small powers and the strategic balance in east asia - philippines and south china sea

7/25/2019 Small Powers and the Strategic Balance in East Asia - Philippines and South China Sea

1/18

SPARKR

the key link between IDEAS and ACTION

stratbase.com.ph

August 2015

QuarterlyPublicationof theADRInstitute

THE STRATEGIC

BALANCEIN EAST ASIA ANDTHE SMALL POWERS:

THE CASE OFTHE PHILIPPINES IN

THE FACE OF THE

SOUTH CHINA SEADISPUTE


2/18

02 SPARK3RD QUARTER 2015

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by China and several small and militarily

weak Southeast Asian powers such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. For almost

three decades, these littoral states have been involved in a chronic competition as each one

seeks to extend its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims over more than a hundred islets, reefs,

and rocks and their surrounding waters. The dispute became dormant in the late 1990s and the

early 21st century after China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN EAST ASIA AND THE SMALL POWERS:

THE CASE OFTHE PHILIPPINES

IN THE FACE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE1

Image credit: abc.net.au


3/18

3RD QUARTER 2015SPARK 03

Tension arising from this maritime row,

however, increased again in 2009 when

China discarded its tactic of delaying the

resolution of the dispute and asserted

instead its sovereignty over the contestedwaters. Chinese leaders feel condent

that with their countrys new

political and economic clout and the

strong Peoples Liberation Army (PLA),

China can boldly advance its core inter-

ests in the maritime domain. This thrust

is reected by Chinas insistence on the

Air Defense Identication Zone (ADIZ)

in the East China Sea, the conduct of

live-re exercises by the Peoples Libera-

tion Army Navy (PLAN), and the PeoplesLiberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in the

West Pacic, and the hard-line response

of PLAN and other maritime law enforce-

ment agencies during several confronta-

tions with Philippine and Vietnamese

civilian ships in the South China Sea.2

Early on, this maritime dispute caught

the attention of the U.S., which is trying

to maintain its naval primacy in East Asia

despite Chinas emergence as an eco-nomic and military power. In 2011, the

Obama Administration announced the

U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-

Pacic region. Interestingly, Japan has

also become interested in the dispute. As

Chinas geostrategic rival and the U.S. key

ally in East Asia, Japan is bent on playing

a balancing role in the dispute by help-

ing other claimant states build up their

respective naval capabilities. The growing

involvement of the U.S. and Japan in theSouth China Sea dispute has generated

a strategic balance in the region. Con-

sequently, many International Relations

scholars and analysts have elevated the

South China Sea dispute from a simple

territorial row to a high-level geopolitical

concern since the disputed area is aImage credit: bloomberg.com

Image credit: bloomberg.com


4/18

05

07

09

10

12

14


CONTENTS

CHINAS REALPOLITIK APPROACHSince the mid-1990s, China has developed anarsenal of conventional yet inexpensive and highlyprecise armed ballistic and cruise missiles aimedat virtually every U.S. airbase and portin the Western Pacic.

THE STRATEGIC REBALANCINGAND CHANGING U.S DEFENSEDuring the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi on 20

July 2010, the then U.S. Secretary of State HillaryClinton, stated that it is vital to American intereststhat the freedom of navigation, open access to

Asias maritime commons, and the littoral statesrespect for international maritime law inthe South China Sea are respected.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE INTHE SOUTH CHINA SEAChina claims almost 80% of the South China Sea.

However, it cannot exercise complete territorial con-trol over the Spratlys and their surrounding watersas some land features are occupied by the otherclaimant states and, more signicantly, because ofthe growing involvement of the U.S. and Japan inthe maritime dispute.

BUILDING UP A CREDIBLEDEFENSE POSTURE

Although determined to shift the AFPs focus from

internal security to territorial defense, the AquinoAdministration is constrained by insufcientnancial resources even with its modestdefense acquisition goals.

FACILITATING THE U.S STRATEGICREBALANCING TO ASIA

An important factor behind the Aquino Administra-tions balancing policy on China is the reconguredPhilippine-U.S. security relationship.

FOSTERING A STRATEGICPARTNERSHIP WITH JAPAN

Aside from strengthening its alliance with the U.S,the Philippines also fosters its strategic partnershipwith Japan, Chinas main rival in East Asia.

ON THE COVERFrom Center of Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS), a sattellite image showingChinese vessels building an articial Island

at Mischief Reef in the disputed seas.

FEATURES

Professor Renato Cruz De Castro. Ph.D.(Ph.D.2001, USC)

Renato Cruz De Castro is a full professorin the International Studies Department,De La Salle University, Manila, and theholder of the Charles Lui Chi KeungProfessorial Chair in China Studies. Heis currently a member of the Board ofTrustees of the ADR Institute. He was theU.S. State Department ASEAN ResearchFellow from the Philippines and was based

Arizona State University in 2009. Heearned his Ph.D. from the Government andInternational Studies Department of theUniversity of South Carolina as a FulbrightScholar in 2001. He obtained his BA andtwo masters degrees from the University ofthe Philippines. His research interests arePhilippine-U.S. security relations, Philip-pine defense and foreign policies, U.S.defense and foreign policies in East Asia,and International politics of East Asia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

AUGUST 2015 VOLUME 8 ISSUE 3


5/18


dangerous ground or a future of conict.3As a future of con-

ict, the South China Sea becomes an arena where states with

powerful navies will jockey for strategic and diplomatic

positions with their warships in the high seas, pursue their

conicting claims for natural resources, and strive for

supremacy in the Western Pacic.4

Trapped in this potentially dangerous strategic balance in East

Asia are the small claimant statesthe Philippines, Vietnam,

Brunei Darusallam, and Malaysia. Two of them, the Philippines

and Vietnam, nd themselves in a classic security dilemma in

which the actions by Chinathe most powerful claimant states

in the disputeis viewed as extremely threatening by the other

claimants.5 They fear that China might seize some of the dis-

puted islands in the South China Sea given the potential energy

reserves of these maritime territories, and their importance in

maritime trade and as sea lanes of communication (SLOC)6.

Confronted by Chinas preponderant economic and military

power, the two Southeast Asian states had no other recourse but

to pursue a regional balance of power where the U.S. remains a

resident Pacic power and a major 21st century strategic player.

Such policy squarely puts these two small powers in the middle

of a strategic stand-off between China and the U.S. with Japan,

which can ignite a major systemic conict in the 21st century.

