smith 2005 into cerberus lair-libre

Into Cerberus Lair: Bringing the Idea of

Security to Light1

Graham M. Smith

Using the motif of Cerberus, the three-headed monster watchdog of Hades, this article attempts to

bring security to light. Specifically, it addresses two related questions. The primary question is:

What does security mean?. Here it is argued that security is related to order and is a reflec-

tion not of a positive value in and of itself, but the relative success of any given order to realise its

core values in relation to other orders. Therefore, security is found to be like Cerberus insofar as

it exists not as an independent value or being, but only in relation between two orders. Having

located security within this conceptual framework, the article then addresses its second question:

What are the effects of security?. The motif of Cerberus suggests that security bites in three ways:

first, that specific measures of security control the members of an order; second, that the identifi-

cation of security threats reinforce certain persons and structures of the order as being the defin-

ers of the order; and finally, that the implementation of certain security measures can change and

transform the order itself. In this way the analysis offered here brings security to light not only

as an inherently political term connected to political values, but to provide foundations for cri-

tiquing the rhetorical use of security in contemporary political discourse and thought.

There is a cavern with a dark, yawning throat and a way down-sloping,

along which Hercules, the hero of Tiryns, dragged Cerberus with chains

wrought of adamant, while the great dog fought and turned away his

eyes from the bright light of day.

Ovid, Metamorphoses (Book VII)

In our current climate security has become a political watchword. Whilst security

was a focus for theorists of the cold war2 its current rise to prominence has seem-

ingly been escalated by dual forces. On the one hand there has been a desire to

re-theorise security away from its military and state-centric orientation,3 and on

the other hand there has been a rise in popular attention to the notion and prac-

tice of security in response to the ongoing war on terror.4 However, as yet little

attention has been paid to the conceptual analysis of this term with specific refer-

ence to debates within political theory and international relations.5 Such an analy-

sis would not only provide conceptual clarity, it would also provide tools for a better

interrogation of the invocation and practice of security in contemporary politics

(Rothschild 1995, 5759; Baldwin 1997, 24, 26).

Taking the three-headed watchdog Cerberus as its motif, this article is one such

contribution to this task. Cerberus was charged with two inter-related duties. The

first of these was to prevent the shades of the House of Hades from returning to

the earth; the second was to deter would-be heroes from entering the Underworld.

Using this evocative motif, this article will address two related questions. The first

asks, what does security mean?. The second asks, what are the effects of

BJPIR: 2005 VOL 7, 485507

Political Studies Association, 2005. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,

Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2005.00204.x

486 GRAHAM M. SMITH

security?. Turning to the first question, it will be argued that the idea of security

is related to the preservation, maintenance and separation of orders. Specifically,

security is charged with the preservation and realisation of political orders. A politi-

cal order consists of both a set of core and subsidiary values, and a membership

which acknowledges those values intersubjectively through their socio-political

arrangements. Thus, like the watchdog Cerberus who maintains the integrity of

two orders, security does not appear in our lexicon as an independent being. Secu-

rity is not a value in itself, but is the reflection of, and an attitude towards other

values, and especially the core values of the order. Therefore, whilst security is also

necessarily and inescapably political, it is not a political value or end in its own

right.

The second question concerns the effects of security. To continue with our motif,

we could ask, how does security bite?. Here we employ security as a relational

term which is connected to the preservation and realisation of the core values of

orders. It is therefore possible to say that security bites in three directions. First,

security is argued to bite the specific members of the order, either individually or

as sub-groups. Second, by declaring both the security threat and the response to

that threat, certain members of the order come to hold privileged positions. Finally,

the third bite is manifest in the acts or measures of security. Those engaged in

decreeing measures which follow from the identification and response to threats

to values begin to redefine the contours and values of that order.6 Thus, the three

bites of security can be seen to seize an order both internally and externally, and

at a variety of levels.

The remainder of this article is divided into four sections and a conclusion. In the

first section an initial account of the idea of security is sketched making the prima

facie case for understanding security in relation to orders as manifestations of polit-

ical values. The second section considers this sketch in relation to the burgeoning

literature on this topic. Whilst this literature identifies and explores specific

instances of security, it does not engage sufficiently with the idea itself. A closer

analysis of the idea of security can reveal what is common to these literatures, and

will offer a way in which we might negotiate between some of their entrenched

disputes. The third section will refocus on the initial sketch, adding depth to three

related notions: orders, politics and values. Here an alternative framework is out-

lined which draws on the strengths of the existing literature and approaches and

provides a guiding thread for an understanding of security which is implicit in

these approaches. The final section suggests how security bites by outlining how

the foregoing analysis illuminates the practices of security.

I. That Monster-Watchdog Cerberus: The Idea andPractice of Security

Security has a double location. Just as Cerberus plays a dual role as idea and actor,

so too does security. In the first instance security is a term within our theoretical

lexicon. It is located as an idea or concept amongst other such ideas and concepts.

Thus, security can be treated analytically in much the same manner as other terms

such as power or the state. However, whilst security can be treated in much

INTO CERBERUS LAIR 487

the same manner as these concepts, it is also evident that security is not simply an

idea or concept. Security is also an act; security (or its effects) can be located in

our political actions, rhetoric and technologies (Dillon 1996, 16; Buzan, Waever

and de Wilde 1998, 2729; Burke 2001, xxv, xxxiii). Security, then, is equally an

idea and a practice, and must be understood as both (McSweeney 1999, 21).

Having noted this double location, the first question we must answer is, what does

the idea of security mean?. In addressing this I edge towards a prima facie account

of security. Initially we are concerned with the conceptual role of security, a

concern previously pursued by both Richard H. Ullman (1983) and Emma

Rothschild (1995). Their articles locate security in its historical context. This is

useful as the historical roots of the term help to inform our current usage and

understandings. However, for our purposes, more needs to be done to develop a

sufficiently abstract understanding of security. Whilst Ullman and Rothschild

offer a history of the idea, they do not develop what unifies the specific instances.

Thus, our current task is to build on this work and to clarify and locate security

in relation to its logical structural family which will provide a nexus of context

and meaning. In this way it is possible to link security to its logical relations, and

to produce a genealogy of terms which help us to make sense of both the term

itself and how it is used.

So, the term security cannot be understood in isolation, and we must identify it

in a nexus or landscape of related terms and ideas. However, security is not only

a contested concept (Baldwin 1997, 1012; Dalby 1997, 6; Smith 2005); it is also

a term which is used in a variety of circumstances. Thus, its use is not confined to

theoretical discussion alone; it is also a term which has acute resonance in politics,

not to mention a host of non-political uses. Even the most cursory consideration

of the term produces a catalogue of contemporary usage: the state of being secure;

assurance from poverty; a person or a thing that secures; precautions taken to

prevent theft or espionage; an asset that can be claimed by a creditor; something

that is given or pledged to secure the fulfilment of a promise.7 Additionally, secu-

rity is also related to securing (McSweeney 1999, 14). There are many meanings

of securing, including being free from danger; free from fear; in safe custody; not

likely to become loose or to fail; to become certain; to make safe from attack.

Clearly, if security is to have any analytic utility, we need to establish a tighter

definition which relates to its political meaning (and closes off the everyday, non-

political meanings and uses of the term).

If it is true that security concerns itself with securing then we might further our

exploration by asking four related questions about this security and securing (cf.

