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Policy Brief No. 20 APLN/CNND 1

SocialMediaDynamicsinBokoHaram’sTerroristInsurgence

MedinatAbdulazeezMalefakis

Abstract

This policy brief analyses the use of socialmedia by different groups affected by BokoHaram’sterroristinsurgence,includingthegroupitself.Therate,speed,spreadandbeliefwhichinformationfromsocialmediacommandshaschangedtheatresofwarandamplifiedterrorist threats.TheNigerianyouthwhoare the forerunnersofsocialmediause in thecountry have further employed Hashtag (#) Activism for varied causes regarding BokoHaram. This study examines the interlinkages between the use of social media in‘orchestrateddatacirculation’(forthedisseminationof informationandpropaganda)byboththeinsurgentsandtheNigeriangovernment,andthepopulace’sgrowingawarenessofthepowertheywieldbysimplyhavinginternetdataandaphonewhichenablesthemtochallenge, counter and refute claimsmadeby the government or security agencies. Thepopulacedoesallofthesebyprovidingverifiableeye-witnessaccountssharedandmadeviralonsocialmedia.Thisbrieffurtherhighlightsthehiddenenablersoftheaboveinter-linkages – Telecommunication Companies (TELCOs) whose role as Mobile NetworkOperators(MNOs)continuestooscillatebetweenbeinggovernmentcollaborators,targetsfor Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks and simply profit-driven enterprises competing forsubscribers.As a base for contextual analysis, this studypremises thatwhile all partiesinvolved attempt to appropriate socialmedia for their benefits, specific parties such associalmedia tech companies, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the populace haveimpactfulrolestoplay.Oneofsuchisensuringthebenefitsaccruedfromthecontinuousboomofsocialmediaareproperlyharnessedforpeaceprocessesandthesafeguardingofindividualrightstofreedomofexpression.

KeyFindings

1. AmajorfactorenablingthespreadofsocialmediainNigeriaisthepoweritconfersonitsuser.The‘attentioneconomy’astheback-boneofsocialmediaconsequentlyfuels

PolicyBriefNo.50

October2019

Policy Brief No. 50 Toda Peace Institute 2

the‘vanityoftheself’andhasledtothepopularityofsocialmediainfluencerswhohaveoperationallycraftedsocialmediatobecomeopinionshapers.

2. Telecommunicationcompanies(TELCOs)suchasMTN,Airtel,Globacomand9-Mobilehaveinvariablyinfluencedthemechanismsthroughwhichsocialmediaisavailableasconflict-impactingtools.Theyarethesocialmediaenablers.

3. BokoHaram,theNigeriangovernmentandtheNigerianpopulacearethesocialmediaprofiteerswhoappropriatethespecificitiesofsocialmediatoachievevariedobjectives.

4. HashtagActivismhashelpedtoredirecttheperceptionofBokoHaram’sterrorismandremains an essential part of citizen’s participation in counter-terrorism operationsusingsocialmedia.

5. SocialmediatechcompaniesandCSOscouldutiliseexistingfeaturesandprogrammestodirectlyandindirectlymitigateBokoHaram’sinsurgentterrorisminNigeria.

TheSocialMediaRevolutionandItsEnablers

Nigeria caught the global internet buzz around1996. Prior to this, the fastestmeans ofcommunicationwasvoicecallsusingnon-mobiletelephones.TheNigerianCommunicationCommission(NCC)’sgrantingofinternetbroadbandoperationlicensestoabout38differ-entcompaniesin1996markedthebeginningofthesocialmediarevolutioninAfrica’smostpopulousnation.Whenthecompaniesbeganoperation,internetcafessprangupinmanyurbancitiesincludingLagos,Kaduna,Port-Harcourt,KanoandEnugu.Atthistime,internetbased activities comprised instantmessaging (IM) using applications such as Yahoo. Asmoreweb-basedsocialmediaapplicationssuchasFacebookemerged, internetcafés(orcybercafésastheyaremorepopularlycalled)experienced increasedtrafficwithpeoplethrongingintogetconnectedtooldfriendsandmeetnewones.TheIMoptionsonFacebookincreaseditsversatilityasasocialisationandcommunicationtoolformanyNigerians.By1999,Nigeriahadabout200,000internetusers.1

TelecommunicationOperators(TELCOs)beganoperationsin2001withthelaunchofGSMservicesbySouthAfricangiantMTNandIndia-ownedBhartiAirtel.Sincethen,accordingtotheNCC,mobiletelephoneusagehasincreasedexponentially,risingfrom8.5percentin2004to92.14percentin2014.NigerianowhasAfrica’slargestmobilephonemarketwith167millionconnectedGSMlines.2MTNandAirtelpioneeredbroadbandinternetserviceswhich made access to social media applications much easier, more private and betteraccessible.Thenumberofinternetuserssteadilyroseto4.9min2005,38.3millionin2010,82min2015and98min2018.3After the telecommunicationssectorbecameprivatised,their continuous competition for subscribers led to the availability of internet access ataffordableratessuchthat,evenwithaneconomicrecession,Nigerianhouseholdscouldstillafford airtime for calls and internet data. The availability of internet data automaticallyincreasedthereachanduseofsocialmediaapplicationssuchasFacebook,2go,WhatsApp,