Using the Philippines as a case study, this paper examines how a

small power responds and adjusts to a uid and potentially

dangerous strategic balance generated by mistrust, suspicion,

and rivalry between China and the U.S.-Japan tandem over a

maritime dispute. It raises this main question: How does the

Philippines adjust to this balance of power situation created by

the involvement of these three major naval powers in the South

China Sea dispute? It also explores these corollary questions:

1) What major developments led to the emergence of this uid

strategic balance of power in East Asia? 2) How do the three

naval powers pursue their respective strategic interests in the

dispute? 3) What are the characteristics of this strategic balan-

cing by the three naval powers in East Asia? 4) How does the

Philippines view this uid and potentially dangerous

strategic balance of power in the region?

Chinas Realpolitik Approach

Since the mid-1990s, China has

developed an arsenal of conventional

yet inexpensive and highly precise

armed ballistic and cruise missiles

aimed at virtually every U.S. airbase and

port in the Western Pacic. These weap-

ons are also designed to sink enemy

surface vessels (including U.S. aircraft

carriers) operating hundreds of miles

off Chinas coastal areas.7

Chinese planners believe that their

missile, with anti-access/area denial

(A2/AD) capabilities, can adequately

prevent the U.S. Navy from intervening

or provoking a confrontation with the

China in the region.8Thus, the U.S. has

reasons to believe that the PLAN has

been developing strategies and weapon

systems that can disrupt American

naval/air operations or slow down the

deployment of its air and naval forces to

the theater of operations.9

With a booming economy and a

formidable navy, China no longer fo-

cuses on pre-empting possible U.S.

intervention in a Taiwan Straits crisis

but on denying the U.S. Navy access to

the East China Sea and South China

Sea or in inside the rst island chain.

China has had an annual double-digit

increase in defense spending since

2006. Consequently, in the past few

years, the PLAN has acquired a growing

eet of Russian-made diesel-electric

Kilo-class submarines and Sovremme-

ny-class destroyers, along with several

types of indigenously-built destroyers,

maritime

dispute


6/18


frigates, and nuclear-powered attack subma-

rines. The PLAN has also upgraded its opera-

tional capabilities across the waters sur-

rounding Taiwan and has deployed two new

classes of ballistic and attack submarines.Moving beyond its strategic preoccupation on

the Taiwan Straits, Chinas naval forces can

generate regional tension by challenging the

claims of its small neighboring states, and in

the long run, to change the strategic pattern

of the maritime commons of East Asia and

West Pacic from where the U.S. Navy can be

eased out. Interestingly, Chinese media com-

mentators have repeatedly emphasized the

signicance of Chinas blue water navy and

the exigency of protecting its territorialclaims in the South China Sea.

With its naval prowess, China has become

more assertive in the South China Sea. In

March 2009, Chinese naval and shing

vessels harassed the U.S.S. Impeccable

which was openly conducting surveying

operations in the South China Sea. The following year, China warned the U.S. to

respect its extensive maritime claims. In March 2010, Chinese ofcials told two

visiting U.S. State Department senior ofcials that China would not tolerate any

American interference in the South China Sea, which is now part of the coun-

trys core interests of sovereignty on par with Taiwan and Tibet.10

Recently,the Chinese government increased its defense budget by 13% to boost the

PLANs capability to accomplish a range of military functions including

winning local wars under information age conditions.

Judging from its recent behavior, Chinas aggressive pursuit of its territorial

claim over the South China Sea has increased in tandem with the expansion of

its navy and maritime services.11It conducts regular naval exercises that utilize

modern surface combatants and even submarines.12 These activities reect

Chinas intention to unilaterally and militarily resolve the maritime issue, aunt

its naval capabilities, and impress upon the other claimant states its

de facto ownership of the disputed territories.13

In the long run, Chinas navalcapabilities will be directed not only to expand its maritime domain but to deny

foreign naviesespecially that of the U.S.access to the East China and South

China Seas. In time, it will be capable of depriving the U.S. 7th Fleets access to

the Western Pacic inside of the so-called rst island chain.14

In mid-2012, China engaged the Philippines in a tense two-month stand-off in

Scarborough Shoal using civilian government ships and shing vessels

CHINAS NAVAL CAPABILITIES WILL BE DIRECTED NOT ONLY TOEXPAND ITS MARITIME DOMAIN BUT TO DENY FOREIGNNAVIESESPECIALLY THAT OF THE U.S.ACCESS TO THEEAST CHINA AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS.



7/18


supported by the PLAN. During the stale-

mate, China stood its ground and insisted on

its authority and control over the contested

territory and its related resources and rights.

A few days after Chinese and Filipino civilianvessels withdrew from the contested shoal,

thus ending the impasse, China deployed its

growing military and paramilitary forces in the

South China Sea. It took certain measures

to advance its right to exploit marine and oil

resources rights; strengthened its administra-

tive control over the disputed land features;

and ignored the harsh criticism of the U.S.,

Japan and other states.15

In July 2012, China created a new admin-istrative unit for the 1,100 Chinese citizens

living in the island groups of the Spratlys, the

Paracels, and the Maccleseld Bank. In addi-

tion, the Central Military Commission, Chinas

most powerful military body, approved the

stationing of PLA personnel to guard these

islands. These actions were designed to rein-

force Chinas territorial claim over the South

China Sea. No less than the president of the

National Institute of South China Sea Stud-

ies based in Hainan Island admitted that thegoal of the strategic move is to allow Beijing

to exercise sovereignty over all land features

inside the South China Sea including more

than 40 islands now illegally occupied by

Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.16

The Strategic Rebalancing andChanging U.S. Defense Strategy

During the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi

on 20 July 2010, the then U.S. Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton, stated that it is vital

to American interests that the freedom of

navigation, open access to Asias maritime

commons, and the littoral states respect

for international maritime law in the South

China Sea are respected. She mentioned U.S

preparedness to facilitate multilateral

negotiations to settle the dispute over the

islands. In November 2011, the Obama Administration announced a strategic

pivot to the Asia-Pacic region. Accordingly, this refocusing of American

strategic attention to the Asia-Pacic is to ensure that the U.S. will play a larger

and long-term role in reshaping the region and its future. The main gambit

is buttressed by U.S. diplomatic strategy of constraining China with a stick.This strategy does not involve Cold War- style containment of China, which is

deemed simplistic and wrong, but rather to make China acknowledge

Americas strength, determination, and strategy.17Its ultimate goal is to shape

the norms and rules of the Asia-Pacic region and to ensure that international

law and norms be respected, that commerce and freedom of navigation are

not impeded, that emerging powers build trust with their neighbors, and that

disagreements are resolved peacefully without threats of coercion.18

In June 2012, then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta detailed Americas strate-

gic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacic during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