Baldwin 1997, 1217, where seven such questions are generated). All the ques-

tions suggest a range of answers. (1) Who or what is being secured?;8 (2) who or

what is doing the securing?; (3) who or what is the subject being secured from?;

(4) why is the subject being secured? Thus, securing is something which might be

thought of as being done, and security a reflection of the success of that action.

Security is therefore a reflection of a relationship between a subject and an object.

Indeed, the third question (who or what is the referent object of security being

secured from?) is dependent on this meaning. In this sense, security is simply a reflec-

tion of the relative success or failure to secure.

488 GRAHAM M. SMITH

In order to develop this idea further it is now necessary to introduce the idea of

an order. At present, no more than a basic conceptual outline will be provided,

as here I am merely attempting to offer a prima facie account of the term and

its relation to our central focus of security. These ideas, and their relationship,

will be developed more fully in section III (after we have examined some of

the conceptual difficulties of the established understandings of security in section

II).

What, then, is an order? An order is a political entity which can be understood to

consist of two related components: (1) values (which shape and define the order);

and (2) a membership (who subscribe to those values). The values that define the

order, although abstract and general, are the result of political judgements. They

are recognised intersubjectively by the members of the order. This is not to imply

that the intersubjective values of the members of an order are necessarily chosen

in a conscious or deliberative manner. It is merely to suggest that these values are

recognised or acknowledged in an intersubjective manner by the members of the

order, and that these values are privileged over other possible values which might

be subscribed to. The members of an order attempt to realise these intersubjective

political values in their institution of particular socio-political relations, bodies,

practices and discourses (in other words, institutions broadly conceived). In any

given order there can be a hierarchy of values, but some values will be agreed by

all members of the order to constitute the core values of the order, and to take pri-

ority over lesser values. In summary, an order can be said to exist where we can

identify both a set of related political values, and a constituency who are bound

together in their intersubjective subscription to those values. Thus, when the

members of an order seek security they seek to realise their values (and especially

core values), and to protect the institutions and arrangements which they under-

stand to best preserve and promote those values.

Therefore, as has been claimed, as an idea security is a relational term. Security is

not a value in and of itself; it has meaning only insofar as it presupposes values

which are considered as ends-in-themselves (cf. Rothschild 1995, 63; Graeger

1996, 113). It is in this way that security can be said to be a reflection of the relative

success or failure to secure. What are being secured are orders. As has been suggested,

orders have two components. At the ideational level they are structured by core

values. At the material level they are manifest by the creation of groups who sub-

scribe (intersubjectively) to those values, and seek to realise them in their institu-

tions. Thus, the idea of security can be seen to make sense only in relation to these

previously presupposed values. This is the case whether or not the values are coher-

ent, rational or even explicit.9 Security, then, stands between two conceptions of

order. Security has the potential to appear only when alternative orders are brought

into relation to each other. Thus, the practice of security relates to the specific actions

of political entities (such as individuals, states, nations, religious communities). As

a practice, these groups use security to motivate the defence of particular concep-

tions of order. In doing so, they attempt to solidify or identify the core values of

their orders.

This understanding of security as a relational term draws from and refocuses the

much cited essay by Arnold Wolfers, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol


(Wolfers 1962). In turn, Wolfers argument draws on the thought of Walter

Lippmann. It is worth repeating the core of this account:

Security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired

... a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having

to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged,

to maintain them by victory in such a war. This definition implies that

security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or

to defeat it (Wolfers 1962, 150).

What is interesting about this formulation from our current perspective is that with

careful refocusing we are able to transform this understanding of security from the

narrow national focus offered by Lippmann and Wolfers to an abstract category

which permits both multiple referents and a variety of practices. Thus, whilst

Wolfers clearly sees the link between security, values and the political, he limits

his analysis to what could be termed a state-centric focus. Wolfers recognises that

the determination both of the security threat and of core values is a political act

(Wolfers 1962, 151, 154); he is also clearly concerned with the security of

the nation through the state as primary amongst those values (Wolfers 1962, 163

164). In doing so, Wolfers asserts that the nation is the primary political value,

and that the nation is to be understood as having its survival connected to the

tool of the state (a position which is implicit throughout the remainder of his

essay).

Although Wolfers state-centrism presents an unduly restrictive conception of secu-

rity, what his analysis highlights is the importance of the notion of core values,

and this is the key to developing an encompassing definition of security. In think-

ing of security as being related to core values we are instantly transported out of

the limitations of some common discussions. These discussions have both charac-

terised previous security literature and resulted in a failure to produce a coherent

conceptualisation of security qua security. In particular, we are able to see beyond

the confines of three related controversies. First, by specifying core values as the

referent object of security (without specifying those values as such), we unravel

the difficulties produced by trying to pin the referent object of security some-

where on the spectrum between the individual and humanity. What unites all the

points where the pin could pierce is that all these points are concerned with values.

All potential referents of security, from the individual through to the state to the

whole of humanity, are possessors and promoters of values, and where an analyst

places their pin also reflects the analysts own political values. All of these entities

can be the objects of security, but only as the result of a political determination. It

is not so much that the individual or the state has to be the object of security, but

that at some point there is a constituting political move to assert or establish the

primacy of the object in question. Thus, the primary referent object must remain

normative and not simply descriptive.

The second difficulty which is addressed by this approach is the security threat.

If it is true that security can relate to any point in a nexus of relations, then it is

also the case that security threats can also emerge at any point on this nexus.

Indeed, this also begins to untangle the complex relationship between individuals,

groups, states and humanity. Just as no single entity has the monopoly on the claim

490 GRAHAM M. SMITH

to being the referent object of security, no single entity has the monopoly of being

the security threat. Different actors and entities can be aggressor, defender and

defended at different times and in relation to different entities or events.

Finally, if we accept the stress in our formula on the foundational role of political

values to security, then we can understand how there can be a whole range of

security issues. That the identification of the security threat is an intersubjective

decision has long been recognised (Wolfers 1962, 151; Art 1993, 820; cf. also

Waever 1995, 5457). However, by attempting to fix the referent object of secu-

rity, and the attendant failure to recognise that security relates to values, both ana-

lysts and politicians alike have foreclosed some avenues for understanding security.

In doing so they have not defended a conception of security understood as poli-

tics, but a particular politics understood as security. The next section will develop

these points, and explore them in relation to existing literatures. In doing so I will

show how the approach outlined here helps to alleviate some of the tensions within

these literatures without negating the contribution that these literatures make to

specific conceptions and practices of security.

II. The Landscape of the Underworld: Mapping theMeanings of Security

As has been suggested, previous accounts of security have tended to focus on

the practice of security rather than the concept of security per se. This approach

has led to robust accounts of security in relation to the particular instance of its

practice, but not an account of security that identifies what lies behind (or is

common) to all such practice. Nevertheless, whilst in previous accounts the

meaning of security has often received little conceptual scrutiny, they work within

the framework provided by our four questions. To repeat, these are: Who or what

is being secured? Who or what is doing the securing? Who or what is the subject

being secured from? And why is the subject being secured?. This has led not

only to a dominance of certain assumed understandings of security; it has also led

to an under-theorisation of the concept itself. Thus, there is no stream of debate

about this term in the same way that there is for terms such as liberty, democ-

racy and the state. We might find this both somewhat surprising and troubling

given the amount of attention that the idea otherwise receives, and its regular

employment.

