social function of philosophy - max horkheimer

7/28/2019 Social function of philosophy - Max Horkheimer

1/5

THE SOOAL FUD[TIODOF PHIOSOPHY maH HarkheimerWhen th e words physics, chemistry, medicine, orhistory ar e mentioned in a conversation, the part icip-ants usually have something very definite in mind.

Should any difference of opinion arise, we couldconsult an encyclopaedia or accepted textbook or turnto one or more outstanding special is ts in th e f ield inquestion. The definition of anyone of these sciencesderives immediately from i ts place in present daysociety. Though these sciences may make th e greatestadvances in th e future, though i t is even conceivablethat several of them, physics and chemistry fo r example,may some day be merged, no one is really interested indefining these concepts in any other way than byreference to the scientif ic act iv i t ies now beingcarried on under such headings . . . .

. . . The s i tua t ion in philosophy is no t th e sameas in other intel lectual pursuits. No matter how manypoints of dispute there may be in those f ields, atleast th e general line of their intel lectual work isuniversally recognized. The prominent representativesmore or less agree on subject matter and methods.In philosophy, however, refutation of one school byanother usually involves complete rejection, th enegation of th e substance of i t s work as fundamentallyfalse. This att i tude is no t shared by all schools, ofcourse. A L1ialectical philosophy, for example, inkeeping with i ts principles, will tend to extract th erelat ive truths of th e indiviLlual points of view andintroduce them in i ts own comprehensive theory. Otherphilosophical doctrines, such as modern positivism,have less clast ic principles, and they simply excludefrom th e realm of knowledge a very large part of th ephilosophical l i terature, especially the great systemsof the past. In short, i t cannot be taken for grantedthat anyone who uses th e term "philosophy" shares withhis audience more than a few very vague conceptions.

The individual sciences apply themselves toproblems which must be treateLl because they arise outof th e l i fe process of present day society. Both th eindividual problems and their allotment to specificdisciplines derive, in the last analysis, from th e needsof mankind in i ts past and present forms or organizationThis does not mean that every single scientific invest i-gation sat isf ies some urgent need. Many scientificundertakings produced results that mankind could easilydo without. Science is no exception to tha t misapplica-tion of energy which we observe in every sphere ofcultural l i fe . The development of branches of science"'hich have only a dubious practical value fo r th eimmediate present i s , however, part of that expenditureof human labour which is one of th e necessary conditionsof scientif ic and technological progress. We shouldremember that certain branches of mathematics, whichappeared to be mere playthings at f i r s t , la ter turnedou t to be extraordinarily useful.

Thus, though there ar e scientific undertakingswhich can lead to no immediate use, all of them havesome potential appl icabi l i ty within th e given socialreal i ty, remote and vague as i t may be . By i ts verynature, th e work of the scientis t is capable of

enriching l ife in i ts present ferm. His f ields ofactivi ty are therefore largely marked ou t for him, andth e attempts to al ter th e boundaries between th eseveral domains of science, to develop new diSCiplines,as well as continuously to differentiate and integratethem, are always guided by social need, whetherconsciously or not. This need is also operative,though indirect ly, in th e laboratories and lecturehalls of the university, not to mention th e chemicallaboratories and s tat i s t ical departments of largeindustr ia l enterprises and in th e hospitals.