He revealed that the U.S. Navy will have shifted its maritime assets such that60% will be in the Pacic by 2020. This strategic maneuver involves the deploy-

ment of six aircraft carriers, a majority of the navys cruisers, destroyers, and

littoral ships designed to operate closely offshore.19 It also needs to move into

position highly advanced war materiel such as the F-22 Raptor ghter jets, Vir-

ginia Class fast attack submarines, lightly armed but fast Littoral Combat Ships

(LCS), and a new class of destroyers labeled DDG-1000; improved precision-

guided weapons; and new electronic warfare communication systems. Former

Secretary Panetta added that the U.S. military is also developing new weapon

systems such as an aerial-refueling tanker, a bomber, and an aircraft for anti-

submarine warfare to provide American forces with the freedom of maneuver

in areas where their access and freedom of action may be threatened.20

The global restructuring of U.S. naval and air assets to the Pacic will give teeth

to the Pentagons 2010 Air/Sea Battle Doctrine (later renamed Joint Concept

for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons). The doctrine projects that in

the unthinkable case of a war with China, the U.S. armed forces will use joint ai

and naval forces to override or deter Chinas anti-access system within the rst

island chain.21Similarly, it envisions U.S. air and naval units attacking

Chinese surveillance and integrated air defense systems, followed by a

weighted campaign to bomb Chinese land-based ballistic and anti-ship missile

systems to seize and sustain the initiative in air, sea, space, and cyber

domains.22As an operational concept, the doctrine proposes the development

of a new generation of naval and air weapon systems, as well as the deeper

military commitments from American allies along East Asias coasts-Japan,

the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia-all of whom are close to the South

China Sea.23 More recently, a new and evolving U.S. strategy even

presupposes neutralizing Chinas capability to control the air and sea around

the rst island chain. It requires the U.S. to integrate allied battle networks and

strengthen allied capabilities by deploying American ground troops as well as

air and naval forces along the rst island chain to deny the PLAN the sea

control it needs to mount offensive operations against these islands.24


8/18


Extending the Sino-JapaneseRivalry into Southeast Asia

Since the mid-1990s, Japan has

closely monitored the PLANs build-

up and sporadic aunting of its

naval prowess.25 There are two other

reasons why the South China Sea

dispute worries Japan. First, if China

succeeds in intimidating the small

littoral Southeast Asian states, it could

use the same gambit in the East China

Sea where Japan has staked a claim

to the Senkaku Islands.26 Second,

Chinas control of the South China

Sea and the East China Sea is part of

the strategy of depriving the U.S. Navy

access to Chinas surrounding waters,

and giving the PLAN easier ingress

to the Western Pacic outside of the

rst island chain.27 If the U.S. Navy is

driven out of the western part of the

Pacic, the PLAN can easily dominate

the South China Sea because even

the combined navies of the Southeast

Asian claimant states cannot match

Chinese naval prowess.28Simply, Tokyo

preempts Beijings calculation that

if Chinese belligerence can end the

South China Sea dispute, then it can

similarly resolve the rivalry with Japan

over the Senkaku Islands in the East

China Sea.

More recently, Prime Minister Shinzo

Abe is pushing for the reinterpretation

of Article 9 (the Peace Clause) of the

1947 Japanese Constitution to

enable the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

to exercise the right of collective

self-defense. A loose interpretation of

this vague provision will allow the SDF

to come to the aid of Japans security

partners that are under armed attack

by a third party. Japans modern and

relatively large Maritime Self-Defense

Force (MSDF), a eet of six Aegis

combat system-equipped destroyers

with 39 guided missile destroyers and

16 conventional submarines, can ll

the strategic gap in the South China

Sea. The MSDF can be supported by

the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF),

which expanded its opreational reach

by developing a mid-air refueling

capacity and acqui-ring of the Boe-

ing KC-767 tanker. The International

Institute for Strategic Studies observes

that Japans National Defense Program

Guidelines for 2011-2015 contain

reform measures enabling the SDF to

respond to the shifting power structure

in East Asia.29Thus, Japan can

strategically confront Chinas

assertiveness in the South China Sea

and assume an active role in the

U.S.-Japan security alliance.

Image credit: washingtontimes.com


9/18


states are using this lull to build-up

their respective military capabilities

for any eventuality.

As a case in point, China has inten-

tionally delayed the resolution of

the dispute to fortify its control of

the contested areas and dissuade

the other states from pursuing their

claims.32This rules out any possibility

of compromise. As a counter-measure,

the Philippines and Vietnam adopt

a balancing strategy that draws the

U.S. and Japan into the fray. Interest-

ingly, these external maritime powers

are anxious to curtail Chinas growing

strategic clout in East Asia. At present,

China nds itself trapped in its own

security dilemma as it faces increas-

ing American and Japanese naval

presence and pressure in the South

China Sea. Despite almost decades

of restructuring and modernization,

the Chinese leadership is not yet

entirely condent that its untried (and

inexperienced) armed forces can win

wars under high technology conditions

when confronted with the U.S. Navy

supported by Japans MSDF.33The In-

ternational Institute for Strategic Stud-

ies observes that despite the PLAs

ambition for a blue-water navy, China

has yet to put in place all the assets

necessary to form an effective carrier

task group for blue-water capability.34

If the balance of power works against

its interests, however, China might use

force on any of the claimant states

who have cemented their security ties

with the U.S. and Japan. Nonetheless,

such maneuvering by China will surely

invite possible intervention by these

two maritime powers, especially if

Chinese forces will make the strategic

push against American (and Japa-

The Strategic Balance in theSouth China Sea

China claims almost 80% of the South

China Sea. However, it cannot exercise

complete territorial control over the

Spratlys and their surrounding waters

as some land features are occupied by

the other claimant states and, more

signicantly, because of the growing

involvement of the U.S. and Japan

in the maritime dispute. The U.S. is

troubled by Chinas bullying behavior

towards the small claimant states. By

all appearances, it assumes that any

Chinese use of force against the Viet-

nam and the Philippines (a formal trea-

ty ally of the U.S.) challenges American

military supremacy and diplomatic in-

uence in East Asia. Meanwhile, Japan,

pressured by China over the Senkaku

Islands dispute, has become involved

in the South China Sea dispute as well.

