operations, and the Officeof Retirement and Survivors Insurance Systems and the Office of Disability andSupplemental Security Income Systems under the Deputy Commissioner of Systems.We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditingstandards.

3 The Numident Master File houses, in SSN order, the identifying information for each number-holder.SSA, POMS, RM 00209.002.



C-1

Appendix C

BACKGROUND

SSA’s Controls for Detecting Duplicate Payments

When an individual applies for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)benefits or Supplement Security Income (SSI) payments, Social Security Administration(SSA) staff ask the person about any prior applications for benefits. This is to ensurethat individuals who may be entitled on more than one record receive the correctamount. In addition, SSA runs computer matches to identify records that appear to beduplicates based on name, date of birth, and/or zip code. SSA personnel review therecords to determine whether they relate to the same beneficiary, correct the benefitamounts (if necessary), and assess any overpayments.

SSI

Under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, the SSI program provides a minimum level of income to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled.1 Generally,individuals may receive payment of both OASDI and SSI benefits under the sameSocial Security number (SSN),2 as long as the combination of such benefits does notexceed the maximum SSI payment allowed.3

The Supplemental Security Record (SSR) exchanges information with other SSAsystems to detect duplicate records and payments. When differences are detectedbetween the identity data from the SSR and other systems, an automatic alert is

generated. SSA field office staff review the records, resolve any discrepancies, andmake any necessary adjustments in SSI payments.4

Additionally, SSA designed the SSI Duplicate Payment Project to reduce the possibilityof a recipient receiving duplicate payments due to multiple SSI records.5 The project isrun annually and is designed to identify cases which have matching names and thesame date of birth.6 Cases which meet these criteria are identified and transmitted tothe appropriate SSA office to resolve the discrepancies.

OASDI

1 The Social Security Act § 1601, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. 2 The Social Security Act § 1612(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(2)(B).

3 The Social Security Act § 1611(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(A).

4 SSA, POMS, SM 02001.001-.425.

5 SSA, POMS, SI 02310.100.

6 On February 24, 2005, SSA staff informed the OIG that—as of January 2005—SSIDPP would be runquarterly.



C-2

Under Title II of the Social Security Act, the OASDI program provides monthly benefitsto retired or disabled workers and their families and to survivors of deceased workers.7 An individual may be eligible for benefits on several records. For example, a personcan be entitled to benefits on his own earnings record and on his spouse’s record.

Although entitled on both records, SSA procedures generally provide that only thehigher benefit amount is payable.

To ensure that individuals who are entitled to multiple OASDI benefits receive thecorrect payment amount, SSA developed systems to adjust, validate, and post accurateentitlement information on the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) involved.8 SSA alsohas another control in place to detect duplicate OASDI benefits, the Master FileDuplicate Detection Operation (MAFDUP). The Agency runs MAFDUP twice annually(March and September) to detect records that match on several items, including firstname, middle name, last name, zip code, and date of birth. Alerts are generated for beneficiaries who may be receiving benefits under multiple SSNs to the appropriate

SSA office to be developed and resolved. To assist the Agency with trackingoverpayments established as a result of MAFDUP, all overpayments posted to benefitrecords must be coded as “multiple entitlement.”9

7The Social Security Act §§ 202(a) - (k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a) - (k).

8SSA, POMS, SM 00823.001.

9 SSA, Operations Bulletin, OB 04-0197, April 1, 2004.



D-1

Appendix D

The Social Security Number

Generally, the Social Security Administration (SSA) assigns an individual only oneSocial Security number (SSN). This unique number is used to record the individual’searnings for future benefit purposes and to keep track of benefits paid under thatnumber. However, SSA may assign an individual a new SSN under certaincircumstances, including:

• Sequential SSNs were assigned to members of the same family.

• Earnings records have become scrambled (i.e., wages belonging to oneindividual are posted to another individual’s record).

• There are religious or cultural objections to certain numbers in the SSN.