Philosophy has no such guide. Naturally, manydesires play upon i t ; i t is expected to find solutionsfo r problems which th e sciences either do not dealwith or t r ea t unsat is fac tor i ly . But th e practice ofsocial l i fe offers no cri ter ion for philosophy;philosophy can point to no successes. Insofar asindividual philosophers occasionally do offer somethingin this respect, i t is a matter of services which areno t specjf ica l ly philosophical. We have, for example,th e mathematical discoveries of Descartes and Leibniz,th e psychological researches of Hume, th e physicaltheories of Ernst Mach, and so forth. The opponentsof philosophy also say that insofar as i t has value,i t is no t philosophy bu t positive science. Everythingelse in philosophical systems is mere ta lk, theyclaim, occasionally stimulating, bu t usually boring andalways useless. Philosophers, on th e other hand, showa certain obstinate disregard fo r th e verdict of theoutside world. Ever since the t r i a l of Socrates, i t hasbeen clear that they have a strained relationship withreal i ty as i t is , and especially with th e community inwhich they l ive. The tension sometimes takes the fOrIDof open persecution; at other times merely fai lure tounderstand their language. They must live in hiding,physically or intel lectual ly. Scientis ts , too, havecome into conflict with th e societies of their time.But here we must resume th e dist inct ion between th ephilosophical and th e scientific elements of which wehave already spoken, and reverse th e pic ture , becauseth e reasons for the persecution usually la y in th ephilosophical views of these thinkers, not in theirscient i f ic theories. Galileo's bi t ter persecutors amongth e Jesui ts admitted that he would have been free topublish his heliocentric theory i f he had placed i t inth e proper philosophical and theological context.Albertus Magnus himself discussed the heliocentrictheory in his Summa, and he was never attacked for i t .Furthermore, th e conflict between scientis ts andsociety, at least in modern times, is no t concernedwith fundamentals bu t only with individual doctrines,no t tolerated by this or tha t authority in one countryat one time, tolerated and even celebrated in someother country at th e same time or soon a f t e n ~ a r d s .

When i t was said that the tension betweenph i losophy and real i ty is fundamental, unli ke th eoccasional diff icul t ies against which science muststruggle in social l i fe , this referred to the tendencyembodied in philosophy, no t to pu t an end to thought,and to exercise part icular control ove! a ll thosefactors of l i fe which are generally held to be fixed,unconquerable forces or eternal laws. This wasprecisely th e issue in the t r i a l of Socrates. Againstth e demand s u b m i ~ s i ~ n to th e c ~ s t o r r . s p r o t e c t e ~

> . ; ~ . ;If'.ll L : ' q U f - ~ ~ < J , - , , ' n g ~ d ? r ' t : > t 1 o n to th e tradltl ' )nal


2/5

forms of l i fe, Socrates asserted th e principle that manshould know what he does, and shape his own destiny.His god dwells within him, that is to say, in his ownreason and will. Today th e conflicts in philosophy nolonger appear as struggles over gods, bu t th e situationof the world is no less cri t ical . We should indeed beaccepting the present situation i f we were to maintainthat reason and real i ty have been reconcilep, and thatman's autonomy was assured within this society. Theoriginal function of philosophy is s t i l l veryrelevant.I t may no t be incorrect to suppose that these areth e reasons why discussions within philosophy, and

even discussions about the concept of philosophy, ar eso much more radical and unconciliatory than discussionsin the sciences. Unlike any other pursuit, philosophydoes no t have a fie ld of action marked ou t fo r i twithin th e given order. This order of l i fe, with i t shierarchy of values, is i t sel f a problem fo r philosophy.While science is s t i l l able to refer to given datawhich point th e way fo r i t , philosophy must fall backupon i t sel f , upon i ts own theoretical activity. Thedetermination of i t s object falls within i ts own programmuch more than is th e case with th e special sciences,even today when th e lat ter are so deeply engrossed withproblems of theory and method ology . Our analysis alsogives us an insight into th e reason why philosophy hasreceived so much more attention in European life thanin America. The geographical expansion and his toricaldevelopment have made i t possible for certain socialconflicts, which have flared up repeatedly and sharplyin Europe because of the existing relationships, todecline in significance in this continent under th estrain of opening up th e country and of performing th edaily tasks. The basic problems of societal life founda temporary practical solution, and so the tensionswhich give rise to theoretical thought in specifichistorical situations, never became so important. Inthis country, theoretical thought usually lags farbehind the determination and accumulation of facts.Whether that kind of activity s t i l l sat isf ies th edemands which ar e jus tly made upon knowledge in thiscountry too, is a problem which we do not have th etime to discuss now.I t is true that the definitions of many modern