The stable but fragile security situation

can be described as an old-fashioned

strategic balancing of an emergent

regional power by two small powers

that depend on other external major

maritime powers to maintain a precari-

ous status quo in the South China Sea

for the foreseeable future.30

Thus far, this balance of power system

in the South China Sea has averted

an armed conict among the claim-

ant states, prompting Professor David

Scott to quip that the benets of

such balancing may become apparent

because balancing is itself a stabilizing

process.31 However, the balance of

power situation has two major aws.

One, it generates a very uid situation

wherein any error or miscalculation

by any claimant state may trigger an

armed confrontation that may escalate

or drag the other maritime powers into

a major systemic war. Two, while the

balance of power system can stabilize

the situation, it has simply failed to

resolve the dispute, creating a tense

and protracted impasse. The claimant

nese) naval presence in the rst island

chain. In effect, the current balance of

power system could signify the prover-

bial calm before the storm.

Chinas use of force against any of the

small claimant states could trigger this

storm. For example, Chinas armed

hostile actions against the Philip-

pines, an American treaty ally, might

push the U.S. to make difcult adjust-

ments to its policies in situations in

which its less-than-vital interests are

at stake. They could also push the

U.S. to reevaluate the strategic risk

posed by Chinas ever growing power

and military capabilities.35On the one

hand, failing to respond to Chinas use

of force against a treaty ally will under-

mine the credibility of Washingtons

security guarantees to all its Asian

allies. Unless the U.S. backs its secu-

rity guarantee with the use of force,

its regional allies may grow fearful of

being abandoned, lose the will to chal-

lenge China, and eventually succumb

to appeasement. On the other hand,

anticipating an expected American in-

tervention, Chinese strategic planners

may be tempted to test their growing

A2/AD capabilities intended to prevent

the U.S. Navy from triggering a naval

confrontation in the region. Worse,

the Chinese military leaders might

convince themselves that if the U.S.

is to intervene, the PLA could cripple

American conventional naval forces in

the Western Pacic.

Balancing ChinasMaritime Expansion

Historically, the Philippines had

primarily focused its strategic attention

and efforts on containing domestic

AS A FUTURE OF CONFLICT, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA BECOMES ANARENA WHERE STATES WITH POWERFUL NAVIES WILL JOCKEY FORSTRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS WITH THEIR WARSHIPS INTHE HIGH SEAS, PURSUE THEIR CONFLICTING CLAIMS FOR NATURALRESOURCES, AND STRIVE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.


10/18


insurgencies generated by economic inequality and the lack of national cohesion.

Since 1946, the Philippines national security concerns have been rooted in

conicts and in the identity of the nation-state, especially over regime legitimacy,

social justice, and socio-economic inequality, all of which continue to create

tension between state and society.36This resulted in the primacy of land-based

security threat, subordinating maritime security to internal security concerns and

counter-insurgency operations. This condition was reinforced by the absence of

any visible external threats emanating from the Philippines maritime domain

and the reliance on the U.S. for the countrys external defense requirements.37

This changed in the rst decade of the 21st century with Chinas emergence as a

naval power in East Asia and the election of President Benigno Aquino III

as the president of the Philippines in May 2010.

On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship

commissioned by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct oil explo-

ration activities in Reed Bank (now called Recto Bank). The Reed Bank lies 150kilometers east of the Spratly Islands and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine

island of Palawan. Stunned by this maritime encounter within the Philippines

EEZ, the Aquino Administration led a protest before the Chinese embassy in

Manila. A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented that the

Philippines is (simply) seeking an explanation for the incident. Brushing aside

the Philippine complaint, a Chinese embassy ofcial insisted that China has

indisputable sovereignty over what China calls the Nansha Islands and their

adjacent territory. Beijing then went on to demand that Manila rst seek Chinese

permission before it could conduct oil exploration activities even within the

Philippines EEZ. Furthermore, China badgered the Philippines and other claim-

ant states into recognizing Chinas sovereign claim over the South China Sea.38

Its heavy-handed attitude and arrogant pronouncements against the Philippines

and Vietnam in the rst half of 2011 escalated the territorial dispute. By then,

President Aquino unmistakably saw that the Philippines is on a direct collision

course with China vis--vis the South China Sea issue.

With these incidents, the Aquino Administration hastened to develop the AFPs

territorial defense capabilities. In October 2011, Philippine Defense Secretary

Voltaire Gazmin released the Defense Planning Guidance (2013-2018)

document restructuring the AFP to a lean but fully capable armed forces to

confront the challenges to the countrys territorial integrity and maritime security.

The Philippines immediate territorial defense goal is to establish a modest butcomprehensive border protection program anchored on the surveillance,

deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), the

Philippine Navy (PN), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). This monitoring and

modest force projection capability stretches from the countrys territorial wa-

ters to its contiguous and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).39The long-term goal,

according to the 2011 AFPs Strategic Intent, is to develop the force structure

and capabilities crucial to maintain a credible deterrent posture against foreign

intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while

allowing free navigation to prosper.40

The most recent defense planning guidance

states: That the defense of the countrys

territorial integrity and sovereignty, speci-

cally in the West Philippine Sea, poses [as]

the most foremost security challenge

Hence, the primary end goal of the depart-

ment is to develop a minimum credible

posture for territorial defense and maritime

security.41This requires the AFP developing

the following capabilities:42 1) an effective

force present in the area that exhibits the

competence to defend the territory; and 2)

greater surveillance and monitoring capabil-

ities to further secure the Philippine islands

and prevent unoccupied islands/reefs from

being occupied by other claimants.

Building Up a CredibleDefense Posture

Although determined to shift the AFPs

focus from internal security to territorial

defense, the Aquino Administration is con-

strained by insufcient nancial resources

even with its modest defense acquisition

goals. The current territorial defense build-up is a very expensive undertaking be-

cause, in many cases, the AFP has to start

from scratch. For example, the Philippine

air defense capability is nil because the PAF

is practically a helicopter air force without

any ghter planes. It has only one operation

al radar with a very limited coverage area.43

The PAF needs to develop or acquire radars

hangars, forward operating bases,

maintenance capabilities, as well as com-

mand and control facilities. The PN plansto acquire two state-of-the-art frigates which

require communications and weapons

systems and mission-essential devices such

as day/night electronic navigational gad-

gets, communication suites, safety-of-life-at-

sea equipment, propulsion and seamanship

and ship-handling gears, and corresponding

logistic support packages.