•

Evidence clearly shows the individual’s SSN has been misused, and that he or she is being disadvantaged by that misuse.1

SSA’s policy, in most cases, is to cross-reference the records for all SSNs assigned toan individual.2 When SSA becomes aware that an individual may have been assignedmore than one SSN, staff review the records and other available information todetermine if the SSNs actually belong to the same individual. If the SSNs do belong tothe same person, cross-reference fields are manually added to each record. A newSSN may be inappropriately assigned to an individual if he/she provides incompleteinformation or deliberately provides false information on the SSN application andsubmits evidence of age, identity, and citizenship/alien status/work authorization, which

supports the information on the SSN application.

Prior Reports on SSN Integrity

The following table shows some of the recent reports we have issued on SSN integrity.

Social Security Number Integrity and Protection

Report Issued

Management Advisory Report: The Social SecurityAdministration's Procedures for Enumerating Foreign Students(A-05-03-23056)

December 17, 2003

Social Security Numbers with More Than One Owner (A-03-03-23003)

June 23, 2004

1 SSA, POMS, RM 00205.040.

2 SSA, POMS, RM 00205.001.



D-2

Social Security Number Integrity and Protection

Report Issued

Brooklyn Social Security Card Center's Compliance with Policiesand Procedures When Processing Noncitizen Social SecurityNumber Applications (A-08-04-14061)

August 30, 2004

Compliance with Policies and Procedures When ProcessingNoncitizen Social Security Number Applications at ForeignService Posts (A-08-04-14060)

August 30, 2004

Field Offices' Compliance with Policies and Procedures WhenProcessing Noncitizen Social Security Number Applications(A-08-04-14005)

August 30, 2004

Congressional Response Report: Survey of EducationalInstitutions’ Issuance of Work Authorization Documents to ForeignStudents (A-08-04-24102)

September 30, 2004



Appendix E

Agency Comments



SOCIAL SECURITY

E-1

MEMORANDUM 34111-24-1247

Date: April 15, 2005 Refer To: S1J-3

To: Patrick P. O'Carroll, Jr.

Inspector General

From: Larry W. Dye /s/

Chief of Staff

Subject: Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report, "Individuals Receiving Benefits

Under Multiple Social Security Numbers at the Same Address" (A-01-05-25002)--

INFORMATION

We appreciate OIG’s efforts in conducting this review. Our comments on the draft report’s

recommendations are attached.

Please let me know if you have any questions. Staff inquiries may be directed to

Candace Skurnik, Director, Audit Management and Liaison Staff, at extension 54636.

Attachment:SSA Response



E-2

COMMENTS ON THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG)

DRAFT REPORT "INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING BENEFITS UNDER MULTIPLE

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS AT THE SAME ADDRESS" (A-01-05-25002)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report. We appreciate your assistance in identifying and preventing fraudulent and improper payments and strengthening the

integrity of the Social Security number (SSN). Over the last several years, we have focused

much attention on strengthening the integrity of the SSN and I am pleased to take this

opportunity to describe some of the initiatives and tools that are, or will be, available to address

the specific issues identified in this report.

Since June 2002, we have required collateral verification of birth records for applications for

original SSNs submitted for United States-born individuals age one and over. Furthermore, as

required by Section 7213 of Public Law 108-458, we will soon begin verifying birth records

(excluding those processed through the Enumeration at Birth Process) submitted by individuals

to establish eligibility for an SSN. An Agency workgroup is currently working on theimplementation of this provision. In addition, since October 1, 2002, the Social Security

Administration (SSA) no longer assigns SSNs to non-citizens without first verifying the

authenticity of their documents with the Department of Homeland Security.

To improve the processing of enumeration transactions, we now have a new tool called the "SS-5

Assistant." This tool serves as the front-end interface to the SSA enumeration system which

Field Office employees use to process SSN applications through the Modernized Enumeration

System (MES). The SS-5 Assistant guides the SSA employee through the enumeration process

and enforces compliance with all enumeration policies.

In addition, in February 2004, we made several systems enhancements to the Master FileDuplicate Detection Operation (MAFDUP) to improve the identification of inappropriate

multiple payments to the same address. MAFDUP was reprogrammed to interface with

enhancements to the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), to compare health and medical

insurance data. The interface assists us in identifying multiple SSNs at the same address who

may be receiving inappropriate benefits. Finally, as part of our redesigned MES, we plan to

develop a sophisticated means to search for the existence of multiple SSNs whenever someone

applies for an original or replacement SSN in order to prevent and/or identify these situations.