authors, some of which have already been cited, hardlyreveal that character of philosophy which distinguishesi t from all th e special sciences. Many philosophersthrow envious glances at their colleagues in otherfaculties who ar e much better off because they have awell marked field of work, whose fruitfulness fo rsociety cannot be questioned. These authors struggleto "sell" philosophy as a particular kind of science,or at least , to prove that i t is very useful fo r th especial sciences. Presented. in this way, philosophyis no longer th e cri t ic , bu t th e servant of scienceand th e social forms in general. Such an attitude isa confession that thought which transcends th e prevail-ing forms of scient if ic act ivi ty, and thus transcendsth e horizon of contemporary society, is impossible.Thought should rather be content to accept the tasksse t fo r i t by th e ever renewed needs of government andindustry, and to deal with these tasks in th e form inwhich they are received. The extent to which theform and content of these tasks are th e correct onesfo r mankind at th e present his torical moment, th equestion whether th e social organization in which theyarise is s t i l l suitable fo r mankind - such problems areneither scient if ic nor philosophical in th e eyes ofthose humble philosophers; they are matters fo r personaldecision, fo r subjective evaluation by th e individualwho has surrendered to his taste and temper. The onlyphilosophical position which can be recognized in sucha conception is the negative doctrine that there reallyis no philosophy, that systematic thought must re t i reat th e decisive moments of l i fe, in short, philosophicalskepticism and nihilism.

Before proceeding further, i t is necessary todistinguish th e conception of the social function ofphilosophy presented here from another view, best 11represented in several branches of modern sociology,

which identifies philosophy with one general socialfunction, namely ideology [1]. This view maintainsthat philosophical thought, or more correctly, thoughtas such, is merely th e expression of a specific socialSituation. Every social group - th e German Junkers,fo r example - develops a conceptual apparatus, certainmethods of thought and a specific style of thoughtadapted to i t s social position. For centuries th e l i feof th e Junkers has been associated with a specific orderof succession; their relationship to th e princelydynasty upon which they were d e p e ~ d e n t and to theirown servants had patriarchal features. Consequently, .. they tended to base their whole thought on th e forms ofth e organic, th e ordered succession of generations, onbiological growth. Everything appeared under th easpect of th e organism and natural t ies . The l iberalbourgeoisie, on th e other hand, whose happiness andunhappiness depend upon business success, whoseexperience has taught them that everything must bereduced to the common denominator of money, havedeveloped a more abstract, more mechanistic way ofthinking. Not hierarchical bu t levelling tendenciesar e characteristic of their intellectual style, of theirphilosophy. The same approach applies to other groups,past and present.

With th e philosophy of Descartes, fo r example, wemust ask whether his notions corresponded to th earis tocratic and Jesuit groups of th e court, or to th enoblesse de robe, or to th e lower bourgeoisie and th emasses. Every pattern of thought, every philosophicalor other cultural work, belongs to a specific socialgroup, with which i t originates and with whose existencei t is bound up. Every pattern of thought is "ideology".

There can be no doubt that there is some truth inthis atti tude. Many ideas prevalent today ar e revealedto be mere illusions when we consider them from th epoint of view of their social basis. But i t is notenough merely to correlate these ideas with some onesocial group, as that sociological school does. Wemust penetrate deeper and develop them out of th edecisive historical process from which the socialgroups themselves ar e to be explained. Let us take anexample. In Descartes' philosophy, mechanisticthinking, particularly mathematics, plays an importantpart. We can even say that this whole philosophy isth e universalization of mathematical thought. Ofcourse, we can now try to find some group in societywhose character is correlative with this viewpoint, andwe shall probably find some such definite group in th esociety of Descartes' time. But a more complicated,ye t more adequate, approach is to study the productivesystem of those days and to show how a member of therising middle class,by force of his very activity incommerce and manufacture, was induced to make precisecalculations i f he wished to preserve and increase hispower in th e newly developed competitive market, and th esame holds true of hi s agents, so to speak, in scienceand technology whose inventions and other scient if icwork played so large a part in the constant strugglebetween individuals, cit ies , and nations in th e modernera. For all these subjects, the given approach to th eworld was i ts consideration in mathematical terms.Because this class, through th e development of society,became characteristic of the whole of society, thatapproach was widely diffused far beyond th e middleclass i t sel f . Sociology is no t suffic ient. We musthave a comprehensive theory of history i f we wish toavoid serious errors. Otherwise we run th e risk ofrelating important philosophical theories to accidental,or at any rate, not decisive groups, and of misconstru-ing th e significance of the specific group in th e wholeof society, and, therefore, of misconstruing th e culturepattern in question. But this is not th e chief objec-tion. The stereotyped application of th e concept ofideology to every pattern of t ~ o u g h t i s , in th e lastanalysis, based on the notion that there is nophilosophical t ruth, in fact no truth at a l l forhumanity, and that a ll thought is seinsgebunden