1“OxfordBusinessGroup,”accessedMay12,2019,https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/paving-way-reforms-listings-and-infrastructure-support-mobile-growth2Jacob,J.UdoandAkpan,I.,“SilencingBokoHaram:MobilePhoneBlackoutandCounterinsurgencyinNigeria’sNortheastregion,”InternationalJournalofSecurityandDevelopment4,no.1(2015):15. 3 “Internet Live Stats,” accessed May 16, 2019, www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/nigeria/

Medinat Abdulazeez Malefakis Social Media Dynamics in Boko Haram’s Terrorist Insurgence

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Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, Telegram and other microblogging platforms. Nigeriacurrently has about 24 million users across all of these social media platforms withFacebookhavingthehighestuser/engagementstatus.

Socialmediarevolutionisedthesocietal,economicandpoliticallandscapeofNigeria.MorebusinessesbecameoperationalandweredrivenbytheirFacebookandInstagrampresence,whileTwitterbecamethesiteforsharedanddisparateviewsonpolitics,sports,activismand social interactions. Nigerians appropriated the use of trends and hashtags to drivediscussionsonanyandeveryissue,andwhenBokoHaram’sterroristinsurgenceemergedin the north east in 2009, social media became an important tool in the hands of theinsurgents,thegovernmentandsecurityagents,andtheNigerianpopulace.

Figure1.OverviewofNigeria’s2019SocialMediaUserStatus


Figure2.MostUsedSocialMediaPlatformsinNigeria

TheSocialMediaProfiteers

1. BokoHaram

Evolving in 2004 as an insurgent group against societal corruption in governance andextremepoverty in theKanurispeakingstateofMaiduguri,BokoHaramhasblended itsgrievances with its extremely violent Salafi ideology to emerge as one of the world’sdeadliestJihadigroups.Afterthegroup’sforemostleader((MuhammadYusuf)waskilledduringaconfrontationwithsecurity forces in2009,BokoHaram(now ledbyAbubakarShekau)regroupedandreinventedtheirtacticalapproachestoincludesuicidebombings,prison raids and high-profile kidnappings. At the height of its existence in 2015, BokoHaramcontrolledareasinNigeria’snortheastthatwerethesizeofBelgium.TheyalsospreadtheirattacksandsphereofinfluencebeyondNigeriatoMayoTsanagaandMayoSavainNorthernCameroon,NguimiinthenorthofNiger’sDiffaregionandNgoubouainChad.In2014,thegroupabductedover250schoolgirlsinthetownofChibokinBornostate,amovewhichteleportedittotheranksofglobaljihadiorganisationssuchasISandAlQaeda.Infact,theuseofkidnappingandothercarefullyorchestratedbombingsofbothsoftandhardtargetsweretheresultsofBokoHaram’scontactwithtopJihadiorganisationssuchasAlQaedaintheIslamicMaghrebandtheIslamicState.4Abreak-outfactionofBokoHaramistheIslamicStateWestAfricaProvince(ISWAP)ledbyMohammedYusuf’sson,Albarnawi.Thisfaction

4 Campbell, John. “Nigerian Security Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified July 1, 2019.https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.


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isreportedlydeadlier,overrunningmilitarybasesinthenortheastwithimpunity.ISWAPwasalsoresponsiblefortheFebruary2018abductionofabout100girlsfromtheirschoolin Dapchi, Yobe state. All but one of these girls has fortunately been returned by theinsurgents.AccordingtotheCouncilonForeignRelation’sNigeriaSecurityTracker,BokoHaram’sterrorism(andbyextensionISWAP’s)haskilled27,414fromMay2011toJanuary2019.TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugeesestimatesthenumberofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsfromBokoHaram’sactivitiestobeover2.2millionpeople,with the displaced scattered across ill-equipped, mostly unhygienic and improperlymanagedcampsacrossNigeria,CameroonandNiger.5