This under-theorisation manifests most clearly when we consider the debates that

have arisen over the referent object of security (i.e. what is being secured). Many

previous accounts of security have restricted security to an association with mili-

tary action and the state (cf. Walt 1991, which can be viewed as a self-conscious

representation of this line of scholarship). Thus, there has been a tendency to iden-

tify security threats as those which threaten the territory or continuance of the

state. Evidently, this privileges the state as the referent of security, and military

activity as the primary threat and tool of that referent. This has been especially so

in realist discourse where the state is seen to seek to perpetuate itself in the context

of possible threats from other states (Wolfers 1962; Krasner 1978; Waltz 1979;

Ayoob 1995). Of course, this is the well-known security dilemma which arises


from the proposed anarchy in which states find themselves (cf. Bull 1977;

Mearsheimer 1990; Jervis 1978; all of which stands in the shadow of Hobbes

Leviathan). However, whilst the state-centric school of thought has been dominant,

there has also been a growing body of literature which attempts to move away

from this approach and to broaden the meaning of security. Under these lights

we have seen the referent object of security being refocused from the state to sub-

state groups and the individual (Rothschild 1995, 61; Havel 1992, 1820). In other

attempts, the referent of security has been broadened to include what has become

known as human security. This has been variously defined, and has occurred both

within academic thought (Thomas and Wilkin 1999; Duffield 2001; Paris 2001)

and the initiatives of policy-makers.10 Others have identified the environment as

a possible referent of security (Mathews 1989; Graeger 1996; Ronnfeldt 1997),11

whilst still others have considered the possibility of economic security (Nye 1974;

Deese 19791980; Mastanduno 1998).

The defence of traditional understandings of security and the emergence of alter-

native accounts have created what may be considered a rift in security literature.

We can understand the source of this rift as being an outcome of the tension

between the advocates of the security of individuals on the one hand, and the secu-

rity of the state on the other. Some have argued that the state is the rightful focus

of security, as although there are tensions between the state and its citizens, ulti-

mately only the state is powerful enough to ensure and realise the claims of the

individual. Without the framework afforded by the state, human rights are mean-

ingless, and individuals are powerless to enforce their rights (cf. Arendt 1963,

230231, 290302; Buzan 1991, 362363; Waever 1995, 49 who makes a con-

ceptual link between security and the state). There is some truth to this. There is

a real sense in which individuals are dispossessed of their rights if they are not con-

scious of them, and do not know to whom to appeal to have them enforced. It is

also true that the failure of states can lead to all kinds of violence, inequity and

humanitarian disasters. Considered as the referent object of security, it has been

noted that states face both external and internal threats (Ayoob 1995, 89).12

However, what these state-centric conceptions of security tend to underplay is the

potential of states to act as security threats to their own citizens. It is clear that the

state-centric account cannot be considered as a general account of security. This is

particularly the case when it is employed to attack the broadening agenda of

others (cf. Ayoob 1995, 812). Whether the strengthening of the state necessarily

brings security or stability to their citizens or their region is a debatable point. It is

also debatable as to whether a strengthening of the state and those who profess

to represent the state territorially and institutionally would worsen or alleviate

this problem (Ayoob 1995, 9; cf. Wheeler 1996; Smith 2005, 45).

From the perspective adopted here, the problem with both the state-centric and

the individual-orientated approach to security is that both of these approaches

suffer from the same category of limitations. They fail to adequately recognise that

security threats can arise at multiple levels for, and from, multiple actors.13 Addi-

tionally, these literatures pay insufficient attention to the idea that the security

threat can arise in this way because in concentrating on the defence of one par-

ticular conceptual instance of security (the state), they fail to develop a conceptu-

alisation of a generic security. Identifying the de facto referent object of security

492 GRAHAM M. SMITH

can only be accomplished if we understand the nature of the generic referent. It

is here suggested that that referent is the notion of value. It is these values that

nominate and locate the de facto referent object as a political entity. Thus, secu-

rity is not related to objects as such (be they individuals, groups or states) but to

constellations of political values. In both cases what is being secured is not so much

the state qua state, or the individual qua individual, but a political understanding

of each. The state and the individual are not facts, but entities prescribed by

political values. Indeed, if we assume the primacy of the individual, we are making

a normative political judgement about value. That value might guide our analysis

of how the world is, and frame our conception of how the world should be, but it

remains a value linked to a political moment. Thus, from the viewpoint of this

analysis, security is inextricably political and could not be otherwise (cf. Dalby

1997, 22; McSweeney 1999, 92, 208; Walker 1997).

The moves to distance security from the political can be understood if security is

conceptualised solely in terms of militarisation. It might well be undesirable to

treat some issues as a matter for military action, or to exclude other issues because

they are not responsive to military action. It is also understandable that it might

be desirable to define some issues as security issues to give them prominence and

the air of requiring immediate action and response. Equally, it might be desirable

to see some issues as simply too important to become politicised in the sense of

becoming embroiled in the daily cut-and-thrust of the machinations of political

(and especially party-political) power. However, ultimately the attempt to separate

security from the political must end in logical failure.14 This is the case because all

referents of security are susceptible to the question of why they should be secured

(especially over and above other possible referents), and this necessarily rests upon

a political determination. That security has had a history of meanings and contes-

tations is a reminder of this flexibility (cf. Rothschild 1995). Thus, the referent

objects of security, and the measures that are taken to secure those objects, are the

results of determination about our values and priorities and remain both tied to,

and defined by, the political.

In this way Buzan, Waever and de Wildes attempts to analyse security through

sectors also seem misguided (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). From our

present perspective the state is a possible category of the political, and not the

reverse. Whilst Buzan et al. explicitly claim that their objectives are to present a

framework incorporating both the wider and traditional agendas of security, they

quickly adopt a state-centric framework (Buzan et al. 1998, 4, 18). What this allows

(by a theoretical sleight of hand) is an analysis of the state-centric understanding

of security, rather than their avowed aim of exploring the logic of security itself

to find out what differentiates securing and the process of securitization from that

which is merely political (Buzan et al. 1998, 4). Of course, this presupposes that

security is something more than the merely political. Additionally, in order to attain

security status, issues have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object

by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures

beyond rules that otherwise bind (Buzan et al. 1998, 5). Whilst Buzan et al. ini-

tially imply that security is linked to the political, they simultaneously wish to say

that it is something beyond the political.15


This issue can be further pursued through a consideration of Jessica Tuchman

Mathews influential article on environmental security (Mathews 1989). Despite

the article being entitled Redefining Security there is no real discussion of what

security is, but only a demonstration that there is environmental change.16 What

is telling about this is the emphasis on the human role in environmental degrada-

tion and resource shortage. As is implied throughout Mathews article, we should

be concerned about this change for aesthetic, economic and political reasons; that

is to say, the threat of environmental change is important as it undermines the realisation

of our values. What is more (as Mathews herself points out), what is significant about

the climatic change that we are currently experiencing is that it is also a result of

human actions. This is made explicit in section IV where Mathews writes that envi-

ronmental concern has arisen from mankinds new ability to alter the environment

on a planetary scale (Mathews 1989, 168). In terms of this change, Mathews

singles out state (governmental) policies and actions (or inaction) as being the

driving forces behind this (Mathews 1989, 172173, 174177). Thus, environ-

mental change could constitute a security issue; a point which (despite his reluc-

tance) Bill McSweeney would surely have to concede (McSweeney 1999, 8991).

