social institutions dynamic in the tragedy of the commons

https://kemlg.upc.edu

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Social Institutions

Dynamics in the Tragedy of the Commons

Student: Luis Oliva Felipe

Advisor: Ulises Cortés

[email protected]

Thesis proposal, Barcelona, February 2013

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Outline

Introduction State of the art

Taxonomy of goods Collective action Social dilemmas Tragedy of the commons Appropriation and provision

Hypothesis and Proposed models Summary, Tasks and Publications

2

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Introduction: What is the Tragedy?

3

Hardin: Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase…without limit. …Ruin is the destination… Open access resource consumed by rational

agents Individual gain and shared cost Leads to overexploitation and, inexorably, to

depletion

Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications

G. Hardin “The Tragedy of the Commons“ (1968)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Introduction: old problem

4

“…people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give. For apart from anything else, the thought that someone else is attending to it makes them neglect it the more.”

Aristotle – Politics

“A state arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants.”

Plato – Republic


IndividualisticCapitalismProperty

GroupalCommunismSharing

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Introduction: interesting problem

5

It belongs to the group of social problems No technical solution

Technical improvements postpone the problem It can be applied to different domains:

Utilities: water, bandwidth Food, energy Pollution Infrastructure: non-tolled highways/roads, bridges


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Outline




6

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

7

A taxonomy of goods

Rivalry: One’s consumption diminishes other’s

consumption

Excludability: Ability to prevent others from

consuming

Exclusive Non-exclusive

Rivalrous

Private good Common good(Common-pool resources)

Non-rivalrous

Club good Public good


P. Samuelson “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure“ (1954)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

8

A taxonomy of goods: Provision of private good


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

9

A taxonomy of goods: Provision of public good


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Collective action

Olson: Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common… interest

Good provision in terms of group size and perceptibility of actions Small Medium

Privileged Intermediate Latent

Large To ensure provision:

Coercive mechanisms Exogenous benefit

10Introduction | State of the Art | Hypothesis & Proposed Models | Summary, Tasks & Publications

M. Olson “The Logic of Collective Action: public goods and the

theory of groups“ (1971)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Social dilemmas

Free riding dilemma Get the good But do not pay for it

Tragedy of the Commons

11

Prisoner’s dilemma: Rational individual behaviour

produces bad outcomes

Can be perfectly modelled in Game Theory

Can be modelled in Game Theory

Other approaches give better results


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Tragedy of the Commons

A metaphor to explain the conflict between

A common good

A set of agents that seek to maximize their own

benefit

Ends with the good exhausted because either

• The agents expand their capacity to consume the

good…

• The agents’ population grows…

• …beyond the good renewal capacity

• Usually it is not being managed


G. Hardin “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons“ (1994)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Tragedy of the Commons

A common good can be seen as a facility that: Sustains a stock of resource units which produces a

flow of resources units over time

Which divides the Tragedy into two problems Appropriation: Allocating the flow of resource Provision: Maintaining the stock of resource


E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, J. Walker “Rules, games and Common-Pool

Resources“ (2006)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Appropriation

The problem lies on the flow

Excluding potential beneficiaries

Allocating the subtractable flow


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Provision

The problem lies on the stock

Creating, maintaining a resource

Improving production capabilities

Avoiding the destruction of the resource


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Outline




16

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Hypothesis

We consider a world with two kinds of agents: Individualistic, selfish agents Communal, altruistic agents

Being selfish Does not mean not having/caring about group

interests Individual interests are more valued

Being communal Does not mean not having personal interests Group interests are more valued


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Proposed models

Plato (Republic, 462b-c) argued that collective ownership was necessary to promote common pursuit of the common interest, and to avoid the social divisiveness that would occur ‘when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings.’

Aristotle responded by arguing that private ownership promotes virtues like prudence and responsibility: ‘[W]hen everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business’ (Aristotle, Politics, 1263a).