Before the advent of socialmedia,BokoHaram communicated its ideologies and stand-pointstothepublicbysharingvideosandpamphletsofMuhammadYusuf’spreachingtojournalistsandthegeneralpopulace.Thegroupalsoreliedonthe‘simultaneity’ofmobilecommunications to coordinate attacks and activate cell members based at locationsproximaltothetarget.6ThisuseofmobilecommunicationforcoordinationofattackshadledtheNigerianmilitarytoinstituteamobilephoneblackoutinMay2013inBorno,Yobeand Adamawa, amove BokoHaram responded to by bombing telecommunication basestationsbelievedtoprovideNigeriansecurityforceswithcalllogsandcalllocationofitsmembers.Withtheadventofsocialmedia,BokoHaramembraceditsresistancetocontrol,highinteractivity,easeofuse,suitabilityforvisualcontentandlackofmediatinginfluence.7Allofthesemadesocialmediaplatformsidealforthegroup’s‘terrorprenuering’activities.WhilesophisticatedterrorgroupssuchasISISandAlQaedausesocialmediaplatformsforrecruitmentpurposes,BokoHaramandISWAPhavebeenabitlesssuccessfulwithdirectrecruitmentsusingsocialmedia.Unlikeothergroupswhorecruitusingtelegramandothersocialmediaapps,BHandISWAPrelymoreon face-to-face,physicalrecruitment tacticsbecausemostoftheareaswheretheyoperateandneedrecruitsareinhabitedbyapopula-tionwithlowlevelsofformalandmobileliteracy.Howevertheystillusesocialmediaforvariousactivitiessuchas:

ClaimingResponsibilityforTerroristAttacks:AssoonasBokoHarammasteredtheuseofsocialmediaplatforms,thegroupclaimedresponsibilityforattacksandshowedproofsofcertainattackswithvideosonYouTube.Thesevideoswererecordedwiththewell-knownterroristregaliaandinsignia:flagsatthebackground,jihadistsdressedinmilitarycamou-flage,holdinggunswiththeirfacescovered.Proofofattackswasdemonstratedintheformofcapturedsoldiers,weaponsorlogisticvehicles.BokoHaramandISWAPalsosharedlivevideosoftheirattacksespeciallyonmilitarybases,chroniclinghowsuchbaseswereover-run,lootedandburnt.Othervideossharedwereforbargainingchips,suchastheproofoflifevideofortheabductedChibokgirls.Inclaimingresponsibilityforattacks,BokoHaramalsosometimestalksaboutthereasonsforsuchattacksandincertaincasesrevealspoten-tialtargets.ThelanguagesusedinthesevideosincludeHausa,Arabic,EnglishandKanuri.

5Abdulazeez,Medinat.“AStudyofRefugeesandInternallyDisplacedPersonsfromBokoHaram’sInsurgency”,UnpublishedDoctoralThesis.6UdoandAkpan,“SilencingBokoHaram”,4.7Ette.MercyandJoe.Sarah,“RivalVisionsofReality’:AnanalysisoftheframingofBokoHaraminNigerianNewspapersandTwitter,”War&Conflict11no.4(2018):394.


Communicatingwith/UpdatingCellMembersandSympathisers:ContextualanalysisofBokoHaram’sYouTubevideosdemonstratesthegroup’suseofthesevideosasameansofpassinginformationtomembersscatteredacrosstheiroperationalcells.Inavideotoclaimrespon-sibilityforanattackonGiwamilitarybarracksin2014,Shekaustates:“Brethren,whereveryouare,Ipraythismeetsyouwell.Igiveyouthegoahead,whetheryouaretwoorthree,takeupyourweaponsandstartkillingthem…killkillkill,slaughterthem,sparetheold,women,children,thementallyunstableandthosewhorepent.AllthosewhorefuseAllahkill…….Killkillandkill.Thatistheinformationfortoday”.8InanothervideosharedafterNigerianmilitaryforcesclaimedtohavekilledhiminashoot-out,Shekautellshisfollowersthatheisaliveandtheworkofsecuringthecaliphateisstillon-going.

SpreadingPropaganda:OnYouTubeandFacebook,BokoHaramsharevideosofdailylifeintheircampsandcapturedterritories.Theaimistocommunicateasenseofcommunallivingshowingobscured facesofwivesand children carryingout ‘everyday chores’.Theyalsoutilise such videos to show the efficient application of Islamic law (Sharia) in capturedterritories, showing women wearing hijabs, offenders for crimes being punished withfloggingorinextremecases,beheadings.Videosofcapturedsoldiersandotherprisonersbeingbeheadedorshotarealsoshared.Allofthesedemonstratethegroup’sdominanceinitscapturedterritorieswhilesimultaneouslyinstillingfearintheNigerianpopulace.BokoHaram’spropagandavideosarealsousedasjurisprudentialcontests,whereversesoftheQuranareappliedtocondemndemocracyandcorruptioninNigeria.

BokoHaramandISWAP’suseofsocialmediabecamemoresophisticatedwithbothgroups’associationwiththeIslamicState.SinceitwasnamedastheIS’sWestAfricanrepresenta-tivein2015,ISWAPhassetupitsownmediadepartment,termedtheMediaOfficeofWestAfricaProvince;ithasmadegreateruseofYouTubeandTwitter(e.g.establishingitsownArabicTwitteraccount@AlUrwahal-Wuthqa,in2015);andithasimprovedthequalityofitsvideosdistributedviatheseplatforms.9OnJune102019,theNigerianarmyannouncedthattheyhadkillednineISWAPsocialmediapersonalitiesknownforpromotingthegroup’sonlinemediapropagandainitsquesttomaintainavirtualcaliphate.ItremainstobeseenhowthedeathsoftheseninepersonalitieswillinfluencetheholdanduseofsocialmediabyISWAP.