However, our admittance of the environment to the fold of security is not

achieved in the manner in which Mathews would intend the issue to be recog-

nised. Environmental issues are not security issues simply because of environmen-

tal change and degradation, and the fear that this could lead to hardship and even

war; environmental degradation can become or be constituted as a security issue

insofar as (1) the changes are brought about by human action, and (2) the changes

threaten the realisation of core values (some of which might concern notions of a

decent life, or the normative value of avoiding war). Thus, it is precisely the politi-

cal dimension of environmental change that makes it a security issue.

It is in this way that Mohammed Ayoobs criticisms of those who would seek to

broaden the security agenda are also misframed. Ayoob (who criticises both human

and environmental security) implies that such a broadening of the concept removes

its political character (Ayoob 1995, 812). For Ayoob, security relates to the state.

Indeed, he argues that types of vulnerability, whether economic or ecological,

become integral components of our definition of security only if they become

acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state

institutions, or regime survival (Ayoob 1995, 9; emphasis added). Whilst Ayoobs

approach is explicitly state-centric, and his specific problematic that of successful

state-building in the Third World, this definition of security is far too restrictive

and exclusionary. Whilst Ayoobs aim is to defend the political against misunder-

standing, we may well wonder as to whether his own definition of security actu-

ally contributes to this misunderstanding. Ayoobs notion of the political precludes

groups and individuals who might not share his normative commitment to the

primacy of the state, however useful for regime survival this might be. If we share

the value that the state is the most important political entity then it is almost

inevitable that we will view security issues under this aegis, and the perpetuation

of the state as being the key referent of security. However, there is no a priori reason

to do so. Indeed, to limit our notion of the political to that of the state is to mis-

understand the political itself. The political is the realm of contested values, and

494 GRAHAM M. SMITH

other constellations of values can emerge than that of the individual and the state.

Thus, from this perspective, neither Ken Booths (1997) notion of emancipation,

nor Thomas and Wilkins (1999) notion of human security, nor Mathews notion

of environmental security (Mathews 1989), nor notions of economic security

can be ruled out a priori. However, what this confrontation does reveal is that whilst

Ayoob has an unnecessarily restrictive notion of politics and security, those who

would seek to broaden the category of security often also fail to successfully link

it to the notion of political value, and thus their accounts suffer from the weak-

ness not of an overbearing state but an insufficiently developed notion of the

political. In other words, these broadening accounts of security present political

manifestos under the banner of security, thereby often disguising the political

nature of their manifestos and actions by masking them with the assumed apoliti-

cal status of security.17 In challenging state-centric accounts, those who attempt

to broaden the agenda often fail to recognise the political constitution of security

and so mirror the moves of the state-centric approach by also treating security as

an apolitical fact. Therefore, to understand and redefine security we must return

to the political itself (cf. Walker 1997, 69).

III. Barking Orders at the Dog: Politics and Values

Let us recapitulate. The first section offered a brief outline of the account of secu-

rity offered here, and the second section related this account to some of the exist-

ing literature. There has been a concern to show that it is desirable to make value

per se the referent object of security, rather than any specific object (such as the

state or individual). By doing so we can generate an account of security that is

comprehensive and inclusive in its application. In what follows we return to this

initial sketch of security and pay particular attention to understanding the rela-

tionship between security and order. Specifically, having argued that security is the

relative success or failure of any given order to realise its core values, it is now nec-

essary to elaborate on what is intended by order. An order consists of two related

components: values and a membership. The membership of an order seeks to

realise their core values in their institutions (broadly conceived). Without core

values an order can be said to desist. Thus, security speaks to orders: it manifests

as the barometer of the success or failure of any given order in its attempt to realise

its core values through its institutions in relation to any other given order. There-

fore, all orders are political (both by definition and de facto), and security is the

political move par excellence insofar as it is a move which declares, promotes and

realises political values against alternative orders.

Orders, then, can be considered to be inter-related and relatively coherent wholes.

However, this is not to say that all orders follow a rationally articulated, or even

consciously articulated, programme.18 Any particular order has its own power

dynamics, social relations and ideational structure. Orders can have component

parts which conflict, compete or co-operate, but this is not necessarily a threat to

the coherence of that order. The degree to which these groups can be multiplied

and tolerated is a reflection of the structure and core values of the order itself. It

is important to note here that the notion of order is not restricted to a notion of

the state. Here, order indicates a wider framework in which the state is only one


possible part of a wider sense of pattern or structure such as liberalism, socialism,

feudalism, Christianity or Islam. Whilst all orders are political (i.e. they are con-

cerned with realising value), they might not retain an overtly political face: they

could appear social, cultural, civil or even fraternal. What gives an order its coher-

ence is that its members share core values which they seek to realise in specific

relations and institutions. This does not mean that all members of an order have

to agree all the time, or even have completely identical values. However, members

of a group must hold certain core values which allow them to hold opposing values

at a lower point in their hierarchies of values. Clearly there is an optimal point, or

threshold, over which disagreement must pass before an order is in mortal danger

of transforming into something else. Thus (notwithstanding the conceptual link

between disorder and forms of violent anarchy), disorder can be understood in

two ways. Disorder could be the pejorative description made by one order of rival

orders. Or, disorder could refer to a state of affairs where there is not sufficient and

widespread recognition of core values.19

In this sense security cannot be said to be the maintenance of order per se, but is

a reflection of the relative success of any given order to maintain its core values and

institutions against the claims of other forms of order. Security relates to particular

orders, and not to order in general. If the order is relatively successful in establish-

ing its values, then it can be said to be secure, or to have securityif it has not

been successful in a relative realisation of these values and institutions, then it can

be said to be insecure, or to suffer from insecurity. Thus, security itself cannot

be the aim or value of any particular order, or indeed even order as such. Secu-

rity is only a reflection of the success of an order in realising its values and insti-

tutions in relation to any other order. Clearly, then, it should be concluded from

this that order is synonymous with the political, but not with the state. The state

represents a visible and powerful manifestation of order: orders (properly under-

stood) are the constellations of political values. States are always political insofar

as they are one possible star in that constellation of order, but states do not define

the political, nor are they necessary to the political. Politics can exist without the

state, but the state cannot exist without the political. Additionally, we should note

that the notion of order (even when the state is identified as a core value) need

not be monistic. As suggested here, an order is a relationship between persons and values

which seeks to realise itself. As such, the order need not be built upon any single value.

Indeed, the order could be based upon the relationship between values. In this sense,

an order need not have a single core value (such as liberty, equality or frater-

nity), but be based around a complex relationship of these values. Therefore, the

order could (in principle) tolerate a degree of competition and disagreement within

its confines without this leading to the disintegration of the order. We might

even think of the members of orders as relating to each other in the same way as

sets are related on a Venn diagram. Whilst not all members of all sets overlap with

each other, all sets might overlap with at least one other set; thus, there is suffi-

cient overlap for the sets to be related, although they do not correspond in all

variables.