In summary, we are confident that these changes are making it considerably more difficult for

individuals to obtain SSNs using fraudulent documents and then defraud SSA. Our responses to

the specific recommendations and some technical comments are provided below:



E-3

Recommendation 1

SSA should develop a match to identify and prevent beneficiaries inappropriately receiving both

Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

benefits under different SSNs.

Response

We agree. We are working internally with our systems staff to conduct a yearly match,

beginning in February 2006, to identify and prevent beneficiaries receiving both OASDI and SSI

benefits under different SSNs at the same mailing address. We expect the match operation to be

handled through the process known as "CATF," where special programming requests are

accomplished to assist with fraud investigative operations.

Recommendation 2

SSA should ensure that all beneficiaries inappropriately receiving multiple OASDI benefits atthe same address are identified and that appropriate action is taken.

Response

We agree. We completed our review of the cases provided by OIG in January 2005 and took

appropriate action on all beneficiaries identified as possibly receiving incorrect multiple benefits.

As a result of this review, we also referred cases that involved possible fraud to OIG for

investigation.

Recommendation 3

SSA should run the Supplemental Security Income Duplicate Payment Project (SSIDPP) more

frequently than once per year.

Response

We agree. As of January 2005, SSA runs the SSIDPP quarterly.

[In addition to the items listed above, SSA provided technical comments which have

been addressed, where appropriate, in this report.]



Appendix F

OIG Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

OIG Contacts

Judith Oliveira, Director, (617) 565-1765

David Mazzola, Audit Manager (617) 565-1807

Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above:

Phillip Hanvy, Senior Program Analyst

Kevin Joyce, IT Specialist

Cheryl Robinson, Writer-Editor

For additional copies of this report, please visit our web site atwww.socialsecurity.gov/oig or contact the Office of the Inspector General’s PublicAffairs Specialist at (410) 965-3218. Refer to Common Identification Number A-01-05-25002.



DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE

Commissioner of Social Security

Office of Management and Budget, Income Maintenance Branch

Chairman and Ranking Member, Committee on Ways and MeansChief of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Social Security

Majority and Minority Staff Director, Subcommittee on Social Security

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Human Resources

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Budget, House of Representatives

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Government Reform andOversight

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

Chairman and Ranking Minority, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services,Education and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations,

House of Representatives

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Labor, Health and HumanServices, Education and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Social Security and FamilyPolicy

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Special Committee on Aging

Social Security Advisory Board



Overview of the Office of the Inspector General

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is comprised of our Office of Investigations (OI),

Office of Audit (OA), Office of the Chief Counsel to the Inspector General (OCCIG), and Office

of Executive Operations (OEO). To ensure compliance with policies and procedures, internal

controls, and professional standards, we also have a comprehensive Professional Responsibility

and Quality Assurance program.

Office of Audit

OA conducts and/or supervises financial and performance audits of the Social Security

Administration’s (SSA) programs and operations and makes recommendations to ensure

program objectives are achieved effectively and efficiently. Financial audits assess whether

SSA’s financial statements fairly present SSA’s financial position, results of operations, and cash

flow. Performance audits review the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of SSA’s programs

and operations. OA also conducts short-term management and program evaluations and projectson issues of concern to SSA, Congress, and the general public.

Office of Investigations

OI conducts and coordinates investigative activity related to fraud, waste, abuse, and

mismanagement in SSA programs and operations. This includes wrongdoing by applicants,

beneficiaries, contractors, third parties, or SSA employees performing their official duties. This

office serves as OIG liaison to the Department of Justice on all matters relating to the

investigations of SSA programs and personnel. OI also conducts joint investigations with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

Office of the Chief Counsel to the Inspector General

OCCIG provides independent legal advice and counsel to the IG on various matters, including

statutes, regulations, legislation, and policy directives. OCCIG also advises the IG on

investigative procedures and techniques, as well as on legal implications and conclusions to be

drawn from audit and investigative material. Finally, OCCIG administers the Civil Monetary

Penalty program.Office of Executive Operations

OEO supports OIG by providing information resource management and systems security. OEO

also coordinates OIG’s budget, procurement, telecommunications, facilities, and human

resources. In addition, OEO is the focal point for OIG’s strategic planning function and the

development and implementation of performance measures required by the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993.