11/18


The nancial constraints on the Aquino

Administrations modernization program are

apparent in its efforts to acquire big-ticket

items for the PAF and the PN. On Novem-

ber 2011, President Aquino announced the

PAFs projected purchase of two squadrons

of second-hand F-16C/D planes through the

U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA).44This ac-

quisition, however, might cause tremendousnancial strain on the AFP which is still ac-

tively engaged in internal security operations.

In fact, relative to the AFPs Oplan Bayanihan

(Operational Plan Community Spirit), the

PAF continues to carry out these counter-

insurgency/counter-terrorism functions: 1)

intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance

(ISR); 2) precision attacks to minimize

collateral damages in its ground support

operations; and 3) education and information

dissemination campaigns to win the peopleshearts and minds.

On May 2012, President Aquino hinted that

the PAF might acquire brand-new lead-in jet

trainers that could be converted into ghter

planes by modifying their airframe.45In an

interview, he admitted that the government

found it too expensive to buy, let alone

maintain, second-hand fourth-generation jet

ghters which only had ve serviceable years. A sound alternative, he said,

was to buy cheaper new ghter aircraft from the United Kingdom,

France, Italy, or South Korea.

In 2012, the Philippine government started negotiations for the procurement

of 12 Korean F/A-50 Golden Eagles from Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI).

The F/A-50s design was largely patterned after the U.S Lockheed Martin F-16

Fighting Falcons. Both ghter planes have similar features: a single engine

and the same speed, size, cost, and range of possible weapons system. These12 F/A 50 interceptors could secure the Philippines air-space and

simultaneously serve as trainer planes to develop the PAF pilots air command

maneuvering (ACM)skills.46During his two-day state visit in South Korea on

17-18 October 2013, President Aquino announced that both governments were

nalizing the deal worth Php18.9 billion (estimated US$450 million).

On March 2014, after nearly two years of difcult and tedious negotiations, the

Philippines nally signed a contract with KAI for the purchase of ghter planes

for the PAF. Guaranteed by the state-owned Korea Trade-Investment

Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the contracts commit KAI to deliver the ghter

planes to the PAF in the next 38 months. With air-to-air mid-distance attackand night-ghting capabilities, the 12 F/A-50 Fighting Eagles would act as

interim jet ghters while the PAF waits for more funding and the proper training

needed for the purchase of fourth-generation multi-role combat interceptors.47

This was the PAFs rst such acquisition since the Philippines bought 25 F-8

Crusader ghter-bombers from the U.S. in 1979 to supplement its squadrons of

pre-Vietnam War F-5 ghter planes. It was an important milestone for the PAF,

which had no operational ghter planes since the retirement of its two aging

squadrons of Northrop F-5s in 2005. This was also the AFPs rst major

acquisition since its planned force modernization in the early 1990s.



12/18


The Aquino Administration is also bank-rolling the PNs

Desired Force Mixan acquisition program aimed to give

the PN some limited anti-air/anti-submarine capabilities.

Since 2012, the PN has been pushing for the purchase of

the aforementioned frigates for territorial defense, internal

security operations, naval interdiction, humanita-

rian assistance, and disaster response. These vessels will

be equipped with air-to-air, anti-ship and anti-submarine

weapons and sensors for extended and extensive patrolling

and surveillance of the countrys vast maritime territory.

Initially, the defense department was mulling over buying

two decommissioned Italian Maestrale frigates which have

credible missile and anti-submarine capabilities. However,

the defense department decided against the purchase

after evaluation studies found out that operating these se-

cond-hand vessels would be more costly in the long run.48

At present, the government is looking at the offers from

South Korea and Spain to supply two brand new frigates.

However, the project has been on hold for the last two

years because the PN is in quandary whether it will acquire

cheaper second-hand ships or the more expensive newly

constructed vessels. In the end, however, the nal

decision depends on the exigent need for the frigates and,

more essentially, on the availability of public funds for the

acquisition of these ships. As one ranking defense ofcial

notes, only vessels that will provide the country a credible

defense posture and (more importantly) affordablecost will be selected.49

In building up the countrys territorial defense capabilities,

the Aquino Administration sinks its teeth into challeng-

ing Chinas expansive claims in the South China Sea as it

encroaches on the countrys EEZ. However, bogged down

by insufcient resources and its slow pace, the AFPs

modernization would hardly deter the PLAN in the South

China Sea given the latters procurement of large surface

combatants and submarines since the advent of the 21st

century.50

Even if the Philippine government provides theAFP the funds for its shopping list of planes, surface

combatants and submarines, the strategic imbalance

between the Philippines and China cannot be rectied in

the foreseeable future. Fortunately for the country, two

external powers are interested in fostering a security

partnership with the Philippines in the face of

Chinas maritime expansion in the South

Chinathe U.S. and Japan.

Facilitating the U.S. StrategicRebalancing to Asia

An important factor behind the Aquino

Administrations balancing policy on

China is the recongured Philippine-U.S. security relationship. The U.S.

regularly extends technical and military

assistance to the AFP to maintain the

Filipino-American security partner-

ship. The most recent U.S. assistance

included the transfer of two former U.S

Coast Guard Hamilton- class cutters to

the Philippine Navy through the Foreign

Military Sales credit.51Aware of its

military inadequacies vis--vis China,

however, Manila has asked for anunequivocal U.S. commitment to Philip-

pine defense and security as provided

for in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty,

specically American naval/air

support in the Spratlys.

Philippine ofcials rationalized that an

armed attack on Philippine metropoli-

tan territory and forces anywhere in

the Pacic, including the South China

Sea, should trigger an automatic U.S.armed response. The American posi-

tion regarding this matter, however, is

ambiguous for two reasons:52On the

one hand, the U.S. tries to address

legitimate Philippine concerns about

the absence of a clear guarantee of

military support in case of an armed

confrontation in the South China Sea;

on the other hand, the U.S. avoids

giving an explicit and broad statement

of a security guarantee that could

encourage the Philippines to behave

provocatively against China, whether

based on its expansive interpretation

of its sovereignty over the islands it

controls in the South China Sea to a

mistaken assumption about the

prospect of an automatic American


13/18


armed response in case of an outbreak of hostility in the disputed waters.