As has been argued, an order, then, is a relationship between persons and values

which seeks to realise itself. Security is a barometer of the relative success of any

given order in realising its core values and relations. The impediment to any given

496 GRAHAM M. SMITH

order realising its aims is the existence (even as a possibility) of other orders (i.e.

alternative sets or configurations of values). Thus, whether change, develop-

ments, impediments or threats are security issues is a political decision.20 It must

be a political decision as orders are (in their very nature) political entities, and the

threat is not to security per se, but to the potential realisation and maintenance of

any given order. No obstruction to the establishment of a particular order is a threat

in and of itself. An impediment which does not compromise the overall project of

the order might be tolerated or simply ignored. Some localised forms of impedi-

ment might even be encouraged and welcomed by an order, such as alliances,

covenants, treaties, promises, protocols, co-operative agreements, and even war, if

this helps to realise core values (cf. Clausewitz, 1968, 119, 122; Jervis 1983,

178).

This focus on the defence of values as being intrinsic to an order was implicit as

far back as Thucydides. Robert J. Art, summarising Thucydides point, writes that

What was thus at stake for Sparta, if Athenian power grew too great, was not

simply safety from military attack but also the protection of Spartas moral values,

its way of life, and the material prosperity of its citizens (Art 1993, 821). Whilst

Sparta might well have feared physical attack, it also feared the loss of its way of

life and values. Thucydides observations are echoed still. Indeed, we can also see

the threat to values reflected in the ideology and rhetoric of contemporary times.21

For example, it is interesting to consider Henry R. Luces comments in Life where

the American Century is an expression of the fate of the US to lead the world not

only as a military power, but also in the values of spirituality, politics, culture and

economics. Thus, the picture presented is not simply a secure state, but an estab-

lished way of life (Luce 1941). This kind of thinking can also be identified in the

uncompromising position of the Bush administration in 1992 at the Earth Summit

in Rio de Janeiro. Aides insisted that the United States standard of living is not

up for negotiation (The Independent on Sunday, 5 July 1992; The Guardian, 1 June

1992). Finally, in our current climate the need to defend values can be detected in

the speeches of Tony Blair, who claims that:

The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values ...

freedom, democracy, the rule of law, religious tolerance and justice for

the oppressed ... we wage war relentlessly on those who would exploit

racial and religious division to bring catastrophe to the world (Blair 2004;

cf. also Lake 1994).

Thus, we can consider security threats as the declared obstructions to the reali-

sation of values for members of orders. Whilst the use of this term is usually

reserved for the state, it is important to note that in principle other entities could

use this term such as the groups and associations that form civil society (e.g. busi-

nesses, religious movements or environmental groups). Here, the members of an

order make an explicit decision, and that decision is based upon whether the par-

ticular restriction of the practices of the order is severe enough actually to inhibit

and to destabilise the order in terms of a destruction or significant erosion of the

core values and relations of such a group. Such an erosion would destroy the par-

ticular order in essence, if not existentially.


Three things follow from this claim concerning the location and participants in the

decision that identifies the threat. As has been noted, whether something is

deemed to be a threat is a matter for the members of the order. This is to say, it is

a matter of political judgement. What might appear to be a threat to one kind of order

might not appear so to another. Thus, security threats are intersubjective in the

sense that their identification is a matter of judgement and perspective and involves

a degree of consensus. Second, it should also be underscored that the identification

of the threat is not really an identification of a threat to security per se (despite how

it might be expressed), but an impediment to the attempts of members of a par-

ticular order to realise their core values and relations. In connection with this, it is

also worth recalling that security cannot be a core value of any order, as the term

security does not have content as such. It is a reflection of the status of other values

(and especially core values), and not a positive value in its own right. Third, and

crucially, the identification of a security threat being an intersubjective judgement

of a particular order on what it deems as its values under threat is, above all else, a

political act. This is the case whether or not the order recognises itself as being politi-

cal, or whether or not the order terms the security threat as a political threat. It is

political precisely because orders are born out of political decisions, agreements or

norms; that is to say, decisions relating to the establishment and pursuit of values

and relations. Indeed, the security threat is political in two senses. First, it is con-

nected to the realisation and preservation of previously acquired political values;

second, it is invoked as a political decision (or act) by members of an order.

From this perspective, whilst it is not nonsensical to differentiate in our use of the

terms non-political, the political and securitisation, the three terms are related.

The identification of both the non-political and the identification of a security

issue are, in fact, political moves. Both the non-political and any securitisation

retain their political character by virtue of the fact that these realms are demar-

cated by the political. It might appear that they are depoliticised (that is to say

outside of the political), or not a matter for the political. However, all that this

amounts to is that a political move has been made to place certain spheres outside

of the cut and thrust of politics as an activity. This does not mean that these groups

really have lost their political character. Moreover, the apparent depoliticisation of

some issues or spheres is an important political move. By embarking on these

moves, an association, regime or community can raise the importance of certain

issues and relations, and provide more pressing and powerful justifications for

certain political moves and division of resources. Of course, by depoliticising a

section of its membership (for example, religious communities, or the family, or

certain cultural communities), then an order can also eliminate the need to deal

with threats to that community as security threats. In contrast, an order might

present certain security threats as being both objective and non-political. From

an analytical point of view these threats should not be viewed as either objective

or non-political. On the contrary, the identification of a security threat is the

political move par excellence: it is a defining of the core values and relations of the order

itself, either explicitly or tacitly (cf. Schmitt 1996, 26).

Thus we have returned to the core of what security is about. Security is a rela-

tional term which acts as an indication of the relative success or failure of any given

498 GRAHAM M. SMITH

order to realise itself. Orders are a constellation of political values that are recog-

nised and pursued intersubjectively by members of an order through their institu-

tions. Thus, security itself is inherently political, and in its generic forms relates not

to specific referent objects (such as the individual or the state), but to the core

values of an order. It is here that our theoretical discussion rejoins and informs our

discussion of the rhetorical use of security, or how security bites. As we have seen,

it is important to undertake such an analysis as it provides a logical and theoreti-

cal framework for the term, which is separate (although related) to its de facto use.

This analysis provides the critic of contemporary political rhetoric with a more

powerful tool of analysis, and the framework for a clearer articulation for

alternatives.

IV. The Three Heads of Cerberus; or, How Security Bites

Having outlined the relational and inherently political nature of security, and its

logical relation order, this final section of the article will sketch a response to the

second question: How is it possible for security to bite?. Like Cerberus standing

between the earth and the Underworld, security stands in relation between two

orders; and just as Cerberus has three heads, security bites not simply in one, but

in three directions. First, security bites both specific members of orders and the

membership of orders in general. Security does this either by channelling and

directing their actions, or (in the most extreme cases) by actually excluding some

members of the order from participating in and realising the core values of the

order. Second, security bites in the sense that in identifying security threats some

members of an order develop a privileged position and come both to identify and

to define the core values of the order, and how they should be realised (cf. Waever

1995). Although distinct, the first two ways in which security bites are two sides

of the same conceptual coin. Finally, although security measures might be intro-

duced to maintain and even realise the core values of an order, it is possible that

these measures work against or attack the core values of the order. In doing so

they risk transforming the order into a new entity.22 Here we are not simply con-

cerned with the logic of the concept of security, but with how the logic of security

produces tangible effects.

Recalling our motif, it will be remembered that Cerberus was commissioned with

a dual task: preventing the shades of the Underworld from escaping to the world

of the living and preventing the living from venturing into the Underworld. Like

Cerberus, it has been argued that security is also commissioned with keeping sep-

arate orders distinct. That is to say, security is invoked in connection with the

realisation of the core values of a particular or given order in distinction to, and in

opposition to, any other order. It will also be noted that not all orders explicitly

invoke security, although all orders pursue their own survival. Additionally, some

orders can overlap or co-exist. Most orders can achieve this precisely because they

do not mutually undermine each others core values in any significant way, or even

share core values.