Cf . Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, London1937


3/5

(situationally determined). In i ts methods and resultsi t belongs only to a specific stratum of mankind and isvalid only fo r this stratum. The attitude to be takento philosophical ideas does not comprise objectivetesting and practical application. but a more or lesscomplicated correlation to a social group. And th eclaims of philosophy are thus sat isf ied. We easilyrecognize that this tendency. th e final consequence ofwhich is th e resolution of philosophy into a specialscience. into sociology. merely repeats th e skepticalview which we have already cri t icized. It is no tcalculated to explain the social function of philosophy.bu t rather to perform one i tself . namely. to discouragethought from i ts practical tendency of pointing toth e future.The real social function of philosophy lies in i tscriticism of what is prevalent. That does not meansuperficial fault-finding with individual ideas orconditions. as though a philosopher were a crank.Nor does i t mean that the philosopher complains aboutthis or that isolated condition and suggests remedies.The chief aim of such crit icism is to prevent mankindfrom losing i tself in those ideas and activit ies whichthe existing organization of society inst i l l s into i tsmembers. Man must be made to see th e relationshipbetween his activi t ies and what is achieved thereby.between his particular existence and th e general l i feof society. between his everyday projects and th egreat ideas which he acknowledges. Philosophy exposesthe contradiction in which man is entangled insofar ashe must attach himself to isolated ideas and conceptsin everyday l i fe. My point can easily be seen fromthe following. The aim of western philosophy in i t sf i rs t complete form. in Plato. was to cancel and negateone-sidedness in a more comprehensive system of thought.in a system more flexible and bet ter adapted to reali ty.In the course of some of the dialogues. the teacherdemonstrates how his interlocutor is inevitablyinvolved in contradictions i f he maintains his positiontoo one-sidedly. The teacher shows that i t is necessarto advance from this one idea to another. fo r each ideareceives i ts proper meaning only within th e whole systeof ideas. Consider. fo r example. the discussion of thenature of courage in th e Laches. When th e interlocutorclings to his definition that courage means not runningaway from th e battlefield. he is made to realize thatin certain situations. such behavior would not be avirtue bu t foolhardiness. as when th e whole army isretreating and a single i ~ d i v i d u a l attempts to win th ebatt le all by himself. The same applies to the ideaof Sophrosyne, inadequately translated as temperance ormoderation. Sophrosyne is certainly a virtue. bu t i tbecomes dubious i f i t is made th e sole end of actionand is not grounded in knowledge of all the othervirtues. Sophrosyne is conceivable only as a moment ofcorrect conduct within th e whole. Nor is th e case lesstrue fo r justice. Good will. th e will to be jus t . is abeautiful thing. But this subjective striving is no tenough. The t i t le of justice does not accrue to actionswhich were good in intention bu t failed in execution.This applies to private l i fe as well as to Stateactivity. Every measure. regardless of th e goodintentions of i ts author. may become harmful unless i tis based on comprehensive knowledge and is appropriatefo r the situation. Summum jus , says Hegel in a similarcontext. may become summa ~ n J u r i a . We may recal l th ecomparison drawn in th e Gorgias. The trades of th ebaker. th e cook and the tai lor ar e in themselves veryuseful. But they may lead to injury unless hygienicconsiderations determine their place in th e lives ofth e individual and of mankind. Habors. shipyards.fort i f icat ions. and taxes ar e good in th e same sense.But i f th e happiness of th e community is forgotten.these factors of security and prosperity becomeinstruments of destruction.

Thus. in Europe. in th e last decades before theoutbreak of the present war. we find the chaotic growthof individual elements of social l i fe: giant economicenterprises. crushing taxes, an enormous increase inarmies and armaments. coercive discipline. one-sided 12cultivation of the natural sciences. and so on.