8Abidemi.OlabodeS.,“APreliminaryOverviewofICTUseintheBokoHaramconflict:ACyberconflictPerspec-tive,”ContemporaryVoices1no.1(2018):43.9Cox.Kate,Marcellino.Williams,Bellasio.JacopoandWard.Antonia,“SocialmediainAfrica,aDouble-edgedSword for Security and Development Research” UNDP 23, //www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Re-ports/UNDP-RAND-Social-Media-Africa-Research-Report_final_3%20Oct.pdf


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Figure3.Iswap’spropagandavideoafteranattackonamilitarybaseinBorno

2. TheNigerianMilitaryandPoliticalApparatus

TocounterBokoHaram’sterroristinsurgence,theNigeriangovernmentemploysthemightofitsmilitary.Atvariousperiodsinthefight,theNigerianmilitaryhasbeenaidedbytheNigerianPoliceForceandothernationalsecurityagencies inacollaborativeoperationaloutfitknownastheJointTaskForce(JTF).TheJTFhasalsobeenassistedbytheAfricanUnion institutedMultinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising troops fromNiger,Benin,Chad,andNigeria.TheNigeriangovernmentanditsmilitaryadoptedsocialmediafordiversifiedpurposesandindistinctcontextswithintheframeworkofcounter-terrorismmeasuresagainstBokoHaram.Moreoftenthannot,boththegovernmentandthesecurityagentsaligntheirpositionsandposturesespeciallyregardinginformationdisseminatedonsocialmedia.Consequently,inthecontextofBokoHaram,theNigeriangovernmentanditssecurityapparatusareoneandthesameintheeyesoftheNigerianpopulace.Socialmediadynamics for themilitary have ranged from being used as an information/propagandaavenue,tobeingemployedbydisgruntledelementsasatooltochannelgrievances.

Information/Propaganda Sharing: The headquarters of the Nigerian army has both aFacebook and a Twitter Handle (@HQNigerianArmy) with about 570,000 followers.Amongstothernews,theseaccountsaredesignedtochroniclethemilitary’scounter-insur-gencyoperationssuchaspicturesofinsurgentskilledandcaptured,triumphantoverrunsofinsurgentbases,recoveryofarmsandammunitions,rescueoperationsforwomenandchildren, and so on. These handles rarely share news aboutmilitary losses or fatalitiessufferedincounter-insurgencyoperations.Accountsrenderedfromthehandlespresentthe


Nigerianmilitaryanditsapparatusesas‘on-top’oftheinsurgencyeventhoughtheconcreteinsecuritysituationinareasaffectedbyBokoHarambelietheseassertions.Althoughlegacymedia outfits quote press releases from the army’s social media accounts for officialdocumentation, many analysts do not rely on the military’s ‘one-sided’, ‘consistentlywinning’ renditions of events on the ground. The army’s culture of classifying relevantinformationhasfurthermadeitimpossibletoverifytheveracityofinformationsharedonthesesocialmediahandles.ThefactthattheNigeriangovernmentsubstantiallyre-echoesthearmy’sversionofeventsespeciallyinregardstocasualitynumbersonthesideofthearmyhascastfurtheraspersionsontheuseofinformationgarneredfromthearmy’ssocialmediaplatforms.

ChannelingofGrievances:Quiteunexpectedly,andalsothroughsocialmedia,thepopulacewas giftedwith informationwhich the armywould rathernot share. Soldiers andarmyofficershavetakentotheirFacebook,TwitterandInstagramaccountstosendpictureandvideorecordsoftheircounter-insurgencyexperiencestotheirfamilies,friendsandsocialmedia followers. From these records, evidence emerges of an acute lack of effectiveweaponrytocombatBokoHaram,lackofadequatewelfareforsoldiersonthebattlefront,low-morale in troops due to non-payment of salaries, entitlement and allowances,non-grantingofleaveandunendingdeploymenttoconflictareas,maltreatmentbyseniormilitaryofficerswhoweredirectlyandindirectlyaccusedofcorruption,nepotism,fundsdiversionandcollusionwithinsurgents.Therumblingsinsecurityrankshaveresultedinsoldiersmutinyingagainstsuperiors(July2014,2017andDecember2018).Someofthesemutiniesandrevoltswerealsocapturedandpostedonsocialmediabythesoldiersortheirfamily/friends.Also,thedeathofasoldieroranofficeronthebattlefrontbecomesknowntofamilymembersandthepublicalmostimmediatelyitoccursbecausemilitarycolleaguesusuallytaketotheirsocialmediaaccountsto‘mourntheirfallencomrade’witheulogiesandgrievingwords.Mosttimes,sucheulogisingpostsbecomepublicwellbeforetheNigerianmilitaryacknowledgesattacksinwhichthedeathoccurs,orofficiallysendsawrittonotifythefamilyofthedead.