However, when security measures are invoked, the members of an order seek to

curtail the actions of their membership, and possibly even the membership itself.


Moreover, the members of the order seek to perpetuate their order in relation to

an identified alternative order. How far these invocations of security are seen as

being restrictive upon the members of an order depends entirely on how the

members of an order relate the measures to their understanding of the core values

of the order, and the possibilities of realising them. Members of orders can accept

all kinds of restrictions as long as they are understood to aim at a realisation of

the core values of the order. Indeed, many actions and moves that an order makes

will not be termed security measures, and will be seen by the membership as con-

sistent with the core values of the order. As such they will not be viewed as alien,

dangerous or as interventions.23 Security measures arise precisely when the order

seeks to articulate its core values, or when these are brought into question. Whilst

an order might be relatively self-maintaining, it regulates its membership through

the pursuit of its core values. That is to say, the membership of an order is identi-

fied by their intersubjective subscription to core values, values which they seek to

realise through their institutions (broadly defined). However, when it is judged that

these core values are placed in jeopardy (which happens when they are brought

into conflict with, or subverted by, an alternative order), then the security measure

arises. The security measure can appear alien to some members of the order pre-

cisely because, for the measure to be invoked, the core values of the order (which

might otherwise remain merely vague and tacit) must be exposed and articulated.24

The first way, then, that security bites is in relation to the members of a given

order. Security bites the external challengers of a given order through conflict and

control (the termination point of which might manifest in physical violence, con-

flict or war); however, it also has the capacity to bite the members of a given order

through general restrictions and controls (such as detention, imprisonment and

even exclusion from core values).25

This first bite leads to the second. Indeed, the first and second ways in which secu-

rity bites are conceptually related. For a security threat to emerge, and for mea-

sures or sanctions to be enacted in relation to it, it has to be declared. As Ole

Waever has argued, security is not simply a concept, but it is also a speech-act

(Waever 1995). This is also consequent from the subjective nature of the identifi-

cation of the security threat. It is this declaration of the security threat, and the

power to enforce its general acceptance and compliance, that constitutes the second

bite.26 However, what is important about this logical claim is that the core values

of the order are viewed as being common to all, even if orders could exist where

core values overlap like the sets displayed on a Venn diagram. In practice, values

might remain tacit; that is to say, we all think that we agree until we attempt to

discuss exactly how we agree. This conceptual framework helps us to expose

further the relationship between security and order, and the basic relationships

between the members of an order and its core values. However, it is also recog-

nised that other forces can be brought into play and that not all members or struc-

tures in that given order have the same ability to declare security threats and to

implement or impose security measures. For example, government or the state is

obviously one important and powerful site of such declarations in most actual

orders. In itself, this is not necessarily antithetical or corrosive to the core values

of an order. Indeed, that groups and structures such as government are recognised

within orders might be a reflection of the commonality of the members in sharing

500 GRAHAM M. SMITH

core values.27 What this reflects is that particular members, groups or structures

can become privileged and even dominant within a given order. It is these groups

that position themselves as the identifiers of security threats, and who become the

instigators/initiators of security measures. However, in doing so, there is also the

attendant move for the group to identify itself not only as the identifiers of security

threats and the implementers of security measures, but also, and necessarily, as the

defenders and definers of the core values of the order.28

Security, then, is seen to bite not only the members of a given order in terms of

restrictions, directives and controls, but also in terms of empowering selected groups

and structures within a given order with a privileged position over other members

of the order. The ability to define a security threat to the core values of an order,

and to implement or impose security measures to defend or perpetuate those core

values, is simultaneously to enable certain structures and groups to take hold of

the core values of an order, that is to define the order itself, and to attack or chase

away potential challengers of that order, or potential power rivals.

In themselves, these first two bites might appear relatively unproblematic. Indeed,

clearly they are (potentially) more troubling to pluralistic or liberal orders than

they are to orders which edge towards monism and especially particular kinds of

conservative, anti-liberal or authoritarian orders. There is nothing inconsistent or

contradictory in an order assigning a group or structure with a privileged position

in identifying security threats and proposing measures to combat these threats. If

the core values of a given order revolve around especially authoritarian themes

then this would necessarily follow. For pluralistic and liberal orders these bites are

more serious as they might run against the core values of those orders, especially

if they revolve around the themes of individualism, autonomy, equality, democ-

racy and the rule of law. Clearly, whilst some groups (such as governments) might

be sanctioned by these core values, the practice of governmental power might be

extended too far.

Having seen the first two bites of security, let us now confront the third. It is the

third bite which is potentially lethal to any given order, and represents a mortal

danger to the core values of orders. It is with the third bite that we recognise the

tension implicit in the location of, and relation between, the first two bites. With

the third bite we must consider the relationship between the privileged groups

within an order as being able to declare both the security threat and the core values,

and the result of this declaration and implementation of measures for those core

values and therefore the order itself. The question now arises as to how far the

declaration and defence of core values transform the core values and therefore the

order itself.

This issue demands a keen focus. It has already been claimed that an order is a

relationship between persons and values which seeks to realise itself. Furthermore,

whilst orders can overlap, they are also frustrated in their attempts at self-

realisation through the presence and objectives of some other orders. What the first

two bites of security bring to light is the idea that orders are not simply corroded

from outside, but that orders can also be attacked from within. If it is true that an

order rests on the relationship between persons and values, then it is also clear

that in declaring the security threat, the privileged groups within an order are also


declaring what the core values of the order are. As such they have the potential

not only to define, but also to modify and reassign those core values. This can be

seen in the common move of declaring that liberties must be sacrificed in order to

achieve greater security.29 If this is the case, then we might be tempted to ask, what

exactly is being secured here? Surely not liberties, as these are exactly what are

being eroded or withdrawn in the name of security. From the perspective devel-

oped here, the declaration that liberty must be exchanged for security is mis-

leading, and is actually masking a variety of political moves. First, it covers the

political move that the privileged group is actually declaring the security threat in

relation to its notion of the core values, and thus reinforcing its own status. Second,

it is masking the political value judgement that liberty is an inferior value when

compared to some others within the order. Third, it is masking the fact that in

making these moves, the order itself is being changed. That is to say, security is

often invoked in relation to core values, but core values which are then sacrificed

for the sake of security. As the framework developed here has exposed, talk of such

a trade-off is confused as security is a relational term which points to the success

of the realisation of core values; it is not an end in and of itself which can be invoked

as a value.

Conclusion: Bringing Security to Light

Finally, then, security is brought to light. Using the motif of Cerberus, the three-

headed monster-dog who guards the entrance of the House of Hades, we have

explored two questions relating to the theme of security. The primary question

which was explored in detail is, What does security mean?. It has been argued

that security is related to order and is a reflection not of a positive value in and

of itself, but the relative success of the membership of any given order to realise

its core values and institutions in comparison to other orders. Therefore, security

is found to be like Cerberus insofar as it exists not in its own right, but only in

relation between two (or more) orders. Additionally, securitisation is a political

move; it rests upon not the objectivity or foreclosing of the threat, but the inter-

subjective identification of the core values of any given order.