Fortunately for the Philippines, an increasing number of U.S. policymakers are

starting to share the Philippines view that the archipelago is a strategic

bellwether of Chinas maritime expansion in the West Pacic and at the same

time, the natural barrier to check Chinas expansionism.53Hence, the U.S. must

help the Philippines develop its own military naval capabilities to counter Chinas

efforts to project power in the Asia-Pacic.54The 2012 Scarborough Shoal

stand-off and later, Chinas occupation of the shoal made it urgent for Manila to

negotiate the Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational Presence (IRP)

with Washington. The agreement facilitates the deployment of American troops

and equipment on a rotational basis, thus skirting the controversial issue of re-

establishing U.S. bases in the country. Curiously, the negotiation was conducted

against the backdrop of recurring tension between the Philippines and China

over the South China Sea. With its small and weak naval force and an almost

non-existent air force, the Philippine military is heavily dependent on the

U.S for technical assistance in joint military training, humanitarianmissions, and disaster response operations.

On 28 April 2014, Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin and U.S. Ambassador

to the Philippines Philip Goldberg signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation

Agreement (EDCA) a few hours before President Barack Obama arrived in Manila

for his rst state visit. Actually, EDCA is not a new security pact; it is merely an

updated implementation of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.55 This executive

agreement provides the framework by which the Philippines and the U.S. can

develop their individual and collective defense capabilities. Such a task can be

accomplished through the rotational deployment of American forces in Philippine

bases.56

Although the EDCA allows American forces to utilize AFP-owned-and-controlled facilities, the Philippine base commander has unhampered access to

these locations. Likewise, American built-or-improved infrastructure inside these

installations can be used by the AFP. Furthermore, any construction and other

activities within in the Philippine bases require the consent of the host country

through the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board.

On a strategic level, the EDCA undercuts Chinas A2/AD Strategy in Southeast

Asia even without the U.S. establishing any permanent base in the region.

Through the EDCA, U.S. forces are afforded two innovative access arrangements

in the Philippines, namely:57 1) forward operating sites-expandable warm military

facilities with limited U.S. military support presence; and 2) cooperative securitylocations-facilities with little or no permanent American presence and are main-

tained by the host nation. The plan involves bringing American

tactical units-personnel and their equipment to allied bases in East Asia to plan

and exercise contingency missions for a crisis or conict situation.58These are

less expensive, less visible and less vulnerable access arrangements that offer

greater strategic and operational for the United States exibility. They are less

likely to create local political problems and are expected to promote long-term

security cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines.


14/18


Fostering a StrategicPartnership with Japan

Aside from strengthening its alliance with the U.S, the

Philippines also fosters its strategic partnership with Japan,

Chinas main rival in East Asia. On July 2012, then Japa-

nese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipinocounterpart, Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement

on maritime security.59 This agreement features high-level

dialogues between defense ofcials and reciprocal visits

by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN ag commander. A

few days later, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert

Del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the

PCG with ten 40-meter boats as part of Japans ODA to the

Philippines by the end of the year.60Newspapers also re-

ported a grant of two additional bigger vessels considered

for transfer to the Philippine government.

On January 2013, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida

announced Japans technical assistance to the PCG

through the provision of essential communications equip-

ment for maritime safety.61On 27 June 2013, Japanese

Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and Secretary Gazmin

conrmed the continuous exchanges of information aimed

at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on

working together to make U.S. strategic rebalancing a rea-

lity in Asia.62Secretary Gazmin also raised the possibility

of allowing the Japanese MSDF access to the former

American military bases in the Philippines if Tokyo isinterested in negotiating and signing an

access agreement with Manila.63

The Philippines and Japan have conducted high-level meet-

ings and consultations to solidify their security cooperation

in the face of Chinas military assertiveness. On December

2013, President Aquino discussed with Prime Minister

Shintaro Abe in Tokyo Chinas establishment of an Air

Defense Identication Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.64

President Aquino was worried that China might extend the

zone into the South China Sea, adversely affecting Philip-pine security. Prime Minister Abe assured President Aquino

that Japan would not tolerate Chinas attempt to change

the status quo in the region by force and that it intended to

cooperate with the Philippines to ensure that the freedom

of ight and navigation is respected.65To help build up the

PCGs capability, Prime Minister Abe approved a yen-based

soft loan to nance the Philippines acquisition of ten

40-meter long multi-purpose patrol boats from Japan.

On June 2014, President Aquino again

met Prime Minister Abe in Tokyo to dis-

cuss ways to further Philippine-Japan

security relations.66

Tackled in particu-lar are areas of possible cooperation

to enhance the recently forged Phil-

ippines-Japan Strategic Partnership.67President Aquino followed up the

PCGs request for ten patrol boats to

be acquired by the Philippines through

a US$184 million soft loan from the

Japan International Cooperation

Agency.68Prime Minister Abe assured

President Aquino that three of the ves-

sels would be delivered in 2015; whilethe remaining seven would be ready

for delivery in 2016. The PCG needs

the patrol boats to secure the waters

around the seven islands claimed

and occupied by the Philippines in the

Spratlys. The boats will also moni-

tor any foreign naval presence in the

several reefs and shoals near the parts

of the countrys Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ) currently occupied by Chi-

nese forces. For the PCGs maritimedomain awareness operations, Japan

promised to provide VSAR and Inmar-

sat communication systems.

In his recent visit to Japan in early June

2015, President Aquino and Prime

Minister Abe signed a joint declara-

tion on A Strengthened Strategic

Partnership for Advancing the Shared

Principles and Partnership and Goals

for Peace, Security, and Growth in theRegion and Beyond. The communi-

qu commits Japan to the following:

1) enhancing the capacity of the PCG;

2) cooperating with the Philippines

on maritime security specically on

maritime domain awareness, and 3)

raising the prospects for the transfer

of Japanese defense equipment and


15/18


technology to the Philippines.69In a press brieng, President Aquino announced the forth -

coming negotiation on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow SDF access

to Philippine military bases. He disclosed that a Philippine-Japan SOFA is possible since

both countries have boosted their security relationship signicantly over the past few years.The SDFs use of Philippine bases, on a limited and rotational basis, will be useful to Japan

as it actively pursues a policy of Pro-Active Contribution to Peace in East Asia. With

refueling and basing facilities in the Philippines, units of the ASDF and MSDF can

conduct joint patrols with their American counterparts for a longer period of

time and over a larger area of the South China Sea.

Conclusion

Since 2009, China has taken an aggressive approach in pursuing its expansive maritime

claim in the South China Sea. Initially, it used a delaying tactic in the resolution of thedispute while it consolidated its claims over disputed maritime territories and deterred

small claimant states from strengthening their own claims. Eventually, the U.S. and Japan

displayed their interests in the dispute and have since projected their naval prowess in East

Asia. These two naval powers have also extended military assistance to the small claimant

states in the South China Sea dispute-the Philippines and Vietnam. This, in turn, has raised

the possibility of a major naval confrontation between an emergent power and two major

naval powers in the South China Sea. These developments have created a potentially

volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea. So far, this balance of

power has prevented an armed conict among the claimant states.