The use of social media by ‘rogue soldiers’ became such a thorn in the military’s flesh that in August 2018, the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff issued a statement to address the issue:

“Itisveryunfortunateandunprofessionalforexampleforservicepersonnel to resort to social media to disclose classified infor-mation or express grievanceswhen the Nigerian Army haswellestablished channels for addressing complaints. It is equallysaddeningtofindoperationalincidentsandoccurrencesincludinggory pictures involving own personnel’s and equipment beingcirculatedonsocialmediabytroopstotheembarrassmentoftheserviceandaffectedfamilies.”10

10MainaMaina,“BokoHaram:BurataiBlamesSocialMediaforEndlessWar,”DailyPost,August17,2017,MainaMaina,https://dailypost.ng/2017/08/17/boko-haram-buratai-blames-social-media-endless-war/


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Figure4.Tweetshowingsoldierdesertingtheatreofwar

TheArmyfurtherclaimedthatthewronguseofsocialmediabysoldiershadexposedsomeofitsoperationstotheinsurgentsandputthelivesoftroopsindanger.11Althoughmanyobserversapplaudthealternativemeasuresusedbysoldierstobringtheirsituationtothefront-burnersofnationaldiscourse,therearealsofearsthatmakingsuchmatterspublicthroughsocialmediaexposesweaknesseswhichinsurgentscould(andhave)capitaliseon.ThisdoesnothoweverjustifytheinactionsoftheNigeriangovernmentandmilitaryservicechiefsintheprovisionofbetterequipmentandwelfarefortroops.

3. TheCitizenry

Influencers and Opinion Shapers: The democratising potential and accessibility of socialmediapresentsitasacrucialapparatusadoptedandmechanisedtosuitdiverseusesinthehandsof theNigerianpopulace.Before its advent, legacymedia (newspapers, radioandtelevision) were the gate-keepers of information which meant that information wascirculatedwithalltheinherentfiltersandrestrictionsaccompanyingmediaoutfits.With

11MollyKilete,“BokoHaram:Again,ArmyCautionsTroopsonIndiscriminateUseofSocialMedia,”SunNewsOnline,August26,2018,https://www.sunnewsonline.com/boko-haram-again-army-cautions-troops-on-indis-criminate-use-of-social-media/


socialmedia, such limitationsare close tonon-existent as longas theadvisoriesof techcompanies (which are less stringent) are abided by. Thus, with a Twitter, Facebook orInstagramaccount,eye-witnessaccountsofterroristactsandaftermathsofterroristattacksaresharedgenerating‘trending’conversations.Atweetcanmakethetweeter‘popular’insecondswiththousandsofretweets,likes,andengagingcomments.The‘attentioneconomy’astheback-boneofsocialmediafuelsthepopularityofsocialmedia‘influencers’whohaveoperationally crafted social media to become opinion shapers, and whose positionscontinuetoinfluencethedynamicsofBokoHaraminNigeria.OnesuchopinionshaperisAhmedSalkida.HeistheonlyjournalistknowntohavehaddirectcontactwithMuhammadYusufandBokoHaram.Histwitterfeedscontainregularupdateswith‘insider’informationaboutBokoHaramattacksandactivities.SalkidahadalsosharedtheproofoflifevideofortheabductedChibokgirls.

Eyewitnessaccountsofterroristactivitiesandinsiderinformationsharedonsocialmediabybothusersandinfluencershavebecomesoinfluentialthatlegacymediacontemporarilylooktosocialmediaforbreakingnews.Theyhelptobridgetheinformationgapespeciallyontheactivitiesofterroristsandkeepthepublicnotonlyupdatedbutalsoalert.12Bothalsohelptoverifyinformationsharedbyboththemilitaryandthegovernment.

Citizen’sUseofHashtagActivism:TheNigerianpopulacehasalsoadoptedthesocialmedia‘hashtag’asadigitalactivismvanguardforparticipation,persuasionandpressure.Hashtagactivism denotes “political participation, activities and protests organised on digitalnetworks with groups involved sharing a common political attribute that includes thestrugglefor‘reformorrevolution’withstate,non-stateplayersandemergentsocio-politicalestablishments.”13Ahashtagisatypeofmetadatatagusedinsocialnetworkstoallowuserstoapplydynamic,user-generatedtaggingwhichmakesitpossibleforotheruserstoeasilyfindmessageswithaspecificthemeorcontent.14SinceitsfirstuseonTwitterin2007,thehashtaghasspreadtoothersocialmediaandisusedasameansforpeopletohighlightnewinformation,drawattentiontoissuesorfindotherswhosharetheirviewpoint.15