Having located security within this conceptual framework, we then addressed the

second question: How does security bite?. Here we were concerned with the logic

of the effects of security. Again, the motif of Cerberus was employed suggesting

that security bites in three ways: first, that specific measures of security control

the members of the order; second, that the identification of security threats rein-

force certain persons and structures of the order as being the defenders and defin-

ers of the order; and finally, that the implementation of certain security measures

can change and transform the order itself, tearing it away from its core values and

relations.

Thus, we are able to link the conceptual analysis undertaken in the first three

quarters of this article to the very real concerns of those who are engaged with

challenging or defending the actions and discourse of orders on the contemporary

political stage. We have followed that incline into the House of Hades, and

attempted to bring the monster watchdog Cerberus to light. Despite its dreadful

502 GRAHAM M. SMITH

aspects, security is not, and cannot be, a value or objective in and of itself. Secu-

rity cannot be attained either in general or particular terms; the attainment of

security is always simply shorthand for the realisation or pursuit of another value.

Despite the rhetoric of politicians, and the arguments of some theorists, there can

be no trade-off between liberty and security, but only a repositioning of liberty

in our constellation of core values. What is more, security threats do not exist in

and of themselves, but have to be identified, and it is in this identification that

certain groups emerge as dominant actors within orders. Security is not an apo-

litical issue, but concerns the realisation of core values; as such it is the political

move par excellence. Finally, in misunderstanding the political foundations of secu-

rity and its relationship to order, we stand in the presence of a danger. That danger

is the risk that we trade away our values for monstrous shadowsand that we lose

what is valuable about politics itself.

About the Author

Dr Graham M. Smith, Department of Politics and International Relations, County South, Cartmel

College, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YL, email: [email protected]

Notes1. I am grateful to the members of POLSIS at the University of Queensland (April 2004), and partici-

pants at Lancaster Universitys Security Bytes conference (July 2004), who engaged with presentationsof an earlier draft of this piece. I would also like to acknowledge the comments and criticisms ofAlan Metcalfe, Gerd Nonneman, Eric Grahn, and especially those of Adam David Morton. Finally, Iwould also like to acknowledge the assessments of the four anonymous reviewers of this piece whohave helped me to clarify my position in important ways.

2. Instances of such concerns can be found in Wolfers (1962); Morgenthau (1966); Bull (1977); Jervis(1978); Buzan (1984); with Mearsheimers article of 1990 forming a Janus-faced endpoint to thisperiod.

3. Such as McSweeney on identity (1999); Mathews on environmental security (1989); Deese oneconomic security (19791980); and Thomas and Wilkin on human security (1999); see alsoCampbell and Dillon (1993); Krause and Williams (1997); Lipschutz (1995).

4. This line of concern has been an ongoing theme in the discussions of the liberal press. For example:In terror of Blunketts security measures (The Guardian, 3 February 2004); An authoritarian stateis in the process of construction (The Guardian, 23 February 2004); One step forward, several stepsback in the fight to protect civil liberties (The Independent, 26 February 2004); Take no comfort inthis warm blanket of security (The Guardian, 15 March 2004); Aliens in their own country (TheGuardian, 1 April 2004); Mr Blunketts plans for ID cards are costly, illiberal and will not be effec-tive (The Independent, 26 April 2004); Half of terror suspects are freed without any charges (TheIndependent, 30 April 2004); David Blunkett has betrayed the trust of all those who care about civilliberties (The Independent, 23 June 2004).

5. There are, however, some notable exceptions. For examples of those who have attempted to theo-rise the concept of security, consult: Ullman (1983); Rothschild (1995); Baldwin (1997); McSweeney(1999). Additionally, Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) can also be considered to be such an attempt.Smith (2005) gives an overview of the attempts to refocus security by the main players in the debatesto broaden and deepen the notion.

6. A point, we might add, which was not wasted on Hobbes or Schmitt. For example, consider therights of the sovereign outlined by Hobbes in Chapter 18 of Leviathan; and this is echoed by Schmittwho opens his Political Theology with the infamous claim that Sovereign is he who decides the excep-tion (Schmitt 1988, 5). Indeed, in these thinkers security is seen to intersect with the theory andpractices of power and sovereignty.

7. To see how others have treated these connections cf. der Derian (1993); McSweeney (1999, 1322);Rothschild (1995).


8. As explored in section II, the subject of security (or the referent object) has been much debated in security literature, and has ranged from the individual, to the state, to humanity and even theenvironment.

9. It should not be assumed that these values are necessarily those which would be accessible to thesober-minded theorist. Whilst liberty, equality and the rule of law could form the basis of thecore values of an order, it could equally be a less conceptually sharp constellation. Such a constel-lation could perhaps shine with the fuzzy but emotionally intense energy of traditions and feelingssuch as nationalism, history, religion or language.

10. An example of this can be found in the discussion and development of the idea of human securityin the United Nations Human Development Report of 1994 (United Nations 1994, ch. 2). Whilst thisconcern with human security might appear to be a new focus for security (especially after the dom-inance of the realist paradigm of the cold war) it is important to remember that this approach hasdeeper historical roots. For example, Rothschild traces this approach back to the thought of Enlight-enment liberalism (Rothschild 1995, 6567). However, in one sense human security is the implicittheme of nearly all political theory in the western tradition which attempts to give an account ofthe good life and how that life can be realised, or secured (cf. Wilkin 2001, 47). This is reflected inthe eudemonia of Aristotle, the Christian polities of Augustine and Aquinas and the rationalism ofHobbes and Locke, both of whom explicitly name security as an end of government, and the desireof the individual (Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 18; Locke 1963, 39599).

11. This has also been reflected in the thinking of Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace (UN DocumentA747/277), and the World Commission on Environment and Development in Our Common Future(1987).

12. Ayoob maintains that, unlike most first world states, third world states face largely internal conflictswhich can become interstate conflicts. For Ayoob, the solution to this insecurity is for third worldstates to engage in state building (Ayoob 1995, 78; Ayoob 1997, 128129). Thus, in Ayoobs account,the state, which is not only the conceptual but also the historically de facto referent of security (Ayoob1997, 131), becomes both the referent of security and the provider of security for all other levels(Ayoob 1995, 89).

13. For example, despite highlighting the observation that there is no necessary harmony between indi-vidual and national security and that The unavoidability of this contradiction between individualand national security must be emphasised, Buzan goes on to conclude that individual security isessentially subordinate to higher-level political structures of state and international system (Buzan1991, 50, 51, 54).

14. Here we can learn an important lesson concerning moving from an is to an ought from David Hume(2000, 302).

15. This state-centric bias (which is expedient if they are to keep realists on board) prevents them fromexplicitly admitting that security is a political issue; that is to say, an issue which rests on politicalmoves. As such it does not lead to an endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that oth-erwise bind. In fact, the provision for certain groups to identify a security threat is a provision thathas already been determined by the political. The identification of the security threat is not a movebeyond the normal political moves that usually bind, but is a normal political move (cf. Hobbes1968, 232; Clausewitz 1974, 109, 119; Schmitt 1996, 45ff.). What is important here is that theaccount of Buzan et al. falters because it refuses to recognise that security is a political issue otherthan in a restricted state-centric sense of that term.

16. A point that Levy (1995) uses as a pivot on which to swing his own attack on the concept of envi-ronmental security as divorced from the interests of the nation state.