The Philippines is taking advantage of this strategic impasse to build up a credible defensecapability to back its deant act of standing up to Chinas maritime expansion in the South

China Sea. It has also strengthened its security ties with the U.S. and Japan to maintain

the balance of power situation for the time being. However, given the slow pace and the

limited funding for its arms modernization program, the Philippines foresees that this stra-

tegic stand-off among the major powers will continue way into the third decade of the 21st

century. Nevertheless, such a view may overlook the possibility that this strategic stand-off

might be the proverbial calm before the storm. If this storm suddenly breaks out on the

countrys maritime horizon, the Philippines might nd itself in the same situation as it was

in the late 1941militarily ill-equipped, utterly defenseless, and totally

unprepared for the tempests destructive onslaught.


16/18

1 This artic le is a shorter version of a paper

that was presented in the panel on Military Balance

and Regional Order Fifth Annual CSIS South China

Sea Conference, Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS), 21 July 2015, Washington, D.C.

2 National Institute for Defense Studies,

NIDS China Security Report 2014 (Tokyo, Japan: Na-

tional Institute for Defense Studies, 2015). p. 3.

3 See Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas New Wave

of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,

International Journal of China Studies 2, 3 (December

2011). pp. 555-583. Fravel M. Taylor, Chinas Strategy

in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia

33.3 (December 2011): 292-319. http://search/pro-

quest.com/docview/921618988?accountid=28547;

Huai-Feng Ren and Fu-Kuo-Liu, Transitional Security

Pattern in the South China Sea and the Involvement

of External Parties, Issues and Studies 49, 2 (June

2013). pp. 103-145; Leszek Buszynski, The South Chi-na Sea Maritime Dispute: Legality, Power, and Conflict

Prevention, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1.1. (2013).

pp. 39-63; http://search.proquest.com/docview/1501

429784?accountid=28547; and David Scott, Conflict

Irresolution in the South China Sea Asian Survey 56,

6 (November/December 2012). pp. 1019-1042.

4 See Robert Kaplan, The South China Sea is

the Future of Conflict, Foreign Policy 188 (September/

October 2011): 76-88. http://search.proquest.com/do

cview/888030576?accountid=28547

5 Taylor, op. cit. p. 296.

6 Michael A. Glony, Getting Beyond Taiwan?

Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA Modernization, Stra-tegic Forum No. 261 (January 2011). p. 4.

7 Aaron L. Friedberg, Buckling Beijing: An

Alternative U.S. China Policy, Foreign Policy (Septem-

ber/October 2012). 91, 5. P. 53.

8 Ibid. p. 53.

9 Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase,

Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the

Dragons Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and their

Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA:

Rand Corporation, 2007). p. xvii.

10 Edward Wong, China Asserts Role as a

Naval Power, International Herald Tribune (23 April2010). pp. 1and 4.

11 Peter Dutton, Three Disputes and Three

Objectives: China and the South China Sea, Naval War

College Review (Autumn 2011) 54, 4. p. 6.

1 2 For details on Chinas Training Exercises in

its surrounding waters see National Institute for De-

fense Studies, NIDS China Security Report (Tokyo: Na-

tional Institute for Defense Studies, 2011) . pp. 14-21.

13 See The International Institute for Strate-

gic Studies, The Military Balance 2011: The Annual As-

sessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence

Economics (London: The International Institute fo

Strategic Studies, 2011). p. 196.

14

Yoichi Kato, Chinas Naval Expansion inthe Western Pacific, Global Asia 5, 4 (Winter 2010). p

19.

15 Robert Sutter and Chin-hao Huang

China-Southeast Asia Relations: Beijing Shifts to the

Positive, Downplays Disputes, Comparative Con

nection: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilatera

Relations (January 2014). p. 1. http://csis.orga/files/

publication/1303qchina_seasia.pdf

16 Jane Perlez, Stand-off Over South China

Sea Shoal Eases: Beijing and Manila Pull their ships

from Area, but the Dispute is not settle, Internationa

Herald Tribune (19 June 2012). p. 4. http://search.pro

quest.com/docview/1020884288/1386FC0C1134

17 Mark Landler, How Obama Switched to

Tougher Line with China, International Herald Tribun

(21 September 2012). pp. 1-1.

1 8 Mark E. Manyin et al Pivot to the Pacific?

The Obama Administrations Rebalancing toward

Asia, Congressional Research Service (Washington

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 28 March 2012)

p. 1.

1 9 Jane Perlez, U.S. Gives Explanation fo

its Pivot to Asia, International Herald Tribune (4

June 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/doc

view/1018261286/13818EF8BE5C...

20 David S. Cloud, Panetta Out to ReassureAllies Defense Chief Says U.S. Commitment, Asian

Pivot Real, South Florida-Sun-Sentinel (2 June 2012)

p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/101814753

5/13818EF8BE5C...

21 Sheldon W. Simon, Conflict and Diploma

cy in the South China Sea: The View from Washing

ton, Asian Survey 52, 6 (November/December 2012)

p. 1012.

22 .X. Hammes and D. Hooker, Americas Ulti

mate Strategy in a Clash with China, National Interest

(June 10, 2014). p.1. http://nationalinterest.org/fea

ture/americas-ultimate-strategy-clash-china-10633

23 Sheldon W. Simon, Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washing

ton, Asian Survey 52, 6 (November/December 2012)

p. 1012.

24 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., How to Dete

China: The Case of Archipelagic Defense, Foreign Af

fairs 94, 2. (March/April 2015). pp. 78-86.

25 National Institute of Defense Studies, NIDS

China Report 2011 (Tokyo: National Institute of De

fense Studies, 2011). p. 17.

26 Ian Storey, Japan Steps Up to the South


endnotes


17/18

China Sea Plate: Tokyo is Confronting Beijing and In-

creasing Defense Ties with ASEAN Members to Pro-

tect Maritime Trade, Wall Street Journal (09 July 2012).

p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview.102413288

4/131979D7E21C...

27 Yoichi Kato, Chinas Naval Expansion in the

Western Pacific, Global Asia (Winter 2010) 5, 4. p. 19.

28 National Institute for Defense Studies, op.

cit. p. 26.

29 The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual As-


Economics (London: The International Institute for

Strategic Studies, 2012).p. 212.