InthecontextoftheongoingBokoHaramterroristinsurgence,hashtagactivismespeciallyon Twitter and Facebook has been adopted by the populace to pressurise theNigeriangovernmenttoact(forexampleusing#BringBackOurGirlsandthe#DapchiGirlstocallforthereleaseof theabductedChibokandDapchigirls).The#BringBackOurGirlscampaigngarnered 3.3 million tweets with celebrities such as Michelle Obama also tweeting tosupport the cause. It also helped put pressure on the government to focus on ensuringaccountability,makingsurethatallthegirlsabductedbyBokoHaramaresafelyrescuedandreunitedwiththeirfamilies.16

12EtteandJoe,“RivalVisionsofReality,”402. 13Igodo.Cynthia,“ThePowerofSocialMediaNigeria'sChangingFeministMovement,”Republic,March1,2019,https://www.republic.com.ng/vol3-no1/the-power-of-social-media/14Igodo,“ThePowerofSocialMedia.”15Igodo,“ThePowerofSocialMedia.”16Sadighi.Darius,“HowHashtagActivismHelpedRaiseAwarenessAboutBokoHaram,”TeenVogue,May12,2017,https://www.teenvogue.com/story/hashtag-activism-raise-awareness-boko-haram


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Figure5.#BringBackOurGirlscampaign

Hashtagactivismisalsousedtorefuteandcountertheclaimsofsecurityagents.InthecaseofBokoHaram’sattackonthearmybaseinMetele,Bornostate,onNovember18,2018,thearmydidnotputoutanofficial report immediatelyafter theattack,andwhen theydid,casualtyfiguresonitssideweregrosslyunder-reported.Avideosurfacedafterwardsonsocialmediawhichrevealedthehorrendousoverrunof themilitarybasewithbodiesofdeadtroops.Thevoicesinthebackground(believedtobesoldierswhoescapedtheattack)estimatedthedeadtobeoverahundred.Thehashtag#Metelebegantotrendimmediatelyrefutingearlierfiguressharedbythemilitary.Thearmyissuedastatementfivedayslaterindamagecontrolbutitsinabilitytogivespecificresponsesonaspectsoftheattackonlyservedtofurtherdiscredititsclaims.

CitizensRedirectingBokoHaramConversations:Becauseitopensthedoortomoredirectandeffectivecommunicationbetween Nigerians and their government, social media isconsideredtobeaformofcitizen’sparticipationinsecurityoperations.17IthasbeenusedbyNigerianstoredirecttheconversationoncertainaspectsoftheBokoHaramconflict.Anexample is theongoingTwitter campaignaboutLeahSharibu.Shewas theonlygirlnotreleased by insurgents following the Dapchi abductions in February 2018 because sherefusedtorenounceherChristianfaith.EveryMay16(Leah’sbirthday)sinceherkidnap,socialmediausersputupherpicturesontheirhandlestokeepherabductiononthefrontburner of political discourse and pressure the Nigerian government into securing herrelease.Socialmediahasalsobeenused toredirect theconversationonBokoHaramtohumanrightsabusesandextrajudicialkillingscommittedbytheNigerianmilitary.Videofootage of the killings, beatings and maiming perpetrated by security forces againstsuspectedBokoHaramextremistsbecamewidespreadonsocialnetworks.AmnestyInter-national has also published a reportwhich is a collection from eyewitnesses and likely

17Sadighi.“HowHashtagActivismHelpedRaseAwareness.”


perpetrators,capturedmainlyoncellphonesandsharedbetweenindividualsoronsocialmedia. 18 In the Boko Haram context thus, the citizenry are no longer docile but haveassumed the role of game changers,19 revolutionising fact-finding and opening up newhorizonsfordiscoursesonBokoHaram’sterroristinsurgence.

Re-InfluencingSocialMediaDynamicsinBokoHaram’sTerroristInsurgence:TheRoleofTechCompaniesandCivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs).

1. Tech Companies Should Collaborate with Youth-Oriented Clerics: Nigeria’syouthfulpopulation, among thebiggest in theworld, isacclaimedasoneof thebestusers of social media to influence political, economic and social change. A host ofsuccessfulsocial media campaign trails (#OcupyNigeria, #NotTooYoungToRun, #EndSARS and#ArewaMeToo) demonstrate the tenacity they apply to digital activism and theenterprisingnatureoftheironlinebattles.Thesecampaignsandthechangingresponsesthey have generated have proven that the Nigerian government has also embracedsocialmediaasalenstounderstandingthepulseofthepopulace.Notjustthegovernment,butthe world also pays attention to Nigeria’s youth-driven social media scene.Consequently, tech companies need to recognise and utilise the already buddingactivismlandscapeinpositivelyinfluencingBokoHaram’sterroristdynamics.Amajorwaytodothisistoemploysocialmediaactivismtospreadcounter-Islamicideologies.TheemergenceofBokoHaram’sterroristbrandwasbuiltontheabilitytomakethegroup’sbrandofSalafismseemsuperiorandalotofyouthsconfessedthattheycameintocontactwithBokoHaram’sradicalisationagentsinuniversities,includingBayeroUniversityinKano,AhmaduBelloUniversityinZaria20andtheUniversityofMaiduguriinBornostate. AmajorwaytocounterBokoHaram's terrorismthuswould involvediscreditingthegroup’sideologicalmotivationanditspowertomotivatethousandsofyoungsupporterstokillandmaiminthenameofjihad.Techcompaniescancollaboratewithidentified,youth-oriented,moderateIslamicclericsandsocialmediainfluencerswhocanusetheirsocialmediastandingtocarryoutyouth-focusedcommunity-basedorientationprogrammesinuniversitiesandinstitutionsofhigherlearning.Suchclericsshouldbeinfluential,with theability toaffect largerpublicopinion,and thegoalswouldbe tocounter extremist agendas, radical interpretations of Islamic religion, and otherelements in the ideologyof terroristviolence.21Islamicscholarswithcontemporary/secular world outlooks that fit this role include Mufti Ismail Menks, Yusuf Estes,NoumanAliKhanandMuhammedSalah.