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Proposed models

Aristotelian agents Capitalistic/rational

agents They only care on

appropriating according to their own benefit

Individualism Private property

Platonic agents Polis – focused on

communal good Traders Warriors Philosophers

Protocommunism: Communal ownership Equality Deemphasis on material

wealth

Utopian society


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Hypothesis

1. A set of agents with Platonic behavioural traits, can work together and exhibit a certain group behaviour that is optimal in terms of provision or conservation of resources

2. A set of agents with Aristotelian behavioural traits, can work together and exhibit a certain group behaviour that is optimal in terms of appropriation or exploitation of resources


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

21

Proposed models

A model composed of

MAS approach: To run social simulations

Provenance-aware monitoring: To capture actions

Complex networks: To represent social interaction

To analyse similar scenarios

Behavioural patterns

Norm or structural changes to avoid the Tragedy

Network structures


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

22

Multi-agent system

Deontic norms to guide agents’ behaviour

Allows studying norms dynamics

Close to human written norms (expressivity)

An agent acts according to

What happens in the system,

Social norms,

Its personality


J. Vázquez-Salceda “The Role of Norms and Electronic Institutions in

Multi-Agent Systems: The HARMONIA Framework“ (2004)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

23

Bounded rationality

Game theory has significant drawbacks

It does not allow changing norms while “in game”

Resource managers are, somehow, out of the

system

Bounded rationality

Humans have limited knowledge

Agents look for a suitable solution, not an optimal

Multi-goal


A. Newell “The Knowledge Level“ (1981)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

24

Provenance-aware monitoring

Stores events and agents’ actions

Graph-based: nodes-events | edges-causal

relations

Retrodiction analysis:

What has produced the current situation

Detection of what should be

prevented/promoted

wrt. norms


J. Vázquez-Salceda, S. Álvarez-Napagao. "Using SOA Provenance to

Implement Norm Enforcement in e-Institutions“ (2008)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Causal models

Actors communicate the action and what caused it

Causal models describe the preorder of actions

Used as a blueprint to detect causal patterns in the provenance


S. Miles, P. Groth, S. Munroe, S. Jiang, T. Assandri, L. Moreau. “Extracting

causal graphs from an open provenance data model“ (2008)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

26

Complex networks analysis

Analysis of the agents’ social

structures

How social structures

influence

Stability

Behaviour spreadness

Emphasis on mesolevel (communities)


D. Villatoro “Social norms for self-policing multi-agent systems and

virtual societies“ (2011)

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Example


If (#cowsInPrairie ≥ 8) → O(retain_less_than(#Cows/#Cowboys))

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Example



I

I

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Example



II

III

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Example



IV

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Example



V

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns Outline



Hypothesis and Proposed model Summary, Tasks and Publications

32

So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

33

Summary: Relevance to AI

Use of provenance-aware and network analysis (as a supportive/auxiliary tool) to further agents’ dynamic research

Two opposite philosophical approaches to manage a common good

Study emergent behaviour to self-organised institutional arrangements

Can be applied to different domains: river basins smart cities virtual goods


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

34

Tasks/Gantt diagram


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

35

Publications

1. L. Oliva, S. Álvarez-Napagao, J. Vázquez-Salceda. “Towards a framework for the analysis of regulative norm performance in complex networks”

2. I. Gómez-Sebastià, S. Álvarez-Napagao, J. Vázquez-Salceda, L. Oliva. “Towards runtime support for norm change from a monitoring perspective”

• 1st International Conference on Agreement Technologies, 15th-16th October 2012, Dubrovnik, Croatia

3. S. Álvarez-Napagao, I. Gómez-Sebastià , S. Panagiotidi, A. Tejeda, L. Oliva, J. Vázquez-Salceda. “Socially-aware emergent narrative”

• AEGS 2011: AAMAS-2011 Workshop on the uses of Agents for Education, Games and Simulations 2 May 2011, Taipai, Taiwan

4. L. Ceccaroni, L. Oliva. “Ontologies for the Design of Ecosystems” • Chapter book in Universal Ontology of Geographic Space: Semantic Enrichment

for Spatial Data. Ed. Tomaž Podobnikar and Marjan Čeh. Hershey: IGI Global, 2012. 207-28. Print.


So

cial

Inst

itu

tio

ns

Dyn

amic

s in

th

e Tr

aged

y o

f th

e C

om

mo

ns

36

Luis Oliva Felipe([email protected])

https://kemlg.upc.edu

https://kemlg.upc.edu/




social institutions dynamic in the tragedy of the commons

Documents