30 Scott, op. cit. p. 1041.

31

Scott, op. cit. p. 1042.

32 Taylor, op. cit. p. p. 12.

33 Ren and Liu, op. cit. p. 7.

34 The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual As-


Economics (London: The International Institute for

Strategic Studies, 2012). p. 213.

35 Charles Glaser, Will Chinas Rise Lead to

War? Why Realism Does not Mean Pessimism, Foreign

Affairs 90, 2 (March/April 2011). p. 91.

36

Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier,The Philippines: State versus Society, in Asian Secu-

rity Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Ed)

Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford Uni-

versity Press, 2001).p. 550.

37 Ronnie Gil L. Gavan, Organized National

Engagement (ONE) at Sea: Optimizing the States Op-

tion for Maritime Security, Digest 19, 1 (First Quarter

2012).p. 10.

38 China Wants Philippines to Seek Permis-

sion before Spratlys Oil Search, BBC Monitoring Asia-

Pacific (10 June 2011). p. 1. http://proquest.umi.com/

pqdweb?index=281&did=2370661661&Sr...

39 National Security Council, National Secu-rity Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security

Council, April 2011). p. 39.

40 Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed

Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon

City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.

41 Secretary of the Department of Defense,

Defense: Planning Guidance 2016-2021 (Quezon City:

Department of Defense March 2015).p. 4.

42 Ibid. p. 4.

43 For an interesting discussion on the dis-

mal state of the PAF see Galileo Gerard R. Kintanar,

Developing an Air Power Culturethe Missing Di-

mension, Digest: Strategic and Special Studies (3rd

Quarter 2012). pp. 35-48.

44 Jon Grevatt, Philippines to Hasten Recre-

ation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16

Purchase, Jane Defense Industry 29, 1 (January 1,

2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/91

0358069/1367C416F31C55.

45 Aurea Calica, Aquino: Government Can

Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets, The Philippine

Star (17 May 2012). p. 2.

46 Asia News Monitor, Philippines: F/A-50s

to Boost Countrys Capability to Defend Territory,

Asia News Monitor (21 October 2013) p.1. http://

search.proquest.com/docview/1443037151?accoun

tid=28547

47 BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, South Ko-

rea, Philippines Sign Agreement on Export of Fighter

Aircraft, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (28 March 2014).

p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/15107033

22?accountid=28547

48 Asia News Monitor, Philippines: DND

Eyes Acquisition of Two Brand New Frigates, Asia

News Monitor (15 August 2013). p. 1. http://search.

proquest.com/docview/1420301565?account

id=28547

49 Asia News Monitor, Only Best, Afford-

able Naval Ships will be Acquired for the Philippines,

Asia News Monitor (09 January 2013). p. 1. http://search/proquest.com/docview/1267135710?accoun

tid=28547

50 Richard A. Bitzinger, Recent Develop-

ments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the

Asia-Pacific: Implication for Regional Security, The

Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving

Roles (Washington D.C: National Defense University,

2011). p. 24.

51 GMA News Philippine Navy to Acquire

Largest Ship in Inventory, GMA News (23 January

2011). p. 1. http://www.gmanews.tv/print/211298

52 See Sheena Chestnuts Greitens, The U.S.

Alliance with the Philippines: Challenges and Oppor-tunities, U.S. Alliances and Partnership at the Center

of Global Power (Eds) Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M.

Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Seattle and Washington,

D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014). p.

144.

53 Ibid. p. 128.

54 Ibid. p. 128.

55 Philippine News Agency, New Defense

Agreement Enhances Philippine, U.S. Alliance on Se-

curity ChallengesDND Chief, The Philippines News

Agency (28 April 2014). p. 1. http://search.proquest

com/docview/1519443096?accountid=28547

56 Jim Garamone, U.S.-Philippine Pact Ex

pands Defense Cooperation, Targeted News Service(28 April 2014). P. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docv

ew/1519453450/17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?accoun

id=...

57 For details regarding this new forms ac

cess arrangements see Robert Harkavy, Thinking

about Basing, Naval War College Review 58. 3 (Sum

mer 2005). pp. 12-42.

58 Ibid. p. 1

59 Janes Country Risk Daily Report, Japan

and Philippines Sign Defense Pact, Janes Country Ris

Daily Report (4 July 2012) 19, 134. p. 1. http://search

proquest.com/docview/102349/13A38763AF488...

60 Jerry E. Esplanada, Philippines, Japan to

Enhance Maritime Security Ties, Philippine Daily In

quirer (9 July 2012). p. 1 http://globalnation.inquirer

net/43508/philippines-japan-to-enhance...

61 Asia News Monitor, Philippine/Japan

Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation in

Maritime Security, Asia News Monitor (14 January

2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/126

9104724?accountid=28547

62 BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Philip

pines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties, BBC

Monitoring Asia-Pacific (27 June 2013). p. 2. http://


id=28547

63 Ibid. p. 2.

64 Jiji Press English News Service, Japan, Phil

ippines to Cooperate on Chinas Air Defense Zone, Jij

Press English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1

http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056?

65 Ibid. p. 1.

66 Gulf News, Aquino and Abe Discuss Mari

time Disputes, Gulf News (25 June 2014).p. 1. http:/


id=28547

67 Ibid.p. 1.

68 Ibid. p. 1.

69 Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A

Strengthen Partnership for Advancing the Shared

Principles and Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth

in the Region and Beyond (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreig

Affairs, 4 June 2015).



18/18

9th Floor 6780 Ayala Avenue,Makati City 1220

V (632) 892.1751F (632) 892.1754

www.s

tratbase

.com.ph

the key link between IDEAS and ACTION

SPARK- the key link between IDEAS and ACTION

The article featured in this series is the sole property of

Copyright 2015

SPARK

R

SPARKThe key link to idea and action is the on-linenewsletter of ADRi (Albert Del Rosario Institute)that covers socio-political, economic and securityanalysis of timely issues that affect the directionof the economy and political landscapegoverning the Philippines.

Stratbase ADR Institute is an independent,international and strategic research organization withthe principal goal of addressing the issues affectingthe Philippines and East Asia through:

1) effecting national, regional andinternational policy change or support;

2) fostering strategic ideas based on cooperationand innovative thinking;

3) providing a regional venue forcollaboration and cooperation in dealingwith critical issues in East Asia; and

4) actively participating in regional debates andglobal conversations

STRATBASE ADRi

small powers and the strategic balance in east asia - philippines and south china sea

Documents