18Koettl.Christopher,“HowTechnologyHelpedusExposeWarCrimesinNigeria,”June4,2015,AmnestyInter-national, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/how-technology-helped-us-expose-war-crimes-in-nigeria/19Koettl.HowTechnologyhelpedusExposeWarCrimesinNigeria.” 20PersonalInterviewwithYushau,(FormerBUKStudent,Kaduna),June12,2014).21 Campbell. Kurt and Weitz. Richard, “Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism: LessonsLearnedfromPastCounterinsurgencies”WoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs,(2006):17.


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2. TechCompaniesShouldAligntheirVanguardActivitiestoTerrorismPrevention.The annual Social MediaWeek (SMW) is held in Lagos. Planned for participants toinspire,connectandengage,SMWbringstogethersocialmediausersandenthusiastsfrom fashion, entertainment, business, travel and politics. Various issues have beendiscussedintheSMWpanelsincludingbutnotlimitedtohowtosucceedinthemusicindustry,theimpactofsocialmediaduringelectionsandthebenefitsofhavingmentors.SMWhashoweverfocusedonzeroissuesregardingradicalisationorviolentextremism.BecauseSMWisdrivenbytheyouthpopulation,suchventuresarecrucialtothefightagainstterroristinsurgence.DuringSMW2019,YouTubeannouncedtheirsponsorshipofNollywoodseriesAyetoroTownbyFunkeAkindeleBello.Techcompaniescanthusutilise the leverage which the entertainment industry has on social interactions toincrease awareness about the deceitful tactics terrorist groups use to recruit newmembersandtheimpactofviolentextremismonNigeriancommunities.

3. GovernmentsandTechCompaniesCanCollaboratewithOrganisationsWorkingonPreventionandCounteringofViolentExtremism(P/CVE):Thisisanotherviabletool to positively influencing Boko Haram’s terrorism dynamics and impact peaceprocesses.UNICEF recruited Snapchat users to launch a campaigndesigned to raiseawarenessofthehorrificimpactoftheBokoHaramcrisisinNigeriaonchildren,withSnapchatmembersredrawingthepicturesbysomeofthechildrenforcedtofleetheirhomes.ThecampaignisdesignedtoequatethetransientnatureofSnapchatcontent,which seespictures andmessagesdisappearing shortly after theyare sent,with thenotionofthechildhoodsofvictimsdisappearing.22OthertechcompaniescanhighlightspecificaspectsoftheconflictusingfeaturesoftheirapplicationslikeGoogledoeswithhistoricaleventsonitssearchengine.Facebookalsosharesananniversaryupdatewithitsusers.ThisfeaturecanbeusedtoshareremindersonimportantBokoHaramrelatedtragiceventsthatneedtobekeptalivesuchastheabductionofLeahSharibuandotherChibokgirlsyettobereleased.

4. TechCompaniesShouldPromotePost-BokoHaramPeaceProcessesbyBlockingDisinformation:Techcompaniesandcivilsocietycouldworktogethertocurbtheuseofsocialmediatospreadfake,unsubstantiatednewsaboutBokoHaramactivities.Techcompanies need to domore in terms of blocking the ceaseless sharing ofmessagesespecially inethnically/religiouslysensitive, crisis-proneareas. In India for instance,following a spate of lynching that was allegedly sparked by fake videos shared onWhatsApp,theapptooksteps,includinglettingusersknowwhenamessagehadbeenforwardedandnotwrittenbythesender.ThishasalsobeenintroducedinNigeriaandwouldhopefullyhavetheeffectofpreventingthespreadofunverifiednews.However,techcompaniescouldgobeyondthistoactuallyflagmessagesthathavebeensharedalittletooconsistently,andnotifytherecipientofthenumberoftimessuchamessagehas been forwarded to different users before the current recipient received it. Thiswouldnotonlyarouseasenseofwarningtotheuser,butwillalsocastdoubtsontheorigin, accuracy and authenticity of the forwarded message. This mechanism couldapplytoplatformswithclosedusermessagingsuchasWhatsAppandFacebook.