Instead of rational organization of domestic andinternational relations. there was th e rapid spread ofcertain portions of civilization at the expense of thewhole. One stood against the other. and mankind as awhole was destroyed thereby. Plato's demand that th estate should be ruled by philosophers does not meanthat these rulers should be selected from among th eauthors of textbooks on logic. In business l i fe. th eFachgeist , th e spi r i t of th e special ist . knows onlyprofit . in military l ife power. and even in science onlysuccess in a special discipline. When this spiri t islef t unchecked. i t typifies an anarchic state ofsociety. For Plato. philosophy meant th e tendency tobring and maintain the various energies and branchesof knowledge in a unity which would transform thesepartially destructive elements into productive ones inth e fullest sense. This is th e meaning of his demandthat th e philosophers should rule. I t means lack offai th in th e prevailing popular thought. Unlike th elat ter. reason never loses i t se l f in a single idea.though that idea might be th e correct one at any givenmoment. Reason exists in th e whole system of ideas.in th e progression from one idea to another. so thatevery idea is understood and applied in i ts truemeaning. that is to say. in i ts meaning within thewhole of knowledge. Only such thought is rationalthought.This dialectical conception has been applied toth e concrete problems of l i fe by th e great philosophers;

indeed. th e rational organization of human existenceis th e real goal of their philosophies. Dialecticalclarif icat ion and refinement of th e conceptual worldwhich we meet in daily and scientif ic l i fe . educationof the individual for right thinking and acting. hasas i ts goal th e realization of th e good. and. duringthe flourishing periods of philosophy at least . that$eant th e rational organization of human society.Though Aristotle. in his Metaphysics. regards th e selfcontemplation of th e mind. theoretical activi ty. asth e greatest happiness. he expressly states that thishappiness is possible only on a specific materialbaSis. that is . under certain social and economicconditions. Plato and Aristot le di d not.believe withAntisthenes and th e Cynics that reason could forevercontinue to develop in people who l i terally le d adog's l i fe . nor tht\t wisdom could go hand in hand withmisery. An equitable state of affairs was fo r themth e necessary condition for the unfolding of man'sintellectual powers, and this idea l ies at th e basisQf a l l of Western humanism.Anyone who studies modern philosophy. not merelyin the standard compendia, bu t through his ownhistorical researches. wil l perceive th e social problemto be a very decisive motive. I need only mentionHobbes and Spinoza. The Tractatus Theologico-Pol i t icus of Spinoza was tlie only major work which hepublished during his l ifetime. With other thinkers.Leibniz and Kant fo r instance. a more penetratinganalysis reveals th e existence of social and historicalcategories in th e foundations of the most abstractchapters of their works. their metaphysical and trans

cendental doctrimes. Without these categories. i t isimpossible to understand or solve their problems. Abasic analysis of th e content of purely theoreticalphilosophical doctrines is therefore one of th e mostinteresting tasks of modern research in th e history ofphilosophy. But this task has l i t t le in Common withth e superficial correlation to which reference hasalready been made. The historian of art of l i teraturehas corresponding tasks.Despite th e important part played in philosophyby th e examination of social problems. expressed orunexpressed, conscious or unconscious. le t us againemphasize that the social function of philosophy isno t to be found just there, bu t rather in the development of cri t ical and dialect ical thought. Philosophy

is th e methodical and steadfast attempt to bring reasoninto th e world. Its precarious and controversialposition results from this . Philosophy is inconvenient.obstinate. and with all that . of no immediate us e -


4/5

in fact i t is a source of annoyance. Philosophy lackscri teria and compelling proofs. Investigation offacts is strenuous, too, bu t one at least knows what togo by. Man is naturally quite reluctant to occupyhimself with th e confusion and entanglements of hisprivate and public l ife: he feels insecure and ondangerous ground. In our present division of labor,those prObleas ar e assigned to the philosopher ortheologian. Or , man consoles himself with th e thoughtthat the discords are erely transient and that fUndamentally everything is a ll right. In th e past centuryof European history, i t has been shown conclusively'that , despite a seablance of security, .an has no tbeen able to arrange his l ife in accordance with hisconceptions of hUllanity There is a gulf between theide8$ by which men judge theaselves and the world onth e one hand, and \h e social real i ty which theyreproduce through their actions on the other hand.Because of thiscircu.stance. a l l their conceptionsand judgments are two-sided and falsif ied. Now mansees himself heading fo r disaster or already engulfedin i t . and in many countries he i s so paralyzed byapproaching barbarisa that he is alaost ccapletelyunable to react and protect himself. He is th e rabbitbefore the hungry stoat. There ar e tiaes perhaps whenone can get along without theory. but this deficiencylowers man and renders him helpless against force.The fact that theory may rise into the rarified ataosphere of a hollow and bloodless idealisa or sink intotiresca and eatpty phraseaongering. does no t mean thatthese forms are i ts true forms. As far as t e d i ~ andbanality are concerned. philosophy often finds i tsmatch in the so-called investigation of facts. Today.at any event. th e whole historical dynaaic has placedphilosophy in the center of social actuality, andsocial actuality in th e center of philosophy.