17. Wilkin is notable in being more explicit about this. For example, consider the claims that he makesin The Political Economy of Global Communication that an integral aspect of human security is the attain-ment of human autonomy and the possibility of meaningful participation in the institutions and pro-cedures that shape political, economic and cultural life (Wilkin 2001, 6). Although Wilkin attacksthose who would limit security to a realist and state-centric agenda (Wilkin 2001, 7ff.), his own definition of human security does not (logically) exclude security also being understood from thisperspectivealthough it is clearly a perspective from which Wilkin recoils. Thus, Wilkins concep-tion of human security is simultaneously both a conceptual or analytical tool and a political ideal.

18. See Note 8.

19. I am especially grateful to members of POLSIS at the University of Queensland who encouraged meto tease out this point when I delivered an earlier version of this article to them in April 2004.

20. To elaborate and illustrate this point: whilst liberalism and Christianity might be said to co-exist,liberalism has identified certain forms of religious fundamentalism and socialism as its special threat.However, Christianity could become a security threat to liberalism if it were to promote certain formsof equality, spirituality and resistance to the power and moral authority of the state. Indeed, whilst

504 GRAHAM M. SMITH

it was by no means a liberal order, this is how Christianity was initially viewed by the Roman Empire,and this was the basis for the disputes of the Middle Ages. Both of these periods reflect a strugglebetween Christianity and sovereign orders; both of these periods illustrate the struggle between two conceptions of order (Held 1997, 70106; McClelland 1998, 278279; W. Ullman 1961, 1926).Additionally, these struggles might serve to unsettle the seemingly supportive relationship betweenChristianity and the sovereign power of the modern state; moreover, they might also question thedominance of the modern state itself.

21. It is important to note the thrust of the argument here. It is recognised that de facto political enti-ties act as if security is an end in itself or a goal, and that (historically) this has important conse-quences. However, in acting in this way states (and their theorists) betray a degree of conceptualconfusionand it is this confusion which compounds the force of those effects. What is beingattempted here is a clarification of the idea of security in order to provide a tool for identifying andunderstanding how security is used and abused in both thought and practice.

22. What is important to note here is that whilst these bites might not be fatal in and of themselves,they are more serious for certain kinds of order, which is to say, certain configurations of value. Amonistic order, which is also especially illiberal or extremely repressive, might not be unduly trou-bled by the first two of these bites. However, for pluralistic orders, and especially those which areliberal in nature, all three of these bites are serious, and especially the last. This is especially true for orders which celebrate and promote the tropes of liberty, equality, the rule of law and constitutionalism.

23. Lockes understanding of tacit consent to the law (which is a security issue) is a fair example of this.

24. One contemporary example of this is the debate in the UK over immigration and the effects of theEuropean Union. Both of these issues challenge the hazy core value of Britishness. What is note-worthy here is that whilst the former issue is often seen in terms of security, the latter is not. Thisis telling because (at face value) both issues can be seen to compromise the integrity of the Britishway of life, and in the case of the EU (from one perspective at least) the British state itself is havingits sovereignty challenged. However, whilst politicians often cite immigration as a potential securityissue with an emphasis on the need to maintain core values and the integrity of borders, securityrhetoric tends not to be used in debates about the influence of the EU, even though there are worriesfrom some quarters over both immigration and border controls.

25. Again, the instance of immigration and especially asylum seekers and terror suspects is a clearexample of this. Whilst proclaiming themselves to be the defenders of liberty, democracy and humanrights, some liberal democratic states (such as the UK, US and Australia) are demonstrating a will-ingness to exclude individuals from the realisation of these ideals.

26. The declaration of the security threat could (in principle) be made by any member of the order.Indeed, in the theoretical Hobbesian state of nature we are asked to imagine an order exactly wherethis is the case (i.e. a state where each individual decides on what is a threat to their life and well-being).

27. Again the models offered by Hobbes and Locke are good examples. Clearly the core value that themembers of the Hobbesian order share is that of the preservation of life and predictable use of power.In order to achieve this they are prepared to forego their natural rights. The Lockean account oforder is more interesting to the argument in hand, as in that account Locke does not simply give anaccount of government and the state, but he also bases this account on a developed understandingof civil society, and the role of non-political actors such as the church, family and commercial enterprise.

28. Whilst this analysis draws on Waevers notion of security as a speech-act, it also deviates in signifi-cant ways from Waevers account. It is not possible to develop a full account of those differenceshere, but it is possible to raise the differences as two general points. First, whilst it is accepted herethat in contemporary times the state is an historically important and powerful performer of thespeech-act of security, our current perspective stresses that there are other actors capable of speak-ing security, both theoretically and de facto. Thus, contrary to Waever, it is not claimed here thatThe concept of security refers to the state, or that Security ... has to be read through the lens ofnational security (Waever 1995, 49, original emphasis). It is indeed true that, in order to understandthe historical way that security has been used and thought about since the consolidation of the statesystem, then this kind of analysis is necessary. What is contested here is that a historical account ofsecurity must be pursued exclusively from this perspective (cf. Rothschild 1995), or that this is theonly way to theorise security. The second point relates to Waevers understanding of the political,which he shares with Buzan and de Wilde (Buzan et al. 1998). In particular, Waever employs thenotions of societal security and political security (Waever 1995, 6571). However, whilst Waevermakes a distinction between societal and political security, he also explicitly links the idea of thepolitical to the idea of the state (Waever 1995, 66). Additionally, Waever goes on to argue that Statesecurity has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has identity (Waever 1995, 67,original emphasis). The perspective developed here argues for a greater differentiation between the


state and the political than Waevers account seems willing to concede. Specifically, whilst the stateis an important political actor, the two terms are not synonymous. Moreover, the attempt to dividethe societal and the political, and to assign separate security concerns, both presupposes certain political values, and is an important political move in itself.

29. This kind of thinking occurs at three loci. In the history of ideas it is instanced in the thought ofsuch figures as Hobbes (1968), Locke (1963) and Rousseau (1968). In contemporary scholarly litera-ture it is echoed by Wolfers (1962, 158), Mearsheimer (1990, 44) and Ayoob (1997, 126). Finally,at the level of political rhetoric, it is a common theme purported by Blunkett, Blair and George W.Bush (cf. America way out of order on War on Terror, The Times, 20 November 2001; No, not quitea dictatorship, The Economist, 8 December 2001; Dont give terrorists the gift of bad laws, The Inde-pendent on Sunday, 9 December 2001); and by Blunkett himself (Freedom and security are two essen-tials that citizens look to the government to provide. Whatever balance is struck, someone will beunhappy. But negative attitudes to the state simply distort the debate, The Guardian, 14 September2002; Heading in the wrong direction, The Economist, 8 March 2003; A question of freedom, TheEconomist, 8 March 2003; Kennedy: Ministers using terror threat to erode civil liberties, The Inde-pendent, 26 October 2004; Blunkett warns of growing danger: UK government Chancellor to main-tain security, The Guardian, 13 March 2004). This understanding of security as an end-in-itself which can be balanced or traded off with other ends is also accepted by such figures as Louise Arbour (United Nations, Human Rights Vision and Promise Under Considerable Strain, Says HighCommissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/5761F3C22335D3EFC1256F65007782D2?opendocument, Internet; accessed 9.12.04).

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