22 “UNICEF,” accessed April 2, 2019, https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/unicef-snapchat-highlight-plight-children-affected-boko-haram-conflict-nigeria/1342719


5. CSOs Need to Develop Social Media Campaigns with the Right Strategy andTemplates:CSOsinNigeriahaveactedasconsciencetoolsagainstpolitical,economicandmediastrugglesinNigeria.EnoughisEnough(EiE),YouthInitiativeforAdvocacy,GrowthandAdvancement(YIAGA),andAllianceforCredibleElectionsaresomeoftheprominentCSOswhohaveadvocatedforpoliticalchangesinthecountry.InMay2016,Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) was also a vibrant voice against theNigerian’s government attempts to limit online freedom of expression through the‘SocialMediaBill’.Thebillifpassedintendedto“ProhibitFrivolousPetitionsandOtherMatters Connected Therewith” and included up to two years in prison, or a fine of$10,000,orboth,foranyonepostingan“abusivestatement”viatextmessage,Twitter,WhatsApp,oranyotherformofsocialmedia.23Varioussocialmediacampaignsinclud-ing the twitter hashtag #NoToSocialMediaBill helped in putting pressure on theNigeriansenatetoredactthebill.TheCLEENFoundation(whichdealswithsecurityandaccessiblejustice),TwitterandInstagram,forexample,couldbeusedasaplatformforeducationwhereinformationsharedforhashtagactivismsaremeaningfullyrelevanttoexistingcontexts,containhistoricalanalogiesandareprofessionallywellresearchedforpublicconsumption.Thiswouldbroadentheuseofsocialmedianotjustforsocialisa-tionbutformindsetreorientationneededinthepost-BokoHaram’ssocietalreintegra-tion and rehabilitation phase. CSOs shouldmore importantly help take socialmediacampaigns offline through activities such as lobbying and focus groupdiscussions.24This would help concretise actions already theorised on social media and bringpragmatic actions to bear in the lives of those affected by Boko Haram’s terroristinsurgence.

Conclusion

ThepopularityofsocialmediainNigeriaandtheyouthpopulationwhodriveitsusearethemajorreasonswhyitisaveritabletoolforcounteringviolentextremismandconsolidatingpeaceprocesses.BokoHaram’suseofsocialmediaforrecruitmentiscontemporarilynotsophisticatedenoughbutthecontactsandconnectionwhichISWAPenjoyswiththeIslamicState can change this trend.Before this happens, tech companies couldmaximise socialmedia usage through social media influencers and flagship activities like the SMW tore-orient youth values and spread counter-terrorist narratives. CSOs could take socialmediaactivismsofflinetoconnectwithrelevantstakeholdersandensurethatnecessarylegislation that fulfills socialmedia hashtag activisms are passed.With all of these, it ispossible to ensure that Boko Haram’s terrorist insurgence loses the backbone of itsexistence:followersandsympathisers.

23 Kermeliotis. Teo, “Proposed Social Media Bill Under Fire in Nigeria,” Aljazeera, December 5, 2015,https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/proposed-social-media-bill-fire-nigeria-151204211513621.html24 Gibson, Megan, “Can A Social Media Campaign Really #BringBackOurGirls?,” Time, May 7, 2014.http://time.com/90693/bringbackourgirls-nigeria-boko-haram/


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TheAuthorMedinatAbdulazeezMalefakisisanInformationAnalystatACAPS.DrMalefakisobtainedherDoctorateinInternationalStudiesfromUniversityofZurichandtheNigerianDefenceAcademy, majoring in Terrorism and Humanitarian Displacement. She was a JuniorResearcherattheMaxPlanckInstituteinHalle(Germany),ResearchFellowwiththeUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace’sRESOLVENetwork,andapost-doctoralresearcherattheBerlinSocial Science Centre (Germany). DrMalefakis’ research interests are terrorism, violentextremism, religious fundamentalism, humanitarian displacement (refugees and IDPs),socialandviolentconflicts,post-conflictresettlement,rehabilitationandreintegration.TodaPeaceInstitute

TheTodaPeaceInstituteisanindependent,nonpartisaninstitutecommittedtoadvancingamorejustandpeacefulworldthroughpolicy-orientedpeaceresearchandpractice.TheInstitute commissions evidence-based research, convenesmulti-track andmulti-discipli-naryproblem-solvingworkshopsandseminars,andpromotesdialogueacrossethnic,cul-tural,religiousandpoliticaldivides.Itcatalysespractical,policy-orientedconversationsbe-tweentheoreticalexperts,practitioners,policymakersandcivilsocietyleadersinordertodiscerninnovativeandcreativesolutionstothemajorproblemsconfrontingtheworldinthetwenty-firstcentury(seewww.toda.orgformoreinformation).ContactUsTodaPeaceInstituteSamonElevenBldg.5thFloor3-1Samon-cho,Shinjuku-ku,Tokyo160-0017,JapanEmail:[email protected]

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