Attention should be drawn to a particularlyimportant change which has taken place along theselines since classical antiquity. Plato held that Erosenables th e sage to know th e ideas.. He linked knowledge with a moral or psychological state. Eros, whiChin principle may exist at every historical moment.For this reason. his proposed State appeared to hiJR asan eternal ideal of reason. not bound up with anyhistorical condition. The dialogue on th e Laws, then.was a compromise, accepted as a preliminary step whichdid no t affect th e eternal ideal. Plato's State is anUtopia. like those projected at th e beginning of th emodern er a and even in our own days. But Utopia is nolonger th e proper philosophic form for dealing with theproblem of society. I t has been recognized that th econtradictions in thought cannot be resolved bypurely theoretical reduction. That requires anhistorical development beyond which we canpot leap inthought. Knowledge is bound up not only with psychological and moral conditions, but also with socialconditions. The enunciation and description ofperfect political and social forms ou t of pure ideas isneither meaningful nor adequate.

Utopia as th e crown of philosophical systems istherefore replaced by a scientific description of conr~ r e t e relationships and tendencies, which can lead toan improvement of hlDllan l i fe . This change has th e mostfar-reaching consequences fo r the structure and meaningof philosophical theory. Modern philosophy shares withthe ancients their high opinion of th e potentiali t iesof the hlDllan race, their optimism over man's potentialachievements. The proposition that man is by natureincapable of living a good l ife or of achieving th ehighest levels of social 'organization, has been r e j e c ~ e dby th e greatest thinkers. Let us recall Kant's f a m o u ~remarks about; Plato's Utopia: "The Platonic Republichas been supposed to be a striking example of purelyimaginary perfection. I t has become a byword, assomething that could exist in th e brain of an idlethinker only, and Bruckner thinks i t ridiculous thatPlato could have said that no prince could ever goverp.e l l , unless he participated in th e ideas. We should40 better, however, to follow up this thought and

-our own efforts, rather than to throw i t aside as useless, under th e miserable and very dangerous pretext ofi ts impracticability. For nothing can be more.u.schievous and more unworthy a philosopher than thevulgar appeal to what is called adverse experience.which possibly might never have existed, i f at th eproper time institutions had been framed according tothose ideas, and no t according to crude 'concepts,which, because they were derived frOll experience only.have .arred a l l good intentions." [2]

Since Plato, philosophy bas never deserted th etrue idealisa that i t is possible to introduce reasonaong individuals and among nations. I t has onlydiscarded the fa lse idealism that i t is sufficient toset up the picture of perfection with no regard forth e way in which i t is to be attained. In modern times,loyalty to th e highest ideas has been linked, in aworld opposed to them, with the sober desire to knowhow these ideas can be realized on earth.Before concluding. le t us return once more to aaisunderstanding which has already been mentioned.in philosophy. unlike business and poli t ics. criticismdoes no t mean th e condemnation of a thing, grlDllblingabout SOlle measure or other, or mere negation andrepudiation. Under certain conditions, criticism mayactually take the destructive turn; there are examplesin the Hellenistic age. By criticism. we mean thatintellectual, and eventually practical, effort which

is no t satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas,actions, and social conditions unthinkingly and frommere habit; effort which aims to coordinate th eindividual sides of social l ife with each other andwith th e general i d e ~ and aims of> th e epoch, todeduce thea genetically, to distinguish the appearancefrom th e essence, to examine the foundations of things,in s h ~ t , really to know them. Hegel, the philosopherto whom we ar e most indebted in many respects, was sofar reaoved from any querulous repudiation of specificconditions, that the King of Prussia caned him toBerlin to inculcate the students with proper loyaltyand to iBmunize them against polit ical opposition.Hegel di d his best in that direction, and declaredth e Prussian state to be th e embodiment of the divineIdea on earth. But thought is a peculiar factor. Tojustify th e Prussian state, Hegel had to teach man toovercome the one-sidedness and limitations of ordinaryhlDllan understanding and to see th e inter-relationshipbetween all conceptual and real relations. Further,he had to teach man to construe human history in i t scomplex and contradictory structure, to search out theideas of freedom and justice in the lives of nations,to know how nations perish when their principle provesinadequate and th e time is ripe fo r new social forms.The fact that Hegel thus had train his students intheoretical thought, had highly eqUivocal consequencesfor th e Prussian state. In the long run, Hegel's workdi d more serious harm to that reactionary institutionthan a ll th e use th e lat ter could derive from hi sformal glorification. Reason is a poor ally of reaction. A l i t t le less than ten years after Hegel's death(his chair remained unoccupied that long) th e Kingappointed a successor to fight the "dragon's teethof Hegelian pantheism", and the "arrogance andfanaticism of his school".

We cannot say that , in the history of philosophy,th e thinkers who had th e most progressive effect werethose who found most to cri t icize or who were alwayson hand with so-called practical programs. Things areno t that simple. A philosophical doctrine has manysides, and each side may have th e most diverse historica l effects. Only in exceptional historical periods,such as th e French Enlightenment, does philosophy i tse lfbecome polit ics . In that period th e word philosophydid no t cal l to mind logic and epistemology so much asattacks on the Church hierarchy and on an inhumanjudicial system. The removal of certain preconceptionswas virtually equivalent to opening th e gates of th e

~ n d e a v o u r (where that excellent philosopher leaves us .. 2without his guidance) to place i t in a clearer light ~ y ~ I Kant, Cri t ique o f Pure Reason, trans. by F. MaxMUller, New York 1920, pp.257-258


5/5

new world. Tradition and faith were two of the mostpowerful bulwarks of the old regine. and th e philosophical attackes constituted an immediate historicalaction. Today. however. i t is no t a matter of eliminating a creed. for in the totalitarian states. where thenoisiest appeal is made to heroism and a lofty Weltan-schauung, neither faith nor WeltanschaQung rule. bu tQnly dull indifference and th e apathy of the individual

~ o w a r d s destiny and to what comes from above. Today

Qur task is rather to ensure that. in the future. thecapacity for theory and for action which derives fromtheory will never again disappear. even in some comingperiod of peace when th e daily routine may tend toallow th e whole problem to be forgotten once more. Ourtask is continually to struggle. lest mankind becomescompletely disheartened by the frightful happenings ofthe present. lest man's belief in a worthy. peaceful andhappy direction of society perishes from the earth.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ @ @ @ ~ ~ @ @ @ @ @ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ @Is pbUosopb, reaD,

Il8C8ssarr'ldmudBarbAs almost any philosopher assigned th e task ofteaching the history of his subject is ready to admiti t is pointless simply to present th e student with a 'chronological sequence of doctrines. with what &succession of celebrities taught of "held". Pointlessbecause there is nothing the student can do with suchdoctrines in isolation except burden his memory andbore his examiners. We must. we frequently say.correlate them with th e problems they were designed

to solve. Suppose. however. that the problems inquestion are those of determining whether we may no tbe d r e ~ i n g all th e time. or whether we can have anyknowledge o fa world other than ourselves. Does i tno t s t i l l remain to be shown that we ar e doing morethat teaching him an esoteric game. which has noobvious connection with th e major concerns of humani ty. and the value of which as intellectual exercisecould arguably be realised equally well. and with agreater practical bonus. by a course in mathematics?Clearly, the best way to meet the implied c r i t i c ~ism here would be to demonstrate that th e problems a ~solutions together have an important function in th egeneral economy of human thought and activity in th eperiod of history under discussion - or. better s t i l l

in any period. And doubtless we should be willing to accept the challenge of mastering th e requisitehistory outside our own speciality. It remains.however, an open question to what extent we candemonstrate this of, say, the time-honoured textsprescribed for courses on ''modern philosophy",Cartesian and post-Cartesian. We may be forced toadmit that a substantial part of their content wassuperfluous to , or parasitic on , th e development ofscientific research; and that while there undoubtedlyis something of the f i rs t importance fo r that 'development which can properly be called philosophy,our primary sources fo r i ts study lie elsewhere.But, i f so , then so much the worse fo r our standardtexts.

Consider one or two ways in which we might. inteaching our modern philosophy course, try to avoidc r e a ~ i n g an impression of misused ingenuity or fantasy.We m1ght, fo r example, portray Descartes and hissuccessors as deeply preoccupied with a problem ofauthori ty, i .e . of what is to count as sufficientgrounds for accepting any statement as true. Wecould suggest obvious enough reasons why this problemshould have had a particular urgency in seventeenthcentury Europe (the conflicting claims of rivalreligious institutions, th e accelerating developmentof natural science, th e appeal of quasi-mathematicalsystems . . . ). And we can go on to make th e quitegeneral point that the acceptance, in any historicalcontext, of any body of statements as true p r e s u p p o s e ~some solution to our problem of authority, even thoughi t may be adopted without any notable intellectualcrisis.Or we might take up Professor Mundle's suggestion

that of exploring. and mapping, alternative categorica l systems. "The exploration of ways of relatingcategories to each other. of alternative categoricalsysteas. has in th e past been one of th e main pursuitsof aetaphysics . " - the purpose of any such systembeing that " . i t should apply to , f i t and aakesense of non-linguistic facts, what is currentlyknown or believed about the world and ourselves". (1 )

Both these suggestions aay be i n t e ~ e s t i n g enoughin themselves but, ~ e n i f they serve to throw sOllel ight on what Descartes and his successors wereactually doing, they scarcely suffice to vindicate i tsimportance. To begin with, as th e passage just quoted. ~ e s e x p l i c i t . we ar e presenting philosophy as anactivity which starts only when the serious businessof research, of finding out about th e world and ou rrelations with i t , has already yielded results in theform of ready -for.llated statements and> establishedfacts. Given these, the philosopher then agonises,r ~ t h e r self-consciously i t would seem, over which ofth e statements, he can conscientiously "accept", orelaborates alternative systems designed to "apply", insOlle sense no t very clearly specified, to factsalready discovered by sa.eone else. And aeanwhile,prestaably, the d e v e l o ~ e n t of natural science. andi ts interactions with th e general l i fe of the ca..uni ty in which i t developes, contime unaffectEd -which s t i l l leaves philosophy very JlUch in theposition of an intellectual luxury, as activitydependent, as i t were, on firs t-order enquiry, withoutcontributing anything essential to i t .

Characteristically, philosophies in this sensear e exposed to th e paradoxes of relativiSll. We aightfo r example, l i s t range of answers, actually adoptedOr aerely possible, to th e problem of authority.Suppose, then, sameone asks naievely: How ar e we to

t e l ~ w h ~ c h one is right? We can only offer in reply,or 1n 11eu of reply, a thoroughgoing relat ivist icthesis - very briefly, sOllething like th e following:To make a case for or against any proposed solution(e.g. on th e grounds that i ts adoption would exposeto the risk of self-contradiction or subjectivism)1S to accept as'true whatever statements we propose touse as evidence in support of our case. But we don'taccept these at random; in accepting them we have ineffect already adopted, and are using, one 'solution.I t follows that all enquirers (ourselves included. ofcourse) must adopt at least one solution without anyevidence whatsoever - though presumably we could tracecauses of such adoptions, educational background etc.I t follows also that i f different enquirers or schoolsof enquiry adopt different solutioBS. they mightassign truth-values among a given range of statementsin ~ a y s different from each other but all equallycorrect.

Nonetheless, relativism requires an answer.1be argument just outlined is not obviously fallacious,no r is i ts application in the history of philosophytnvariably unconvincing, even i f some of i ts consequences are disturbingly paradoxical. (The historianpf philosophy could sometimes be forgiven fo r takingup something l ike the stance of an existentialisthero. surveying, from the vantage-point of disillusion,th e earnest endeavours of those less conscious oftheir own arbitrariness, and from there demonstrating,pot the importance of their activity, but th e self-

that one worthwhile task of philosophy. which he would 14 1apparently like us to resume, has traditionally been A CRITIQUE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY. Oxford 1970.p.26Sf.

social function of philosophy - max horkheimer

Documents